IR 05000295/1986019

Insp Repts 50-295/86-19 & 50-304/86-18 on 860729-0926. Violation Noted:Fire Watch for Inoperable Fire Detectors Not Continuous,Per Tech Specs

ML20197A997
Person / Time
Site:	Zion  File:ZionSolutions icon.png
Issue date:	10/16/1986
From:	Burgess B NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION III)
To:
Shared Package
ML20197A961	List: IR 05000295/1986019 ML20197A956 ML20197A985
References
TASK-1.A.1.1, TASK-TM 50-295-86-19, 50-304-86-18, NUDOCS 8610270439
Download: ML20197A997 (14)

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U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

REGION III

Reports No. 50-295/86019(DRP); 50-304/86018(DRP)

Docket Nos. 50-295; 50-304 Licenses No. DPR-39;DPR-48 Licensee: Commonwealth Edison Company P. O. Box 767 Chicago, IL 60690 Facility Name: Zion Nuclear Power Station, Units 1 and 2 Inspection At: Zion, Illinois Inspection Conducted: July 29 through September 26, 1986 Inspectors: M. M. Holzmer L. E. Kanter J. Bauer Approved By: ief Reactor Projects Section 2A

/d/4k Date

Inspection Summary

Inspection on July 29 through September 26, 1986 (Reports No. 50-295/86019(DRP);

No. 50-304/86018(DRP))

Areas Inspected: Routine, unannounced resident inspection of licensee action i

on previous inspection findings; inoperable penetration fire barriers; pressurizer power operated relief valve stroke times; engineered safety

feature (ESF) bus breaker interlocks; gaseous release; boron injection tank (BIT) inoperable; operational safety and ECT system walkdown; surveillance; maintenance; licensee event reports (LERs); training; followup on TMI action plan items; attendance at a public meeting; and followup of Region III request Results

Of the 14 areas inspected, no violations or deviations were identified in 13 areas, and one violation was identified in the remaining area (operational

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safety verification and ESF walkdown - fire watch not continuous as required by Technical Specifications).

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. DETAILS 1. Persons Contacted

+* Plim1, Station Manager

+*E. Fuerst, Superintendent, Production

+*T. Rieck, Superintendent, Services

+* Kurth, Assistant Station Superintendent, Operations R. Johnson, Assistant Station Superintendent, Maintenance J. Gilmore, Assistant Station Superintendent, Planning

• R. Budowle, Assistant Station Superintendent, Technical Services L. Pruett, Unit 1 Operating Engineer N. Valos, Unit 2 Operating Engineer M. Carnahan, Training Supervisor

+*R Cascarano, Technical Staff Supervisor

+*C. Schultz, Regulatory Assurance Administrator V. Williams, Station Health Physicist

+*J. Ballard, Quality Control Supervisor

+* Stone, Quality Assurance Supervisor

• F. Woodin, Industrial Relations Supervisor

• A. Broccolo, Operating Engineer

• Indicates persons present at exit interview on September 5, 1986

+ Indicates persons present at exit interview on September 26, 1986 2. Licensee Actions on Previous Inspection Findings (0 pen) Open Item (295/82028-01;304/82025-01) Defective ITT Barton Electronic Transmitters. In a notification made pursuant to 10 CFR Part 21, licensees were informed that ITT Barton Model 763 and 764 electronic differential pressure transmitters could possibly be defective due to thermal non-repeatability and performance outside of the transmitter specification Conversations with the cognizant technical staff engineer indicate that Westinghouse has determined that none of the suspect transmitters were supplied directly to Zion by the vendor. ITT Barton pressurizer level transmitters were replaced at Zion with a model manufactured by Rosemount, Inc., eliminating the thermal non repeatability concern for those transmitters. Other Barton Model 763 and 764 transmitters are used in safety related applications at Zion. These were inspected by a Westinghouse technical representative during the last Unit 1 and Unit 2 outages for this concern in addition to the inspection and modification of these transmitters to meet environmental qualification (EQ) requirement The Westinghouse representative informed the station that because the adjustment potentiometer which made the suspect transmitters subject to thermal non-repeatability is encased in plastic for the transmitters installed at Zion, no further action by the licensee is necessary. The cognizant engineer was unable to produce copies of the appropriate correspondence at the time of the interview. This item will remain open pending review of copies of objective evidence to support this conclusio I

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(Closed) Violation (295/85016-01) Operator temporarily away from the controls. The operator in question was counselled regarding this event and other operators were informed of the station policy regarding operator movement relative to the control boards. No similar events have been observed or reported. This item is considered close (Closed) Open Item (295/85018-03) Reactor coolant system boron dilution event during cold shutdown. The following corrective actions have been completed:

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Operators now record refueling water storage tank (RWST) level shiftly per PT-0,

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PT-0 now requires sampling the RWST for boron concentration if the level increased by 0.5 feet or more,

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PT-0 also requires that the RWST is sampled for boron concentration weekly during cold shutdown,

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Test procedures TSS 15.6.84 and 15.6.85 were revised to require verification that RWST boron concentration is greater than that required to maintain adequate shutdown margin,

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A study performed regarding the use and maintenance of reach rod operated valves concluded that the marginal improvements in performance for these valves from a preventive maintenance program would not justify the additional dose received by the maintenance personnel involve A modification to remove the primary water line to the RWST will be installed in Unit 1 during the Fall, 1986 outage and in Unit 2 during the Winter, 1987 outage. This item is considered close (Closed) Violation (295/85036-02; 304/85038-02) Corrective action system revie The licensee has reviewed their system for licensee event reports (LER) and deviation reports (DVR) and has completely revised their administrative controls for corrective actions. Review of LERs and DVRs since the violation indicate that root cause identification and corrective actions to prevent recurrence have both improved considerabl This item is considered close (Closed) Unresolved Item (295/85036-01) Determination of reportability of auto start of the 1B service water (SW) pump on low SW header pressure during normal operations. The licensee has determined that the SW system will be classified as an engineered safety feature (ESF) system as defined in 10 CFR Parts 50.72 and 50.73. In addition, the licensee has determined that the automatic start of the 18 SW pump was not reportable since the the pump started from a process signal and not an ESF actuation signa This interpretation is consistent with the statements on Page 39043 of l the Federal Register published with 10 CFR Part 50.72 which states that

" Actuation of multichannel ESF Actuation Systems" is defined as actuation of enough channels to complete the minimum actuation logic. Therefore, single channel actuations whether caused by failures or otherwise, are not reportable if they do not complete the minimum actuation logi Since the IB SW pump auto started as a result of a process signal (low

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header pressure) instead of an ESF signal, the licensee determined that this event was not reportable. This interpretation was reviewed by the onsite review committee and was discussed with the Resident NRC Inspector, and his immediate regional management, and is considered acceptable. This item is considered close (Closed) Open Item (295/85036-04) Missed quadrant power tilt ratio surveillance. The licensee's corrective actions were reviewed and found adequate. This item is considered close (Closed) Open Item (295/85028-04; 304/85029-06) STA Training Record Upgrade (see Paragraph 15 of this report). This item is considered close No violations or deviations were identifie . Summary of Operations Unit 1 The unit operated at power levels up to 75% throughout the inspection period. The unit coasted down in power until September 4, 1986 when it was taken off the grid at 12:57 a.m. The reactor was shut down on at 1:20 a.m. the same day for a 17 week refueling and maintenance outag Unit 2 The unit operated at power levels up to 100% until September 20, 1986, when the turbine was taken off the grid for repairs to the turbine electro hydraulic-control (EHC) system. The unit was tied to the grid the same day at about 4:00 p.m., but tripped at 4:04 due to an EHC pressure transmitter being inadvertently valved out of service. The unit was made critical on September 22, 1986, and was tied to the grid the same day at 10:15 p.m. The unit operated at power levels up to 100% for the remainder of the inspection perio No violations or deviations were identifie . Inoperable Penetration Fire Barriers On August 25, 1986, while working on a ventilation duct between the 1A and IB centrifugal charging pump (CCP) rooms, the licensee identified that construction gaps existed between the top of the walls and the concrete overhead. These gaps were about 1 inch in width, and were filled with styrofoam. The gaps existed as indicated in the station construction drawings, and were for the purpose of allowing thermal expansion and shifting of these non-load bearing wall The wall between the 1A and 18 CCP rooms is a penetration fire barrier as described in Technical Specification (TS) 3.21.6.A and was required to be intact. Since the filler material was not fire retardant, the fire barrier was not intact. A continuous fire watch was establi'shed within one hour as require by TS 3.21.6.B. This condition was subsequently

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identified in several walls in the auxiliary building some of which were fire barriers for safety related equipment. Ultimately, one continuous fire watch was established on the 579 foot elevation of the auxiliary building to cover the CCP rooms and the valve isles for both units, and another continuous fire watch was established on the 560 foot elevation to cover the safety injection (SI) pump rooms for both units. These watches were to be continuously roving to cover all the affected walls on their floor, paying extra attention to the walls for which no operable fire detectors existed. (There are no fire detectors installed in the CCP or SI pump rooms or in the horizontal valve isles)

The licensee continued and augmented a program to walk down the entire plant in an effort to identify inoperable fire barriers. This program had been initiated in response to a quality assurance (QA) finding earlier this year. In addition, the licensee requested their architect engineer, Sargent and Lundy, to review station drawings for other potential penetration fire barriers which may not be filled with the appropriate fire retardant material. Several other inoperable fire barriers have been identified, and fire watches have been established as appropriate. The seismic analysis was also reviewed to determine whether the 1 inch gap was considered in that analysis. The seismic analysis was found to already have considered these gaps. The licensee's Station Nuclear Engineering Department (SNED) reviewed this matter for reportability under 10 CFR Part 21 and found that this event was not reportabl The licensee informed their corporate office of the inoperable fire penetration barriers using the company's Potentially Significant Event (PSE) notification format. The licensee was subsequently informed that the same condition had already been identified at the Byron Station, which, in fact, had not been communicated to the Zion Station. At the exit meeting the resident inspection expressed concern that this problem had not been communicated to all nuclear stations in the compan The inoperability of penetration fire barriers will be considered an Unresolved Item pending review by the NRC of the root cause identified by the licensee and examination of their corrective actions (295/860019-01; 304/86018-01).

No violations or deviations were identifie One Unresolved Item was identifie . Excessive Pressurizer Power Operated Relief Valve (PORV) Stroke Times On August 21, 1986, the licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector that it had been determined during a review of a proposed change to the Zion Technical Specifications (TS) that the measured stroke times for their pressurizer PORVs for both units were longer than the PORY stroke time assumed in the Low Temperature Overpressure (LTOP) accident analysi The Westinghouse Cold Overpressure Mitigating System (COMS) analysis assumes a PORV stroke time of 2.5 seconds (sec) or less for Zion. The stroke times for the Unit 1 PORVs were 4 sec and 8 sec, and the times for the Unit 2 PORVs were 3 sec and 4 se . - . - _ _ _ - _-.

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At the time it was identified, both units were operating in Mode 1, during which the LTOP feature of the pressurizer PORVs is not required to be operable. Unit 1 was shut down on September 4, and cooled down on September 7 and 8, 1986. Prior to plant cooldown, the stroke time of one of the PORV's, 1A0V RC-455C, was reduced to less than 2.5 seconds, but the stroke time of 1A0V RC-456 remained greater than 2.5 second Overpressure protection was required from 6:15 a.m. , September 8,1986 when reactor coolant system (RCS) temperature went below 250 Technical Specification (TS) 3.3.2.G.a.1 requires that ii RCS temperature is less than 250 F and the reactor vessel head is installed, then both PORVs shall be operable. If one PORV is inoperable (such as by having a stroke time greater than assumed by the accident analysis) then the plant may remain in this condition for seven days or reduce pressurizer level to less than 25% and RCS pressure to less than 100 psig in the next 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br />. Unit 2 was taken to less than 25% pressurizer level and less than 100 psig RCS pressure on September 13, 1986, at 4:00 a.m., meeting TS requirement This is considered an Unresolved Item pending determination of root cause and NRC review of the licensee's corrective action (295/86019-02; 30^/86018-02).

No violations or deviations were identifie One Unresolved Item was identifie . Unit 2 Engineered Safety Features (ESF) Bus Interlock Installed Improperly On July 27, 1986, while performing Periodic Test, PT-10 (Safeguards Actuation, Unit 2, an operator observed what he thought to be improper operation of an engineered safety feature (ESF) bus electrical breake Further investigation by the licensee identified that during a safety injection with a subsequent loss of outside AC power, the potential existed for the asynchronous closure of the emergency diesel generator (DG) onto a fully loaded bus. A modification (83-20) completed during the previous Unit 2 outage was the cause of the breaker improper operation. This modification affected the 2A, 28 and 0 (common) DGs and their associated ESF busse During the Fall, 1985 Unit 1 refueling outage, Modification 83-20 was installed adding an electrical interlock between the two series feeder breakers (2424 and 2471) from bus 242 to 247 such that if 2424 trips open, 2471 would also trip open. Prior to this modification, if breaker 2424 were opened, breaker 2471 would not open automatically until bus 247 incurred an undervoltage at 72% of nominal bus voltage (4160 volts).

Modification 83-20 was designed and installed to " gang" the operation of these breakers, as in other Commonwealth Edison plant designs, but was based partly on the false assumption that a previous modification (81-09)

was already installed. Modification 81-09 proposed to add a 72%

undervoltage plus 2 second time delay interlock to the closing logic of the diesel output Breaker 2473. This modification had not been installed because site personnel questioned its value and decided it required further revie _ . . .

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. On July 27, 1986, during the performance of PT-10, the operator noticed that Breaker 2474 did not cycle as required by the procedure. Breaker 2474 ties the 4160 volt ESF bus with the 4160/480 volt transformer which

, feeds all 480 volt EST loads. It was the conclusion of the operator and Shift Control Room Engineer (SCRE) that the breaker had cycled but due

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to the rapid breaker reclosure (as expected) the indicator light was not able to change state fast enough. On July 28, 1986, PT-10 was being performed on two remaining ESF trains. The same operator again noticed that the equivalent breakers to 2474 did not appear to cycle as required by the procedure. The Supervisor on Shift (SOS) reviewed the electrical prints (which included Modification 83-20) and concluded that the procedure was in error because the print indicated that Breaker 2474 should not cycle under the test conditions in view of the recent modificatio On August 4, 1986, the discrepancy was forwarded to the Technical Staff Electrical Group for resolution. On August 5, 1986 after a technical review, an interlock problem due to Modification 83-20 was identifie TheinterlockwhichgangedthetrippingofBreakers2424and2471,was immediately removed using the licensee s lifted lead procedure. This is considered an Unresolved Item pending the results of a Region III a Enforcement Board, which will determine whether enforcement is appropriate (304/86018-03).

One Unresolved Item was identifie . August 4, 1986 Inadvertent Gaseous Release On August 4, 1986, a gaseous release occurred at 11:20 a.m. while sampling the hold-up tanks. The maximum' instantaneous release rate of 5.2 E+3 microcuries per second (uCi/sec) was measured. This is 8.7% of the TS limit for instantaneous release rate.

. The cause of the release was found to be bad contacts on solenoid operated sample valves. A circuit board was replaced, resolving the proble No violations or deviations were identifie . Inadvertent Isolation of Boron Injection Tank (BIT) Recirculation On July 23, 1986, at about 10:30 a.m., with Unit 1 at 80% power, BIT recirculation was inadvertently isolated during an out-of-service maintenance lineup on 1A boric acid transfer pump. The combination of burned out light bulbs from the BIT low recirculation flow alarm and other unrelated alarms resulting from instrument maintenance work being performed on the unit prevented the operator from discovering the recirculation isolation until 2:25 p.m. that afternoo Once discovered, the proper valve lineup was restored and BIT recirculation was j re-established within 50 minutes.

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. This is considered an Unresolved Item (295/86019-03) pending the results of a Region III Enforcement Board, which will determine whether enforcement is appropriat One Unresolved Item was identifie . Operational Safety Verification and Engineered Safety Features System Walkdown The inspectors observed control room operations, reviewed applicable logs and conducted discussions with control room operators from July 29 through September 5, 1986. During these discussions and observations, the inspectors ascertained that the operators were alert, fully cognizant of plant conditions, attentive to changes in those conditions, and took prompt action when appropriate. The inspectors verified the operability of selected emergency systems and reviewed tagout records. Tours of the auxiliary and turbine buildings were conducted to observe plant equipment conditions, including potential fire hazards, fluid leaks, and excessive vibrations and to verify that maintenance requests had been initiated for equipment in need of maintenanc On September 4, 1986, the inspector observed the shutdown of Unit 1 associated with the Fall, 1986, refueling and maintenance outag Observations included shift supervision in the control room, communications and that appropriate procedures were used by the operators. Some plant equipment did not perform during the shutdown as expected, and the response of the shift to these events was goo The inspectors by observation and direct interview verified that selectea physical security activities were being implemented in accordance with the station security pla The inspectors observed plant housekeeping / cleanliness conditions and verified implementation of radiation protection controls. Discrepancies observed were brought to the attention of the licensee management (Operating Engineers), and were promptly corrected. From July 29, 1986, to September 26, 1986, the inspectors walked down the accessible portions of the safety injection, containment spray, and residual heat removal systems to verify operability. These equipment walkdowns were done implementing portions of Probablistic Risk Assessment (PRA) system walkdown checklists provided to the NRC under contract with EG&G Idah These reviews and observations were conducted to verify that facility operations were in conformance with the requirements established under Technical Specifications, 10 CFR and administrative procedure On September 4,1986, while conducting an inspection of the auxiliary building on the midnight shift, the resident inspector observed the fire watch on the 579 foot elevation (see Paragraph 4) sitting down, leaning his back against a wall with his arms folded, his head down and his eyes

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, close After waking him, the inspector proceeded to the 560 foot elevation and found the fire watch on that elevation seated reading a magazine. Both watches stated that their instructions were to make a set of rounds every ten minutes, and that they had been doing s However, both fire watches were to have been " roving" to observe conditions in several areas on their respective levels of the auxiliary buildin Technical Specification 3.21.6 requires that with one or more penetration fire barriers protecting safety related areas not intact, a continuous fire watch shall be established on at least one side of the affected penetration. The fire watches on the 560 and 579 foot elevation of the auxiliary building were not continuous in that, while on duty, two individuals were found inattentive to their duties. This is considered a Violation (295/86019-04; 304/86018-04).

The fire watch instructions were not specific enough to ensure that the watches were making their rounds continuousl This appears to have resulted from a failure of the licensee to properly communicate with the fire watches. In addition, there did not appear to be sufficient direct supervision of the fire watches. Licensee policies and procedures already prohibit reading materials which are not job related and sleepin Both fire watches were immediately relieved and sent home for the remainder of the shift. Each has subsequently received an additional day off without pay. Interviews with fire watches since that time indicate that their instructions were to be continuously roving such that their rounds did not exceed ten minute One violation and no deviations were identifie . Monthly Surveillance Observation The inspector observed Technical Specifications required surveillance testing on the ESF logic system and verified that testing was performed in accordance with adequate procedures, that limiting conditions for operation were met, that removal and restoration of the affected components were accomplished, that test results conformed with technical specifications and procedure requirements and were reviewed by personnel other than the individual directing the test, and that any deficiencies

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identified during the testing were properly reviewed and resolved by appropriate management personne The inspector also witnessed portions of the following test activities:

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TSS 15.6.35, Manual actuation of the Safety Injection and Safe Shutdown Systems and Diesel Generator Loading Test No violations or deviations were identifie _ - _- _ __ - - _ ._ .-

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. 11. Monthly Maintenance Observation Station maintenance activities on safety related systems and components listed below were observed or reviewed to ascertain whether they were conducted in accordance with approved procedures, regulatory guides industry codes or standards and in conformance with Technical Specification The following items were considered during this review: the limiting conditions for operation were met while components or systems were removed from service; approvals were obtained prior to initiating the work; activities were accomplished using approved procedures and were inspected as applicable; activities were accomolished by qualified personnel; parts and materials used were properly certifie Work requests were reviewed to determine status of outstanding jobs and to assure that priority is assigned to safety related equipment maintenance which may affect system performanc The following maintenance activities were observed or reviewed:

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IB Service Water Pump Replacement The IB service water pump has not yet been returned to servic No violations or deviations were identifie . Licensee Event Reports (LER) Followup Through direct observations, discussions with licensee personnel, and review of records, the following event reports were reviewed to determine that reportability requirements were fulfilled, immediate corrective action was accomplished, and corrective action to prevent recurrence had been accomplished in accordance with Technical Specifications. The LERs listed below are considered closed:

UNIT 1 LER N DESCRIPTION 85019-02 Reactor Trip and Inadvertent Engineered Safety Features Actuation 85021-01 Inadvertent Trip of Reactor Trip Breakers While in Cold Shutdown 86005 Two Aircraft Crash Dampers in Cribhouse Inoperable in Open Position 86008 Nuclear Instrumentation System (NIS) Negative Rate Trip Inoperable Due to Unanalyzed Condition

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. 86008-01 NIS Negative Rate Trip Inoperable Due to Unanalyzed Condition 86012 Unit 1 Reactor Trip Due to Reactor Trip Breaker (RTB) Not Fully Racked In 86014 08 Auxiliary Building Supply Fan Aircraft Crash Damper Failed Open 86015 Non-Functional Penetration Fire Barrier 86016 Isolated Aircraft Fire Detection System Air Compressor 86019 Incomplete Review of Fuel Handling Procedure Change 86020 De-energization of Safeguards Due to Improper Fuse Pulling 86021 Reactor Coolant System (RCS) Leakage in Excess of Technical Specifications Due to Valve Packing Failure 86023 Reactor Trip Signal Due to Source Range Channel Bypass Relay Failure 86024 Inoperable Fire Barrier 86025 Containment Spray Additive Tank Below Minimum Level 86027 Inoperable Fire Barrier UNIT 2 LER N DESCRIPTION 86009 Engineered Safety Feature Actuation Due to Breaker Trip 86010 Failure of 0 Diesel Generator While 2A Diesel Generator Was Inoperable 86010-01 Failure of 0 DG While 2A DG Was Inoperable 86016 Reactor Trip Due to Lightning Strike Regarding LER's 295/86005 and 295/86014, "Two Cribhouse Aircraft Crash Dampers Positioned Open and Inoperable", and "0B Auxiliary Building Supply Fan Aircraft Damper Failed Open", respectively, in both incidents the fire dampers were considered inoperable. In the first case, the fans were taken out of service (00S) as a safety precaution for internal repairs. In the second case, the OC auxiliary building exhaust fan main breaker was taken 005 for repair and the damper control loop for the OC exhaust fan was also de-energized (Maintenance and Operating personnel

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. were unaware at the time that OB and OC damper control loops share a common damper control loop switch). In both events, the outlet dampers were identified by the licensee to be failed open contrary to Technical Specification (TS) 3.17.2.1 requirements. A firewatch was posted in the area until the dampers were verified close Corrective action to prevent future occurrences will include permanent placards on equipment that have dampers which are part of the aircraft crash system. These placards will have a statement requiring that the

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aircraft dampers be jumpered closed prior to being de-energized. These two events will be considered an Unresolved Item pending review by NRC Region III (295/86019-05).

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Regarding LER 295/85021-01, the licensee added to their corrective actions and to their station commitment list a revision of procedure S0I-63, " Electrical Power and Lighting", to warn operators to refer to Procedure ZED-2," 120VAC Instrument Distribution", when switching inverter power supplies, or a similar appropriate statement to help prevent operators from inadvertently interrupting power to the source range nuclear instrumentation, and cycling the reactor trip breaker This is considered an Open Item pending a review of the revised 501-63 (295/86019-06; 304/86018-05).

Regarding LERs 295/86008 and 295/86008-01, this event was discussed in Inspection Reports No. 295/86005 and No. 304/86005, and an Open Item was opened at that time. Further action will be tracked under Open Item 295/86005-03 and 304/86005-0 Regarding LER 295/86020, Violation 295/86011-01 was issued in a previous report for failure to follow a procedural caution in 50I-3 Regarding LER 295/86021, the RCS leakage was stopped by shutting the upstream and downstream isolation valves for one of the two pressurizer spray valves, but the exact source of the leakage is not known. The source of the leakage will be determined during the current Unit 1 refueling outage. This is considered and Open Item pending repair of the source of the leakage (295/86019-07).

j Regarding LER 295/86025, a violation was issued in Inspection Reports No. 295/86013 and No. 304/86012 for failure of calibration procedures

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i No violation or deviations were identifie One unresolved item and two Open Items were identifie . Training During the inspection period, the inspectors reviewed abnormal events

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and unusual occurrences which may have resulted, in part, from. training

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. classroom, simulator, or on-the-job training received before the event was sufficient to have either prevented the occurrence or to have mitigated its effects by recognition and proper operator actio Personnel qualifications were also evaluated. In addition, the inspectors determined whether lessons learned from the events were incorporated into the training progra Events reviewed included the events discussed in this repor In addition, LERs were routinely evaluated for training impac Two training sessions were attended by the resident inspectors. One covered training on installation of Ray Chem Splices and the other was on Fire Training Barrier Evaluation. These training sessions were informative and professionally presente No violations or deviations were identifie . TMI Item Closeout 1.A.1.1.3.b STA Training Training records for selected STA/SCRE (shift technical advisor / shift control room engineer) qualified individuals were reviewed in Inspection Reports No. 295/85028 and No. 304/85029 to determine whether the licensee's commitments for training were met, and it was found that the licensee had difficulty producing objective esidence (training records) to show successful completion of a few portions of the training, or to show waivers where individuals were otherwise qualified. The licensee agreed to perform a review to upgrade the STA/SCRE training records to provide objective evidence of training received or waived. The inspector reviewed the licensee's upgraded training records and found them acceptable. This completes the inspection of this TMI action plan item. Item 1.A.1.1.3.b is considered close No violations or deviations were identifie . Attendance at Kenosha County Board Meeting On September 11, 1986, the Health and Human ~ Services Committee of the Kenosha, Wisconsin Count- Board held a public meeting to decide whether to recommend passage of a resolution that questioned the safety of the

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Zion Station, and called for additional emergency preparedness measures i including issuing potassium iodide (KI) tablets to all residents for Kenosha Count The meeting was attended by members of the Chilwaukee Alliance, who spoke against nuclear power in general and who favored the resolution. Also in

attendance were representatives of Commonwealth Edison and members of the

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public. The NRC was represented by Messrs C. Paperiello, R. Lickus,

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R. Woods, and M. Holzmer. The committee voted 4 to 1 against the l resolution.

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. No violations or deviations were identifie . Followup of Region III Requests In a memorandum dated July 3, 1986, from Mr. B. Burgess, the resident inspectors were requested to provide a copy of a report submitted pursuant to 10 CFR Part 21 to the licensee. The Part 21 report involved degraded insulation on conductors of Foxboro "E-line" controllers. A copy of this report was provided to the licensee during August, 198 The memorandum also requested that the resident inspectors determine the extent of applicability of the Part 21 report to respective licensee The licensee informed the resident inspector that Foxboro "E-line" controllers are not used at Zion in safety related application No violations or deviations were identifie . Open Items Open Items are matters which have been discussed with the licensee which will be reviewed further by the inspector and which involve some action on the part of the NRC or licensee or both. Two Open Items disclosed during this inspection are discussed in Paragraph 1 . Unresolved Items Unresolved items are matters about which more information is required in order to ascertain whether they are acceptable items, items of noncompliance or deviations. Five Unresolved Items disclosed during this inspection are discussed in Paragraphs 4, 5, 6, 8, and 1 . Exit Interview The inspectors met with licensee representatives (denoted in Paragraph 1)

throughout the inspection period and at the conclusion of the inspection on July 29 through September 26, 1986 tosummarizethescopeandfindings of the inspection activitie The licensee acknowledged the inspectors comments. The inspector also discussed the likely informational content of the inspection report with regard to documents or processes reviewed

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by the inspector during the inspection. The licensee did not identify

any such documents or processes as proprietary.

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