ML20058H261
| ML20058H261 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Zion File:ZionSolutions icon.png |
| Issue date: | 12/07/1993 |
| From: | Farber M NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION III) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20058H233 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-295-93-20, 50-304-93-20, NUDOCS 9312130033 | |
| Download: ML20058H261 (14) | |
See also: IR 05000295/1993020
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U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
REGION III
Report Nos. 50-295/93020(DRP); 50-304/93020(DRP)
Docket Nos. 50-295; 50-304
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Licensee:
Commonwealth Edison Company
Executive Towers West 111
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1400 Opus Place - Suite 300
Downers Grove, IL 60515
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Facility Name:
Zion Nuclear Power Station, Units 1 and 2
Inspection At:
Zion, IL
Inspection Conducted: October 12 through November 23, 1993
Inspectors:
J. D. Smith
V. P. Lougheed
M. J. Miller
Approved By:
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M.J.Tafer, Chief
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Reactor
-rojects Section lA
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inspection Summary
Inspection from October 12 to November 23. 1993 (Report No. 50-295/304-
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93020(DRP))
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Areas Inspected: This was a routine, resident inspection of licensee action on
previous inspection findings; summary of outage activities; operational safety
verification; maintenance and surveillance observation; engineering and
technical support observations; safety assessment and quality verification;
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licensee event reports (LERs); and management meetings.
Results:
One violation, with two examples, was identified during this
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inspection period as discussed in sections 3 and 8.
One non-cited violation
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was identified and is discussed in section 8.
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9312130033 931207
ADOCK 05000295
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Plant Operations
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Operations overall performance during the dual unit outage has been good.
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However, there have been a number of configuration control errors' of minor
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safety significance. Operations has provided good out-of-service support,
which assisted the station in maintaining its outage schedule.
Maintenance and Surveillance
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The EDG team has performed and supervised the major control and air system
modifications being installed during the dual unit outage.
This work has
progressed smoothly and on schedule due to good planning and scheduling, and
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excellent performance by the EDG team.
Engineerina and Technical Support
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Engineering resolution of three SG plug anomalies was timely and thorough.
The root cause committee was effective in identifying the causes of the three
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failures as well as determining methods to prevent such failures from
recurring.
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Safety Assessment and Quality Verification
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Management control of outage activities including contractors has been good.
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Helping to achieve the good controls was an increased in-plant time by
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management, quality control, and quality verification personnel.
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DETAILS
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1.
Persons Contacted
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R. Tuetken, Vice President, Zion Station
A. Broccolo, Station Manager
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M. Lohmann, Site Engineer & Construction Manager
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S. Kaplan, Regulatory Assurance Supervisor
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- D. Wozniak, Technical Services Superintendent
L. Simon, Maintenance Supervisor
J. LaFontaine, Outage Management. Manger
T. Printz, Assistant Superintendent of Operations
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R. Cascarano, Services Director
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- W. Stone, Performance improvement Director
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- M. Rauckhorst, Site Engineering Supervisor
- K. Moser, Unit 0 Operating Engineer
- C.
Grasser, Site Quality Verification
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- J. Winston, Quality Control
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- K. Dickerson, Regulatory Assurance - NRC Coordinator
- Indicates persons present at the exit interview on November 23, 1993.
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The inspectors also contacted other licensee personnel including members
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of the operating, maintenance, security, and engineering staff.
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2.
Licensee Actions on Previous inspection Findinas (92701. 92702)
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(Closed)' Inspection Followup Item (295-90030-29(DRP)):
"Zicn-
Staff Philosophy and Operational Attitudes."
In the three years
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since the DET, these items have significantly improved.
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Communications between operations and the NRC nave been candid,
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the station was removed from the watch list in February 1993,
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'and the Zion Review Team completed 'its final inspection on
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November 18, 1993. This item is closed.
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(Closed) Inspection Followup Item (295-90030-30(DRP)):
" Corporate
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Oversight." Significant improvements have occurred in this area-
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during the three years' following the DET. The restructure of both
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corporate'and site organizations included the new position of site
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vice president as well as an expanded engineering organization on
site.
This item is closed.
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c.
(Closed)' Unresolved item (295/92006-02(DRP)):
" Contract Workers
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Working under the Wrong Radiation Work Permit." Upon further
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investigation, this item was determined to be a violation. As-
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noted in the letter from B. L. Jorgensen to L. O. DelGeorge, . dated
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July 21,1993, the corrective actions already taken were adequate
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and no response to the violation was required.
Both the
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unresolved item and the violation are closed.
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d.
(Closed) Unresolved Item (295/304-92021-02(DRP)):
"TI 2515/115 -
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Verification of Plant Records." Upon review this item was.
determined to be a violation. As noted in the letter from J. B.
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Martin to M. J. Wallace, dated October 15, 1993, the corrective.
actions already taken were adequate and no response to' the
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violation was required. Both the unresolved item and the
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violation are closed.
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(Closed) Inspection Followuo Item (295-93019-01(DRP U:
" Licensee-
Review of the Effect on Eagle 21 Control Room Annunciators due to-
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a Reversed Wire Ribbon Connector." The reversal of the bitbus
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cable was evaluated by the vendor and will be documented in the
next licensee's periodic system performance report for the. Eagle
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21 system.
The connector in question contained a two conductor .
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differential data signal, located in. the two center positions of
the connector..
Therefore, reversal of the connector did not
disable the data path.
In additicn, the reversed connector caused
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the floating ground for the test sequence processor card to be
raised to 12 Vdc. The vendor confirmed that the system was
tolerant of this condition.
The system was able to annunciate in
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the control room normally, except during the actual time the
sporadic alarms were activated. The inspectors have no further
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questions and the item is closed.
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No violations or deviations were identified.
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3.
Summary of Outace Activities
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Outage Activities
uuring this inspection period, the dual unit outage' commenced.
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Both units have been defueled and fuel pool cooling is being
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supplied by-a temporary service water system. The shutdown,
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cooldown, and_ defueling of both units were accomplished in an
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efficient manner. Good attention to shutdown risk was observed,
except (as described below) for service water (SW) being secured
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to the Unit 1 emergency diesel generator (EDG). A new multi-user
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out-of-service has been implemented.and appears to have reduced -
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work loads while still providing adequate control of the systems.
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The extensive SW work was progressing well, as were the EDG -
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modi fications.
Both the SW and EDG were projected to complete
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ahead of schedule; however, the planning department has. identified
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motor operated valve testing as a potential problem area.
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identification of this area by planning has allowed management to
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resolve issues promptly'and improve the. testing progress. An-
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increased presence of management in'the plant has also contributed
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to timely resolution of potential issues.
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The Unit 1 10-year reactor vessel inservice inspection has been
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completed successfully and the lower internals have been
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reinstalled. Two low pressure turbine rotors (l A and 2A) have
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been removed and the inspection was completed with no-problems
being identified. The Unit I steam generator U-tube inspection
and repair was completed. The expected scope was to repair 250
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tubes; however, only 1 tube met the technical specification
criteria for a required repair and only 101 other tubes were
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plugged preventively.
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Outage Events
Unit 2 Initial Head lift: On October 16, during the initial Unit 2
head lift and flood up of the reactor cavity, airborne
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radioactivity was detected in the containment atmosphere.
Twenty
eight of the twenty-nine individuals involved with the head lift
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received minor, but unexpected, internal contaminations.
The
licensee's root cause analysis determined that the cause of- the
airborne activity was Cobalt-58, which was present in quantities
an order of magnitude higher than ouring previous outages.
Corrective actions included waiting on containment flood-up until
the head lift was completed, clearing all non-essential personnel
from containment, and beginning the flood-up using the charging
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system, rather than the residual heat removal (RHR) system. The
inspectors reviewed the licensee's response to the event and
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considered the root cause analysis and corrective actions to be
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good. No airborne activity occurred during the Unit I head lif t.
Unusual Event: On October 21, an unusual event was declared when
a worker fell 27 feet into the Unit 2 reactor cavity.
The worker
had been repositioning an equipment hose along the cavity edge-
when he fell. There was no safety rail in place, and no other
safety gear was being used.
As he fell, the worker became
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entangled in the hose and an attached rope, which appeared to
minimize the effects of the fall.
The worker was able to climb
out of the reactor cavity unassisted and was transported to a
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local hospital in a paper suit. The hospital was well prepared
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for the patient and no spread of contamination occurred.
No
injui ies were identified and the worker was returned to the site
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to be decontaminated. A whole body count detected only a minor
radiological up-take and the worker remained on site for the
remainder of his shift.
The station completed a significant
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review of safety measures and changes were implemented.
Contractor Controls: A temporary loss of DC power to the 1A EDG
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panel occurred on October 21.
The loss of power was caused by the
close proximity of scaffolding to the key locked switch.
When-
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workers were passing through this tight area, they' bumped the key
turning the power off.
Power was quickly restored and after the
second incident, a watch was posted to protect the switch. The
purpose of the switch is to turn DC power off for maintenance
work.
The current modifications to the 0, lA, and 2A EDGs
includes new key switches which allow the key to be removed in
either the "on" or "off" positions. This will prevent recurrence
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of the problem. The licensee has installed a jumper across the
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switch for the IB und 2B EDG that will prevent recurrence of this
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problem until the modifications for these diesels, scheduled for
1995, are completed.
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Inoperability of Unit 1 Diesel Generators: On November 3, SW to
both Unit 1 EDGs was inadvertently isolated. This rendered both
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(The swing EDG had already been taken out-of-
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service for outage maintenance work.) At the time the event
occurred, the last few fuel bundles were being removed from the
core.
Zion administrative technical specification 3.15.1 requires
that at least one EDG remain operable while fuel is being removed
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from the vessel, or that fuel movements be suspended.
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The event occurred due to poor communications among shift
personnel, and failure to follow established procedures for
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changing outage work windows.
Specifically, a work group
requested out-of-service coordinators- that valve OMOV-SWOO8 be
taken out-of-service in order to isolate service water to the 0
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EDG. Approximately one-half hour after the valve was closed, the
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out-of-service coordinator recognized that both Unit 1 EDGs were
rendered inoperable when they were administratively required, and
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ordered the valve reopened. The valve was reopened approximately
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one hour after it had been closed. During this hour, the Unit I
reactor was completely off-loaded, with all fuel moves complete.
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The failure to either maintain one EDG operable or to suspend fuel
movement is contrary to the requirements of technical
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specification 6.
1, which requires, in part, implementation of
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written procedures involving nuclear safety. This is considered
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the first example of-a violation (295/304-93020-Ola).
One example of a violation was identified.
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Oneration..al lafetY Verification (71707)
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Operational Overview
The inspectors verified that the facility was being operated in
conformance with the licenses and regulatory requirements, and
that the licensee's management control system was effectively
carrying out its responsibilities for safe operation.
During
tours of accessible areas of the plant, the inspectors made note
of general plant and equipment conditions, including control of
activities in progress.
On a sampling basis, the inspectors observed control room staffing
and coordination of plant activities, observed operator adherence
with procedures and technical specifications, monitored control
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room indications for abnormalities, verified electrical power
availability, and observed the frequency of plant and control room
visits by station managers. The inspectors also monitored various
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administrative and operating records.
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Specific areas reviewed were:
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Radiation Protection Centrols:
The inspectors verified that
workers were following health physics procedures and randomly
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examined radiation protection instrumentation for operability and
calibration.
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Securitv: During the inspection period, the inspectors monitored
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the licensee's security program to ensure that observed actions
were being implemented according to their approved security plan.
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Housekeepina and Plant cleanliness:
The inspectors monitored the
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general status of housekeeping, plant cleanliness, as well as
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protection of safety-related equipment from intrusion of foreign
matter. During this period, the licensee identified assorted
problems with foreign material exclusion (FME), and took
aggressive actions to resolve the concerns, such as requiring
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rigorous control over plant activities to ensure FME, not only
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inside containment, but also during various pump and turbine-
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overhauls. The licensee also reemphasized the importance of FME
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to plant workers on a continuing basis.
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b.
Assessment of Plant Operations
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Operations overall performance during the dual unit outage has
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been good. However, there have been a number of configuration
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control errors of minor safety significance. Operations has
provided good out-of-service support, which assisted the station
in maintaining its outage schedule.
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No violations or deviations were identified.
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5.
Monthly Maintenance and Surveillance (62703 and 61726.).
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' Routinely, station maintenance and surveillance activities'were observed
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and reviewed to verify that they were conducted in accordance with all
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regulations. Also considered during the observation and review was:
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that proper approvals were obtained and that operability requirements
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were met; that appropriate functional testing and calibrations were
performed; that any discrepancies identified were resolved; that quality
control records were maintained; and that all activities were
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accomplished by qualified personnel.
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The following specific maintenance and surveillance activities were
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reviewed during this inspection period:
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NWR #
Title
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Z25957
Unit 1 Steam Jet Ai- Exhaust Off-Gas flow Rate Recorder-
Repair
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Z26765
Cleaning and Inspection of Motor Control Center 1372
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Z27236
Trevi-Testing of Main Steam Safety Valve IM50025
Z27505
2-10-4 Rotor MOV Modification - Auxiliary Feedwater Valve
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IMOV-FW-0074
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Z28678
Trevi-Testing of Main Steam. Safety Valve IM50018
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Z28575
Trevi-Testing of Main Steam Safety. Valve IMS0023
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Z32660
Replacement of Anti-Rotation Key on RHR Valve 2MOV-RH-610
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Maintenance / Surveillance Related Activities
Main Steam Safety Valve Testino: On October 16-18, Unit I was-
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reduced to 50 percent power in order to do in-place steam testing
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of the main steam safety valves (MSSVs).
Sixteen of the twenty
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valves tested were within the one percent acceptance criteria; the
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remaining four required adjustment. The inspectors witnessed two
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of the valve tests, and discussed the four failures with the
cognizant licensee engineer.
Maintenance and vendor personnel
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performing the tests were knowledgeable and well-prepared.
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Motor Control Center Breaker Testina: On November 8 and 9, the
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120 Vac motor control center breakers were tested to ensure that
they would adequately pick up loads under degraded voltage
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conditions (90 Vac). The 90 Vac degraded voltage commitment was in
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response to an electrical distribution safety functional
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inspection finding.
Fifteen of the breakers failed to pick up at
90 Vac. At the end of the inspection period, the licensee was
evaluating the effects of the failures on the degraded voltage
issue.
Review of the licensee's evaluation will be tracked under
previously opened inspection followup item 295/304-92003-08.
Lona-Standino Eauipment Problems: On November 10, a meeting of
the radiation monitor task force took place. The task force had
been formed to resolve the on-going problems with radiation
monitors. The inspectors found the task force to have.a.
reasonable strategy for rectifying the continuing failures of
plant radiation monitors; however the inspectors noted that the
task force did not have an established meeting schedule, which may
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have reduced their effectiveness.
RHR Start Durina Surveillance Response Time Testina: On
November 10, during the performance of required surveillance
response time testing of reactor protection and engineered
safeguards features logic relays on Unit 1, the 1A RHR pump
automatically started.
The apparent cause of the event was the
failure of the' safeguards Division 19 Train B safety injection
(SI) timer to reset properly. A problem with the SI timers not
resetting occurred last year after all 12 were-replaced. The.
failure to reset was caused by improper shaft cam adjustments by
the vendor. After the adjustments were made, there have been
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numerous tests performed without a failure until this one. The
resident inspectors will continue to follow the licensee's root
cause evaluation.
b.
Assessment of Maintenance and Surveillance
The EDG team has performed and supervised the major control and
air system modifications being installed during the dual unit
outage. This work has progressed smoothly and on schedule due to
good planning and scheduling, and excellent performance by the EDG
team.
To date, the major plannino and scheduling preparations for the
outage appear to be effective with the station slightly ahead of.
schedule.
No violations of deviations were identified.
6.
Engineerina and Technical Support (37828)
The inspectors evaluated the extent to which engineering principles and
evaluations were integrated into daily plant activities.
This.was-
accomplished by assessing the technical staff involvement in non-routine
events, outage-related activities, and assigned surveillances; observing
on-going maintenance work and troubleshooting; and reviewing deviation
investigations and root cause determinations.
a.
Engineering and Technical Support Events
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Unit 1 Steam Generator Pluo Anomalies:
On November 4, a steam
generator (SG) tube plug was found partially protruding from "C"
SG hot-leg tube R2C2.
Upon further investigation, the plug was
identified as a Combustion Engineering (CE) mechanical plug,
installed during the last refueling outage in hot-leg tube RlC41.
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Review of the. rolling torque traces for that tube revealed
anomalies which, in retrospect, the licensee identified as
indication of defects in the tube surface which prevented a proper
-seal between the tube and the plug. The licensee postulated that
the lack of proper sealing allowed water to seep behind the plug
during reactor fill and vent activities. As the reactor began
heating up, the water behind the plug began increasing in
temperature and pressure, until it reached a temperature great
enough to cause the plug to collapse. Once the plug collapsed, it
fell out of its intended tube and was carried by the force of.the
reactor coolant into the open tube where it was found.
The
licensee sealed hot-leg tube RIC41 with a welded plug.
On November 12, a plug was found in the reactor vessel. The plug
was found in two pieces; both pieces were recovered from the
vessel.
During examination of the pieces, the licensee was able
to ascertain the plug's serial number, which identified the
intended location of the plug as being "B" SG cold-leg tube RIC47.
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Tube RIC47 was verified as missing its cold-leg plug. This plug
was also a CE mechanical- plug installed during the last refueling
outage. Through review of the rolling torque traces, and
concurrent viewing of a video tape showing the rolling process,
the licensee determined that an indexing error resulted in tube
RIC34 being rolled twice - with the second roll being labeled as
"RIC35".
This resulted in the remaining tubes being labeled as
one higher then they actually were. As a result, tube RIC47 was
never rolled, and fell out of the tube.
The reactor coolant
carried it through the reactor coolant' pumps (which sheared it in
half) and into the reactor vessel, from where .it was recovered.
The licensee replaced the plug with one that was properly rolled.
On November 14, a plug in "B" SG hot-leg _ tube R17C19 was found to
be weeping. The licensee removed the plug and analyzed the water
found in the tube.
The water was confirmed to be primary side
water, which indicated that the tube had not been completely
sealed. The plug was also a CE mechanical plug installed during
the last refueling outage.
Review of the rolling torque traces
identified anomalies similar to those seen on the plug for SG "C"
hot-leg tube RIC41.
The licensee postulated that this plug
behaved like the first one, except that the water pressure behind
the plug during heat-up never increased to the point where the
plug collapsed.
The hot-leg tube was sealed 'with a welded plug.
Because all three events easily correlated to problems seen on the
torque traces, the licensee reviewed the torque traces for all of
the plugs installed during the last refueling outages on both
units. No other anomalies were identified.
The licensee revised the procedures for future tube plugging to
require following a pre-determined torque curve with engineering
disposition of any anomalous torque traces. The licensee also
provided additional guidance to ensure that plugs were inserted
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into the correct tubes, and properly rolled.
Additionally, the licensee prepared a " lessons learned" notic_e and
distributed it to the other five of the license's sites.' The
licensee also notified other utilities, through the nuclear news
network, of the tube problems, and the ability to identify these
problems through correlated anomalies in the torque traces. The
inspectors considered the licensee's actions and conclusions to be
appropriate and had no further concerns.
b.
Assessment of Engineering and Technical Support
Engineering resolution of the three SG plug anomalies was timely
and thorough. The root cause committee was effective in
identifying the causes of the three failures as well as
determining methods to prevent such failures from recurring.
No violations or deviations were identified.
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7.
Safety Assessment and Quality Verification (40500)
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The effectiveness of management controls, verification and oversight.
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activities in the conduct of jobs observed during this inspection were
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evaluated. Management and supervisory meetings involving plant status
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were attended to observe coordination between departments. The results
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of licensee corrective _ action programs were routinely monitored by
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attendance at meetings, discussion with the plant staff, review of
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deviation reports, and root cause evaluation reports.
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a.
SAQV Events
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Implementation of Electronic Work Control System:
During this.
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inspection period, the licensee gave a presentation of the
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electronic work control system (EWCS) which was to be implemented
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following startup from the dual unit outage.
The licensee noted
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several benefits of the EWCS, including prioritization and
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scheduling of all backlog work; standardizing the schedules and
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work packages; better previous work histories for components; and
reduced stored inventories.
However, the licensee recognized that
implementation of EWCS was a major change to planning and
execution of work, and that initial problems were_to be expected.
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Operation Safety Predictor System: The operation safety predictor
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(OSPRE) is a computerized program that provides plant personnel
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with risk-related information about the selected plant
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configuration based on a probabilistic risk assessment data base.
The data base was generated from two safety analysis' codes which
were used to complete the Zion individual plant examination.
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The main purpose of OSPRE is to provide plant personnel with
information regarding risk values associated with current or
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proposed plant states.
This information is contained in core
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damage frequency values. This system provides operations and
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planning with excellent information on plant risk for equipment
out-of-services between 20 and 100 percent _ power.
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Shutdown Risk:
Good controls have minimized the shutdown risk
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during this outage. The controls consist of' daily risk assessment
evaluation forms for all required safety equipment and power
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supplies.
They also have protected path tags on all control room
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required equipment switches and tags on equipment requiring
temporary service water.
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b.
Assessment of SAQV
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Management control of outage activities including contractors has
been good. Helping to achieve.the good controls was an increased
in-plant time by management, quality control, and quality
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verification personnel.
No violations or deviations were identified.
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8.
Licensee Event Reports (LERs) Followup (92700)
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.Through direct observations, discussions with licensee personnel. and
review of records, the following event reports were reviewed to
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determine that reportability requirements were fulfilled, immediate
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corrective action was accomplished, and corrective action to prevent
recurrence had been accomplished in accordance with technical
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specifications. The LERs listed below are considered closed-
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295-90015-01
Incorrect Containment Flood Level Specified in UFSAR-
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295-92023-00
Incomplete Quadrant Power Tilt Ratio Surveillance due
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to Management Deficiency
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295-93008-00
Entry into Technical Specification 3.0.3 Due to
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l-MOVSI-8804A Being Out of-Service'for Greater Than
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Seven Days
Due to a typographical error, LER 90015-01 was incorrectly referred to
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as LER 90013-01 in inspection report 93019.
The inspectors confirmed
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that the correct number was 90015-01, and that the. corrective actions
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mentioned in inspection report 93019 were correct.
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LER 92023 discussed a Unit 1 event where the operators overlooked
several nuclear instrumentation switches, left in the " defeat" position
following maintenance, for approximately a twenty-four hour period.
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Control board walkdowns during this period did not identify that the
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power mismatch, rod stop, comparator channel defeat, and the upper and
lower current comparator switches were in the defeated position, thus
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rendering power range nuclear instrumentation IN1-41 inoperable. This
resulted in the surveillance requirements of technical specification
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4.2.2.B.I.b not being met. This is considered a non-cited violation as-
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it meets the criteria specified in Section VII.B.2 of the Enforcement
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Policy (10 CFR Part 2, Appendix C). The corrective actions included
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counseling of the involved individuals, two procedure changes, and a
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final procedure change scheduled for completion in January of 1994. The
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delay for the final change was due to higher priority procedure needs
for support of the dual unit-outage.
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LER 93008 addressed an out-of-service (005) which remained in place past
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the seven-day administrative limit and resulted in entry into TS 3.0.3. _
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The 00S was to perform a motor control center breaker inspection on RHR
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valve IMOV-SI8804A and cards were hung on the control board and at the
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breaker at the same time as 005 cards for unrelated RHR pump work.
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Operating shift personnel did not question why the valve was still- cards
remaining after the other RHR work was closed out.
Contributing to the
005 cards remaining in place past the administrative time limit were two
other events:
the maintenance department failed to return the work
package to the operations department when the breaker inspection was
completed, and the 005 was mistakenly removed from the outage editor
computer system without the work package or the 00S cards being pulled.
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The failure to clear the 00S within the administrative limits is the
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second example of the violation of technical specification 6.2.1
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(295/304-93020-Olb).
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In addition, the inspectors reviewed problem identification forms
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(PIfs), and the licensee's resulting investigations, to ensure that PIFs
were appropriately generated and dispositioned.
The following completed
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Plfs were reviewed:
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295-200-93-CAT 3-182
SW Valve Closure
295-200-93-CAT 3-185
295-200-93-CAT 3-192
CE Mechanical Plug found in the Reactor Vessel
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295-200-93-CAT 3-193
Leak on the Tubesheet of IB Steam Generator
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295-201-93-CAT 4-0547
Spent fuel Rack Removed from Pool with Missile
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Door Open
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295-201-93-CAT 4-0854
Rad Material Sent Off-site
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One example of a violation and one non-cited violation were identified.
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9.
Manaaement Meetinos (30703)
On November 4, Mr. Edward G. Greenman, Director, Division of Reactor
Projects, RIII, visited the site. Mr. Greenman toured the station and
control room, and met with the site vice president and the station
manager.
Mr. Greenman noted that the plant appeared to be in good
condition, for the stage of the outage, and that management, especially
the station manager and the assistant superintendent of operations, were
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highly regarded by the shift personnel.
Mr. Greenman expressed concern
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over the continuing problems with the Eagle 21 system and. the IC
containment spray pump and with the station's ability to establish and-
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meet commitment dates. Overall, Mr. Greenman considered that the
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station's progress was continuing.
The Zion Review Team visited the site from November 16 through 18. .The
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five member team examined the areas of operations, maintenance,
engineering, planning and scheduling, and management actions with an
outage perspective. The_ team concluded that Zion's' performance
continues to improve, but cautioned against relaxing their efforts,
since a number of areas still need management' attention. The team noted
that this was the last formal inspection by the ZRT.
On November 22 and 23, Mr. Hubert J. Miller, Deputy Regional
Administrator, Rill, toured the site and met with craft personnel and
station management. The purpose was to review the root cause program.
He did an assessment of the problem' identification form (PIF), screening
meeting, and evaluation of the root cause program for resolution of
problems. Mr. Miller also assessed the integrated quality effort (IQE)
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program, which uses the root cause program as a major input. Mr. Hiller
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indicated that the Plfs, root cause, and 10E process looked' good and
that the process had strong support from top management.
Interviews
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revealed that management needs to better communicate to station
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personnel how the PIF and root cause process works.
In conclusion he
stated that senior management is focused on problems and appears to have
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a realistic concept of their root cause programs and the improvements
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needed.
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No violations or deviations were identified.
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10.
Exit Interview (30703)
The inspectors met with licensee representatives (denoted in section 1).
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throughout the inspection period and at the conclusion of the inspection
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on November 23, 1993, to summarize the scope _and findings of the
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inspection activities.
The licensee acknowledged the inspectors'
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comments.
The inspectors also discussed the likely informational
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content of the inspection report with regard to. documents or processes
reviewed by the inspectors during the inspection.
The licensee did not
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identify any such documents or processes as proprietary.
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