IR 05000295/1988018
| ML20195C209 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Zion File:ZionSolutions icon.png |
| Issue date: | 10/20/1988 |
| From: | Patterson J, Ploski T, Snell W NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION III) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20195C208 | List: |
| References | |
| TASK-3.A.1.1, TASK-3.A.1.2, TASK-3.A.2.1, TASK-3.A.2.2, TASK-TM 50-295-88-18, 50-304-88-18, NUDOCS 8811020404 | |
| Download: ML20195C209 (31) | |
Text
.
,
ei-U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
REGION III
Reports No. 50-295/88018(DRSS); 50-304/88018(DRSS)
Docket Nos. 50-295; 50-304 Licenses No. DPR-39; DPR-48 Lit.;en see: Commonwealth Edison Company Post Office Box 767 Chicago, IL 60690 Facility Name: Zion Nuclear Generating Station, Units 1 and 2 Inspection At: Zion Station, Zion, Illinois Inspection Conducted: September 27-29 and October 14, 1988 I Inspectors:
w. LJt )
T. Ploski / " i*/s./s s
'
Date W. $ l J. Patterson'" &/w/as '
Date Approved By:
(AhSS W. Snell, Chief WWa Emergency Preparedness Section Date j L
Inspection Summary
[
Inspection on September 27-29 and October 14, 1988 (Reports No. 50-295/88018(DRSS); No 50-304/88018(ORSS))
Areas Inspected: Routine, announced inspection of the Zion Station's annual emergency preparedness exercise (IP 82301), involving four NRC representative Results: The exercise scenario was extremely challenging in that emergency responders had to simultaneously deal with a Transportation Accident, involving multiple injuries with some contamination complications, plus a loss !
of feedwater to Unit 2 that was lengthy enough to warrant a General Emergency declaration. Feur Exerciss Weaknesses were identified which will require .
corrective action. Control Room (CR) and Technical Support Center (TSC) l staffs failed to adequately inform State officials of the Transportation Accident. CR personnel failed to recognize, for almost 30 minutes, that plant r conditions had further degraded enough to necessitate a Site Area Emergency i declaration. TSC and Emergency Operations Facility (EOF) staffs failed to i provide simulated NRC Duty Officers with adequately detailed and accurate i
>
>
f gi%%$ck$$ P O
. . _ _ _ _
. . -
,
information on conditions existing at the times of the Site Area and General Emergency declarations. The overall response to the Transportation Accident, which involved multiple injuries and personnel contamination complications, was inadequate at the scene and within various emergency response facilitie One Open Item also requiring corrective action was identifie The licensee must conduct a successful 1988 assembly / accountability drill, as an earlier drill was self-evaluated as unsuccessful. Demonstration of onsite assembly and accountability was deleted from the exercise objectives. Although there were numerous examples of adequate player performance at each location observed, program refinements were.also recommended at each location observed.
1 l
l J
l
$
,
l i
i
-
. .-
,
DETAILS
.. Persons Contacted NRC Observers and Areas Observed M. Holzmer, Control Room (CR), Technical Support Center (TSC)
T. Ploski, CR, TSC, Emergency Operations Facility (EOF)
J. Patterson, TSC, Operational Support Center (OSC)
R. Meek, Transportation Accident, EOF Licensee Representativ1 ties
~
- G. Plim1, Station Manager E. Fuerst, Production Superintendent ,
T. Rieck, Services Superintendent
- R. Budole, Assistant Services Superintendent
- P. LeBlond, Rad Chem Supervisor A. Nyriel, GSEP Coordinator W. Stone, Regulatory Assurance Supervisor J. Golden, Supervisor of Emergency Planning T. Gilman, Emergen.y Planning Supervisor M. Ponzio, Emergency Planning Supervisor
- T. Leachton, Emergency Planner W. Cramer, Training Group Leader ;
J. Johnson, GESP Training Instructor T. Cox, First Aid / Fire Instructor
J. Leech, Safety / Industrial Health Advisor P. Vitalis, Emergency Planner
,
R. Pratt, Rad Chem Foreman R. Thornton, Training Instructor D. Cole, Health Physicist R. Palatini, Health Physicist 1 R. Neeley, Quality Assurance Inspector
'
P. Zurwaski, Quality Assurance Inspector J. Walls, Engineering Assistance
- I. Johnson, Nuclear Licensing Administrator (
e
- These individuals participated in the September 29 and October 14, 1988 exit interviews. The remaining licensee representatives participated in only the former exit intervie . Licensee Action on Previously Identified Items (IP 92701)
>
-
Open Open Items No. 50-295/87007-1, -2, -3, and -5 and 50-304/87009-01 ,
-02,-03; and -05: These items related to various performance problems '
of post-accident sampling and offsite radiological survey teams during
, the 1987 exercise The licensee's corrective actions involved additional
,
!
^
-. - .
.- .
-
,
training emphasis on these identified problem areas during technicians'
annual requalification training sessions and annual drills. Records of these activities will be evaluated during a future inspection. The 1988 exercise scenario did not involve plume measurements by offsite survey teams. Post-accident sampling activities were not observed. These items remain ope t 3. General (IP 82301)
A daytime exercise of the licensee's Generating Stations Emergency Plan (GSEP) and Zion Annex to the GSEP was conducted at the Zion Station on September 28, 198 The exercise tested the licensee's capabilities to respond to an accident scenario which escalated to a General Emergency without a simulated, major radioactive release. The attachments to this report consist of the licensee's scope of participation and exercise
objectives, plus a scenario narrative summary and approximate timelin This was an evaluated exercise only for the licensee's emergency response organization. However, one Illinois agency and the local rescue squad participated to limited extents in order to assist the licensee in demonstrating certain exercise objective . General Observations (IP 82301) Procedures This exercise was conducted in accordance wish 10 CFR 50, Appendix E requirements using the GSEP, Quad Cities Annex, and the Emergency
! Plan Implementing Procedures (EPIPs) of the licensee's onsite and
]
offsite emergency organization Observers Licensee observers monitored and critiqued this exercise, as did four NRC evaluator Coordination
'
The licensee's response was generally coordinated, orderly, and timely primarily with respect to the reactor transient. If scenario l events had been real, actions taken by the licensee's emergency l organization would have been sufficient to allow State and local officials to take appropriate actions to protect public health and safet ,
! Critique ;
The licensee held preliminary critiques following the exercis l The NRC critique was held on September 29, 1988. As additional i
i l
r 4 l r
t
_ . -
___ _ _ _ _ _____. ,- - r_-
-
,., .
records were provided for NRC evaluation following the September 29th critique, a second critique was conducted on October 14, 198 . Specific Observations (IP 82301) Control Room (CR)
As Acting Station Director (SD), the Shif t Engineer (SE) in charge of CR activities correctly declared an Unusual Event at 9:00 upon commencing a Unit 2 shutdown in accordance with Technical Specification requirements. Initial notifications of Illinois, Wisconsin, and NRC officials were adequately completed by a CR communicator within the regulatory time limit ;
The Unit 2 shutdown was necessitated as a result of the failure of a motor-operated valve associated with the unit's only available Auxiliary Ferdwater (AFW) pump to open when required at 8:10 The SE promptly ordered an examination of the valve by an inplant team. The Malve again failed to open at 8:23 a.m. and the AFW pump was then aeclared inoperable. Exercise controllers defeated a plausible plan to cross-tie a Unit 1 AFW pump to Unit 2 in order to avoid a Unit 2 shutdown. Meanwhile, onshift personnel incorrectly
reported the time that the Unit 2 AFW pump became inoperable as being 8:23 a.m., when the valve failed to open for the second tim The correct beginning time for this Limiting Condition for Operation was 0:10 a.m., when the valve initially failed to open when require The future Station and Operations Directors reported to the CR within 15 minutes of the Unusual Event declaration. The first report of the Transportation Accident was received in the CR about ten minutes later. CR personnel then followed obsoiete guidance in Emergency Plan Implementing Procedure (EPIP) 100-1 and completed a Nuclear Accident Reporting System (h4RS) message form in order to report the Transportation Accident, which involved simulated injuries and a simulated release of Dry Active Waste (DAW)
supposedly carried by one vehicle, to Illinois officials. However, State officials soon requested that a "transportation accident form" be completed and transmitted to the CR personnel exhibited confusion over this request, which was neither satisfied by CR staff ,
nor later by Technical Support Center (TSC) staff. The current NARS '
form is not designed for reporting Transportation Accidents. The i Generating Stations Emergency P'lan (GSEP) contains an "IESDA Hazardous Materials Radiological Questionnaire" which is to be utilized when informing State officials of a Transportation Acciden However, this form was not included in the Station's EPIPs. The failure of CR and TSC staffs to adequately inform State
.
"
l L
>
,
,re.w-- --,,ww-- - - - - - -
-
,
,
o properly and that the Residual Heat Removal (RHR) system was not operable. By 10:15 a.m., the Acting SD, who was still in charge of emergency response activitiss, had not recognized that these conditions satisfied an Emergency Action Level's (EAL's) criteria for a Site Area Emergency. Therefore, exercise controllers issued a contingency message to declare a Site Area Emergency in accordance with the exercise ground rules. The future SD then re-entered the CR from the adjacent TSC to recommend this emergency declaration. The failure of onshif t personnel to recognize, in a timely manner, that degraded plant conditions warranted a Site Area Emergency declaration is an Exercise Weakness (No. 50-295/88018-02).
As the exercise progressed, Emergency Operating Procedures (EOPs)
were adequately followed. When in procedural loops, operators typically anticipated future actions. However, the Station Control
'
Room Engineer (SCRE) was slow to initiate status tree forms and perform periodic status tree evaluations per the E0P Onshif t personnel were not always informed in a timely mani.ar by the SE of significant emergency response actions, such as when conditions had been reclassified or when commend and control had been transferred to the seni,r individuals in the TSC and EO Such information was not always listed in CR 1. a to document the crew's awareness of these change ,
There were some difficulties with telephone communications to and from the CR involving lines not dedicated for emergency response
'
cal?s. CR telephone lines carried both actual and exercise calls,
! which caused occasional annoyance to exercise participants and I
actual onshift personnel as they often had to refer calls to each I
other. The initial call to have the local rescue squad respond to
the Transportation Accident scene was delayed several minutes while l a CR communicator searched the CR center desk area and adjacent TSC for an available telephon In addition to the two Exercise Weaknesses, the following items should be considered for improvement:
Onshift personnel should receive additional training on establishing the beginning time for a limiting Condition for Operatio *
The NARS form should be revised to list relevant LAL information, so that offsite officials can be more clearly informed of situations where an mergency classification has been upgraded due to the simultaneous existence of several abnormal conditions each having a lesser classificatio .
,
o
The CR simulator should be utilized in future exercises to give participants a more realistic presentation of plant transients and to segregate exercise from "real world" telephone communication * *
Onshift personnel should be informed of all emergency classification changes and transfers of command in a timely manner. Awareness of such information should be logge b. Technical Support Center (TSC)
The Station Director (50) assumed command and control of emergency response activities within 45 minutes after issuance of the .
contingency message to declare a Site Area Emergency. He and the :
Operations Director recognized that a General Energency declaration would soon be required, per the EALS, if no source of feedwater to the steam generators was available within 45 minutes of the start of the loss of feedwater. The SD directed that a communicator initially notify the States of the Site Area Emergency declaration, while the Station Director Communicator was instructed to begin preparation of another NARS message form for the probable General Emergency declaratio As feedwater was not resorted within 45 minutes, a General Emergency was declared at 10:35 a.m. The correct Protective Action Recommendation (PAR) was chosen per procedural guidanc The States were initially notified of this reclassification and associated PAR in a timely manne Later discissions with EOF staff resulted in the correct conclusion that the initial PAR did not require revisio Since the Site Area and General Emergency declarations were made within a hectic 35 minute period and both declarations related to the same abnormal condition, the SD made a reasonable decision that one call to the NRC Operations Center should effectively satisfy the
'
initial information needs of the NRC regarding the loss of feedwater
'
situation. A modified version of the NRC's Event Notification Worksheet was completed and verbally communicated to a "NRC response cell" of remotely - located controllers at 11:00 After transfer of command and control to the E0F occurred at 11:00 a.m.,
i EOF staff formulated and transmitted a second message to the "NRC
. response cell" at about 11:15 a.m. to provide additional detail Exercise ground rules restricted "NRC response cell" controllers from requesting information from CR, TSC, or EOF communicators beyond that which the communicators were prepared to provide from their completed Event Notification Worksheets. Comparisons of information on the worksheets completed by TSC and EOF communicators and by "NRC response cell" controllers inri1cated that the information l
\
.
,
.-
on the forms had been adequately communicated to the message recipients. However, while the 11:00 a.m. and 11:15 a.m. messages contained accurate information, together they provided an inadequately detailed and unclear description of the plant conditions which led to the Site Area and General Emergency declarations, as well as the status of the Transportation Accident response. The failure of TSC and EOF staffs to provide the NRC with adequately detailed information and a clear understanding of conditions existent at the times of the Site Area and General Emergency declarations is ar, Exercise We+ ness (No. 50-295/88018-03).
The TSC's 11:00 a.m. message indicated that: a reactor trip had occurred at an unspecified time; a General Emergency had been declared; the Transportation Accident still existed; one contaminated accident victim was enroute to the hospital; safety injection had occurred; a steam leak of unspecified origin in the Turbine Building had been isolated; the EOF was in command of emergency response at 11:00 a.m.; and that "FRH-1 was in progress at
, Step No. 17.*' This last item referred to CR operators being on the
"red path" of a Functional Restoration procedure for a loss of heat sink condition. It is extremely doubtful that an NRC Duty Officer could have interpreted the remark about FRH-1 es meaning that a loss of feedwater situation had begun approximately 75 minutes earlie The 11:15 a.m. message from the E0F indicated that no feedwater was available to the steam generators; however, the duration of this condition was still not stated. Additional information on systems availability was provided which also clarified that the loss of feedwater involved only Unit 2 and that Unit 2's containment had been isolated. The E0F's message also contained an incomplete description of the offsite PAR and referred to only one accident victi However, there were two victims enroute to the hospital, only one of whom had been contaminated. Neither message clearly indicated whether State officials had been notified of the Site Area of General Emergency declarations. Neither message clearly stated the reason for either emergency declaratio The SD ordered the simulated assembly and accountability of onsite personnel promptly after the Site Area Emergency declaration. The simulated evacuation of non-essential personnel was ordered along an appropriate evacuation route several minutes after the accountability process was reported to be successfully complete Information flow within the TSC was largely accomplished by the SD periodically requesting status updates from his staff and by the periodic distribution of data sheets listing reactor parameter data and systems availability information. Most TSC directors exhibited a reluctance to share new information with all TSC staff unless questioned by the 50 or until it was time for the next status update
-
., .-
session. A flip chart was utilized to chronologically list a variety of information, including: the emergency classification; changes in plant systems status; transfers of command and control; and excerpts from the periodic status updates. Two unformatted, wall-mounted status boards remained blank during the exercis Heavy reliance on periodic verbal status updates and minimal use of pre-formatted status boards placed an additional burden on each TSC director to accurately maintain notes or otherwise recall relevant information from the discussions. By the time of the scenario time jump, however, a staggered shift change of TSC key staff was adequately demonstrate .
Following the time jump, TSC staff adequately demonstrated their capability to compile a preliminary list of short-term action items before participating in a conference call with their EOF counterparts to consolidate action item lists and jointly conclude that the emergency situation could now be reclassified as being in Rec 0ver In addition to the Exercise Weakness, the following items should be considered for improvement:
- A senior manager in the TSC and EOF should review and approve all message forms intended for transmittal to NRC Duty Officers to better ensure that these messages contain complete and clear information.
4 *
Plant specific and licensee-specific acronyms should not be utilized in communications with NRC Duty Officers unless they are adequately explaine *
The specific reason (s) for an emergency reclassification should be clearly communicated to NRC Outy Officer c. Transportation Accident and Medical Emergency Response
'
An integral part of the scenario was a traffic accident along a plant access road that involved a motorcycle and a truck carrying a shipment of Dry Active Waste (DAV). Both vehicles were simulate Uncontaminated trash was used to simulate OAW which supposedly came out of several barrels as a result of the collision. The motorcyclist and truck driver, both portrayed by roleplayers, were injured in the l collision, the latter also becoming contaminated by the simulated
DA Some windblown DAW was later retrieved by a third roleplayer, who portrayed a frightened, teenaged passerby. Local police were not exercise participants. The local rescue squad did participate to the extent that the victims were given onscene care and were placed in an ambulance.
i i
-
., .-
NRC inspectors evaluated the licensee's response efforts at the accident scene and in the CR, TSC, EOF, and the onsite Radiation Protection Office. The performances of emergency responders at these locations ranged from good to inadequate, as indicated in the following paragraphs. The overall evaluation was that the licensee's emergency organization did not adequately respond to the Transportation Accident involving personnel injuries with and without contamination complications. This is an Exercise Weakness (No. 50-295/88018-04).
The vehicle accident occurred at 9:15 a.m. The CR and Radiation Protection Office (RPO) were notified about ten minutes later. A foreman in the RPO had initial difficulty in obtaining a Radiation Protection Technician (RPT) to send to the accident scene. Another individual was in the midst of briefing some nearby onshift RPTs and did not want his briefing interrupted by exercise players. An RPT was soon selected and dispatched to the accident scene. Two additional RP0 were later selected to respond to the acciden However, they did not leave the RPO for almost 30 minutes after being selected. They were, however, prudently told to drive the
"GSEP Van," which is equipped for use by offsite survey teams, to the accident scene. While they brought some needed Health Physics supplies and communications equipment to the accident scene, they did not leave the RPO in a timely manne The first responder to reach the accident scene was a Station security officer who drove to the scene 28 minutes after the accident. He did not attempt to aid the victims. He was aware that
,
the local rescue squad had been requested. The officer began to
. fill out a report form until the local rescue squad arrived at about 9:53 They would not approach the victims until RPTs were present to assist them, which finally occurred at abuut 10:02 when two RPTs arrived in the "GSEP Van." Thus, the victims were not examined to ascertain the extent of their injuries for an unacceptable 50 minutes after the acciden The motorcyclist was initially unconscious with no other obvious injuries. The RPTs correctly concluded from surveys that he was not contaminate The truck driver was conscious, but dazed and confused. He had had make-up applied to simulate facial lacerations with bleeding and an arm fracture with arterial bleeding. He also complained of chest and shoulder injuries. He was surveyed and correctly determined to be contaminated. The truck driver's vital signs were not assessed for an unacceptable one hour after the accident. Neither victim was even provided with a blanket for
! prevention against shock or for warmth due to their injuries and the ambient condition . .
,
The ambulance had been parked in an uncontaminated are However, the driver would not leave the scene until the outside of the ambulance had been surveyed for contamination. This was not done for several minutes until an RPT had finished cordoning off the presumably contaminated area downwind of the acciden Ths net result was that hospita! treatment of the victims was unacceptably further delayed. An RPT with a survey instrument was correctly sent with the ambulance. However, this left personnel at the scene without a survey instrument suitable for assessing personnel contaminatio At the exit interview, the licensee indicated that there had been some late confusion as to the extent to which the local rescue squad was to participate beyond driving to the accide-r. scene. It was also mentioned that not all of the rescue squac's personnel who participated in the exercise had had previous exercise experienc t The medical response portion of the Transportation Accident situation terminated once the victims were in the ambulanc While one of the victims was being transferred to the ambulance, the roleplayer portraying a teenaged passerby arrived carrying a bag clearly labeled "radioactive" to simulate DAW. As the RPTs and rescue squard's attention was focused on the accident victims, the passerby was essentially ignored. He returned about 20 minutes later at 10:45 a.m., shortly before a security guard unintentionally entered the contaminated area. This time the roleplayer was noticed.
- He complied with instructions to remain in the contaminated area until
'
a survey instrument was available, since he was told that he was potentially contaminate The RPTs who had arrived in the "GSEP Van" made at ' east four requests for additional manpower and supplies, neti.ner of which
- were not forth coming in a timely and adequate manner. Another RPT finally walked to the scene at about 11:22 a.m., after waiting some unknown time for a ride from the gatehouse to the accident scene, an estimated distance of only 500 yards. He remained at the accident scene. Another technician eventually arrived with only some of the j requested Health Physics supplies. He then returned to the plant, j per instructions given him prior to leaving the Protected Area.
- The RPT who arrived about 11
- 22 a.m. became involved with the roleplayer portraying the contaminated teenager. The roleplayer i began to exhibit anxiety over the inordinate delay in getting i surveyed for contamination. He wanted to leave or at least telephone a parent. The RPT told the roleplayer that he could either disrobe (in the outdoor contaminated area) and then don protective clothing in order to enter the uncontaminated area, or he must remain within the contaminated area. The roleplayer
,
., .-
refused to remove any clothing. The RPT then informed the roleplayer that he must remain in the contaminated area and that the nearby armed security guard would see to it that this order would be enforced. This indirect threat of force made to a simulated member of the public was totally inappropriate as a contamination control tacti Prior to the scenario time jump at 1:00 p.m., NRC inspectors in the CR, TSC, and E0F concluded that no decisionmakers in these locations had acquired an adequately detailed, accurate picture of the situation at the Transportation Accident scen Before 10:10 a.m.,
the TSC's Station Director (50) had ordered his Environs Director on several occasions to provide him with a complete report on the injury situation and DAW discharge. By about 10:20 a.m., the SD was informed that there were two accident victims, not one as previously reported, and that both were being taken to a hospital. Some summary information on the quantity and radioactivity levels of the DAW shipment was later given to the SD, along with the important clarification that none of the unknown number of ruptured barrels was leaking liquid. Between about 10:20 a.m. and 10:45 a.m., the SD became very involved with the Site Area and General Emergency declarations and the many onsite response actions necessary following these declarations. He continued to ask for updates on the progress presumably being made by the Rad Chem and OSC Directors and other staffs to satisfy the manpower and equipment requests coming from the onscene RPTs. However, it was not apparent prior to 11:00 a.m. that TSC staff u.1derstood how much herculite was needed at the scene and for what contamination control strctegy it was to be used. TSC staff were aware of the contaminated passerby. However, at least four requests were made between 10:35 a.m. and 12:10 a.m. by the onscene RPTs before some of their additional manpower needs were met (at 11:20 a.m.) and some of their supply needs were met (12:25 p.m.)
by TSC and EOF staff Response activities were still in progress at the accident scene at the 1:00 p.m. scenario time jum Shortly before 11:00 a.m., the TSC's SC and EOF's Manager of Emergency Operations (MEO) agreed that EOF staff would assume lead responsibility for all activities at the accioent scene, while TSC staff would retain control of a second field survey team in the event of a radioactive plume from the Station. Such a division of responsibility had meri However, the EOF's protective measures staff now had to gain a thorough understanding the situation at the Transportation Accident scene, something which their TSC counterparts had never really accomplished. Also, requests for additional manpower and supplies at the accident scene now had to be directed to and explained to EOF staff before they could be satisfied by Zion Station personnel. At one point, the MEO even sent one of his directors several hundred yards down the road to the
. .
,
accident scene in a somewhat successful attempt to provide the ME0 with a better picture of the accident situation and the needs of personnel at the scen Shortly before the 1:00 p.m. scenario time jump, the ME0 and his key aides adequately understood the earlier personnel injuries and personnel contamination problems at the accident scene. The MEO and members of his protective measures staff realized that the accident situation had now become an area survey and contaminated trash retrieval problem. Reasonable plans were quickly forrrulated to utilize Byron Station personnel and some previously evacuated Zion Station personnel for survey and trash collection duties. The Coast Guard and police were also to be fully informed of the contaminated debris situation, while preliminary plans to collect water samples at intake structures along the lakeshore were discusse Based on the above findings, the overall response to the Transportation Accident involving personnel injuries is an Exercise Weakness. A remedial demonstration of capabilities, rather than evaluation of remedial classroom training activities and/or records review, is necessary to satisfy NRC concerns at various tocation The remedial demonstration of capabilities should be scheduled not later than the May 1989 exercis In addition to the Exercise Weakness, the following items should be considered for improvement:
Additional efforts should be made in the Rad Protection Office area to ensure that exercise participants and non players do not disrupt each other's activitie *
The scope of participation of offsite support organizations should be clearly understood by these organizations prior to an exercis *
While the involvement of relatively inexperienced persons as
- exercise participants is encouraged, an exercise should be viewed primarily as a demonstration of emergency response
,
capabilities rather than as a training session for relatively j inexperienced personnel.
,
t d. Operational Support Center (OSC)
!
The Rad Chem Supervisor in the RPO was informed of the Unusual Event declaration at 9:14 He informed the Lead Health Physicist of this declaration; however, no general announcement was made to nearby radiation protection personnel, who were a mixture of I
l l
l l
! 14 l
_ _ _ _ _ _ _ - _ _ . _ _ _ _ _ . _ _ _ _ _ _ _ .
-
c . r
,
participants and non participants. As indicated in Section Sc, this contributed to initial delays in providing support to the Transportation Accident scen The Station Manager's and an adjacent off'ce were converted into ;
the OSC workspace following the Alert declaration. The OSC was considered to be fully operational at 10:05 a.m. O'C activities
,
were observed for the next hou The OSC Supervisor provided a good initial briefing to OSC personnel on events leading to the Alert declaration. However, there was little subsequent attempt to brief technicians awaiting assignment in the Station Manager's office on changing scenario events. The :
OSC Director in the adjacent office was in constant c: eact with
,
the TSC's Maintenance Director over a dedicated teleprone lin '
They had several good interchanges of information and ideas relevant to the use of the inplant team Inplant teams were adequately briefed on their assigned task I Simulated radiation exposures were adequately tracked. There was no apparent attempt to routinely provide Area Radiation Monitor (ARM) ,
data to the OSC for use in briefings and planning of the best routes to be used by inplant teams to and from their job sites. The OSC Director used a status board to track which personnel had been assigned to what inplant team. However, the Director had to urt through paperwork to obtain additional details on these teams, such as what were their assignments and had they been successfully !
complete Based on the above findings, this portion of the licensee's program was acceptable; however, the following items should be considered for improvement:
All OSC staff should be kept informed of significant changes in i abnormal plant conditions, changes in e,*ergency classification, l and changes to command and control of emergency response effort r t
- ARM data should be made routinely available in the OSC for use f in the planning of inplant team mission *
Information on team assignments, team dispatch and return r status, and the teams success should be readily visible on I an OSC status boar e. Emergency Operations Facility (EOF) j The EOF was conservatively activated following the Alert declaratio j The facility's ME0 assumed overall command and control of the '
licensee's response efforts 78 minutes later following a conference call with the TSC's 5 l i
f
[
l
,
, _ _ . _ _ _ . _ _ . , _ _ _ .
,.,_____.,-,___m,,m., _ . . , . . _ . , _ , _ , _ . , . -
. - .. -
., .- l l
i As described in Section Se of this report, the MEO and some of his staff assumed lead responsibility for activities at the Transportation Accident scene from their TSC counterparts shortly before 11:00 a.m. The other major technical problem confronting EOF staff was the loss of feedwater to Unit 2's steam generators, a situation that had lasted long enough to necessitate the TCS's General Emergency declaration at 10:35 a.m. Before noon, TSC and i EOF staffs adequately monitored the affects of maximum feed and bleed on the reactor coolant system in the absence of a feedwater supply to te steam generai.ves. Both staff were adequately aware of the ter.aorary restoration of a condensate-condensate booster pump that was used to supply water to one steam generator. The EOF was kept inforued of the gradual venting and cooling of two auxiliary feedwater (AFW) pumps such that the pumps were available for use at noontim However, TSC, EOF, and Westingh9use staffs briefly debated whether to begin using the available AFW pumps, per the Station's Emergency Operating Procedures, or to continue to feed and bleed at the maximum rat Feedwater flow was re-established to one steam generator at about 12:10 p.m. and to the other three steam gerarators within 30 minutes. Available flow to each steam generator was about 100 gallons per minut Following a sixteen hour time jump in the scenario at 1:00 p.m.,
the ME0 led his principal technical staff in preparing a preliminary list of short-term Recovery action items which adequately addressed the Transportation Accident cleanup and the Unit 2 investigative and repair tasks. Procedures were adequately utilized to lead
! to the correct conclusion that the overall situation could be reclassified from a General Emergency to Recovery, considering the activities that had been reported as completed during the
- sixteen hour time jum Principal EOF and TSC staffs then compared and refined their actions i item lists during a teleconference. The MEO and 50 concurred that the situation could now be reclassified as being in Recovery and that offsite PARS were no longer required. The MEO then briefed the senior representative of the Illinois Department of Nuclear Safety (IONS) who concurred in the reclassification and cancellation of offsite protective action However, several role players
- portraying NRC Site Team members in the EOF were not present during the ME0's teleconference with TSC and IDNS staff Based on the above findings, this portion of the licensee's program 1 was acceptable; however, the following item should be considered for improvement
!
l l
l
'
1 l
!
. ,< .-
NRC Site Team representatives should be invited to participate in all discussions regarding emergency reclassifications, proposed recovery activities within the Owner Controlled Area, and c hnges to offsite Protective Action Recommendation . Exercise Scenario and Controller Actions The exercise scenario was particularly challenging in that the licensee's emergency organization had to contend with two distinct situations. The first was a vehicle accident on a plant access road. The simulated accident included multip'e injuries, discharge of simulated Dry Active L Waste (DAW) articles supposedly being shipped in one of the vehicles, '
and the resulting contamination of one of two accident victims and an uninjured passerby. The second situation confronting the emergency organization was a steam generator feedwater line break, and subsequent ;
loss of all feedwater and auxiliary feedwater sources to Unit 2 long enough to warrant a General Emergency declaration. While ambitious and complex, the scenario was presumably not designed to exceed the Station's
<
emergency response capabilitie By letter dated July 29, 1988, NRC staff approved the licensee's exercise ;
objectives. On September 27 Station management requested that the exercise objective of assembling and accounting for all onsite personnel ,
be deleted due to: the number of contractors onsite in preparation for '
an outage; TSC construction and building maintenance activities in progress; and self-identified problems from a recent assembly drill. The -
{ licensee's request was granted with the proviso that a successful onsite '
assembly drill would be conducted in 1988 to satisfy the Emergency Plan's ,
annual commitment. At the exit interview, Station management disagreed with the internal critique finding that the earlier assembly drill had been unsuccessful, despite the fact that some unspecified proceture changes had been deemed appropriate following that drill. Orill records l indicated that 16 persons had not oeen properly accounted for during the
'
drill. The inspectors concluded that the drill was unsuccessfu During 1988, the licensee must successfully demonstrate the capability to
,
'
assemble and account for all onsite personnel within the procedural time limit. This is an Open Item (50-295/88018-05).
The scenario postulated that an Onusual Event would be declared when onshift personnel began a rampdown of Unit 2, per the Technical Specifications, due to an inoperable AFW pump. However, onshift
,
personnel determined that the Technical Specifications also permitted continued Unit 2 operation if a Unit 1 AFV pump could be cross-tied to Unit 2, while another Unit 1 AFW pump remained operable for that Uni CR controllers successfully improvised messages to defeat this pla Onshift personnel then began a Unit 2 shutdown, which necessitated an
-
Unusual Event declaration per the Station's EAl.s.
d
l
"
I
._ . . . _ . __ ._.__ _ _ .- -_. - . _ - - ___ -
.~
~ - __ . _ _ . . _ _ __ .
. .
-
,
L At about 11:15 a.m., CR controllers intervened to keep the scenari: I on the timeline by informing onshift personnel that the 2C !
condensate-condensate booster pump had been temporarily restored to !
service; the break in the feedwater recirculation line had been isolattd; l and that the turbine building deluge system had been installed. Wit h such intervention, the TSC's and E0F's computerized Saf(ty parameter Display System (SPOS) and plant parameter trend displays would have been
'
unrepresentative of plant conditions and would have needlessly confused :
participants using these displays. These displays were eventually turned ,
off in the TSC and EOF about 45 minutes prior to a scenario time jump.
The root causes for these controller interventions are uncertai Possib111tias include: scenario developers failed to anticipate players i'
actions or their reasonable response t mes; scenario technical flaws;
-
f failure of players to initiate appropriate actions; or failure of players
] at the same or multiple locations to adequately communicate. In any event, the computerized scenario data bases could not be adjusted on a i
real-time basis to permit their continued operation as player actions (
deviated in time or in type from those anticipated by scenario :
developer '
'
At about 10:15 a.m., exercise controllers in the CR correctly issued a contingency message to the Acting Station Director then in command and i control of emergency response activitiet. Issuance of the contingency i
message meant that that individual had failed to recognize for almost l 1 30 minutes that total loss of feedwater to Unit 2's steam generators required a Site Area Emergency declaration per the EALs. The TSC's !
Station Director was unaware of the contingency message and re-entered
- the CR to recommend a Site Area Emergency declaration and to reiteve the ,
l Acting Station Director of overall command and control responsibilit :
As indicated by the Exercise Weakness in Section 5a of this report, the ;
,
Site Area Emergency was not declared in a timely manner by the Acting l Station Director. Issuance of the contingency message was appropriate, j One example of improper controller action was identified. A participant i asked an exercise controller at the Transportation Accident scene whether !
the truck driver, who was one of the victims portrayed by a roleplayer, !
could be presumed to be still aliv The controller indicated '. hat the t victim was alive, and gave the participant a scenario message that ;
described the sictim's injuries in greater detail before the particMar t t had completed his own assessment of the victim's wounds and comr -a..' m l tMs "sessment to his superior !
t n er . ion to the Open Item, the following itera should be considerec !
t<. -rovement:
- The licensee should have the capability of making real-time adjustments to computerized scenario data in the event that participants take unanticipated, early, or late actions which
. _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ - _ _ _ ___
y
.
- .
I result in plant parameter values being different from those preprogrammed for computerized displays. This capability should add additional realism to the exercise end enhance the ability to evaluate player pe formance.
'
Controllers should respond to information requests without providing r u,; solicited informatio ;
.
7. TMI Safety Issues Management System (SIMS) Items !
r On October 31, 1980, the NRC issued NUREG-0737, which incorporated into one document all TMI-related items approved for implementation by the Commission at that time. On December 17, 1982, the NRC issued Supplement 1 to NUREG-0737 to provide additional clarification regarding ,
Regulatory Guide 1.97 (Revision 2) - Application to Emergency Response l Facilities, and Meteorological Data, as well as other areas. The sta+us of the completion of these TMI SIMS items are internally tracked by t% i
'
NR The below itsting provides the status of the SIMS items relaiad .o emergency preparedness. The listing indicates how the item e s tracked +
- as of August 22, 1988 on SItiS, as well +s what we have determt vi to be ;
'
i the correct and current status of the item. In some cases, the f.istus of l items tracked by SIMS are incorrect and/or should be updated bu a on ;
recent inspection findings. The comments provide a background and basis
'
i
for the current status.
.
II SIMS Status: Open
- Current Status: Open This item refers to implementation of Chapter 8 of Supplement I to NUREG-0737, and should be closed upon completion of the yet to be scheduled CRF Appraisa III.A. SIMS Status: N/A Current Status: Closed This item involved short term improvements to the emergency preparedness program and was closed at the conclusion of the Emergency Preparedness Implementation Appraisal: Reports No. 50-295/81-13; 50-304/81-09 dated i August 26, 198 l III.A.1. $1MS Status: Closed Current Status: Closed t
_ _
.- -- - - - - - - - - - . - - - - - - - - - -
.
- .-
This item involved interim upgrades to the ERF's and was closed at the conclusion of the Emergency Preparadness Implementation Appraisal; Reports No. 50-295/81-13; 50-304/81-09 dated August 26, 198 III.A.1.2.2 SIMS Status: Not Listed Current Status: N/A Thir item involved design c.riteria for upgraded ERF's, but was subseq'antly determined to be not applicable (N/A).
III.A.1.2.3 SIMS Status: Open Current Status: Closed Because this item involved ERF modifications that incorporated into MPA-F-63, 64, ano 65, this item was closed based on the Emergency Preparedness Implementation Appraisal: Reports No. 50-295/81-13; 50-304/81-09 dated August 26, 198 III.A. SIMS Status: N/A Current Status: Closed This item involved the submittal of upgraded emergency plant. This item was closed with the issuance of the SER: Reports No. 50-295/82-23; 50-304/82-20 dated November 19, 198 III.A. SIMS Status: N/A Current Status: Closed This item involved the submittal of emergency procedure This item was closed at the conclusion of the Emergency Preparednest Implementation Appraisal: Reports No. 50-295/81-13; 50-304/81-09 dated August 26, 198 III.A. SIMS Statos: Not Listed Current Status: Closed This item involved an acceptable interim meteorological program. This item was closed at the conclusion of the Emergency Preparedness Implementation Appraisal: Reports No. 50-?95/81-13; 50-304/81-09 Jated August 26, 198 II' '. S!MS Status: Open Current Status: Open
_-
r
,
, ;- This item involves an acceptable final meteorological program and will be clased upon completion of the as yet unscheduled ERF Appraisa III.A. SIMS Status: Open Current Status: Open This item involves an acceptable Class A meteorological model and will be closed upon completion of the as yet unscheduled ERF Appraisa III.A. SIMS Status: Open Current Status: Open
'This item involves a licensee's review of their Class A .
/ meteorological model and will be closed upon completion '
of the as yet unscheduled ERF Apprsisa III.A. SIMS Status: Not Listed Current Status: N/A This item required the licensee to provide a description of the Clast. B meteorological model to the WRC. Based ,
on the current structure of the ERF Appraisal prograat, the NRC is not reviewing submittals cf the Class B mode Therefore, this item is not applicable (N/A).
III.A. SIMS Status: Open Current Status: Open This item involves an acceptable Class B meteorological model and will be closed upon completion of the as yet unscheduled ERF Appraisa MPA-F-63 SIMS Status: Open Current S'.atus: Open l
This item involves a review of the TSC during the ERF Appraisal and should be closed upon completion of the as yet unscheduled ERF Appraisa !
MpA-F-64 SIMS Status: Open Current Status: Closed .
This item involved a review of the OSC, which h was completed during the June 23, 1987 exercise: ;
Reports No. 50-295/87007(DRSS); 50-304/87009(DRSS)
~
dated July 14, 198 '
'
t
!
,
. . . - - - , , _ _ - . - - - _ - - - - , _
- . - - - - ~ - - . - - _ - - - ~
_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ __
', .. ., .
.
i MPA-F-65 SIMS Status: Open Current Status: Open This item involves a review of the EOF during the ERF i Appraisal and should be closed upon completion of the as yet unscheduled ERF Appraisa MPA-F-66 SIMS Status: Open s Current Status: N/A !
,
This item involved the Nuclear Data Link, which has been superseded by the Emergency Response Data System (ERDS).
Therefore, this item is not applicable (N/A). Exit Interview (IP 30703)
On September 29, 1988, the inspectors met with those lice.asee representatives iJentified in Section 1 to present the preliminary inspection findings. A teleconference was cond'Jeted on October 14, 3989 with licensee representatives also identifisd in Section 1 to present the revised inspection firdings following evaluation of additional records generated luring the exercise and feedback during the September 29 meeting. The licensee indicated that none of the matters discussed were proprietary in natur Attachments: : ope of Participation Exercise Objectives Scenario Narrative Summary and Timeline i
i
!
I l
!
,
.- _ - , - - _ , . , - - , , - ,,-a---n -~--r .
_ _ _ _ - _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _______ __
.." ***
- *
ZION NUCl2AR POWER STATION GSEP EXERCISE . .
Septeraber 28, 1988 SC0Pl_.Qf_PARTLCifATIQ3
-
The September 28, 1988 Zion GSEP Exercise is a daytime event to test the capability of the basic elements within the Cormonwealth Edison Company GSE The Exercise vill include mobilization of Ceco personnel and resources adequate to verify their capability to respond to a simulated emergenc The Exercise is a Ceco only event thus there vill be no involvement required by local and State agencie Commonwealth Edison vill participate in the Zion Exercise by activating the on-site emergency response organization and the Emergency Operations Facility (EOF), as appropriate, subject to limitations that may become necessary to provide for safe, efficient operation of the Zion Station and other nuclear generating station The Corporate Command Center nnd Joint Public Information Center (JPIC) vill not be activated for this Exercis Personnel for the TSC and other on-site participants will be on-site at Zion by 0730, the start of the Exercise. The Exercise shift vill receive the initial scenario information and respond accordingl The "Exercise" Nuclear Duty Person vill be notified of simulated events as appropriate on a real-time basi The "Exercise" Nuclear Duty Person and the balance of the recovery group vill be prepositioned close to the Zion EOF to permit use of personnel f rcm distaat location Commonwealth Edison vill demonstrate the capability to make contact with contractors whose assistance vould be required by the simulated accident situation, but vill not actually incur the expense of using contractor services to simulate emergency response except as prearranged specifically for the Exercis Corconvealth Edison vill arrange to provide actual transportation and communication support in accordance with existing agreements to the extent specifically prearranged for the Exercis Ccmmonwealth Edison vill provide unforeseen actual assistance only to the extent that the resources are available and do not hinder normal operation of the Compan /1/vjm 2 ION GSEP 0-28-88 l
- _
.
. _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ -
., , a ,.
. . ZI.QiU ElGLEAR POWER _EIAIl03 - -
lill_GAIP_AKERGIII Septeater 28, 1988 OBJICIIYES HIf1ARL9BJECIIH1 Demonstrate the capability to impleatat the Coeusonwealth Edison Generating Stations Energency Plan (GSEP) to protect the public in the event of a major accident at the Zion Nuclear Power Station. Demonstrate this capability during the hours to qualify as a dayttee Exercise in accordance with NBC guideline M R QRIlH9 O N LGI1 U 31 1) IntLdent._Aatessment._ sad Classif1 sit.lso Demonstrate the capability to assess the accident conditions, to determine which Emergency Action Level (EAL)
has been reached and to classify the accident level correctly in accordance with CSE (CR, TSC)
2) Eglific.i*.1&_.',a4_Gosstun i e a t i on 1 Demonstrate the capability to no t ,1fy the principal offsite
.
' organizations within fif teen (15) ainutes of declaring an accident classificatio '
- (CR, TSC) Demonstrate the capability to notify the NRC within one (1)
'
hour of the initial inciden (CR)
h pertinent the capability to contact Demonstrate organizations that would nor1 sally assist in an (e.g., emergency, INPO,
' but are not participating in this Exercise Murrary & Trettel, General Electric, etc.)
Demonstrate the aD111ty to provide follow-up information/ updates to the State and NRC in a timely and ongoing manner.
] - (TSC, IOF)
!
i an open-line of Demonstrate the ability to maintain communication with the NRC upon reques (CR, TSC, EOF)
I
!
OC022/1/wjm
! ZION GSEP EXERCISE 9-28-88
m
, o ,. 210N NUCLEAR POVER SIAIl03
- 1988 GSEP EXERCISE
Septc;bst 28, 1988 - .
OBJECllYES (cont'd)
3) Etilqlprical Assessmenti Damonstrata the ability to collect radiological sur ty in fo rma t ion , document and make appropriate recor.mendations concerning protective actions for personne (OSC, TSC, E0T) Demonstrate the capability of the Operations Support Center to implement proper Health Physics practices and dosimetry issuance fo OSC personnel and Maintenance Teams dispatched te radiological area (OSC) Demonstrate the capability of the Operations Support Center to implement proper contamination control provision (OSC) Demonstrate the capability of the Operations Support Center to track and document personnel exposures for OSC personnel and Maintenance Teams dispatched from the OS (OSC) Demonstrate the capability of Environmental Field Teams to conduct field radiation survey (CSC) Demonstrate the ability to make recommendations for radiological control for and protection of the publi (CR, TSC, EOT) Demonstrate the ability to brief and update Fielf Teams throughtout the acciden (TSC, EOT) Demonstrate the ability of plant personnel to administer first aid, and to assess a medically injured, radioactively contaminated individua (CR, OSC, TSC) Demonstrate the ability to determine the content of shipped material and adequately account for "released" materia (OSC) Denonstrate the ability to properly retrieve a radioactive material sh ; ment released in the environ =en (OSC)
00022/2/wje ZION CSEP EXERCISE 9-28-88
_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ - _ _ .
t'" * 1988 GSEP.EXERGU I
.
5:ptemb3r 28, 1988 . ,
QJQI.quYE1 (cont'd)
. 4) Enttgency_Facilitiesi Demonstrate the capability to activate the emergency organization and staf f the Emergency Response Facilities in accordance with procedures during the daytim (CR, OSC, TSC and EOF) Demonstrate the capability to record and track major plant status information relative to changing plant exercise events using plant status board (CR, CSC, TSC and EOF) Demonstrate the capability to track and document, on status boards and legs, dispatched Operations and Maintenance Team activities and in-plant job statuse (TSC, OSC)
c EntItency Dir1ction and Controit Demonstrate the ability of the GSEP organization to manage and direct a simulated emergency Exercis (CR, TSC, OSC, EOF) Demonstrate the ability of the Directors to manage their emergenr.y response facilities in the implementation of GSE (CR, OSC, TSC, E0F)
t Demonstrate the ability to cortdinate and prioritize Maintenance and Operating activicies during abnormal and emergency p1&nt operatio (CR, OSC) Demonstrate / simulate the abliity to requisition, acquire and transport emergency equipment and supplios necessary to mitigate or control unsafe or abnormal plar,t condition (CR, TSC, EOF) Demonstrate t.se capability to assemble and account for on-site personne (TSC)
< Demonstrate the ability of the OSC Director, or designee, to conduct periodic briefings of OSC staf (OSC) Demonstrate the use of plant procedures and PIDs, as necessar (CR, TSC, EOF) Demonstrate the capability to conduct a partial shift
'
turnover in the TS (TSC)
00022/3/wja
!!ON GSEP EXERCISE 9-28-83
_
_ _ _ _ _ - _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ - _ _
. * e*
,
ZION NUCLEAE F0WEL1 TAI 1Q3
, - *
133)__GSEP EXERCISE Septc=ber 28, 1988 QBJECTIVES (cont'd)
6) Recovery Demonstrate the capability of the emergency response organization to identify the requirements, criteria and implementing procedures for recover (TSC, EOF) Demonstrate the capability to identify work priorities, procedures and prograss which would be required to return the plant to a normal operating statu (TSC, EOF)
tLolEl
- (CR, TSC) designates the primary areas where demonstration of the objective may occu Dependent on exercise conditions and steps taken by the station, not all areas specified may need to demonstrate that objective. Key for abbreviations:
CR = Control Room TSC = Technical Support Center OSC = Operations Support Center (including Environmental Field Teams.)
EOF = Emergency Operations Tacility 00022/4/wja ZION GSEP EXERCISE 9-28-88
__ _ ___----. _ _-__-____-_-_-----
___________ __
,e . . :
..
' * *
ZION NUCLEAR POWER STATION 1988 GSEP EXERCISE September 28, 1988 NARRATIVE SUMMARY INITIAL _IITUATION: (0800 - 0830)
Both Zion Units are at approximately 100% power with the following major ;
equipment out of services j i
1C Condensate / Condensate Booster Pump i 1C Circulating Water ? ump !
2D Condensate / Condensate Booster Pump 2C Feedvater Pump 2C Service Water Pump 2MOV-RC80005 PORV Block Valve
'
2PCV-RC06 Pressurizer Spray Valve PT-7 " Auxiliary Feedvater System Tests and Checks" is in progress on l' Unit 2 when 2MOV-MS0006 (2A Auxiliary Feedvater Pump Turbine Steam Supply i Isolation Valve)' closes but fails to reopen either electrically or mechanically. This places the Unit on a 7 day clock per Technical Specification 3.7. Also, a Dry Active Waste (DAW) shipment has been authorized to leave the
site.
i UEM1UAL EVErrr (0830 - 0945)
EAL #3A Equipment described in the Technical Specification is degraded
- such that a ilmiting condition for operation requires a shutdown and power decrease for reactor shutdown has commence The 2A Service Water pump fails during operation as indicated by lover than normal motor amps and pump discharge pressure. This event places Unit 2 ci. a 4 hour4.62963e-5 days <br />0.00111 hours <br />6.613757e-6 weeks <br />1.522e-6 months <br /> clock per Technical Specification 3.8.7.D and a ramp down of the Unit is starte IRAMH91 TAT 10BJCCIDENTt (0915 - 1301)
i EAL #11A A vehicle transporting radioactive materials from a Commonwealth Edison Generation Station is involved in a situation with breakage in which radioactive contamination occurs.
' The truck transporting the DAW shipment is involved in an accident with a motorcycle that overturns the truc Four DAW barrels are ruptured and debris is scattered. The North Cate entrance to the site is blocked by
,
the accident.
!
0020Z/1/cdv ZNPS 88 GSEP EXERCISE
l l . o. -
,
IRARSMRTAl10R ACCIDEND_00n5 - 1300) (cont'd) - -
The motorcycle driver is injured while the truck driver is injured and i contaminated by debris. The transportation of the truck driver to the ;
hospital is an Unusual Event (EAL #10A). !
Upon consultation with the Nuclear Duty Officer, the station is to activate the TSC rather than the CCC for better control of the incident i and due to construction occurring at the CC f RCT's must survey the area and recover vaste which has blown over an approx. 100 yard area. Protective actions must be made for members of the public on the beach. During debris recovery, an underage member of the i
'
general public is found to be contaminated from contact with the debri The individual is not injure U MERGERCII_._LO M5 - 1030)
EAL's #3N,4H Loss of all Feedvater AHD all Auxiliary Feedvater AHD the Residual Heat Removal System is not in operatio During the Unit 2 ramp down, the 2B Feedvater pump recirculation line ruptures due to a pressure surge and erosion / corrosion wear of the piping. As a result, the Unit 2 reactor trips with no safety injection require The two motor-driven Auxiliary Feedvater pumps start as required but quickly trip due to steam binding. The turbine driven Auxiliary Feedvater pump is unavailable due to the closed steam supply valv Condenser vacuum is lost due to the location of the brea Due to the Feedvater line break, steam in the area causes a deluge activation in the Turbine Building. The large amounts of steam and water in the area cause the loss of Bus 23 This loss of power results in the loss of *.he 0A and OB Condensate Make-up pumps. 08 Instrument Air compressor, 2A Service Air compressor, Unit 2 Carbon Monoxide monitor, miscellaneous heatet inlet and outlet valves and tle 2A and 2B Condensate-Condensate Booster pump oil pump A site assembly is conducted to account for personnel due to the steam break, i
GENERAL.EMERGERGYt f1939 - 1300)
EAL's #3Q, 4J Loss of all Feedvater AND all Auxiliary Feedvater AND the Residual Heat Removal System is not in operation for greater than the 45 minute Every effort is being made to restore some form of Teedvater to the Steam Generator but being unsuccessful a reed and Bleed is begun on the Reactor Coolant System and a General Emergency declare /2/cdv 2NPS 88 GSEP EXERCISE
_ - _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ __
. .. o-GMERAU'MERGEMI;_GQJQ - 130Q) (cont'd) . -
At 1115, the 2C Condensate-Condensate Booster pump is started. After the 2D Steam Generator is depressurized below the pump shutoff head, it is used to supply water to the 2D Steam Cenerato Af ter 30 minutes, the 2C Condensate-Condensate Booster pump trips due to a short in the motor and the supply of vater to the Steam Generator cease At 1155, the 2B and 2C Auxiliary Feedvater pumps are cool and vented for operation. Auxilia ry Feedvater is restored to the 2D Steam Generator and level recovers into the Narrow Rang At 1200, half of t"e TSC Staf f becomes exhausted and requests a replacement. Shift turnover is demonstrated.
'
RECQYERYL_.0300_ __1410)
Steam Generator level is restored to one Steam Generator. Transportation Accident clear.up is completed. The TSC and EOF must evaluate conditions for recovery entr Detailed plans muat be derived for short-term activities in the recovery proces .
s 00202/3/cdv 2NFS 88 GSEP EXIRCISE
%
E ! O N _ STAT 19.N_1188_CS E P_EXEJt CIS E_.TlBC_L LNE
.
TRANSPORTATION ACCIDENT (225 MINS.)
UNUSUAL SITE CENERAL CROUND EVENT EMERCENCT EMERGENCT RECOVERY JULES f75 MIM (45_M[FS.) _f150 MlNS.) (90_ MINS.)
_
U = -30 T=0 T = 30 T = 75 T = 105 T = 150 T = 300 T = 390 (0730) (0860) (0830) (0015) (0045) (1030) (3300) (1430)
. EAL F3A EAL #11 EAL #3 EAL #3Q SUITIARY_0T_ EVENTS
~
PRIOR TO T = 0 CROUND Rt!LES DISCUSSED ,
INITIAL PLANT CONDITIONS. BOTH UNITS AT 99.5%.
PRIMARY TO SECONDARY LEAK ON 2A S/G OF 10 CP PT-7 FOR 2A AW PUMP IN PROGRESS ON PREVIOUS SHIF D CCB PUMP, 2C W PUMP, 2C SW PUMP, 2MOV-RC80008, PCV-RC06, 2FCV-CD23C ARE 00 T = 15 PT-7 COMPLETION DONE. 2MOV-M50006 FAILS TO OPEN RENDERINC 2A AW F3P INOPERABL T = 30 2A SW PUMP FAIL T = 75 TRUCK WITH SHIPMENT OF DRT ACTIVE WASTE LEAVES CATE AND OVERTURNS AT BEND IN ROA TW3 PERSONS ARE INJURED (I CONTAMINATED) WITH DEBRIS ON ROADWAY. ONGOING CLEANUP OF EVENT WILL COPMENC T = 105 2B FEEDWATER Pt!P!P RECIRC. LINE BREAKS. TURBINE BUILDING *' UMP AREA FILLS UP WITH STEAM AND WATER. STEAM CAUSES DELUGE ACTIVATION. FIRE BRICADE RESPOND IIOTVELL LEVEL DECREASE T = 106 DELUCE CAUSES LOSS OF BUS 232. EQUIPMENT IS LOST DUE TO UNAVAILABILITY OF BUS 23 T = 107 25 AND 2C AW PUMPS TRIP DUE TO STEAM BINDING CAUSING LOSS OF HEAT SIN T = 120 AN UNDERACED MEMBER OF THE PUBLIC IS FOUND CONTAMINATED AT THE SITE OF THE TRANSPORTATION ACCIDEN T = ISO FEED AND BLEED IS E31aBLISHED. PRT RUPTURE DISC PLOWS CONTAIIWENT RADIATION
,
INCREASES. HOTWELL PAKEUP IS INITIATE T = 195 2C CCB PUMP 13 STARTED TO FEED THE D S/ T = 220 2C CCB PUMP TRIPS DUE TO WATER IN THE MOTOR AND CABLE TRAY T = 240 ONE OF THE AW PUMPS IS SUFFICIENTLY COOLED AND VENTED TO START. IIED IS ESTABLISHED TO D S/ T = 300 LEVEL INCREASES ABOVE 4% NR ON D S/C. A TIME JUMP OF 90 MINUTES OCCURS. DURING THIS TIME, ALL AW PUMPS HAVE BECOME AVAILABLE AND THE FR PROCEDURE IS ABOUT TO BE EXITE DrTERMINATION IF RECOVERY IS APPROPRIATE IS DISCUSSED.
.
O
- 002'tZ/1/cdw J