IR 05000295/1986029

Insp Repts 50-295/86-29 & 50-304/86-29 on 861117-20.No Violations or Deviations Noted.Major Areas Inspected: Licensed Operator & Nonlicensed Staff Training

ML20211Q290
Person / Time
Site:	Zion  File:ZionSolutions icon.png
Issue date:	12/15/1986
From:	Darrin Butler, Phillips M NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION III)
To:
Shared Package
ML20211Q217	List: IR 05000295/1986029 ML20211Q210
References
50-295-86-29, 50-304-86-29, NUDOCS 8612190235
Download: ML20211Q290 (7)

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U. S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

REGION III

Reports No. 50-295/86029(DRS); 50-304/86029(DRS)

Docket Nos. 50-295; 50-304 Licenses No. DPR-39; No. DPR-48 Licensee: Commonwealth Edison Company P. O. Box 767 Chicago, IL 60690 Facility Name: Zion Nuclear Power Station, Units 1 and 2 Inspection At: Zion, Illinois Inspection C ducted: ov mber 17-20, 1986 Inspector: . . Ef ler /f '

Date Approved By: onte P. Phillips, Chief / /Ikd Operational Programs Section Date Inspection Summary Inspection on November 17-20, 1986 (Reports No. 50-295/86029(ORS);

No. 50-304/86029(DRS))

Areas Inspected: Routine, unannounced inspection on the effectiveness of licensed operator training (IE Module 41701) and the effectiveness of non-licensed staff training (IE Module 41400).

Results: Of the two areas inspected, no violations or deviations were identified.

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DETAILS 1. Persons Contacted

• G. Plim1, Station Manager

• T. Rieck, Superintendent, Services

• C. Schultz, Regulatory Assurance Administrator

• Carnahan, Training Supervisor

• W. Stone, Quality Assurance Supervisor

• R. Landrum, Training Group Leader U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission

• L. Kanter, Resident Inspector

• Denotes those in attendance at the exit meeting on November 20, 1986.

The inspector also talked with and interviewed other members of the Licensee's staff during the course of the inspectio . Training The inspection consisted of a review of deviation reports which occurred during the years 1985 through 1986, to determine if personnel were cognizant of the event and that lessons were factored back into the training program. The inspection was not designed to be an evaluation of the licensee's overall training program. That evaluation is currently performed by the Institute for Nuclear Power Operations (INPO) as part of the training accreditation process. At the time of this inspection, three of the training programs had been accredited. These were as follows:

(1) Non-licensed Operator; (2) Licensed Operator, and (3) Senior Reactor Operator, the Licensed Operator Requalification program had been reviewed by INP0. The seven remaining programs had been formally submitted for accreditation. These were as follows: (4) Shift Technical Advisor; (5) Instrument Maintenance; (6) Electrical Maintenance; (7) Mechanical Maintenance; (8) Radiation Protection; (9) Chemistry, and (10) Technical personnel. Full accreditation was expected by the Fall of 198 Licensed Operator Training Effectiveness (41701)

The inspector reviewed operational events, and interviewed plant personnel to evaluate the effectiveness of training programs for licensed personne _ _ - _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ - _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ - _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ - _ _

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a. Deviation Report Review Of approximately 150 deviation reports reviewed, the inspector chose three reports for further review as listed below:

Deviation Report Number Description 22-1-86-027 Unit 1 Reactor Trip 22-1-86-054 Auto-Start of 18 and IC

, AFW Pumps 22-1-86-066 SI Pump Room 1A Cooler Fans Off Deviation Report 22-1-86-027 dealt with a reactor trip generated by a misaligned trip breaker. The licensee's root cause evaluation determined the trip was caused by insufficient training. Operations personnel interviewed were cognizant of this event. The inspector observed breaker training in progress during a tour of the training facility, and noted that it addressed the weaknesses identified by this even Deviation Report 22-1-86-054 dealt with an inadvertent auto-start of 18 and IC AFW pumps. The unit was in Mode Five and operations was draining SG 18 due to bad chemistry. As a result of the AFW pumps having not been placed in " pull-to-lock," at 10% level the low-low SG level logic initiated the auto-start of the pump Discussions with the operators indicated that they were knowledgeable on the system response to low-low SG water level, but had just errored in following the procedure. This appears to be an isolated cas Deviation Report 22-1-86-066 dealt with SI pump room 1A room cooler fans being turned off. Fan cooler requirements had been addressed in licensee training. Operations personnel were knowledgeable of the event and training feedback was provided via a memo on this subject in Required Reading Package 86-06. The memo addressed the SI room and included additional fan cooler requirements for other safety-related room In all of the above cases, the inspector determined that the training was adequate to address the event and prevent its recurrence, b. Licensed Operator Training The licensee's training program provided several means of disseminating information related to operating deficiencies and events to licensed operators. The Training Department issued and controlled required reading and incorporation of lessons learned from past events into the classroom training subject matte _ _ _ _ _ _ _ - _ _ _ - _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ ~

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The inspectors found the required reading program (RRP) to be well defined. The RRP was used to disseminate information regarding changes to procedures, technical specifications, significant events, standing orders, deviation reports, plant modifications, and NRC correspondences. All of these types of changes would be reviewed initially by the Training Supervisor. The items, if appropriate, were placed in the RRP. Applicable training instructors also reviewed these items for possible inclusion in formal lesson plans. RRP distribution included all Zion licensed individuals, non-licensed operators, radwaste foreman, training staff members, NRC license candidates, and maintenance training coordinators. Required Reading Completion Acknowledgement Forms were required to be returned to the training department within 30 days. Delinquent participant names were sent to security after 60 days with instructions to remove their security badg The Modification Coordinator notified training on each plant modification. Final approval of the training completion time frame was completed by an Operating Engineer (a licensed individual).

Modification training was provided by routine retraining or at the completion of the modification. The modification package may be signed off prior to completion of the training described above two items. The training prior to " Inservice" time frame was controlled on the Station Mod Checklis The licensee's formal training program for operations personnel had been accredited by INPO, and as such included the basics of task analysis. Instructors were required to participate in the Company's Supervisor on Shift (505) progra .

The licensed operator requalification program was fully meeting regulatory requirements for reactivity and control manipulation Review of the licensee's training records indicated they were typically attempting to complete the manipulations required on an annual basis and those specified on a two year cycle within a one year period, c. Summary All the operatiores personnel interviewed indicated that they felt the Training Department was providing adequate training. There was a good feedback path between operations and training. Operators were aware of the opportunities to input suggestions for revision to the training programs. The training department activities were guided by procedures that implemented a well defined licensed operator progra \

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4. Non-Licensed Staff _ Training Ef_f_ectivenes_s_ (_4_14_00)

The inspector reviewed operaticnal events and interviewed personnel to evaluate the effectiveness of training programs for non-licensed personne Deviation Rep _ ort Review Of approximately 150 deviation reports reviewed, the inspector chose four reports for further review as listed below:

Deviation Rep _ ort Number Description 22-1-86-044 Unit 1 and Unit 2 DG Jacket Water Coolers 22-2-86-061 Unit 2 Reactor Trip 22-1-86-058 Raychem Splice Kit Installation 22-1-85-238 18 Accumulator Relief Value Maintenance Deviation Report 22-1-86-044 dealt with DG jacket water cooler outlet valves that were in the throttled position. The valves were required to be open per procedure 501-11 " Diesel Generator System Operating Instruction." Root cause evaluation determined that prior to installing flow control orifices in the jacket water cooler lines, the valves had been throttled to control excess water flow and were not returned to their normal position after the work had been completed. The inspector was not able to evaluate training provided to the individual prior to the event; however, the deviation report will be included in the next RRP and a Training Review Requisition was initiated to determine additional equipment operator training need Deviation Report 22-2-86-061 dealt with a reactor trip generated by an IM inadvertently turning off feedwater pump 2B controls. The IMs were performing continuity checks on feedwater pump 2C controls (Pump 2Cwasout-of-service). The initial continuity checks were performed by the IM's with a vendor representative and a Technical Staff Engineers; however, the IMs had no training on the new control system. Continuity checks continued into the next shift with no trained personnel available to assist the IM. It was during this shift that the wrong control breakers were opened. Instrument personnel interviewed had been cognizant of the incident and how to prevent its recurrence. The IM Department had begun a new system status review during their weekly shop meeting. The Maintenance Training Program will be used to ensure that mechanics who have not received training or have not previously worked on a system will not be assigned to jobs on that system unless they are accompanied by a foreman or mechanic with training on the system. This deviation report was also part of RRP 86-0 ,

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Deviation Report.22-1-85-238 dealt with improper maintenance on accumulator relief valves. The valves were rebuilt and tested prior to having detailed valve maintenance procedures. The licensee had subsequently trained the mechanical mechanics on these procedure In all of the above cases, the training given as a result of the event was adequate to address the event and prevent its recurrenc b. Maintenance Training Each Maintenance Department had a Training Coordinator (TC). The licensee selected individuals who had considerable. experience in their department. Each TC had progressed from the lowest department grade into a foreman position. The TCs were qualified by the licensee as instructors and as on-the-job (0JT) evaluators. The master mechanics selected additional OJT evaluators (typically foreman).

The TC maintained their department Training Matrix in the foreman's desk area. This provided the foreman easy access to the Matrix for selection of qualified mechanics. The Matrix was task oriented and it indicated the number of tasks required to qualify for a particular job area. The TCs were using past work experience to update the Matrix. Mechanics lacking experience were scheduled for formal training. A training schedule was maintained by each T The inspector noted there was no Matrix or record package maintained for qualifying the OJT evaluators on all the tasks. Recognizing the OJT evaluators (typically foreman) have considerable knowledge and experience at the plant, the inspector recommended that documentation be maintained on each evaluator demonstrating their proficiency on all the Training Matrix Tasks. The licensee was receptive to this recommendation and indicated they would pursue i The OJT program was directed toward the application of previously taught knowledge and skills to maintain plant equipment. The OJT program was presented by the Maintenance and Training Department personnel using lesson plans and OJT guides. The inspector reviewed the lesson plan for "Use and Operation of the Explosimeter ELP-BA-1,"

and its OJT Performance Guide, "Use an Explosimeter to Take an Area Sample." The le sson plan provided course objectives, suggested instructional aids, and provided detailed instructions. The OJT Performance Guide ovided instructions for the student and evaluato The guide had course prerequisites, references, and objectives. The contents of the guide included a detailed checklist of action steps to be performe The guide was clear enough to ensure consistency in the evaluation process.

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The inspector observed portions of the Hydraulic Snubber Testing DJT training. The mechanical TC taught the course. The lecture portion clearly stated the lesson plan objectives. The instructor used video tapes, over-head viewer, and a cutaway model of a hydraulic snubber. There was good interaction between the instructor and student. Following the lecture, the group moved into the plant for the hands on portion of the trainin Summary All the maintenance personnel interviewed indicated the Training Department was responsive to their trair.ing needs. Review of the deviation reports demonstrated that their was a good feedback path from maintenance to the training department, and items were being factored into the training program. Maintenance personnel were aware of their opportunities to input suggestions for revisions to the training program. The Training Coordinators understood their training procedures and were implementing a well defined maintenance training progra . Exit Interview The inspector met with licensee representatives (denoted in Paragraph 1)

on November 20, 1986, to discuss the scope and findings of the inspectio The licensee acknowledged the statements made by the inspector with respect to items discussed in the report. The inspectors also discussed the likely informational content of the inspection report with regard to documents or processes reviewed by the inspector during the inspectio The licensee did not identify any such document / processes as proprietar .

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