IR 05000295/1999002
| ML20196D338 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Zion File:ZionSolutions icon.png |
| Issue date: | 06/18/1999 |
| From: | NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION III) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20196D335 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-295-99-02, 50-295-99-2, 50-304-99-02, 50-304-99-2, NUDOCS 9906240262 | |
| Download: ML20196D338 (14) | |
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U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION REGION lli Docket Nos: 50-295; 50-304 i
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Report No: 50-295/99002(DNMS); 50-304/99002(DNMS)
Licensee: Commonwealth Edison Company Facility: Zion Nuclear Plant, Units 1 and 2 Location: 101 Shiloh Boulevard Zion, IL 60099 '
Dates: January 21 - June 8,1999
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Inspectors: J. E. House, Senior Radiation Specialist, DNMS R. B. Landsman, Project Engineer, DNMS R. J. Leemon, Senior Resident inspector, DNMS D. W. Nelson, Radiation Specialist, DNMS W. G. Snell, Health Physics Manager, DNMS Approved By: Bruce L. Jorgensen, Chief Decommissioning Branch Division of Nuclear Materials Safety
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9906240262 990618 gDR ADOCK 05000295 PDR
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- EXECUTIVE SUML.ARY Zion Nuclear Plant, Units 1 and 2 ,
NRC Inspection Report 50-295/99002(DMNS); 50-304/99002(DMNS)
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This routine decommissioning inspection covered aspects of licensee facility management and I
- control, decommissioning support activities, spent fuel safety, and radiological safet l
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Facility Manaaement and Control e Nine open items were close e' The plant's rr.aterial condition and housekeeping remained good, and were being monitored by plant managemen Decommissionino Suooort Activities e Management identified an adverse trend in worker practices and took steps to reverse the tren e The material integrity of structures, systems and components necessary for the safe storage of spent fuel and conduct of safe decommissioning was being maintaine Soent Fuel Safety e The spent fuel pool was operated safely and spent fuel integrity was maintaine e- The systems that monitor and cool the spent fuel pool can accommodate conditions that would challenge fuel pool level or cooling and these systems thus protect fuel integrit e _ Work progressed on the Nuclear Island Projec Radiological Safety e- The number of high risk radiological work activities has been reduced significantly. ;
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Most of the remaining work to be completed before safe storage is completed involves limited scope activities in low dose environment l
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-o With one minor exception, in 1998 radioactive waste / materials were shipped without incident and in compliance with state and federal regulations, e- One-hundred-eighty-nine (189) contaminated filters were removed from the spent fuel pool without incident. Project dose was reasonable considering the expanded scope of the projec e- The 1998 Radiation Protection Program Review report was excellen ,
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. Report Details Summary of Plant Activities During the inspection period, construction of the Spent Fuel Pool (SFP) Island continued. SFP systems appeared adequate to maintain water level and temperature within safety margin I
! Facility Management and Control
. , Onsite Followup. Written Reports of Non-routine Events at Power Reactor Facilitleg (IP 92701)
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1. General The following violations and inspection followup items were reviewed and are being close (Closed) VIO EA 95-283: Failure to implement and maintain in effect certain provisions of the Fire Protection Program. There were two examples of failures to replace emergency light battery packs, and one example of a procedure inadequac Electrical Maintenance Surveillance Procedure (EMS) 03, Revision 1, " Emergency Light Surveillance" failed to identify nonconforming equipment in that the procedure did not specify the use of a calibrated voltmeter or the final voltage acceptance criterion for battery failure. Also, some testing records for the emergency lighting surveillance program were not being maintained as require EMS-03, " Emergency Battery Lighting Unit Surveillance", Revision 5, dated October 14,1998, was reviewed. EMS-03 required batteries that do not meet acceptance criteria to be replaced and the actions recorded on Attachments A and C. A sampling of Attachments A and C from late 1997 through January 1999 were reviewed which indicated batteries were being replaced as required. EMS-03 was also found to specify the use of a certified DC voltmeter and the acceptance criteria for terminal voltage. Section 1.5.2 of EMS-03 specified that completed surveillance should be forwarded to the central files for the life-of-plant record retention. The review of records for Attachments A and C indicated that records were being retained as required. This item is close (Closed) IFl 50-295/96006-12(DRP) and 50-304/96006-12(DRP): The licensee was l
operating their facility in a manner that was contrary to the Updated Final Safety Analyals Report (USAR). Four specific inconsistencies were noted: 1) the requirement to wait at least 100 hours0.00116 days <br />0.0278 hours <br />1.653439e-4 weeks <br />3.805e-5 months <br /> after becoming suboritical before moving fuel assemblies, 2) a normal versus full core offload, 3) conducting a fuel building exhaust system test if a Safety injection actuation was present, and 4) containment isolation valves were not reflected in Procedure GOP- The 'above four inconsistencies all pertained to an operational plant. With the plant in a permanently defueled status the USAR has been replaced by the Defueled Safety Analysis Report (DSAR) and under the DSAR these items are no longer applicable. This item is close .
(Closed) IFl 50-295/96007-OS(DRP) and 50-304/96007-03(DRP): The tubes for the 28 Diesel Generator (DG) Jacket water cooler were found to be 60 percent plugged i and the tubes for the lube oil cooler were 30 percent plugged. The fouling material I was mainly crushed zebra mussel shells, algae, and small fish parts in response, the licensee stated the frequency for cleaning the coolers would be changed to ,
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. Under the permanent shutdown condition of the facility, the DG's are no longer j required to be operable, although the are considered to be importaht to the Defueled Condition (ITDC) of the facility per the DSAR. The 2B Diesel Generator Loading !
Test Procedure (PT-11DG2B) required the 2B DG to be tested every 92 days. The licensee refers to these as " functional tests." The flow path of water through the DG coolers begins with 2B, then to 2A,0,18 and 1 A, which is why the 2B gets plugged first. The procedure requires an acceptance check of the outlet <
temperatures for both the Jacket water cooler and lube oil cooler. Similar procedures exist for each DG. The procedures are considered adequate to address concems regarding plugging. This item is close (Closed) IFl 50-295/96010-04(DRP) and 50-304/96010-04(DRP): Unacceptable in leakage during testing of the control room ventilation syste According to the DSAR, the Control Room Ventilation System is not considered ITDC. The accident consequences in a defueled condition are significantly below the 10 CFR 100 guidelines, and the licensee has taken no credit for control room ventilation isolation in the safety analysis since the dose consequences to control room inhabitants would be significantly low without ventilation isolation. This item is close (Closed) URI 50-295/96021-03(DRS) and 50-304/96021-03(DRS): Discrepancies existed between Section 11.2 of the USAR and the manner in which radioactive waste tanks were sampled and the manner in which the evaporator was maintaine This item was addressed in 50-295/97026(DRS) and 50-304/97026(DRS).
Remaining concems involved an additional review by the licensee of their safety evaluation which evaluated the manner in which radioactive waste tanks were sampled, and the licensee's completion of an evaluation of the radioactive waste evaporato Section 4.5 of the DSAR, which has superseded Section 11.2 of the USAR, provided a description and flowchart of the liquid processing of mdweste in a defueled statu Concems raised in this item are no longer relevant in that the radioactive waste evaporator will no longer be used. This item is close (Closed) IFl 50-295/97008-01(DRS) and 50-304/97008-01(DRS). Failure of the Bulk Power Operations (BPO) officer to answer the Nuclear Accident Reporting System (NARS) telephon This item was tracked by the licensee under Problem Identification Form-(PlF) 97-1438. The NARS telephone was checked and found to be operable. The PlF indicated that the NARS phone was one of many, and that if the grid became busy the BPO may not have noticed it ringing. This was considered to be an issue that was generic to all the Commonwealth Edison Company nuclear sites, and was
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to be pursued by the corporate emergency preparedness organization. In addition, because Zion is in a permanently defueled status, this telephone call is no longer required by regulation. Therefore this item is close (Closed) IFl 50-295/97008-02(DRS) and 50-304/97008-02(DRS) Improper communicator's response during exercise while on the NARS telephone with the State of Wisconsin. '
- Because Zion is in a permanently defueled status, this telephone call is no longer required by regulation. Therefore this item is close (Closed) VIO 50-295/97013-05(DRP) and 50-304/97013-05(DRP): Three instances were identified where two individuals falsified the data sheets for the EMS 03,
" Emergency Light Surveillance," Revision The NRC addressed this issue in the Notice of Violation that was issued under cover letter dated August 15,1997 (EA 97-109) (50-295/97013(DRP)
and 50-304/97013(DRP)). In the Notice of Violation the NRC statod that the information regarding the reason for the violation, the corrective actions '.aken to correct the violation and prevent recurrence and the date when full con pliance was achieved had already been adequately addressed on the docket in the licensee's April 3,1996, response to a Severity Level lil Notice of Violation and Civil Penalty dated March 22,1996. This item is close (Claamd) URI 50-295/97025-02(DRP) and 50-304/97025-02(DRP): Control Room Heating Ventilation and Air Conditioning may not be operable during a Safety injection because an incomplete 1985 modification would prevent the proper closing of dampers.
l According to the DSAR, the Control Room Ventilation System is not considered ITDC. The accident consequences in a defueled condition are significantly below the 10 CFR 100 guidelines, and the licensee has taken no credit for control room ventilation isolation in the safety analysis since the dose consequences to control room inhabitants would be significantly low without ventilation isolation. This item is close .2 y_2K a. - Insoection Scooe (IP 71801)
The inspector interviewed Zion management to determine if the Y2K computer issue had been examined and addresse Observations and Findinos The licensee investigated the potential effects of multiple failures of the onsite computers due to the Y2K issue. The areas' addressed included security, spent fuel safety and radiation monitoring. The licensee concluded from the investigation that the facility had sufficient resources to address any problem that could arise following multiple failures of the onsite computer A
. Conclusions Computer failures due to the YP,K issue would not affect the safety of the spent fuel, I prevent monitoring of effluents or compromise facility securit .0 Decommissioning Support Activities Self Assessment; Auditino and Corrective Actions , Insoection Scooe (IP 40801)
The inspector reviewed a selection of PIFs, and interviewed individuals responsible for investigating and closing the PlF j t Observations and Findinos
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Several events that occurred during the inspection period, and were documented by the PlF process, indicated a potential generic problem with workers not paying attention to detail while performing work activities. These events are discussed belo PlF Z1999-00046 documented an incident in which operators failed to perform surveillance (source checks) on the Unit 2 vent stack monitor (PR49). Operators were required to periodically source check this monitor during normal operation On January 23,1999, channel 10 pump of PR49 failed and the monitor was declared inoperable even though an altemate pump had been brought on line and the monitor continued to perform its function. Station procedure PT-14,
" Inoperable / Degraded Equipment Surveillance Tests," required that operators continue to perform surveillance (source checks) on the monitor even though it had
- been declared inoperable. . The surveillance would continue until the original defective pump was fixed or replaced. The operators failed t, perform the surveillance because, in part, they assumed that the declared inoperable p, ump was l not longer functioning. The subsequent investigation determined that the operators !
had failed to review PT-14 and the associated source documents for surveillance !
requirements. The operators also failed to discuss the monitor's condition during i shift tumover. The monitor was subsequently source checked and found to be
~ operating within specifications. Because Monitor PR49 was not required to be operational per the Technical Specifications, this was a minor problem with no safety significanc !
PlF Z1999-00111 documented an incident that occurred on March 22,1999, which involved moving new fuel from the New Fuel Vault to shipping casks for transport to the vendor. Durir$ the fuel move, the wrong fuel bundle (S06C) was loaded into shipping Cask M-114.' The new fuel removal sequence was cleartfdetailed in the Nuclear Component Transfer List (NCTL), however, the incorrect bundle was i removed from the vault. The licensee's investigation found that the supervisor z responsible for the removal of the new fuel had read the wrong step in tha NCTL j and ordered the fuel handlers to remove the wrong bundle. While the NCTL was ;
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misread by the supervisor, the fuel handling crew could have prevented the incident by noting that bundle S06C was being removed out of sequence based on previous bundle moves. Bundle S06C was subsequently retumed to the storage vault and
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the correct bundle loaded into Cask M-114. The investigation concluded that the
- incident was the result of personnel error but did not constitute a violation of Zion's procedure PlF Z1999-00137 documented an incident that occurred on April 12,1999, in which a non-operator silenced an activated annunciator. Zion procedures require that only
_ operators may manipulate installed plant equipment. The investigation conduded that the non-operator, himself an ex-operator, was trying to talk to someone and because he could not hear the other party had made a poor decisidn by silencing the annunciator. There was an operator in the immediate area so this incident was considered to be minor in nature with no safety significanc PlF Z1999-00121 documented an incident that occurred on March 30,1999, in which the car-shed door leading into the SFP building was opened without the presence of a radiation protection technician (RPT) the radiological barrier across the door was removed by someone other than a RPT. The door was opened to allow a concrete truck to enter the SFP building and pour concrete for one of the Nuclear Island pads. The investigation concluded, in part, that the incident was the result of personnel error and poor communications betwean the radiation protection and maintenance staff. The removal of the radiological posting had no safety significanc In the " Proposed Solution" Section of PlF Z1999-00121, the licensee stated the following: "Recently, a number of events have occurred that independently were not significant (four examples included) however, in aggregate they may be a more significant indicator." The events used as examples induded two of the events listed ,
above. When the inspector asked about this assessment, management indicated I that the corrective actions described in the " Proposed Solution" section were intended to programmatically address and correct all events involving personnel ;'
enors. A stand alone adverse trend PlF had not been generated to address the events because licensee management believed that the events, taken collectively, I did not constituted a significant conostion adverse to quality. The inspectors noted, however, that in the "Why it Heppened" section of this PlF the events had not been i addressed or analyzed collectively and the PlF had been closed before the l effectiveness of the corrective actions had been assessed. Management agreed that this approach had failed to provide workers at Zion with management's assessment of the events. The Nuclear Assessment Supervisor indicated that l generating an adverse trend PlF was not required by station procedures; however, a PlF would be generated to address the issues raised by the aforementioned event The conective actions taken, as described in the " Proposed Solution" of the PIF, included staff meetings and the implementing of a single document delineating basic radiation worker expectations.- The effectiveness of the corrective actions will be assessed in the adverse trend PlF and will be reviewed by the NRG in future ,
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. Conclusions Management demonstrated good programmatic oversight by identifying an adverse trend in worker practices and taking actions to reverse the trend.' Management could, however, have used the corrective action program more effectively to address this adverse tren .0 Spent Fuel Safety , Soent Fuel Pool Safety at Permanentiv Shutdown Reactors
- Inspection Scope (IP 60801)
- Progress of the Nuclear Island conversion was reviewed and the system alterations necessary for its implementatio Observations and Findinas The SFP and support systems were inspected during a plant tour. Construction was underway to convert the SFP to a SFP island which will be independent of plant systems. Two new power lines were being brought in from the City of Zion to provide electricity for the island. Foundation work for the cooling system skids along the east side of the truck-bay was completed. Electric power trays were being installed inside the SFP building to support the new power supplies. Modification to the SFP building air conditioning system, which will enable it to operate apart from the main plant systems, was in process. Electric space heaters were being installe The inspector also reviewed the SFP parameters that are alarmed in the control room (radiation high, temperature high, and level high and low). Also reviewed were shift logs which record local temperature and level indications in the pool. Water chemistry and cleanliness controls in the pool continue to be excellent. However, the inspectors found six wood pallets with four large cardboard boxes in the SFP track way. This material could become unnecessary radioactive waste and unnecessary fire loading in the SFP building. The licensee was removing the materia Conclusions The safety of the fuelin the SFP was being maintained and construction of the SFP island was progressin .0 _ Radiological Safety General -
The inspector conducted reviews of ongoing activities in order to assess the overall Radiation Protection Program. ' Specific findings are detailed in the sections belo . Occupational Radiation Exposure Inspection Scope (IP 83750)
The inspector reviewed the status of the Hazard Removal / Control Projects, reviewed the SFP Filters Final Report and the licensee's1998 Radiation Protection Program Revie '
l Observatk ns and Findings in preparation for safe storage (SAFSTOR), most of the high risk (radiological)
projects have been completed. These projects included examining and recovering new fuel which had been stored in the SFP, deconning the spent fuel transfer canal and Unit-1 fuel transfer canal, disposing of the filters stored in the SFP, disposing of station resins, reducing the station's contaminated space square footage, and preparing an inventory of the non-fuel materials in the spent fuel pool. The lower risk projects that remain included the cleaning of the radwaste drumming room, cleaning approximately 8 tanks located within the protected area, eliminating all satellite radiation protection areas and consolidating all low level radioactive waste into areca located within the prow %d area. Most, if not all, of the remaining
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projects on the hazard remova!/ce.arol projects list should be completed by the summerof 200 The inspector reviewed the licensee's 1998 Radiation Protection Program Review which was written, in part, to comply with the requirements of 10 CFR 20.1101(c).
The review was comprehensive in scope and provided en excellent overview of the Radiation Protection Program during 1998. The review included the findings from
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the 1998 audit of the radiation protection program, findings from the station's Nuclear Oversight Program, findings from the Radiation Protect. ion Program's
. self-assessments, findings from radiation protectbn related corrective documents, and an overview of the effectiveness of the RadiaCon Protection Program. The review conclude that the performance of the Radiation Protection Program had been good in spite of pressures put on the program from plant closure and the resulting personnel change Conclusions -
Work at the site appears to be progressing as scheduled. The 1998 review of the Radiation Program was comprehensive in scope and provided an excellent overview of the program.
i Processino and Removal of Filters from the SFP a, Insoection Scooe (IP 83750. IP 83728) -
The inspector reviewed the SFP Filters Final Report Sr the removal of 189 spent filters from the SFP and discussed the project with the As-Low-As-Reasonably-Achievable (ALARA) Coordinator.
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. Observations and Findinas The project to remove spent filters from the spent fuel pool was successfully completed on November 11,1998. One-hundred eighty-nine (189) filters removed l were removed from the SFP and 172 of those filters worr thioped to the Bamwell site for disposal. The remaining 17 filters ware stored penw shipment to Bamwell in the first half of 1999. The final total dose for the project wo M34 Person-Rem or approximately 0.434 Person-Rem over budget. Since the project's original dose budget was based on the removal and disposal of 125 spent filters,'the final project dose was viewed by the inspectors as being reasonable. The project workers made 365 entries into the Radiological Protection Area (RPA) and the workers spent 971 hours0.0112 days <br />0.27 hours <br />0.00161 weeks <br />3.694655e-4 months <br /> in the RPA during project for an average exposure of less than 1 millirem per hour, Good ALARA concepts were implemented throughout the project. To reduce dose, special tools were created to retrieve the filters. Remote dosimetry was used to obtain dose rate information and the shipping cask was placed adjacent to the pool to reduce the time filters were exposed to air. The final report also had sections on lessons leamed during the project and an analysis of the two personnel contamination events that occurred during the projec c. Conclusions Good ALARA planning was demonstrated during the spent filter removal projec Radiological controls and special tools kept project dose to a minimu .4 Survev instrument Celibieuon
. insoection Scone (IP 83750)
The inspector reviewed an incorrect decay correction calculation used in instrument calibratio Observations and Findinas On June 2,1999, the licensee repor1ed in PIF Z1999-00172 that an incorrect date had been used to decay correct a source (mixed Co-60 and Cs-137) used to calibrate the licensee's RAM 100 survey instruments. To calculate the calibration source's total activity in disintegrations per minute (dpm) the licensee used a spreadsheet as a calculational side. The licensee discovered on June 2 that someone had inadvertently entered September 1991 as the origination date of the source into the spreadsheet when in fact the correct origination date was April 199 This resulted in a calculated calibration value that was approximately 10 percent lower than the true value because the activity of the source had been decay corrected an additional two years. Upon discovery the licensee immediately entered the correct origination date into the spreadsheet, recalibrated the RAM 100s, and reviewed the RAM 100 calibratien records to determine if the low value had adversely affected the performance of the instrument The review of the RAM 100 calibration records indicated that'while a few of the instruments could have been calibrated to the lower incorrect valve, most of the instruments would not have been effected. The RAM 100 has a digital readout that displays activity in dpm. The RAM 100s are not recalibrated unless the displayed
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' dpm are greater than +/- 10 percent of the calculated source activity. Since the RAM 100s have a history of over responding during calibration, the licensee believed
- that the calculated lower source valve would not have resulted in the RAM 100s being recalibrated. In addition, introducing a small under response into the instruments during calibration would not have adversely effected their intended us j RAM 100s, which are Geiger-Mueller counters with attached pancake probes, are j used to survey potentially contaminated materials before the material is released j from the radiological protected area. Since the station does not free release {
material unless the material is totally free of contamination, a small under response in the RAM 100s would not have resulted in contaminated materials leaving the radiological protected are Conclusions ,
The licensee's response to this finding appeared appropriate. The inspectors agreed with the licensee that the a small under response in the RAM 100s would not have adversely effected their intended us .5 Solid Radioactive Waste Manaaement and Transoortation of Radioactive Materials
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The inspector reviewed a selection of documents associated with the radioactive <
shipments made by Zion from March 1998 to January 21,1999. The inspector also interviewed the individuals responsible for ensuring that shipments were made in accordance with NRC and Department of Transportation requirement Observations and Findinas Between March 25,1998 and January 21,1999, Zion made 19' shipments of radioactive materials. The shipments contained a variety of materials including contaminated dry active waste, spent resins, spent filters and oil containing glyco All of the shipments but one, the September 16,1998, shipment of contaminated oil containing glycol (Inspection Report 50-295, 50-304/99001(DNMS)), arrived at their destinations without incident and in full compliance with the applicable regulation The shipping documents contained the information required by the regulations, and the descriptions of the materials accurately portrayed the contents of the shipping containers. The shipping documents were also well organized and maintained, Conclusions With one exception, the radioactive matals shipments were done without incident and in full compliance with '.he regulations. The shipping documents accurately described the contents of the shipping container ,
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i Tours Inspection Scope (IP 86750)
The inspectors toured containment and the SFP and the auxiliary buildir.g Observations and Findinos The inspector noted during the tours that housekeeping in containtnent and the SFP and auxiliary buildings continued to be very good. The buildings were generally very clean and although there was some debris on the floors, most materials were properly stored or had been placed in the appropriate waste container l q
Radiological signs were posted in accordance with station procedures and all containers appeared to be properly labele During the tours the inspector noticed that several rooms posted as high radiation areas were not locked. Although this practice is allowed under the station's !
technical specifications, the Radiation Protection Manager was asked if not locking the doors was a good practice in light of the station's decommissioned status. The Radiation Protection Manager indicated that the practice had been discussed among management and it had been decided that most, if not all, of the rooms would be locked prior to SAFSTO Conclusions in general, the buildings toured were clean and well maintained. The labels on containers and the radiological postings were appropriate and in accordance with station procedure .0 Exit Meeting Summary i
The lead inspector presented the inspectan results to members of licensee management at the conclusion of the inspection on May 12, #999. A discussion was held with Radiation Protection management on June 8,1999. This discussion covered the calibration source j decay correction error that was reported to the NRC on June 2,1999. The licensee ;
acknowledged the findings presented. The licensee did not identify any of the documents or processes reviewed by the inspectors as proprietar )
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PARTIAL LIST OF PERSONS J ,NTACTED R. Boyce, Radwaste Shipping Coordinator p : D. Bump, Maintenance and Rad / Chem Manager R. Godley, Manager, Regulatory Assurance R. LaBum, Radiation Protection Manager R. Schuster, Rad / Chem Supervisor R. Starkey, Station Manager
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J. Waters, Regulatory Assurance J. Zeszutek, Regulatory Assurance INSPECTION PROCEDURES USED IP 36801:- Organization, Management,'and Cost Controls at Permanently Shut Down Reactors IP 60801: Spent Fuel Pool Safety at Permanently Shut Down Reactors IP 71801: Decommissioning Performance and Status Review at Permanently Shut Down
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. IP 83728: Maintaining Occupational Exposures ALARA -
IP 83750: Occupational Rad!ation Exposure IP 86750: Solid Radwaste Management and Transportation of Radioactive Materials IP 92701: .Onsite Followup, Written Reports or Non-routine Events at Power Reactor Facilities ITEMS OPENED, CLOSED AND DISCUSSED Opened None
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VIO EA 95-28 Failure to implement and maintain in effect certain provisions of the Fire Protection Program including failure to replace emergency light battery packs, and an inadequacy of Electrical Maintenance Surveillance Procedure 03, Revision 1, " Emergency Light Surveillance."
IFl 50-295/304-96006-1 Operating the facility contrary to the Updated Final Safety Analysis Repor IFl 50-295/304-96007-03 The tubes for the 2B Diesel Generator Jacket water cooler were found to be 60 percent plugged and the tubes for the tube oil cooler were 30 percent plugge IFl 50-295/304-96010-04 Unacceptable in leakage during testing of the control room ventilation syste <
URI 50-295/304-96021-03 ~ Discrepancies between Section 11.2 of the Updated Final Safety Analysis Report and the manner in which radioactive waste tanks were sampled and the evaporator was maintaine .
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IFl 50-295/304-97008-01 Failure of the Bulk Power Operations officer to answer the Nuclear Accident Reporting System telephon IFl 50-295/304-97008-02 Improper communicator's response during exercise while on the Nuclear Accident Reporting System telephone with the State of Wisconsi VIO 50-295/304-97013-05 Two individuals (three instances) falsified the data sheets for the Electrical Maintenance Surveillance Procedure 03, " Emergency Light Surveillance," Revision URI 50-295/304-97025-02 Control Room Heating Ventilation Air Conditioning may not be operable during a safety injection because an incomplete 1985 modification would prevent the proper closing of damper Discussed Non LIST OF ACRONYMS USED ALARA As-Low-As-Reasonably-Achievable BPO Bulk Power Operations DG Diesel Generator .
DNMS Division of Nuclear Materials Safety dpm disintegration per minute DRP, Division of Reactor Projects DRS Division of Reactor Safety DSAR Defueled Safety Analysis Report EMS Electrical Maintenance Surveillance Procedure IFl - Inspection Followup Item ITDC Important to the Defueled Condition NARS Nuclear Accident Reporting System NCTL Nuclear Component Transfer List
- NRC- . Nuclear Regulatory Commission PlF Problem Identification Form RPA Radiological Protection Area RPT Radiation Protection Technician SAFSTOR Safe Storage SFP . Spent Fuel Pool USA Updated Final Safety Analysis Report UR Ur. resolved item VIO Violation
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