IR 05000295/1998007

Insp Repts 50-295/98-07 & 50-304/98-07 on 980425-0609.No Violations Noted.Major Areas Inspected:Operations,Maint, Engineering & Plant Support

ML20236L449
Person / Time
Site:	Zion  File:ZionSolutions icon.png
Issue date:	06/26/1998
From:	NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION III)
To:
Shared Package
ML20236L447	List: IR 05000295/1998007 ML20236L445
References
50-295-98-07, 50-295-98-7, 50-304-98-07, 50-304-98-7, NUDOCS 9807130012
Download: ML20236L449 (12)

Text

.

.

U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION REGION lil Docket Nos: 50-295; 50-304 License Nos: DPR-39; DPR-48 Report No: 50-295/98007(DRP); 50-304/98007(DRP)

Licensee: Commonwealth Edison Company Facility: 7 ion Nuclear Plant tJnits 1 and 2 Locm;on: 101 Shiloh Boulevard Zion,IL 60099 Dates: April 25 through June 9,1998 Inspectors: A. Vegel, Senior Resident inspector D. Calhoun, Resident inspector J. Ye:,inowski, Illinois Department of Nuclear Safety Inspector Approved by: David E. Hills, Acting Chief Reactor Projects Branch 2 i

i 9807130012 990624 PDR ADOCK 05000295 G pm

_ _ _ - _ _ _ _ _

.

- _ _ _ _ _ _ - _ . _ _ _ _ - _ _ _ - _ - _ _ _-

.

.

l l

t EXECUTIVE SUMMARY Zion Nuclear Plant, Units 1 and 2 l NRC inspection Report 50-295/98007(DRP); 50-304/98007(DRP)

l l This inspection included aspects of licensee operations, maintenance, engineering, and plant l

support. The report covers a 6-week period of inspection activities by the resident inspector Operations

. Operators effectively monitored the spent fuel pool, properly responded to control room alarms, and maintained an awareness of the status of plant equipment (Section O1.1).

Plant Support

!

! * A non-cited violation was identified involving the failure of radiation protection personnel to ensure that proper radiation posting signs were in place following transfer of items from ;

'

the new fuel storage vault.. A lack of attention to detail by radiation protection personnel

'

and fuel handlers and poor communications between a radiation protection supervisor and radiation protection technicians contributed to the occurrence of this event i (Section R1.1).

. Radiation protection personnel and fuel handlers demonstrated good teamwork in transferring new fuel assemblies frcm the new fuel storage vault to shipping casks for shipment back to the vendor (Section R1.2). 1

i

i  !

l

.

l i

l i

i

- , - . . .

. . _ - _ - - - _ _ - _

.

.

ReDort Details Summary of Plant Status During the inspection period, the licensee maintained Unit 1 and Unit 2 in a defueled conditio The licensee continued to implement the plant's transition to a decommissioned facility and completed the installation and testing of synchronous condensers on both Units 1 and 2 on May 26,1998, and June 2,1998, respectively. The licensee installed the synchronous condensers to provide electrical grid stabilit . ODerations 01 Conduct of Operations 01.1' Adeauste Performance By Control Room Operators The inspectors continued to perform routine tours of the control room and the plant to verify that the licensee was performing plant activities in a safe manner and in accordance with regulatory requirements. The licensee maintained control room manning requirements, and both licensed and non-licensed operators were cognizant of the status of plant equipment and properly responded to expected and unplanned alarms. In addition, operations staff effectively monitored the spent fuel pool and assisted in i coordinating activities associated with the fuel shipments discussed in Section R1.2 of i this repor Miscellaneous Operations issues (92901)

As a m!nimum, the inspectors reviewed the existing open items against the following criteria: (1) the issue is not applicable to a permanently shutdown / decommissioning reactor; (2) the issue does not raise potentially generic concems (including 50.54(f)

commitment); (3) the issue does not involve any pending enforcement action or open investigation; (4) the issue does not involve any indication of willful violations; (5) the issue does not involve a potential non-willful Severity Level ll1 or higher enforcement actio .1 The licensee's corrective actions for the items listed below were of concem only for power operations and are, therefore, administratively closed:

(Closed) Violation (VIO) 50-304/97032-01: Failure to restore auxiliary feedwater system to proper configuratio (Closed) Licensee Event Report (LER) 50-295/97005-00: Unapproved mode

. change with Technical Specification (TS) required equipment inoperabl (Closed) LER 50-295/97005-01: Unapproved mode change with TS required equipment inoperabl (Closed) LER 50-304/98002-00: Failure to maintain sufficient service water pumps operable caused by failure to assess plant conditions thoroughl !-

L l- - . - . _. _ - . _ _ _ _ _ _ . - _ _ . _ . - . _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _

__ _ _ .

.

.-- -

.

.

(Closed) Violation 50-295/EA-96-216-01023; 50-304/EA-96-216-01023: Failure to follow procedures for control!ing on-line maintenanc II. Maintenance M8 Miscellaneous Maintenance issues (92902)

As a minimum, the inspectors reviewed the existing open items against the following criteria: (1) the issue is not applicable to a permanently shutdown / decommissioning reactor; (2) the issue does not raise potentially generic concems (including 50.54(f)

commitment); (3) the issue does not involve any pending enforcement action or open investigation; (4) the issue does not involve any indication of willful violations; (5) the issue does not involve a potential non-willful Severity Level lli or higher enforcement action that is still pendin M8.1 The licensee's corrective actions for the item listed below was of concern only for power operations and is therefore administratively closed:

(Closed) LER 50-295/97017-01: Missed TS surveillance on containment isolation valve operabilit Ill. Enaineerina E8 Miscellaneous Engineering issues (92903)

As a minimum, the inspectors reviewed the existing open items against the following criteria: (1) the issue is not applicable to a permanently shutdown / decommissioning reactor; (2) the issue does not raise potentially generic concems (including 50.54(f)

commitment); (3) the issue does not involve any pending enforcement acticq or open investigation; (4) the issue does not involve any indication of willful violations; (5) the issue does not involve a potential non-willful Severity Level lli or higher enforcement actio E The licensee's coiTective actions for the items listed below were of concem only for power operations and are therefore administratively close (Closed) Inspection Follow-up Item (IFI) 50-295/95011-01; 50-304/95011-01:

Review oflicensee respons (Closed) Unresolved item (URI) 50-295/95011-02; 50-304/95011-02: Lack of testing of reactor containment fan cooler (RCFC) containment isolation valve (Closed) URI 50-295/96020-09; 50-304/96020-09: Missing ventilation holes on containrrmt recirculation sump cover (Closed) LER 50-304/82003-01: Blocked safety injection signal while performing safoguards logic testin _ _ - - _

___ _ _

- _ _ - _ _ . _ __ _ _ _ __-_ - - _________ _ _

-

)

.

'

(Closed) LER 50-295/97001-01: Recirculation sump cover plate holes were not l

installed at original constructio (Closed) Vio!ation 50-295/EA-96-3SS-01123; 50-304/EA-96-355-01123: Two !

exan1ples of inadequate corrective action (Closed) LER 50-295/97015-01: Unit i emergency diesel generator and Unit 2 residual heat removal system inoperable and inadvertent engineered safeguard feature actuation while performing TS related surveillanc (Closed) LER 50-295/97016-01: Failure to recognize 125 VDC buses inoperable on 8/15/97 due to DC cross-ti l (Closed) LER 50-295/97018-01: Failure to recognize 125 VDC buses inoperable j during unit cross-ties prior to 9/96 calculatio l (Closed) Violation 50-295/EA-96-355-01053; 50-304/EA-96-355-01053: Failure to j l follow problem identification process procedure.

1  !

'

l

!

IV. Plant Support  ;

R1 Radiological Protection and Chemist:y (RP&C) Controls

R The Licensee Failed to Establish The Proper Radiation Postina 1 Inspection Scope (71750)

'

The inspectors reviewed 't he circumstances surrounding the licensee's failure to properly post a radiation area. The inspectors reviewed applicable documentation and interviewed radiation protection and operations department personnel, b. Observations and Findinos On April 20,1998, a radiation protection technician (RPT), performing weekly surveys on the 617 elevation of the fuel building, measured radiation levels from two containers of radioactive materials which exceeded radiation area sign posting requirements. These containers, measurinp about 6 mrem /hr @ 30 cm, were not within a posted radiation area. The licensee established the proper radiological controls for the containers and initiated an investigation of the incident. Subsequently, the licensee determined that the bags had been previously relocated by the fuel handlers (FHs) from the new fuel storage vault to a posted contaminated area in the fuel building. However, the FHs failed to recognize that the containers required radiation area postings in addition to the contaminated area posting l

-_ -_ _ _ _ _ _

\

_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ - _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ - _ _ _ _ - _ - _ - _ _ _ _ _ _ - _ - _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _

!

I' The Ucensee had established the posted contaminated area in preparation for the FHs removing filters from the spent fuel poi The licensee had designated a FH foreman to oversee the entire filter activity. Duiing the evolution, the licensee suspended the filter rem ( 01 activity and re-directed the FHs to clean out the vault, which required radiation prott mn support. However, the radiation protection (RP) supervisor, in assigning i support for the work activity, failed to ensure that the RPTs provided RP coverage for the l enti e work activity. Although the FH foreman was prasent, he did not question why the l RPis were not supporting the entire evolution. As a result, the FHs relocated the items

! from the vault to the designated contaminated area. The FHs did not notice that the bags werre labeled as radioactive material indicating documented readings of greater than

.005 rem in i hour at 30 centimeters. The failure to properly post the area containing radioactive materials that had readings of greater than .005 rem in 1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br /> at l

'

30 centimeters w;th caution signs bearing the radiation symbol and the words " CAUTION, RADIATION AREA"is a violation of 10 CFR 20.1902(a), Posting of Radiation Areas (50-295/98007-01; 50-304/98007-01). This non-repetitive, licensee identified and corrected violation is being treated as a non-cited violation, consistent with Section Vll.B.1 of the NRC Enforcement Polic The licensee implemented the following corrective actions:

j (1) The licensee established the proper posting for the area.

l

(2) The RP manager counseled the RP supervisor on expectations and l tumover items and the RPTs on demonstrating a questioning attitud l

,

'

(3) The operations manager counseled the fuel handGng foreman on job responsibilities.

l (4) The maintenance manager tailgated the incident with maintenance i department personnel emphasizing radiological work practice (5) The licensee planned to discuss the event with all RPT (6) The radiation protection department planned to evaluate the threshold for using job-specific radiation work permits and performing pre-job briefs.

!

'

The inspectors reviewed the licensee's corrective actior9 and determined that they were appropriate. The inspectors also determined that the safety significance of this event was minimal because the radiation levels and the area within which the containers were stored would not increase the potential for an unexpected radiation dose to personnel. In addition, personnel entering the area were required to wear electronic dosimetry, Conciusion The inspectors considered that the RP department personnel and fuel handlers

' demonstrated a lack of attention to detailin failing to ensure that the proper radiation posting ;igns were in place following the transfer of items from the new fuel storage vaul The inspectors also considered that deficient communications between an RP supervisor and the RPTs contributed to the failure to properly post the are _ __ __ _ _ _ _ - _ _ - _ - _ _ - _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ - _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ - . _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ - _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ - . .______ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _

., __ -_ . .

-

.

.

R Shipment of New Fuel Assemblies Back to the Vendor (71750) Inspection Scope The inspector observed the licensee's actions for shipping non-Irradiated fuel assemblies (FAs) back to the vendor. The inspectors interviewed fuel handlers (FHs), the fuel handler foreman, and radiation protection technicians (RPTs). The inspectors also

}

reviewed applicable procedures and documentatio Observations and Findinas On May 29,1998, the licensee began removing new FAs from the new fuel storage vault in preparation for shipping the non-irradiated FAs back to Westinghouse. The inspectors observed portions of the FA retrieval and packing ectivitie The inspectors determined that proper management oversight was provided, in that the FH supervisor was present and overseeing all activities. Also, the inspectors observed that the FHs performed the evolution in accordance with applicable procedures. The licensee properly controlled tne work area. Specifier'ly, a foreign material exclusion area was established to ensure that the FAs were not d. .naged by foreign objects while handling the FAs and that debris did not inadvertently enter the casks. The inspectors determined that the RPTs properly performed RP responsibilities by checking each side of a FA for radiological contamination before allowing the FHs to place the FA in the cas At the end of the inspection period, the licensee had shipped 36 of 72 new FAs offsit Conclusion The nspectors determined that good teamwork was demonstrated between RPTs and the FHs to ensure the new FAs were safely and properly handled in preparation for shipment to the vendo R8 Miscellaneous RP&C issues (92904)

As a minimum, the inspectors reviewed the existing open items against the following criteria: (1) the issue is not applicable to a permanently shutdown / decommissioning reactor; (2) the issue does not raise potentially generic concems (including 50.54(f)

commitment); (3) the issue does not involve any pending enforcement action or open investigation; (4) the issue does not involve any indication of willful violations; (5) the issue does not involve a potential non-willful Severity Level lil or higher enforcement actio R The licensee's corrective actions for the items listed below were of concem oniy for power operations and are, therefore, administrative!y closed:

(Closed) URI 50-295/95022-01: 50-304/95022-01: Permanently impaired emergency diesel generator fire barrier ._ __ _- _ __

- _ - - - _ _ - - _ _ _ - _ - _ - - _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ - _ _ _ _ _ _ . . _ _-__-_ -_

'

l l

V. Manaaement Meetinas X1 Exit Meeting Summary The inspectors presented the inspection results to members of licensee management at i

the conclusion of the inspection on June 9,1998. The licensee acknowledged the l findings presented. The inspectors asked the licensee whether any materials examined during the inspection should be considered proprietary. No proprietary information was

identified.

!

l l

l l

!

!

I

!

I i

i

!

i 8 l l

._. . _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ - _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ - - _ _ _ _ _ - _ _ _ _ _ _ _ - - - _ _ _

- - _ _ _ __ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ ___ _ ___ __ _ _ __-________-____ -____ - _-. __ __

,

.

.

I l PARTIAL LIST OF PERSONS CONTACTED !

I l

Licensee J. Brons, Site Vice President R. Starkey, Plant General Manager T. Saksefski, Executive Assistant to Site Vice President R. Landrum, Operations Manager i

. R. Godley, Regulatory Assurance Supervisor l J. Zeszutek, Regulatory Assurance NRC j A. Vegel, Senior Resident inspector  !

D. Calhoun, Resident inspector l lDNS J. Yesinowski, IDNS Inspector I

i l

l I l l

J

.

i f

i i

l I

l

!

_ _ _ _. _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ - __-____ _ _ _ _

I

. 1

'

LIST OF INSPECTION PROCEDURES USED IP 37551 Engineering IP 62707 Maintenance Observation  ;

IP 71707 Plant Operations -

IP 71750 Plant Support LIST OF ITEMS OPENED, CLOSED, AND DISCUSSED i

' Opened l

'

50-295/304-98007-01 NCV The failure of RP department personnel to properly post a radiaCon area.

I Closed 50-295/304-98007-01 NCV The failure of RP department personnel to properly post a i radiation are /304-95011-01 IFl Review of licensee respons /304-95011-02 URI Lack of testing of RCFC containment isolation valve /304-96020-09 URI Missing ventilation holes on containment recirculation sump covers.

I 50-304/97032-01 VIO Failure to restore auxiliary feedwater system to proper configuratio /82003-01 LER Blocked safety injection signal while performing safeguards logic testin /97001-01' LER Recirculation sump cover plate holes were not instal led at original constructio /97005-00 LER Unapproved mode change with 79 rm"'M equipment inoperabl /97005-01 LER Unapproved mode change with TS required equipment inoperabl /97015-01 LER Unit 1 emergency diesel generator and U2 residual heat removal system inoperable and inadvertent engineered safeguard feature actuation while performing TS related surveillanc _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ . _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ .-

- - - _ - __ _ _ - _ - _ - _ _ - _ - _ - - _ - _ _ _ __ - - - . - - . __ - _ . --.

.

50-295/304-95022-01 URI - Permanently impaired emergency diesel generator fire barrier /97016-01 LER Failure to recognize 125 VDC buses inoperable on 8/15/97 due to DC cross-ti /97017-01 LER ' Missed TS surveillance on containment isolation valve operabilit /97018-01 LER Failure to recognize 125 VDC buses inoperable during unit cross-ties prior to 9/96 calculatio /98002-00 LER Failure to maintairs sufficient service water pumps operable caused by failure to assess plant conditions thoroughl /304; VIO Failure t follow procedures for controlling on-line EA-96-216-01023 maintenanc /304; VIO Two examples of inadequate corrective action EA-96-355-01123 50-295/304; VIO Failure to follow problem identification process procedure EA-96-355-01053-1

!

!

l l l I I

f

,

I

11

.

!'

l

!

- _ _ - _ - - _ - _ - - . _ - _ _ _ _ _ - _ _ - _ _ _

.

'

l LIST OF ACRONYMS USED ,

AB Auxiliary building AFW Auxiliary Feedwater CFR Code of Federal Regulation EDG Emergency Diesel Generator -

.ESF Emergency a.ifety features FA Fuel Assemb;y FB Fuel building FH Fuel handlers IDNS lilinois Department of Nuclear Safety IFl Inspection Follow-up item LCO~ Limiting Condition For Operation LER Licensee Event Report NRC Nuclear Regulatory Commission NRR Nuclear Reactor Regulation PDR Public Document Room RCFC Reactor Containment Fan Cooler RHR Residual Heat Removal RP RadiaFon Protection ,

'

RPT Radiation Protection Technicians TS Technical Specifications URI Unresolved item VIO Violation

!

l

- _ _ _ - _ - _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ .- _ _ _ _