Text

Insp Repts 50-295/90-20 & 50-304/90-22 on 900910,24-28 & 1018.Violations Noted.Major Areas Inspected:Followup of Licensee Actions on Previously Identified Items
	ML20062F119
Person / Time
Site:	Zion File:ZionSolutions icon.png
Issue date:	11/08/1990
From:	Dan Barss, Snell W; NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION III)
To:	;
Shared Package
ML20062F097	List: IR 05000295/1990020; ML20062F093; ML20062F108;
References
	50-295-90-20, 50-304-90-22, NUDOCS 9011270096
	Download: ML20062F119 (34)
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U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

REGION 111 Repurts No. 50-295/90020(DRSS);50-304/90022(DRSS)

Docket Nos. 50-295; 50-304 Licenses No. DPR-39; DPR-48 Licensee: Commonwealth Edison Company Opus West 111 1400 Opus Place Downers Grove, IL 60515 facility Nemt:

Zion Nuclear Generating Station, Units 1 and 2

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Inspection At:

Zion Station, Zion, Illinois Inspection Conducted:

September 10, 24-28, and October 18, 1990 l0 0.' U~

Inspector:

D.

. berss

_ o/sho Date Accompanying Personnel:

(Sestember 10,1990)

J. roster A. Bongiovanni i

whiSA Approved By: William Snell, Chief II/8//o Raoiological Controls and Date

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l Emergency Preparedness Section i

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Inspection Summery l

Inspection on September 10, 24-28, and October 18, 1990 (Reports'

No. 50-295/90020(DR55); 50-304/90022(DR55))

l Areas Inspected:

Routine announced inspections-of the Zion Nuclear Generating l

5tation Emergency Preparedness (EP) program including the following areas:

follow-up of licensee actions on previously identified items (IP 92701);

followup on actual emergency plan activations (IP 92700); and operational status of the emergency preparedness program (IP 82701).

This inspection involved-three inspectors on September 10, 1990 and one inspector September 24-28, and October 18, 1990.

Results: Two violations were identified during this inspection:

(1)a failure to maintain emergency plans and implementing procedures up to date; (2) a failure to complete and/or document completior, of inventories in

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accordance with program requirements. One non-cited violation was issued for a failure to notify the NRC upon termination from an Unusual Event.

One open r

item was identified for a concern with completeness of NARS forms used during

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actual event. notifications. 'A mini-exercise was. observed'which demonstrated-

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-i a marked improvement in'OSC and TSC performance.

Five previously identified

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open items were closed, one of which was an exercise weakness for a failure i-to complete. assembly / accountability in a timely manner. - An apparent

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inconsistency in the use of emergency action levels was identified and:two recomend6tions for inprovement were provided.

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DETAILS 1.

Persons Contu +tj

T. Reick, Technh >1 Superintendent

L. Lanes, Emergenc,.'reparedness Coordinator R. Chrzanowski, Regiclatory Assurance Supervisor 0. Lee, GSEP Trainer

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L. Holden, On-Site Program Administrator

G. Cole, Radiation Protection Technical Health Physicist i

All of the above listed individuals attended the NRC exit interview held on September 28, 1990.

These personnel attended an informal exit briefing conducted on October 18, 1990.

The inspectors also contacted other licensee personnel during the course of the inspection.

2.

Mini-Exercise Observation On September 10, 1990, a mini-exercise was conducted at the Zion Station

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to redemonstrate, in part, the licensee capability to activate and l

coordinate activities in the Operational Support Center (OSC) and the

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Technical Support Center (TSC). This redemonstration was conducted at the licensee's volition following the July 18, 1990 exercise in which performance in the TSC an OSC was judged to be minimally successful.

(See Reports No. 50-295/90012(DRSS);50-304/90014(DRSS)fordetails.)

The licensee's controllers and evaluators monitored and critiqued this exercise along with three NRC observers. Attachment 1 to this report describes the scope and objectives of the mini-exercise. Attachment 2

'i describes the mini-exercise scenario.

The following is a summary of observations made by the NRC observers:

J. Foster in the TSC and OSC, A. Bongiovanni in the TSC and Control Room (CR) and D. Barss in the OSC and decon facility.

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Technical Support Center (TSC)

Office space adjacent to the' actual Control Room is currently utilized for the Technical Support Center (TSC) at Zion. This space is relatively small and not conducive to the efficient layout of a TSC. A new facility is under construction for the Zion TSC, and should be operational in early 1991.

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The Shift Engineer declared the Alert at 0815 hours0.00943 days 0.226 hours 0.00135 weeks 3.101075e-4 months .

The last

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response organization manager to assemble in the control room /TSC area arrived at 0851 hours0.00985 days 0.236 hours 0.00141 weeks 3.238055e-4 months .- Command and control was assumed by the l

TSC at 0915 hours0.0106 days 0.254 hours 0.00151 weeks 3.481575e-4 months . Other TSC persor.nel assumed their roles on entry into the area. The briefings by the station managers were complete and very detailed.

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The licensee properly declared a Site Area Emergency at approximately 0910 hours0.0105 days 0.253 hours 0.0015 weeks 3.46255e-4 months . All personnel were accounted for approximately 25 minutes

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later.

One person, who was in a trailer located within the protected area, did not hear the alarm; however, he was notified by security and proceeded to the assembly area. An announcement was made at 0937 hours0.0108 days 0.26 hours 0.00155 weeks 3.565285e-4 months that all personnel were ecc~.'r.te:: Tur.

Identification of drill players positions was not. evident; position labels had been placed on desk surfaces, but were almost totally obscured by documents, printouts, and supplies in use.

Position labels could be converted to stand-up signs or suspended from the ceiling, and this would make them more visible and serve to maximize i

desk space, At apprcximately 0950 hours0.011 days 0.264 hours 0.00157 weeks 3.61475e-4 months , discussion in the TSC indicated that a General Emergency (GE) should be declared based on dose projections

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of more than one Rem at the site boundary. The decision to upgrade to the General Emergency was promptly and properly made.

Resulting Protective Action Recomendations (PARS) were discussed for several minutes, as it was realized that the release plume was based on a finite amount of radioactivity released from the damaged fuel assembly. As such. TSC personnel realized that the intensity of the plume would begin lessening in the very near future.

A two hour default was utilized for the off-site dose projection performed, and it was not clear that this value was justified.

Standard default release times utilized by other midwest utilities

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range form four hours to eight hours, with four hours being the most common.

It is recommended that the default release time incorporated i

into the off-site dose projection software be reevaluated.

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printout from the dose projection sof tware also did not provide information as to the input values. This made assessment of the validity of the completed dose projection difficult.

It was not clear whether the input values included an iodine component.

TheNuclearAccidentReportingSystem(NARS)formfortheGE declaration was transmitted to the State of. Illinois at approximately

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1004 hours0.0116 days 0.279 hours 0.00166 weeks 3.82022e-4 months , within the required fifteen minutes of-the emergency classification change.

At 1011 hours0.0117 days 0.281 hours 0.00167 weeks 3.846855e-4 months , a staff update was provided to TSC 1ersonnel. This j

update briefing was excellent, detailing plant proalems and efforts being made to mitigate the accident.

It was noted;during the update briefing that a (simulated) site evacuation was in progress, b.

_ Operations Support Center (OSC)

l At 0824 hours0.00954 days 0.229 hours 0.00136 weeks 3.13532e-4 months , the first personnel began arriving at the Operations l

Support Center (OSC).

These personnel referred to tha procedure

defining the OSC layout (EPIP 210-1, Revision 0) and began x ttir,9 i

i up the facility as designated on the layout diagram (Attachment E).

The exact directional layout of some tables is not clear in the procedure, but responding personnel appeared aware of correct table

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positions.

Remodeling of the room utilized for the OSC is currently

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in progress, so the finalized chair and table layout was not exactly as that 3rovided in the procedure, but differences were minimal and unavoida)le.

At 0832 hows, the bulk of the OSC responders, including the OSC Director arrived at the f acility.

Radios, survey instruments 6nd other equipment was rapidly set up, and a quarterly inventory checklist was utilized to assure that required supplies were available. Digital dosimeters were assigned, and a check point was establishtd.

All set up actions were rapidly and professionally performed.

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At 0837 hours0.00969 days 0.233 hours 0.00138 weeks 3.184785e-4 months , the OSC Supervisor proviJed the first of a aumber of OSC staff briefings via the OSC public address system.

Briefings were considered excellent, being concise and informative, i

The OSC has several status boards:

an "in OSC" board provides a listing of available manpower, color-coded by discipline; on "out on task" board provides the status of active teams; and ")riorities",

" facilities activated", and Emergency Action Level (EA.) boards provide other needed information. The "out on task" board accounted for personnel already present in the plant when the drill began, a point often overlooked.

l By 0857 hours0.00992 days 0.238 hours 0.00142 weeks 3.260885e-4 months , the total manning list had oeen completed, and as of 0900 hours0.0104 days 0.25 hours 0.00149 weeks 3.4245e-4 months , two tasks were being assigned, with first priority determined to be getting health physics personnel into the l

containment building to determine ambient dose rates.

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flow was good, with OSC personnel aware, as of 0903 hours0.0105 days 0.251 hours 0.00149 weeks 3.435915e-4 months , that there had been a (scenario) dropped fuel assembly in the containment building.

The OSC Director made a good determination that an environs team i

should be sent out to monitor onsite dose levels. This

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recommendation was passed to the Control Room.

A new card reader is available in the OSC.

The OSC Director directed accountability to start when the assembly / accountability i

announcement was not heard in the OSC. The public address system was later turned up, but plant pages were still barely audible in the OSC. MC personnel reported to the card reader, by table, in an unhurried and professional manner.

At approximately 1030 hours0.0119 days 0.286 hours 0.0017 weeks 3.91915e-4 months ,'a sump pump in the crib house actually failed (not a part of the drill), and water levels in the crib

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house began to rise. At approximately 1040 hours0.012 days 0.289 hours 0.00172 weeks 3.9572e-4 months , the Station Director indicated that the actual crib house flooding was sufficiently significant to warrant increased attention, and the drill had progressed to a point where the major objectives had been demonstrated.

The drill was then halted. A good critique i

was held af ter the drill, and controllers / participants actively

critiqued their actions.

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Overall, TSC and OSC performance was accept 6ble and much improved

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from the July 18, 1990 exercise.

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No violations or deviations were identified.

3.

Licensee Actions on Previously identification 1.tems (IP 92701)

_(0 pen) Open item No. 295/07005-02; 304/87005-02:

Review acceptability of the Technical Support Center (TSC) Ventilation System. These items will remain open pending a future inspection following completion of the new TSC.

_(0 pen) Open Item No. 295/88006-01:

Repair and periodically test the EOF'

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emergency ventilation system and PING monitor.

Procedure IM-0R-AR19 is to be revised by 12/1/90.

This item will remain open pending a further evaluation during a future inspection.

_(Open)OpenitemNo. 295/90012-01:

The failure of the TSC to aggressively pursue and receive plant parameter updates from alternate sources in a

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timely manner. This was not demonstrated in the mini-exercise and will remain open pending a future inspection.-

(Closed) Open Item No. 295/90012-02:

The failure of the TSC to demonstrate the ability to c61culate offsite dose projections. As discussed in section 28. above, the licensee successfully demonstrated the ability to calculate offsite dose projections.

This item is closed.

(Closed) Open Item No. 295/90012-03:

The failure of the licensee to successfully perform assembly / accountability in a timely manner.

This-was an exercise weakness.

As discussed in Section 2a. above the licensee successfully performed assembly / account 6bility in a timely manner. This item i:; closed.

(Closed) Open Item No. 295/90012-04:

There was no procedural guidance

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i for a preplanned set up of the OSC instructing personnel on the set up and activ6 tion of this facility.

As discussed in Section 2b above, EPIP-210 -3 has been revised to provide procedural guidance for the set up and activ6 tion of the OSC.

This was successfully demonstrated during the mini-exercise. This item is closed.

l (Closed) Open item No. 295/90012-05:

Failure of the OEC to coordinate I

and dispatch teams Tn a timely manner.

During. the mini-exercise the licensee successfully demonstrated the ability to coordinate, establish priorities, and dispatch teams in a timely manner.

This item is closed.

(Closed) Open Item No. 295/90012-06: The failure of radiation protection l

technicians to adequately and fully perform all aspects of personnel i

decontamination including identification of the contamination source and

follow up with proper bioassay procedures.. During the mini-exercise the e

licensee adequately demo %i.,ated personnel decontammtion mathods and follow up activities including investigation of source and consideration of follow up bioassay evaluations.

This item is closed.

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4.

Emergency Plan Activations (IP 92700)

Licensee and NRC records of actual emergency plan activations for the period of February 1989 through September 1990 were reviewed. During this time period the licensee had a total of 21 GSEP activations.

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this total, three events were classified at the Alert level and the remainder as Unusual Events (UE).

The three Alert classifications were all due to a loss of annunciators in the Control Room resulting from power supply fuse problems. Two of these events occurred on the same day, July 7, 1990.

The eighteen VEs were declared for a variety of problems as described below.

Two for potentially contaminated injured persons who required

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transportation to an offsite medical facility.

Four for various miscellaneous problems:

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A fire which required offsite assistance.

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Crib house flooding which required offsite assistance.

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A malfunction of the Control Rocm annunciator horn, A miscalculated offsite release rate.

Twelve events vere associated with shut downs required by Technical

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Specifications.

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Seven of the Technical Specification shut downs involved excessive primary coolant system leak rates.

Though all seven of these events appeared to be very similar in nature, four were classified as VEs in accordance with Emergency Action Level (EAL) 2E, " Reactor coolant system leakage requires initiation of a plant shut down per Technical Specification and power decrease for reactor shut down has commenced". The other tnree events were classified as VEs in accordance with EAL 9A, "A condition that warrants increased a';:areness on the part of State and/or local offsite i

officials". This appears to be an inconsistency in the use of EALs 2E cnd 9A - Complete background information for these events was not aveilable l

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for detailed evaluation by the inspector.

It is recommended that the

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licenset consider evaluating this apparent inconsistency.-

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For the twenty one events which were declared the notification of State-l and Federal officials was ' generally timely.- The licensee did self identify I

one event for which the declaration was delayed cM and a half hours.

In this instance a memorandum was distributed to appropriate station' personnel to reemphasize the necessity of-timely GSEP event declaration. This delay-was a deviation from the licensee's normal practice of declaring an event

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when power reduction for a reactor shut down has commenced.

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determined that in this instance the power reduction was not for a reactor shut down but rather ALARA concerns.

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The licensee did not properly inform the NRC Headquarters Operations

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Center (HOC) in a timely manner on one occasion when a UE was terminated.

This event occurred on September 10, 1990, at 1133 hours0.0131 days 0.315 hours 0.00187 weeks 4.311065e-4 months . The licensee-declared an UE in accordance with EAL'68, " Damage is such that off-site assistance is required to prevent further degradation of the level of safety of the facility," due to a crib house sump pump failure which j

resulted in flooding of the crib house. Additional pumping capacity was requested from several offsite agencies.

By 1700 hours0.0197 days 0.472 hours 0.00281 weeks 6.4685e-4 months the same day, the flooding had been controlled an the VE was terminated. The licensee notified the NRC HOC at 1209 hours0.014 days 0.336 hours 0.002 weeks 4.600245e-4 months of the VE declaration' but failed to notify the NRC HOC of the VE termination as required by 10 CFR 50.72(C)(1)(iii).

The NRC HOC questioned the licensee on the morning of September 11, 1990, of the status of the VE and was informed by_the licensee at that time that the event had been terminated at 1700 hours0.0197 days 0.472 hours 0.00281 weeks 6.4685e-4 months on September 10, 1990, i

The licensee had not completed an evaluation and determination of corrective actions for this event.

The operating crew on shif t at the time of the event termination has been reminded during a regularly scheduled training session of the requirement to notify the NRC upon an event termination. This same subject is planned to be discussed with all operating crews during regularly scheduled training.

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this was considered to be an isolated Severity Level V violation, and the licensee had initiated corrective actions before the end of the i

inspection, this will be considered a non-cited violation based on the enforcement criteria of 10 CFR part 2, Appendix C, V.A.

(0penItem No. 50-295/90020-01),

s The licensee conducted a GSEP event review for most of the GSEP

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activations.

This review included gathering copies of applicable documents such as Shift Engineer's Logs, Nuclear Accident Reporting System (NARS) forms, Emergency Notification System (ENS) notification worksheets,DeviationReportsandLicenseeEventReports(LER).

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evaluation was then made to determine if the classification was pertinent, notification timely and if the GSEP and associated procedures were properly implemented.

Problems identified through these reviews were corrected by the licensee.

This practice of self evaluation i

following real activations helps the. licensee improve their emergency

plan program.

The inspector reviewed the records packages maintained for GSEP events.

No package was available at the time of the inspection for the July 7,

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1990 Alert declarations.

The inspector noted that for many of the events the NARS forms had not been completely filled out. Ten examples were identified where NARS forms did not contain the name of the person contacted and the time of the notification to State officials.

This failure to accurately complete NARS forms is an Open Item (No.

50-295/90020-02). The licensee had previously-identified this problem and a memorandum was sent to all effected personnel on July 14, 1990 requesting they review instructions for completion of NARS forms.

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Ont violation was identified, as discussed above, during the review

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of this program area.

No deviations were identified; one open item was identified; and, one recommendation for improvement was made concerning the review of consistency in the use of EALs.

5.

Operational Status of the Emergency Preparedness Program (IP 82701)

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Emergency Plan end Implementing Procedures There has 'een one minor revision, Revision 6b to the licensee's v

generic Generating Station Emergency Plan (GSEP), and one minor revision, Revision 66, to the GSEP Zion Annex since the last routine inspection. These revisions did not decrease the effectiveness of the approved emergency plan.

Revision 7 to the generic GSEP is still in the review process and has not yet been issued.

When it is issued, the GSEP Zion Annex will then be reviewed and revised as appropriate.

The GSEP Zion Annex has been reviewed annually as required by procedure.

The inspector noted while reviewiag the GSEP Zion Annex, (Controlled Copy No. 501), that pages ZA 4-2 and ZA 4-5, Revision 6, appear twice.

Both pages contain the identical informatica.

This problem was also

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noted in the GSEP manual maintained in the Control Room (Controlled Copy No. 521). Also noted while reviewing the Zion Annex, (Controlled Copy No. 501), was that pages ZA 4-3 and ZA 4-4, Revision 6. had not been removet from the book when they were superseded by Revision 6a.

The generic GSEP, Section 8.5, Step 6, specifically requires that old pages be destroyed when new pages are added.

Five additional copies of the Zion Annex were checked to verify that revisions had been made as required.

Two copies maintained in the Radiation Protection office, (Controlled Copy Nos. 541 and 518), were found to not have been updated with Revision-6a, dated June 1989. Also one copy of the generic GSEP, (Controlled Copy No. 541), was found to contain a GSEP Telephone Directory dated 4th Quarter 1988. This tele-phone directory is required to be updated every quarter in accordance with the generic GSEP Section 8.5, step 8.

Since the current telephone directory revision is 3rd Quarter 1990, this manual has not been updated

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for almost two yeert an* has missed nine quarterly updates.

Several Emergency Plan Imp 13menting Procedures (EPIP)~were reviewed and the following probier.5 were noted:

EPIP 099-1, Revision 3, dated 6/17/87 refers to several Radiation

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Protection procedures by incorrect procedure numbers.

These numbers were changed during the February.to November 1987 time ieriod.

EPIP 099-1 was lest reviewed on. March 31, 1989 and these corrections were not identified.

EPIP 100-1, Revision 11, dated 8/30/90, incorrectly references

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EPIP 360-1, which was deleted February 1,1990.

l EP1P 110-1, Revision 13, dated 1/11/90, and EPIP 170-1,

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l Revision 2, dated 8/25/88 reference EPIP 360-1, which was

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EPIP 410-1, Revision 3, dated 10/14/87 incorrectly identifies

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in step F.4.a the location of'the Operational Support Center J

(OSC).

EPIP 440-1, Revision 5, dated 9/8/88, incorre',tly identifies in

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step F.1.b(1) the NRC Region III Duty Officer is the individual

to acknowledge monthly Emergency Notifications System (ENS)

phone checks.

10 CFR 50.54(q) requires the licensee to follow and maintain an emergency plan.

Section 8.5 of the Generating Station Emergency Plan (GSEP) states the provisions to be employed to ensure the emergency plan and implementing procedures are maintained up to date. As discussed above, the licensee failed to maintain all controlled copies of the GSEP'up to date and several examples of out of date EPIPs were discussed.

This is a violation (0 pen Item No. 50-295/90020-03).

Letters of agreement maintained by the licensee with local support agencies were reviewed. The licensee identified six agencies with which they maintain agreements. Only three letters of agreement were on file. After discussion with cognizant licensee )ersonnel it was determined that four agencies of the City of Zion w11ch are listed separately in the Zion Annex of the GSEP are actually all incorporated into one blanket letter of agreement which was on file, t

The licensee's records pertaining to the transmittal of emergency

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plan implementing procedure (EPIP) revisions to affected procedure

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holders were reviewed. This review indicated that revisions have been sent as appropriate including copies to the NRC within 30 days of the changes.

Current copies of the emergency plan and implementing procedures were found to be maintained, notwithstanding the above discussed problems, and readily available in the emergency response facilities and the i

control room.

One violation. ; identified, as discussed above, during the review of this program area. No deviations were identified in the review of this program area, b.

Emergency Facilities. Equipment. Instrumentation and Supplies An inspection tour was conducted through the Technical Support Center (TSC),OperationalSupportCenter(OSC),EmergencyOperationsFacility (EOF), and the Control Room (CR). These facilities were found to be as described in the Zion Anner of the Generating Station Emergency l

Plan (GSEP).

The TSC is a multiple use facility and was found to be generally clean, orderly and. acceptably ready for use.. A supply of GSEP logs

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L and message forms are maintained for use in f.he facilities.

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communication equip. ment is left connected and positioned at labeled-locations to minimize the facility set up tin.e.

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Raciological survey meters stored in the TSC were found to be calibrated and ready for use.

A check source is also available to verify meter operability.

Each meter was checked and found to be satisfactory.

In the CR, telephones dedicated for emergency use were clearly labeled and positioned to be readily accessible. Appropriate procedures and notification forms were also found to be readily accessible and sufficiently stocked for use in the CR.

The OSC is established wh *n necessary in the new Administration Building sixth floor auditorium.

This is a new location for the OSC and differs from that desc ibed in the Zion Annex.

This new facility is an improvement over the area originally designated as the OSC.

This change should be refle'.ted in the next revision of the GSEP Zion Annex.

Emergency supplies are stored in lockers in a corner of the OSC.

The contents of these emergency lockers were checked and found to be as described by procedures.

One dose rate meter was found

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to have a dead battery: this was corrected immediately by the licensee. A count rate meter was found to have been stored in the locker which was not included in the locker inventory.

This meter was observed to be used during recent drills and exercises and should be included in the facility inventory listing.

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'l Air sampler equipment stored in both the OSC and TSC were found to I

have "0" ring seals which showed signs of deterioration and should be replaced. Also in the OSC, TSC and E0F, thermoluminescent dosimeters (TLD) which are stored for emergency issue did not have a control TLD

designated as required by procedures.

The EOF is a dedicated facility and was found to be clean, orderly and ready for use. A review of general administrative supplies maintained in the facility revealed a shortage of paper supplies for use with copy machines; this was corrected dbring the course of the-inspection.

The GSEP Van was inspected and found to be adequately maintained and ready for use.

Emergency communications systems surveillance records for the emergency response facilities were reviewed and found to be complete and thorough. These surveillances are conducted monthly and include the Nuclear Accident Reporting System (NARS) phones, GSEP radios, GSEP microwave phone system connections, NRC ENS and Health Physics Network (HPN) phones and other inplant phone system extensions maintained for emergency use and not used in normal work activities.

The licensee's inventory records for emergency supplies were reviewed i

and found to be poorly m6tntained and disorderly fi'ed. After additional reviews it was determined that several records documenting i

completion of inventories, (seven quarterly inventories, ten post

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drill inventories, and three monthly inventories) required by licensee

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(The licensee was provided a list of records identified as missing during the inspection.)

10 CFR 50.54(q) requires a licensee to follow and maintain an l

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l emergency plan. Section 8.6 of the Generating Station Emergency

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Plan (GSEP) states that the operational readiness of emergency equipment and supplies are ensured by quarterly inventory and inspection required by each Station's procedures.

Zion Emergency PlanImplementingProcedures(EPIP) 420-1, 450-1, 450 2, 550-1,

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550-2 and 550-6 provide required emergency equipment inventories and surveillance frequencies.

As discussed above. the licensee l

cculd not provide evidence to compliance with the requirements delineated in various EPIP's and the GSEP. This is a violation.

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(0 pen Item No. 50-295/90020-04)

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One violation was identified, as discussed above, during the review of this program area.

No devictions were identified in the review of this program area. The following item is recommended for improvement:

Count rate meters stored in the OSC and TSC could be plugged

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in to an AC power supply to allow trickle charging of the internal battery, c.

Organization and Management Control l

It was learned through discussion with cognizant licensee personnel that there have been three changes made in the licensee's organizational i

l structure which affected emergency planning. All three changes are l

viewed as positive enhancements to the D program. The Control Room l

(CR) operating crew structure was.modif ed to provide a unit supervisor and designated nuclear station operators for each unit.

There was no net change in the num%r of personnel.available on

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shift, only a reorganization and designation of supervisory functions.

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Chemistry and Radiation Protection has been divided into two separate functions. This division has benefitted emergency planning by focusing more specialized training on each group.

for example, the l

chemistry technicians now are responsible for operating the high l

radiation sample system (HRSS) and radiation protection technicians

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are assigned to environmental monitoring and sampling. This focusing I

of responsibilities has improved performance in both areas.

The lie.ensee has not yet revised the GSEP Annex to reflect the division of Chemistry and Radiation Protection.

This revision is planned to be made after Revision 7 of the Corporate GSEP is issued.

The Emergency Preparedness Coordinator (EPC) reporting chain was changed.

Instead of reporting to the Services Director the EPC now

,

reports to the Technical Superintendent. A new individual'was appointed as the EPC effective September 24, 1990.

No violations or deviations were identified.

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Emeraency Preparedness Traininj The current GSEP onsite train,ng progr6m was reviewed with a GSEP Training Instructor and the Emergency Preparedness Coordinator, including a review of the training matrix requirements, selected lesson plans, training records and ongoing improvements to the program.

The inspector reviewed the training records of 18 individuals randomly selected from the licensee's emergency response organization (ERO).

All of the records reviewed indicated that ERO members had completed

'

required training in accordance with the established training matrix or an equivalent coune.

The licensee has been using a cumbersome manual tracking method to review and verify completion of training requirements.

The EP Coordinator and the GSEP Trainer are currently developing a computerized data base to replace the existing manual system.

This should greatly improve the efficiency and enhance the records review process for tracking EP training requirements.

The training program is being improved by an effort to standardize most of the GSEP training across the six Commonwealth Edison stations.

i The trainers f rom each of the stations meet quarterly to discuss the tr6ining programs.

Training is also enhanced by including relevant findings originating from drill and exercise critiques in the annual retraining program.

Records of the 1989 and 1990 emergency preparedness drills were reviewed. All 1959 health physics, medical, post-accident sampling, communication, environmental monitoring, assembly / accountability and shift eugmentation drill requirements were successfully met.

The 1990 drills have not been completed but they are scheduled l

appropriately.

There were a few minor licensee identified findings associated with the drills and these problems were corrected in a timely mar.ner.

No violations or' deviations were identified, e.

independent Reviews / Audits Records of the Quality Assurance-(QA) Department audits and surveillances done in 1989 and 1990 which focused-on the emergency preparedness program were reviewed. All records were readily available and complete.

Several onsite QA Surveillances were conducted which evaluate.d

.

'

various drills, exercises and callout lists. Two onsite QA Audits were conducted, Report No. QAA 22-89-20 for 1989 and QAA F2-90-15 for 1990.

Both of.these audits were conducted by a team of qualified auditors. A prepared and approved audit checklist was usod to ensure adequate depth and scope of the audit.

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An offsite QA Audit, Report No. 22-89-11/111,'was conducted of the

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Zion Station EP program for 1989.

This audit was performed by one ine'ividual using a generic checklist developed for the GSEP area.

%is generic checklist consisted of 78 key items of which only 31 were evaluated.

This audit was adequate to satisfy the requirements

of10CFR50.54(t).

The audit results were documented: no findings,

!

observations or open items related to EP were identified. A brief summary of these results were distributed to both Corporate and Plant management and made available to State and local authorities.

The

_'

offsite audit for 1990_was in progress at the time of this inspection and was not reviewed by the inspector, No violations or deviations were identified.

However, the following-

item is reconnended for improvement:

The size and experience level of the offsite audit team could-

-

be improved. Also, more of the 78 key items identified in the generic GSEP audit checklist could be covered.

6.

_ Exit Interview l

The inbpectors met with licensee representatives denoted in Paragraph '1, on September 28 and October 18, 1990.

The inspectors reviewed the scope

and findings of the inspection and indicated.that certain licensee activities regarding the maintenance of emergency plan ond implenienting-

procedures; the completion and documentation of program-required

inventories; and the timeliness of notification to the NRC upon emergency event termination; were apparent violations. The incompleteness of NAR.c.

,

forir.s was identified and the concern over the~ inconsistency in the'use of

'

EALs was also discussed.

,

The licensee indicated that the information discussed was not of a proprietary nature.

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Attachments:

1.

Zion Nuclear Power Station 1990 GSEP Mini-Exercise Objectives-2.

Zion Nuclear Power Station 1990 GSEP Mini-Exercise Narrative Summary and Event Sunnary

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ZION NUCLEAR POWER STATION 1990 CSEP MINI-EKERCISE

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SEPTEMBER 10, 1990

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DNICIIBS

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I ERIMELDMEGIIH1 Commonwealth Edison will demonstrate tLa ability to implement the Generating Station Emergency Plan (GSEP) to provide for protection of

the public health and safety in the event of a major accident at the Zion Nuclear Power Station. The September 10, 1990 demonstration will be conducted during the hours which qualify as a daytime Exercise in accordance with NRC Guidelines.

SLTPPORTIRG_DBJECTIVESI

>

1) Agarm eent and Classificatinn a.

Given information provided by the Exercise Scenario, demonstrate the ability to assess initiating conditions which warrant a GSEP Classification within fifteen (15) minutes.

- (TSC)

b.

Demonstrate the ability to determine which Emergency Action

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Levels (EALa) are applicable within fifteen (15) minutes of determination of the initiating conditions warranting

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classification.

- (TSC)

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2) Notification and Communications a.

Demonstrate the ability to correctly fill out a NARS form in accordance with EPIPs or EOF procedures.

- (TSC*)

b.

Demonstrate the ability to make applicable notifications to offsite State and local organizations within fifteen (15)

minutes of making an Emergency classification.

- (TSC)

,

c.

Demonstrate the ability to correctly fill out an EMS Notification Workabeet in accordance with EPIPs or EOF procedures.

,

- (TSC)

d.

Demonstrate the ability to notify the NRC immediately after the State notifications and within one (1) hour of the Emergency classification.

- (TSC)

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NOTE: "*" DESIGNATES A PREVIOUSLY NOTED PROBLEM OR DEFICIENCY.

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2) Motification and Communications (cont'd)

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o.

Demonstrcto th2 ability to prtride infermation updatcs to th3

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States at.least hourly and within thirty (30) minutes of

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changes in monitored conditions.

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- (TSC)

f.

Demonstrate the capability to contact appropriate support

'

organizations that would be available to assist in an actual emergency within one (1) hour of conditions warranting their j

assistance.

- (TSC*)

Demonstrate the ability to maintain an open-line of communication with the NRC on ENS upon request.

- (TSC)

i h.

Demonstrate the ability to maintain an open-line of communication with the NRC on HPN upon request.

- (TSC)

!

1.

Demonstrate the ability to provide information updates to the

!

NRC at least hourly and within thirty (30) minutes of changes

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in monitored conditions.

- (TSC)

3) Emeraency Facili11g3

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a.

Demonstrate the ability to staff and activate the TSC and OSC

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within thirty (30) minutes of the Alert Classification in

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accordance with EPIPs.

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- (TSC, OSC)

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b.

Using information supplied by the Exercise Scenario, demonstrate the ability to record, track and update information on Status Boards at least every thirty (30)

i minutes.

- (TSC, OSC*)

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I c.

Demonstrate the ability to document and track all Operations and Maintenance Team activities in loss and.on appropriate Status Boards.

.(TSC, OSC)

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4) Emeraency Direction _ gad _ Control o.

Demon 3trate th3 Obility cf the individuals 12 the knergency

Response Organization to perform their assigned duties and

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responsibilities as specified in Generic CSEP and

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position-specific procedures.

- (TSC, OSC)

b.

Demonstrate the ability of the Managers and Directors to exert Command and Control in their respective areas of responsibility as specified in Generic CSEP and position-specific procedures.

- (TSC, OSC)

c.

Demonstrate the ability to prioritize Operations and Maintenance activities during abnormal and emergency situations.

- (TSC, OSC)

d.

Demonstrate the ability to requisition, acquire and transport emergency equipment and supplies necessary to altigate or control unsafe or abnormal plant conditions.

- (TSC)

e.

Demonstrate the ability to brief and dispatch the Rnvirons Teams within forty-five (45) minutes of determination of the need for field samples.

- (TSC*, OSC*)

f.

Demonstrate the ability to control / coordinate Environs Team's activities in accordance with ED and EC procedures.

- (TSC)

bemonstrate the ability to direct coordination of Environs Team'n activities in accordance with Station EPIPs and EOF procedures.

- (TSC)

h.

Demonstrate the ability to assemble and account for all on-site personnel within thirty (30) minutes of sounding the Assembly Alarm.

- (TSC*)

1.

Demonstrate the ability of Emergency Response Facility Management to provide briefings and updates concerning plant status, event classification and activities in progress at least every thirty (30) minutes.

- (TSC, OSC*)

j. Demonstrate the ability to keep Field Teams informed of changing plant conditions as appropriate.

- (TSC*)

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5) Radiological Assessment mad Protective Actions

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a.

Demonstrate the ability to trend plant radiological survey information for conditions presented in the scenario.

- (TSC, OSC*)

b.

Demonstrate the ability to colleet and document all radiological surveys taken for conditions presented in the scenario.

- (OSC*)

c.

Demonstrate the ability to take appropriate protective actions for on-site personnel in accordance with Station EPIPs.

i l

- (TSC*, OSC*)

i d.

Demonstrate the ability to issue and adminstrative1y control

'

dosimetry to the teams dispatched from the OSC in accordance with established policies and Station procedures.

- (OSC)

'

e.

Demonstrate the ability to establish radiological controls in accordance with established Health Physics policies and plant procedures.

- (OSC*)

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f.

Demonstrate the ability to monitor, track and document radiation arposure to inplant Operations and Maintenance

Teams in accordance with established policies and plant procedures.

- (DSC)

Demonstrate the ability to establish radiological monitoring and controls of Assembly areas in accordance with established i

policies and plant procedures.

- (OSC)

h.

Using information provided by the Rxercise scenario, demonstrate the ability to calculate Offsite Dose Projections in accordance with appropriate procedures, programs and l

guidances.

- (TSC*)

1.

Demonstrate the ability to make appropriate Protective Action

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Recommendations (PARS) within ten (10) minutes of determining l

an Offsite Dose Projection or using an Emergency

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Classification flowchart.

- (TSC)

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5) Radiplorical Assessment and Protective Actions (cont'd)

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j. Demonstrate the ability to perform decontamination of

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radioactively contaminated individuals in accordance with established policies and procedures.

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- (OSC*)

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l k.

Demonstrate the ability to collect field samples in

,

accordance with Environmental Sampling procedures.

- (Fleid Teams)

l 1.

Demonstrate the ability to perform field sample analysis in

)

accordance with Environmental Sampling procedures.

- (Field Teams)

m.

Demonstrate effective contamination control techniques for the handling and storage of environmental samples.

- (Field Teams *)

n.

Demonstrate the ability to document, trend and assess field

,

sample results in accordance with Environmental Sampling procedures.

- (TSC*)

6) Erl.es.allon ob.iectives

.

a.

Demonstrate the ability to identify and designate non-essential personnel within a half an hour after deciding to evacuate the site.

- (TSC*)

b.

Demonstrate the ability to arplain the evacuation route, f

properly brief non-essential personnel prior to the start of site evacuation and arrange for traffic control.

- (TSC*)

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ZION NUCLEAR POWER STATION

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1990 GSEP MINI EXERCISE SEPTEMBER 10,1990

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NARRATIVE SUMMARY.

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INITIAL CONDITIONS (Prior to 0800)

i UNIT 1 -

In Day 9 of a 10 week refueling outage. The Refueling Cavity is flooded and the fuel shuffle is in ~ progress.

The 1B RHR pump is running for shutdown cooling. The 1A RHR Pump and train are Out of Service (OOS)

'

for repairs to the air supply line to the recirc valve 1RHFCV 610._ Both U 1 RWST level Instruments are OOS for modification and calibration.

Decontamination crews are working in containment on the 568' level

floors and the Seal Table room.

Preparations are being made inside the l

Missile Barrier for Eddy Current testing of the 1 A and 10 Steam

.

Generators starting next week after refueling operations are complete.

Main Condenser tube sheet cleaning is in' progress and expected to be i

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completed on day shift.

Repairs to the Main Turbine Governor and Reheat valves are in progress. The Main Generator has been purged for insulation checks of the PMG starting today.

The-following equipment is OOS for administrative control: 1 A and 10 Charging Pumps; 1 A and 1B-St Pumps; all RCPs; all Accumulator Discharge Valves; and 1Sl8811 A andB.

,

t UNIT 2 -

Mode 1 for the last 78 days maintaining 98100% power during the days and load-swings to 80 85% at night.

A tube leak on the 2A Steam

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Generator has been trended at 2 3 gpd for the last 10 days.

Primary makeup does not operate in Auto and has been operated in manual for

.i the last two shifts.

Instrument Maintenance Investigation revealed a'

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problem with the switch on the MCB.

A switch replacement is being planned by the Work Analysts.

The 2B C/CB Pump is OOS for motor bearing replacement and the OA Primary. Water Makeup pump has been

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isolated due to excessive leakage.

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ALERT

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(0800 - 0930)

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At 0800 the Shift Engineer (Response Cell) will call the Operating

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Engineer and inform him that the 1B RHR pump was tripped due to cavitiation when the 1RH8701 valve closed.

1RH8701 was reopened i

about a minute after the pump was tripped.

The Refueling % reman will report that the level in the SFP and Refueling cavily is decreasing rapidly.

The SFP low level alarm annunciates at 0805.

At 0810, the feeder breaker to Bus 138 will trip on an internal fault and power will be lost to the bus and associated MCCs.

Significant equipment affected by the power loss includes the-OB Aux Bldg Exhaust Fan, the ENS /NARS/NAWAS phones, the U 1 stack SPING vacuum pump,1MOV-RH8702 (suction valve from RCS),1MOV RH87008 (B RHR Suction valve),1MOV-Sl8811B (B RHR pump suction from Containment recirc sump), the U 1 Purge Rad Monitors and the Purge system.

At 0815 the

level in the Refueling Cavity will reach the Tech Spec (3.13.10.A) limit i

at 613 feet 2 inches.

An Alert will be declared per EAL #50 (Fuel Pool level decreases below the Tech Spec limit) by the Shift Engineer.- If the OE has not already ordered entry into AOP 6.2, Refueling Cavity / Spent Fuel Pit / Transfer Canal Uncontrolled Loss of Level, the SE will initiate a containment evacuation of non essential personnel and start placing the in transit fuel assemblies in safe storage.

Two personnel from the decontamination crews will be wet and contaminated when they exit the containment and provide information on the location of the RHR leak.

Fuel assemblies w!Il be " parked" either in the core or in the SFP per AOP 6.2.

At 0900, while performing ' AOP 6.2, a fuel assembly

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(X60B) will be dropped over the core and land on' the Reactor vessel flange and be leaning against the refueling cavity wall.

Upon impact the assembly will be bent and break -open several fuel rods releasing Noble Gas and lodine to the atmosphere.

As Radiation levels increase rapidly, the Refueling crew will evacuate the Containment.

Ventilation flow from the Containment, through the. Fuel Building to the Aux Bldg stack will provide the release path.

EXPECTED ACTIONS Operations personnel will be dispatched to investigate the 1RH8701 valve closure at the breaker and check.the RHR pump-

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for damage.

The OE will discuss and may declare the ALERT'

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classification per EAL #3F (Equipment is ' degraded such that only. one system or means is available. for achieving or maintaining a Mode 5 condition (Cold Shutdown) except during controlled, planned evolutions.) with the Shift Engineer, or the Alert will be declared per EAL #5C (Fuel Pool level decreases

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below the Tech Spec limit.) by the Shift Engineer at 0815.

Initial State and NRC notifications will be made by the Control Room (Response Ceh).

Operatinns and Electrical Maintenance personnel will be dimatr+.ed to in.*estigate the loss of Bus 138.

The TSC and OSC wm iso stafied and activated through the established Security callout procedure.

=

J SITE EMERGENCY (0930 - 1045)

~

As the Refueling Cavity level continues to decrease, radiation and airborne levels in the Containment will increase.

At 0930 the Containment rad levels will rapidly increase above 400 R/hr as the

=

dropped fuel assembly is uncovered.

The nobie gas release rate will

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increase to 1.1E7 pCi/see which will provide a boundary Whole Body dose rate > 50 mrem /hr.

The Nuclear Duty Officer / Manager of

~

Emergency Operations (Response Cell) will partially staff the EOF but will not have minimum staffing to take Command and Control within the time scope of the scenano, g

EXPECTED ACTIONS The

!3tation Director will declare the Site Emergency classification on EAL #2P (Primary Containment radiation

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Levels 2400 R/hr) QR EAL #1U (As a result of releases from the site, confirmed field team measurements are greater than or equal to 50 mr/hr).

EAL #91 (A condition that warrants the

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activation of the EOF AND monitoring teams OR a p'recautionary notification of the public near the site) may also ' applicable.

Projected dose rates at the site boundary may also lead to a General Emergency classification.

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RECOVERY

=

(1045 - 1200)

At 0940, power will be restored to Bus 138 by replacing the feeder breaker with a spare breaker.

Operations will then close 1RH8701 (if not previously closed) and 1RH8702 to isolate the leak.

The RHR system will then be lined up for suction from the Containment Recirc sump.

Venting of the RHR pump will be completed at 1015 at which time refilling the Refueling cavity can be started.

At 1045,

"

containment radiation levels will decrease below 400 R/hr.

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EXPECTED ACTIONS

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Once Refueling cavity level starts to increase, the TSC will be forced to make plans for a long term recovery.

Of major concern to them is the realization that the volume of water in the containment recirc sump will only be able to supply water for about two hours. At that time, RHR cannot be realigned for recirculation due to the location of the leak.

Inovative methods will need to be explored to establish a recirculation flow path, l

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ZION MINI-EXERCISE TIMELINE

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8:00 820 0:00 9:30 10:00 10:30 11:00 11:30 12:00

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0800 LOSS OF RHR EVENT 1RH8701 SHUTS /RECPENS 0800 LOSS OF C VITY LEVEL i

0810 LOSS OF BUS 138

~ ^${ $[.^^j

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0900 DROP FUEL ASSEN

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EWO FILL AND VENT THE GriR PUMP

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h1015 FT. FILL REACTOR CAVITY,

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EVENT SUMMARY-l EVENT:

LOSS OF RHR

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DESCRIPTION:

i At 0800 the 1 A RHR Pump suction valve 1RH8701

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inadvertently closes causing-the pump - to cavitate.

The Control room stops the pump, reopenfthe valve:and reports to the Operating Engineer.

When the valve closes, a rupture occurs on the upstream side causing -

si a loss of water level in the Refueling Cavity and Spent J

Fuel Pool, At 0805, the Cavityi low level. alarm -is-j:l initiated.-

At 0815, the low level Tech Spec for the Spent Fuel Pool is ' reached.

U-1. RWST level

instruments are both OOS.

CHALLENGING ASPECTS:-

The. Operating Engineer will be challenged with determining the cause -of the loss of RHR, finding a method to re establish core _ cooling, and

_

classification of the event.

With the-conditions presented to' him, the OE'should consider! activating

!

the TSC for. assistance in' determining-plant

'

conditions.

EXPECTED ACTIONS:

The Op Engineer.will discues the situation with-the

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Shift Engineer and may classify the Aled on EAL#3F j

(Equipment is degraded such that only one system or means is available for ac%ing or maintaining a Mode 5 condition (Cold ShutdeMg except during controlled, planned evolutions.), or the Alert.will.be declared per EAL.#50 (Fuel Pool level decreases below -the : Tech Spec limit.) by the SE at 0815.

Initial: State and NRC

.,

notifications will be made by the -Control Room (Response Cell).

ThelTSC and OSC will oe activated through the established-Security callout procedure'.

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The volume of water available in the RWST is unknown and primary makeup capacity. is limited.

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EVENTSUMMARY EVENT:

LOSS OF BUS 138

/

DESCRIPTION:

At 0810 the-feeder breaker to Bus 138_will trip-on an_

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internal fault.

Loss-of-the bus and its associated L

MCCs will affect the following; major equipment: the.

,

OB, Aux Bldg Exhaubt Fan; the ENS /NARS/NAWAS

'

phones; th'e U 1 stack SPING vacuum pump; the U 1 Purge Rad Monitors;._ the Econtainment purge system,-

1MOV-RH8702(suction valve from RCS),

1 MOV--

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RH8700B (B RHR Suction _ valve), and 1MOV-Sl8811B (B

!

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RHR pump. suction from Containment recirc. sump).

CHALLENGING ASPECTS:

Restoration of ' Bus 138 should become the highest-priority -task for the TSC and OSC.. Determination of

.

the-relet.e (both path and quantity) will challenge the TSC with determining. appropriate Protective Action Recommendations.-

Alternate - phone JIines will be needed to' make contact with the State (s) and JNRC.

RH8702 requires power to-isolate the RHR leak. Water for core cooling will be available in the recirc sump, but cannot be lined up until power is available for closing RH87008 which is : Interlocked-for opening

,'

Sl8811B.

EXPECTED ACTIONS:

Priority will be given to. restoring power to Bus 138 so the leak can be isolated and' refilling.the cavity can

be accomplished.

Field teams will be. dispatched to monitor the offsite downwind. sectors close to the a

plant.

Commercial phone lines will be used to establish required : notification and communications.

The source term. and release path determination will be determined _.by inplant monitors 'and off-site sampling method p

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EVENTSUMMARY

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I EVENT:

CONTAMINATED PERSONNEL'

DESCRIPTION:

Two_ members of the decontamination crews will!

evacuate the containment. In wet anti Cs with skin j

contamination and potential internal contamination.

-A i

simulated-hot particle will be used on one of the I

individuals.

Information on the RHR leak location will j

be provided by these personnel.-

q CHALLENGING ASPECTS:

RPTs will be challenged _with determining-the doses,

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evaluating internal contamination and providing decontamination of these individuals.

EXPECTED ACTIONS:

The contaminated individuals will be decontaminated and given a whole body count. -The-hot particle will-be identified- 'and removed as: a priority _to skin contamination.

An investigation of where they were working will provide information -on ' the location of i

the RHR leak.

SUCCESS / FAILURE PATHS:

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If a thourough survey is not completed, the hot particle will not be identified 'and removed.-

An assessment of the dose recieved by the -individuals

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must also be accomplished.

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EVENT SUMMARY'

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EVENT:

DROPPED FUEL ASSEMBLY i

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DESCRIPTION:

At 0900, while per_ forming _ AOP-6.2, a fuel assembly

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(AdOB) will be dropped over the core, land on 'the

Reactor vessel flange and be leaning -against -the

-)

refueling cavity wall.

Upon Impact the assembly will l

be bent and break' open 'several fuel rods releasing

.

.i Noble Gas and lodine to' the : atmosphere.

Ventilation l

flow from the Containment, through. the Fuel Building; to the Aux Cldg stack will provide the release path.

CHALLENGING ASPECTS:

The. decre& sir.g water level in the Refueling' cavity

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will expose thet dropped assembly at 0930.

Increasing

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radiation and airborn lev 6!s will be t experienced.

The TSC will be ' challenged. with determining alternate methods of reflooding the Refueling.- Cavity.to Leover thel assembly.

. After'. Bus 138 restoration and: the

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refill of the cavity is-started, a long term method - to

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provide' core cooling will still need to be explored.

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Water-will be available from-the Recirc sump for only about 2 hours2.314815e-5 days 5.555556e-4 hours 3.306878e-6 weeks 7.61e-7 months .

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EXPECTED ACTIONS:

Several methods will be explored to stop the RHR-leak and establish a path.to -refill ther Cavity.-

Research will reveal that Bus 138 will allow.a refillclineup with the RHR system.

Long term cooling methods will also.be explored until a core cooling. solution is found.

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SUCCESS / FAILURE PATHS:

Restoring power to Bus 138 will allow realigning the.

RHR system to the recirc sump to refill the cavity.

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EVENTSUMMARY

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EVENT:

RELEASE PATH DESCRIPTION:

j Air flow through the FHB/AB Dwill extract the noble gas from the containment and out the stack. 'The Unit.

1 Stack SPING monitoring will be lost with the loss of

Bus 138, but the Unit 2 will be monitoring.-

The equipment hatch will not be able to be closed due -to

seal repairs.

CHALLENGING ASPECTS:

The TSC will be challenged with.~either. reficoding the

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cavity to cover the exposed assembly 'or isolation of i

the containment will be 'necessary. to. stop t'ie release to the environment.

Personnel attempting' ta,c as the'

equipment hatch will -be' in a high radiation t.. ;-high

.'

airborn area.

EXPECTED ACTIONS:

Field teams' will be' dispatched to track :the - plume in

-

the environment.

The TSC will pursue' restoring power -

to Bus 138 as -the highest priority.

Ops' and i

maintenance may be ' dispatched to investigate closing

.,

the equipment hatch.

l SUCCESS / FAILURE PATHS:

The only method available to minimize the radiation levels and the release Is: to reflood. ;the Refueling cavity.

!

t.

i r

,,,

, - +.

- - - -

+. - -

- - - -

, - -

..a

.

. _ _ _

_

.

y

'

...,

L" ZION MINI-EHERCl$E

-}

,

t

.

EHERCISE

CM1 j

GROUNDRULES

!

+

f INITI AL

'

PL ANT STATUS CM 2, 3 INFORM ATION

!

- V r

,

LOS$ OF HHR 0800 l

i i

'

W v

. V r

,

r-p SBOE LOSS OF BUS 138 LOSS OF REFUELING DECMRES O810 WATER VO'LUME..

ALERT'

L

<

-;

t

,

l i

p

'

DROPPED FUEL

,

SITE ASSEMBLY

0900.

.

_<.

t

.

. -. --

.. -..

. -

-..

-

... -.-

.... -....

.

-.

o ** e

.

toss or niin

-

,

.

0800 SE CALLS OE INFORMS i

'

OF 1RH8701 CLOSURE AND STOPPING OF 1B RHR PUMP

!

[ CM 4

'l DUE TO CAVITATION.

1RH8701 FAILED TO OPEN

\\

REh0TELY AND OPERATORS HAVE BEEN SENT TO THE -

' VALVE.

!

i

MO-

,

CONDITIONS

,

\\

"

SE CARRYS OUT DECISION

!

OEORDERSCORE UNLOrTED

.!

- OEORDERS INCREASED CHARGING FLOW

,

OEORDERS REPAIR 1 A

. MA!NTENANCE RHR s

I TEAMS TRAIN I

i

.

-e D 'o

'

Loss 0F BUS 138

o

,

l

.

LOSS OF BUS -

[' A-

'

,

'

INDICATIONS

-\\ CR-

V

!

OPS DISPATCH MAINT -

-

V i

U

[ MO; FEEDER BREAKER MO.

BREAKER INDICATIONS

INDICATIONS.

\\

t U

->

LOSS OF U 1 SPING

'U

,

i C R-INSTALL SPARE. <

MO-

-\\

U

4 LOSSOFCONT PURGE I

V V

[ MO-RE ENERGlZE

--,

LOSS OF ENS, NARS.

ESTABLISH m

& NAWAS PHONES COMMERCIALLINES BUS;

\\ CR-

'

__

U LOSS OF POWERTO -

V~

RH8702, RH87008 ANOJMh811B RESTORE' LOST gg EQUIPMElg -

CR-

--

_. _ - - - _ - _.

_ _ _ _ _ _ _ - _ _ - _ _ - - -

d ** O

'

LOSS OF HEFUELING WATER UOLUME

..

,

.

SEINFORMS OE

,

'!

-

OF LEVELDECREASE

h FUEL ASSEMDLIES 4-ORDER AOP 6.2 +

CONTAINMENT C M, PostTIONED EVACUATED j

=

IF 1r

_

"KE"

^'

ALERT AT TS LEVEL C M-MO-cont NATEo CO, IN RHR LEAK CM-INFORMATON

>

PROVIDE 0

WORKERS MO-

'

DECONTAMINATED

<

gs-,

DROPPED FUEL ASSEMBLY

!

'

,

o

,,

i

,....

.

!

/~ CM-FUEL ASSEMBLY

"

'

DROPPED

-

!

1r 1r-RELEASETHROUGH PS-

'[PS-

-l ngotgygt m

FUB.0VILDING -

A-INCREASNo A.

,l

'

V

- y V

C M.

co nAINMENT.=

SITE EMERGENCY l

FIELD TEAMS EVACUATED

>400R/HR

DISPATCHED V

FUEL ASSEMBLY

-

.

0930

"

!

>

.

\\

a

..

-. _.. - - _ - - - - - -. - -

v t e Inspection Report - Zion - 1990020
80 \| 81 \| 82 \| 83 \| 84 \| 85 \| 86 \| 87 \| 88 \| 89 \| 90 \| 91 \| 92 \| 93 \| 94 \| 95 \| 96 \| 97 \| 98 \| 99 00 \| 01 \| 02 \| 03 \| 04 \| 05 \| 06 \| 07 \| 08 \| 09 \| 10 \| 11 \| 12 \| 13 \| 14 \| 15 \| 16 \| 17 \| 18 \| 19 \| 20 \| 21 \| 22 \| 23 \| 24 \| 25 \| 26 \|
1990 Quarterly Integrated 1Q (0) 2Q (0) 3Q (0) 4Q (0) Assessments Mid Cycle End of Cycle 14(0) 7(0) 9(0) 11(0) 12(0) 13(0) 14(0) 15(0) 16(0) 18(0) 19(0) 20(0) 21(0) 22(0) 23(0) 26(0) 9(0) 12(0) Security Operator Exams Emergency Planning Other

IR 05000295/1990020

Text

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