ML20246K978

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Enforcement Conference Repts 50-295/89-26 & 50-304/89-24. Major Areas Discussed:Enforcement Options,Circumstances Surrounding & Corrective Actions in Response to Potential Violations of Security Plan
ML20246K978
Person / Time
Site: Zion  File:ZionSolutions icon.png
Issue date: 08/25/1989
From: Christoffer G, Creed J, Greger L, Madeda T
NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION III)
To:
Shared Package
ML20246K776 List:
References
50-295-89-26-EC, 50-304-89-24, NUDOCS 8909060192
Download: ML20246K978 (3)


See also: IR 05000295/1989026

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U. S.-NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION l;

REGION III I

Reports No. 50-295/89026(DRSS); 50-304/89024(DRSS)

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Docket Nos. 50-295; 50-304 Licenses No. DPR-39; DPR-48

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. Licensee: Commonwealth Edison Company

Post Office Box 767

Chicago, IL 60690 -

Facil'ity Name: Zion Nuclear Power Station -

Meeting At: Region III Office,. Glen Ellyn, Illinois -

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. Meeting Conducted: August 17, 1989  !

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.-Type of Meeting: Enforcement Conference

Inspectors: . kb M. Christoffer Date

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Physical Security Inspector

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J/J.-Madeda Date i

Physical Security Inspector

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Reviewed By: bh

mes R. Creed, Chief

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afeguards Section

Approved By: 8 'P5'-88

L. Robert Greger, Chief Date  !

Reactor Programs Branch

Enforcement Conference Summary

Enforcement Conference on August 17, 1989 (Reports no. 50-295/89026(DRSS);

No. 50-304/89024(DRSS))

~ Areas Discussed: Included a review and discussion of the enforcement options,

,. circumstances surrounding, and corrective actions in response to potential

R violations of the licensee's security plan relating to two degraded vital area

barriers and reporting requirements associated with the barrier degradation.

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8909060192 890825 l

PDR ADOCK 05000295

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DETAILS

1. Meeting Attendees

The following individuals were present at an Enforcement Conference held

in Region III on August 17, 1989.

Commonwealth Edison Company

C. Reed, Senior Vice President-Nuclear Operations

L. Del George, Assistant Vice President, Compliance Program and Assessment

K. Graesser, General Manager, Pressure Water Reactors (PWR)

T. Joyce, Station Manger, Zion

W. Stone, Regulatory Assurance Supervisor

T. Kovach, Manager, Nuclear Licensing

G. Trzna, Administration, Nuclear Licensing

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B. Sanders, Nuclear Security Administration, Corporate

D. Elias, Project Manager, Pressure Water Reactors

T. Broccold, Director, Performance Improvements-Zion

R. Fussner, Administration Engineer, PWR Operations

R. Chrzanowski, Administrator, Nuclear Licensing

L. Holden, Performance Improvement

P. Barnes, Performance Improvement

F. Willaford, Nuclear Security Administration, Corporate

T. Van DeVoort, QA Superintendent, Zion

R. Smith, Security Administration, Zion

S. Trubatch, S&L

A. Palek, Attorney

Nuclear Regulatory Commission

C. Paperiello, Deputy Regional Administrator

C. Norelius, Director, Division of Radiation Safety and Safeguards

J. Creed, Chief, Safeguards Section

G. Christoffer, Physical Security Inspector

T. Madeda, Physical Security Inspector

W. Schultz, Enforcement Coordinator

D. Jones, Project Inspector, Section 1A

R. Rosano, Enforement Specialist, Office of Enforcement

C. Patel, Project Manager, NRR

2. Enforcement Meeting

An enforcement meeting was held to discuss two of three apparent

violations described in Inspection Reports No. 50-295/89022(DRSS);

No. 50-304/88020(DRSS). The report was transmitted by the licensee by

letter dated August 11, 1989. One potential violation involved

two instances of inspector identified inadequate vital area barriers.

The second potential violation involved the late reporting of the

first violation. A third potential violation involving inadequate access

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control was also identified in that report but was not discussed in this

' enforcement meeting as it was not directly related to the matters

discussed.

A short presentation of the findings by the involved NRC inspectors

followed an explanation and purpose for the meeting by the Deputy

Regional Administrator.

Subsequent to the NRC's comments the licensee made presentations on the

facts relating to each of the two inadequate barrier examples that were

identified as one violation. They indicated that the facts described

by inspectors were accurate, that guards were posted when discovered and

permanent barriers have since been installed. The licensee's managers

also described a series of additional corrective actions (detailed security

information is exempt from disclosure in accordance with 10 CFR 73.21)

that should improve the overall effectiveness of their program in

addition to addressing these specific problems. The licensee attributed

the root cause for these incidents as inadequate evaluation of

exploitability for vital areas, and failure to adequately implement

corrective actions or recognize the potential problems. They contended

that neither of the barrier degradations were easily exploitable, and

that, in the second case the inadequacy of a previously existing

compensatory measure (guard) was a significant consideration.

Our preliminary finding that these events were not reported within

one hour was also discussed. The licensee's review had :oncluded that

the reports were made late due to an inadequate evaluation of the

significance of the barrier degradations and incorrect application

of an existing reporting procedure. Retraining of appropriate security

personnel on that procedure will be completed.

In addition to the short term immediate corrective action the licensee

managers described a series of additional actions to upgrade the overall

program at Zion. They included the retention of a security oriented

contractor to review barriers, implementation of an action plan for

additional construction, evaluation of the adequacy and application of

compensatory measures, increased security personnel resources, increased

regulatory assurance involvement with security and application of lessons

learned to the other Commonwealth Edison facilities.

The Deputy Regional Administrator acknowledged the licensee's comments

and discussed commitment to security. He stated that the Regfon III

recommendation concerning enforcement action for the event would be

forwarded to NRC's Office of Enforcement for their review and

concurrence. The liccnsee would be notified in writing of the NRC's

proposed enforcement action after review by that office.

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