IR 05000295/1990007
| ML20055D245 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Zion File:ZionSolutions icon.png |
| Issue date: | 06/22/1990 |
| From: | Farber M NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION III) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20055D244 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-295-90-07, 50-295-90-7, 50-304-90-07, 50-304-90-7, NUDOCS 9007060017 | |
| Download: ML20055D245 (15) | |
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e U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION b
REGION III
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Report Nos. 50-295/90007(DRp); 50-304/90007(DRP)
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Docket Nos. 50-295; 50-304 License Nos. DPR-39; DPR-48 Licensee: Commonwealth Edison Company
P. O. Box 767
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ll Chicago, IL 60690 i
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Facility Name:
Zion Nuclear Power Station, Units 1 and 2
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Inspection At:
Zion, il
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Inspection Conducted: April 14 through June 2,1990 L
Inspectors:
J. D. Smith R. J. Leemon A. M. Bongiovanni R. B. Landsman
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M. J. Farber, Chief 6 2 2
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Approved By:f Reactor Projects Section IA p
Date Inspection Summary Ing ection from. April 14 through June 2, 1990 (Report Nos. 50-295/90007(DRP);
FO-3T4/90007(DEP))
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Areas Inspected:
Routine, unannounced resident inspection of licensee action on previous inspectich findings; summary of operations; operational safety verification and engineered safety feature system walkdown; surveillance observation; maintenance observation; engineering-and technical support; a
licensee event reports (LERs); quality program effectiveness; and training.
T Results: Of the 9 areas inspected, no violations or deviations were
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-identified. The performance of the unit 1 operators during mid loop operations was considered very good. The licensee identified a radiation monitor which was not returned to service before exceeding the limiting condition of
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operation time clock due to a personnel error by a Shift Control Room Engineer
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(SCRE),
Corrective actions to previous problems concerning the
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responsibilities of the SCRE were being pursued at the time of this event.
- Strengths were noted in the area of technical support due to their involvement
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.in the Unit 2 core reload, determination of the ID steam generator primary to secondary side leak, and main steam isolation valve investigation.
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Poo7060017 900622
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DETAILS 1.
Persons Contacted
- T. Joyce, Station Manager
- T. Rieck, Superintendent, Technical
- W. Kurth, Superintendent, Production R. Budowle, Director, Services P. LeBlond, Assistant Station Superintendent, Operations R. Johnson, Assistant Station Superintendent, Maintenance J. LaFontaine, Assistant Station Superintendent, Work Planning
- N. Valos, Unit 2 Operating Engineer W. Demo, Unit 1 Operating Engineer M. Carnahan, Unit 0 Operating Engineer E. Broccolo, Jr., Director of Performance Improvement E. Fuerst, Project Manager, ENC
- T. Vandevoort, Quality Assurance Supervisor C. Schultz, Quality Control Supervisor W. Stone, Regulatory Assurance Supervisor W. T'Niemi, Technical Staff Supervisor d
R. Smith, Security Administrator
- T. Saksef ski, Regulatory Assurance W. Mammoser, PWR Projects
- Indicates persons present at the exit interview on June 8,1990 i
The inspectors also contacted other licensee personnel including members of the operating, maintenance, security, and engineering staff.
2.
Licensee Actions on Previous Inspection Findings (92701, 92702)
(Closed) Bulletin (295/87002-BB;304/87022-BB) Fastener Testing. The resident inspector verified the bolt selection process as identified in i
Inspection Report 295/87036;304/87037.
This bulletin is considered
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closed.
(Closed) Violation (304/86032-01) Containment integrity was violated because valves 2DWOO30 and 20 WOO 38 were open with the reactor above cold shutdown mode. The following procedures were revised to ensure that the 1(2)DWOO30 and 1(2)DWOO38 valves are locked closed when required; System Operating Instruction (501-7), Periodic Test (PT-41, Locked Valve Audit)
and General Operating Procedure (GOP-1, Plant Heatup Record). This violation is considered closed.
(Closed) Open Item (304/90006-01(DRP)) Anchor Darling check valve inspections results.
In April 1990, the licensee conducted inspections
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of Anchor Darling check valves in response to Bulletin No. 89-02, " Stress
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Corrosion Cracking of High-Hardness Type 410 Stainless Steel Internal Preloaded Bolting in Anchor Darling Model S350W Swing Check Valves or Valves of Similar Design." On April 27, 1990, the licensee completed inspection of all Unit 2 Anchor Darling check valves. Of the 24 Anchor Darling check valves inspected, 5 of the 24 had one broken retaining block stud.
The studs were sent off site for evaluation.
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plans to perform NDE on the remaining studs which had no visual indication of stress corrosion cracking to determine the actual hardness of the studs.
Four of the five failures on unit 2 occurred in the Emergency Core Cooling Systems (ECCS) cold leg injection inboard and outboard check valves. The remaining failure occurred in the loop C ECCS' accumulator check valve. The valves were repaired and reassembled.
This issue is considered closed for Unit 2.
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t (0 pen) Open Item (295/90006-01(DRP)) Anchor Darling check valve inspections results.
Due to the problems found in unit 2, the licensee l
expanded the inspection to include a population of the Unit 1 Anchor
Dorling check valves.
The licensee completed the inspection of 12 of
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the 24 check valves. One broken retaining block stud was identified two years ago and the valve was repaired at that time.
The inspector i
verified that the replacement stud had an acceptable hardness as specified in Bulletin No. 89-02.
Four valves were inspected during the Fall 1989 Refueling outage and no failures were identified. Of the
seven valves inspected during this forced outage, two were found with one broken retaining block stud.
In a letter dated May 14, 1990 to Dr. T. E. Murley, Director Office of Nucledr Reactor Regulation, from Mr. R. A. Chrzanowski, Nuclear Licensing Administrator, the licensee
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submitted on engineering evaluation to document the basis for continued operation of Unit I until the next schedeled refueling outoge, at which time, the remaining 12 valves will be inspi.cted, The evaluation concluded thot neither a single stud feilure er a two stud foilure in ony volve would affect the performance of the valves.
The licensee
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dlso indiCdted that to complete the inspections during the current forced outage would require off-loading the core.
In a letter to Mr. T. Kovoch, Nuclear Licensing Manager, from Mr., C. Potel, NRR project Manager, the NRC determined that the proposed inspection schedule Wds Within the bulletin requirements.. This issue remains open pending the completion of the inspections of these 12 valves.
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3.
Summary of Operations it Un,L _1 The Unit entered this report period in cold shutdown from a forced outage due to the 1A main steem isolation volve feilure to stroke within.
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technical specification time limits and a body to bonnet gasket leak on the reactor coolant system (RCS) Loop D hot leg stop valve.
On April 18, the RCS was teken to mid-loop operation to facilitate the repairs to the.
loop stop valve and to perform other outoge related maintenance. On May 16, at approximately 4:00 p.m., the unit left mid-loop operation and remained in cold shutdown for the remainder of the period.
Unit 2 The unit entered this period defueled for the cycle 11 refueling outage.
Me reload began on May 6; however, it was halted on Mdy 7 when a fuel
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assembly was determined to be unusable due to a torn bottom grid strap.
A reload safety eveluation.(RSE) west performed and approved to modify the
care load pottern.
The licensee completed a full core reload on May 16.
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On June 2, the reactor vessel head was tensioned and the unit changed modes from refueling to the cold shutdown mode. The unit remained in cold shutdown for the remainder of the period.
Ojerationel Safety Verification and Engineered Safety features System
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,oTTdown (71707 & 7T710)
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The' inspectors observed control room operations, reviewed applicable logs
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and conducted discussions with control room operators from April 14
through June 2, 1990. During these discussions and observations, the
inspectors ascertained that the operators were alert, cognizant of plant
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conditions, attentive to changes in those conditions, and took prompt i
dCtion when appropriate.
The inspectors verified the operability of selected emergency systems, reviewed tegout records and verified proper return to service of affected components.
Tours of the auxiliary, containments, cribhouse, and turbine buildings were conducted to observe plant equipment conditions, including potential fire hazards, fluid leaks, and excessive vibrations and to verify that maintenance requests had been initiated for equipment in need of maintenance.
The inspectors toured the unit I containment with the licensee to observe housekeeping / cleanliness conditions prior to the unit leaving cold shutdown. Minor housekeeping items were pointed out to the licensee during the tour which were immediately corrected.
The inspectors, by observation and direct interview verified that selected physicol security activities were being implemented in accordance with the stetion security plen.
The inspectors verified that the required reports were made to the NRC on security matters, lhe inspectors observed plant housekeeping / cleanliness conditions and verified implementation of radiation protection controls.
From April 14 through June 2,1990, the inspectors walked down the accessible portions of ths' AC electrical power system; DC electrical power system; reactor protection system; residual heat removal system; safety injection systems; letdown and charging system; auxiliary feedwater systems; containment and support system; radiation monitoring system; service water system; component cooling water system; mein and auxiliary steam systems; condensate and feedwater systems; emergency diesel generator-and auxilidries systems; plant fire protection systems; and fuel handling systems to verify operability.
These reviews and observations were conducted to verify that facility operations were in conformance with the requirements established under Technical Specifications (TS), 10 CFR, and administrative procedures.
Unit 1 Mid-loop Operations During the period of April 18 through May 16, the Unit I reactor coolant system inventory was reduced to mid-inop operation to facilitate maintenance activities.
Control room activities were observed or reviewed to assure that actions to prevent and, if necessary, respond to a loss of decay heat removel during mid loop optrations were being implemented.
The inspectors verified that appropriate systems were
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operable to provide a means of adding inventory, a containment closure log was maintained, parameters such as temperature and level were monitored at fifteen minute intervals, and discrepancies between the two level indications were investigated and resolved. The inspectors periodically toured the Unit I containment to assess the attentiveness of the individual monitoring the reactor level indication in the containment.
Operation at the reduced inventory occurred without event. The operators were sensitive to the unit condition and were attentive. Mid-loop operation is considered to be a sensitive operating condition that requires balancing numerous water systems within a very narrow margin.
The operators did a very good job of maintaining the reactor vessel water level within a four inch band for thirty-or:e days.
Radiation Monitor Exceedino TS Out of Service Time On April 23, 1990, the licensee determined that radiation monitor, IRIA-pR49, was out of service for 33 days.
IRIA-PR49 monitors beta particulate, iodine and noble gases, in the gaseous effluent discharges through the Unit I ventilation stack.
TS 3.12.3.A Table 3-12 action statements 6, 8 and 10 state that releases via this pathway can continue for up to 30 days. Additionally, action statement 6 requires that noble gas samples be token at least once per shif t and analyzed for gross ottivity with 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br />. Action Statement 8 requires that particulate and iodine samples be continuously collected with auxiliary equipment.
Action Statement 10 requires an alternative means of measuring for noble gas activity must be established if the monitor is not returned within 30 deys.
On March 21 the monitor was token out of service.(005) and a low priority (B3) work request was written to repair a broken belt on the blower.
The B3 priority signifies that work should be started; however, not immediately.
During this time, the licensee was attempting to return i
the unit online from a forced outage.
Due to problems with the main steem isolation valves and the loop isolation valves, the licensee decided to 90 into another forced outage on April 3.
The work request was then given non-outage priority; therefore, it would not be completed during the forced outage. On April 23, while reviewing a different work request associdted with the monitor, the technical staff system engineer realized that the thirty day clock from March 21 had expired.
Work was completed on the monitor and it was returned to service on the evening of April 26. During the entire period, the required alternative sampling was being performed.
The root tause of this event was personnel error, in that, the SCRE failed to track the 00S clock. Contributing to the error was the fact that the radiation monitoring display system (RMDS) modifications which had begun on Unit I during the Fall 1989 refueling outage were being performed at the time of the event.
The RMDS modification required a large number of radiation monitors to be taken out of service. The work was coordinated by the staff engineer who also informally assumed the responsibility of tracking the associated time clocks.
When the Unit 2 refueling outage began in March 1990 the RMDS modifications for Unit I wereputonholdandtheattentionofthestaffengineerfocusedon Unit 2.
However, the operating staff continued to assume that the stoff engineer was tracking the 005 times.
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Discussions with the licensee management indicated that when the exceeded
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tirne clock was noted on April 23, the release pathway could not be isolated because it was believed that the Unit I stack served as the pathway for the battery rooms ventilation systems; therefore, needing to rerrain open.
Rt. view of applicable piping and instrumentation diagrams showed that isolating the release pathway would not affect
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the battery rooms ventilation.
However, this information was not communicated to the operations staff.
On the morning of April 26, the shift engineer switched the release pathway to conform to the TS oction statements.
Corrective actions to previous problems concerning the responsibilities of the SCRE were being pursued at the time of this event.
The licensee has recently completed the task analysis of SCRE duties and is evaluating the implementation of the report's recommendations. Also, the licensee is communicating all limiting conditions of operation clocks during the
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plan of the day meetings, i
Damagedfuel Assembly During Reload On May 7 et approximately 11:30 p.m., while performing a core reload on unit 2 the fuel handlers had problems inserting fuel assembly Y-48B into the tore. The assembly had been in the core for one previous cycle. As the fuel assembly was being lowered into the core, it was apparent that the assembly was slightly corkscrewed.
When the assembly was lowered approximately half-way into the core, the senior reactor operator (SRO)
licensed foremen noticed significant bowing and the decision was made to use the core loading guides to ease the assembly into its core position.
This required removing the assembly from the core.in order to insert the guide.
As the assembly was being pulled out from its core location, the fuel handlers felt some resistance and saw a piece of debris fall from the assembly down into the core.
The SRO ordered the assembly to be moved back to its spent fuel pit position until an assessment of the damage could be made.
Examination of the damaged assembly showed that a corner portion of the
' bottom grid strap was missing.
Also, the fuel pin at this corner was pulled down toward the bottom nozzle.. Examination of the adjacent fuel assemblies showed only a minor scratch on one nozzle and a small piece of grid strap debris found lodged in the lowest. grid strap of an adjacent essembly.
All cloading on the fuel rods remained intact; therefore, there was no release of radioactivity.
An inspection of the lower core was performed using an underwater camera i
to locate the missing pieces. Attempts were made to recover the fallen pieces; however, the pieces were unable to be retrieved using the air operated grippers. A contracting firm specializing in retrieval operations was able to recover the pieces on May 10 using guidelines provided by the technical staff, it was determined that the assembly would not be reloaded into the core; therefore, a revised core reload configuration was necessary.
A RSE was performed to load the new core pattern and operate in modes 5 (cold shutdown) and 6( refueling). The technical staff incorporated the
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t variations into the fuel shuffle procedure and the core was fully reloaded on May 16. The RSE was reviewed, accepted and approved for operation in all modes of operation by the Onsite Review committee.
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licensee made the required notification to the NRC per 10 CFR 20.403(a)(4)
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on May S at approximately 1:20 p.m.
Unusual Events due to Potentially Contaminated injuries
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During this period, the licensee declared two unusual events due to the transportation of potentially contaminated individuals to an area l
hospital.
On May 7, 1990, an individual working in the Unit 2
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containment in a contaminated area fell from an eight-foot scaffold and suffered neck and back iniuries.
The individual was dressed in full t
protective clothing, including outer plastics and a respirator at the time of the fall.
The respirator, hood and outer plastic clothing were removed f rom the individual prior to being transported offsite. The
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individual was transferred to a clean backboard. The individual remained
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conscious throughout the whole event.
A contamination survey completed at the hospital showed no contamination present on the individual or on the backboard.
The unusual event was terminated on May 8.
On May 8, at approximately 9:00 e.m., an individual, working in a potentially
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contaminated area of the Unit I containment, strained his'back while lif ting a hydraulic torque tool.
The individual was dressed in full protective clothing and was transferred to a clean backboard prior to
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being taken to the hospital.
The individual remained conscious throughout the whole event. A contamination survey was performed at
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the hospital and no contamination was detected on the individual.
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individual was treated and released from the hospital; the unusual event was terminated at 10:55 a.m. on May 8.
No violations or deviations were identified.
5.
Monthly Surveillance Observation (61726)
The inspector observed TS required surveillance testing on the emergency
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diesel generator systems, auxiliary feedwater systems, containment spray
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systems and the emergency core cooling systems and verified whether-testing was performed in accordance with adequate procedures, whether
test instrumentation was calibrated, whether limiting conditions for operation were met, whether removal and restoration of the affected components were accomplished, whether test results conformed with TS and procedure requirements and were reviewed by personnel other than the individual directing the test, and whether any deficiencies identified during the testing were properly reviewed and resolved by appropriate managenent personnel.
The inspector also witnessed portions of the following test activities:
PT-2J Residual Heat Removal Pump Test PT-11 Diesel Generating Loading i
PT-7 Auxiliary feedwater Systems Checks and Tests
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T The iroectors had the following observations:
On May 3, 1990, during a Nuclear Quality (Program (NQP) audit, the NQP inspector identified that the refueling head detensioned) surveillance
'(E-1) required each shift, had not been completed for three consecutive shifts.
At the time, the_ unit was in refueling mode with core alterations stopped.
During this time, the shift had completed the Refueling (Core
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L Alterations) shif tly surveillance, (E-2). Discussions with the licensee indicated although the shift did not perform E-1, the individual line items were covered in other surveillances required each shift.
Based on this fact, the shift engineer and the shift control room engineer made a consciencious decision to not perform E-1.
However, this decision was not documented nor communicated to the other oncoming shifts; therefore, it appeared that the surveillance had been missed. The licensee immediately perfor.;ed the E-1 surveillance to verify that all parameters were within the acceptable limits.
The licensee plans to revise the operating surveillence checksheets to clarify the surveillance require-ments at the various modes and conditions.
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No violations or deviations were identified.
6.
Itonthly Maintenance Observation (C M Station maintenance activities on safety related systems and components were observed or reviewed to ascertain whether they were conducted in accordance with approved procedures, regulatory guides, industry codes or standords and in conformance with TS.
Consideration was given to:
the limiting conditions for operation while components or systems were removed from service; approvals prior to initiating the work; use of approved procedures; functional testing and/or calibrations prior to returning components or systems to service; quality control records; personnel qualifications and training; certification of parts and materials; radiological and fire prevention controls..In oddition, work requests were reviewed to determine status of outstanding jobs and to assure that priority is assigned to safety reloted equipnent maintenance which may affect system performance.
TS required surveillonce testing on the reactor ventilation and containment isolation systems were reviewed or observed. Consideration was given to:
procedures; calibration of test instrumentation; limiting conditions for operation during testing; removal and restoration of the affected Components; Whether test results Conformed with TS and procedure requirements; review of test results by personnel other than the
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individual directing the test; and correction of any deficiencies identified during the testing.
The following maintenance activities were observed or reviewed:
NWR 284420 Loop A RHR Hot Leg injection Check Velve
HWR 270264 1A Accumulator Discharge Check Volve
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The following observations were mede:
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Unit 2 Refuelino Outage Activities During this period, Unit 2 was in a refueling outage which had begun on March 13, 1990. Major items completed included a complete core off-load end reload; inspection and repair of Anchor Darling check valves; installation and testing of the residual heat removal pump seal drain modification; eddy current testing, sleeving and plugging of steam generator tubes; modification of the 2A auxiliary feedwater turbine steam traps; maintenance and inspection of the 2A and 2B emergency diesel generators; walldowns of all required NRC safety system outage modification inspection cable inspections; detailed control room design modifications, and environmental qualification inspection of safety related instrumentation.
Due to the activities associated with the Unit 1 forced outage, the refueling outage was extended by approximately 23 days.
The inspectors monitored portions of the ongoing activities by verifying that controls were implemented for refueling operations and maintaining control of plant conditions as required by TS and approved procedures.
This was done by observing testing and verification of the operability of refueling related equipment and required systems, observing fuel handling operations, monitoring plant conditions, determining that housekeeping was appropriate for conditions in the applicable areas, and verifying appropriate staffing levels. This included observation of various maintenance, surveillance refueling, and operationel activities.
No violations or deviations were identified.
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Engineering and Technical Support o.
Technical Issues Meeting In response to the Performance Improvement Plan action plans, the licensee has initiated technicel issues meetings. On April 25, 1990, the resident attended a technical issue meeting on the.
planning ci the next Unit I refueling outage.
The purpose of the meeting was to improve coordination between departments, to prioritize the important issues for better scheduling of resources and to provide a status update on the impending modifications and major maintenance items scheduled for the Cycle 13 outage.
The information exchanged during the meeting was useful in determining possible personnel and project coordination problems.
The meeting was well organized and provided an open forum to discuss concerns, b.
10 Steam Generator Primary to Secondary Leakege In late January 1990, the licensee identified a small increase in the primary to secondary leakage in the ID ste3m generator (SG).
At that time, the leakage was approximately 40 gallons per day and was trended daily. During the forced outage, the licensee was proactive and opened the steam generator primary side to identify the source of the leakage.
The technicel staff performed a low pressure hydrostatic test by filling the SG using the
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condensate pumps then pressurizing with nitrogen gas to assure that the leak would be identified.
The leak was verified to be from one tube containing a manually welded Combustion Engineering (CE)
plug installed during the fall 1989 unit I refueling outage. A visual check showed that the leakage was through the CE plug weld.
The plug was removed and the inside diameter of the tube was inspected.
A new plug was installed, welded and inspected.
The technicol staff reviewed the records for plugs installed in the other SGs M ing the outage and determined that two plugs of similar design were installed in the ID steam generator.
Both of the plugs were rechecked using video equipment to verify the adequacy of the weld.
No other problems were identified. The technical staff performed a pressure test and no further leakage was observed, c.
Broken Ball Valve in the Secondary Storage Tank In April 1990, parts of a polyvinyl chloride ball valve were founo in the unit 2 secondary water storage tank during cleaning activities.
The licensee performed an inspection of the Make-ur Demineralizers to determine if the pieces came from this sysiem; however, the system valves were all intact. The techni:a1 staff is continuing to investigate the source of the pieces.
Discussion with the engineer indicated that there is no filter prior to the suction side of the auxiliary feedwater pumps; therefore, a concern was raised on the operability of the pumps.
In early May, the technical staff inspected the internal areas of the unit I secondary water
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storage tank to observe the general conditions and to verify that ddditional pieces were not transported into the tank.
No foreign objects were found.
The tank was then cleaned. The licensee plans to inspect the tanks during future refueling outages. No further concerns were identified.
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Unit 1 Main Steam Line Flooding On May 16, 1990, water was discovered coming out of the 1A and IC
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main steam isolation valve open bonnets.
The water was determined to be coming from the condensate storage tank (CST) through the condenser overflow valves into the condenser via the condensate recirculation valve.
The condenser level increased until it started to flood into the main steam line low point drains.
The condenser overflow valves were open with the condensate pumps off causing back flow through the condenser due to head differential between the CST and the condenser.
The condenser overflow valves were isolated and the steam lines were drained.
Since the original design of the supports and piping included hydrostatic loading, the accidental filling of the steam line would not have subjected them to greater stresses than design. A walkdown of the lines after draining found all supports intact except for constant support MSH-109A, which was bottomed out.
The stresses due to the pipe not returning to its original elevation at this location were evaluated by the Sargent and Lundy and were found to be below Code allowable values.
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Main Steam Isolation Valve Repairs On March 29, 1990 the 1A main steem isolotion valve (MSIV) packing gland was injected with furmanite compound to stop steam leaks from the packing.
While in hot standby, Mode 2, the licensee attempted to time the volve stroke; however, the attempt was unsuccessful. The reactor was manuolly shutdown on March 30 to test and troubleshoot the MSIV. Subsequent stroke testing while at hot shutdown, M,de 3, were successful.
On April 3, while in hot standby, the valve again failed to stroke within the TS time of five seconds. The unit was manually shut down.
At the time of the event, it was believed that the valve shaft was bent which would contribute to the valve binding during the stroke.
Detailed inspection by the technical staff showed that the shaft was not bent; however, longitudinal scoring indications were present.
Circumferential ridges within the indications were found which could grab onto the packing material and impede the valve motion. The technical staff determined that a small piece of metal which was found near the packing ejector port caused the ridges within the scoring indications. The root cause of the 1A MSlv binding is the combined effect of the circumferential ridges on the shaft and the presence of funnanite compound in the packing gland.
No violations or deviations were identified.
8.
LERs followup (92700)
Through direct observations, discussions with licensee personnel, anj review of records, the following event reports were reviewed to determine that reportebility requirements were fulfilled, immediate corrective action was accomplished, and corrective action to prevent recurrence had been accomplished in accordance with TS. The LERs listed below are considered closed:
, UNIT 1 LER NO.
DESCRIPTION 89016 Fuel Handing SRO Did Not Meet Requirements of 10 CFR 55.53 Due to lack of Controls 90001 RCS Leakage Due to IMOV-RH8702 Packing Failure 90008 Two Unit Shutdown Due to "0" Emergency Diesel Generator (EDG)
Inoperability 90010 1RIA-PR49 Exceeded Its Thirty Day Clock Regarding LER 295/89016, this issue was discussed in a previous inspection report and was considered to be a violation (295/89040-01(DRS);304/89036-01(DRS)). This LER is considered closed.
Regarding LER 295/90001, this issue was discussed in a previous inspection report and the corrective actions will be followed under Open Item (295/89039-0?(DRP).
This LER is considered closed.
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Regarding LER 295/90008, the impact an plent operation and root causes of the failures were discussed in inspection Reports 295/90003(DRP)and 295/90006(DRP),respectively.
The technical staff h6s been aggressive in investigating the root causes of the EDG feilures, determining common mode foilure or impact on operability for the other EDGs and initiating corrective actions.
This LER is considered closed.
Regarding LER 295/90010, the event is discussed in poregraph 4 Additionally, the licensee secured the exhaust f an on April 26 to conform to the TS action statement until the monitor was returned to service later the same day. This LER is considered closed.
Ull1T 2 LER 110.
DESCRIPT10li
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9500 F fiissed Tritium Sample 90004 flissed Surveillance for 2B and 2C Auxiliary Feedwater Pumps 90005 2B EDG Auto Start Regarding LER 304/90002, the licensee was unable to obtain the required TS monthly tritium sample for the unit 2 auxiliary building vent due to the low humidity conditions.
Discussions with the chemistry department personnel indicated that attempts were inade to draw the sample for approximately seven weeks; however, the dehumidifier was unable to condense moisture for the enelysis. The licensee did not have another occeptable method to collect the samples.
The ',urveillance tracHng system was used to document the performance of the surveillance and did not indicate when the last sample was analyzed; therefore, the missed sample was unnoticed for the seven week period. The licensee has modified the tracking system to track the TS requirement and hed implemented two alternate methods for collecting the semple during low humidity conditions.
This LER is considered closed.
Regarding LER 304/90004, the licensee foiled to complete the monthly TS surveillonce test for the 2B and 2C motor driven auxiliary feedwater (AfW) pumps within the required time.
The surveillance had a criticol due date of liarch 10; however, it was not completed until fierch 13 when it was noted that the surveillance had not been performed.
At the time of the event, the unit was in hot shutdown with the 2B and 2C AFW pumps operating and maintaining the steam generators' levels. The root couse of the missed surveillance was due to personnel error.
Other factors including a duel unit shutdown due to the failure of the 0 EDG, two Wdivers of compliance to facilitate EDG troubleshooting and testing, and the 2A AFW pump surveillance test failure also contributed to the error. The activities associated with the forced outages distracted the operators from the routine activities. The licensee immediately performed the surveillance to verify operability.
Other corrective oCtions included revising the Shift Engineer's turnover sheets and reporting past due surveilla,.es to upper management for tracking purposes. This LER is considered closed.
Regarding LER 304/90005, this issue was documented in a previous inspection report and will be trocked as Unresolved Item 304/90005-02(DRP).
This LER is considered closed.
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In addition to the foregoing, the inspectors reviewed the licensee's Deviation Reports (DVRs) generated during the inspection period.
This was done in an effort to monitor the' conditions related to plant or personnel performance and potential trends.
Deviation Reports were also reviewed to ensure that they were generated appropriately and
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dispositioned in a manner consistent with the applicable procedures and j
the quality assurance manual. The following DVRs were reviewed:
i 22-1 90-035 1A Residual Heat Removal miniflow velve unable to close due to failed comparator 22-1-90-041
".SIVs Failed to Stroke 22-1-90-046 Cable Separation Criteria Violations involving-1(2)R-AR02 and 1(2 R-AR03 22-2-90-031 OC Boric Acit Tank Level fio concerns were noted.
t flo violations or deviations were identified.
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Quality Proge m Effectiveness
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a.
Self Check Campaign in April, the residents attended a training session on the Self Check campaign. The purpose of the campaign was to increase the awareness on personnel errors and to support error-free performance by encouraging employees to take the necessary time to reverify their work. The licensee stressed that each supervisor and worker needed to assess the potential consequences of.their actions prior to implementation.
The training sessions are to be completed by all plant personnel.
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b.
Onsite Review Committee (40700)
During this period, the inspectors observed several onsite review connittee meetings to ascertain-the effectiveness of the committee on overall. plant safety.
The inspectors verified that the j
composition, duties and responsibilities were consistent with l
technical specifications, that the committee was properly briefed of l
ensuing evolutions impacting reactor safety, and that their concerns
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were resolved in a timely manner.
The inspectors observed that the licensee adequately reviewed current plant conditions, commitments, a
TS surveillances, and prioritization of work prior to changing pia
'i conditions. Onsite reviews discussing the Unit 2 core reload, Unit 1 entering and leaving mid loop operations, and Unit I leaving cold shutdown were attended. The inspectors had no concerns, c.
First Line Manaaer Trainig The licensee had established a task force to enhance the role of the first-line supervisors. The tesk force meets monthly and has developed the " Principles of Leadership for the First Line Supervisors" gcals. The policy stresses the importance of l
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communication, resource utilization, accountability..and teamwork to achieve a high standard of performance. The inspector attended.
one of the meetings and will monitor the implementation and effectiveness, 10. Rainingj41400)
During the inspection period, the inspectors reviewed abnormal events and unusual occurrences which may have resulted, in part, from training deficiencies.
Selected events were evaluated to determine whether the classroom, simulator, or on-the-job training received before the event was sufficient to have either prevented the occurrence or to have mitigated its effects by recognition and proper operator action.
Personnel qualifications were also evaluated.
In addition, the inspectors determined whether lessons learned from the events were incorporated into the training program.
Events reviewed included the events discussed in this report.
In addition, LERs were routinely evaluated for training impact.
No event reviewed this period was found to have significant training deficiencies as contributors.
Two training sessions were atterded by the resident inspectors. The inspector attended one session for the Zion site specific nuclear general employee. traini ng.
Discussions with the training personnel indicated that the necessary changes to the training materials such as updeting the station phone numbers to be consistent with the new four digit extensions, correcting appropriate new area codes, and including the new service building in the ple" lay-out. diagram.were being made. A training course on respiratot squipment was also attended. The inspector.
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observed that the course was informative and well presented.
No violations or deviations were identified.
11. Management Meetinas (30703)
On April 17, 1990, Mr. W. Shafer, Branch Chief, Reactor Projects, met with Itr. T. Joyce, Zion station manager, and other plant personnel to discuss Regien III concerns and review the status of the Performance Improvement Plan.
On May 21, Mr. James Partica, Associate Director for Projects, Mr. John Zwolinski, Assistcnt Director for Region 111 Reactors., and Mr. Edward G. Greenman, Director, Division of Reactor Projects, and other NRC management personnel met with Mr..T. Joyce, Zion station manager, and other corporate and plant personnel to discuss the Performance Improvement Plan and prepare for the Commissioner Curtiss visit scheduled for June 21, 1990.
No violations or deviations were identified.
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12. Exit Interview (30703)
The inspectors met with licensee representatives (denoted in Pardgraph 1)
throughout the inspection period and et the conclusion of the inspection on June 8, 1990,.to summarize the scope and findings of the inspection dCliVities. The licensee acknowledged the inspectors' comments.
The-inspectors also discussed the likely informational content of the inspection report with regard to documents or processes reviewed by the inspectors during the inspection.
The licensee did not identify any such documents or processes as proprietary.
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