IR 05000295/1997021
| ML20203H542 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Zion File:ZionSolutions icon.png |
| Issue date: | 12/09/1997 |
| From: | NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION III) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20203H443 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-295-97-21, 50-304-97-21, NUDOCS 9712180424 | |
| Download: ML20203H542 (14) | |
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U. S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
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REGION 111 Docket Nos:
50-295; 50 304 License Nos:
50 295/97021: 50-304/97021
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Licensee:
Commonwealth Edison Company (ComFd)
Facility:
Zion Generating Station, Units 1 & 2 Location:
101 Shiloh Boulevard Zion,IL 60099 Dates:
June 2 - September 19,1997 Inspectors:
M. Bielby, Examiner / Inspector Rl!'
P. Cataldo, Examiner / inspector in Training Rlli H. Peterson, Examiner / inspector Rill
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Approved by:
M. Leach, Chief, Operator Licensing Branch Division of Reactor Safety
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i 9712190424 971209
gM ADOCK 05000295 PDR
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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY Zion Generating Station, Units 1 & 2 NRC Examination Reports 50-295/97021; 50-304/97021 The inspectors performed a review of the licensee developed Phoenix training program as part of the station restart action plan. The inspectors observed operator performance in the control room and simulator. The inspectors considered the overall program to be effective at improving operator performance.
The inspectors concluded that conduct of operations and communications in the control
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room were effective at maintaining appropriate focus on work activities (Section 01.1).
Overall crew and individual performance during training and evaluations was satisfactory
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with instances of weak performance identified by the licensee evaluators (Section 04.1).
Licensee management's oversight and assessment for improving operator performance
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was appropriate (Section 05.1).
Overall quality of simulator training was satisfactory (Section 05.2).
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Remediation training for operators was appropriate and effective in the short term
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(Section 05.3).
The fundamentals written examination was of marginal quality and benefit (Section
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05.4).
The simulator evaluation scenarios were an acceptable evaluation tool, but with
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significant weaknesses (Section 05.4).
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Reoort Details J. Onorations
Conduct of Operations 01.1 Control Room Observations
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a.
Insoection Scone The inspectors obcerved the conduct of operations in the control room, including a shift turnover and briefing. A new shift tumover and briefing format had been recently initiated.
b.
Observations and Findinas Control room decorum was professional. Although both units were shutdown, traffic and noise were maintained at a minimum. Command and control was evident as demonstrated by personnel asking permission of the shift manager (SM) or unit supervisor (US) prior to entering the control room. The inspectors did not observe any instances where personnel entered the control room prior to receiving permission. An inspector observed the off going SM counsel an individual for inappropriately telephoning the control room during shift turnover.
Crew communications were clear, concise and timely. During a reactor coolant system (RCS) loop drain down evolution, the inspectors observed formal three way communications between the unit nuclear shift operator (NSO) and an outside equipment operator. Before operators performed equipmeni manipulations outside the control room, they reported to the respective unit NSO. The NSO then identified any expected annunciators to the US prior to receiving the alarm. Upon receipt of unexpected alarms, NSOs referenced appropriate alarm response procedures after acknowledging the alarm.
Shift tumovers were timely and informative. When the oncoming shift arrived, the off going shift was prepared to review logs, system configuration, annunciators in an alarm status, and to conduct panel walkdowns with the oncoming operators. After the initial turnover was completed, the oncoming crew exited the contro! room to attend a crew brief. The meeting was conducted by the SM who discussed expected plant evolutions and planned surveillances for the shift. Individual watchstanders provided a summary of their respective equipment and system status. Each summary was concluded with a risk assessment based on equipment out of service and system configuration. The SM concluded the brief with a focus on safety statement and an overall review of risk assessment. The oncoming crew retumed to the control room for a final turnover from their counterparts and assumed the shift.
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Conclusions The inspectors concluded that conduct of operations and communications in the control room were effective at maintaining appropriate focus on work activities. Additionally, the timeliness and formality of the shift turnover and crew briefing format promoted good synergy between c ew members with an emphasis on safety and risk assessment.
Operator Knowledge and Performance 04.1 Ooerator Performance Durino Phoenix Trainino and Evaluation Scenarios a.
Insoection Scooe The inspectors assessed the performance of three of six operating crews in the simulator.
During the week of 6/2/97, the inspectors observed one crew during Emergency
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Operating Procedure (EOP) training and final evaluation, and a second crew during an initial out-of-box evaluation and during integrated Operation training sessions.
On 7/18/97, an inspector observed a third operating crew during a final
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evaluation, b.
Qbimyations and Findinos The inspectors observed the licensee training and operations staffs evaluate crew and individual performance during integrated simulator operations, EOP training, and final evaluation scenarios. Overall procedure usage was good. Reference to alarm response procedures was a strength, but use of EOPs was mixed. The inspectors also observed instances of weak command and control, lack of understanding of management expectations for conservative decision making, weak event diagnosis, and failure to follow procedures. Licensee evaluators identified and ado?Jssed those occurrences.
Conservative decision making by two of three crews observed by the inspectors was in accordance with the licensee's new policies and standards. However, the licensee had identified early in the Integrated Operations week that one crew did not appear to clearly comprehend the new conservative decision making policy. The observation became eviderit during an EOP training scenario in which the crew lost all charging capability.
They entered Abnormal Operating Procedure (AOP) 1.3, Loss of Charging and Letdown, and initiated a ramped unit shutdown. The SM, aware that RCS inventory was being lost through the seals, decided that pressurizer water level would drop below the reactor trip band that he had set prior to completing the shutdown and ordered a reactor trip. During the post scenario critique, licensee evaluators asked the SM why he did not immediately trip the reactor. His response was "... the plant was stable at the time, an AOP cover d the plant condition that was present, and I therefore initiated a ramped
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shutdown'. Operations management stated they were aware AOPs were in place which were contrary to the new standards and policies, and they were in the process of
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Identifying and initiating correcticns to conflicting AOPs to eliminate the inconsistencies.
Operations management emphasized their expectation that the reactor was to be tripped if the plant was at power, and RCS inventory could not be controlled. The inspectors determined that the coaching of the first crew was effective based on observations of that crew's performance in subsequent scenarios. The inspectors observed that a second crew being evaluated on the same scenario immediately tripped the reactor when confronted with the scenario's leak conditions.
The inspectors observed satisfactory command and control in accordance with the new standards for two of three crews. Generally, command and control was reflected by:
(1) crew members maintaining an overall, integrated picture of plant status; (2)
solicitation and use of information between crew members during plant transients; (3)
questioning attitude, and (4) good teamwork when addressing anomalies. Overall, operator panel awareness and response to annunciators was also good. Licensee evaluators identified weak command and control for one SM carly in the Integrated Operations week and provided additional coaching. However, the individual demonstrated an inability to delegate responsibilities and provide adequate oversight during major transients. The SM's performance was evaluated as unsatisfactory during the final evaluation.
Overall communications were good and generally in accordance with the licensee's new standards. Licensee expectations for concise and timely use of briefs and three way communications (order, repeat back, acknowledgment) were identified, practiced and reinforced during training and evaluation scenarios. Operators were coached: (1) to avoid a sense of urgency to prevent communication overload, (2) to take a breath and not " step on each other"; (3) to respond to EOP step parameter questions by answering the question and giving the parameter value and trend; (4) to repeat back solicited information only if the information was unexpected, or resulted in a transition or Response Not Obtained (RNO) step implementation; and (5) to use concurrent verification vice three way communication to prevent impeding procedural progress after the plant had been stcbilized and recovery actions were being implemented. Crew briefs were generally held in accordance with the new standards. They were held at appropriate times, conveyed critical information in a concise manner, and set priorities for crew personnel so the plant could be stabilized. However, the inspectors observed minor communications problems during crew implementation of the new standards. For example, one US had difficulty with the mechanics of reading EOP steps and communicating them to the crew.
The inspectors observed crews conduct reactivity insertions using supervisory oversight in accordance with the new reactivity management standards. Prior to actions affecting reactivity, the expected effects were identified and indications of those effects were monitored during the change. Core reactivity changes were not made without prior
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concurrence from the US or another control room SRO However, on two occasions the inspectors observed NSOs initiate reactivity changes prior to receiving the order to do so from the US. On one occasion, a primary NSO drove rods into the core, and on a
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separate occasion, a secondary NSO opened steam generator atmospheric relief valves to initiate a cooldown. Both occurrences were identified and addressed by the licensee evaluation team.
The inspectors observed that licensee evaluators identified additional improvement areas for specific crews and individuals as well as reinforcing the requirements of the new standards; for example:
(1)
Weak event diagnosis skills were demonstrated by one crew when they were unable to identify faulted steam generators in a reasonable amount of time based on abnormal steam generator parameters and reactor coolant temperature trending low (stuck opsn atmospheric safeties). Another crew was unable to identify a stuck open pressurizer power operated relief valve (PORV)
until safety injection was actuated.
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Use of EOPs was mixed. One US misdiagnosed status trees, but this was corrected by another crew member. Another US directed the use of pressurizer PORVs to initiate reactor coolant system depressurization contrary to the procedure requirement to use pressurizer sprays as the primary method of reactor coolant system depressurization. Licensee evaluators identified and satisfactority addressed the problems.
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Conclusions Although the inspectors observed instances of weak individual perfcrmance during evaluated scenarios, overall crew performance was determined to be satisfactory.
Operating crews and individuals demonstrated good understanding and proficiency when using the new standards end policies. The inspectors observed that unsatisfactory performance identified by the licensee was corrected by coaching during training and verified by satisfactory performance during subsequent scenarios.
Operator Training and Qualification 05.1 Background. Objectives. and Construction of Phoenix Training a.
Insoection Scoce The inspectors discussed Phoenix Training with training and operations management and staff personnel to understand the background, objectives, and construction of the program. Interviews were conducted with licensed operators to obtain their understanding of the program, The inspectors reviewed training schedules and the licensee's new policies and standards, and observed training to verify aspects of the Phoenix program.
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Observations and Findings In early 1997, the licensee implemented an operator performance improvement training program to address concems with fundamental operator errors that had been occurring in the industry and at the station in 1995 and 1996. After the February 21,1997, reactivity management event at the station, the licensee made an assessment that this
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training program could not adequately address the emerging issues of operator competency and training effectiveness in a timely manner. The Phoenix Training program was subsequently developed as part of the licensee's restart plan to address the operator and training confidence issues. The program consisted of three training weeks per shift for the purpose of reviewing operating fundamentals and training on new standards and policies for conduct of operations. Operations, senior station management, and corporate management performed independent evaluations of licensed operators based on work records, training records, and personal interviews, to select operating crews prior to commencing training. Operations department management developed a set of standards and policies to clarify expectations for conservative decision making, reactivity management, communications, command and control, peer checking, and watchstation accountability. The overall program goal was to significantly improve operator performance by clarifying operator roles and responsibilities.
Phoenix training started during the last week of April 1997. Six operating and two additional crews were scheduled to complete a total of three weeks of classroom and simulator training using six, ten-hour days per week. The program commenced with one week of classroom instruction that included reactor theory, thermodynamics and fundamental operations training, and culminated in a written exam. The second week consisted of one week of daily classroom Instruction in the morning and simulator training in the afternoon. Both sessions concentrated on normalintegrated plant operations and use of normal, abnormal, and alarm response procedures. An "out of-the-box" scenario was administered early in the week and evaluated by operations and training staffs, plant management, and corporate management. The new standards and policies were introduced in the form of seminars and reinforced during training. Shift mentors were introduced late in the second week or early in the third week. The final week consisted of EOP classroom and simulator training. An overview of Emergency Response Guidelines (ERGS) was presented with a focus on EOP steps and activities.
T he new standards and policies were reinforced in the classroom through lectures, tapes, and demonstrations. The standards and policies were coached and evaluated in simulator scenarios by training staff and an Operations department management representative. A final evaluation of crew and individual performance in two scenarios was conducted on the last day of the final week.
c, Conclusions The licensee's training program, incorporating a defined set of management expectations for clarifying operator roles and responsibilities and Operation's management oversight, was appropriate to improve operator performance.
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05.2 Conduct of Simulator Tralning and Evaluations i
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insoection Cmpg iV.S inspectors observed the licensee conduct EOP simulator training and evaluations for one crew during the week of June 2,1997. Another inspector observed scenario evaluations of a second crew on July 18,1997, b.
Qblervations and Findings
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Crews spent approximately six days in EOP training Moming sessions consisted of classroom heture;
'h afternoon sessions conducted in the simulator. The classroom subjects were coordinated with the simulator events. Visual aids and handouts complimented the lectures. Classroom instructors facilitated discussions by asking questions; crew members actively participated.
The crew complement in the simulator consisted of a Shift Manager, Shift Technical Advisor (STA), Unit Supervisor, and two Nuclear Station Operators designated as primary and secondary. An extra NSO from the other unit was available when requested, as were various personnel from other disciplines. The inspectors noted the constant presence of Operations management oversight. During at least one simulator training session, maintenance role players were used to provide distractions during the scenario. The primary areas of emphasis and reinforcement were based on the licensee's new policies and standards. The SM of each crew, with assistance from instructors, maintained a Training Activity Sheet (TAS) on a cally basis. The TAS was used to focus crew training based on previously identified weaknesses as well as new classroom material. Other performance areas were identified and coached on a case-by-case ' asis. Crews and individuals received immediate feedback during and after o
simulator drills in the form of coaching and critiques. The inspectors identified the same performance deficiencies identified by licensee evaluators during the evaluation scenarios, c.
Conclusions The ins.oectors concluded that the overall quality of the simulator training was satisfactory. The instructor ccaching, training activity sheets and critiques provided immediate feedback. The new standards were consistently reinforced by coaching, lectures, discussions and evaluations. Operations management oversight was always evident.
05.3 Remediation Rates and Methods a.
Jnsoection Scope The inspectors discussed methods of remediation with the training staff after they had identified knowledge or performance deficiencies. The inspectors reviewed licensee
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evaluation records and observed a simulator re-evaluation. Additionalinsight was obtained through interviews with training staff and crew members.
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Observations and Findings Three operators received unsatisfactory grades (less than 80%) on the Fundamentals written examination. Licenses for two of the operators were subsaquently terminated.
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The training staff reviewed incorrect answers with the third operator and a written examination with like difficulty level was administered and the operator successfully passed the retake written examination.
One of six crews and four individuals demonstrated unsatisfactory performance during their evaluated scenarios. Unsatisfactory individual performance during EOP evaluations were remediated based on individual performance items. Generally, the individual was required to review appropriate documentation, then was administered an evaluated simulator job performance task containing similar events to those previoWy evaluated as unsatisfactory. A crew with unsatisfactory performance was reqdw to review their identified weaknesses with a training instructor and retake another set of evaluated scenarios.
On June 12,1997, an inspector observed re-evaluation of an operating crew that had demonstrated unsallsfactory crew and individual performances during their simulator EOP evaluation. Individual and crew weaknesses identified for command and control, communications, and event diagnosis in the original evaluated scenarios were not repeated. The inspector noted that the evaluation team continued to identify and document other areas of performance weaknesses during the re-evaluation scenario.
The inspector concurred with licensee evaluators that crew and individuals demonstrated satisfactory performance.
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CDt0lusions The inspectors observed that the licensee % remediation program adequately addressed unsatisfactory crew and individual operator performance in the short term as verified by satisfactory operator performance during subsequent evaluations.
05.4 Training and Evaluation Material a.
Insoection Scoce The inspectors conducted a table-top review of the Fundamentals written examination, and training and evaluation scenarios. The inspectors also observed administration of the training and evaluation scenarios.
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Observations and Findings The inspectors determined that the training and evaluation material was acceptable.
Classroom leuores and seminars covered industry and plant events, and supported the
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goals of the Phoenix program. The inspectors observed good <liscussions of f
procedures and applicability of the new standards by operators in the classroom and
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r The Fundamentals written examination provided a quick overview of reactor theory,-
thermodynamics, and sensor / detectors. The inspectors determined that it was of
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marginal quality and, for the most part, not challenging for an experienced operator.
Based on an inspector review of the RO and SRO examinations, it contained a minimum
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of performance based analysis questions related to the knowledge necessary for l
operators to perform their jobs. A majority of questions were simple memory or simple analysis questions. Multiple point questions were used which led to further simplification of the examination. The overall average of greater than 90 was high and indicated the relatively low minimum knowledge level required to pass the examination.
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Training and evaluation scenarios were satisfactory for demonstrating and evaluating i
aspects of the new standards and policies. The combination of Integrated Operations and EOP training scenarios were based on industry and plant events, focused on specific training objectives for the standards and policies, and incorporated a wide range of operating procedures (normal, general, abnormal, emergency, alarm response) and plant conditions (startup, shutdown, power operations).
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The inspectors reviewed several evaluation scenarios. Overall, the scenarios were considered to be an acceptable evaluation tool. The major transients were challenging and incorporated concurrent failures of major equipment that forced operators to take
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attemate EOP paths in mitigate the event. However, the following weaknesses were identified:
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(1)
Most of the equipment failures were identified in the turnover, or near the beginning and middle of the scenario which diluted evaluation of operator
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diagnosis and response during the major transient.
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The inspectors reviewed the Evaluation Summary Sheet for one of the crews that was determined to be unsatisfactory for their evaluation smnario. The sheet stated that "All of the valid Crew Critical Tasks and Crew Signitaant Tasks were
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performed during both scenarios." However, the inspectors identified that none of the evaluation scenarios identified crew critical tasks or crew significant tasks As a result, there did not appear to be any common evaluation criteria identified for the evaluators.
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A minimum number of evaluation scenarios were used which could skew evaluations if scenarios were discussed between operators. Four different evaluation scenarios were used for the six operating and two staff crews. Each crew received two scenarios for the crew's graded evaluation.
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One significant scenario administration weakness was identified by the inspectors.
Some scenario events were deleted during the training and evaluation scenarios based
on a lack of time, For example, the inspectors observed that during an evaluation i
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scenario, a normal power change event was deleted to complete the scenario in an expeditions manner. As a result, licensee evaluators missed an opportunity to evaluate l
command and control, reactivity management, communications, conservative decision making, self checking, and conduct of crew briefs.
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Conclusions
Most training and evaluation material was acceptable and supported the goals of the
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Phoenix program. The fundamentals written examination was of marginal quality and
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benefit to evaluators. The evaluation scenarios were acceptable evaluation tools, but with significant weaknesses.
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Miscellaneous Operations issues
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-08,1 (Closed) LER 50-304/96-003 A trip of the 2A Emergency Diesel Generator (EDG) output breaker caused an entry hto Tech. Spec. 3.0.3, resulting in a unit shutdown, followed by a missed surveillance, both due to personnel error.
On May 19,1996, while performing PT-11 DG2A-R, "2A Diesel Generator 24 Hour
Loading Test", a control room operator adjusted the EDG speed control rheostat instead of the volts rheostat to reduce the indicated KVARS, resulting in a tdp of the 2A EDG
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output breaker. The licensee determined that the 2A RDG tdp was due to operator error.
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On September 27,1996, a riotice was issued for this event as part of enforcement
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action EA 96 216. The iicensee's corrective actions included counseling the involved nuclear station operator, discussing the event in the 1996 Human Performance Day communications and training alllicensed personnel on the use of self-checking techniques. Additionally, to heighten the awareness of EDG testing, an Operating Order (9617) was issued to require a shift briefing prior to all EDG performance testing.
These corrective actions were reviewed by the inspectors.
During the follow up inspection of this event, the inspector had the opportun'ty to
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observe surveillance testing of the 2EDG on 2/21/97. During surveillance test PT-11 DG2A, the diesel generator output became erratic (KVARS) and remained in this
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condition for approximately 45 minutes. The licensee's immediate investigation of this event did not uncover any problems with the newly installed voltage regulator. The licensee conducted an operability evaluation of the station's EDGs to determine the
effect of KVAR fluctu :tions during EDG operation. The evaluation concluded that when an EDG is operated in the surveillance mode and paralleled to the grid, it is not uncommon for KVAR loading to fluctuate. An EDG is tuned to respond properly to an ECCS event concurrt.nt with a loss of offsite power, The excitation system is tuned to l
be very responsive so EDG output voltage does not sag and cause ECCS pumps to fail to start. This fast response in the ECCS mode maker the EDG very responsive to
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system perturbations when paralleled to the grid. As IMG loading is increased, the KVAR fluctuations decrease in frequency and magnitude. This response was observed
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O during the February 20,1997, EDG surveillance test. Other Comed sites were consulted and this same condition exists at low loads at other Comed plants.
The inspector also reviewed other information related to the EDG and noted that due to ongoing operational and reliability issues with EDGs at the station, the licensee formed an investigation / root cause evaluation team to address these issues. A report regarding this subject matter was issued by the licersee's team and identifies the specific problems with each EDG and v/ hat corrective actions have been taken or are planned.
This LER is considered closed.
08.2 (Closed) VIO 50-295/96008-04: 50-304196008-04: The inspectors reviewed the licensee's corrective actions in response to a violation for crediting active license duty watch standing hours in the work control organization.
The violation identified two SROs who were improperly credited for active license duty watch standing in the work control organization, specifically, the Outage Out-Of Service Team, during 1994. The inspectors interviewed the training staff and verified the issue was discussed with Comed training managers during a Nuclear Training Team meeting on November 11,1997. The inspectors also verified that procedure 7AP 200-9A,
" Control of 10 CFR 55 Requirements for Licensed Individuals", clarified " actively performing the functions of an operator or senior operator". No new issues were identified during the review. The inspectors' determined the licensee's corrective actions to be adequate.
This VIO is considered closed.
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08.3 (Closed) URI 50-295/304 97016-03: The inspectors reviewed training and c./aluation Steam Generator Tube Rupture (SGTR) scenarios used from 1995 through February 1997. None of those scenarios evaluated operator response times for terminating rupture flow. The inspectors also reviewed the charter (9/4/97) for tha 13yron EOP vs Operator Action Time task force that reviewed the issue and identified that the station was not a participant. The licensee has requested an analysis for increasing the operator response time. Based on the widespread similar nature of this issue at other plants this issue is considered closed.
08.4 Zion Station Rastart Action Plan Review a.
Moection Scoce (71707)
The inspectors reviewed the licensee's completed restart action items as specified in the NRC Zion Station Restart Action Plan, dated September 11,1997.
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Qhgervations and Findings C.2.2.a: Manaoement Oversicht and Effectiveness - Goals /Exoectations communicated to and understood by the staff ~
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The inspectors rev!ewed licensee Recovery Plan item 3.3, " Conduct formal classroom
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and simulator training incorporating the operational standards." The inspectors review was documented in Sections 04.1,05.1,05.2, and 05.4. The inspectors verified that the licensee completed Recovery Plan item 3.3 satisfactority.
C.2.2.b: Manaaement Oversloht and Effectiveness - Demonstrated exoectation of
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adherence to orocedures The inspectors reviewed licensee Recovery Plan item 5.2, * Incorporate expectations for procedures use and adherence into the Operator Remediation and Training Program."
l The inspectors review was documented in Sections 04.1,05.1,05.2, and 05.4. The Inspectors verified that the licensee completed Recovery Plan item 5.2 satisfactorily.
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C.3.1.b: Assessment of Staff (Ooerations) Demonstrated safety consciousness The inspectors reviewed licensee Recovery Plan item 3.3, * Conduct formal classroom and simulator training incorporating the operational standards." The inspectors review was documented in Sections 04.1,05.1,05.2, and 05.4. The inspectors verified that the licensee completed Recovery Pian item 2.3 satisfactorily.
C.3.1 e: Assessment of Staff (Oceratione)- Qualifications and training of the staff.
Including the effectiveness of control room s!01ulator training The inspectors reviewed licensee Recovery Plan !tems 2.9, * Develop training materials (fundamentals; normal, abnormal, and emergency operations)* and 2.15, " Implement the Remedial Training." The inspectors review was documented in Sections 04.1,05.3 and 05.4. The inspectors verified that the licensee completed Recovery Plan items 2.9 and 2.15 satisfactorily.
V. Management Meetings X1 Exit Meeting Summary An inspector presented these observations and findings to members of the licensee's management on October 9,1997. The licensee acknowledged the findings presented. The licensee also acknowledged that proprietary information given to the inspectors during the inspection was returned.
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PARTIAL LIST OF PERSONS CONTACTED t
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Licenute C. Basner, Operations D. Beutel, Regulatory Assurance J. Brons, Senior Vice-President D. Bump, Restart Manager M. Carnahan, Operations
B. Demo, Operations Training Supv.
R. Godley, Regulatory Assurance Manager r
R. Harrsch, Operations Treir.Ing Liaison F. Jones, Regulatory Assurance B. Meade, Operations Training
B. Musico, Regulatory Assurance T. O'Connor, Operations Manager R. Roton, Q&SAllSEG Supv.
L. Schmeling, Training Manager D. Selph, Operations Trainhg G. Smith, Training R. Starkey, Plant General Manager W. Stone, Regulatory Assurance
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C. __ Winters, SOS / Operations R. Zyduck, Q&SA Director NEC E. Cobey, Resident inspector
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A. Vegel, Senior Resident inspector ITEMS OPENED, CLOSED, AND DISCUSSED Closed 50-304/96-005 LER Trip of the 2A Emergency Diesel Generator caused by operator error.
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50 295/96008-04;50-304/96008-04 VIO Improper crediting of hours for:
maintenance of active operator licenses.
50-295/304 97016-03 URI Review of the licensee's actions to resolve the discrepancy between UFSAR assumptions and observed operator response time to a Steam Generator tube rupture simulator scenario.
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