IR 05000295/1990012

Insp Repts 50-295/90-12 & 50-304/90-14 on 900717-19.No Violations,Deficiencies or Deviations Noted.One Exercise Weakness Identified.Major Areas Inspected:Annual Emergency Preparedness Exercise

ML20056A698
Person / Time
Site:	Zion  File:ZionSolutions icon.png
Issue date:	08/02/1990
From:	Dan Barss, Snell W NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION III)
To:
Shared Package
ML20056A697	List: IR 05000295/1990012 ML20056A696
References
50-295-90-12, 50-304-90-14, NUDOCS 9008090048
Download: ML20056A698 (31)

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p 9' C Areas Inspected: ; Routine, announced inspection of-thcLZion~ Station's annual E

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iactivities and locations during the exercise--(IP 82301);iand followup on g

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R. Smithb Security Admin.

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G.' Trzyna, Training Supervisior:;

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All of 5 the.abovellisted 'persinnel attended' the -NRC exil interview held.on

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The inspector also contacted other licensee personnel during the' course of ',

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Theinput/outputtolerances'fdr' channel'onewei"eexceed'd,(3.5%:J Y

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versus 1%) during the' April 1990 performance of IMSP-89-024.6 The

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the' failure.of, channel one.

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(Closed) Open Item No. 295/89012-01:

Ability'ofaTSC staff to promptly t./

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-sectors.in accordance with procedural requir,ements.

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During the'1990' exercise, responsibil.ity for offsite notifications <had-

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The EOF informed the state of the' win'd shift within

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The TSC had previously~ demonstrated an. ability to.

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communicate with the state in a timely manner.

This item is closed.-

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-(Closed) Open Item No.. 295/89012-02:

Ability of the Operational Support-

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Center, (050) supervisory personnel to establish a contamination :M rol

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point near the facility's entrance and follow procedural guidance"on

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The radiation protection technicians (RPTs) set-up a contamination'controlf i

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Personnel entering.the facility.were C f T

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Supervisor instructed the OSC staff.during the first status briefing,to a, ',N 1 f ensure theyEperformed an appropriate frisk prior to entering the OSC.

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This item is' closed!-

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(Closed)L0 pen Item No. 50-295/89006-02:

The licensee:had, committed to'

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the; State'of ' Illinois to" upgrade the training 'of_ radiation chemistry

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The lihensee contracted with Radiation Management Consult' ants (RMC) to

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, conductitraining.for RCTs utilizing contractor supplied, lesson plans.

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T ctoured 'the3 hospital receiving area for familiarization with the sfacility.

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A total of 22.RCTs completed this training whichiwas conducted'in, August'

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This training has been added to the annual 1retrainirig requirements.

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Antannounced,.off' hours, utility only exercise,of the Zion Nuclear

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" Generating Station's Emergency Plan (GSEp) was conducted at the1 Zion

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Station on July'18, 1990.

This exercise tested the capabilities of the

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licensee's emergency response organization to respond to en accident'

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a scenario ~resulting.in a simulated airborne release.

Attachment 1 to 4l d

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Thiiexerciselwasconductedinaccordance'with10CFR50,*AppenixE

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the GSEP,'and the Emergency Plan Implementing P,rocedures,(EPIPs). -

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The: licensee's overall response.to the simulated eventsiwas adequate.

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licensee would have been sufficient to-mitigate'the accident and to'*

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permit State and local' authorities to take appropriate action to"

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protect /the,public's health and safety.

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observed; strengths and weaknesses for each facil.ity:and the overall o$ W ~

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exercise s;The NRC discussed observed strengths and: weaknesses,.

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Before making major

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(SCRE) and the Shift Foreman ~(SF) to obtain their inputs.

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tought out actions..-He correctly initiated the steam dump-bypass;' H

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times the CR crew was aggravated because they felt they.were 'in [ n, go,L M

<The'CR communications'with<the TSC, OSC, and EOF were. good.

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abetterpositiontomake" action" decisions'thanthedirectors*'ile,

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decisions that were made and their' concerns were well communicated.,

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conditions and events that called'for emergency declarations -

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After the TSC and-later the EOF took comand and control, the CR U

{0 crew continued to provide input and point out relevant EALs.

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~The CR status board was used effectively and was valuable.for setting priorities. The shift briefings were initially very good. However,

their effectiveness decreased as the event progressed. The SE j

announced the shift briefing as such whenever there was a major ij

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change in plant conditions; however, it was not obvious that the

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crew was listening or received the message.

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The Critical Safety Function Status Tree, Section F-0.3, entry conditions to FR-H, " Response to Loss of Secondary Heat Sink",-

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were unclear and caused some confusion for the CR crew. Despite.

i the confusion, the CR crew controlled cool down appropriately.

i Based on the above findings, this portion of the licensee's program was acceptable;.however, the following item should be considered for-I improvement:-

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Review and revise as appropriate the entry conditions to FR-H

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to make them more precise and less confusing, b.

'Technicial Support Center (TSC)

After the Alert declaration at 1808 hrs, the TSC began staffing.

It did not take command and control until one' hour and 20 minutes later at 1928 hrs. The TSC could not obtain scenario plant data from the computer.

Presented with this situation, plant perameter updates

'

were' received by telefax from the control room at about 50 minute s

intervals for the first three and a half hours'of the exercise and

~ at 30-minute intervals for the remainder of the. exercise. When distributed ir the TSC, these telefaxed data updates were as much-l, as 20 minutes old.

If the scenario had been more complicated and

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required a detailed technical analysis in the TSC, this frequency of data updates would have presented a serious impediment to the analysis.of plant conditions. This situation caused frustration in the CR because the TSC was slow in' decision making wMle the CR wanted to act on system parameters. The TSC did not ayp essively u

pursue methods to speed up data acquisition and failed to receive

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t plant parameter u 50-295/900012-01)pdates in a timely manner.(Cpen Item No.

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The TSC declared a Site Area Emergency at 2000 hrs and promptly notified the State /and gave them protective action recommendations.

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All emergency classifications and notifications to the offsite j

authorities were timely.

The anticipatory escalation to General i

Emergency, in view of deteriorating plant conditions, was a sound

decision.

However, the TSC was unable, over the course of the

. exercise, to demonstrate the ability to quantify the radiological release. The TSC completed only one dose projection which was based

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on a monitored release via the Steam Jet Air Ejector (SJAE) exhaust.

This SJAE release path was of minor concern and was eliminated as a i

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-release path' when the reactor was tripped because of the Steam

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generator level.

Both hard copy procedures and'compu ur programs are in place to perform such dose projections.

Lacking dose projections, the TSC did not aggressively pursue the alternate route of obtaining'

field monitoring data.

The first field data was not received until almost two hours,af ter the commencement of the release via the "D" i

Steam Generator atmospheric dump valve. As a result of these weaknesses, the TSC failed to demonstrate the ability to calculate offsite dose projections.

(0 pen Item No. 50-295/90012-02)

At 1745 hrs, an inspector observed a security guard sitting in a room in the designated assembly area with a bull horn and some clipboards.

The inspector asked the guard about the assembly and the guard indicated that he thought it would take place between 1700 and 1800 hrs. When security was infonned of the Alert declaration at 1808 hrs, they mistakenly initiated assembly. This seemed to be a personal error of a security person.

Security mistakenly confused Alert with assembly. Due to the prestaging, this " false" assembly was going well until it was terminated by the controllers. The real accountability was initiated at 2012 hrs,12 minutes after the Site Area Emergt;ncy declaration, with the sounding of the siren.

After 15 minutes, the first print out showed 82 persons unaccounted for.

It was 6F minutes before all persons were accounted for.

As a result, the licensee failed to satisfactorily complete Exercise

Objective 4h(seeAttachment1). The failure of the licensee to successfully perform assembly / accountability is an Exercise Weakness.

(0penItemNo. 50-295/90012-03)

The use of the status board in the TSC for prioritization of repair-efforts and other actions was a very useful management tool. The use of a simulated NRC site team added realism to the exercise.

This portion of the licensee's program was acceptable.

However, one Exercise Weakness and two Open Items were identified.

In addition, the following~ item should be considered for improvement:

Prestaging should be avoided to make the outcome of the

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Operational Support Center (OSC)

T Personnel began arriving in the Operational Support Center (0SC)

approximately 30 minutes after the Alert declaration was made.

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The first individual who arrived in the OSC began to set up the facility by relocating a table behind a partition to establish what he mistakenly thought was to be a work area for the OSC Director. This area was set up complete with telephones, log books, and procedures. Within 45 minutes of the Alert declaration, three radiation protection technicians (RPTs) had arrived in the OSC and begun to conduct an inventory of supplies stored in the OSC

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emergency equipment lockers.

When the OSC_ Director arrived in the 0SC, he discovered that the area he'had intended to:use as a-t briefing area for teams had actually been set up as, a work:

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and communication area. This misunderstanding caused considerable delay-in-the set.up and activation of the OSC becaus'e the 0SC Director's work area had'to be relocated.in order to. establish an lar6a for briefing teams. The final. set up'used separated the-s'upervisory personnel from the rest of the staff.

It was also noted by the inspector that the actual physical layout of the OSC had been altered immediately prior to the exercise.

J Several office partitions had been moved to a different location sometime between a facilities tour conducted the day prior to the.

exercise and the exercise.

The' facility currently being used as an OSC is not the area described in the Zion Annex, Section 7.1.3, of the GSEP.

It isLunderstood that the current facility is an improvement over the area originally designated as the OSC. This change should be reflected in the next i

revision of the GSEP.

,

There is no procedural guidance provided to responding personnel addressing how the OSC should be set up and activated.' As a consequence a considerable amount of valuable response time was wasted in the activation of the OSC because of the confusion caused by the incorrect location of the OSC Director's workstation. Also the RPTs spent time inventorying supplies-when more' appropriately they could have been setting up the facility and establishing a contamination control point.

(0 pen Item No. 50-295/90012-04)

key; personnel in the OSC.were observed to have established and maintained. chronological logs of major events occurring during' the exercise.

The licensee has developed an effective set of status: boards ~ to clearly display who was available for team assignments and what teams had;been. dispatched from the OSC.

However, these status boards could be ' positioned better, making them more visible to the OSC Director.

A contamination control point "as established at the entrance to the.

OSC and habitability surveys +

'e conducted to ensure the.0SC was not

contaminated.

Personnel who a, ived at the OSC prior to the set up of the frisking station were no6 directly surveyed. After the h

frisking station was set up, the volume on the frisker was not set at an audible level.

i Approximately one and a half hours after the Alert declaration, personnel in the OSC were provided with their first briefing and informed of plant conditions and the reason for the Alert declaration. This briefing only provided a minimal amount of information concerning what major plant components were out of service.

The OSC Director did provide a good overview of the team

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When he opened the door, he.was engulfed in steam.

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The: message;from securityrregarding the contaminated l

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The'0SC failed to

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The guard wasinot informed that he was potentially;

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complete-demonstration'of~this-scenario' objective.

The OSC failed?

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.to coordinate?and dispatch teams in a timely manner.,'(0 pen Item W'E i.

No; 50-295/90012"05) '

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successfully.deconned him with the exception.of the base of his

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mi sthat they needed to get him to the decon shower to remove the

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three more times.

The RPT. failed to recognize that the contamination-

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The RPTs

iMw failed to' adequately and fully perform all aspects of decontamination,.

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.was marginally' acceptable.~ The following items should be:c'onsideredi

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were.t Ten minutes prior to each of.these' briefings, the ME0_ met with

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forecast information, and the shif ting winds. _' The E0F generally

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protective action' recommendations(PARS) with the States.

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by p'rocedure,_and coordinated with the State's< prior to-being'

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upgrade the PAR to evacuate out.to two miles in all-directions;

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ld that the wind would.be shifting from+the north to the south, which VI i'T n

was being confirmed,as the~~ wind startedishifting, that could have.

i provided for upgrading th'e shelter recommendations:in the;as yet oj d

unaffected sectors based on'the' expected wind change.

.

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L The Environs' staff ~did a. good' job in.trying to quantifyEthe magnitude, s e

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unmonitored pathway, and the~-delay in establishing field teams tol,4,e

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procedures:otherwise seldom used.

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take actual measurements, the staff was required to implement s

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Westinghouse Noble Gas Monitor and Steamline-Monitor Readings", was A,[

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'used to manually calculate / estimate the release to!be;1.6 E8 pCi/sec.<

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a value of 9.18 E8 pCi/sec.

Considering the potential error in the

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confirmatory, and indicated that the; protective > actions already

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No above background readings were noted.

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Logkeeping in the E0F_. appeared to be thorough andfwas:be'ing'done by

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-smooth and prompt 9throughout-the; exercise. -An example of_ good f.

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the four non-essential. personnel-because it was-felt with the wind-

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shifting and thetrelease still in progress, these individuals would:

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e-be better protected by remaining where they were.

However, verifying

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_information with the TSC was in at leas * one case slow.

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.. EOF wanted to_ verifylthe, basi _s for the~ value prior t'o using' it, but U ~

provided the EOF with a: release rate value of 5000 pCi/sec. 'The

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it1took 20 to;30 minutes to verify it was from the SJAE rad monitor,

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Personnelireviewed their recovery procedures to verify if. conditions

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were met to enable-a transition from General Emergency to Recovery.i N f j a,,

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Discussions included examining both short"and long tem actions, such!, 3

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looking at all failed' equipment to assess the basisifor the I

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failure:and' determine,.among o,ther things, if any there wereLany"

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$ Exercise'0bjectives and Scenario Review (IP 82302)

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The licensee's scenario.was..

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good.

It wasLan off hours exercise which allowed the licensee:to' test its-

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Based upon the above findings, this portion of the licensee's program was

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acceptable.

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Exercise Control and Licensee Critiq'ue's (IP 82301) '

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objectives of the exercise.

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The controllers did not control the

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sequence of events revolving around two workers who were. supposed to show

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up in theLassembly area in protective clothing and be contaminated.

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accountability should have been nearly. comp 1_eted.1

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. assigned controllers arrived.

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with the participants immediately following the exercise.; Lead

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attended the facility critiques': but-dua 'to the tinie schedule-NRCLcould-i'","3 M; 7' X l

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-not attend the lead controller, critiques. 'However, the NRClwas briefed E

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-had also been identified by licensee personnel,=as well;as' numerous" W M N 1 M'#x'

was well-performed.1 SignificantNRCidentifiedexercise^deficienciesjL

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TMI Safety Issues' Management System (SIMS) Items

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theNRCissuedNUREG-0737,whichincolrpor(ated'y/j

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3 Linto one document al1 TMI-related items; approved for'implemeintation byithe Commission 1at-that time.c On December 17, 1982, the NRC. issued

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Supp1bment 1 to NUPEG-0737'to provide additional clarification regard.ing: a

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Regulatory Guide 1.97 (Revisi.on 2) - Application to Emergency Response-

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Facilities; Emergency Response Facilities, and: Meteorological l Data, as

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"well?as'other' areas.

The status offthe completion of these THI SIMS-

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.itemsareinternally?trackedby.theNRC.

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ML j-Based on:recent verbal guidance from Headquarters;NRC;and. evaluations-

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E7 n f;the May 3, 1989 and July:18, 1990 exercises, and the February 1989 o

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' routine inspection, -SIMS items MPA-F063 andlHPA-F065 are administrative 1y

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With:the closure of.these two items, all'SIMS/TMI items related M

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.to emergency preparedness are closed for'the Zion plant.

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all(other-TMI/SIMS items related to emergency preparedness was>discussedt;

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$4 fin Inspection-Reports 1No. 50-295/88018, 50-304/88018, dated October 26,

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1988~and'50-295/89006, 50-304/89006, dated March 6, 1989.)

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on,the,part of the NRC, licensee or both. The Open Items. disclosed during

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• this' inspection'are discussed in detail in Section 5.b. and 5.c. of this

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Thefidpectibntia tiild an exit 'inte'rvieho'n July,19p;i990/'with,lic'eNee s%j~

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a C yi scope (and findingsLof; the inspection.7 ' No violationsi of NRC crequirementsl' s he H

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siLwere identifiedm The licensee'was informed of the Exercise Weakness;, J

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identified durin'g ;the inspectio'n forc failure lto perform a timely

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poor exercise" performance which are'discussedtin detail: in~ this< reporth,

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offsite dose projection's< in the TSC;' lack' of procedural: g6idande ' for. A.

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setup and activation ?of the OSC;f failure' of the OSC totoordinate and "

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fully; perform deconiand'.relatedlincident' investigation.~

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The licenseetw'as asked'if any of thefinformation discussed dur$g the' exitc

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interview was proprietary.

The licensee responded that none1of thel.

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Attachments:

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Zion Nuclear'PoweriStation 1990.

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GSEP ExercisefScbpe,and

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.;0bjectives _,

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-Zion Nuclear P,owertStation 1990 t 5

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m w GSEP Exercise Narrative Summary

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'210N NUCLEAR' POWER STATION

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1990 GSEP EKERCISE

,

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July 18, 1990

[

.,

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OBJECTIVES

.,

,

.

PRIMARY OBJECTIVE:

.,

Commonwealth Edison will demonstrate the ability to implement'the.

Generating Station Emergency Plan (GSEP) to provide for protection of the-public health and safety in the event of a. major accident at the Zion Nuclear Power Station. The 1990 demonstration will be conducted-

during the hours which qualify as a offhours Exercise in accordance

'

with NRC Guidelines.

l'

SUPPORTING OBJECTIVES:

1) Assessment and Classirisation

-

a.

Given information provided by the Exercise Scenario, i

demonstrate the ability to assess initiating conditions which.

warrant a GSEP Classification within fifteen (15) minutes.

- (CR*, TSC, ROF)

b.

Demonstrate the ability to determine which Emergency Action Levels (EALs) cre applicable within fifteen (15) minutes of determination of the initiating conditions warranting classification.

- (CR, TSC, BOF)

2) Notification and Communications

,

f a. -Demonstrate the ability to correctly fill out a NARS form in

accordance with EPIPs or EOF procedures.

t

- (CR, TSC,-EOF)

b.

Demonstrate the ability to make applicable notifications to offsite State and local organizations within fifteen (15)

d minutes of making an Emergency. classification.

- (CR, TSC, EOF)

L c.

Demonstrate the ability to correctly fill out an ENS l

Notification Worksheet in accordance with EPIPs or EOF procedures.

t

- (CR, TSC, EOF)

d.

Demonstrate the ability to notify the NRC immediately after the State notifications and within one (1) hour of the-Emergency classification.

'

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NOTE: "*" DESIGN 2TES A PREVIOUSLY NOTED PROBLEM OR DEFICIENCY.

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=2)[ Botification and Communicationg (c:st'd)

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0.yNemonstrcteth2:cbilitytoprovideinformaticaupdatestotha-

. States at'.least hourly and within thirty (30) minutes of

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. changes. '.n' monitored con.sitions ~.

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. - (CR, ;'.SC, EOF)

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Demon,trate the capability to contact appropriate support orga'.lzations that would be available to assist in an actual ~

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ene*gency within one (1) hour of conditions warranting their

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ast1 stance.

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- (TSci; EOF)

3. ' Demonstrate the ability to maintain an open-line of'

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communication with the NRC on ERS upon request.

- (TSC, B0F)

h.

Demonstrate the ability to maintain an open-line of-

!

communication with the NRC on HPN upon request.

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- (TSC, B0F).

.

.

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i.

Demonstrate'the ability to provide information updates to the i

f-NBC attleast hourly and within thirty (30) minutes of changes.

in. monitored conditions.

<

-:(CR, TSC, EDF)

j.

Demonstrate the ability to notify the State of wind shifts-

!

occurring during a release where PARS are in effect.

-- (TSC, BOF*)'

g 3) Emergency Facilities a.

Demonstrate the ability to staff and activate the on-site

!

Emergency Response Facilities within sixty (60) minutes

during off hours of the Alert Classification in accordance L

.with EPIPs.

- (TSC, OSC)

!

'b.

Demonstrate the' ability'~to augment:the Control Room staff j

within. thirty (30)' minutes of an appropriate Emergency

Classification in accordance with tha EPIPs.

.r

- (CR)'

c.

Demonstrate the ability to staff and activate the Emergency

.

Operations Facility within approximately one (1) hour of the q'

Site Emergency Classification in accordance with EOF procedures.

}

"

..l(EOF)

d.

Using information supplied by the Exercise scenario, demonstrate the ability to record, track and update information on Status Boards at least every thirty (30)

minutes.

- (TSC*,.OSC, EOF *)

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3) Energener Facilities-(c:ct'd)L l

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Demonstrate th3'abkifty to dscument and. track cli Op3rcticas:

-and Maintenance = Team activities.in logs:and on appropriate

..

Status Boards.

{

--(CR, TSC, OSC).

f.

Demonstrate the ability to pr0 vide Station activity-updates to the ROF at least every thirty (30)' minutes.

--(TSC)

!

4) Emermency Direction and Contrql-a.

Demonstrate the ability of the individuals. in the Emergency Response Organization to, perform their assigned duties and-responsibilities as specified in Genaric CSEP and position-specific procedures.

- (CR,.TSC, OSC,' EOF)

b.

Demonstrate the ability of the Managers and Directors to i

exert ' Command and Control in their respective areas of

!

.

responsibility as specified in Generic CSEP and

'

position-specific procedures.

l=

- (CR, TSC, OSC, B0F)

c.. Demonstrate the ability to prioritize Operations and-i

'Naintenance activities during abnormal and emergency

)

situations.

--(CR, TSC, OSC)

d.

Demonstrate the ability to requisition, acquire-and transport l

-

,

E emergency equipment'and supplies necessary to mitigate or

- l control unsafe or abnormal plant conditions,.

j

- (CR, TSC, ROF)-

~

u e.

Demonstrate the ability to dispatch the Environs Teams within forty-five (45) minutes of determination.of the need for field samples.

j

- (TSC, OSC)

'

"

l f.

Demonstrate the ability to' control / coordinate Environs Team's activities in accordance with'RD and EG procedures.

- (TSC, B0F)

g.

Demonstrate the ability to transfer control / coordination of Environs-Team's activities in accordance with Station EPIPs and ROF procedures.

- (TSC, EOF)

F h.

Demonstrate the ability to assemble and account for all

,

on-site personnel within thirty (30) minutes of sounding the

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Assembly Alarm.

- (TSC*)

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.:i.L Demonstrcto tha cbility of Em2rstacy Re:ponsa Facility.-

E Management to provide-briefings rnd updates concerning-plant'

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J l status,: event classification and activities in progress at,

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'least every thirty (30)' minutes, j

-;(CR, TSC,:OSC, ROF)_

'

'j. - Demonstrate the ' ability to provide access for a Mock MRC Site (

' Team.in accordance with Access Control procedures.

- (EOF)

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,y k.: Demonstrate the ability to' interface with a Mock NRC Site m

t Team.

- (EOF *)

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.

.

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5) Radiolomical Asser. ament and Protective Actions

c.

Demonstrate the ability to trend plant radiological survey information for conditions presented in the scenario.

- (TSC, OSC, B0F)

L b.

Demonstrate the ability to collect and document all

radiological surveys taken for conditions presented in the

,

scenario.

'

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- (OSC)..

t c. ? Demonstrate the ability to take appropriate protective f

actions for on-site personnel in accordance with Station

'EPIPs..

'

- (TSC, OSC)

d.

Demonstrate the ability:to issue and adminstrative1y control

,

dosimetry to:the teams dispatched from the OSC in accordance-

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with established policies-and Station procedures.

J L

- (OSC)

i 1 ;.

-t

e.

Demonstrate the ability to establish radiological controls in

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accordance with established Health Physica policies and plant procedures.

- (OSC*)

h f.

Demonstrate the ability to monitor, track and document

!

radiation exposure to inplant operations and Maintenance

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Teams in accordance with established policies and plant

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procedures.

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'5)- Radiolonical Assessment"and protective Actions.(ccat'd)

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Demonstrate the bility to establish radiological monitoring-

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and controls of Assembly areas in accordance with established policies and' plant procedures.

- (OSC);

h.

Using information provided by the Exercise scenario, demonstrate the ability to calculate Offsite Dose Projections in accordance with' appropriate procedures, programs and guidances.

- (TSC, E0F)

1.

Demonstrate'the ability to make appropriate Protective Action Recommendations (PARS) within ten (10) minutes of' determining

'

an Offsite Dose Projection or using an Emergency-

_

Classification flowchart.

- (CR, TSC*, EOF)

.j.

Demonstrate;the ability.to perform decontamination of radioactively contaminated individuals in accordance with'

established policies and procedures.

- (OSC*)

k.

Demonstrate the ability to collect RCS' samples using the Post Accident Sample System (PASS) equipment in accordance with PASS. procedures and proper Health Physico-controls.

'

- (OSC)

1.

Demonstrate the ability to analyze RCS samples using appropriate analysis' equipment in accordance with PASS procedures and proper Health Physics controls.

- (OSC)

m.

Given information obtained from the PASS results, demonstrate the ability to perform a Core Damage Assessment in accordance with EPIPs.

- (TSC)

n. - Demonstrate the ability to collect field samples in-accordance with Environmental Sampling procedures.

- (Field Teams)

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o.

Demonstrate the ability to perform field sample analysis in-accordance with Environmental Sampling procedures.

- (Field Teams)

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p.

Demonstrate the ability to document, trend and assess field sample results in-accordance with Environmental Sampling procedures.

,

- (TSC*, EOF *)

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6)- Relocation Ob3ectives J

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- (TSC*).

b.

Demonstrate the ability,to explain the= evacuation route,

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properly brief non-essential personnel prior to the start of-

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site evacuation and arrange for traffic control.1

- (TSC*)'

i c.

Demonstrate the ability to staff land set up the Relocation

.

Center within one hour of-calling for evacuation of

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non-essential-personnel.

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(Relocation' Center *)

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)

d.

Demonstrate the ability to-survey and arrange for.

decontanination of personn/ vehicles at the' Relocation Center.

- (Relocation Center)'

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7) Recovery 1[

a.- Denonstrate the ability:to generate a Recovery Plan which will return the plant to normal operations in accordance with

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l-CECO policies and procedures.

L

- (TSC, EOF)-

b.

Demonstrate the ability to identify the criteria'to enter a~

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Recovery classification in accordance with' procedures.

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- (TSC, BOF)

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ZION NUCLEAR POWER STATION J

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CSEP EXERCISE I

4i

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. July 18 -1990

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4 ' i, RARRATIVE..SUfflART g

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INITIAL CONDIIIDEA i

(1700 - 1800)

J

Both Units : have been anintaining * 99% power on a " Red" system grid for-c

-the last week.- Unit 1 RCS activity has increased in the last three days but is still below Tech. Spec limits. A tube leak has been identified in i

the D S/G. An : increasing trend has been monitored for the last week.

For j

the 'last three days, the leakage has been steady at m 100 spd.

The D a

S/G is being sampled every shift.

The 1A RHR Pump is Out of Service for seal replacemnt.

Return to service is expected - on _ this shif t af ter completion of PT-2J.

The 1C AIV Pump was Out ' Of Service for an oil change.

PT-7 was started at 1645 and is in progress for return to service.

The 1A CCB Pump is Out Of Service for l

scheduled overhaul.

The 1A South Gland Exhauster is Out 7f Service for-

.y motor replacement.

The 1D Main Steamline Rad Monitor, IRIM-PR60, failed on day shift.

IMs are scheduled to repair the monitor this shift.

C

' At 1710, during the performance of PT-7 on the 10 AFW Pump, excessive.

j noise,. vibrations and current readings are observed.

>

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l EXPECTED ACTIONS Work in progress on the 1A RilR Pump continues. When the PT-7 action level s

limits are exceeded for the 1C AFV Pump, a trip from the control board f

will be performed.

Operations and Maintenance will investigate.

i AIARI N

(1800 - 1945)

At 1745, while performing PT-2J on the IB Ri!R Pump, indications of a f

bearing failure occurs. At 1830, the tube leak in 1D S/G escalates to 450

spd.

At 1845, - IMs working on the '1D Steamline Rad Monitor, observe a

,

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steam leak ~' in the B 'and D valve house.

At 1900, the Load Dispatcher l

allows a ramp down at 1/2%.per minute, the 1D S/G tube leak increases to

'

'10 spm and the Air Ejector Rad Monitor, 1RE-0015, alarms.

i AREGTED AGILORS O

A Work Request will be issued to investigate the 1B RIIR Pump failure.

Tech. Spec. 3.8.3.d puts the Unit in a four hour clock to llot Shutdown.

An Alert Classification is made per EAL 3F.

A power rampdown is requested by the Load Dispatcher.

At 1845, the IMs report a steam leak in the B and D Valve House.

Operations will be dispatched to investigate.

At 1900, the 1/2% per minute ramp down is initiated.

Operations will respond to the Air Ejector Rad Monitor alarm and dispatch RTs to investigate.

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SITE.. EMERGENCY (GENERAL EMERGENCY)

(1945 - 2300)

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At 1930,. the'1D S/G. tubo leak ruptures at a-rate of 680 spa._ Pressurizer; levelsi and RCS = pressurv decrease uncontrollably.

A Reactor: trip andL SI

..-

occur.- The 1A AW-pumrJ trips immediately af ter SI actuation.

Af ter the.

~

Reactor trip, the A bactor Trip Breaker will not close to clear P-4 until

--2040.

At 1945,1B AW: pump -trips on low suction pressure.

Also,.at 1945,'

Security in the CAS receiving a door alarm on the B and D Valve House due to the < steam leak.

The Patrol Officer, dispatched to - investisate the.

alarm, becomes contaminated.

At 2100, the ID S/G Atmospheric. Relief Valve, 1 'MOV-MS0019, fails open due to a pressure transmitter. in - an adverse steam atmosphere from the feed line break.

This provides an unmonitored release path. to the environment.

During the Assembly, a contamincted worker ~ is -identified.

An evt w tion of 5 non-essential personnel.will be made to the Relocation Center at Antioch High School.

..

EXPECTED. ACTIONS Operations wikl react to the SGTR per E0Ps.

When the IB AW Pump trips, the-loss of neat ' sink FR will be entered.

Operations and Maintenance personnel will be dispatched to investigate AW malfunctions.

A Site Emergency will be declared per EAL #3N.

At 2040, the A~ Reactor Trip-Breaker is closed and a feedwater lineup is-accomplished.. Attempts will.

be uade to' close or isolate the release path,. but. are not successful until 2200.

The contaminated individual in the Assembly and the Patrol Of ficer

'

will be decontaminated and appropriate radiological controls ; established.

-A General Emergency classification may be declared.per EAL #3Q 45 minutes after the Site Emergency declaration.

At 2230, the 1B AW - Pomp will be returned to service allowing-a controlled cooldown to Cold Shutdown.

RBC0 VERI (2300 - 2400)

At 2300, a 24-hour time jump will occur with the following condit hns.

The affected Unit.is in a Cold Shutdown condition.

lA RHR Pwnp-has been returned to service.

Bearing replacement jobs are currently in progress on the 1C AW and 1B RHR Pumps.

Feedwater line leakage in the B and D Valve House has been stopped.

Decontamination of the area _ is being discussed.

All other conditions are the same as the previous day.

CECO Field _ Teams have surveyed the entire 10-mile EPZ and found no residual contamination.

The State Field Teams, utilizing - micro R meters, have a

identified a strip approximately 1 mile wide stretching from Sector-R to K with slightly elevated background readings (10-20 micro R/hr).

0335Z/2/wja i

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,, ZIDE NUCLEAR POWER STATION

'I ydrA gis t

1990 GSEP EEERCISE

L N

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JULY 18, 1990

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y EVENT SUttlARY s.

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EVENT /

EEEDitATER LINE Bor n AND D S/G DELIEF VALVE LIEIIBG i

DRS.GRIPTION:

At 1845, the D S/C Feedwater Line develops n'anall leak.

~

Steam.is, released into the B & D valve house making

conditions hazardous for entry. At 1900,.the leak has

'

escalated'and has an adverse affect on a non-BQ D S/G r

pressure transmitter. The transmitter causes an.

unwarranted lifting of the atmospheric relief. valve at 2300. Steam from the leak is-sufficient to escape the valvelhouse at both levels. The relief valve closes at 2200.

i.

,

QBALLENGING

'

ASPECTS:-

Steam and feed. flow to the D S/G are the only indications.

i

<

of the break in the Control Room. THe D 8/G has a tube

'

leak and rupture which allows an unmonitored release out-the. atmospheric relief valve. After the SGTR, trip and SI, the break will be supplied with diluted RCS: water, making

,

entry into the. area a radiation problem in addition to the

'

- steam.

.

EKPECTED ACTIQNS:

IMs, located in the Valve House when the leak starts, will v

p report conditions to the Control Roon.. Operators will be K

dispatched to investigate.

Rad Protection will be notified b

of the conditions. An attempt toienter.the Valve House in b

steam suits to-close/ isolate the relief valve may be made.

. The unmonitored release path will'be noted and the release quantiffed.. Attempts to close/ isolate the relief valve will not be successful until 2200.

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BD_GEMES/.

p 3.HE[LATION:

The B & D Valve House area will be used with leakage and i.

- steam indications given by messages.

Indications of the lt break and atmospheric relief valve will be provided by the

.

simulator.

0295Z/2/0452I/wja

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1990 GSEP EXERCISE,

-.

s JULY _'18, 1990

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EVENT -SUIMARY (

I

'N 3g311

'1D S/G TUBE LEAKACE/SGTR-

,

DESCRIPTION:

The ID S/G samples have~ indicated a tube leak which has steadily increased. For the last three days, the leakage.

- !

"

has stabilized at 100 spd. Samples are being taken each shift.- At.1830, R-15 alarus.

Samples indicate an increased leakage'to 450 spd. At 1900, leakage increases

'

to'10 gym. At 1930, a SGTR occurs at a rate of 680 gym

'

causing a trip and SI.

Gil&LLENGING ASPECTS:

An increase in Primary and Secondary leakage will increase the radiation levels during the S/G sampling process.

Decisions will be made regarding.the dose received by the chemist. The unit will be ramping power down and mask the

!

initial leakage. indications. When the SGTE. occurs, i

pressurizer level and RCS pressure decrease uncontrolled.

L

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N ACTIONS; Steam Generator sampling will be performed with i

, consideration given to the radiation levels and dose to the Chemist. As the tube leak escalates, operations will take

!

procedural actions to react to the trip and SI.

NOCKUPS/

SIMULATIONS Actual S/G mamples will be-obtained with anocked up" L

results provided after the analysis-is complete. The q

simulator will be used to provide operations of Control

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Room personnel.

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ZION EUC12&R POWER STATIOR

.

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1990 GSEP EXERCISE

!

JULY 18, 1990

.

EVENT SL98%RY EVERT A1 ARM OR M DOOR MAT RBIY VALVE BOUSB DESCRIPTION:

At 1945, the Security CAS (Central Alarm Station) Operator receives an alarm on the 6 door M at the MSIV Valve House. The Card Reader at the door will be damaged from the steam exposure from the M51V Room. When an attempt is made to activate Card Reader 90, the Card Reader gives a green light but the strike (electronically activated door lock) will not activate. Massive amount:s of steam will be evident. During approach to the Card Reader, security personnel will contact the cloud of steam and

.,

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become contaminated, t minuggligg A3fRGIR1 Security personnel will be challenged with coasnaicating the door condition and the potential contamination of the patrol officer and the vehicle. Consunications between Security, Operations and Rad Protection will be required to control the situation.

EEERGTED ACTIOR8t Upon receiving an alara in CA8, a mobile patrol will be dispatched to investigate the alars. The patrol officer abould check the outer door for secureness and insert his card into the Card Reader. Upon opening the door, steam will be observed. Upon finding an inoperabia Card Reader, IMs may be calle6 to repair the Card Reader. The Patrol officer will report steam coming from the doors. SAS will report potentially contaminated person and the steam conditions in the Control Room for investigation.

SUCCasA/rAnas FATR1 If the officer reports steam exposure and potential

'

radiological contamination is realized lamediately, only the Officer will be contaminated. If the Officer returns to the vehicle, contamination will be spread to the interior of the vehicle req; iring additional decontamination efforts.

MDCKl&S/

BJI!UIATION:

Card Reader will be mocked up to simulate inoperable condition. Messages will be issued to describe steam conditions upon approach to door at valve house. A guard, with a vehicle, will be supplied for decontamination O

activities and surveys. Actual decontamination and isolation of contamination control vill be demonstrated.

0295Z/3/04521/vje N

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110E EUCLEAR POWER STAT 10E P<. o A o

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1990 CSEP EEERCISE

.

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JULY 18, 1990

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EVENT SLNGERT l\\~

p EVENTt LOSS QF FEEWATER DESCRIPTIOR For a post maintenance opefability check, the IC A N Pump is

running at the start of the Exercise. At 1710, the pump and l'

motor indicate high noise, vibration and high current due to l

a bearing failure. After investigation, it will be

'

determined that the pump w!11 be 008 for several< days. At approximately 1930, a Beactor Trip /81 signal starts 1A AFW Pump which immediately trips due to a broken valve stem on-1M81063. At 1945, the 18 AN Pump trips on overcurrent.

When investigated, the EM discovers and replaces the breaker

'

- charging motor or the entire breaker. The IMs investigate the Control Loop and discover the 1PSL-N114 switch charred and failed closed. Lifting the'?,eads will bypass the switch and allow motor starting.- The repairs will not be completed

.before 2230. After the less of all AN Pumps, the Feedwater Inclation Signal cannot be cleared due to a failure of l

Reactor trip breaker A and Gerefore, the M N System cannot be used to supply feed to the 8/Gs. The A RTB is repaired and can be closed at 2040.

CHAILERGIEG ASPECT 81 Operations will be challenged with a compound casualty

.

situation of a SGTR and Total Loss of Feedvater. The D 8/C, with the tube rupture, appears to be the only heat sink. EM and IM personnel will be challenged with troubleshooting and

!

repairs under urgent conditions.

!

EKEE.CIED i

ACT10R32 Operations will issue an A* Work Request to investigate the

)

IC A N failure. Maintenance wiD investigate and identify

,

the problems. After the Reactor trip and SI, Operations and

~l Maintenance personnel will be dispatched to investigate the

.]

IB A W and 1A A N Pump problems. With the loss of all Feedwater, Operations will enter the FR proceeding to regain a heat sink. The failed RTB will be investigated and y

repaired allowing Main Feedwater or Condensate to be supplied

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to the 8/Gs.

HQCUff/

31HUI.ATION:

A spare breaker will be used for IB aid breaker i

troubleshooting indications and repairs. A complete control l

loop will be used for IM investigation of IB AN Pump failure. Two valves will be used to simulate the 1A A N Pump i

isolation valve with a broken stem and for the blocking i

actions.

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1990 G8sP EERRCISE

r JULY 18, 1990

.

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EVENT SUIMARY

!

i IVRET:

BM8/_G9EIAHIR&IKILif9EEB18

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DESCRIPTIOB:

The Ezere:se initial conditien places 1A RER Pump 008 for

seal replacement. Final installation reconnections and testins is scheduled for the shift.- A surveillance

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regstres running the IB RER Pep. At approximately 1730,

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beaning failure occurs when the pump is started makir; ' e

{

pump inoperable. Maintenance investigation identifies the i

fatisd bearing. Work continues on both RER Pumps m;il the assembly. When reporting to the' Assembly area, two workers

from the 1A RER Pump Room arrive in PCs. One worker is i

I, contaminated.

EllALLERGfsG ASPECTSt Maintenance will be challenged with troubleshooting the IB

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RER bearing failure. The contaminated worker in the

!

Assembly area will challenge Security and Rad Protection

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with contamination control docusentation and decontamination activities.

.

EXPECTED ACTIONSt Maintenance personnel vill continue the work in progress on

)

1A RER Pusp. Operations will issue a Work Request to investigate the IB RRR Pump failure. An Alert classification will be declared due to the loss of shutdown cooling capability. The OSC Director / Supervisor will dispatch RTs to the Assembly area. The RTs will establish

,

contamination controls and perform decontamination of the individual. A survey of potentially contaminated ares vill be conducted.

,

KUGGKSEL

!

FAILURE

,

PATH; If the contaminated individual is not contained within a

'

certajn area of the assembly area, an additional person l -

will become contaminated and a larger portion of the assembly area contaminated.

MQGKESI SIMULATION:

Two Maintenance personnel vill arrive at the Assembly area in PCs. Contamination survey resulta vill be supplied by

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message.

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ZION AUCLEAR POWER STATIOR f, o _' o d 1990 G8EP EEERCISR l

JULY 18, 1990

...

.p EVENT SUfetARY EYEl(Il EELQCATION CENTER DESCRIPTION:

After the Assembly / Accountability, five personnel vill be selected as non-essent;'als and evacuated to the Relocation Center at the Antioch high School per EPIP 360-1.

The

!

Relocation Center will be activated prior to the arrival of the non-essential evacuees. 00 contamination will be found

,

on personnel or vehicles.- The normal station access route i

vill be in the path of the plume.

j i

CBALLEEi1Ei

'

ASPECTS:

The Station will be challenged with ecordination and control of the evacuation process. The station must arrange for Security to open an alternate Station access

!

And evacuate via Illinois Beach State Park.

,

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EXERGIED ACTIONS:

The TSC Director will decide to activate the Relocation Center and determine the route to evacuate non-essential personnel. The OSC Director will dispatch RTs to set up at Antioch High School. When the evacuees arrive at the

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Relocation Center, they will be surveyed and processed in.

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IRGER8l e

AltElLATION:

The Relocation Center at Antioch High School will actually be setup and used. Five station personnel will be

it.entified and relocated.

0295Z/6/04521/wjn

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ZION NUCMAD POWER STATION

,; o. o ~ v 1990 G8EP EXERCISE

~

o JULY 18, 1990

.

,

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EVENT SIDMARY

.>.(.

.

IVENTt WIND 8BIFT/ PAR 8 DESCRIPTION:

At 2100, the ID 8/G Atmospheric Relief lif ts and provides a path for an unmonitored release. The wind is blowing the plume into R Sector from 1600 (88E). A shift in the wind direction to the NRE was forecast for the evening. At 2130, the wind shift occurs blowing the plume into K 8ector from 200 (NNE). Field Teams will be required to follow a non-linear plume.

1.

CBALLINGIRG ASPECTS:

With the forecasted wind shift, the Station is challenged with decision making to determine PAta appropriate for the conditions and making State notifications.

EKEKGIED ACTIONSt'

The State will upgrade the PAR to evacuate the 0-2 mile radius and initially shelter Sectors Q, R and A.

As the wind shifts, the Station should make updated PAR recommendations to the State based on the r.filfted wind conditions.

1196KUES/

SlNAAI1QRi NONE.

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ZION NUCLE.

MER ST; TION O.

1990 GSEP EXERCISE-

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s JULY 18, 1990

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i i 24-NOUR TIME l INITIAL l

l l

l JimP l.

CONDITIONS l

ALERT l - S.E.

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CENiiRAL EMERGENCY l [ RECOVERY TERMINATE I

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PLANNING 1 I i

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i 1-i 1700 1800 1900 2000 2100 2200 2300 2400

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1700 PLANT AT FULL POWLR. HIGH RCS ACTIVITY. S/G TUBE LEAK 100 GPD. IA RHR P'JMP OUT OF SERVICE.

1705 1C A N PUMP FAILS - EXCESSIVE NOISE / VIBRATION.

~

1800 SURVEILLANCE ON 18 RHR PUMP FAILS. (ALERT)

1845 SMALL N BREAK STARTS. IMs EVACUATE AREA.

1900 PLANT SHUTDOW8 STARTED. S/G TUBE LEAK INCREASES TO 10 GPM.

1930 TUBE RUPTURE (680 GPM). REACTOR TRIP AND SI.1A AFV FAILS TO START.

t SITE ASSEMBLY. CONTAMINATED WORRERS AT ASSEMBLY. ACTIVATION OF i

RELOCATION CENTER WITH EVACUATION OF SITE PERSONNEL. REACTOR TRIP BREAKERS WILL NOT RESET.

1945 15 AN PUMP TRIPS. (SITE EMERGENCY).

ALARM ON VALVE HOUSE 000R AT CAS.

GUARD INVESTIGATING BECOMES CONTAMINATED.

2030 IF NO FW, UPGRADE TO GENERAL EMERGENCY.

STATE REQUESTS INCREASING PARS TO EVACUATE 0-2 MILES.

2100 S/G D ATMOSPHERIC FAILS OPEN.

2130 WIND SHIFT OCCURS.

2200 ATMOSPHERIC IS CLCSED.

2230 18 AN PUMP RESTORED.

2300 24 HOUR TIME JUMP.

0318Z/wje I

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