IR 05000295/1990021
| ML20058H165 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Zion File:ZionSolutions icon.png |
| Issue date: | 11/02/1990 |
| From: | Farber M NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION III) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20058H163 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-295-90-21, 50-304-90-23, NUDOCS 9011140287 | |
| Download: ML20058H165 (23) | |
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' . ' U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISS10ll , REG 10ll 111 Report Nos. 50-295/90021(DRP);50-304/90023(DRP) l Docket lios. 50-295; 50-304 License Nos. DPR-39; DPR-48 l l Licensee: Commonwealth Edison Company P. O. Box 767 Chicago, IL 60690 Facility Name: Zion liuclear Power Station, Units 1 and 2 Inspection At: Zion, IL ' Inspection Conducted: September 2 through October 13, 1990 e inspectors: J. D. Smith R. J. Leemon A. M. Bongiovanni D. R. Calhoun
l W. J. Kropp ' R. B. Landsnian D. L.-Shepard l R. N. Sutphin ! LQ3.L4.. L Approved By: M. J. Farber, St elirector og/p o . Inspection Summary l l l Ins >ection from September 2 through October 13, 1990 (Report Nos. 50-295/90021 TDR9T50:30379UUTJT!IRP7T ' , i Areas Inspected: Routine unannounced resident inspection of licensee action on previous inspection findings; suninary of operations; operational safety , verification and engineered safety feature (ESF) system walkdown; surveillance observation;maintenanceobservation;engineeringandtechnicalsupp(LERs); ort; safety assessment and quality verification; licensee event reports training, Temporary Instruction (TI) 2500/27.
Results: Of the 8 areas inspected, no violations or deviations were . ident1TTed.
In the area of plant operations, the licensee's performance remains constant.
The unit operator's responses to the unit 2 reactor trips on September 7 and September 22 wer very good. The fire brigade extinguished $$M $$b![ N > '[ Ci
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' - . , ' j the main transformer fire before the Zion fire department arrived on site.
l The unit 1 operator noted the bank D control rod misalignment within two minutes of the occurrence on October 12 which is indicative of good attention , t to the control boards. The control room reorganization appears to be effective.
However, when the main steam safety valve lif ted during unit 2 ' heat up, the operations staf f supervisors did not provide guidance to the ' operators to limit the reactor coolant system temperature or the steam generator pressure to prevent additional lifting of the main steam safety valve (MSSV).
As a result, the MSSV lifted a second time about four hours l later, i ' The licensee's performance in the area of maintenance and surveillance was i overall considered good.
An extensive number of outage-related, start-up, and normal routine surveillances were performed during this period.
During the human performance enhancement system (HPES) investigation of the missed instrument maintenance (IM) surveillance, other programmatic deficiencies pertaining to tracking methods and prioritization of surveillances were found which the licensee is currently addressing. An inadequate review of wiring and j schematic diagrams during troubleshooting activities attributed to the inadvertent start of the 2A auxiliary feedwater (AFW) pump. To enhance the surveillance program and to ensure proper prioritization of resources, a list of the surveillances which are within the grace period is provided to upper
management during the plan of the day meeting.
In regards to the maintenance
program, one strength includes the implementation of a new three-day rolling r
maintenance schedule which will track and plan current work and will aid in reducing the prioritized backlog of work requests. The work on the condenser boots was well planned and performed.
No major concerns were noted during the r performance of routine and outage related maintenance.
The maintenance staff ^ have also supported several motor operated valve inspections during this , period.
The licensee's performance in Engineering and Technical Support was overall ! considered good.
The engineering support to the operations staff during the , unit 2 startup and the unit I control rod slippage and recovery was considered a strength.
The technical staff's inspections and investigations relating to the unit 2 boot failure were very good.
The technical staff was also extensively involved in field verification and evaluation of the missing work requests.
Investigations into the unit 2 BOP annunciator fuse problems, spiking of the 10 steam generator steam flow, and isolation valve seal water / accumulator leakage continue. Two instances where engineering support was deficient included the inadequate review of wiring diagrams which caused the inadvertent start of the 2A AFW pump and an inefficient temporary alteration (TA) on the containment spray system.
, ' In the area of Safety Assessment / Quality Verification, the licensee's performance was considered good. The Zion station management presented the , ' results of the DET findings to all members of the Zion staff in a candid, straight forward manner. The message was that the findings are real and that the staff will move forward to solve the problems identified. The inspectors noted several supplemental LERs which have not been issued by the licensee.
Management failed to provide guidance to the operators to prevent a repeated lifting of the MSSV.
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. . , , ' DETAILS > 1.
Persons Contacted ,
- T. Joyce, Station Manager
- T. Rieck, Superintendent, Technical
' 'W. Kurth, Superintendent, Production R. Budowle, Onsite Nuclear Safety , T. Broccolo, Director, Services . "
- D. Karjara, Director, Performance Improvement
' l W. Stone, Assistant to Technical Superintendent - D. Redden Assistant to Production Superintendent , P. LeBlond, Assistant Superintendent, Operations ' , R. Johnson, Assistant Superintendent, Maintenance J. LaFontaine, Assistant Superintendent, Work Planning
- D. Woznial, Project Manager, ENC T. Vandervoort, Quality Assurance Supervisor
- C, Schultz, Quality Control Supervisor
- R. Chrzanowski, Regulatory Assurance Supervisor
- W. T'Niemi, Technical Staf f Supervisor R. Smith, Security Administrator
- T. Saksefski, Regulatory Assurance
N. Valos, Unit 2 Operating Engineer
W. Demo, Unit 1 Operating Engineer i l H. Carnahan, Unit 0 Operating Engineer W. Mammoser, PWR Projects
- S. Kaplan, Nuclear Quality Programs U.RC
- M. Farber, Section Chief i
- Indicates persons present at the exit interview held on October 17, 1990.
The inspectors also contacted other licensee personnel including members of the operating, maintenance, security, and engineering staffs.
2.
Licensee Actions on Previous inspection Findings (92701, 92702) Holations (Closed) Violation (295/89002-02;304/89002-02(DRP)). Failure to record the as-found valve stroke time using test procedure PT-7B as required by procedures QP 5-51 and ZAP 10-53-1. The licensee's corrective actions included 1) Nisions to test procedure PT-7B to preserve the record of the as-found condition and data, as well as providing for an effective preventative maintenance program; and 2) revisions to ZAP 5-51-3A and ZAP 5-51-5, in accordance with the requirements for as-found data as provided in ZAP 10-53-1, QP 5-51, and ANSI N18.7-1972.
Based on this corrective action, minimal safety significance of the issue and the time since the violation was issued, this item is considered closed.
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. - . , h ' (Closed) Violation (295/89008-03).
Failure to perform hold point inspections per procedures QP 10 51 and 18-52. The licensee initiated a discrepancy report to document the error and identify the necessary corrective actions. The licensee concluded that this was an.
isolated case, and held training discussions with all the affected departments which were completed on April 5, 1989. This violation is considered closed.
(Closed) Violation (295/89015-05:304/8901",-05): The cause and corrective , actions for an inoperable reactor vent fan were not documented in LER 304/88017. The licensee issued a revised LER that provided sufficient information which 1) concluded there was no significant impact on safety; i 2) clearly defined fan run time; 3) clarified operating modes during reversed fan operation; and 4) defined the method used for determining the absence of abnormal temperature excursions.
In addition, a procedure changewasmadetomotorcontrolcenter(MCC) inspection (E016-1)to address post-maintenance rotation verification. This violation is considered closed.
(Closed) Violation (295/89015-06;304/89015-06): The cause and corrective actions for the OBN Service Water Area Vent Fan Aircraf t Damper found failed open were not documented in LER 295/89001.
The licensee issued a revised LER which stated that a sticking control air valve was the cause
ofthedampernotreclosingduringthegerformanceofTSSP152-88, bus " Endurance Testing of Diesel Generator, when a momentary loss of voltage occurred.
Per caution notes in the Zion Electrical Distribution index, it was not required to verify the circraf t crash damper position , because jumpers were not used on the valve to maintain the damper in its normal closed position during a momentary loss of bus voltage.
The LER also indicated that the root cause of the licensee's failure to initiate a deviation report in a timely manner was due to personnel error. The ! licensee's corrective actions included replacing the damper control air valve and a solenoid valve.
Also, the Station Control Room Engineer was counseled on when to initiate a Deviation Report. This violation is considered closed.
(Closed) Violation (304/89019-02): Valve manipulations were performed on ' valves 2 PCV RC06 and 2 PCV RC07 without written guidance or an adequate briefing which resulted in both valves being isolated.
The licensee's corrective actions included revising 2AP-0 Section 5.3.3.3, " Shift , l Evolution Briefing," to provide guidelines on pre-job briefings; l establishing communications between shift engineer and crew prior to I containment entry and improving communications in noisy areas; and . providing written instructions prior to performing work in high noise areas. This violation is considered closed.
Unresolgd , (Closed) Unresolved (295/88019-06;304/88019-09).
Failure to test valve l remote position indicators not located in the control room.
Subsequent to this finding, it was determined that the ASME code only requires
verifying operability of indicators at the location used to perform the
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Even though it was not required, the I licensee performed a one time verificati::n tu of thirteen remote - position indicators for each unit.
Two special procedures were used for > the testing.
The licensee is further considering a periodic surveillance ' to test all the safety related equipment remote position indicators
required for shutdown that are outside the control room.
This unresolved item is considered closed.
Ojen items (Closed)Openitem(295/89021-01): Implementation of corrective actions-for continued operation in excess of the TS limits with 1A containment spray system inoperable due to the failure of IMOV-CS-0049.
The 11cer,ee's corrective actions included upgrading the quality of pT-14.to imrcove operability assessments.
The station also revised its roministrative process for determining the proper course of action in response to the failure of a component.
The revised process consists of a two phase review for component failures, discrepancies, or deficiencies.
The shift personnel will make the initial determination as to whether a LCO clock should be entered for the inoperable equipment, taking into consideration the specific and support functions of the equipment.
All determinations, which require no l LCO clock entry, will subsequently be reviewed by of fshif t personnel.
' . One aspect of the open item which relates to the licensee's commitment to { evaluete the need for a TS change to the recirculation phase functions of l containment spray will be followed up by Open item 295/89019-01. This open item is considered closed.
(Closed)Openitem(295/89021-04): The OB diesel driven fire pump and the 0A motor driven fire pump were declared inoperable due to low j differential pressure measurements from the in-line annubar.
The , licensee's corrective action included making a change to PT-202 to i inspect, clean and verify proper alignment of the annubar before
performing tests. This open item is considered closed.
No violations or deviations were identified.
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Summary of Operations
, .U..n._i t.1 j 1he unit operated at power levels up to 100% power for most of the inspection period. On September 10, 1990, at approximately 11:33 a.m., i the licensee declared an unusual event due to notification of outside i aaencies to obtain submergible pumps to help raduce the water level in the circulating water pump crib house. No damage to equipment in the crib i house occurred, nor was any safety related equipment in danger of being degraded during the event. On September 17, power was reduced to 50% to facilitate the realignment of a control bank D control rod which had j slipped twenty steps from the other rods in the bank. After the rod was realigned on September 18, the unit continued power ascension and operated at aower levels up to 100% until October 13 when the same: control rod aank D control rod slipped again.
Power was reduced to 67% for realignment of the rod.
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. . ' Unit 2 On August 30, 1990, the unit was synchronized to the grid, ending the 162nd day of a 70 day scheduled refueling outage. On September 7, a catastrophic failure of two condenser boots occurred causing a turbine trip and reactor trip.
The unit was at 92% power at the time of the reactor trip.
The licensee repaired the boots and performed other maintenance activities during this forced outage. On September 20, at approximately 10:45 p.m., unit 2 was taken critical and was synchronized to the grid on September 22, at 2:58 p.m.
On September 22, at 9:51 p.m., unit 2 was operating at 40% when an explosion in one of the two main transformers occurred which caused a main turbine trip and a subsequent reactor trip. There was no loss of off-site power and unit 1, which was
in operation, was not affected.
The unit was in hot shutdown for the remainder of the period.
Operational Safety Verification and Eng neered Safey Features System - - - - RaHB57n T71707T7171D7 a.
Operational Safety During the inspection period between September 2 through October 13, 1990, the inspectors verified that the facility was being operated in conformance with the license and regulatory requirements and.that the licensee's management control system was effectively carrying out its responsibilities for safe operation.
This was done on a sampling basis through routine direct observation of activities and i equipment, tours of the facility, interviews and discussions with licensee personnel, independent verification of safety system status and limiting conditions for operation action requirements (LC0ARs), ! corrective action, and review of facility records.
On a sampling basis the inspectors daily verified proper control room staffing and access, operator behavior, and coordination of plant activities with ongoing control room operations; verified operator adherence with the latest revisions of procedures for ongoing activities; verified operation as required by Technical Specifications (TS), including compliance with LC0ARs, with emphasis on engineered safety features (ESF) and ESF electrical alignment and l l valve positions; monitored instrumentation recorder traces and duplicate channels for understanding, of f-normal condition, and corrective actions being taken; examined nuclear instrumentation and other protection channels for proper operability; reviewed radiation (rad) monitors and stack monitors for abnormal conditions; verified-that onsite and offsite power was available as required; observed > the frequency of plant / control room visits by the station manager, superintendents, assistant operations superintendent,.and other managers; and observed the Safety Parameter Display System for operability.
Regional inspectors from the operator licensing section administered requalification exams durin the weeks of September 10 and 17.1990.
Ninereactoroperators(R0s$and14seniorreactoroperators(SR0s) participated in the requalification exams. All of the R0s and 11 of 14 SR0s passed the examinations.
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. During the requalification examinations, the inspector noted that abnormal operating pNcedure A0p 3.1, Feedwater Malfunction, Appendix E, listed 'he thrust bearing wear trip for the turbine driven feedwater pu'.p as a valid trip.
Further investigation indicated that modification 22-1(2)-88-08 completed in early 1989, permanently disable d the trip. Themodif$cationpackagestatedthat only annunciator pvocedures had been af fected by the modification; therefore, the A01 was not corrected to reflect the modification.
This is considered an Unresc1ved item (295/90021-01; 304/90023-01(ORP)) pending review of the modification program, b.
Engineered Safety Feature (ESF) Systems (71710) During the inspection, the inspectors selected accessible portions y of several ESF systems to verify status. Consideration was given to the plant mode, applicable TS, Limiting Conditions for Operation Action Requirements (LC0ARs), and other applicable requirements.
Various observations, where applicable, were made of hangers and supports; housekeeping; whether freeze protection, if required, was installed and operational; valve position and conditions; potential ignition sources; major component labeling, lubrication, cooling, etc.; whether instrumentation was properly installed and functioning , and significant process parameter values were consistent with i expected values; whether instrumentation was calibrated; whether ' necessary support systems were operational; and whether locally and remotely indicated breaker and valve positions agreed.
- During the inspection, the accessible portions of the AC electrical power system; DC electrical power system; reactor protection systems; residual heat removal systems; containment and support j systems; safety injection systems; letdown and charging systems; accumulator systems; rad monitoring system; service water system; component cooling water system; condensate and feedwater systems; circulating water systems; main generator systems; diesel generator
and auxiliaries systems; and control room were inspected to verify " operability.
The inspectors verified the operability of selected emergency systems, reviewed tegout records, and verified proper . return to service of affected components. Tours of the auxiliary ' and turbine buildings and crib house were conducted to observe plant equipment conditions, including potential fire hazards, fluid leaks, j and excessive vibrations and to verify the maintenance requests had ' been initiated for equipment in need of maintenance, j c.
OnsiteEventFollow-up(9370M Activation of Inactive part 55 License ! In September, 1990, the licensee reported on DVR No. 22-2-90-114N that a senior reactor operator assumed the duties of the unit 2 supervisor without completing an of ficial plant tour as required by , i 10 CFR 55.53(f).
The requirements to activate an inactive part 55
license include 1) the qualifications and status of the license are l current,2) a minimum of 40 hours of shift functions including turnover under the direction of a senior operator have been completed, and 3) a complete tour of the plant.
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. - . , , The license of the unit supervisor was current.
Requalification training for the individual was satisfactory, in that, all classes were attended or had makeun packages completed for the classes, in addition, all weekly quiz! ; were passed. The required annual operating test was passev.n July and October,1989 with the 1990 annual test scheduled fr October and November, 1990. A total of 40.5 hours were spent in the control room and plant during September, 1990. These hours were verified by security card access and one log book entry.
The unit supervisor toured only the auxiliary electrical rooms, the turbine building, and crib house. During the reactivation week, the unit supervisor did not tour the auxiliary building. _ In the month prior to the activation, the unit supervisor worked in the training department and had worked on all floors of the auxiliary building.
During the May/ June time frame, the unit supervisor worked in outage planning which required walking down jobs and out-of-service requests. Due to the initiative and the particular jobs of the individual, it appeared to the NRC that the intent of the plant tour
was met.
However, upon realizing that the official plant tour was
not completed, the unit supervisor performed a plant tour with an ! active senior operator to demonstrate his knowledge of plant
conditions.
. The root cause was attributed to not having a procedure available to ensure that the operator was cognizant of the requirements to e activate an inactive license.
The shift engineer did not ensure i that the unit supervisor was aware of the requirements and the unit , supervisor did not know the requirement for a complete tour. The [ licensee is currently writing a procedure for activation and reactivation of operator licenses.
Unit 2 Turbine Trip and Reactor Trip - Condenser Boot Failure < On September 7,1990, at approximately 7:49 p.m., a catastrophic failure of the unit 2 condenser boot occurred causing a turbine trip and reactor trip.
An unusual event was declared. The unit was at 92% power at the time of the reactor trip.
All plant systems responded as expected. The unit was depressurized and cooled down ' to cold shutdown to allow entry into the condenser to assess the damage to the boots.
! Investigation identified two rubber boots, located between the condenser neck and the low pressure turbines, ere blown on the 2A and 20 condenser boxes. Also, a rupture disc was blown on one low pressure turbine.
The root cause was attributed to the boots' age i and premature deterioration due to operational stresses. The licensee replaced all three condenser boots and plans on replacing i the boots on a periodic basis.
' M,iis, alignment and Recovery of a Control Rod On September 16, 1990, at 11 p.m., unit I control bank D control rod H-08 slipped approximately 20 steps from the other rods in the bank.
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' . . ' The unit was at 67% power at the time and had been on economic generation control (EGC) during the previous shift.
Incore thermocouples and an incore flux map verified that the rod had slipped and confirmed that the problem was not an incorrect rod position indication.
The licensee declared the rod inoperable and complied with technical specifications. Westinghouse was contacted for engineering support to review industry experience and to explore possible root causes. A temporary procedure change to the abnormal operating procedure for realigning mispositioned rods was written by the technical staff to provide instructions for the following recovery sequence: insertion of the other 8 bank D rods to the assumed H-08 position while maintaining 50% power through dilution of the reactor coolant system; withdrawal of the bank D rods at a rate of 3 steps per hour until out of the core; verification that-the rods are not misaligned; and resume normal operating power.
On September 18, the rod was realigned.
It was speculated that the movable gripper did not adequately energize during the. insertior demand at the time of the rod slippage. The licensee installed a recorder to monitor the coil current of the rod to detect any faults.
On October 13, 1990, at 12:10 p.n.,-unit I control bank D control rod H-08 again slipped approximately 15 steps from the other rods in the bank. The unit was at 95% power and on EGC.
Incore thermocouples and a flux map verified that the rod had slipped.
The , licensee declared the rod inoperable and followed the abnormal ! operating procedure and realigned the rod at 5:41 p.m.
No obvious deviations were found on the current trace.
The licensee is currently investigating the root cause to determine the appropriate , course of action.
! Main Steam Safety _ Valve (MSSV) Lifting Below its Set point On September 18, 1990, at 11:12 a.m., while unit 2 was in hot ! shutdown, one MSSV, 2MS0030, prematurely lif ted at 1030 psig.
The i valve reseated at 11:18 a.m.
At the time of the event, the temperature of the reactor coolant system should have been maintained at 547 degrees F; however, the temperature had increased l to approximately 551 degrees F.
This corresponded to a steam generator pressure of 1030 psig. The shift supervision were notified of the MSSV prematurely lifting; however, no guidance on temperature control was given to the operators to prevent further lifting of the valve. At 3:05 p.m., the MSSV again lifted and reseated at 3:15 p.m.
Technical Specification 3.7.1. A. states that at reactor coolant temperatures greater than 350 degree F, twenty ASME code safety valves shall be operable.
Table 4.7-1 specifies l the setpoint of 1063 psig for 2MS0030.
The MSSV was declared i inoperable.
The licensee performed trevf-testing on the 2MS0030 and five additional MSSVs to determ ne the lift setpoints. The as-found for the 2MS0030 was 1039 psig; however, the other five MSSVs tested were verified to have acceptable setroints. The 2MS0030 was readjusted to a corresponding lift setpoint of 1060 psig.
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. ' . ' All of the unit 2 MSSYs were recalibrated in March 1990, prior to the refueling outage.
The licensee is still investigating the root Cause.
Main Transformer Fire and Reactor Tri,p On September 22, 1990, at 9:51 p.m., unit 2 was opere',ing at 40% power when an explosion in one of the two main transformers occurred which caused a main turbine trip and subsequent reactor trip. All safety systems functioned as designed. There was no loss of i off-site power and unit 1, which was in operation, was not affected.
The transformer deluge system was activated; however, it was unable l to extinguish the fire.
The licensee contacted the Zion fire department for assistance; however, the site fire brigade had the ' i fire extinguished by the time the Zion fire department had arrived on site.
The unusual event which was declared at 9:58 p.m. was terminated at 11:30 p.m.
The transformer failure appears to have been caused by a fault on the 345 KV high voltage side of the transformer. A spare main i transformer was available for installation.
Installation and I testing is expected to be completed for startup in early November.
Visible damage to one phase of the generator to transformer duct work was evident.
Inspection of the main generator indicated that no damage had occurred. The root cause of the event is still under review by the licensee, d.
Current 11aterial Condition (71707) The inspectors performed general plant as well as selected system and component walkdowns to assess the general and specific material condition of the plant, to verify that nuclear work requests had been initiated for identified equipment problems, and to evaluate housekeeping.
Walkdowns included an assessment of the buildings, components and systems for proper identification and tagging, accessibillty, fire and security door integrity, scaffolding, radiological controls, and any unusual conditions.
Unusual conditions included but were not limited to water, oil, or other
liquids on the floor or equipment; indications of leakage through ceiling, walls or floors; loose insulation; corrosion; excessive . noise; unusual temperatures; and abnormal ventilation and lighting.
! i During the performance of job performance measures (JPM) for the i licensed operators recent requalification examinations, it was noticed that one of the compressed gas bottles in the unit 2 steam ' , tunnel did not have a required up-to-date hydrostatic test stamp.
l These bottles, which are stored energy scarces, are required to have ' a current hydro test. The unit 2 bottle's most recent stamp shows l 12-75+. The plus sign means-the hydro test was good for a five year ! period (i.e., through December 1980). A star (*) would mean the hydro test is good for ten years.
This bottle was used to locally ! operate power operated relief valves. This information on the ! ' discrepant bottle was turned over to the' licensee for follow up action. The bottle has been replaced and the program to account for i
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- - _ - - _ _ _ _ , ' . . . . bottles that need inspection is being reviewed by the licensee.
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Radiological Controls (71707) The inspectors verified that personnel were following health physics procedures for dosimetry, protective clothing, frisking, posting, etc., and randomly examined rad protection instrumentation for use, ! operability, and calibration.
The licensee has implemented the new radiation work permit system during this inspection period, l f.
Security (81064} Each week during activities or tours, the inspector monitored the licensee's security program to ensure that observed actions were implemented in accordance with the approved security plan. The inspector noted that persons within the protected area displayed proper photo-identification badges and those individuals requiring escorts were properly escorted.
The inspector also verified that checked vital areas were locked and alarmed. Additionally, the inspector also verified that observed )ersonnel and packages entering the protected area were searcied by appropriate-equipment or by hand, g.
Assessment of plant Operations In the area of plant operations, the licensee's performance remains constant. The unit operator's responses to the unit 2 reactor trips on September 7 and September 22 were very good. The fire brigade extinguished the main transformer fire before the Zion fire department arrived on site.
The unit 1 operator noted the bank D control rod misalignment within two minutes of the occurrence on October 12 which is indicative of good attention to the control boards. The control room reorganization acpears to be effective.
However, when the main steam safety valve lifted during unit 2 heat up, the operations staff supervisors d'.d not provide guidance to the operators to limit the reactor coolar.c system temperature or the steam generator pressure to prevent additional lifting of the MSSV.
As a result, the MSSV lifted a second time about four hours later.
5.
Monthly Surveillance Observation (61726) l The inspector observed technical specification required surveillance testing on the plant systems and verified whether testing was performed in accordance with adequate procedures, whether test instrumentation was calibrated, whether limiting conditions for operation were met, whether removal and restoration of the affected components were accomplished, , whether test results conformed with technical specifications and procedure requirements and were reviewed by personnel other than the individual directing the test, and whether any deficiencies identified during the testing were properly reviewed and resolved by appropriate management personnel, a.
Missed Surveillance Due To Programmatic Deficiency
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. In March 1990, the licensee failed to complete the monthly surveillance test for the 2B and 2C motor driven auxiliary feedwater pumps within the required time as documented in LER 304/90004 and
inspection report 304/90007(DRP). On Au ust 27 1990, the. licensee - failed to perform the quarterly technica specificationfunctional , test on ILT-459, pressurizer level channel, as documented in LER 295/90019. In both events, reactive plant conditions and associated activities distracted the licensee from the routine surveillances.
Discussions with the general surveillance coordinator indicate that
since the March event actions were taken to improve the method of surveillance scheduling and tracking. Surveillances performed by the operations, technical staf f, chemistry, health physics, fire , protection and electrical maintenance staff are tracked using the newly implemented general surveillance (GSRV) program and are now , scheduled on the master operating tracking system (MOTS).
Long term ' corrective action included providing u)per management with a listing of the surveillances that are within tie grace period on a daily basis to ensure proper priority for the completion of the surveillance activity.
, The instrument maintenance (IM) department's surveillances are not ! presently tracked on the GSRV but through an independent system, the j general surveillance instrument nuclear (GSIN) program, which has
been in existence for several years.
During the Human Performance Enhancement System (HPES) investigation, other progransnatic deficiencies pertaining to IM surveillance tracking practices were found.
The corrective actions described in the HPES report should address the concerns. Consistent with the other departments, the - past due IM surveillances are discussed at the morning plan of the day meeting. The resident inspectors will continue to monitor the . surveillance programs and implementation of the corrective actions , ! stated in the LERs.
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Auxiliary Feedwater ( AFW) Pump Auto Start Durino Surveillance TFoubTeshoo_tliig~ l On September 15, 1990, while replacing a defective undervoltage relay in the safeguard logic circuity, the 1A AFW inadvertently started.
The relay was found defective during the performance of PT-5B, Reactor Protection Logic testing. The root cause of the auto-start was attributed to personnel error, in that, the technical staff engineer did not adequately review the wiring and schematic diagrams prior to de-terminating the relay, c.
Ojmergen,cyDieselGenerator(EDG)TrippedDuringSurveillance On October 10, 1990, while bus drops were in progress in accordance with the safeguards protection operability surveillance, the 0 EDG tripped. At the time of the event, the O EDG was running unloaded for cooldown in preparation for securing the EDG prior to the next bus drop.
An investigation indicated that the overspeed and lube oil pressure annunciators were the first alarms received after the tri). After several starts during troubleshooting activities, the tecinical staff and electrical maintenance personnel could not -
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q . . , . reproduce the failure. The licensee plans to monitor the lube oil: pressure during subsequent starts to trend any deviations in pressure. On October 12 the 0 EDG lube oil heater supply breaker from unit 1 motor control center 1371 was observed smoking by a roving firewatch.
The operations-staff investigated and found that-the breaker had automatically transferred:to the unit 2 associated MCC. The lube oil heater will be powered from the unit 2 until'the-breaker is repaired. The 0 EDG was declared operable on October 12.
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Assessment of Surveillance
An extensive number of outage-related, start-up, and normal routine surveillances were performed during this period.
During the HPES investigation of the missed IM surveillance, other programmatic.
i deficiencies pertaining to tracking methods and prioritization of.
' surveillances were found which the licensee is currently addressing.. An inadequate review of wiring and schematic diagrams during troubleshooting activities attributed to the inadvertent start;of the 2A AFW pump.
To enhance the surveillance program and to ensure proper prioritization of resources, a list of the surveillances which are within the grace period is provided to upper management during the plan of the day meeting, - No violations or deviations were identified.
6.
MonthlL Maintenance Observation (62703) Station maintenance activities af fecting the safety-related systems and componerts listed below were observed / reviewed to ascertain that they were conducted in accorAnce with approved procedures, regulatory-guides: and industry codes or stradards, and in conformance with Technical , , l Specifications.
l The following items were considered during this review: the limiting: conditions for operation were met while components or systems were removed from and restored tc service; approvals were obtained prior to initiating the work; cctivities were accomplished using approved . procedures and were inspected as applicable; functional. testing.and/or calibrations were performed prior to returning components or-systems to service; quality control records were: maintained; activities were . accomplished by qualified personnel; parts and materials used were l L properly certified; radiological controls were implemented; and fire protection controls were implemented.
Work requests were reviewed to I aetermine the status of outstanding jobs-and to assure that priority is assigned to safety-related equipment maintenance which may affect: system j performance.
! [ a.
Unusual Event Due to Crib House Flooding , i On September 10, 1990, at approximately 11:33 a.m...the licensee t
declared ~an unusual event due to notification of outside agencies to-l obtain submergible pumps to help reduce the water level in the l-circulating water pump crib house.
In late 1989, to accommodate u ' ! \\
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, ' . , ' ' , . L planned overhaul of the 1A circulating pump, the licensee drained down the crib house suction bay for the 1A circulating water pump.
Two temporary sump pumps were placed in the bay to drain any leakage into this area. At approximately 8:30 a.m., both of the temporary-sump pumps were found tripped and the water-level in the crib house was rising. The licensee contacted outside local agencies to obtain _ extra pumps to help lower the water level. The closure plate cover for the 1A circulating water pump was installed which sufficiently-stopped the back flow of water into the crib house through the pump !' casing, it is estimated that the water depth reached 24' inches-above the lower crib house floor before it stopped rising.
By 1:00 p.m., the water level was decreasing. The licensee terminated i the unusual event at 5:00 p.m. when the water level returned to an acceptable level.
No damage to equipment in the crib house occurred, nor was any; safety related equipment in danger of being degraded during the event. The licensee has implemented extra tours of the crib house to monitor water level until the circulating water-pump.is returned _to service, b.
MissinL Maintenance Work Requests To verify the accuracy of the job management database and to ensure that current work requests were properly coded, the licensee-conducted a physical search to locate all outstanding work requests.
During this process, the licensee was-unable to locate;1054 work
requests.
Further investigation revealed that over 300 of'these ! work requests were in various. stages in the maintenance _ process and were eventually located..The remaining 616 work requests were then researched, field verified and evaluated by -the technical staf f to verify that the work specified on the job order was either completed,'not required or needed to be completed. Approximately 170 new work requests were generated by this effort.L A1.1 work requests are now tracked by a new system recently implemented. - ' c.
Assessment of Maintenance One strength includes the implementation of a new three-day rolling maintenance schedule-which will track and plan current work and will aid in reducing the prioritized backlog of work requests.
The work on the condenser boots was well> planned and performed.
No major concerns were noted during the-performance of routine.and outage related maintenance. The maintenance staff have also supported several motor operated valve inspections during this period.
No violations of deviations were identified.
7.
Engineering and Technical Support (37828) j Thr inspectors evaluated the extent to which engineering principles and evaluations were integrated into daily plant activities.
This was accomplished by assessing the technical staff involvement.in non-routine
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. ' events, outage-related activities,'and assigned technical specification (TS) surveillances; observing on-going maintenance work and troubleshooting; and reviewing deviation investigations and root cause determinations.
' a.
Ventilation Fan Failure in the Rod Drive MG-Set Room On September 20, 1990, the unit I rod drive MG-Set room ventilation fan failed.
Instructions were provided to the operations staff to monitor the room temperature daily and to take appropriate actions to provide temporary cooling if indications showed that the temperature was approaching 105 degree F.
Maintenance was completed.
and the fan was returned to service on the-next day ~. An on-site review was conducted tot justify operation without the fan-since the updated final safety analysis report limits the maximum MG-Set room ambient temperature'to 105 degree F.
The licensee was concerned with the temperature effects on the: safety related reactor trip breakers. An ongoing analysis is being' conducted by contracting - engineers to clarify the relationship between equipment operability; and the availability of various ventilation; systems..The current.
analysis determined an equivalent continuous ambient temperature of . - approximately 100 degrees F assuming the loss of ventilation.
Therefore, the operability of the reactor trip breakers were not compromised.
b.
Temporary Alteration to the 2B Containment Spray System-(37700) TA 90-066 Installation of 2CS0020 valve bonnet to act as:a-pressure boundary The purpose of the temporary alteration (TA) was to install the valve bonnet to provide a pressure boundary in the-sodium hydroxide-(haOH) line to the containment spray (CS) q stem. The 2B eductor.
isolation manual valve, 20$0020, which' is normally locked opened, had a broken stem and the replacement parts'had not been received by the licensee. The valve internals were not installed; therefore, the final configuration was that of a straight pipe. The 10 CFR 50.59 safety analysis which was completed by the system engineer stated that the containment spray system'under this configuration would maintain the ability to-inject Na0H through the 2B CS system.
Therefore; the 28 CS train would be available for iodine removal as well as pressure reduction.
The inspector reviewed the associated inoperable equipment information, PT-14,. relating to the 2CS0020 which referenced the TA and a temporary-change to the monthly operability surveillance.
During a walkdown of the control panels, the inspector noted that a caution card on the 2B CS pump stated that two manual valves, .2CS0019 and 2CS0022, were closed which. prevented the flow' of Na0H.
Discussions with the unit. supervisor indicated that the NaOH supply was isolated per an administrativeout-of-service (00S). The 00S was conducted to prevent the operations staff from draining an
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excessive amount of NaOH from the system prior to_ the performance of the monthly operability test, PT-6.
The inspector noted that the PT-14 did not reflect the condition of the system.
The iodine removal capability of the 2B CS train was-made inoperable by the administrative 00S; however, the PT references the TA which states that the iodine removal capability: , was not affected.
The TS requires two of the three trains-of iodine removal to be operable; therefore, no TS violation has occurred.
- However, the purpose of the PT was to document the abnormal condition of the system.
The-licensee implemented a new PT-14.for the isolation of the line. Also,_the operations-staff did not communicate the need for additional isolation for personnel protection and to prevent excessive drainage. The TA did not i account for these human factor considerations; therefore, the operation staff implemented the administrative 00S. The system engineer was not cognizant of the. isolation of the NaOH line._ The H licensee is reviewing the above concerns.
c.
Assessment of Enjineerina and Technical Support The engineering support to the operations staff during the unit 2 l startup and the unit I control rod slippage and recovery was considered a strength. The technical staff's inspections and investigations relating to the unit 2 boot failure were very good.
The technical staf f was-also extensively involved in field , verification and evaluation of the missing work requests.- ! Investigations into the unit 2 B0P annunciator fuse problems, spiking of the IC steam generator' steam flow, and isolation-valve.
seal water / accumulator leakage continue.
j - Two instances where engineering support was deficient _ included the-i inadequate review of wiring diagrams which caused the inadvertent-start of the 2A AFW pump and an inefficient TA on the: containment' spray system.
No violations or deviations were identified.
' 8.
SafetL Assegment and Quality Verification
a.
Diagnostic Evaluation Team (DET) Findinas Presentation-to Zion Staff 1l Mr. Mike Wallace, Vice President, PWR Operations and:Mr. Tom Joyce,- i Zion Plant Manager, held 30 minute presentations.on the importance ' and significance of the DET findings for the Zion -staf f. ~ Attendance was required. The DET findings and the licensee action plans were , discussed very candidly, j b.
EguipmentLaungyTags a The Zion station management was concerned that all plant equipment with deficiencies were not being identified. As-a result of this concern, emphasis has been put on-the use-of equipment. laundry tags '16 l
- .. ' . s . , - , ' for in-plant equipment _ deficiencies and stickers on;the main con' trol board equipment.
This ensures that a maintenance work request or a material condition report is written to correct the deficiencies.
, c.
Su_mmary of Personnel Errors The inspectors have noted a number of personnel errors which have occurred during the last report.(50-295/90017 and 50-304/90019) and present reporting period. The errors consisted of an inadvertent . trip of the wrong main turbine by La nuclear station operator; an - < operator's failure to verify proper valve position resulting in an
inadvertent flow-from the volume control tank through the boron
- injection tank into the reactor coolant-system; an inadvertent start' =t of a containment spray pump during troubleshooting; and the mechanic's failure to notify the control-room of the inadvertent start; and inadvertently leaving the vent stack system particulate i iodine noble gas monitor in the flush mode rendering it. inoperable.
During this inspection period, a MSSV setpoint drifted and one MSSV prematurely lif ted at 1030 psig.- Operations, supervisors failed to provide guidance to the operators to limit reactor coolant temperature, and the same valve lifted again.
While replacing an
, undervoltage relay in the safeguards logic circuitry, the 1A.
auxiliary feedwater pump auto-started.
The root cause was attributed to_ personnel error,-in that,-the wiring and schematic diagrams were not adequately reviewed-prior to de-term.inating the relay.
The licensee conducted root cause analysis' for'each of these errors.
The causes were-identified as inattention to detail and-communication problems. The resident inspectors are monitoring the licensee's corrective actions and have seen less. errors during this ? L assessment period.
d.
Assessment of SAQV . The Zion station management presented.the results of the DET finding to all members of the-Zion staff in'a candid, straight forward manner.
The message was that the findings are real and that the staff will move ~ forward to solve the problemsLidentified.. The inspectors noted several supplemental.LERs which have not been issued by the licensee. Management failed to provide guidance to the operators to prevent a repeated lifting of the MSSV.
9.
McenseeEventReports(LERs) Followup (92700) Through direct observations, discussions with licensee personnel, and review of records, the following event reports were reviewed to_ determine that reportability requirements were: fulfilled, immediate corrective ,
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action was accomplished, and corrective action to prevent recurrence had been accomplished in accordance with Technical Specifications.
The LERs listed below are considered closed: uNIL1 LER N0.
DESCRIPTION 89001 OBN Service Water Area Vent Fan Aircrt.ft Crash Damper Found Failed Open due to Faulty Valve.
89001-ll (Supplement) OBN Service Water Area Vent Fan Aircraft Crash Damper Found Failed Open due to' Faulty Valve.
89025 Auxiliary Feedwater Discharge Motor Operated Valve Failures 89026 Missed Firewatch in Crib house Service Water Pump Area-90005 Lake Discharge Tank Release Without Second Verification of Release Calculations-90013 Misalignment of Unit 1 Isolated Valve Seal Water tank 90017 Unit 1 Main Turbine Trip / Reactor Trip due to Personnel Error 90019 Missed Surveillance on Pressurizer Level Channel Due to Programmatic Deficiency Regarding LER 295/89001 and LER Supplement 295/89001-01, violation (295/89015-06(DRP); 304/89015-06(bkP)) on failure to document the root cause and corrective actions in the LER was cited. :The violation is closed in paragraph 2 of this report.
This LER and the Supplement (01) to the LER are considered closed.
Regarding LER 295/89025, this item was discussed in inspection report (295/89039;-304/89025(DRP)), and the concerns regarding the apparently - incorrectly sized MOV spring packs, which prevented setting of the torque switches for the operating differential pressure, are considered an unresolveditem(295/89039-04(DRP)). Immediate corrective actions resolved the problems identified with the AFW MOVs for unit 1.
An engineering review is planned to resolve all deficiencies-prior to , corrective action, if required,-on unit 2.
A supplement to the LER will be issued when the engineering review is completed and the corrective actions are established to 3revent recurrence. The NRC review of-the-supplement to the LER will se tracked as Open Item (295/90021-02(DRP)). ? This LER is considered closed.
Regarding LER 295/89026, this event had minor safety significance as the area involved was monitored at all times by fire detectors that would alarm in the control room.
For long term corrective action, a full < firewatch force has been established.
This LER is-considered closed.
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Regarding LER 295/90005, the licensee failed to perform the second independent verification of the release rate calculation prior to the four lake discharge tank releases on January 29 and-30, 1990.
The second verification was required by TS since the associated radiation monitor was inoperable at the time.
The licensee had performed the second verifications on earlier releases.
The root cause was attributed-to procedural deficiency, in that. the release form did not address.second-verification. The licensee revised the appropriate forms and procedure.
This LER is considered closed.
Regarding LER 295/90013, the primary water isolation valve and the: I emergency makeup isolation valve were closed; thus could not function to [ provide makeup to the isolation valve seal water tank. This condition existed for thirteen days while the unit was in hot shutdown'and hot- ! (j standby, The root cause of the event was attributed to procedural deficiency, in that, the lineup included in the technical staff operability procedure which was performed on May 29, 1990, was different-i than the system lineup included in the operation department procedure.
l The operation department was unaware of the lineup discrepancy; i therefore, did not realize that the system was misaligned. Additionally, the inspector noted that the licensee's original deviation report stated that while performing the investigation, the service water ma keup i isolation valve was also found misaligned; however, this was not , addressed in the LER.
This LER is considered closed.
Regarding LER 295/90017, this event was discussed in inspection report I (50-295/90017;50-304/90019(DRP)). The inspector reviewed the HPES-report which is referenced in the LER and has no further concerns.- Regarding LER 295/90019, the licensee failed to perform'the quarterly j functional test on the ILT-459, pressurizer level channel, within the TS allowable time limit.
The apparent root cause of the event was- , attributed to a programmatic deficiency, in that, the existing method of.
I scheduling instrument maintenance (IM) surveillances does not require the IM management notification of approaching critical due-dates. Other contributing factors included reactor vessel level indication = system (RVLIS) resi;tance temperature detector (RTD) priority work, rod position , indication problems, unit 1 trip and-startup, and unit 2 startup preparation. The safety significance was nioimal since the channel was i found to be in calibration and the functional-was done one day.past the ~ grace period allowed by TS.
This event is discussed.in Paragraph 5 and the LER is consi'ered closed.
J ' UNIT 2 LER N0.
DESCRIPTION 84004-1L (Rev.2) Plant Condition Not Bounded by Safety Analysis
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88013 Plant Condition Not Bounded'by Safety. Analysis , 88017 Inoperable Reactor Cavity _ Vent Fan 2A due to a Procedure i Deficiency l 89006 Missed QPTR Surveillance Due to Personnel Error 89007 Missed Surveillance Due to Vent Stack Rad Monitor in High Rad Mode , 89009 Missed Surveillance Due to Personnel Error 90009 Inadvertent Auto Closure of the 2B Diesel Generator Output Breaker and Bus 249 Main Feed Breaker Regarding LER 304/84004, the original LER was written because the original Westinghouse loss of feedwater transient analyses. showed that.
Zion would have had inadequate auxiliary. feedwater. flow to the steam - generators in the event of losing all feedwater. A standing order was , issued to the operators to ensure adequate flow during such.an event.
A subsequent revision to the analysis and LER indicated that enough margin existed in the analysis such that no additional actions were required and the standiag order was cancelled.. This latest revision was issued because the licensee received a new loss of feedwater analysis from Westinghouse which uses a reactor power of 102% rathers than 102%-of . 11890 ESF power. This new analysis further verified that no additional actions are required to assure adequate cooling during'a' loss of i feedwater transient. This LER revision is considered closed.
i Regarding LER 304/88013, the licensee-failed to perform grab samples at t ! the required frequency when-the containment vent stack rad monitor,. 2RI A-PR40, was out-of-scry1ce (005).
While the rad ~ monitor was 00S, the ' licensee vented Ins "rit 2 containment as documented in release number l G-88-902 and G-88-904.
Technical Specification-3.12 states that with rad l monitor 2RIA-PR40 inoperable,lyzed. venting operations may continue' only'~if shiftly grab samples were ana The licensee identified poor communications between the Operating and Radiation Protection (RP) departments as the cause of the event.
The poor method used by operating and RP to confirm which required surveillances were performed was also-identified as.a cause of the event. As a result of a subsequent event ' documented in LER 304/89005,.the following corrective action was' - I scheduled: I ! l: 1) Procedure ZRP 1720-1 will be rev'ised to require the RP-foreman, upon notification from the Operating Department of an 005 Rad monitor, to ensure the proper surveillances were performed; and
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, , ' 2) The 00S rad monitor surveillance form will be revised.to require the-shift supervisor concurrence.for initiation and termination of-00S rad monitor surveillances.
' The ebove corrective actions, if effectively implemented, should preclude future missed grab samples. The completion of the above two corrective actions will be tracked as Open item (304/90023-02(DRP))..This LER is
considered closed, o Regarding LER 304/88017, violation (304/89015-05(DRP)) on failure to document the cause and corrective actions for an inoperable reactor vent i fan was cited against this LER. The violation is closed in' paragraph.2 of this report and this LER is considered closed.
Regarding LER 304/89006, this event was,a case of personnel errors by
plant personnel by the operations and maintenance departments.
Upon . , discovery, the licensee took immediate corrective action-to verify that' '
2NI-42 was operable and returned the' alarm defeat switch lineup to normal. Data analyzed from the plant, process computer verified that'the.
reactorpowerdistributionwasalwayswithintherequiredband(i.e., less than 1.02).
The safety significance.was minimal.
Long term , corrective actions are in progress and the licensee-has a commitment to issue a supplemental report to this LER when-corrective actions to prevent recurrence are established.
The NRC review of the supplement willbetrackedasOpenItem(304/90023-03(DRP)). This LER is considered closed.
Regarding LER 304/89007, this event'was a case of the vent stack SPING monitor operating in a selected special.high. rad mode,-when it should have been in a normal mode.
This was-corrected immediately when- - discovered and an investigation was initiated.
Other upstream gas l monitors in operation during the. time of the event indicated that no abnormal releases occurred.
The health and safety of the general public ' was not compromised. The surveillance, which would have been required-t under this condition, was apparently missed for one shift. The licensee has committed to issue a supplement to the LER when the cause and i engineering evaluation have been determined. The NRC review of the supplement will be tracked as'0 pen Item (304/90023-04(DRP)). This LER is L considered closed.
i Regarding LER 304/89009, this event was a case of personnel error in ' missing a surveillance during one shift.
When the vent. stack f. low monitor failed, the surveillance should have been initiated and
continued. The safety significance was minimal because the auxiliary.
building vent stack monitor was operable throughout the avent'and this: monitor was upstream of the area of concern. The immediate corrective - , action was effective, in performing the required sur eillance, and the longer term-corrective action, including a HPES was initiated.. The licensee has a commitment to issue a su)plement-to the LER when the
results of the HPES are established.
Tie NRC review of the supplement will be tracked as 0 pen Item (304/90023-05(DRP)). This LER is considered-closed.
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n e ' , i o , ! ! . Regarding LER 304/90009, this issue was discussed in previous inspection-report 50-304/90019 in section 7.b.
The discrepant wire was not properly unlanded ar specified on the design-drawings during a modification performed in 1973.
Therefore, the field installation did not reflect the design diagrams.
Additionally, the inspector noted-that-the auto synchronization relay was installed during this past outage using the _.
same design drawings; however, the discrepancy was not found-during the modification or post installation walkdowns.
In addition to the foregoing, the inspectors reviewed the licensee's DVRs l generated during the inspection period. This was done in an effort to I monitor the conditions related to plant or personnel performance and-potential trends.
Deviation Reports were also reviewed to. ensure that . they were generated appropriately and dispositioned in a manner ' consistent with the applicable procedures and the quality assurance manual. The following DVRs were reviewed: ' l DVR 22-2-90-95 Pressurizer Boron Samples Diluted by Primary Water l Valve Hispositioned
.i No violations or deviations were identified.
10. T gining (41400) < During the inspection period, the inspectors reviewe'd abnormal events and unusual occurrences which may have resulted, in part, from training , deficiencies.
Selected events were' evaluated to determine whether the
. classroom, simulator; or on-the-job training received before the~ event j was sufficient to have either prevented the-occurrence or to have = mitigated its effects by recognition and proper operator action.
Personnel qualifications were also evaluated.
In addition, the inspectors determined whether lessons learned.from the events-were
incorporated into the training program - Events reviewed included the events discussed-in this, report.
In' ' addition, LERs were routinely evaluated for training. impact.- No-event.
reviewed this period was found to have significant training deficiencies
. as contributors.
~ ! The resident inspector attended one simulator portion _of the-l requalification training session.
Good coordination and communication l between the operators were observed., No deficiencies were'noted.
' No violations or deviations were identified.
11. Temporary Instruction (TI) 2500/27 This TI pertained to follow-up activities for Bulletin 87-02, " Fastener - Testing to Determine Conformance with Applicable. Material Specifications." The TI was not applicable to the' Zion plant. This TI is considered closed.
! No violations or deviations were identified.
___ __ , . ! ,' .- . o' . .; . 12. Open 1,tes '! Open items are matters which have been discussed with th'e licensee which will be reviewed further by the inspector and which involve some action on the part of the NRC or licensee or both.
Five Open items disclosed ~ ! during this inspection are discussed in paragraph-9.
! 13.
Ug esolved items Unresolved items are matters about which more information-is_ required ~in' ' order to ascertain whether they are acceptable items, items of _ noncompliance'or deviations. One Unresolved item disclosed during this inspection is discussed in paragraph 4a.-
Mangement Meetinos (30703) fj On September 7,1990, Mr. James M. Taylor, Executive Director for.
Operations; Dr. Thomas E. Murley, Director, Of fice of Nuclear Reactor -{ Regulation; and Mr. Bert Davis, Regional Administrator met with the ' Commonwealth Edison Company (CECO) Board of Directors to discuss the-
performance and the results of the-recent diagnostic evaluation-conducted: i at the Zion Nuclear Power Station.
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On September 10, 1990, W. D. Shafer, Chief, Branch 1,. Division of Reactor- - Projects, attended the entrance meeting for the NRC human factor'section inspection of overtime at the Zion station.
On September 17, 1990, Mr. T. Joyce, Zion plant manager and other CECO management met in Region Ill with Mr. Bert A. Davis, Regional-Administrator, and other NRC management to present the monthly.
, ll Performance Improvement update and Zion performance status.- l On October 10, 1990, Commissioner Rogers and Mr. E. Greenman, Director, Division of Reactor Projects, toured the Zion site and met with the , management of Zion to discuss Zion's performance and related issues-i pertaining to pressurized water reactors.
o No violations or deviations were identified.
15.
Exit Interview (30703) The inspectors met with licensee representatives (denoted in Paragraph 1)
, l throughout the inspection period and at the conclusion;of the inspection l l on October 17, 1990, to summarize the scope and findings of the i l inspection activities. The licensee acknowledged the inspectors' . l comments. The inspectors also discussed the likely informational content ' of the inspection' report with regard to documents or processes-reviewed by:the inspectors during the inspection. The licensee did not identify - any such documents or processes as proprietary.
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