IR 05000295/1989012

Insp Repts 50-295/89-12 & 50-304/89-12 on 890420 & 0502-05. No Violations,Deviations or Deficiencies Noted.Major Areas Inspected:Annual Emergency Preparedness Exercise

ML20247G375
Person / Time
Site:	Zion  File:ZionSolutions icon.png
Issue date:	05/17/1989
From:	Ploski T, Matthew Smith, Snell W NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION III)
To:
Shared Package
ML20247G367	List: IR 05000295/1989012 ML20247G362 ML20247G378
References
50-295-89-12, 50-304-89-12, NUDOCS 8905300389
Download: ML20247G375 (23)

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'U.S. NUCLEAR-REGULAT0'RI. COMMISSION

REGION III

y . Reports No. 50-295/89012(DRSS);50-304/09012(DRSS) .

1-l Docket Nos. 50-295; 50-304 Licenses No. DPR-39;-DPR-48 Licensee: Commonwealth Edison Company

. Post Office Box 767 Chicago, IL 60690 Facility Name: Zion Nuclear Generating Station, Units 1 and 2 Inspection At: . Zion Station, Zion, Illinois

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Inspection. Conducted: April 20 and May 2-5, 1989 Inspectors:

LO ddA $ .08# h T. Ploski :f/t *7/S,f Date iktM k CS M. Sm{s.th Sl/YS9 Date M b Approved By: William Snell, Chief g/n/sp Emergency Preparedness Date and Effluents Section Inspection Summary Inspection on April'20 and May 2-5, 1989 (Reports No. 50-295/89012(DRSS);

No. 50-304/89012(0RSS))

Areas Inspected: Routine, announced inspection of licensee actions on previously-identified items (IP 92701) and the annual emergency preparedness exercise (IP 82301). Two NRC representatives evaluated licensee performance during the April 20 remedial demonstration. Four NRC representatives evaluated licensee performance during the May 3 exercis Results: No violations of NRC requirements, deviations, or deficiencies were identified. All weaknesses from the 1988 exercise have been closed in addition to several other perviously-identified items. Increased Station and corporate management attention to the emergency preparedness program was evident'from the challenging aspects of the April 20 and May 3 exercise scenarios and by the overall performances of exercise participants. However, several' items were identified during the May 3 exercise which will require corrective action. The licensee agreed that increased plant and corporate management attention to the program was still warrante PDR ADOCK 05000295 Q PDC

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'4 The April 20 activity was a successful remedial demonstration of the licensee's capability to respond to a trani.portation accident involving simulated radioactive materials and multiple injuries with simulated contamination complications. The licensee has developed a procedure for responding within the city limits of Zion, Illinois to a transportation accident involving radioactive materials. Challenging aspects of the May 3 exercise scenario included the use of: the Control Room simul'ator; variable wind direction data; and roleplayers simulating NRC duty officers and Site Team representatives in the Emergency Operations Facilit i l

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'6 DETAILS 1. Persons Contacted NRC Observers and Areas Observed (April 20 Remedial Drill)

M. Smith, Technical Support Center (TSC)

T. Ploski, Transportation Accident Scene NRC Observers and Areas Observed (May 3 Exercise)

M. Smith, Control Room (CR), TSC T. Ploski, TSC, Emergency Operations Facility (E0F)

R. Hogan, CR, E0F J. Jamison, Operations Support Center (OSC) and Inplant Teams * Licensee Representatives (April 20 Remedial Drill)

T. Joyce, Station Manager R. Budoule, Services Director A. Nykiel, GSEP Coordinator J. Johnson, GSEP Training Instructor T. Gilman, Emergency Preparedness Supervisor P. Vitalis, Emergency Preparedness Staff Offsite Support Agency Representatives (April 20 Remedial Drill)

• • D. McAdams, City of Zion Fire Chief B. Stern, City of Zion Training and Safety Officer C. Sargent, City of Zion ESDA Coordinator R. Sargent, City of Zion ESDA Training Officer

' * Licensee Representatives (May 3 Exercise)

K. Graesser, General Manager, PWR Stations T. Rieck, Technical Superintendent A. Nykiel, GSEP Coordinator T. Gilman, Emergency Preparedness Supervisor

• Approximately 15 other licensee representatives also attended the April 20 and May 3, 1989 exit interview **Also attended the May 3, 1989 exit intervie . Licensee Action on Previously Identified Items (IP 92701)

(Closed) Open Item No. 295/87007-01; No. 304/87009-01: During the r

1987 exercise, an inplant team failed to follow several procedural steps during reactor coolant sample collection using the High Range Sampling System (HRSS).

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Records indicated that the sampling team demonstrated good ALARA practices and adherence to procedures while collecting and diluting a reactor coolant semple during the March 23, 1989 HRSS drill. This item is close (0 pen) Open Item No. 295/88006-01: The licensee must repair and periodically test the Emergency Operations Facility's (E0F's) emergency ventilation system and Particulate, Iodine, and Noble Gas (PING)

monito The PING has been electrically upgraded and calibrated and was now operable. However, the periodic surveillance procedure for the PING and the E0F's emergency ventilation system had not been finalized and approved. This item remains ope (Closed) Open Items Nos. 50-295/88018-01 and 04: During the September 1988 exercise, neither Control Room (CR) nor Technical Support Center (TSC) staff adequately informed State officials of the Transportation Accident situation utilizing the "IESDA Hazaraous Materials Radiological Questionnaire," which the State had aeveloped for I such situations and which had been incorporated in the licensee's {

Emergency Plan. During that exercise, the licensee's overall response to i the Transportation Accident, which also involved simulated injured personnel with and without simulated contamination complications, was inadequate, i

On April 20, 1989, the licensee successfully demonstrated its capabilities to respond to a challenging Transportation Accident scenario involving injured persons with simulated contamination complication The demonstration was well coordinated with the City of Zion Fire Department, the local ambulance service, and local hospital. The licensee submitted a scope of participation, objectives, and a scenario which were reviewed and approved by Region III staff prior to the April 20 demonstration. A Zion Station procedure was also developed for responding to a Transportation Accident, with or without injuries, within the city limits of Zion, Illinoi The scope of participation, objectives, and scenario narrative summary  !

for the April 20 demonstration are attachments to this Inspection Report. The following paragraphs summarize the well coordinated responses of licensee personnel and their onscene interface with offsite agency responder FEMA Region V representatives observed the onscene ,

and hospital responses of local emergency support organization The l FEMA observers' findings will be documented separatel An Alert was correctly declared due to the simulated emergency landing of a news helicopter on the Turbine Building's roof. This declaration resulted in the activation of the onsite Technical Support Center (TSC)

and Operational Support Center (0SC). The TSC's Station Director (SD)

assumed overall command and control within an acceptable 35 minutes of the Alert declaration. Initial offsite notifications to State and NRC officials were completed in a timely manner. Appropriate TSC staff

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L B adewately-addressed the security aspects of the simulated landing, while

~ engineering staff performed a preliminary evaluation of.the hazards due

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to the extra weight on the roof. A prudent. decision was'made to relocate'onsite personnel away from the affected portion of the Turbine Buildin A conservative decision was made to remain in the Alert classification due to the ongoing security threat even after the Transportation Accident was reported to TSC staff. 'The proceduralized "IESDA Hazardous. Materials Radiological Questionnaire," was properly utilized to inform Illinois officials of the accident. Information on the form was' adequately detailed and approved by the SD prior to transmittal. The local ambulance. service was promptly-notified of the accident. The ambulance crew and local hospital were made aware of the victims'

simulated radiological contamination in a timely manne The Environs Director made good use of the radio base station to establish and maintain communications with personnel dispatched'to the accident. scene. Environs staff and the onscene OSC Supervisor took appropriate steps to ensure that all communications between the Station and the accident scene were clearly understood by both parties. The SD conducted frequent briefings within the TSC as additional informatio became available from the accident scene. The SD ensured that his staff and the OSC responded in a timely manner to all equipment and manpower requests from the accident scen A flatbed truck, crates, boxes, and plastic wrapping material were effectively used to present a more realistic accident scene to the energency responders than was available during the September 1988 exercise. The accident victims' injuries appeared realisti The Zion Station'.s "first response" security vehicle and the local rescue squad's vehicles arrived at the accident scene.almost simultaneousl The security guard and Radiation Protection Technician (RPT), who were the "first esponse team," promptly attended the injured truck drive They utilized radios to report their preliminary observations to their supervisors. Meanwhile, the second victim with a cut leg that had supposedly become contaminated, ran to a nearby ambulance where he was treated and detained by rescue squad personnel. Another RPT was soon available from the GSEP Van to assist the rescue squad in assessing the extent of this victim's contamination. The van, normally used by field survey teams, transported several RPTs and an initial quantity of Health Physics supplies to the accident scene several minutes after the

"first response" vehicle had arrive The security guard soon located the shipping papers for the truck's load and adequately reported information from these records to his supervisors. He then established and maintained a perimeter around the truck and debris to ensure that no unauthorized personnel would enter the potentially contaminated area around the truck or remove any debri __ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ - - _ _ _ - _ - - _ .

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-The first onscene RPT did a' good job of interfacing with rescue squad personnel who attended the injured truck driver. This victim was never left alone. Proper priority was given to the: victim's medical-needs. One of the responders soon located the driver's Medi-Alert bracelet indicating that the . driver was a diabetic. Preliminary

. radiological surveys of the victim were- adequately performed before he was placed on a backboard, then a gurney, and then loaded into the ambulance. A cervical collar was placed on the victim before he was moved. Care was taken to avoid further contaminating the victim's wound, skin, and clothing. The RPT reported his' survey findings to the rescue squad and to his supervisors. Good contamination control practices were demonstrated when dealing with concerns'over first aid supplies and other equipment that had been brought into the contaminated arn by the RPT and the rescue squa The OSC Supervisor quickly assumed onscene command of licensee personnel. He frequently radioed his observations, opinions, and needs-to the TSC, while effectively directing the activities of the onscene RPTs'

and the guard. .He was very mobile initially, until complying with the senior Fire Department official's request to remain with him. At the exit interview, Zion Fire Department officials suggested the licensee establish an onscene command and control structure analogous to theirs, so that the senior onscene Fire Department and licensee representatives would remain together to better maintain a coordinated overview perspective of the situation, while their deputies would be mobile to direct their staffs' activitie Good contamination control practices were demonstrated when an ambulance was brought near the injured truck driver to facilitate his transport to the hospital. Although heavy plastic (herculite) had recently been requested to drape the inside of the ambulance, it had not been brought to the scene by the time that the truck driver was ready for transpor Onscene personnel correctly did not delay the transport of the truck driver and second victim, who was already within the ambulance, while waiting for herculite to be delivered. Ambulance personnel and the RPT who boarded the ambulance indicated that they were well aware that the inside of the vehicle was potentially contaminated. The truck driver's l outer clothing was carefully removed once he was inside the ambulanc This clothing was handled as contaminated waste. When an RPT performed another survey of the victim, the survey instrument's probe' occasionally touched areas of the victim's skin or T-shirt which had not come in direct contact with simulated contaminated materials at the accident scen By the time that the accident victims had been transported, efforts were well underway to address the remaining contamination control problems at the scene. Personnel and equipment that had entered the potentially contaminated zone were adequately surveyed before leaving this zone. The contaminated zone was resurveyed to better ascertain its border, roped off, and posted. Smear surveys were taken of large pieces of debri Results were reported to the TSC. A guard was dispatched into the tall grassy areas to the North and South of the truck to ensure that no other victims were present and that no debris had been blown beyond the posted I-

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contaminated zone. A proper decision was made to let Zion Station personnel perform debris gathering and packaging tasks without the assistance of remaining offsite support organization personnel. A group of plant personnel arrived with a number of barrels for the debri They donned appropriate protective clothing and began cleanup activities when the onscene demonstration was terminate TSC staff held.an adequate preliminary discussion of action items for both the Transportation Accident response and the response to the earlier helicopter landing that had resulted in the Alert declaration. A conservative decision was made to remain in an Alert classification until the debris at the accident scene had been removed and appropriate surveys of the area had been complete These Open Items are close (Closed) Open Item No. 295/88018-03: During the 1988 exercise, Technical Support Center (TSC) and E0F staffs failed to provide simulated NRC duty officers with adequately detailed information on plant conditions associated with the Site Area and General Emergency declaration During the fourth quarter of 1988, Control Room crews and appropriate TSC staff completed a " Team Training / Accident Management" program which included training on emergency classification and offsite notificatio The NRC's Event Notification Worksheet has been proceduralized to better ensure that licensee communicators understand the NRC's information need As indicated in Sections Sa, 5b, and 5d of this report, Control

Room, TSC, and E0F communicators adequately informed controllers  ;

portraying NRC duty officers of simulated plant conditions associated with all emergency declarations during the 1989 exercise. This item is close (Closed) Open Item No. 295/89006-01: In February 1989, the licensee committed that all persons eligible for director-level positions in the onsite Emergency Response Organization (ERO) during the first quarter of 1989 would complete all training requirements by April 198 This commitment was made in response to an NRC concern that an ongoing reorganization of the normal station organization could result in an insufficient number of fully trained personnel for their revised ERO positions. Records review indicated that three or four persons had been trained for each director-level position in the onsite ERO, with no cases of an individual being listed for more than one position. This level of staffing will better ensure the licensee's capability to fill all key positions in the onsite ERO on a 24-hour basis. This item is close . General (IP 82301)

l A daytime exercise of the licensee's Generating Stations Emergency Plan l (GSEP) and Zion Annex to the GSEP was conducted at the Zion Station on 1 May 3, 198 The exercise tested the integrated capabilities of State, local, and licensee emergency organizations to respond to an accident

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scenario which included a simulated major radioactive release.. This was a partial participation exercise for the States of Illinois and Wisconsin and a full participation exercise for Lake County, Illinois and Kenosha'

County , ' Wi sconsi n.- The attachments to this report include the licensee's scope of participation, exercise objectives,-scenario narrative' summary,

'and approximate timeline for.the May 3, 1989 exercise.and the April 20,,

~1989_ remedial response to_a Transportation Accident scenari . General Observations (IP 82301)

a.: Procedures This exercise was conducted in accordance with 10 CFR 50, Appendix E req'uirements, using the GSEP, Zion Station Annex, and the Emergency Plan Implementing Procedures (EPIPs) of the licensee's onsite and offsite emergency organization Observers Licensee observers . monitored and critiqued this exercise, as did four NRC evaluator ' Coordination-

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The licensee's response was coordinated, orderly, and timely. If scenario events had been real, actions taken by the licensee's emergency organization would have been sufficient to allow State and local officials.to take appropriate actions to protect public health and safety, . Critique-The licensee held preliminary critiques on May 3-4, and presented a summary of its preliminary findings on May 4,1989 prior to the NRC exit interview. The licensee's preliminary findings exhibited good agreement with the NRC's preliminary finding On May 5, the FEMA Exercise Director cancelled the scheduled Public Critique after it had become. apparent that no media or members of the public~would be coming to hear FEMA's and the NRC's preliminary evaluations of offsite support organizations' and the licensee's exercise performances, respectivel . Specific Observations (IP 82301) Control Room (CR)

This was the first exercise at the Zion Station during which the CR crew functioned from the simulator rather than the actual C The simulator was provided with the telephone equipment needed for communications with State and NRC officials and with personnel in the Technical Support Center (TSC) and Operational Support Center (OSC).

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lf:, The Shift Engineer.(SE) in charge of CR activities promptly and correctly classified the Unusual Event and the Alert. Initial-notifications to Illinois, Wisconsin, and NRC officials were-

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, completed.in a timely and adequately detailed manner. A response cell of controllers portrayed NRC Duty Officers for all licensee communications with the NRC following the Unusual Event. initial notification.

V 'CR personnel demonstrated good teamwork and' good utilization of relevant EPIPs.and abnormal operating procedures. As the scenario progressed, CR staff effectively used al status. board to display information on the current emergency classification, the Emergency-Response Facility (ERF) where command and control resided, and information related to current inplant-team activitie The SE occasionally contacted TSC ' staff when he questioned the priorities given by the TSC directers to various inplant teams assignment Although communications'between the CR and TSC were generally- .

adequate, TSC staff failed to notify the CR that the E0F staff had assumed overall command and control of emergency response efforts until'an unacceptable 40 minutes had elapsed from the time of this transfer of responsibilitie In order to facilitate inplant activities prior to the Alert declaration and the associated OSC activation, one of the CR's Shift Foremen (SF) and several non-licensed operators functioned from the TSC workspace instead of the CR simulator located beyond the Protected Area. The SF did a very good job of interfacing with-CR personnel and an operator dispatched to. verify the positions of containment vent valves 1RV0005 and 1RV000 The SF also adequately briefed the TSC's future Station Director (SD) and Operations Director on these: investigative efforts when they reported to the TSC instead of the CR simulator following the Unusual Event declaration. CR staff kept the SD, Operations Director, and the SF adequately informed of the ' increasing Reactor Coolant System (RCS) leak which eventually resulted in the Alert declaration by the S Based on the above findings, this portion of the licensee's program was acceptable; however, the following item should be considered for improvement: 1

• TSC staff should promptly inform the CR of any changes to the individual in overall command of emergency response efforts as well as any emergency reclassification , Technical Support Center (TSC)

Shortly after 9:00 a.m. , the future SD prudently requested that a Maintenance Director and a tech staff engineer report to the TSC once he concluded that further efforts were necessary to troubleshoot the inability to close the 1RV0006 valve. The SE concurred with this decision. The future SD then concurred with the SE's Alert declaration at'9:10 a.m. The future SD ensured that CR

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H ' staff had completed all offsite notifications for the UE and Alert declarations. 'He also briefed the corporate Nuclear Duty Officer on scenario events. An orderly and timely transfer of~ command an control from the SE to the SD occurred after the SD had' assured-himself that his TSC staff had been initially briefed and were ready to assume their dutie TSC staff adequately monitored the increasing RCC leak and slowly rising containment radiation level. The Rad Chem and Environs Directors correctly concluded that an abnormal vent stack reading was due to a simulated release from a gas decay tank rather than a:

release from containment. They adequately responded to questions on this analysis that were posed by the State of Wisconsin's emergency response staf The SD approved a periodic update message to State officials around 10:00 a.m. Between 9:15 a.m. and 10: 05 a.m., the scenario's meteorological data included a gradual wind direction shift of almo'st 60 degrees, which was sufficient to change the affected downwind sectors from those indicated to State officials at the time of the Alert notificatio However, State officials were not informed of this change until a Nuclear Accident Reportin System (NARS) message was transmitted following the 10:25 Site Area Emergency declaration. The failure of TSC staff to promptly inform State officials of this significant change in l affected downwind sectors in accordance with procedural requirements is an Open Item (295/89012-01). Following appropriate controller '

intervention, TSC and EOF staffs promptly informed State officials of further changes in affected downwind sectors for the remainder of the exercis The SD quickly and correctly declared a Site Area Emergency at I 10:25 Initial offsite notifications were completed in a timely and adequately detailed manner to the State and to a response cell of simulataed NRC duty officers. TSC staff adequately demonstrated the capability to maintain open line communications with the simulated NRC duty officers until relieved from this task by EOF staf The SD ordered his staff to initiate the assembly and accountability .i

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of all onsite personnel approximately 12 minutes after the Site Area Emergency declaration. All personnel were initially accounted for within an acceptable 32 minutes of the activation of the assembly siren. Another 35 minutes were needed to verify that 10 persons, who were onsite but not within their assembly area, were members of various inplant teams that had left the OSC before the siren  !

sounded. TSC staff selected an appropriate evacuation route for the simulated evacuation of non-essential personne The SD conducted very good, periodic briefings where each director l summarized current actions to bette ensure that all key staff were well aware of each others' activities. The directors maintained l adequately detailed logs to facilitate later reconstruction of their

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L- actions. Administrative-support staff distributed summaries of.

l} previous' status board information to supplement these logs and l

briefing informatio TSC ' status boards were. better organized than in previous' exercise Status board information included: the Emergency Action Levels'(EALs)

and the_. times associated with all emergency declarations;'the higher-

_ priority tasks assigned to inplant teams; and onsite meteorological-

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datal. However, key staff' occasionally expressed uncertainty _about the' dispatch status of specific inplant teams, or whether the posted meteo'rological data were current.' Time information for thsse data

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and the status of-inplant teams were not posted on any TSC status

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boar Following a 24-hour time jump in the scenario, the SD led his staf in a preliminary onsite recovery planning session. A number of good action items were identified, including the need for all onsite emergency responders to have wholc body counts and the.need to-evaluate the affects of the degraded fuel on the secondary system, since a minor primary to secondary system leak had been postulated in the scenario's initial conditions. The TSC staff's onsite .

recovery action items were merged with the F F staff's similar list prior to exercise terminatio In addition to the Open Item, the following items should be considered for improvement:

• Onsite assembly should be initiated in a more timely manner following a Site Area Emergency declaration. Members of dispatched inplant teams should be promptly identified to TSC staff to expedite completion of accountabilit * The times associated with posted onsite meteorological data and the dispatch of inplant teams should be posted on a TSC status

- boar c. Operational Support Center (OSC) and Inplant Teams This facility and the TSC were activated following the Alert declaration; however, the OSC was relatively slow to become fully operational. A number of inplant teams and two offsite survey ,

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teams were dispatched from the OSC during the exercise. The dispatch of some inplant teams was untimely due to a number of factors, including: communications problems between TSC and OSC decisionmakers; a fragmented briefing process in the OSC; and a '

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cumbersome process for completing all paperwork associated with a team's assignment. Approximately 60 minutes elapsed from the request to the dispatch of a team to simulate removing a governor from the 2A diesel generator to replace a damaged governor on the 1A diesel. Over 30 minutes elapsed before a Radiation Protection

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Technician (RPT) arrived in the onsite assembly area to survey for potential contamination resulting from the arrival of two individuals

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who were simulated to have become contaminated during a fuel handling operatio RPTs accompanied inplant teams when appropriate. The technicians !

generally displayed good awareness of ALARA principles and proper caution when encountering unknown and potentially high simulated radiation field The RPTs complied with briefing instructions to promptly inform OSC supervisors of simulated radiological- conditions that they encountered. Such timely reports helped OSC supervisors maintain a more complete picture of inplant radiological conditions when planning other +eams' missions. OSC supervisory personnel maintained an adequate awareness of team members' simulated exposure Habitability surveys were begun in the OSC within an hour of its activation and were performed at regular intervals. Survey results were given to the OSC Supervisor and were also poste However, there was no indication that eating and smoking were prohibited in the OSC, even after the presence of inplant airborne contamination was confirme No contamination control point was established near an entrance to the OSC to better ensure that returning personnel did not introduce contamination control into the facilit The failure of OSC supervisory personnel to establish a contamination control point near the facility's entrance and to follow procedural guidance on prohibiting eating and smoking within the OSC is an Open Item (295/89012-02).

OSC relocation due to simulated increasing airborne activity levels was simulated shortly after 1:00 p.m. The new location was selected after RPTs had surveyed several alternative locations and had reported their findings to OSC supervisor At the exit interview, the licensee stated that a new location for the OSC would be created as part of the Service Building remodeling and expansion project. The licensee indicated that the new facility would likely be ready for use in 1990 and would include better provisions for contamination contro In addition to the Open Item, the following item should be considered for improvement:

• The licensee should re-evaluate OSC layout and administrative support provisions to better ensure that teams are well briefed and dispatched in a timely manner, d. Emergency Operations Facility (EOF)

The E0F was activated in accordance with procedures following a conference between the TSC's SD and the corporate office's NDO, The E0F's Manager of Emergency Operations (MEO) assumed overall command and control of the licensee's emergency response efforts well within an hour after the Site Area Emergency declaratio _ _ _ - _ _ _ _ _ _ _

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The ME0 promptly and correctly declared a General Emergency a :37 a.m. The procedurally correct offsite. Protective Action Recommendation.(PAR) was determined. State and simulated NRC officials were: adequately informed of this emergency reclassification and PAR in a timely manner. When containment radiation levels continued to increase and a release from containment became apparent, a revised PAR was developed. State and simulated NRC officials were

. promptly informed of the revised PAR, the. release, and another shift of the affected downwind sectors. E0F staff correctly suspended plans.for an EOF evacuation once the winds had shifted towards a more northerly directio Between about 12

30 p.m. and 1:30 p.m., the MEO. initiated several very good meetings and teleconferences involving himself, key staff,  !

three State agencies' representatives in the E0F, simulated NRC-Site

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Team members, and remotely located Illinois and Wisconsin official These sessions resulted from some concern over what protective actions were being irrplemented in each State versus the revised PAR. State and. licensee staffs demonstrated their capability.to discuss the status of offsite protective actions so that all parties were-adequately aware of each others' decisions and action Although the ME0 and his key aides had become well aware of the offsite protective actions being implemented by Illinois and Wisconsin officials, E0F status boards were poorly used to supplement verbally transmitted information to E0F staff on the offsite PARS, implemented protective actions, and the emergency classification. A status board duplicating the NARS message form utilized to initially inform State officials of emergency classification, affected sector, and PAR information contained obsolete PAR and emergency class information for about-one hour after the General Emergency declaration. It was updated with inaccurate information for another 30 minute The ME0 and his key staff learned shortly before 2:00 p.m. that an inplant team had isolated the release pathway from containmen They remained concerned that the containment vent stack monitor's readout remained abnormally high. They prudently sought additional confirmation from their TSC counterparts rather than issuing a potentially premature release termination message to State official E0F staff did, however, detect another change in the affected downwind sectors and promptly informed State officials of that change minutes before a 24-hour time jump in the scenari Following the time jump, the E0F staff compiled a list of short-term recovery action items and consolidated their list with one prepared by TSC staf State agency and simulated NRC representatives concurred in the decisions to reclassify the situation as being in  ;

Recovery and to maintain the current offsite protective actions pending completion of further environmental monitoring activitie When it appeared that E0F and TSC staffs had concluded development of their preliminary action item list, a Site Team roleplayer appropriately asked if anyone had also anticipated

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't planning to interact with.an NRC Accident Investigation Team (AIT).

He rightly asked if a consensus been reached on requesting DOE assistance to help assess the environmental impact of the simulated depositio Based on the above findings, this portion of the licensee's program was acceptable; however, the following item should be considered for improvement:

• . EOF status boards should be promptly updated with accurate information on offsite PARS and protective actions being implemented by offsite official .

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6. . Exercise Scenario and Controller Actions (IP 82301 and IP 82302) i Exercise objectives and complete scenario manuals were submitted in-accordance with the established schedule. The licensee was responsive to the NRC's questions on scenario data. The exercise was particularly challenging to participants in several respects. The CR simulater was utilized for the first tim This made the CR staff's responses to changing plant conditions more realistic compared to their reacting to a series of hardcopy messages summarizing changing plant parameter values and annunciator alarms. The licensee is constructing a new TSC u that.will be remotely located from the station's CR, compared to the l current TSC which is adjacent to the CR. Therefore, use of the CR simulator posed additional telecommunications challenges to CR and some i TSC staff.which will be more realistic once the new TSC is complete A gradual wind direction shift of about 140 degrees occurred during the exercise. This provided a good challenge to TSC and E0F protectiie i measures staff and their superiors since these shifts and the associated changes to downwind af fected sectors had to be~ promptly recognized and reported to State official I A response cell of several controllers having scenario knowledge provided I a good challenge to TSC and EOF staffs. The response cell portrayed NRC duty officers. They requested and obtained continuous communications with TSC and E0F staffs in addition to detailed information associated with all emergency declarations. Three roleplayers, having no prior scenario knowledge, simulated NRC Site Team representatives in the E0 They provided E0F staff with the challenge of satisfying their information needs. However, the roleplayers seemed unsure about whether they should l exhibit having lead role in the NRC's response efforts immediately upon  !

arrival in the EOF. They occasionally exhibited or expressed some uncertainty about how aggressive they should be in requesting information, or whether their remarks might be construed as prompting by exercise evaluators. Such uncertainties implied the need for improved roleplayer training in order to maximize the benefit from their us i l

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[ b In general, the exercise was well-controlled. Several controllers effectively interfaced early in the exercise to correct misinformation L inadvertently given to a participant regarding the' status of containment _3 vent valves.1RV0005 and 1RV0006. Given the extent of exercise

' participation by State and local agencies, controller intervention was appropriate later in.the TSC to better ensure that;the Environs Director and his staff kept the SD better informed of changing wind direction data j, prior to the EOF becoming fully operationa Exercise controllers conducted several levels of critiques following the exercise. Two lead controllers gave the inspectors a summary _of the preliminary, self-identified, strengths and weaknesses before the NRC's exit' interview. The licensee's preliminary findings generally were in agreement with the inspectors' preliminary finding Based on the above findings, this portion of the licensee's program was acceptable; however, the following item should be considered for improvement:

• The licensee should review training given to portraying NRC l officials regarding the appointment of a Director of Site Operations, and guidance for interfacing with participants without prompting or becoming overly aggressiv . 7 .' Exit Interviews (IP 307038)

On April 20 and May 4, 1989, the inspectors met with those licensee and offsite agency representatives identified in Section 1 to present their preliminary inspection findings. The licensee was informed that all concerns identified during the September 1988 exercise had been resolved, based on performances during the April 20 and May 3 exercises and records review. Several other previously-identified items were also closed based on records review. The licensee was informed that an increased level of management attention to the Zion Station's Emergency Preparedness program was apparen However, the successful performances-

.on April 20 and May 3 did not warrant reducing this heightened level of attention. The licensee concurred in this overall conclusion, and indicated that none of the matters discussed during the April 20 and May 4, 1989 exit interviews were proprietary in natur Attachment: Scope of participation, objectives, and scenario narrative summaries for the April 20 and May 3, 1989 exercises

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• * ZION NUCLEAR POWER STATION TRANSPORTATION ACCIDENT / MEDICAL DRILL April 20, 1989 (.

t SCOPE OF PARTICIPATLQ3 DATE: APRIL 20, 1989 TIPJi DAYTIME OFFSITE AGENCY PARTICIPATION: * NONE (Zion ESDA 2 Communication with Zion Fire Dept. only)

PURPOSE: Test the capability of the basic elements within the Commonwealth Edison Company GSEP. The Exercise will include mobilization of CECO personnel and resources adequate to verify their capability to respond to a simulated Transportation Acciden CECO FACILITIES ACTIVATED: * TSC

• OSC CECO FACILITIES NOT ACTIVATE _D_1 * JPIC

• CEOF

• EOF

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OTHER PARTICIPANTS: * ZION FIRE DEPARTMENT - FULL

• VICTORY MEMORIAL HOSPITAL - FULL The " Exercise" Nuclear Duty Persen will be notified of simulated events as appropriate on a real-time basi Commonwealth Edison will demonstrate the capability to make contact with contractors whose assistance would be required by the simulated accident situation, but will not actually incur the expense of using contractor services to simulate emergency response except as prearranged specifically for the Exercis Commonwealth Edison will arrange to provide actual transportation and communication support in accordance with existing agreements to the extent specifically prearranged for the Exercise. Commonwealth Edison will provide unforeseen actual assitance only to the extent that the resources are available and do not hinder normal operation of the Compan t 0170Z/5/wjm ZNPS TA/MED. '89

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.. ZION NUCLEAD POWER STATION TRANSPORTATION ACCIDENT /P[EDICAL EMERGENCY EXERGISE

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APRIL 20, 1989

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OBJECTIVES PRIMARY OBJECTIVE: .

Demonstrate the capability to implement the Commonwealth Edison Generating Stations Emergency Plan (GSEP) to protect the public in the event of a transportation accident near the Zion Nuclear Power Statio Demonstrate the capability of the Zion Station staff to respond effectively to a radiation medical emergency outside the plan Demonstrate the capability to provide prehospital and hospital emergency medical services involving multiple injured and contaminated patient SJIPPORTING OBJECTIVES:

1) Incident Assessment and Classification Demonstrate the capability to assess the accident conditions and to classify the accident correctly in accordance with the CSE (TSC)

2) Notification and Communication Demonstrate the capability to notify the principle offsite  !

[ organizations within fifteen (15) minutes of declaring the Transportation Accident classificatio (TSC) i Demonstrate the capability to notify the NRC within one (1)

hour of the initial inciden (TSC) Demonstrate the ability to, provide follow-up information/ updates to the State and NRC within thirty (30)

minutes of major plant condition changes or at least hourl (TSC)

3) Fadiolomical Assessment Demonstrate the ability to collect radiological survey information, document and trend this information and make appropriate recommendations concerning protective actions for personne (OSC, TSC) Demonstrate the ability to make Protective Action Recommendations, if applicabi (TSC)

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p F 3)~ . Radio 1'omical' Assessment"(cont'd)

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.7 i Demonstrate the ability of plant personnel to assess medical L[1 Jinjury!and administer first:ajd.to radioactively contaminated L'" individual .(OSC)'

2 d. - Demonstrate the ability to determine the location ~and level of contamination on the victim (OSC).

s Demonstrate the ability to provide. contamination control and

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Health: Physics support at the-scene of the acciden (OSC), Demonstrate the ability to determine the content of and account for shipped materia (TSC)- Demonstrate the ability to properly retrieve radioactive material released to the environmen (OSC)

4) EMERGENCY FACILITIES:

. Demonstrate the ability to augment as necessary, the TSC and OSC staff ~in;a timely manner (i.e., on-site facilites within 15-minutes) and in accordance with procedure (TSC)

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5) EMERGENCY DIRECTION AND CONTROL:-

a.- Demonstrate 'the ability of the individuals in the GSEP organization to perform their' assigned duties an . responsibilities (i.e, assessment of conditions and initiation-of mitigatory or protective actions) as specified in Generic

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GSEP and position-specific procedure (TSC) Demonstrate the ability of the Directors to exert command and'

control in the-TSC according to the duties anil responsibilities specified in Generic GSEP'and position-specific procedure ~

- (TSC) Demonstrate the ability to requisition, acquire and transport emergency equipment and supplies necessary to mitigate or

,i control unsafe or abnormal situation (TSC) Demonstrate the ability to dispatch, communicate with and control Field Team (TSC)

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6) MEDICAL SERVICES: ' Demonstrate the triage capability of the p7 ant staff while responding to a multiple victim acciden .( - (Medical) Demonstrate the ability to respond to the accident as per the procedures of the Zion Fire Department and Victory Memorial Hospita (Medical)

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• Demonstrate timely and accurate communications between offaire

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response agencie Demonstrate priorities and appropriate techniques in first aid, prehospital and hospital emergency car (Medical) Demonstrate priorities and appropriate techniques in exposure and contamination control at the accident site, during transport and at the hospita (Medical) Demonstrate cooperation and teamwork between the Zion Station, Zion Fire Department and Victory Memorial Hospita (Medical)

7) EgCOVERY:

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J Demonstrate the. capability'of the emergency response organization to identify the requirements, criteria and implementing procedures for recover .(TSC)

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EI"O MUCLEAR POWER STATION

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TRANSPORTATION ACCIDENT / MEDICAL EMERGENCY EXERCISE

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NARRATIVE SUPflARY INITIAL CONDITIONS

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ALERI (0915 - 1000)

UNIT 1 - Mode 1 steady state at 100% powe UNIT 2 - Mode 1 at 95% power ramping to 100% after Power Range NIS calibratio At 0858, a Security guard reported a helicopter landing on the top of the Unit 1 Turbine Building.. The Alert condition was declared by the Control Room at 0909 based on EAL #6R (Aircraft impacted within the protected area but not affecting vital areas). The NARS notification was completed at 0914 but ENS notifications have not been made. The TSC and OSC are activated

~{. and staffed. Upon investigation, it is discovered and reported to the TSC that the WZRS TV-22 helicopter was taking some file footage of the Zion Station area and had to make an emergency landing on the building. A pilot, a reporter and a camerman are onboard the craft. Tr g were afraid of setting down in the yard or on the Containment Building. i:cpirs can be made in about half an hour by the pflot if he can bt,; row a 3/4 inch open-end wrench and some leak-tight thread 1. cele .

EXPECTED ACTIONS:

The Control Room Response Cell will call the Security guard to make t.he ALERT callouts. The TSC will staff, take command and control and immediately make the nimulated ENS cal .

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TRANSPORTATION ACCIDENT

. (1000 - 1300)

A radioactive' shipment (RCP motor) is being shipped to Westinghouse from Zion Station in a large corregated metal crate on a flatbed trailer. While driving west on Shiloh Blvd., and just east of the Westinghouse Training Center, the truck.. driver tries to avoid hitting a deer which runs from the north in front of the truck. The truck

runs off the south side of the road and into a' power pole. The pole is left dangling suspended by the wires. The truck and trailer'

Jackknife throwing the driver into the windshield and the shipment onto the. road. The corregated crate breaks open spreading contaminated packing and wrapping material across the area. The driver crawled out .of the. truck and passed out by the side of the road. He has a large laceration on his forehead and a skull fracture. . A civilian,l walking to the beach to go fishing,.'is an eye witness to the accident and tries to administer first aid to the trtick driver. The civilian, while approaching the driver through the wreckage, cuts his right leg on some of the jagged metal and contaminates his wound. He used some of the plastic wrapping torn '

from the motor to cover and provide a pillow for the driver, thus, contaminating both of them. The TLD Coordinator discovers the accident' on his way from the EOF lto the Station and returning to the -

EOF makes the initial reports to the Control Roo EXPECTED ACTION ( The Response Cell Control Room will transfer the information to the TSC. The Transportation Accident will be classified per EAL-

1. 11 and. notifications rade per procedures. The Station will dispatch RTs and a Rad Foreman to the scene to take radiological control of the scene and administer first aid to the victim The Zion Police, Fire Department, and Rescue Squad respond to the scene. Control of the area will be demonstrated and cleanup of the area vill be started but not necessarily completed by the end of the exercis MEDICAL FJ1ERCENCY r

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(1015 - 1300)

First aid is administered to both victims by the first responders (either the Station or the Fire Department) at the scene. The victims are prepared for, and transported to, Victory Memorial Hospital. At the hospital, they will be treated for their injuries

and decontaminated as necessar EXPECTED ACTIONS:

The initial first aid responders will assess the injuries and administer first aid. The victims vital signs will be b constantly monitored at the scene. Contamination control will be maintained at the scene, in the ambulance during transport and at the hospital by the Station RT Z/2/wja ZNPS TA/MED u_ _ _ _ _ _ _ . _ _ _ _ . _ __  !

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JtKPECTED ACTIONS 2' (etnt'd),

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Prior to transport, the ambulance attendants will.be briefed on .l

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the medical condition of the victims and the radiological.'

conditions of the area. The victims will be' transported to Victory Memorial Hospital for more ext,ensive treatment an decontamination accompanied by a. Station R .A medical and-radiological report will be provided to.the hospital upon arrival of the ambulance. The victims will be transferred to ~

.the Radiological Emergency Area (REA) where appropriate medical jl assessment and treatment will be administered followed by decontamination. Contamination control'will be maintained.by '

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MOCKUPS / SIMULATION:

A truck will be provided.by the Zion Fire Department. The RCP motor will be mocked-up with safety rope and four stanchions. There are

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I two oil: reservoirs and a pump motor assembly.which separate from the RCP motor. .These will be mocked-up with two 5 gallon paint cans and a 50 gallon cardboard barrel painted green and marked to identify each component. Puddles'of oil around tae' reservoirs will be simulated. Plastic wrappirg materials.and a broken shipping crate will be used at the scene. The simulated shipment information will be available.to the Station Directo The injured individuals will role play with simulated injuries I

(moulage). ' Medical information (vital signs) will be provided by controlled messages. .The driver will be provided with a Medi-Alert  !

- bracelet indicating diabetes. Contamination of the individuals will i I

be simulate !

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• - ZION NUcTRAR POWER STATIO3 1989 GSEP EXERCISE W SCOPE OF PARTICIPATION b

DATE:

MAY 3, 1989 TYPE:

DAYTIME OFFSITE AGENCY PARTICIPATION;

• ILLINDIS - PARTIAL e WISCONSIN - PARTIAL BIEPOSE:

Test the capability of the basic elements' within the Commonwealth Edison Company GSEP. The Exercise will include mobilization of CECO personnel and resources adequate to verify their capability to respond to a simulated emergenc CECO FACILITIES ACTIVATED:

o CONTROL ROOM e TSC e OSC m o EOF e JPIC Ceco FACILITIES NOT ACTIVATJDJ e CEOF OIHER PARTICIPANTS:

e INPO - FULL e ZION FIRE DEPARTMENT - PARTIAL The " Exercise" Nuclear Duty Person will be notified of simulated '

events as appropriate on a real-time basis. The " Exercise" Nuclear Duty Peroon and the balance of the Recovery Group will be repositioned close to the Zion EOF to permit use of personnel from distant location Commonwealth Edison will demonstrate the capability to make contact with contractors whose assistance would be required by the simulated accident situation, but will not actually incur the expense of using contractor services to simulate emergency response except as prearranged specifically for the Exercis Comunonwealth Edison will arrange to provide actual transportation and communication support in accordance with existing agreements to the extent specifically prearranged for the Exercise. Cosunonwealth Edison will provide unforeseen actual assitance only to the extent that the resources are available and do not hinder normal operation of the Compan >

'ZNPS '89 GSEP 0118Z/1/vjm

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