IR 05000295/1986020

Insp Repts 50-295/86-20 & 50-304/86-21 on 860916-870113.No Violations or Deviations Noted.Major Areas Inspected:Exam of Procedures,Representative Records,Observations,Interviews W/ Personnel & IE Bulletin 82-02 Resolution

ML20209F772
Person / Time
Site:	Zion  File:ZionSolutions icon.png
Issue date:	01/27/1987
From:	Danielson D, David Jones, Schapker J, Ward K NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION III)
To:
Shared Package
ML20209F710	List: IR 05000295/1986020 ML20209F706
References
50-295-86-20, 50-304-86-21, IEB-82-02, IEB-82-2, NUDOCS 8702050192
Download: ML20209F772 (10)

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U. S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

REGION III

Reports No. 50-295/86020(DRS); 50-304/86021(DRS)

Docket Nos. 50-295; 50-304 Licenses No. DPR-39; DPR-48 ,

Licensee: Commonwealth Edison Company Post Office Box 767 Chicago, IL 60690 Facility Name: Zion Station, Units 1 and 2 Inspection At: Zion Site, Zion, Illinois Inspection Conducted: September 16-19, 23-25; October 8-10, 17, 23, 28; November 6, 24-25; December 2, 9, 1986, and January 6 and 13, 1987 Inspectors- K. D. Ward / 27// 7 (September 16-17, 19, 23-24; October 17, Date 23, 28; November 6, 24-25; December 2, 9,1986, and January 6 and 13,1987)

WMkVW

. F. Schapker '!27!/7 (September 16, 18, 23, 25; November 6- Date

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December 2,1986,andJanuary6,1987)

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mdLb . ones /[,27 !V7 (Oct r8-10,1986) Date <

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Approved By: D. H. Danielson, Chief / 27MF7 Materials and Processes Date Section

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Inspection Summary Inspection on September 16-19, 23-25; October 8-10, 17, 23, 28; November 6, 24-25; Fecember 2, 9, 1986, and January 6 and 13, 1987 (Reports No. 50-295/86020(DRS);

No. 50-304/86021(DRS))

Areas Inspected: Routine unannounced inspection of Inservice Inspection (ISI) activities including review of program (73051), procedures (73052),

observation of work and work activities (73753), and data review and g20ggy $b G

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evaluation (73755); of the resolution of IE Bulletin 82-02(92703);ofthe follow-up on an unresolved item (92701); of the radiography of 36 steam line check valves (57700); of the failure of the diesel generator (55700, 57700);

of the steam generator sludge lancing (73051, 73052, 73753); and of the reactor vessel nozzle inside radius examinations (73051, 73052, 73753 and 73755).

Results: No violations or deviations were identifie i O

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DETAILS 1. Persons contacted Commonwealth Edison Company (CECO)

• G. Plim1, Station Manager

• W. Stone, Q. A. Superintendent

• C. Schultz, Regulatory Assurance Supervisor

• M. Madigan, ISI Coordinator E. Fuerst, Production Superintendent B. Soares, ISI Engineer D. Dumbocher, ISI Tech. Staff Engineer G. Korwin, Welding Coordinator L. Schaeve, Chem. Control Coordinator J. Barrows, Mech. Maintenance B. Johnson, Mech. Maintenance J. Lafontaine, Maintenance Staff Engineer D. Johnson, Stores Keeper Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC)

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• Holzmer, Sr. Resident Inspector L. Kanter, Resident Inspector P. Eng, Resident Inspector Westinghouse Electric Corp. (W)

N. Bollingmo, level II MT Combustion Engineering (CE)

W. Nadean, Day Shift Supervisor Conam Inspection (Conam) ,

J. Douglas, Lead Operator B. Jones, "A" Station Operator J. Funanich, level III ET Hartford Steam Boiler Inspection and Insurance Company (HSB)

B. Dellota, ANII The NRC inspector also contacted and interviewed other licensee and contractor employee * Denotes those present at the final exit interview January 13, 1987.

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2. Licensee Action on Previous Inspection Finding (Closed) Unresolved Item (295/79-12-01): On June 13, 1978, NRC personnel met with licensee personnel at the CECO offices in Maywood, Illinois to discuss the volumetric examination results and to compare the Zion radiographs to the D.C. Cook radiographs, that did show cracking. This meeting concluded that no rejectable indications had been detected in the feedwater nozzle weld areas. The questionable areas, noted in this unresolved item, that did appear in the radiographs were discussed in detail with the licensee. As a result of these discussions to determine what these areas actually were, the licensee committed to perform an in-depth review of existing records both at the Zion site and at the facilities of the steam generator manufacturer, Westingncase, to determine if documentation did exist to explain the questionable area Prior to the next scheduled outage, October 1979, IE Bulletin 79-13,

" Cracking in Feedwater System Piping," was sent to Zion for actio After shutdown of Unit 1 on October 6, 1979, for refueling, the licensee performed radiographic examination of the steam generator feedwater nozzle to pi)e welds in accordance with bulletin requirements. The results of t1is examination revealed crack-like indications present in all four steam generator pipe to nozzle welds which were repaired (See NRC Inspection Report No. 50-295/79-22; No. 50-304/79-24).

3. Licensee Action on IE Bulletins (Closed) IE Bulletin (295/82-02-BB; 304-82-02-BB): Inspection of the licensee's actions taken in response to IE Bulletin No. 82-02,

" Degradation of Threaded Fasteners in the Reactor Coolant Pressure Boundary of PWR Plants" (TI 2515/71). The NRC inspector selected maintenance procedures for steam generator primary manway covers removal / installation and mechanical closures procedure for primary system valves. The procedures reviewed required inspection of all threaded fasteners, used to make mechanical closures, per the requirements of ASME Section XI IWA-2210 and IWA-2220. The lubricant specified by the equipment manufacturer (Westinghouse) is not utilized; however, the licensee has applied for and received approval from the equipment manufacturer for molybdenum-disulfide (MoS 2 ) type lubricant usage. The bolt torque values with the use of the MoS2 type lubricant was evaluated by the licensee and approved by the equipment manufacture The use of the MoS 2 based lubricant was preferred to the nickel graphite based lubricants due to the licensee's experience at the Byron and Braidwood Stations where the use of nickel graphite lubricant was utilized. At those plants an abnormal amount of galling and seizing was experienced with the use of nickel graphite lubricant Review of the licensee's procurement documents for the purchase of MoS2 disclosed that the lubricants were not required to be purchased to specific QA requirements. However, the licensee's chemical control program for consumable products established controls for the uniform testing, approval

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and use of products used on stainless steel. Review of these procedures and inspection of the lubricants revealed that the licensee's program requires that the lubricants be tested by the System Materials Analysis Departnient (SMAD). SMAD subsequently submits the results to.the various user group In addition, a " Summary of Products Results Analyzed by SMAD" list is issue The Nuclear Services Technical group (NST) periodically reviews the station's chemical programs, provides guidance for the classification of station products, maintains a list of products analyzed by SMAD, and submits a list of products to the nuclear station 'The acceptance criteria for products, chemicals, and other non-metallic materials for use on stainless steel are:

Maximum Limit Halogens and Sulfur PPM by Weight Chlorine, C1 200 Fluorine, F 100 Bromine, BR 200 Total Halogens (CL, F, BR) 300 Sulfur, S 300 Heavy Metals Cadmium Cd 50 Copper, Cu 50 lead, Pb 50 Tin, Sn 50 Mercury, Hg 1 The Zion station chemical control program is administered by the station chemical coordinator, a station chemist who has the responsibility of a working group comprised of one representative from maintenance, stores, station technical staff, stationmen foremen, training, quality control, and chemistr The " Working Group" issues an acceptable product list for use with stainless stee Category I on this list represents an approved product / unlimited use on stainless steel; Category II, unapproved product / minimal use on stainless steel; and Category III, unapproved product /not for use on stainless steel. The NRC inspector questioned the applicability of the Category II products. The maintenance personnel stated only the Category I products were utilized on stainless steel. This was verified by the NRC inspector through inquisition of the applicable maintenance technicians who perform the task and their supervisory personnel. Further discussion with the chemical control coordinator was made concerning the classification of an unapproved product capable of utilization on stainless steel. The station chemical coordinator confirmed the use of the unapproved lubricant was not utilized by maintenance on stainless steel, and reclassified the product to Category II Further clarification of the Category II classification

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was made within the applicable procedure to preclude unrestricted use of an unapproved product on stainless steel. These procedure clarifications and changes were adequate to minimize susceptibility to stress corrosion cracking environments caused by use of an unapproved produc . Inservice Inspection (ISI), Unit 1 General This is the second outage of the first period of the second ten year pla CECO contracted Conam Inspection to perform the eddy current examina-tions of the steam generator tubes. Westinghouse Electric Corporation performed the ISI and ultrasonic examination (UT) of the reactor vessel, and Combustion Engineering the sleeving of the steam generator tubes in accordance with ASME Section XI, 1980 Edition, Winter 1981 Addend The ultrasonic examinations were performed by Westinghouse Electric Corporation using Ultrasonic Procedure ISI-206, Revision 1. A pulse-echo ultrasonic flow detection instrument and various transducers, 45 , 60 etc. were used. No Intergranular Stress Corrosion Cracking (IGSCC) was identified. The Westinghouse UT procedure was reviewed and approved by a CECO Level III that was EPRI qualifie Programs and Procedures The NRC inspector reviewed the ISI procedures and programs and found them to be acceptable. Where these rules were determined to be impractical, specific relief was requested in writing. The NRC inspector reviewed the specific relief requests including the related correspondence between the licensee and~the NR Review of Material, Equipment, and Personnel Certifications, Audits and Data The NRC inspectors reviewed documents relating to the following:

• Ultrasonic instruments, calibration blocks, transducers, and UT couplant certifications

• Sleeves - certified material test reports

• Sleeves - certificate of conformance

• Eddy current equipment

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• NDE personnel certifications in accordance with SNT-TC-1A

• Audits and surveillances

• NDE reports

• Data from the last Unit 1 outage and this outage

• ET data reports that included the plugging and sleeving of the following:

System Previously Generator Plugged Sleeved Plugged

"A" 3 16 136

"B" 36 64 214

"C" 6 44 147

"D" 38 4 144 d. Observation of Work Activities The NRC inspector observed work and had discussions with personnel during the ISI activities. These observations included calibration, performance, and documentation of the following NDE. The preparation of welds for the various NDE methods was also observe * Edd "A", "B",

"C"y Current

, and examinations.(ET)

"D" steam on tubes in the generators (SG).

• The Eddy Current MIZ-18 data acquisition system and the ET analysis system being use * Visual inspection of the following SG "B" tube lower sleeve welds in accordance with CE Procedure 00000-NSS-061,

. Revision 2, " Visual Examination Procedure For Steam Generator Plug Weld and Sleeve to Tube Welds":

Row Col Row Col 23 24 21 32 24 24 29 31 25 24 16 11 28 24 27 31 25 30 23 33

• Tube cleaning and swabbing in SG "C" in accordance with CE Procedure 0000-MSD-068, Revision 5, " Procedure For Cleaning Of Steam Generator Tubes For Sleeve Installation."

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• Sleeving Installation of the following SG "C" tubes in accordance with CE Procedure 96486-001, Revision 0,

" Installation Of Welded Steam Generator Tube Sleeves:"

Row Col Row Col 9 36 10 42 9 37 8 42 9 38 8 43 9 39 6 43

'9 40 13 41

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• Magnetic Particle Examinations (MT) of three welds on supports for the Loop 4 main steam lin * Liquid Penetrant Examination (PT) of the RHR takeoff line hanger that contained a crack. The crack was repaired, PT'd and found acceptabl '

• PT of the RHR cold leg missile barrier guide that contained a crac The crack was repaired, PT'd and found acceptabl * MT using the Y-6 yokes on the reactor vessel stud The NRC-inspector visually examined the following we'ld preparation surfaces for UT and/or P .

• MS line from the SG at the 617' Level (UT)

• Three SG welds, secondary side (UT)

• Loop A RC cold leg weld (UT and PT)

• Bypasslineweld(PT)

• Charging line weld at elbow (PT)

• SI hot leg branch connection (PT)

• CVCS letdown weld (PT)

No violations or deviations were identifie . Steam Generator Sludge Lancing The NUS Operating Services Corporation (NUS0SC) equipment consisted of a trailer mounted high pressure, high flow, closed loop water lancing and filtering system used for the removal of sludge from the secondary side of the tubesheet. Once dislodged and flushed to the outside of the

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tube bundle by the sweeping action of the oscillating lance, it was moved around the annulus by a second flow of water to the suction pickups. The slurry was then removed from the steam generator, filtered in the process trailer, and returned to the high volume pump and the high pressure pump for injection into the steam generato The NRC inspector reviewed the program, procedures, personnel certifications and other related documentation and observed the high pressure water being injected through a multiple nozzle movable oscillating lance which dislodged the sludg No violations or deviations were identifie . Radiographic Examination of 36" Steam and Check Valve A mechanical failure which resulted in separation of the disc from the tailpiece of a 36" Schutte and Koerting Company check valve occurred in one of the secondary side steam loops in Unit 1, May 1986. Inspection of the other three Unit 1 check va'.ves revealed internals degradation which prompted an examination of the Unit 2 check valves to determine if the discs were properly positioned. Radiographic examinations provided the direct evidence of disc placement. Opgositewallradiographywasperformedonthe26" check valves in the "A , "B", "C", and D steam loops of Unit 2 under full power operation. In viewing the. radiographs the NRC inspector also determined that the disc placement on the tailpiece was properly positioned in each cas Only one area of each valve was radiographed since the location chosen identified a distinctive feature of the tailpiece and disc intersectio No violations or deviations were identifie . Repair of Diesel At 9:00 p.m. October 24, 1986, the 1B Diesel Generator (Cooper-Bessemer Model KSV16-1) failed during a post maintenance run. After having been loaded to approximately one megawatt (approximately 25% power) for nearly an hour, a piston connecting rod and a portion of one of the counterweights were ejected from the engine. The NRC inspectors observed the resulting hole that was approximately two feet acros The licensee quarantined the 1B Diesel Generator room and began an investigation into the causes of the incident. A special inspection team composed of Region III and I&E inspectors was also dispatched to the sit ~

The NRC inspector observed welding on the upper block using the Shielded Metal Arc Welding (SMAW) method. This special process was performed utilizing an approved welding procedure and qualified welders and documented

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in accordance with the Quality Assurance Program requirement The NRC inspector also observed installation of part of the internals and the Metalstitch process performed by the Reynolds French Compan This process is performed by having the broken pieces positioned, aligned, and firmly held together by special fixtures and clamps. Holes are then drilled across the line of fracture to the correct depth. The drilled holes are joined using a pneumatic chisel, and the apertures conforming to the shape of the locks. The locks are inserted into the apertures, then peened into the metal-to-metal contact. Holes are drilled along the length of the crack, then tapped and filled with studs. Each stud locks into its predecessor; that results in a pressure tight joint and restores rigidity to the casting the studs are run down until their heads shear and the remaining rough . metal is removed with pneumatic chisels. The entire repair is then finished with hand grinder The NRC inspector reviewed the following:

• Work requests

• Magnetic particle examination reports

• Drawings

• Procedures

• Station Traveler

• Weld data sheets No violations or deviations were identified. Also, see NRC Inspection Report No. 50-295/86026; 50-304/86026 for details of additional reviews that were performe . Reactor Vessel Outlet Nozzle Inside Radius Examinations The NRC inspector observed the Deep Sea Minirover MKI Vehicle being used to perform visual examinations on the reactor vessel outlet nozzle inside radius sections IR 12, IR 14, IR 16 and IR 18 in accordance with Procedure No. ISI-8, Revision 9. The MKI was equipped with a low light, high resolution color TV camera. The visual sensitivity was excellen The visual examinations were taped for future reviewing which is not a requirement. No unacceptable indications were found by the visual examinations.

The NRC inspector reviewed the technical specifications of the MKI, visual examination Procedure ISI-8, applicable drawings, and reports of examinatio No violations or deviations were identifie . Exit Interview The inspector met with site representatives (denoted in Persons Contacted paragraph) at the conclusion of the inspection. The inspector summarized the scope and findings of the inspection noted in this report. The inspector also discussed the likely informational content of the inspection report with regard to documents or processes reviewed by the inspector during the inspection. The licensee did not identify any such documents / processes as proprietar . _ __ _ - _ _ _ _

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