ML18022A432

Forwards Addl Info Re Classification of Containment Isolation Valves,Per Request.Future Rev to FSAR & marked-up Tech Specs Indicating Changes Prior to OL Issuance Encl

ML18022A432
Person / Time
Site:	Harris
Issue date:	09/25/1986
From:	ZIMMERMAN S R CAROLINA POWER & LIGHT CO.
To:	DENTON H R Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
References
NLS-86-365, NUDOCS 8610010167
Download: ML18022A432 (90)

Text

CRK Carolina Power&Light Company SERIAL: NLS-86-365 Mr.Harold R.Denton, Director Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, DC 20555 SHEARON HARRIS NUCLEAR POWER PLANT UNIT NO.1-DOCKET NO.50-000 CLASSIFICATION OF CONTAINMENT ISOLATION VALVES

Dear Mr.Denton:

Carolina Power R Light Company hereby submits additional information regarding classification of containment isolation valves at the Shearon Harris Nuclear Power Plant (SHNPP).This information, as provided in Attachment 1, responds to concerns raised by your staff following review of recent FSAR changes.The SHNPP FSAR will be revised as shown in Attachment 2 in a post-fuel load amendment.

Attachment 3 provides marked-up pages to the SHNPP Technical Specifications (TS)which show changes that are to be included in the TS prior to their issuance with the operating license.'f.-you hav'e.any'questions on';this subject, please;"contactrme at:(919).836-:6202.

You very trul 3DK/pgp (50023 DK)Attachments cc: Mr.B.C.Buckley (NRC)Mr.G.F.Maxwell (NRC-SHNPP)

Dr.3.Nelson Grace (NRC-RII)S.R.Zimmerman~~Manager Nuclear Licensing Section 8~0~~'I eb~OOCltt pgR 00101~7 500040 pDR A 411 Fayetteville Street o P.O.Box 1551 o Rateigh, N.C.27602 pQ I I 4 Etll~I(

bcc: Mr.H.R.Banks Mr.H.W.Bowles Mr.R.K.Buckles (LIS)Mr.C.Carmichael (2)Mr.N.3.Chiangi Mr.R.M.Coats Mr.A.B.Cutter/E3W/SM Mr.G.L.Forehand Mr.B.3.Furr Mr.3.F.Garibaldi (Ebasco)Mr.W.3.Hindman Mr.D.E.Hollar Mr.L.I.Loflin Mr.R.E.Lumsden Mr.L.H.Martin Mr.D.C.McCarthy Mr.C.A.Rosenberger Mr.M.Shannon (Westinghouse)

Mr.R.B.Starkey, 3r.Mr.R.A.Watson Mr.B.M.Williams Mr.3.L.Willis Mr.T.A.Baxter (Shaw, Pittman, Potts 2 Trowbridge)

File: HI/A-2D File: H-X-Attachment I to NLS-86-365 CLASSIFICATION OF CONTAINMENT ISOLATION VALVES Containment Isolation Valves for Seal Injection Lines (Penetrations M-9, M-10, M-I I): The check valves located inside containment will be classified as containment isolation valves and a Type C Local Leak Rate Test will be performed on these valves.These valves are identified as follows: Penetration Nos.Valve Numbers Ebasco CPRL M-9 M-10 M-11 CS-V25 CS-V26 CS-V27 ICS-300 ICS-365 ICS-026 Containment Isolation Valves for the RHR Pump Suction from the RCS Hot Legs (Penetrations M-15 and M-16)The valves located inside the missile barrier (IRH-V502SB-I and IRH-V500SB-I) will not be classified as containment isolation valves.This design is consistent with ANS 56.2 for"Containment Isolation Provisions for Fluid Systems." Since these lines connect to the SI recirculation loops, which are filled with sump water and at least one of which is in operation post accident, there is no need for containment isolation valves in these lines outside containment.

The closed system outside containment isolates the line..Containment Isolation Valves for the High Head Safety Injection Lines (Penetrations M-I7, M-20, M-21, M-22)The check valves located inside containment for each of these penetrations will be classified as containment isolation valves.None of the containment isolation valves for these penetrations will be Type'C Local Leak Rate Tested because they are provided with a pressurized water seal at a pressur'e greater than 1.10 times the accident pressure (Pa)for a minimum of 30 days following an accident.This water seal is provided by the ECCS Low Head Safety Injection (LHSI)pumps via the suction crossover for the ECCS High Head Safety Injection (HHSI)pumps and the system piping from this crossover to these penetrations..

The LHSI pumps are automatically actuated for a loss of coolant accident and other accidents.

The crossover valves (2CS-V587SA-I, 2CS-V588SB-I, 2CS-V589SA-I, 2CS-V590SB-I) are open for a minimum of 30 days following an accident.(1057NEL/pg p)

Attachment 1 to NLS-86-365 The Boron Injection Tank inlet isolation valves (2SI-V503SA-1 and 2SI-V500SB-I) open automatically after a loss of coolant accident (and other accidents) and remain open for a minimum of 30 days following an accident to provide the pressurized water seal to Penetration M-17.-The water supply to these penetrations is virtually unlimited because the LHSI pumps are supplied initially from the Refueling Water Storage Tank and then from the containment recirculation sumps after transfer to the recirculation mode.No single active failure can prevent penetration pressurization via this pressurized water seal.The containment isolation valves located outside containment on these penetrations are gate-type valves with a single piece wedge.Upon closure and pressurization, the wedge will seal the downstream seat (toward containment).

The upstream seat will not be seated and will allow the packing and body/bonnett gasket to be pressurized above 1.10 Pa.Thus, no.containment atmosphere can enter the valves or be released to the outside environment through the packing or gasket.These valves are identified as follows: Penetration Nos.Valve Numbers Ebaeco CPRL~Valve T e M-17 M-20 M-21 SI-V505 SI-V506 SI-V17 SI-V23 SI-V29 SI-V30 SI-V500 SI-V80 SI-V90 SI-V96 SI-V501 SI-V39 SI-V05 SI-V51 1SI-3 ISI-0 1SI-8 1SI-9 1SI-10 1SI-03 ISI-107 1SI-127 1SI-128 ISI-129 ISI-86 ISI-100 1SI-105 ISI-106 gate gate check check check globe gate check check check gate check check check M-22 SI-Y502 SI-V63 SI-V69 SI-V75 1SI-52 1SI-72 1SI-73 ISI-70 gate check check check Containment Isolation Valves for the LHSI to the RCS Hot Legs (Penetration M-18)The check valves located inside containment for this penetration will be.classified as containment isolation valves.(1057NEL/pgp)

Attachment 1 to NLS-86-365 None of the containment isolation valves for this penetration will be Type C Local Leak Rate Tested because they are provided with a pressurized water seal at a pressure greater than 1.10 Pa for a minimum of 30 days following an accident.This water seal is provided by the ECCS LHSI pumps via the crossover line located outside containment.

The LHSI pumps are automatically actuated for a loss of coolant accident and other accidents.

'he crossover valves (2SI-V577SA-1 and 2SI-V576SB-1) are open for a minimum of 30 days following an accident.The water supply to this penetration is virtually unlimited because the LHSI pumps are supplied initially from the Refueling Water Storage Tank and then from the containment recirculation sumps after transfer to the recirculation mode.No single active failure can prevent penetration pressurization via this pressurized wa ter seal.v The containment isolation valves located outside containment on this penetration is a gate-type valve with a single piece wedge.Vpon closure and pressurization, the wedge will seal the downstream seat (toward containment).

The upstream seat will not be seated and will allow the packing and body/bonnett gasket to be pressurized above 1.10 Pa.Thus, no containment atmosphere can enter this valve or be released to the outside environment through the packing or gasket.These valves are identified as follows: Penetration Nos.Valve Numbers Ebasco CPRL~Valve T e M-18 SI-V587 SI-V510 SI-V511 1SI-359~ISI-130 1SI-135 gate check check Containment Isolation Valves for the Component Cooling Water (CCW)Supply to the Reactor Coolant Drain Tank and the Excess Letdown Heat Exchangers (Penetrations M-37 and M-38)The relief valves on the closed loop inside containment will be classified as containment isolation valves.The setpoint for these relief valves is greater than 1.5 times Pa.e These relief valves will not be Type C tested based upon the justification provided in Section 6.2.6.3 of FSAR Amendment No.29 for these penetrations.

These valves are identified as follows: Penetration Nos.Valve Numbers Ebasco CPRL~Valve T e M-37 R M-38 CC-R6 CC-R5 ICC-190 1CC-186 relief relief ti057NEL/pgp)

Attachment 1 to NLS-86-365 VI.Containment Isolation Valves for the Containment Recirculation Sump Penetrations (Penetrations M-47, M-48, M-49, and M-50)The valve located inside the valve chamber on each of these penetrations will be classified as a containment isolation valve., These valves are identified as follows: Valve Numbers Penetration Nos.Ebaeco CPRL Valve Tyae M-47 M-48 M-49 M-50 SI-V571 SI-V570 CT-V6 CT-V7 ISI-300 ISI-301 1CT-105 1CT-102 gate gate gate gate VII.Containment Isolation Valves for Safety Injection-Low Head to the Cold Legs (Penetrations M-13 and M-14)The check valves located inside containment will be classified as Containment Isolation Valves for each of these penetrations.

These valves are identified as follows: Penetration Nos.Valve Numbers Ebasco CPRL M-13 M-14 SI-V581 SI-V580 1SI-346 ISI-347 (1057NEL/pgp

)

1 ATTACHMENT 2 TO NLS-86-365 TABLE 3,9,3-13 (Contend)HSSS SUPPLIED ACTIVE CLASS I 2 Ak0 3 VALVES 4F'c~l~~e.l/Er<<g 4 P vJc~v(mls Ebssco Meetinghouse Envlronnentel

~Ts H~r~Ta Nuaaat S~stea Location~alit lcatlon~Ts O~srstor Nsnulsntursr

'66-VSM~ISB BlOI~BllB (Sl~Slobs Notor--asian 2<~"V 778'-8qS3$

C5 gee,--V7Tfse I-8gals.-C5 RAG Volvo'ystem Sefety Design Operetlng Cless R~etln Condltlons

.Slee 2.....1500 15 pslg 2 150 f'w 2]ssO (6'~/jl 8 F 8/50 l5Pste/l~f gf SI/416 Cet~ECCS.Operation

'Cel4S gm C'h+X4c1cS+icTR,

-TABLE 3,9,3-b ant>d)NSSS St%PLIED ACTIVE CLASS I 2 ANI 3 VALVES V a I va Sy stan Ehasco Ilast lnghoosy Envlronnantal Safaty Design Oparptlng~te Nueber~ta N aber a~etna lonatlan.~alt tluetton~T~triturator ttanutaoturar blaue R~atln coneltlon~alta function 2I6%590SA-1 I-l l26 tJG 2v0429158-I I-7150 t.Dfaphrsge Alr Ci annal Diaphragm Alr.Or Irma l 2 150 2 pslg 3/4 100 F 2 150 2 pslg 3'00 F Coqta lnsont I so I at Ion Conta Instant I sol at Ion 33 3CC45llSA-I e 3CC&5l558-I Zcc-R 554 2<C-RC Sd I-$511 c<RCA CC Rc6 Dlyphragn Alr r Dlaphraqn Air"'Pc(iF F'gf~lgb R'cbcF.Acr>nTIr~Scc.p I TT-Cr lan alt I TT~Irma I Ck~sb)csosb)150.I08 pslg 105 F 150 IM pslg 4 150 F/yO (afP54/HSN 4/2/50 gob~/I~V ECCS Oparat Ion ECCS Operat lon u'O C~r.sea..Sa 0

TABID 3,9.3-14 (continued)

NON-NSSS SUPPLIED CLASS I 2 AND 3 ACTIVE VALVES~Ts tt be b~etee Env, Leeettee Ollel~Te erator Safety Manufacturer Class valve Design RatIng (ANSI I)Systee DesIgn Sire Cond 1 t iona (Inches-ID)

Funct Ion 2CT-V6SA CT (3)Gate Motor Anchor-Oar I lng 2 150 45 pslg~300 F Gnkrhg~t Xi~/u 2CT-VTSB CT 2CT-V'I3SA CT RAB (3)Gate RAB (3)Check Motor 45 pslg~300 F Rockwe I I 2 1500 50 pslg~200 F Anchor-Darling 2 150 12 f-Z so/~/'~ECCS Operation~2CT-V21SA CT 2CT-V27SA CT RAB (3)Gate RCS (4)Check Motor Anchor-Darling 2 300 Anchor&sr I (ng 2 300 300 pslg 0 300 F 300 pslg t 300F ECCS Operation~ECCS Operation 0 2CT-V3558 CT RAB (3)Check Rockue I I 2 1500 50 ps I g 0 200 F ECCS Operation 2CT-V51SB g'CT-V85SA CT CT 2CT-V43SB CT RAB (3)'ate RCS (4)Check RAB (3)Globe Motor lip Motor Anchor&ai I lng e2 300 Zarway 3 1500 AnchorDar I lng 2 300 300 pslg 0 300 F 300 pslg~300 F 15 pslg~200 F ECCS Operat (on ECCS Operation ECCS Operat I on 0 3CT-RISAB CT RAB (3)Safety S-A Crosby 3 150 15 pslg 0 200 F lxl)Protect ECCS 3CT-V95SN CT.RAB (3)-Clobo Hand Yal Nay 3 1500 15 pslg 1I 200 F ECCS Operation

'.TABLE 3,9,3-14 (cont lnued)NDNWSSS SUPPLIED CLASS I 2 AND 3 ACTIVE VALVES~ta k ncr~Satan Enva Location punt.~T a pperstor kanutaaturer Safety Class Valve Design Rating (ANSI I)Systee Design Cond I t 1ons Size (Inches-ID)

FunctIon ICS-V7'IISN ICS-V70SN CS RCS (4)Check RCB (4)Check hP" Rockwell Rockwell 1521 1521 248S pslg t 650 F 248S pslg 8 650 F 2 RCPS Soundary RCPB Boundary 2CS-VI29SN CS RAB (3)Check Rockwe I I 2 1500 220 ps 1g~200 F Safe Shutdown 3CS-V222SN CS 3CS-V223SN CS RAB (3)Check RAB (3)Check hp hp Rockwe I I Rockwe I I 1500 150 pslg t 250F 150 psig t 250 F Safe Shutdown Safe Shutdown 33 ISI-V39SA V45SB V51SA ISI-V63SA V6958 V75SA SI SI RCS (4)Check RCB (4)Check hP.Rockwell Roc kwe I I 1521 I 1521 2485 pslg 8 650 F 248S pslg 8 650 F RCPS Boundary Qyr/kkk'ae

~cert P ms>~+~, RCPB Boundary C~.4+~;+2i~lwL.

TABLE 3.9,3-14 (continued)

NON-NSSS SUPPLIED CLASS I 2 AND 3 ACTIVE VALVES Tare II be~sstrw Env, beret tee Ore l~tee t~eereter Safety Hanufacturer Class Valve Design Rating (Attsl et System Design Size Conditions (Inches-ID)

Function ISI-V84SA V9059 V96SA Sl RCB (4)Check Rockwe I I I l 521 2485 pslg 8 650 F RCPB Boundary ec)~w.~t Z sDIA A~A I 5 I-V I 7SA V?3SB SI V?9SA RCB (4)Check Rockuell?CB-BI SA CB RAB l3)But terf ly Pneumatic BIF Conte Inment Vacuum Relief I 1521 2 150 2485 pslg 8 650 F 45 pslg 8 366 F 2 24 RCPB Boundary~~~n+m2<bc Open&lose.

~?CB-82SB CB Containment Vacuum Relief RAB 13)But terf ly Pneumatic BIF 2 150 45 ps ig t 366 F 24 Open&i ose 33?CP-BISA CB Norma I RCB Containment Purge Hake-up l41 Butter f ly Pneumat I c.'IF 2 150~45 psig g 366 F Conte lnment Isolation 8 2CP-B?SB 0 CB Normal RAB Contalnmant Purge Hake-up 13)Butterfly Pneumatic.

BIF 2 150 45 pslg~366 F Containment I sol et lan TABLE 6,9~3-14 (continued)

NON-NSSS SUPPLIEDt CLASS'I 2 AND 3 ACTIVE VALVES Env,'Ta Ko aer hates Locatloa gus I~Te Sefety~0 crater ttaeotactarer Class Ve I v@Design Retlng (ANSI I)Systea Design Cond I t lons Size (Inches-ID)

Function fn tA I ICS-Y22SN CS 1CS-Y24SN CS 2CS-V25SB CS ICS-Y23SN CS RCB (4)Check RCB (4)Check RCB (4)Check RCB (4)Check 6P 6P Rockuel I Rockvs I I Rock@el I Roc kml I 1 1521 I 1521 I 1521 2 1500 2465 pslg d 650 F 2465 pslg d 650F 24dS pslg I 650 F 2735 pslg t 200 F I I/2 Sefe Shutdcwn I I/2 Sefe Shutdown I I/2 4~/<,),~+~~s~l~bi~i~I 1/2 Sefe Shutdurn TABLE 3 9,3-14 (continued)

NON-NSSS SUPPLIED CI.ASS I 2 AND 3 ACTIVE VALVES~Ta N aa~Stree En'uustfas Suet~T8 Sffsrsta Naffufaeturer Safety Class Valve Design Rating IANSf at Systea Design Site Condltlons-(Inches-ID)

Function 2CS-V2658 CS 2CS-V275B CS IC5-V345N CS 1CS-V355N CS ICS-V36SN CS 2CS-V6758 CS RCB (4)Check RCB (4)Check RCB (4)Check RCB (4)Check RCB (4)Check RCB (4)Check dp dp dp Rockve I I Rockwl I Rockw I I Rock w I I Rock w I I Rockw I I 1500 2 1500 I 1521 I'I 521 I 1521 2 1500 2735 pslg~200 F 2735 pslg~200 F 24SS pslg-g 650 F 2485 pslg~650 F'4S5 pslg t 650 F 150 pslg~500 F I I/2 Agm~rn~O/Oh'Ost I I/2 I I/2 M Safe Shutdcwn Safe Shutdcwn 3/4 Conte lneent I sol et loll I I/2 n Wl gefmO~~a*m I I/2 Safe Shutdossn 33 251-YISSSA g 251-V15051 o 2CC-V515N Sl SI RCB (4)Check RCB (4)Check RCB (4)Check dp Rockwl I Rock w1 I Rockw I I 2 1500 2 1500 700 pslg~300 F 2735 pslg S 300F 150 pslg S 200 F Conte I neent I sol et)on Conte Ineent Isola'loll 3/4 Conte lneent I so I at Ion at%TRATlOII OATA TABlK 6.2A-I COMTANMENT lSOLATON SYSTEM DATA SilNPP FSAR%LVE DATA I I/jp p<

>ee 55 RO CICS g SEAL UATEE TO SCt'A'15 T522 SA HO 0 0 AI C C 5 IES Itl 55 oc w~ui~e 805 55 CTCS SEAL'MATTE TO RCt~S~T26 5525 CE Cl 0 0 Ai g r IKI t5'I ES ra TE5 TES I W W~III J 605 Cf CS SEAL VATES TO ACt'C'tr V524 SA lla 0 0 AI C C y TE5 Tt5 yes Ttt e Ie Cf CS~SElL UAIEE EEIDIN i EICE55 1EIDOOI%Sr T516 A T511 A 10 10 C 0 0 AI AI C C C Tt 5 Ttt Itt~e'SlW olllse 610$5 SAIETT IRJE CTINI LM READ TO COIO IECS T561 T519 A SA 255 C 0 0 0 AI'AS TE5 E.Ps Ir 410 55 5AIZIT INJECIIS 1ASJ READ TO COLD ItCS V560 v526 0 0 AI 0 0 It5 E.A 11 62A RNE SUCTION IEQl ROI Lta 6501 TSOI 5 V505 100 12 K N 0 0 C 0 C AI Al 0 0 0 NO NO NO 2~$<<16'@WC i z~dPA-11 Aseotoeot Noi 1~pp>> ~I~I.Wgg I~~~lN lI~I~\I'~~I I I I~M lM~RESRMRERRR55551+'W~ II lI lI II~I~\~I I~I~~~I~\~I ~I~~~~I I I'I III IIR.HHII888888888888IIIHER IIIRI Rm 5155555mm1151555& I~~~tt<<I~~I I\~~~~I~I~I MMR~Rb555i5555RRRREMS& I\I t MRM~RRMEE5555555555%5W ~~'I ~~~~P~I~~~,'~.~ ~~l h g J~~h FSRR a The RHR pumps and the Safety Injection system piping provide a pressuri ed water seal to containment penetrations M-13, M 14)M-17, M-18, M-20, M-21, and M-22 for a minimum period of 30 days following a design basis accident.This seal is maintained following any single active failure.This water seal ensures that the Containment Atmosphere cannot leak to the environment following 4 design basis accident (See section b.2.h).The requirement to maintain this seal imposes the following restrictions Dn valve positions during the specified period.1~The Charging Pump Suction Header Crossover Valves must remain open during the post.-accident injection and recirculation modes.An additional benefit of these valves being open is that a fai,lure of an RHR pump in the recirculhation modes will not result in loss of a charging pump bec'ause one RHR pump can provide sufficient flow and NPSH for two charging pumps.P 30P At least one of the Boron Injection Tank'inlet isolation valves must remain open during the'post-accident injection and recirculation modes.h The RHR system crossover valves at the connection to the: china supplying+1'ow to the RCS Hot Legs for Hot, Leg RecircuXation must-.remain. open during the post-accident injection. and.recirculation. modes A motor operated.Containment Isolation Valve on one of the low head flowpaths to the RCS Cold Legs must be closed during the past-accident cold leg recircula ion mode to prevent RHR pump, runout.shouted a single active failure of an RHR pump occur.J J h P J h P h I~h TAOLE 6.5,1-1 (Continued) EHERGEN:Y CORE COOL(HO SYSTEH FAINRE KODES AHO EFFECTS AHALYSIS Coaponont o Fnl ahura)lode Functl on Ef(oct on System Fal (ure Ootgtlon Hath cd o Reworks the suction of LHSI/RHR pump I (puap 2)to fhe EST Kotcr.>Fol/s to atod clcae on gate v'teande 1-888Th.(I-888m.aru)logos s I provides separation Qtuoon tuo Indcpon-doqt flor paths outside conte(natant dur I ng cold Ieg re CI rcu'I atl one~Directs LHSI f I or at logs during hot le oc)rac-latl on, Fal lure rodjces redun-dancy to prewitt excessive purp runcvt during cold log reel r-eal ntl ot4'.Ho ef fact on gyston operation, Iso!at(on Valve I.888m (I-8887A)prov'ides backup separation of I lou paths, Sane as I tea l(Our lng tho first 2i.hours ot long t phase Incl ro-cove Sl jan%puips aligned for In<<)oct(on Into cold legs of RCS coolant (ceps Atter 2i hcNcsg polps al 4'ligned by operator for reel rar I at(on floe into tho hot logsa F'al la to open on danandp qro reduce dun>>Sane as Iten II I~dancy of provl ding t luld (lou frais LHSI/RHR puaps f or I n)ection Into hot logs ot RCS l copse'lnl cue f lou requlronants el I I be~t bt opening ot Isolation valve I-8887B (I-8887A)and floe frcxI traa LHSI/RHR puap 2 (puap 11~

)ThBl.E fi>3.l-I (Continued)

EHERGEt1CY CORE COOLINC SVSTEH PAILHRE MODES AND EFPECTS hNALYSIS.~Component 17'otor./operated-.gate valve 1-8888A (1-88888~analogous) Fatlllrj Node Fails to close).Function" Provides isolation of, fluid floe from LHSi/RHR pump 1 (pump 2)to cold leg infection header of RCS , coolant loops~f!ffect on System Failure Detg~tion Hetkod Same as item fl In addition LIISI/RflR pump discharge~header prcssure and flow indication and oiniflow valve moni-toring at HCB.Fa i lure rcd uc ca f low of recirculation cool-ant to hot legs of RCS coolant loops from LHSI/RHR pump 1 (pump 2)~Minimum flow requirements to hot leg of RCS coolant loops pill ba met by deiivery of coolant from'NISI/RHR pump 2 (pump 1)and~SXfCHC g&o Pg5X/Ch6~~P~e+e~ega Remarks*Hot legs RCS coolant loop recirculation required to prevent boron precipitation problem for long-tcrni core cooling.~If, 4'18.Hotor..Paf.la':to ..operated.-'pen oo.gate valve dpman11, 1-8889 Provides isolation o'f fluid flow frog LIISI/RIIR pumps to hot leg infection hander of RCS coolant loops, Failure prevents fluid flow from LIISI/RHR pumps to hot leg in)ection feeder of RCS coolant loops Hinimua flow requirements to hot legs of RCS coolant loop will be met by delivery of coolant from two HHSI/CHC pumper'dmc as item f2'n addition, LHSI/RHR p~p discharge header pressure and flow indication and'iniflow valve monitoring at HCB~ L ,.)Thbt.F, 6~3'-l (Continued) .EHERCENCY CORE COOLINC SYSTEM FhILURE HODES AND EFFECYS hNhLYSIS Component,' ~Motor operated-.gate valve 1-8706ho.(1-87068 analogous) Failure 4e Pbi)s to~close pn'emand~.~I~g rails to-'-opeII on demands., Function" Provides isolation of fluid flow from LHSI/RHR pump 1 (pump 2)vis RIIR lteat Exchanger, (exchanger 2)to suction line o!HIISI/CIIC pump 1 (HIISI/Cllc 2)~.Ff fec t on Sys tarn~Failure Detection Method*Failure reduces redun-dancy of providing isolation of recit culatioO of fluid into Ilot legs of RCg coolant loops by 1 LIISI/RltR pumps;Negligible effect on~recirculation into cold legs of RCS coolant.loops,~~>AA~i~>~o~~/gg~~,~~@+~~~C04-88SVW~d-&~>cv~~~j>>~~~-"~88+a</~r~i~'~luku~~r@~~~No effect on system,.Same as that operationi HHSI/CIIC stated for item pumps 1 and 2 will be f2.In addition, provided suction head.HIISI/CIIC pump 1 by LIISI/RHR pump 2 , (pump 2)flow (pump 1)via the indication at common charging HCB~pump suction headeri ,~l~*Rema&a >>>>'TABS.E ti>3.1-$(Coqttnued) EHBRCENCY CORE CNLIIIC SYSTEH FAILURE HODES AMII EFFECTS ANALYSIS Component le Hots/operated-.gate Yalve" 1-8801A (1-8801B analogous) '..-Failur<<de Feign to-.'..'lose'On e demapd>>Functtoq" Provides isolation oj fluid floe from IIIISI/CHC pump 02 discharge line.via BlT to cold.legs of RCS coolant loops>>, Effacg on Systea Fatlure geducea redun-dancy of providing isolqttoq of fluid floe from NISl/CIIC pump 2 to cold legs of RCS coolant loops, n Failure Detection Hethod**Same aa itea)2>>In addition, pressure of bIT discharge line indicated st,HCB>>Remarks*Valves are activated to open by an SIAS.Peter to the closing of the valves, reactor operator resets the SIAS>>>>~~r8&4 WHO~<<i'itic, mJu~17'~o&i4~-of IIHXr/Z~PkrnPS'A g~goy/~5'irtrrrrv~ ~4/II/kc~c'f$g+pgg Pygmy~P&VICI(A)t f/o~Q Q$P J~4>ol b~Fk Valves are cIosed by the reactor operator for recirculation in-to hot legs of RCS coolant loops and open by the operator shen recirculation into cold legs of RCS coolant ia desired during long tera tn-cidant recovery pertod.)iota Fails to operated osa gate valve, demands 1"8803A (1-8803B ana Same as iten 24~Same ay i/era f24 except Same as iten I isolation valves 1-SAO and ea agkup isolation of fluid flon&roaMI CIIC pump t2~ SHNPP FSARa>>r'I (~H QA two out of four coincident logic is utilized in both protection cabinets A and B to ensure a trip signal in the event that two out of the four level channeL bistables are energized. This trip signal, in conjunction with the"S" signal., provides the actuation signal to automatically open the corresponding containment sump isolation valves.As part of the manual switchover procedure, the discharge of the residual heat removal pumps are aligned to the auctions of the charging pumps.Charging estabLish two separate and redundant high head, recirc la ion systems.jhcsuch'~8~er drugs-connect values are ace c Jar~M gmare s~~~AHRyu~p xnxmize tnN possaoiaity ot Lou temperat~&everpressure transient during startup and cooldown, low pressurizer pressure and Low steam line pressure safety injection actuation logic is manuaLly blocked at 1900 psi.At 1000 psi>power is locked out from the accumulator isoLation valves and from the non-operating charging pumps.It should be noted that the high containment pressure safety injection actuation Logic cannot be blocked.If a steamLine rupture occurs while both of these, Sl actuation signals are blocked, steamline isoLation will occur on high negative steam pressure rate.An alarm for steam line isolation will alert the operator of the accide'nt. The nuclear power and core flux increase is terminated at RCS pressure that approximates the beginning of accumulator discharge. 'his transient is, however, terminited by the boron resulting from BIT injection so no adverse impact would be expected.to result from accumulator isolation. For large LOCAs, sufficient. mass and energy would be released to the containment to automatically actuate SI when the containment high pressure setpoint is reached.At this time, the operator would be alerted to'the occurrence of a LOCA by the foLlo~ing safety-related indications. a)Loss of pressurizer level b).rapid...decrease of'CS pressure,, and c)increase in containment pre sure In addition to the above, the following indications are normaLLy avaiLable to the operator at the control board a)radiation alarms inside containment, b)increase in sump water LaveL, c)'-decrease off icale of.accumulator water levels.-and decrea e in pr ssure,*.d), ECCS valve and pump position and status Light in ECCS energized indication,'and annunciatocs Light as safeguards equipment becomes'r mergized, and~~', e).flow from ECCS pumps.4 LOCAs during,startup and cooldown have been evaluated to determine the effects of the unavailability of tne accumuLators. The limiting case is, of course,'.3.2-13g Amendment No 23 SEEP FSAR TABLE 6.3.2-6 SEQUENCE OP SWITCHOVER OPERATION FROM IMECTION TO RECIRCULATION Manual operator actions are required to complete the switchover from the in)ection mode to the recirculation mode.During the in]ection mode, the operator verifiis that all ECCS pumps are operating and monitors the RWST and reactor building recirculation sump levels in anticipation of switchoveri The operator opens or verifies'open, the component cooling water inlet isolation valves to the residual.heat removal heat exchanger prior to switchover isolation. Upon receipt of the RWST low-low level signal in con)unction with the safety.in]ection signal, the containment sump isolation valves automatically open.Following this automatic action, the operator is required to complete the switchover. The following manual actions must" be performed to align the charging pump suction to the residual heat removal pumps discharge. lo Verify that the containment sump isolation valves are open and close the residual heat removal pump suction valves from the refueling water storage tank~C4 on~(M b4)o<+c Co4f l~heaJe-jsdChe y>ives associated uaiA+4 R"~t'ŽP>'.2'.(7$gs ct c~~p~~~b'PPAR pc/~+/Yr&~+/e/Ac pem~hk~mcC'0)Open residual heat removal pump discharge valves to the charging pump suction ALl ECCS'umps are now aligned wi h suction flow from the containment. sump.The operator verifies proper operation and alignment of all ECCS components and proceeds to complete.the following manual actions to align the ECCS in redundant flow paths for long term recirculation operations .4:.Close refueling water storage tank valves to charging pump suction.Dctdcd..6 Open valve in the alternate high head cold leg recirculat'on line..T~CLose valves (dependm~g on operating charging pumps)in the discharge.'header to establish two separate high heed recirculation systems..The following manual operator actions are.required to perform the change-over

.operation from the cold leg recirculation mode to the hot.leg recirculation mode a.h 6.3.2-25

~l SHNPP FSAR~~TABLE 6 o3~2H (Continued) SEOUEHCE OF SWITCHOVER OPERATION FROM INJECTION TO RECIRCULATION 1~Close the cold leg header isolation valves associated vith the RHR pumps./chic cf...5~Open the hot'leg header isolation valve from the RHR pumps~Stop charging pump No.l.If pump Ho.1 vas out of service prior to the accident, stop the swing pump (charging pump No.3).C1ose.the alternate high head cold leg header isolation valve and open the corresponding high head hot leg header isolation valve.Restart the charging pump stopped in Step 4o, Stop charging pump Ho 2i If pump Hoi 2 uas out of service prior to the accident,, stop the sving pump (charging pump Ho 3)~8~CIose the boron infection cank discharge isolation va'ves and open the corresponding high head.hot'eg header'solation valve Restart the charging pump stopped in step 7>>h~~3~'6 3 2-26 ~Yelva Nof.lb.~..182A'38~4A 1A a 9A 98 IOA IM 11A 118 12A 128 13h 138 14A 148 l h,.:.-'Homal'" InJect Ion Standby':..llexlaua Sefepuerda 'I'ge'I~,, 0.:.,'0~~0: "'0~~-'Q.~~':~0 C:%'C J 0:.:-.0~.".~:, C C-'C'-.C 0'0/0-: 0 0~'0~'.0 C',.CC.'C CC C C C C r C'C C"~C C C C C C 0 C 0-0.'0 C VALVE AL I QOKIfT TABLE PRINCIPLE NDOES OF ECCS OPERATION (Shoot 2)C InJect)on Plnlnuw'efeguerda ITreln A Only)D Cold Leg Reclrculatlon Hewlaun Sofeguerda E Cold I.ag Reclr-culetlon Nlni-~Sefeguerda (Trafn A Only).0 0 0 0 C C 0 C C 0 0 0 0 C C C C C C C C C 0 C C 0 C C 0 0 C'C C C 0'O~0M 0" Cat 0 0 0 0 C C C C C C C C 0 0 0 C C C 0 0 C 0'll 0 0+C C 0 C 0 C C C C C C C C~0 NOTES TO FIGURES do3e2-4 TIIOUGH do3o2-6 F Wt Lag Roc lrcul at Ion Meal~Sefeguerda C C 0 0 C C C C 0 0...0 0 C C 0 0 0.0 0 C C C C C l27 0 Hot Leg Reclr culatlon lllnl-~Sefeguerda fTreln A Only)C 0 0 0 C C C 0 0 C 0 0 C 0 0 0 C 0 C.~~,~.n C~~C C C c C C 0/+)JIL-7<4 e~n h~I doscJ'iii/I'c~of/'8 56/~<Narcism preenk Efg pu~p run-ovf 4~>>INTES TO FIGUAES 6o3o2-i TINOUGH 6+3+2-6 VALISE ALI~IIT TABLE PRINCIPLE HOOES OF ECCS OPERATIOH~~ln.ISheat 3)23A 238 2l 25 26 C C C C 0 0 c I C I C A':.'8, Valya'.."-Normal..Injection Ho~: Standby".Hex)run..Safeguards 15A i.0 i-'...0 158,'.0.i'.'16A'.'.'.'i'~..l68'".0:~=j:.0 17A.0-~.0 I78, 0"-:,.0.16A 0~.'0 168.0.'.0 19A 0'..'C 198~0'19C 0'.,', f C 2'0 0',~.C 2IA 0.;,.C~21B~0"~C 22A C~0 228 C~~~0 C Inject Ion Hlnlnua Safagvards ITraln A Only)0 0 0~0 0 0 0'0 0 0 C C 0.0 C.0 C C C C 0 Cold I.eg Reclrculatlon Naxlavn Safaguards 0 0 0 0 C;.Ci C C C C C C C C 0.0 0 C C 0 E Cold Leg Raclr-cutatlon Hlnl-aun Safeguards (Train A Only)0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 C C 0 C.0 C C C'C F Hot Leg Roc lrcul at Ion Hax 1am Safeguards 0 0 0 0 C C C'C C C C C 0 0 C 8 Hot Leg Raclr-culat ton Hlnl ave Safeguards (Train A Only)0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 Q.0 0 C C 0 C C 0 C 27 29h 298 29C 0~0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 O.0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 .~AQ~oo I ao>>~a Li I<<aoaao~<<>><<aa<<>>a>><<oa>>I~~ggla>>+j>>p>>\a>>a>><<s rip<<>><<~c<<Oo<<<<>>a>><<.<<ao>>pa<<~<<<<l ~e aoo<<<<a>>o>>a<<pro>>I~>>~>>a<<>>>>I~<<<<a p>>a<<<<<<aoo~.I<<<<p<<po<<ptas>>oaara>>oao>>a <<>>>>P'KOI a,<>I<<o~<<o>>~<<I&<<<< L<<>>alp>>>><<a>>>>o<<<<<<>><<owaa<< ~<<<<>><<aa>>>>o<<>> aa~<<>>~ao a>>>>>><<<<<<o<<lra>>I>>>>p po>>Ia>>>>p>>o>>o>>o>><<po <<>>oao N Q>>opa I>>>>Iv>>p>>>>a<<r>>>>p>>>><<l>>i ~.<<>>aaa<<p<<<<IWWM >>aAAa u C\PL I~<<>>>>Iro>>>>o~I~o~~ora a aao t MI")WA.O'Rl~o>>I~I~tt-)<<IITICICP'1'o')~o~g<<r fo I ao~I i~(~fi..~l.~~o o>>~~<<po<>14~oa~I tl1 PFjgz~inc chal.ud<<bc*i~~"s S~I 3)II css-St stIM ZCS-V7FtSS gcs8PS>A)ZCS-V 7 f)Sg ICt CIO,ICOSA-CI~~ ltl~callol Il<<alit Iacccoc Ccaol tuolt coool laa to<<o~cllat Cora<<t F I WL CIPCIT JIW.TC IC ICtCAT ocaII~po a)alac c<<III~L TIOJC~.C 1 1 4 ATTACHMENT 3 TO NLS-86-365 PENETRATION NO.13 Table 3.6-1 (Continued) CONTAINMENT ISOLATION VALVES VALVE NO.CP&L~EBASCO FUKCTIOK lSI-340 SI-LOM HEAD TO COLD LEGS (5 I-V579)lSI-341 SI-LOM HEAD TO COLO LEGS (SI"V578)INIL WN I NAXIHUN ISOLATION APPLICABLE ~TIKE SEC KOTES N/A 1 N/A 15 16 18 20 25 IRH-2 RHR PUHP SUCTION (TRAIN A)(RH-V503)1RH-40 RHR PUMP SUCTION (TRAIN B)~(RH-V501)-1SI-359 SI LOM HEAD TO HOT LEG (SI-V587)151-107 SI'HIGH HEAD TO HOT LEG (S I-V500)1SI-86 SI HIGH HEAD TO HOT'LEG (SI-V501)1SI 52 SI HIGH HEAD TO COLO LEG (SI" V502)1SM-92 SERVICE MATER TO FAN COOLER ('SM-B46)AH-3 N/A N/A.N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A 1,3 1,3 3 2 J 3 Xp 3 1,6 26 27'" 28 1SM-91 (SM-845)'1SM-225 (SM-852)UM-227 (SM-851)SERVICE MATER TO FAN'OOLER AH 2 SERVICE MATFR TO FAN COOLER AH-1 SERVICE MATER TO FAN COOLER AH-4 N/A N/A N/A 1,6 1,6 1,6 29 30 1SM-97 SERVICE MATER FROM FAN COOLER N/A-(SM-847)AH-3 1SM-109.SERVICE MATER FRO!l FAN COOLER N/A (SM-849)AH-2 1,6 1,6 31 1SM-98 (SM-a48)SERVICE MATER FROM FAN COOLER N/A AH-1 1,6 SHEARON HARRIS-UNIT 1 3/4 6-24 Table 3 6 1 (Cantfaued) COHTAIHMEHT ISOLATION VALVES VALVE HO.PEHETRATIOH CP4L HO.~BANCO FOHCTIOH 1SM-110 SERVICE MATER FROM FAN COOLER (SM-850)AH"4 151-3 SI TO HIGH HEAD CQLQ LEG (SI-V505)HtQL Pr RerfSlON H/h 1,6 H/A', 3<"G,$8 MAXIMUM ISOLATION APPLICABLE ~TIME EEC NOTES 17 1SI-4 SI TO HIGH HEAD COLO LEG I.H/(SI-V506).H/A 10.MA UAL PyLVFS I~~.D r~s~~A~~i)1MS-?0 (MS-V8)IMS-?2 (MS V9}2 CM M (CM B5)VALVES 1SI 43 (Si-V30}MAIN STEAM B TO AUXILIARY F.W.TURBINE MAIN STEAM C TO AUXILIARY F.'L TURBINE Hg PURGE EXHAUST SI&IGH HEAD TO COLO LEGS N/A 1,3,6 1,3,6 3 1,3 45 1SF-118 (SF-025)1LT-6 (LT-V2)ISA 80.....-----~(SA V14)1EQ-119 (WL-0651)1SF 145 (SF-0164)15F-144 (SF-0165)ILRT ROTOMETER (LOCXEQ CLOSED)SERVICE AIR (LOMK CLOSED)RCOT PUMP QISCH BYPASS cacemP REFUELI~~CAVITY CLEANUP (LOCK%CLOScQ).REFUELIHG CAVITY'C~~'UP (LOCKEO CLOSED)REFUELIHQ CAVITY CLEAHUP (u.'um CLOSED)N/A N/A H/h ZH3 23 2.3 2.3 2.3 2.3 45 39 15F 119 (SF-026)1CC-250{CC-V50)REFUELIHG CAVITY CLEAHUP (LOCXFS CLOSED)CCW FROM RCP THERMAL BARRIER H/A SHEAROH HARRIS-UHIT 1 r 3/4 6-25 ming yea;~1 Fort&~jAE.PCS \I Pa/ve Po, CP/l.~ST FAnrCTZ+4 Hppu;cA EM/VM/$I~~e II~ldll,....~ ~...........COnhiarr,mZ'Diem@ A SPY'Pu~p~.~/A I.(si'-vs 70 I..)~e e I I je~~~e M k8.~.~.io~duu.natu p.A/HZ Pi net P..~/4.ir-imam I.Se lg tkinmrnP'Jump..d>,.CT.../amp f.nf/A....: 4, 3 (8r-R)-pl Canhinneun..f .,dbmp x4.C'7 Pi.~.p....~.., 6../A (er-vr)'~~, e~C~ SHNPP REVlStON tAU8 S86 PEHETRATI OH HO.98'5 pa 11.RELIEF a<SZga7 bC/I W 1~/CR4PCS g-a8 (a), Q), any/Pc)Si/A~~~(c~A), 7 CB-hC (CS-V2)1FP 349 (FP-V46)VALVES.COHTAINHEHT VACUUH RELIEF FIRE MATER SPRIHKLER SUPPLY ICS 10 CVCS HORHAL LETOOMH (CS-R500)1RH-7 RHR SUCTIOH FROH HOT LEG (RH-R501)1RH-45 RHR SUCTION FROH HOT LK (RH-R500)Tabl>>3.6-1 (Contfnued) COHTAIHHEHT ISOLATION VALVES VALVE NO.CP4L~EBASCQ FUHCTIQH FINAL Der HAXIHUH ISOLATIOH APPLICABLE ~TIRE SEC HQTES M/A N/A H/A H/A , 30 31 LSM-95 (SM R')LSM-107 (SM-R3)1SM-'96 (SM-R2}1S&108 (SM-R4)SERVICE MATER FROH FAH CtMLER AH 3 H/h SERVICE MATER FRY FAH CNLER H/A AH 2 SERVICE MATER FROH FAH COOLER AH-L SERVICE MATER FlÃN FAH COOLER AH-4 ,p iI JP~EB,/CL-'@8~Ice-wS)d ex/i=ROM gS"gT Flea++~cd.SHEAROH HARRIS-UHIT 1 3/4 6"28 If I I~~.I lep&~$~~'I/o.ll cP/c"A Opal'cAB ZX WocATrbg~st~A/cps-V~5 344..cl/Cs".Seal 4afcr 4 pep'g"]vp (cs-ajar)rv)P v (g 4>CS-Sea/Matc/-g4 Agp"gy" (cs-vie)'->'~-'~/C---<<~~-...~.~..u~/-~ nc/"~" cs-'...+g/c7y.2' q~b~-"-4o Lf Acing (~rZ" y5'&i').....Ck.'Ze~ "~a<ch/~y'~/i~-./ <Prude's'x'- Vs so)--~/i/M c~.</c$2jc 4.--,Aiph g.rag*.Cs'i-V/'7)'" lop g d//g g~v//(I/7 2'52'-/0 (s~-vzv y arch/Zyec/7'ir-A'jh Pgc/Wop S Br<Zap 5~/AD/y 2n)cr/i~-@ah P<~g g Czz-VZS>ucp.2 Dfc/g~~//A u/R.2/~~~~~+$~/h/2.;,/~A~ -,/o~f/~.Z@/'y h~l (>g-V5/o)>A r-ZR () l 1~-128 Sorck Za~iC k'e=A'.A.Ia>4.-~/~-g~P Az...4~.XSAM l2 0-5~QP Wnj c:cubi ciIc.CSj li Csz-yy'e7~p.3'.4z'ag,. up/ZSZ-tu4-Csr-v~v>~calcic,'g 2rPrcficicc -PiPh A~CcccI c.Aop g/g4g..Leg.....~c I c~I f~2j ygz-to(p (sx v~i)Sihf&njecAnci ..I/j ig AcccI-, 4~~p P~4m~S~ya~~rcb~ &PA P~-Z~dc op 9~Lac gz, Qs'z-72 Csx-V~>3'I I zz-gs~7>Csx-vcr 3 I P'~~) CPBcL Coxnxnents <HNPP Proof and Review Technical S pecif ication s Record Number: 778 LCO Number: NRC TYPOs Section Number: Comment: Comment Type: ERROR Page Number: SEE LIST CHANGES HAVE BEEN MADE TO THE FOLLOWING PAGES TO CORRECT TYPOGRAPHICAL ERRORS MADE IN THE TYPING OF THE FINAL DRAFT TECH SPECS.~2-7~W 31~2-9 OA 3/4 3-22 7//jj I Qo~3/4 6-3>8rx c~3/4 6-20 8 21 v'p'3/4-5 8 26~6Jj 3/4-3 4~OK (.~~~~@.~(p)3/4 7-41~Q+~3/4 8-2~OFi/3/4 8-5+~g B 3/4 3-6v 1/'/q q-'/O>><Basis TYPOGRPHICAL ERRORS VALVE NUMBER TABLE'3.7-2 STEAM LINE SAFETY VALVES PER LOOP LIFT SETTING+IX"~~~ISlON ORIFICE SIZE STEAN GENERATOR A B C 1MS" 43 1MS-44 1MS-45 1HS-46 1M 5-47 1MS-48 1MS-49 1MS-50 1HS-51 1MS"52 1MS-53 1MS-54 1MS-55 1HS-56 1MS-57 1170 psig 1185 psig 1200 psig 1215 psig'230 psig 16.0 16.0 16.0 16.0 16.0 ,/"The lift setting pressure shall correspond to ambient conditions of the valve at nominal operating~te peratur, and pressure.~qL SHEARON HARRIS-UNIT 1'/4 7-3 PLANT SYSTEMS AUXILIARY FEEDWATER SYSTEN LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION I FT SHNPP REVlstOS~JUL 886 3.7.1.2 At least three independent steam generator auxiliary feedwater pumps and associated flow paths shall be OPERABLE with: a.Two motor-driven auxiliary feedwa r p s, each capable of being.powered from separate emergency b s/es and b.One steam turbine-driven auxilia eedwater pump capable of being~5J<$ "'owered from an OPERABLE steam supply system., APPLICABILITY: HODES 1, 2, and 3.ACTION: With one auxiliary feedwater pump inoperable, restore the required auxiliary feedwater pumps to OPERABLE status within 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br /> or be in at least HOT STANDBY within the next 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br /> and in HOT SNTDOWN within the following 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br />.With two auxiliary feedwater pumps inoperable, be in at least HOT STANDBY within 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br /> and in HOT SHUTDOWN within the following 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br />.C.With three auxiliary feedwater pumps inoperable, iaeediately initiate corrective action to restore at least one auxiliary feedwater pump to OPERABLE status as soon as possible.SURVEILLANCE RE UIREMENTS 4.7.1.2.1 Each auxiliary feedwater pump shall be demons4zeted OPERABLE: a.At least once per 31 days on a STAGGER O ST BASIS by:~~P~lco iso 1.Verifying that each motor driven ump develops a discharge pres-sure of greater than or equal to psig at a recirculation flow of greater than or equal to 50 gpm.l5/0 2.Verifying that the steam turbine driven/pump de elops a discharge-pressure of greater than or equa to psi on a recircula-tion flow of greater than or equ 1 to 90 when the second-ary steam supply pressure is grea r th 210 psig.The pro-visions of Specification 4.0.4 are n applicable for entry into NODE 3;SHEAROK HARRIS-UNIT 1 3/4 7-4 CP&.L Coxnxnenta <HNPP Proof and Review'echnical Specifications Record Number: 722 LCO Number: 3.07.01.02 Section Number:4.7.1.2.l.a Comment: Comment Type: IMPROVEMENT Page Number: 3/4 7-4 ITEM 4.7.1.2.1.a.l -CHANGE"1510" TO"1590".ITEM 4.7.1.2.1.a.2 -CHANGE"1450" TO"1510" Basis NEW VALUES HAVE BEEN PROVIDED BY THE A.E.FOR THESE DISCHARGE PRESSURES BASED ON PUMP CURVES AND TESTING RESULTS, PLANT SYSTEMS AUXILIARY FEEDWATER SYSTEM LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION I T S8NPP REViS~ON JOL 386 3.7.1.2 At least three independent steam generator auxiliary feedwater pumps and associated flow paths shall be OPERABLE with: a.Two motor-driven auxiliary feedwater pumps, each capable of being powered from separate emergency bus/es, and b.One steam turbine-driven auxiliary feedwater pump capable of being powered from an OPERABLE steam supply system.APPLICABILITY: MODES 1, 2, and 3.ACTION: a.With one auxiliary feedwater pump inoperable, restore the required auxiliary feedwater pumps to OPERABLE status within 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br />, or be in at least HOT STANDBY within the next 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br /> and in HOT 50TDOWN;within the following 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br />.With two auxiliary feedwater pumps inoperable, be in at least HOT STANDBY within 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br /> and in HOT SHUTDOWN within the following 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br />.With three auxiliary feedwater pumps inoperable, imaediately initiate corrective action to restore at least one auxiliary feedwater pump to OPERABLE status as soon as possible.SURVEILLANCE RE UIREMENTS 4.7.1.2.1 Each auxiliary feedwater pump shall be demonstrated OPERABLE: a~At least once per 31 days on a STAGGERED TEST BASIS by: F570 1.Verifying that each motor driven pump develops a discharge pres-sure of greater than or equal, to psig at a recirculation flow of greater than or equal to 50 gpm.j5/0 2.Verifying that the steam turbine-driven/pump develops a discharge-pressure of greater than or equal to 5%8 psig on a recircula-tion flow of greater than or equal to 90 gpm when the second-ary steam supply pressure is greater than 210 psig.The pro-visions of Specification 4.0.4 are not applicable for entry into MODE 3;SHEARON HARRIS-UNIT 1 3/4 7"4 Shearon Harris Technical Specifications Resolution of Staff Comments Originator: SIC~@~~o~~<Comment Date: 7/as/C(Comment: Page.7+>7,>,>Based on our review of the final draft Technical Specifications and discussions with the FOB, it is not apparent that all of the EICSB items identified in our memorandum of Narch 11, 1986 were satisfactorily consider n the development of the final Technical Specifications. Items 12, 21, an 25 hould be resolved prior to plant startup.In addition, we found (1)that t surveillance reouire-ments of Standard Technical Specification (STS)Sections 4.8.1.1.2e(2) and (11)have been omitted from the Shearon Harris Technical Specifications and (2)that adequate justification(s) has not been provided for the ESFAS slave relays that are not testable during power operation. We recommend that these sections be included with the STS.We also recommend that for each ESFAS slave relay not testable at-power adeouate justification(s) be provided.Resolution Basis Resolution Acce ted: NRC I CP8L Date: Date: Shearon Harris Technical Specifications Resolution of Comnents Originator: Ar<c/m/4~>> ~M Page: p/p-5 Comment Date: w~i~~i~I<TS: CPKL Record Uo.: Comment: (ZQ Previous1y approved TS provide four (4)verification steps that are to be performed every 18 months to ensure that the auxil'iary feedwater system is operable.As presently written, the Shearon Harris TS provide verification that the auxiliary feedwater pumps start and that the respective pressure control valve responds.Justify the omission of the verification of the positions for the supply valves, suction valves, and each automatic valve in the auxiliary feedwater flow path.Sasis:Resolution: Resolution Acce ted: NRC g~~,~/>>/se, Cc~'mQn g'~+W.41-~Cf'r't~P[S/q i-gpSi~CPEiL Date: C PScL C mmmen<m SHNPP Final Drake, Technical S pl e c-i+i c a t=i c)n&Record Number': r92 LCO NumLer: 3.r,"7.01.0=: Beati an Number"."4.7.1.5 Cofllment: Tvpe: ERROR Paae Numbe.: 3/4 7-'?Comment.: IN 4.7.1.5 CHANGE'l'JODE 3" TO"NODES 3 or 4." BcRSt.B A CHANGE TQ BHON I'1ODE 4 FOP, THE MBIV'e lJAB HADE SOJRE T Il'1E AGO TO RESOLVE A LONG STANDING CONFLICT LiJITH THE BTB.HQMFVER.IT IS STILL NOT POSSIBLE TQ PROPERLY TFST THE VALVES UNTIL THERE IS SUFFICENT STEAlq PRESSURE THE STB HAS ALWAYS GRANTED THE EXEhlPTIQN FOR I'1ODE'ND THIS IS SIJ JPLY A LOGICAL ENTENB ION TO THE LOLJER l1ODE. PLANT SYSTEMS MAIN STEAM LINE ISOLATION VALVES LD LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION 3.7.1.5 Each main steam line isolation valve (HSIV)shall be OPERABLE.APPLICABILITY: HODES 1, 2, 3, and 4.ACTION: MODE 1 With one HSIV inoperable but open, POWER OPERATION may continue provided the inoperable valve is restored to.OPERABLE status within 4 hours4.62963e-5 days <br />0.00111 hours <br />6.613757e-6 weeks <br />1.522e-6 months <br />;otherwise be in HOT STANDBY within the next 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br /> and in HOT SHUTDOWN within the following 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br />.HODES 2 and 3: With one HSIV inoperable, subsequent operation in HOOE 2 or 3 may proceed provided the isolation valve is maintained closed.Otherwise, be in HOI STANDBY within the next 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br /> and in HOT SHUTDOWN within the following 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br />.The provisions of Specifications 3.0.4 are not applicable. SURVEILLANCE RE UIREHEHTS 4.7.1.5 Each HSIV shall be demonstrated OPERABLE by verifying full closure within 5 seconds when tested pursuant to Specification 4.0.5.The provisions of Specification 4.0.4 are not applicable for entry into HOD@gmH~SHNPP RBtjpic~i AUG 586 SHEARON HARRIS-UNIT 1 3/4 7-9 Originator: f'5&-Comment Date: ij J5'jgg Comment: Shearon Harris Technical Specifications Resolution of Staff Comments Page:~/q 7-I t.Section 3/4.7,4, Item-General Emergency Service Water System Page 3/4 7-12: 1.A similar LCO and surveillance requirement should be provided for the booster pumps or the booster pumps should be included as a surveillance requirement to establish the ESW system operability. 2.Add a surveillance requirement to the effect that every 18 months verify that upon loss of their respective discharge line pressures, that emergency service water pumps start automatically, and that the lineup of valves required for the switchover occurs automatically following startup of the ESW pumps.Resolution g ps4~a.t:+A 5ec~~~~7" 4 O~An y r-Is~y e see ,'PMM~'g mrsv e 7.'I~'asis Resolution Acce ted: NRC CPEL Date: g Date: PLANT SYSTEMS 3/4.7.4 EMERGENCY SERVICE WATER SYSTEM a LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION 3.7.4 At least two independent emergency service water loops shall be OPERABLE.APPLICABILITY: MODES 1, 2, 3, and 4.ACT I orr: With only one emergency service water loop OPERABLE, restore at least two loops to OPERABLE status within 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br /> or.be in at least HOT STANDBY within the next 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br /> and in COLD SHUTDOWN within the following 30 hours3.472222e-4 days <br />0.00833 hours <br />4.960317e-5 weeks <br />1.1415e-5 months <br />.SURVEILLANCE RE UIREMENTS 4.7.4 At least two emergency service water loops shall be demonstrated OPERABLE: a.At least once per 31 days by verifying that each valve (manual, power-operated, or automatic) servicing safety-related equipment that is not locked, sealed, or otherwise secured in position is in its correct position;and b.At least once per 18 months during shutdown, by verifying that: 2.Each automatic valve servicing safety-related equipment or isolating non-safety portions of the system actuates to its correct position on a safety fnlection test signal, ann~vwt oocL msrvvret mr~rroo~Each emergency service water pump starts automatically on a safety injection test signal..)SHEARON HARRIS-UNIT 1 3/4 7-12 PLANT SYSTEMS 3/4.7.4 EMERGENCY SERVICE WATER SYSTEM FlNAL tjlQF LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION 3.7.4 At least two independent emergency service water loops shall be OPERABLE.APPLICABILITY: MODES 1, 2, 3, and 4.ACTION: With only one emergency service water loop OPERABLE, restore at least two loops to OPERABLE status within 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br /> or be in at least HOT STANDBY within the next 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br /> and in COLD SHUTDOWN within the following 30 hours3.472222e-4 days <br />0.00833 hours <br />4.960317e-5 weeks <br />1.1415e-5 months <br />.SURVEILLANCE RE UIREMENTS 4.7.4 At least two emergency service~ater loops shall be demonstrated OPERABLE;a.At least once per 31 days by verifying that each valve (manual, power-operated, or automatic) servicing safety-related equipment t%at is not locked, sealed, or otherwise secured in position is in its correct position;and b.At least once per 18 months during shutdown, by verifying that: 1.Each automatic valve servicing safety-related equipment or isolating non-safety portions of the system actuates to its.correct position on a safety injection test signal, and 2.Each emergency service water pump starts automatically on a safety injection test signal.rt~d emen~ePCy SCHVICC<a+em.boosWca pcs~p SHEARON HARRIS" UNIT 1 3/4 7-12 Shearon Harris Technical Specifications Resolution of Staff Comments Originator: f'~B-<i<<Page:~gg 3.7,X Comment: F cgg R Pmpu)gee b'o'R7 ot~x'(i'ag cx>>0~irrcesecrrci'Ps ger be~cti x$a ieQ a p tliei'c rtyccprrcole. /errm/m'Aer w'rem 6m PIrtmf~c-(d be Sh~fdS.u n.rl~7S Shoals'S(e.r. Pecan.rrev e<<l, Resolution Basis q<A'e9 g~&~+',>Pe~9>>4 F~4F~.Resolution Acce ted: HRC~i/, P J l<~CPSL D.t'.Date: PLANT SYSTEMS 3/4.7.5 ULTIMATE HEAT SINK LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION 3.7.5 The ultimate heat sink shall be OPERABLE with: b.A minimum auxiliary reservoir water level at or above elevation 250 feet Mean Sea Level, USGS datum, or a minimum main reservoir water level at or above 205.7 feet mean sea level, USGS datum, and A water temperature as measured at the respective intake structure of less than or equal to 95'F.APPLICABILITY: MODES 1, 2, 3, and 4.ACTION: With the requirements of the above specification not satisfied, be in at least HOT STANDBY within 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br /> and in COLO SHUTDOWN within the following 30 hours3.472222e-4 days <br />0.00833 hours <br />4.960317e-5 weeks <br />1.1415e-5 months <br />.SURVEILLANCE RE UIREMENTS 4.7.5 The ultimate heat sink shall be determined OPERABLE at least once per 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> by verifying the water temperature and water level to be within their limits'HEARON HARRIS-UNIT 1 3/4 7-13 Originator: fP&" Fell Comment Date: ig/gJ gt, Comment: Shearon Harris Technical Specifications Resolution of Staff Comments 1 Page:+/q 7-/5 Section 3/4.7.6, Item 4.7.6.d.3, Page 3/4 7-15: Control room leakage rate to be closed out by SSER, mid-August 1986.The pressurization flow rate in Technical Specification 3/4.7.6 reflects the value Carolina Power 5 Light Company (CPSL)is currently attempting to justify.This value is in the technical specifications and the staff is in the process of completing the review of the CP&L analysis.Only a couple of questions remain on the analysis and CP8L had indicated that Ebasco Services will be coming to Bethesda to go over the analysis with the staff.Resolution m Basis Resolution Acce ted: NRC CP8L Date: Date: PLANT SYSTEMS IN L FT CONTROL ROOM EMERGENCY FILTRATION SYSTEM SURVEILLANCE RE UIREMENTS Continued C.Revisions 2, March 1978, and the system flow rate is 4000 cfm k 10K during system operation when tested in accordance with ANSI N510-1975; and 2.Verifying, within 31 days after removal, that a laboratory analysis of a representative carbon sample obtained in accor-dance with Regulatory Position C.6.b of Regulatory Guide 1.52, Revision 2, March 1978, meets the laboratory testing criteria of Regulatory Position C.6.a of Regulatory Guide 1.52, Revi-sion 2, March 1978,'y showing a methyl iodide penetration of less than 0.175K when tested at a temperature of 30'C and at a relative humidity of 70K in accordance with ASTM D3803.After every 720 hours0.00833 days <br />0.2 hours <br />0.00119 weeks <br />2.7396e-4 months <br /> of charcoal adsorber operation, by verifying, within 31 days after removal, that a laboratory analysis of a repre-sentative carbon sample obtained in accordance with Regulatory Posi-tion C.6.b of Regulatory Guide 1.52, Revision 2, March 1978, meets the laboratory testing criteria of Regulatory Position C.6.a of Regulatory Guide 1.52, Revision 2, March 1978, by showing'a methyl iodide penetration of less than 0.175K when tested at a temperature of 30'C and at a relative humidity of 70K in accordance with ASTM D3803.)d.At least once per 18 months by: l.Verifying that the pressure drop across the combined HEPA fil-ters and charcoal adsorber banks is less than 5.1 inches water gauge while operating the system at a flow rate of 4000 cfm a 10K.2.Verifying that, on a safety injection and high radiation test signal, the system automatically switches into an isolation with recirculation mode of operation with flow through the HEPA filters and charcoal adsorber banks;3.Verifying that the system maintains the control room at a positive pressure of greater than or equal to 1/8 inch Wa Gauge at less than or equal to a pressurization flow of 15 cfm relative to adjacent areas during system operation; 4.Verifying that the heaters diSsipate 14 t 1.4 kW when tested in accordance with ANSI N510-1975; and 5.Verifying that, on a High Chlorine test signal, the system automatically isolates the control room within 15 seconds and initiates a recirculation flow through the HEPA filters and ch'arcoal adsorber banks.SHEARON HARRIS-UNIT 1 3/4 7-15 CP&.L Comments.NPP Proof and Review Technical Specifications Record Number,: 731 LCO Number: 3.07.06 Section Number: 4.7.6.d,&~~ Comment: Comment Type: IMPBOVE~1E.';I Page Number: 3/4 7-15 CHANGE THE FIRST LINE OF SURVEILLANCE TO THE FOI LOWING: ot1"Verifying that,4 either a safety injection or a high radi'ation test signal, the system.... Basis THIS CHANGE IS TO CLARIFY THAT TWO DIFFER ARE INVOLVED IN MEETING THIS SURVEILLANC NT TESTS PLANT SYSTEMS CONTROL ROOM EMERGENCY FILTRATION SYSTEM SURVEILLANCE RE UIREHENTS (Continued T SHNP P RFVIS)A~!JUL$86 Revisions 2, Harch 1978, and the system flow rate is 4000 cfm+lOX during system operation when tested in accordance with ANSI N510-~;and>980 2.Verifying, within 31 days after removal, that a laboratory analysis of a representative carbon sample obtained in accor-dance with Regulatory Position C.6.b of Regulatory Guide 1.52, Revision 2, Harch 1978, meets the laboratory testing criteria of Regulatory Position C.6.a of Regulatory Guide 1.52, Revi-sion 2, Harch 1978, by showing a methyl iodide penetration of less than 0.175K when te'sted at a temperature of 30'C and at a relative humidity of 70X in accordance with ASTH 03803.After every 720 hours0.00833 days <br />0.2 hours <br />0.00119 weeks <br />2.7396e-4 months <br /> of charcoal adsorber operation, by verifying, within 31 days after removal, that a laboratory analysis ofw repre-sentative carbon sample obtained in accordance with Regulatory Posi-tion C.6.b of Regulatory Guide 1.52, Revision 2, Harch 1978, meets the laboratory testing criteria of Regulatory Position C.6.a of Regulatory Guide 1.52, Revision 2, Harch 1978, by showing a methyl iodide penetration of less than 0.175X when tested at a temperature of 30'C and at a relative humidity of 70'n accordance with ASTH 03803.d.At least once per 18 months by: 1.Verifying that the pressure drop across the combined HEPA fil-ters and charcoal adsorber banks is less than 5.1 inches water gauge while operating the system at a flow rate of 4000 cfm i 10X amer~og a 2.Verifying that, on a<safety injection~high radiation test signal, the system automatically switches into an isolation with recirculation mode of operation with flow through the HEPA filters and charcoal adsorber banks;3.Verifying that the system maintains the control room at a positive pressure of greater than or equal to 1/8 inch Water Gauge at less than or equal to a pressurization flow.of 315 cfm-relative to adjacent areas during system operation; 4.5.Verifying that the heaters dissipate 14 i 1.4 kW when tested in accordance with ANSI N510-%0%8; and/980 Verifying that, on a High Chlorine test signal, the system automatically isolates the control room within 15 seconds and initiates a recirculation flow through the HEPA.filters and charcoal adsorber banks.SHEARON HARRIS-UNIT 1 3/4 7-15 CP8c.L Cornxnenta dK NPP Proof and Review Technical Specifications Record Number: 701 LCO Number: 3.07.06 Section Number: VARIOUS Comment: Comment Type: ERROR Page Number: 3/4 7-15,16 8, B~7/ITEMS 4.7.6.b.l, 4.7.6.d.4, 4.7.6.e, 4.7.6.f AND BASES 4.7.6-CHANGE ANSI N510-1975 TO*ANSI N510" 1980 IN ALL PLACES Basis THIS CHANGE IS MADE FOR CONSISTENCY WITH THE FSAR. PLANT SYSTEMS CONTROL ROOM EMERGENCY FILTRATION SYSTEM SURVEILLANCE RE UIREMENTS (Continued l Ft SHNPP PP/lgtgg]JUL 586 C.Revisions 2, March 1978, and the system flow rate is 4000 cfm+10K during system operation when tested in accordance with ANSI N510-%%&;and)9$0 2.Verifying, within 31 days after removal, that a laboratory analysis of a representative carbon sample obtained in accor-dance with Regulatory Position C.6.b of Regulatory Guide 1.52, Revision 2, March 1978, meets the laboratory testing criteria of Regulatory Position C.6.a of Regulatory Guide 1.52, Revi-, sion 2, March 1978, by showing a methyl iodide penetration of less than 0.175K when tested at a temperature of 30 C and at a relative humidity of 70K in accordance with ASTM 03803.After every 720 hours0.00833 days <br />0.2 hours <br />0.00119 weeks <br />2.7396e-4 months <br /> of charcoal adsorber operation, by verifying, within 31 days after removal, that a laboratory analysis of p: repre-sentative carbon sample obtained in accordance with Regulatogy'osi-tion C.6.b of Regulatory Guide 1.52, Revision 2, March 1978,Sects the laboratory testing criteria of Regulatory Position C.6.a of Regulatory Guide 1.52, Revision 2, March 1978, by showing'a methyl iodide penetration of less than 0.175K when tested at a temperature of 30'C and at a relative humidity of 70K in accordance with ASTM 03803.d.At least once per 18 months by: 1.Verifying that the pressure drop across the combined HEPA fil-ters and charcoal adsorber banks is less than 5.1 inches water gauge while operating the system at a flow rate of 4000 cfm 2 10K;Cmrck 8 2.Verifying that, on a<safety injection~high radiation test signal, the system automatically switches into an isolation with recirculation mode of operation with flow through the HEPA filters and charcoal adsorber banks;3.Verifying that the system maintains the control room at a positive pressure of greater than or equal to 1/8 inch Water Gauge at less than or equal to a pressurization flow of 315 cfm-relative to adjacent areas during system operation; 4, 5.Verifying that the heaters dissipate 14 t 1.4 kW when tested in accordance with ANSI N510-%0%8; and 1980 Verifying that, on a High Chlorine test signal, the system automatically isolates the control room within 15 seconds and initiates a recirculation flow through the HEPA filters and charcoal adsorber banks.SHEARON HARRIS" UNIT 1 3/4 7"15 PLANT SYSTEHS CONTROL ROON EMERGENCY FILTRATION SYSTEH SURVEILLANCE RE UIREHENTS Continued I'QL 51N 8HNPp RE'VfStC~~ JUt.SSS e.After each complete or partial replacement of a HEPA filter bank, by verifying that the unit satisfies the in-place penetration and bypass leakage testing acceptance criteria of less than 0.05K in accordance with ANSI N510-for a COP test aerosol while operating the system at a flow rate of 4000 cfm t'10K;and After each complete or partial replacement of a charcoal adsorber bank, by verifying that the cleanup system satisfies the in-place penetration leakage testing acceptance criteria of less than 0.05K in accordance with ANSI N510-for a halogenated hydrocarbon refrigerant test gas while perating the system at a flow rate of 4000 cfm e 10K.SHEARON HARRIS-UNIT 1 3/4 7-16 0 PLANT SYSTEMS BASES SHNPP'EVt8!GN JUL 8S FINAL OR'/4.7,3 COM>ONENT COOLING WATER SYSTEM The OPERABILITY of the Component Cooling Water System ensures that sufficient cooling capacity is available for continued operation of safety-related equip-ment during normal and accident-conditions. The redundant cooling capacity of this system, assuming a single failure, is consistent with the assumptions used in the safety analyses.3/4.7.4 EMERGENCY SERVICE WATER SYSTEM The OPERABILITY of the Emergency Service Water System ensures that sufficient cooling capacity is available for continued operation of safety-related equip-ment during normal and accident conditions. The redundant cooling capacity of this system, assuming a single failure, is consistent with the assumptions used in the safety analyses.3/4.7.5 ULTIMATE HEAT SINK l The limitations on the ultimate heat sink level and temperature ensureQhat sufficient cooling capacity is available either: (1)provide normal cooldown of the facility or (2)mitigate the effects of accident conditions within acceptable limits.The limitations on minimum water level and maximum temperature are based on providing a 30-day cooling water supply to safety-related equipment without exceeding its design basis temperature and is consistent with the recommend-ations of Regulatory Guide 1.27,"Ultimate Heat Sink for Nuclear Plants," Rev.2, January 1976.3/4.7.6 CONTROL ROOM EMERGENCY FILTRATION SYSTEM The OPERABILITY of the Control Room Emergency Filtration System ensures that the control room will remain habitable for operations personnel during and following all credible accident conditions. Operation of the system with the heaters operating for at least 10 continuous hours in a 31-day period is sufficient to reduce the buildup of moisture on the adsorbers and HEPA filters.The OPERABIL-ITY of this system in conjunction with control room design provisions is based on limiting the radiation exposure to personnel occupying the control room to 5 rems or less whole body, or its equivalent. This limitation is consistent with the requirements of General Design Criterion 19 of Appendix A, 10 CFR Part 50.AN-will be used as a procedural guide for surveillance test>ng.riteria for laboratory testing of charcoal and for in-place testing of HEPA filters and charcoal adsorbers is based upon a removal efficiency of 99K for elemental, particulate and organic forms of radioiodine. The filter pressure drop was chosen to be half-way between the estimated clean and dirty pressure drops for these components. This assures the full functionality of the filters for a prolonged period, even at the Technical Specification limit 3/4.7.7 REACTOR AUXILIARY BUILDING EMERGENCY EXHAUST SYSTEM The OPERABILITY of the Reactor Auxiliary Building Emergency Exhaust System<<-sures that radioactive materials leaking from the ECCS equipment within the SHEARON HARRIS" UNIT 1 B 3/4 7-3 DP'Scl Dc)mmenCm SHNPP Final Draft.Technical B~eci+icaCiun a R-:.(.v: 2 i'(;,o(!.LCQ tJui>>ber.Cc:IAAF>c.f'. Tvpc: I Paste Nunib r:;./4 7-17 8".-1: S",'(4, 1',Jl I t'Jl.'tll'~ I 0-7-7 8'k.'s.12 Caeini.t;t.,: Itl I"'="HS~~.7.7.b1.'P 7" 17)'nd,4~~.12.b.', (P CHAt tBE"C.(i5/".Q"0.<&~i'.CH~~RCQjiL 0~7.7,", (P 7-1S)and 4.~.1='.f,!P~'-16)-CHAt!CE I>g'~gC.,/II f')Il$~g~II~1~t C.I~L4, E:,~IH:"." ILTERS COVERED BY THESE TL~JQ SPECIF I AT1GNS AR" 95.EFF ICIEt~JT.i~CCQRDI tdC TQ GENERIC LETTFP, S.--1:~.;JARCH Z.I~a=-.W VALuE QF 1.O': IS APPROPRIATE FQ.i FIL'":ERS ASSLltIED TQ BE 95%"-.F~I C: EN'J.THE I tuCGRRECT Vi)LUE I~V(S ERRQtdEQUSLY SL'SHIT fEU PY CP':1. PLANT SYSTEMS FIN D FT SHNP P 3/4.7.7 REACTOR AUXILIARY BUILDING RAB)EME RGENCY EXHAUST SYSTEM LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION 3.7.7 Two independent RAB,Emergency Exhaust Systems shall be OPERABLE.APPLICABILITY: MODES 1, 2, 3, and 4.ACTION: With one RAB Emergency Exhaust System inoperable, restore the inoperable system to OPERABLE status within 7 days or be in at least HOT STANDBY within the next 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br /> and in COLD SHUTDOWN within the following 30 hours3.472222e-4 days <br />0.00833 hours <br />4.960317e-5 weeks <br />1.1415e-5 months <br />.SURVEILLANCE RE UIREMENTS 4.7.7 Each RAB Emergency Exhaust System shall be demonstrated OPERABLE: a.At least once per 31 days on a STAGGERED TEST BASIS by initiating, from the control room, flow through the HEPA filters and charcoal adsorbers and verifying that the system operates for at least 10 continuous hours with the heaters operating; b.C.At least once per 18 months or (1)after any structural maintenance on the HEPA filter or charcoal adsorber housings, or (2)following significant painting, fire, or chemical release in any ventilation zone communicating with the system by:@ah, l la c.4kecoo-L 1.Verifying that the cleanup system satisfies the in-place pene-tration and ypass leakage testing acceptance criteria of less than 0.05K and uses the test procedure guidance in Regulatory Positions C.5.a, C.5.c, and C.5.d of Regulatory Guide 1.52, Revision 2, March 1978, and the unit flow rate is 6800 cfm+10K during system operation when tested in accordance with ANSI N510-%8i%; zoo 2.Verifying, within 31 days after removal, that a laboratory analysis of a representative carbon sample obtained in accor" dance with Regulatory Position C.6.b of Regulatory Guide 1,52, Revision 2, March 1978, meets the laboratory testing criteria of Regulatory Position C;6.a of Regulatory Guide 1.52, Revi--sion 2, March 1978, by showing a methyl iodide penetration of less than l.OX when tested at a temperature of 30 C and at a relative humidity of 70K in accordance with ASTM D3803.After every 720 hours0.00833 days <br />0.2 hours <br />0.00119 weeks <br />2.7396e-4 months <br /> of charcoal adsorber operation, by verifying, within 31 days after removal, that a laboratory analysis of a representative carbon sample obtained in accordance with Regulatory Position C.6.b of Regulatory Guide 1.52, Revision 2, March 1978, SHEARON HARRIS-UNIT 1 3/4 7-17 PLANT SYSTEMS REACTOR AUX!LIARY BUILDING RAB EHERGENCY EXHAUST SYSTEM SURVEILLANCE RE UIREHENTS (Continued FI DRAFT SHNPp RF,>/'I;.ip~i AUG 586 meets the laboratory testing criteria of Regulatory Position C~6.a of Regulatory Guide 1.52, Revision 2, March 1978, by showing a methyl iodide penetration of less than 1.0X when tested at a temperature of 30'C and at a relative humidity of 70X in accordance with ASTN 03803.d.At least once per 18 months by: 1.Verifying that the pressure drop across the combined HEPA filters and charcoal adsorber bank is less than 4.1 inches water gauge while operating the unit at a flow rate of 6800 cfm+10X, 2.Verifying that the system starts on a safety injection test signal, 3.Verifying that the system maintains the areas served by the exhaust system at a negative pressure of greater than or equal to 1/8 inch water gauge relative to the outside atmosphere, 4.Verifying that the filter cooling bypass valve is locked in the balanced position, and e.5.Verifying that the heaters dissipate 40 k 4 kW when tested in accordance with ANSI N510-~.>980 After each complete or partial replacement of-a HEPA filter bank, by verifying that the unit satisfies the in-place penetration leakage testing acceptance criteria of less than 0.05X in accordance with ANSI N510-~for a DOP test aerosol while operating the unit-at a flow rate off6800 cfm a 10X;and After each complete or partial replacement of a charco I adsorber dank, by verifying that the unit satisfies the in-place penetration leakage testing acceptance criteria of less than in accordance with ANSI N510-for a halogenated hydrocarbon efrigerant test gas while operating the unit at a flow rate of 6800 cfm 2 10X.680 l,o%SHEARON HARRIS-UNIT 1 3/4 7-18 CPS.L Coznmenta.NPP Pr oof and Review Technical, Specifications Record Number: 702 I,CO Number: 3.07.07 Sect ion Number: VARIOUS Comment: Comment Type;ERROR Page Number: 3/4 7-17, 18 5B 7 ITEMS 4.7.7.b.l, 4.7.7.d.5, 4.7.7.e, 4.7.7.f AND BASES 4.7.7-CHANGE ANSI N510-1975 TO ANSI N510-1980. Basis THIS CHANGE IS MADE FOR CONSISTENCY WITH THE FSAR. Fm Ft PLANT SYSTEMS SHNPP~~<~stow 3/4,7.7 REACTOR AUXILIARY BUILDING RAB EMERGENCY EXHAUST SYSTEM JUL 566.LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION 3.7.7 Two independent RAB Emergency Exhaust Systems shall be OPERABLE.APPLICABILITY: MODES 1, 2, 3, and 4.ACTION: With one RAB Emergency Exhaust System inoperable, restore the inoperable system to OPERABLE status within 7 days or be in at least HOT STANDBY within the next 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br /> and in COLD SHUTDOWN within the following 30 hours3.472222e-4 days <br />0.00833 hours <br />4.960317e-5 weeks <br />1.1415e-5 months <br />.SURVEILLANCE RE UIREMENTS 4.7.7 Each RAB Emergency Exhaust System shall be demonstrated OPERABLE: a.At least once per 31 days on a STAGGERED TEST BASIS by initi@ing, from the control room, flow through the HEPA filters and charcoal adsorbers and verifying that the system operates for at least 10 continuous hours with the heaters operating; b.At least once per 18 months or (1)after any structural maintenance on the HEPA filter or charcoal adsorber housings, or (2)following significant painting, fire, or chemical relea'se in any ventilation zone communicating with the system by: 2.Verifying that the cleanup system satisfies the in-place pene-tration and bypass leakage testing acceptance criteria of less than 0.05K and uses the test procedure guidance in Regulatory Positions C.5.a, C.5.c, and C.S.d of Regulatory Guide 1.52, Revision 2, March 1978, and the unit flow rate is 6800 cfm i 10K during system operation when tested in accordance with ANSI N510-%%i'; iR90 Verifying, within 31 days after removal, that a laboratory analysis of a representative carbon sample obtained in accor-dance with Regulatory Position C.6.b of Regulatory Guide 1.52, Revision 2, March 1978, sects the laboratory testing criteria of Regulatory Position C;6.a of Regulatory Guide 1.52, Revi--sion 2, March 1978, by showing a@ethyl iodide penetration of less than 1.0X when tested at a temperature of 30'C and at a relative humidity of 70K in accordance with ASTM D3803.c.After every 720 hours0.00833 days <br />0.2 hours <br />0.00119 weeks <br />2.7396e-4 months <br /> of charcoal adsorber operation, by verifying, within 31 days after removal, that a laboratory analysis of a representative carbon sample obtained in accordance with Regulatory Position C.6.b of Regulatory Guide 1.52, Revision 2, March 1978, SHEARON HARRIS-UNIT 1 3/4 7-17 PLANT SYSTEHS REACTOR AUXILIARY BUILDING RAB EHERGENCY EXHAUST SYSTEH SURVEILLANCE RE UIREHENTS Continued SH happ REPfpfgaj JUL S meets the laboratory testing criteria of Regulatory Position C.6.a of Regulatory Guide 1.52, Revision 2, Harch 1978, by showing a methyl iodide penetration of less than 1.0X when tested at a temperature of 30'C and at a relative humidity of 70K in accordance with ASTH D3803.d.At least once per 18 months by: 1.Verifying that the pressure drop across the combined HEPA filters and charcoal adsorber bank is less than 4.1 inches water gauge while operating the unit at a flow rate of 6800 cfm i 10K, 2.Verifying that the system starts on a safety injection test signal, 3.Verifying that the system maintains the areas served by~e exhaust system at a negative pressure of greater than oP4qual to 1/8 inch water gauge relative to the outside atmosphere, 4.Verifying that the filter cooling bypass valve is locked in the balanced position, and 5.Verifying that the heaters dissipate 40 4 4 kM when tested in accordance with ANSI N510-%HP./R%After each complete or partial replacement of a HEPA filter bank, by verifying that the unit satisfies the in-place penetration leakage testing acceptance criteria of less than 0.05K in accordance with ANSI N510-idi&8 for a DOP test aerosol while operating the unit at a flow rate of 6800 cfm i 10K;and/After each complete or partial replacement of a charcoal adsorber bank, by verifying that the unit satisfies the in-place penetration leakage testing acceptance criteria of less than 0.05K in accordance with ANSI N510-for a halogenated hydrocarbon refrigerant test'as while operating the unit at a flow rate of 6800 cfm i 10%.SHEARON HARRIS-UNIT 1 3/4 7"18 PLANT SYSTEMS BASES SHNPP pp.i]<i{.,H 886 4 REACTOR AUXILIARY BUILDING EMERGENCY EXHAUST SYSTEM Continued pump room following a LOCA are filtered prior to reaching the environment. Operation of the system with the heaters operating for at least 10 continuous hours in a 31-day period is sufficient to reduce the buildup of moisture on the adsorbers and HEPA filters.The operation of this system and the resultant effect on offsite dosage calculations was assumed in the safety analyses.ANSI"'"'*for laboratory testing of charcoal and for in-place testing of HEPA filters and charcoal adsorbers is based upon removal efficiencies of 95'X for organic and elemental forms of radioiodine and 99K for particulate forms.The filter pres-sure drop was chosen to be half-way between the estimated clean and dirty pressure drops for these components. This assures the full functionality of the filters for a prolonged period, even at the Technical Specification limit.3/4.7.8 SNUBBERS All snubbers are required OPERABLE to ensure that the structural integrity of the Reactor Coolant System and all other safety-related systems is maia+ined during and following a seismic or other event initiating dynamic loads.Snubbers are classified and grouped by design and manufacturer but not by size.For example, mechanical snubbers utilizing the same design features of the 2-kip, 10-kip and 100-kip capacity manufactured by Company"A" are of the same type.The same design mechanical snubbers manufactured by Company"8" for the purposes of this Technical Specification would be of a different type, as would hydraulic snubbers from either manufacturer. A list of individual snubbers with detailed information of snubber location and size and of system affected shall be available at the plant in accordance with Section 50.71(c}of 10 CFR Part 50.The accessibility of each snubber shall be determined and approved by the Manager-Technical Support.The determination shall be based upon the existing radiation levels and the expected time to perform a visual inspection in each snubber location as well as other factors associated with accessibility during plant operations (e.g., temperature, atmosphere, location, etc.), and the recommendations of Regulatory Guides 8.8 and 8.10.The addition or deletion of any hydraulic or mechanical snubber shall be made in accordance with Section 50.59 of 10 CFR Part 50.The visual inspection frequency is based upon maintaining a constant level of snubber protection to each safety-related system during an earthquake or severe transient. Therefore, the required inspection interval varies inversely with the observed snubber failures on a given system and is determined by the number of inoperable snubbers found during an inspection of each system., In order to establish the inspection frequency for each type of snubber on a safety-related system, it was assumed that the frequency of snubber failures and initiating events is constant with time and that the failure of any snubber on that system could cause the system to be unprotected and to result in failure during an assumed initiating event.Inspections performed before that interval has I SHEARON HARRIS-UNIT 1 B 3/4 7-4 Shearon Harris Technical Specifications Resolution of Staff Comments'Originator: P~P-4.l~Comment Date: Rt/5Jg4 Comment: Section 3/4.7.7, Item 4.7.7.d.3, Page 3/4 7-18:.Resolution Page:/g Closed item: However, value of 1/8" water gauge relative to outside atmosphere to be subject of a later proposed generic issue.With respect to the technical specification on the emergency filtration system for ECCS pump rooms, Technical Specification 3/4.7.7, the Westinghouse Standard Technical Specifications have a number inconsistent with staff practice.The number specified for negative pressure should be 1/4" water gauge versus the 1/8" listed.In addition, the measurement of the pressure differential should be made relative to all adjoining areas versus the atmosphere. Because both of these items would involve backfit considerations for Shearon Harris, PSB will not pursue them for Shearon Harris but will send a separate memo to FOB regarding generic implications. Basis Resolution Acce ted: NRC CPKL Date: Date: PLANT SYSTEMS REACTDR AUXILIARY BUILDING RAB EHERGENCY EXHAUST SYSTEM I'INAL URN I SURVEILLANCE RE UIREMENTS Continued meets the laboratory testing criteria of Regulatory Position C.6.a of Regulatory Guide 1.52, Revision 2, larch 1978, by showing a methyl iodide penetration of less than 1.0X when tested at a temperature of 30'C and at a relative humidity of 70K in accordance with ASTH D3803.d.At least once per 18 months by: l.Verifying that the pressure drop across the combined HEPA filters and charcoal adsorber bank is less than 4.1 inches water gauge while operating the unit at a flow rate of 6800 cfm i lOX, 2.Verifying that the system starts on a safety injection test signal, 3.Verifying that the system maintains the areas served by the e aust s stem at a negative pressure f reater than or equal o nc ater gauge relative to he outs>e a os er 4.Verifying that the filter cooling bypass valve is locked in the balanced position, and 5.Verifying that the heaters dissipate 40 k 4 kW when tested in accordance with ANSI N510-1975. e.After each complete'or partial replacement of a HEPA filter bank, by verifying that the unit satisfies the in-place penetration leakage testing acceptance criteria of less than 0.05K in accordance with ANSI N510-1975 for a DDP test aerosol while operating the unit at a flow rate of 6800 cfm k 10X;and After each complete or partial replacement of a charcoal adsorber bank, by verifying that the unit satisfies the in-place penetration leakage testing acceptance criteria of less than 0.05K in accordance with ANSI N510-1975 for a halogenated hydrocarbon refrigerant test gas while operating the unit at a flow rate of 6800 cfm t 10K.I SHEARON HARRIS-UNIT 1 3/4 7-18 Shearon Harris Technical Specifications Resolution of Staff Comments Originator: +it ul/r'ran Lg<<<<M (J,8rn~meg Comment Date: page:+/p 7-/9~ZiP Comment: Se R~beJ~rkeJ r, (~~a,r Resolution Basis ST5--Resolution Acce ted:V Date: CPSL PLANT SYSTEMS 3/4.7.8 SNUBBERS LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION 3.7.8 All snubbers shall be OPERABLE.The only snubbers excluded from the requirements are those installed on nonsafety-related systems and then only if their failure or failure of the system on which they are installed would have no adverse effect on any safety-related system.APPLICABILITY: MODES 1, 2, 3, and 4.MODES 5 and 6 for snubbers located on systems required OPERABLE in those MODES.ACTION: With one or more snubbers inoperable on any system, within 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br /> replace or restore the inoperable snubber(s) to OPERABLE status and perform an engineering evaluation per Specification 4.7.8g.on the attached component or declare the attached system inoperable and follow the appropriate ACTION statement for that system.SURVEILLANCE RE UIREMENTS 4.7.8 Each snubber shall be demonstrated OPERABLE by performance of the following augmented inservice inspection program the requirements of Specification 4.0.5.sb As used in this specitication, type of snubber shall mean snubbers of the same design and manufacturer, irrespective of capacity.b.Visual Ins ections Snubbers are categorized as inaccessible or accessible during reactor operation. Each of these groups (inaccessible and accessible) may be inspected independently according to the schedule below.The first inservice visual inspection of each type of snubber shall be performed after 4 months but within 10 months of commencing POWER OPERATION and shall include all snubbers.If all snubbers of each type n an sys e are found OPERABLE during the first inservice visua snspec>on, the second inservice visual inspection ~t~~4cfg~seeshall be performed at the st refueling outage.Otherwise, subsequent visual inspections f a iven s s shall be performed in accordance with the following'c e u e: SHEARON HARRIS-UNIT 1 3/4 7-19 PLANT SYSTEMS SNUBBEIIS SURVEILLANCE RE UIREMENTS Continued N.of Ino erable Snubbers of Each Type on An S ste er Ins ection Period 0 1 2 3,4 5,6,7 8 or more c.Visual Ins ection Acce tance Criteria Subsequent Visual Ins ection Period""".18 months a 25K , 12 months+25K 6 months i 25K 124 days f 25K 62 days f 25%31 days f 25K Visual inspections shall verify that: (1)there are no visible indi-cations of damage or~impaired OPERABILITY, (2)attachments to the foundation or supporting structure are functional, and (3)fasteners for attachment of the snubber to the component and to the snubber anchorage are functional. Snubbers which appear inoperable as a re-sult of visual inspections may be determined OPERABLE for the purpose of establishing the next visual inspection interval, provided that: (1)the cause of the, rejection is clearly established and remedied for that particular snubber and for other snubbers 1w t)II affected snubber is functionally tested in the as-found condition and determined OPERABLE per Specification 4.7.8f.All snubbers connected to an inoperable common hydraulic fluid reservoir shall be counted as inoperable snubbers.assess.i~e.~~Nunc d.Transient Event Ins ection An inspection shall be performed of all snubbers attached to sections of systems that have~experienced unexpected, potentially damaging transients as determined from a review of operational data and a visual inspection of the systems within 6 months following such an event.In addition to satisfying the visual inspection acceptance criteria, freedom-of-motion of mechanical snubbers shall be verified using at least one of the following: (1)manually induced snubber movement;or (2)evaluation of in-place snubber piston setting;or (3)stroking the mechanical snubber through its full range of travel."The inspection interval for each type of snubber on a given s ste shall not be lengthened more than one step at a time unless a generic problem has been identified and corrected; in: that event the inspection interval may be lengthened one step the first time and two steps thereafter if no inoperable snubbers of that type are found n a sys e"*The provisions of Specification 4.0.2 are not applicable. SHEARON HARRIS-UNIT 1'/4 7-20 PLANT SYSTEMS kllIHl Uter I 3/4.7.8 SNUBBERS LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION 3.7.8 All snubbers shall be OPERABLE.The only snubbers excluded from the requirements are those installed on nonsafety-related systems and then only if their failure or failure of the system on which they are installed would have no adverse effect on any safety"related system.APPLICABILITY: MODES 1, 2, 3, and 4.MODES 5 and 6 for snubbers located on systems required OPERABLE in those MODES.ACTION: With one or more snubbers inoperable on any.system, within 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br /> replace or restore the inoperable snubber(s) to OPERABLE status and perform an engineering evaluation per Specification 4.7.8g.on the attached component or declare the attached system inoperable and follow the appropriate ACTION statement for that system.SURVEILLANCE RE UIREMENTS 4.7.8 Each snubber shall be demonstrated OPERABLE by perfor a of the following augmented inservice inspection program he requir ements of Specification 4.0.5.~O.+As used in this specification, type of snubber shall mean snubbers of the same design and manufacturer, irrespective of capacity.b.Visual Ins ections Snubbers are categorized as inaccessible or accessible during reactor operation. Each of these groups (inaccessible and accessible) may be inspected independently according to the schedule below.The first inservice visual inspection of each type of snubber shall be performed after 4 months but within 10 months of commencing POWER OPERATION and s ll include all snubbers.If all snubbers of each type>are found OPERABLE during the first inservi visu ectim, the second inservice visual inspection shall be performed at the f't ef l'utage.ise, s sequent visual inspections shall be performed in accordance with the following sc e u e: SHEARON HARRIS-UNIT 1 3/4 7-19 PLANT SYSTEMS SNUBBERS SURVEILLANCE RE UIRENENTS Continued No.ble Snubbers of Each Type er Ins ection Period 0 1 2 3,4 5,6,7 8 or more Subsequent Visual Ins ection Period""" 18 months k 25K 12 months i 25K 6 months i 25K 124 days+25K 62 days t 25K 31 days i 25K C.Visual Ins ection Acce tance Criteria d.Visual inspections shall verify that: (1)there are no visible indi-cations of damage or impaired OPERABILITY, (2)attachments to the foundation or supporting structure are functional, and (3)fasteners for attachment of the snubber to the component and to the snubber anchorage are functional. Snubbers which appear inoperable as a re-sult of visual inspections may be determined OPERABLE for the purpose of establishing the next visual inspection interval, provided that: J'hat a u ar snubber and for other snubbers V~at may be generically susceptible; and (2 e a er is functionally tested in the as-found condition and determined OPERABLE per Specification 4.7.8f.All'nubbers connected to an inoperable common hydraulic fluid reservoir shall be counted as inoperable snubbers.common to mor e sys em, e red in e surve>llance sche u he related sy Transient Event Ins ection An inspection shall be performed of all snubbers attached to sections of systems that have experienced unexpected, potentially damaging transients as determined from a review of operational data and a visual inspection of the systems within 6 months following such an event.In addition to satisfying the visual inspection acceptance criteria, freedom-of-motion of mechanical snubbers shall be verified using at least one of the following: (1)manually induced snubber movement;or (2)evaluation of in-place snubber piston setting;or (3)stroking the mechanical snubber through its full range of travel."The inspection interval for each type of snubber shall not be lengthened more than one step at a time unless a gen roc pro em has been identified and corrected; in that event the inspection interval may be lengthened one step the first tim d tw teps thereafter if no inoperable snubbers of that type are found,"*The provisions of Specification 4.0.2 are not applicable. SHEARON HARRIS-UNIT 1 3/4 7"20 PLANT SYSTEMS I')HAL ill%I BASES REACTOR AUXILIARY BUILDING EMERGENCY EXHAUST SYSTEM Continued C pump room following a LOCA are filtered prior to reaching the environment. Operation of the system with the heaters operating for at least 10 continuous hours in a 31-day period is sufficient to reduce the buildup of moisture on the adsorbers and HEPA filters.The operation of this system and the resultant effect on offsite dosage calculations was assumed in the safety analyses.ANSI N510-1975 will be used as a procedural guide for surveillance testing.Criteria for laboratory testing of charcoal and for in-place testing of HEPA filters and charcoal adsorbers is based upon removal efficiencies of 95K for organic and elemental forms of radioiodine and 9SX for particulate forms.The filter pres-sure drop was chosen to be half-way between the estimated clean and dirty pressure drops for these components. This assures the full functionality of the filters for a prolonged period, even at the Technical Specification limit.3/4.7.8 SNUBBERS All snubbers are required OPERABLE to ensure that the structural integrity of the Reactor Coolant System and all other safety-related systems is maintained during and following a seismic or other event initiating dynamic loads.Snubbers are classified and grouped by design and manufacturer but not by size.For example, mechanical snubbers utilizing the same design features.of the 2-kip, 10-kip and 100-kip capacity manufactured by Company"A" are of the same type.The same design mechanical snubbers manufactured by Company"B" for the purposes of this Technical Specification would be of a different type, as would hydraulic snubbers from either manufacturer. A list, of individual snubbers with detailed information of snubber location and size and of system affected shall be available at the plant in accordance with Section 50.71(c)of 10 CFR Part 50.The accessibility of each snubber shall be determined and approved by the Manager-Technical Support.The determination shall be based upon the existing radiation levels and the expected time to perform a visual inspection in each snubber location as well as other factors associated with accessibility during plant operations (e.g., temperature, atmosphere, location, etc.), and the recommendations of Regulatory Guides 8.8 and 8.10, The addition or deletion of any hydraulic or mechanical snubber shall be made in accordance with Section 50.59 of 10 CFR Part 50.The visual inspection frequency is based upon maintaining a constant level of snubber protection to each safety-related system during an earthquake or severe transient. Therefore, the required'n interval varies inversely with the observed snubber failures and is determined by the number of inoperable snubbers found u g an~~~establ-'sh the inspection frequency for each type of snubbe>r it was assumed that the frequency of snubber failures and sn>a in events is constant with time and that the failure of any snubber could cause the system to be unprotected and to result in failure dur>ng n assumed initiating event.Inspections performed before that interval has SHEARON HARRIS-UNIT 1 B 3/4 7-4