ML18022A432

Forwards Addl Info Re Classification of Containment Isolation Valves,Per Request.Future Rev to FSAR & marked-up Tech Specs Indicating Changes Prior to OL Issuance Encl

ML18022A432
Person / Time
Site:	Harris
Issue date:	09/25/1986
From:	Zimmerman S CAROLINA POWER & LIGHT CO.
To:	Harold Denton Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
References
NLS-86-365, NUDOCS 8610010167
Download: ML18022A432 (90)

Text

CRK Carolina Power & Light Company SERIAL: NLS-86-365 Mr. Harold R. Denton, Director Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, DC 20555 SHEARON HARRIS NUCLEAR POWER PLANT UNIT NO. 1 DOCKET NO.50-000 CLASSIFICATION OF CONTAINMENT ISOLATION VALVES

Dear Mr. Denton:

Carolina Power R Light Company hereby submits additional information regarding classification of containment isolation valves at the Shearon Harris Nuclear Power Plant (SHNPP). This information, as provided in Attachment 1, responds to concerns raised by your staff following review of recent FSAR changes.

The SHNPP FSAR will be revised as shown in Attachment 2 in a post-fuel load amendment. Attachment 3 provides marked-up pages to the SHNPP Technical Specifications (TS) which show changes that are to be included in the TS prior to their issuance with the operating license.

'f.-you hav'e.any'questions on';this subject, please;"contactrme at:(919). 836-:6202.

You very trul S.~ R.~ Zimmerman Manager Nuclear Licensing Section 3DK/pgp (50023 DK)

Attachments cc: Mr. B. C. Buckley (NRC)

Mr. G. F. Maxwell (NRC-SHNPP)

Dr. 3. Nelson Grace (NRC-RII) 8~0~~' I eb 00101~7

~OOCltt 500040 pgR pDR A

pQ I I 411 Fayetteville Street o P. O. Box 1551 o Rateigh, N. C. 27602

4 Etll ~

I(

bcc: Mr. H. R. Banks Mr. R. E. Lumsden Mr. H. W. Bowles Mr. L. H. Martin Mr. R. K. Buckles (LIS) Mr. D. C. McCarthy Mr. C. Carmichael (2) Mr. C. A. Rosenberger Mr. N. 3. Chiangi Mr. M. Shannon (Westinghouse)

Mr. R. M. Coats Mr. R. B. Starkey, 3r.

Mr. A. B. Cutter/E3W/SM Mr. R. A. Watson Mr. G. L. Forehand Mr. B. M. Williams Mr. B. 3. Furr Mr. 3. L. Willis Mr. 3. F. Garibaldi (Ebasco) Mr. T. A. Baxter (Shaw, Pittman, Mr. W. 3. Hindman Potts 2 Trowbridge)

Mr. D. E. Hollar File: HI/A-2D Mr. L. I. Loflin File: H-X-

Attachment I to NLS-86-365 CLASSIFICATION OF CONTAINMENTISOLATION VALVES Containment Isolation Valves for Seal Injection Lines (Penetrations M-9, M-10, M-II):

The check valves located inside containment will be classified as containment isolation valves and a Type C Local Leak Rate Test will be performed on these valves. These valves are identified as follows:

Valve Numbers Penetration Nos. Ebasco CPRL M-9 CS-V25 ICS-300 M-10 CS-V26 ICS-365 M-11 CS-V27 ICS-026 Containment Isolation Valves for the RHR Pump Suction from the RCS Hot Legs (Penetrations M-15 and M-16)

The valves located inside the missile barrier (IRH-V502SB-I and IRH-V500SB-I) will not be classified as containment isolation valves. This design is consistent with ANS 56.2 for "Containment Isolation Provisions for Fluid Systems." Since these lines connect to the SI recirculation loops, which are filled with sump water and at least one of which is in operation post accident, there is no need for containment isolation valves in these lines outside containment. The closed system outside containment isolates the line..

Containment Isolation Valves for the High Head Safety Injection Lines (Penetrations M-I7, M-20, M-21, M-22)

The check valves located inside containment for each of these penetrations will be classified as containment isolation valves.

None of the containment isolation valves for these penetrations will be Type'C Local Leak Rate Tested because they are provided with a pressurized water seal at a pressur'e greater than 1.10 times the accident pressure (Pa) for a minimum of 30 days following an accident. This water seal is provided by the ECCS Low Head Safety Injection (LHSI) pumps via the suction crossover for the ECCS High Head Safety Injection (HHSI) pumps and the system piping from this crossover to these penetrations.. The LHSI pumps are automatically actuated for a loss of coolant accident and other accidents.

The crossover valves (2CS-V587SA-I, 2CS-V588SB-I, 2CS-V589SA-I, 2CS-V590SB-I) are open for a minimum of 30 days following an accident.

(1057NEL/pg p)

Attachment 1 to NLS-86-365 The Boron Injection Tank inlet isolation valves (2SI-V503SA-1 and 2SI-V500SB-I) open automatically after a loss of coolant accident (and other accidents) and remain open for a minimum of 30 days following an accident to provide the pressurized water seal to Penetration M-17.

- The water supply to these penetrations is virtually unlimited because the LHSI pumps are supplied initially from the Refueling Water Storage Tank and then from the containment recirculation sumps after transfer to the recirculation mode.

No single active failure can prevent penetration pressurization via this pressurized water seal.

The containment isolation valves located outside containment on these penetrations are gate-type valves with a single piece wedge. Upon closure and pressurization, the wedge will seal the downstream seat (toward containment). The upstream seat will not be seated and will allow the packing and body/bonnett gasket to be pressurized above 1.10 Pa. Thus, no.

containment atmosphere can enter the valves or be released to the outside environment through the packing or gasket.

These valves are identified as follows:

Valve Numbers Penetration Nos. Ebaeco CPRL ~Valve T e M-17 SI-V505 1SI-3 gate SI-V506 ISI-0 gate SI-V17 1SI-8 check SI-V23 1SI-9 check SI-V29 1SI-10 check SI-V30 1SI-03 globe M-20 SI-V500 ISI-107 gate SI-V80 1SI-127 check SI-V90 1SI-128 check SI-V96 ISI-129 check M-21 SI-V501 ISI-86 gate SI-V39 ISI-100 check SI-V05 1SI-105 check SI-V51 ISI-106 check M-22 SI-Y502 1SI-52 gate SI-V63 1SI-72 check SI-V69 1SI-73 check SI-V75 ISI-70 check Containment Isolation Valves for the LHSI to the RCS Hot Legs (Penetration M-18)

The check valves located inside containment for this penetration will be.

classified as containment isolation valves.

(1057NEL/pgp)

Attachment 1 to NLS-86-365 None of the containment isolation valves for this penetration will be Type C Local Leak Rate Tested because they are provided with a pressurized water seal at a pressure greater than 1.10 Pa for a minimum of 30 days following an accident. This water seal is provided by the ECCS LHSI pumps via the crossover line located outside containment. The LHSI pumps are automatically actuated for a loss of coolant accident and other accidents.

crossover valves (2SI-V577SA-1 and 2SI-V576SB-1) are open for a 'he minimum of 30 days following an accident.

The water supply to this penetration is virtually unlimited because the LHSI pumps are supplied initially from the Refueling Water Storage Tank and then from the containment recirculation sumps after transfer to the recirculation mode.

No single active failure can prevent penetration pressurization via this pressurized wa ter seal.

v The containment isolation valves located outside containment on this penetration is a gate-type valve with a single piece wedge. Vpon closure and pressurization, the wedge will seal the downstream seat (toward containment). The upstream seat will not be seated and will allow the packing and body/bonnett gasket to be pressurized above 1.10 Pa. Thus, no containment atmosphere can enter this valve or be released to the outside environment through the packing or gasket.

These valves are identified as follows:

Valve Numbers Penetration Nos. Ebasco CPRL ~Valve T e M-18 SI-V587 1SI-359 ~

gate SI-V510 ISI-130 check SI-V511 1SI-135 check Containment Isolation Valves for the Component Cooling Water (CCW) Supply to the Reactor Coolant Drain Tank and the Excess Letdown Heat Exchangers (Penetrations M-37 and M-38)

The relief valves on the closed loop inside containment will be classified as containment isolation valves. The setpoint for these relief valves is greater than 1.5 times Pa.

e These relief valves will not be Type C tested based upon the justification provided in Section 6.2.6.3 of FSAR Amendment No. 29 for these penetrations.

These valves are identified as follows:

Valve Numbers Penetration Nos. Ebasco CPRL ~Valve T e M-37 R M-38 CC-R6 ICC-190 relief CC-R5 1CC-186 relief ti057NEL/pgp)

Attachment 1 to NLS-86-365 VI. Containment Isolation Valves for the Containment Recirculation Sump Penetrations (Penetrations M-47, M-48, M-49, and M-50)

The valve located inside the valve chamber on each of these penetrations will be classified as a containment isolation valve.

, These valves are identified as follows:

Valve Numbers Penetration Nos. Ebaeco CPRL Valve Tyae M-47 SI-V571 ISI-300 gate M-48 SI-V570 ISI-301 gate M-49 CT-V6 1CT-105 gate M-50 CT-V7 1CT-102 gate VII. Containment Isolation Valves for Safety Injection-Low Head to the Cold Legs (Penetrations M-13 and M-14)

The check valves located inside containment will be classified as Containment Isolation Valves for each of these penetrations.

These valves are identified as follows:

Valve Numbers Penetration Nos. Ebasco CPRL M-13 SI-V581 1SI-346 M-14 SI-V580 ISI-347 (1057NEL/pgp )

1 ATTACHMENT2 TO NLS-86-365

TABLE 3,9,3-13 (Contend)

HSSS SUPPLIED ACTIVE CLASS I 2 Ak0 3 VALVES 33 Volvo'ystem )

Ebssco Meetinghouse Envlronnentel Sefety Design Operetlng

~Ts H~r

'66-VSM~ISB

~Ta BlOI ~

Nuaaat S~stea Location BllB

~alit lcatlon ~Ts (Sl ~Slobs O~srstor Notor-Nsnulsntursr asian Cless 2 .....

R~etln 1500 Condltlons 15 150 pslg f'w

. Slee 2

FunctIon Sefe Shutdovn 4F'c~l~~

2<~ "V 778'-8qS3$

-V7Tfse 2CS-VS I ISA I-8gals C5

.-C5 gee, RAG e.l/Er<<g 4 P vJc~v(mls 2 ]ssO

/50 (6'~/jl 8 F l5Pste /l~f 350 F V51158 gf SI/416 Cet ~

RAB (6) Gate Hotor Westinghouse 2 I SOO '2485 ps lg 10 ECCS.Operation 2SI-V5875A 1-8889 5I 350 F 1-88IIA,B 5I RCB (6) Gate Hotor Westinghouse 2 300 400 pstg 14 251-V5715A 'Cel4S V57058 350 F gm C'h+

X4c1cS+icTR, o

TABLE 3,9,3-b ant >d)

NSSS St%PLIED ACTIVE CLASS I 2 ANI 3 VALVES Va I va Sy stan Ehasco Ilast lnghoosy Envlronnantal Safaty Design Oparptlng

~te Nueber ~ta N aber a~etna lonatlan. ~alt tluetton ~T ~ triturator ttanutaoturar blaue R~atln coneltlon ~ alta function t.

2I6%590SA-1 I-ll26 tJG Dfaphrsge Alr Ci annal 2 150 2 pslg 3/4 Coqta lnsont 100 F I so I at Ion 2v0429158-I I-7150 Diaphragm Alr . Or Irma l 2 150 2 pslg Conta Instant I sol at Ion 3'00 F

33 3CC45llSA-I Dlyphragn Alr I TT-Cr lan alt 150 . I08 pslg ECCS Oparat Ion r

105 F e 3CC&5l558-I Dlaphraqn Air I TT~ Irma I 150 IM pslg 4 ECCS u

Operat lon

'O 150 F Zcc -R 554 c< RCA 'Pc(iF F ' gf~lgb Ck~sb) /yO (afP54/HSN 4/ C~r. sea..

2<C -RC Sd I -$ 511 CC Scc.p Rc6 R'cbcF . Acr>nTIr~ csosb) 2 /50 gob~/I~V Sa 0

TABID 3,9.3-14 (continued)

NON-NSSS SUPPLIED CLASS I 2 AND 3 ACTIVE VALVES valve Design Systee Env, Safety RatIng DesIgn Sire

~Ts tt be b~etee Leeettee Ollel ~Te erator Manufacturer Class (ANSI I) t Cond 1 iona (Inches-ID) Funct Ion 2CT-V6SA CT (3) Gate Motor Anchor-Oar I lng 2 150 45 pslg

~ 300 F Gnkrhg ~t Xi~/u 2CT-VTSB CT RAB (3) Gate Motor Anchor-Darling 2 150 45 pslg 12

~ 300 F f-Z so/~/'~

2CT-V'I3SA CT RAB (3) Check Rockwe I I 2 1500 50 pslg ECCS Operation

~ 200 F

~ 2CT-V21SA CT RAB (3) Gate Motor Anchor-Darling 2 300 300 pslg ECCS Operation ~

0 300 F 2CT-V27SA CT RCS (4) Check Anchor&sr I (ng 2 300 300 pslg ECCS Operation 0 t 300F 2CT-V3558 CT RAB (3) Check Rockue I I 2 1500 50 ps I g ECCS Operation 0 200 F 2CT-V43SB CT RAB (3) 'ate Motor AnchorDar I lng 2 300 300 pslg ECCS Operat (on 0 300 F 2CT-V51SB CT RCS (4 ) Check lip Anchor&ai I lng e2 300 300 pslg ECCS Operation

~ 300 F g'CT-V85SA CT RAB (3) Globe Motor Zarway 3 1500 15 pslg ECCS Operat I on

~ 200 F 0

3CT-RISAB CT RAB (3) Safety S-A Crosby 3 150 15 pslg lxl ) Protect ECCS 0 200 F 3CT-V95SN CT. RAB (3) -Clobo Hand Yal Nay 3 1500 15 pslg ECCS Operation 1I 200 F

TABLE 3,9,3-14 (cont lnued)

NDNWSSS SUPPLIED CLASS I 2 AND 3 ACTIVE VALVES Valve Design Systee Enva Safety Rating Design Size

~ta k ncr ~Satan Location punt. ~T a pperstor kanutaaturer Class (ANSI I) t Cond I 1ons (Inches-ID) FunctIon ICS-V7'IISN RCS (4 ) Check hP Rockwell 1521 248S pslg 2 RCPS Soundary t 650 F ICS-V70SN CS RCB (4) Check Rockwell 1521 248S pslg RCPB Boundary 8 650 F 2CS-VI29SN CS RAB (3) Check Rockwe I I 2 1500 220 ps 1g Safe Shutdown

~ 200 F 3CS-V222SN CS RAB (3) Check hp Rockwe I I 1500 150 pslg Safe Shutdown t 250F 33 3CS-V223SN CS RAB (3) Check hp Rockwe I I 150 psig Safe Shutdown t 250 F ISI-V39SA V45SB SI RCS (4) Check . Rockwell 1521 2485 pslg RCPS Boundary V51SA 8 650 F ms>~+~, ~

Qyr/kkk'ae cert P ISI-V63SA V6958 SI RCB (4) Check hP Roc kwe I I I 1521 248S pslg RCPB Boundary V75SA 8 650 F C~.4+~;+

2i~lwL.

TABLE 3.9,3-14 (continued)

NON-NSSS SUPPLIED CLASS I 2 AND 3 ACTIVE VALVES Valve Design System Env, Safety Rating Design Size Tare II be ~sstrw beret tee Ore l ~tee t~eereter Hanufacturer Class (Attsl et Conditions (Inches-ID) Function ISI-V84SA V9059 Sl RCB (4 ) Check Rockwe I I I l 521 2485 pslg RCPB Boundary V96SA 8 650 F ec )~w .~t Z sDIA A~A I5 I-VI 7SA 2485 pslg Boundary V?3SB V?9SA SI RCB (4) Check Rockuell I 1521 8 650 F 2

~~~n+

RCPB m2< bc

?CB-BI SA CB RAB l3) But terf ly Pneumatic BIF 2 150 45 pslg 24 Open&lose. ~

Conte Inment 8 366 F Vacuum Relief

?CB-82SB CB RAB 13) But terf ly Pneumatic BIF 2 150 45 ps ig 24 Open&i ose Containment t 366 F Vacuum 33 Relief

?CP-BISA CB Norma I RCB l41 Butter f ly Pneumat I c.'IF 2 150 ~

45 psig Conte lnment Containment g 366 F Isolation Purge Hake-up 8 2CP-B?SB CB Normal RAB 13) Butterfly Pneumatic. BIF 2 150 45 pslg Containment Contalnmant ~ 366 F I sol et lan Purge 0 Hake-up

TABLE 6,9 ~ 3-14 (continued)

NON-NSSS SUPPLIEDt CLASS 'I 2 AND 3 ACTIVE VALVES Ve I v@

fn Design Systea Sefety Retlng Design Size Ko aer hates Locatloa Env,'Ta gus I ~Te ~0 crater ttaeotactarer Class (ANSI I) Cond I t lons (Inches-ID) Function tA I

ICS-Y22SN CS RCB (4) Check Rockuel I 1 1521 2465 pslg ~ I 1/2 Sefe Shutdurn d 650 F ICS-Y23SN CS RCB (4) Check 6P Rockvs I I I 1521 2465 pslg I I/2 Sefe Shutdcwn d 650F 1CS-Y24SN CS RCB (4 ) Check Rock@el I I 1521 24dS pslg I I/2 Sefe Shutdown I 650 F 2CS-V25SB CS RCB (4) Check 6P Roc kml I 2 1500 2735 pslg I I/2 t 200 F 4 ~/<,),~+ ~

~s~l~bi~ i

TABLE 3 9,3-14 (continued)

NON-NSSS SUPPLIED CI.ASS I 2 AND 3 ACTIVE VALVES Valve Design Systea Safety Rating Design Site

~Ta N aa ~Stree Suet En'uustfas

~T8 Sffsrsta Naffufaeturer Class IANSf at Condltlons- (Inches-ID) Function 2CS-V2658 CS RCB (4 ) Check Rockve I I 1500 2735 pslg I I/2

~ 200 F Agm~rn

~O/Oh'Ost 2CS-V275B CS RCB (4) Check dp Rockwl I 2 1500 2735 pslg I I/2 n

~ 200 F WlgefmO~

~a*m IC5-V345N CS RCB (4) Check Rockw I I I 1521 24SS pslg- I I/2 Safe Shutdossn g 650 F M

1CS-V355N CS RCB (4) Check dp Rock w I I I 'I 521 2485 pslg I I/2 Safe Shutdcwn

~ 650 F'4S5 ICS-V36SN CS RCB (4) Check dp Rock w I I I 1521 pslg I I/2 Safe Shutdcwn t 650 F 2CS-V6758 CS RCB (4) Check Rockw I I 2 1500 150 pslg 3/4 Conte lneent

~ 500 F I sol et loll 33 251-YISSSA Sl RCB (4 ) Check Rockwl I 2 1500 700 pslg Conte I neent

~ 300 F I sol et)on g 251-V15051 SI RCB (4 ) Check dp Rock w1 I 2 1500 2735 pslg Conte Ineent S 300F Isola' loll o 2CC-V515N RCB (4) Check Rockw I I 150 pslg 3/4 Conte lneent S 200 F I so I at Ion

TABlK 6.2A-I COMTANMENT lSOLATON SYSTEM DATA SilNPP FSAR I I/ jp at% TRATlOII OATA %LVE DATA p <

>ee oc w ra g r 805 CTCS T26 CE 0 TE5 IKI ~ ui 55 SEAL 'MATTE 5525 Cl 0 Ai TES It5 'I ES ~e TO RCt ~S~ y yes W W ~ III J 605 CfCS 'C'tr SEAL VATES TO ACt V524 SA lla 0 0 AI C C TE5 Tt5 Ttt CfCS ~ %Sr C C Tt 5 SElL UAIEE T516 A 10 0 AI C Ttt Ie e EEIDIN i T511 A 10 0 AI C Itt EICE55 1EIDOOI 'AS 610 SAIETT T561 SA C 0 ~ e' $5 IRJE CTINI T519 A 255 0 0 AI TE5 E.Ps SlW olllse LM READ TO Ir COIO IECS 410 5AIZIT V560 0 0 INJECIIS v526 0 AI 0 It5 E.A 55 1ASJ READ TO 11 COLD ItCS 62A RNE SUCTION 6501 0 C 0 NO IEQl ROI Lta TSOI 5 100 K 0 0 AI 0 NO V505 12 N C Al 0 NO 2~$ << 16 dPA-11 Aseotoeot Noi 1~ '@WC i z ~ pp>> I ~ ~ I. I ~ ~ ~ Wgg I I ~ lN ~I I lII ~ \ I' ~ II ~ M lM~RESRMRERRR55551+'W~ lI lI II ~ I ~ I ~ \ I ~ I ~ ~ ~I ~ \ ~ I ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ I I I I 'I III IIR . HHII888888888888IIIHER IIIRI Rm ~ I ~ tt ~ 5155555mm1151555& < Fol/s to provides separation Fal lure rodjces redun- Sane as I tea l( Our lng tho first 2i atod clcae on Qtuoon tuo Indcpon- dancy to prewitt .hours ot long t gate v 'teande doqt flor paths excessive purp runcvt phase Incl ro-1-888Th. outside conte(natant during cold log reel r- cove Sl jan% puips (I-888m . dur I ng cold Ieg eal ntl ot4'. Ho ef fact aligned for In<< aru) logos s I re CI rcu'I atl one ~ on gyston operation, )oct(on Into cold Directs LHSI f I or Iso!at(on Valve I. 888m legs of RCS coolant at logs during (I-8887A) prov'ides (ceps Atter 2i hot le oc)rac- backup separation of hcNcsg polps al 4 latl on, I lou paths, by operator 'ligned for reel rar I at(on floe into tho hot logsa F'al la to qro reduce dun>> Sane as Iten II I ~ open on dancy of provl ding danandp t luld (lou frais LHSI/ RHR puaps f or I n)ection Into hot logs ot RCS l copse'lnl cue f lou requlronants el I I be ~t bt opening ot Isolation valve I-8887B (I-8887A) and floe frcxI traa LHSI/RHR puap 2 (puap 11 ~

)

ThBl.E fi>3. l-I (Continued) .~ EHERGEt1CY CORE COOLINC SVSTEH PAILHRE MODES AND EFPECTS hNALYSIS Failure Detg~tion Component Fatlllrj Node Function" f!ffect on System Hetkod Remarks* 17 'otor ./ Fails to Provides isolation Fa i lure rcd uc ca flow Same as item fl Hot legs RCS coolant operated -. close) . of, fluid floe from of recirculation cool- In addition LIISI/RflR loop recirculation gate valve LHSi/RHR pump 1 ant to hot legs of RCS pump discharge ~ required to prevent 1-8888A (pump 2) to cold coolant loops from header prcssure and boron precipitation (1-88888 leg infection LHSI/RHR pump 1 (pump flow indication and problem for long-tcrni ~ analogous) header of RCS 2) ~ Minimum flow oiniflow valve moni- core cooling , coolant loops~ requirements to hot toring at HCB. leg of coolant ~P RCS loops pill ba met by .~ deiivery of coolant from 'NISI/RHR pump 2 (pump 1) and ~SXfCHC g&o Pg5X/Ch6 ~ If, 4 ~e+e~ega

18. Hotor ..Paf.la':to .. Provides isolation Failure prevents fluid as item f2 operated. - 'pen oo . o'f fluid flow frog flow from LIISI/RHR pumps addition, 'n gate valve 1-8889 dpman11, LIISI/RIIR pumps to hot leg infection hander of RCS pumper'dmc to hot leg in)ection feeder of RCS coolant loops Hinimua flow LHSI/RHR p~p discharge header pressure and flow coolant loops, requirements to hot indication legs of RCS coolant valve and'iniflow loop will be met by monitoring at delivery of coolant HCB ~

from two HHSI/CHC L ,.) Thbt.F, 6~3 '-l (Continued) . EHERCENCY CORE COOLINC SYSTEM FhILURE HODES AND EFFECYS hNhLYSIS Component,' Failure 4e Function" Ff fec t on Sys tarn~ Failure Detection Method

• ,~ l~

Rema&a Pbi)s to ~ Failure reduces redun-close dancy of providing pn'emand~ isolation of recit culatioO of fluid . ~ into Ilot legs of RCg coolant loops by 1 LIISI/RltR pumps; Negligible effect on ~ recirculation into cold legs of RCS coolant.loops, ~~> AA~i ~ >~o ~~/gg ~ ~,~~@+ ~~~ ~ -" ~j>>~~ C04 -88SVW~d- &~>cv~~ I ~88+a< ~ g /~r ~i~'~luku ~~r@~~ ~ ~ Motor rails to- '- Provides isolation No effect on system, .Same as that operated- . opeII on of fluid flow from operationi HHSI/CIIC stated for item gate valve demands., LHSI/RHR pump 1 pumps 1 and 2 will be f2. In addition, 1-8706ho . (pump 2) vis RIIR provided suction head . HIISI/CIIC pump 1 (1-87068 lteat Exchanger, by LIISI/RHR pump 2 , (pump 2) flow analogous) (exchanger 2) to (pump 1) via the indication at suction line o! common charging HCB ~ HIISI/CIIC pump 1 pump suction headeri (HIISI/Cllc 2) ~ . TABS.E ti>3.1-$ (Coqttnued) EHBRCENCY CORE CNLIIIC SYSTEH FAILURE HODES AMII EFFECTS ANALYSIS Failure Detection

• Component Failur<< de Functtoq" Effacg on Systea Hethod** Remarks le Hots/ Feign to - .'.. Provides isolation Fatlure geducea redun- Same aa itea )2>> Valves are activated operated - . 'On e

'lose oj fluid floe from dancy of providing In addition, to open by an SIAS. gate Yalve" demapd>> IIIISI/CHC pump 02 isolqttoq of fluid pressure of bIT Peter to the closing 1-8801A discharge line. floe from NISl/CIIC discharge line of the valves, (1-8801B via BlT to cold . pump 2 to cold legs indicated st,HCB>> reactor operator analogous) '..- legs of RCS of RCS coolant loops, resets the SIAS>> coolant loops>>, n ~ r' ~ '8&4 WHO~ Valves are cIosed by the reactor operator for recirculation in-to hot legs of RCS coolant loops and open by the operator <<i'itic, mJu~ 17'~ o&i4~-ofIIHXr/Z~ PkrnPS 'A 4/II/ kc g~ goy /~5'irtrrrrv~ ~c'f $ +pgg Pygmy ~ shen recirculation into cold legs of RCS coolant ia desired during long tera tn- ~ P&VICI(A)t f/o~gQ Q $ P J cidant recovery ~4>ol b~ Fk pertod. )iota Fails to Same as iten 24 ~ Same ay i/era f24 except Same as iten I operated osa isolation valves 1-SAO gate valve, demands and ea 1"8803A agkup isolation of (1-8803B fluid flon&roaMI CIIC ana pump t2 ~ SHNPP FSAR A two out of four coincident logic is utilized in both protection cabinets A and B to ensure a trip signal in the event that two out of the four level channeL bistables are energized. This trip signal, in conjunction with the a>>r ' "S" signal., provides the actuation signal to automatically open the corresponding containment sump isolation valves. I As part of the manual switchover procedure, the discharge of the residual heat removal pumps are aligned to the auctions of the charging pumps. Charging estabLish two separate and redundant high head, recirc la ion systems. jhcsuch'~ 8~er drugs-connect values are ace cJar~ M gmare s~~~ AHRyu~p xnxmize tnN possaoiaity ot Lou temperat~&everpressure transient during startup and cooldown, low pressurizer pressure and Low steam line pressure safety injection actuation logic is manuaLly blocked at 1900 psi. At 1000 psi> power is locked out from the accumulator isoLation valves and from the non-operating charging pumps. It should be noted that the high containment pressure safety injection actuation Logic cannot be blocked. If a steamLine rupture occurs while both of these, Sl actuation signals are blocked, steamline isoLation will occur on high negative steam pressure rate. An alarm for steam line isolation will alert the operator of the accide'nt. The nuclear power and core flux increase is terminated at RCS pressure that approximates the beginning of accumulator discharge. 'his HQ ( transient is, however, terminited by the boron resulting from BIT injection so no adverse impact would be expected. to result from accumulator isolation. ~ For large LOCAs, sufficient. mass and energy would be released to the containment to automatically actuate SI when the containment high pressure setpoint is reached. At this time, the operator would be alerted to 'the occurrence of a LOCA by the foLlo~ing safety-related indications. a) Loss of pressurizer level b). rapid...decrease of'CS pressure,, and c) increase in containment pre sure In addition to the above, the following indications are normaLLy avaiLable to the operator at the control board a) radiation alarms inside containment, b) increase in sump water LaveL, c)'- decrease off icale of. accumulator water levels.-and decrea e in pr ssure, . d), ECCS valve and pump position and status Light in ECCS energized 'r indication,'and annunciatocs Light as safeguards equipment becomes mergized, and e) . flow from ECCS pumps. 4 LOCAs during,startup and cooldown have been evaluated to determine the effects ~ ~ ', of the unavailability of tne accumuLators. The limiting case is, of course, '.3.2-13g Amendment No 23 SEEP FSAR TABLE 6.3.2-6 SEQUENCE OP SWITCHOVER OPERATION FROM IMECTION TO RECIRCULATION Manual operator actions are required to complete the switchover from the in)ection mode to the recirculation mode. During the in]ection mode, the operator verifiis that all ECCS pumps are operating and monitors the RWST and reactor building recirculation sump levels in anticipation of switchoveri The operator opens or verifies 'open, the component cooling water inlet isolation valves to the residual. heat removal heat exchanger prior to switchover isolation. Upon receipt of the RWST low-low level signal in con)unction with the safety .in]ection signal, the containment sump isolation valves automatically open. Following this automatic action, the operator is required to complete the switchover. The following manual actions must" be performed to align the charging pump suction to the residual heat removal pumps discharge. lo Verify that the containment sump isolation valves are open and close the residual heat removal pump suction valves from the refueling water storage tank~ p~~~b'PPAR C4 on~ (M b4) o< +c Co4f l~ heaJe- jsdChe y>ives associated uaiA +4 R"~tP> '.2'. (7$ gs ct c~~ pc/~+ /Yr&~+ /e /Ac pem~hk~ mcC'0 ) Open residual heat removal pump discharge valves to the charging pump suction ALl ECCS'umps are now aligned wi h suction flow from the containment. sump. The operator verifies proper operation and alignment of all ECCS components and proceeds to complete. the following manual actions to align the ECCS in redundant flow paths for long term recirculation operations .4:. Close refueling water storage tank valves to charging pump suction. Dctdcd. .6 Open valve in the alternate high head cold leg recirculat'on line. .T~ CLose valves (dependm~g on operating charging pumps) in the discharge .'header to establish two separate high heed recirculation systems. . The following manual operator actions are. required to perform the change-over

. operation from the cold leg recirculation mode to the hot. leg recirculation mode a.

h 6.3. 2-25 ~l SHNPP FSAR ~ ~ TABLE 6 o3 ~ 2H (Continued) SEOUEHCE OF SWITCHOVER OPERATION FROM INJECTION TO RECIRCULATION 1~ Close the cold leg header isolation valves associated vith the RHR pumps. /chic cf Open the hot'leg header isolation valve from the RHR pumps ~ Stop charging pump No. l. If pump Ho. 1 vas out of service prior to the accident, stop the swing pump (charging pump No. 3). ...5 ~ C1ose.the alternate high head cold leg header isolation valve and open the corresponding high head hot leg header isolation valve. Restart the charging pump stopped in Step 4o, Stop charging pump Ho 2i If pump Hoi 2 uas out of service prior to the accident,, stop the sving pump (charging pump Ho 3) ~ 8~ CIose the boron infection cank discharge isolation va'ves and open the corresponding high head. hot'eg header'solation valve Restart the charging pump stopped in step 7>> h ~ ~ 3 ~ 6 3 2-26 NOTES TO FIGURES do3e2-4 TIIOUGH do3o2-6 l27 VALVE AL I QOKIfT TABLE l PRINCIPLE NDOES OF ECCS OPERATION (Shoot 2) h,.: .- ' C D E F 0 ~ Yelva Homal InJect Ion InJect)on Cold I.ag Reclr- Wt Nof Standby ': ..llexlaua Plnlnuw Cold Leg Reclrculatlon culetlon Nlni-Lag Roc lrcul at Ion Hot Leg Reclr culatlon lllnl- 'I ' Sefepuerda ITreln A 'efeguerda Only) Hewlaun Sofeguerda ~ Sefeguerda (Trafn Meal~ ~ Sefeguerda 'I ge A Only) . Sefeguerda fTreln Only) A ~,, '0 ~ .. 18 .lb. ~ ~ 0: 0.: ., 0 -' "' 0 0 C C C 0 C C C 0 2A Q. ~ ~ ~ ~ ': ~ 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 C:% ' C C C C '38 J C 'C C C 0: .:-. C C C ~ 4A C C C C 0 .". ~:, C 0 0 ~ C C 0 C -' C 0 0 ' 0 C -. C C 0 C 0 C ' 'O~ 0 'll 1A / 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0M 0" 0 ...0 0 0 0 ~ 0 C C a C', 0 ~ '. 0 C 0 C Cat +C C C 0 0 0 9A 98 IOA C C C C ' C C C C C 0 0 0 0 C 0 0 0. 0 0 C 0 IM C C r C 0 C 0 ~ 11A C ' C C C C C C C~~ , ~ .n . ~ 118 C ~ C C C C C 12A C C C C C C C 128 C C C C C C C 13h C 0 0 C c 138 C 0 C C C C 14A -0 . ' C C C C C 148 0 C 0 C ~ 0 C 0 / + )JIL- 7<4 I e~n h~ doscJ'iii /I'c~ of /'8 56/~< Narcism preenk Efg pu~p run-ovf 4 ~ ~ ~ INTES TO FIGUAES 6o3o2-i TINOUGH 6+3+2-6 ln . VALISE ALI~IITTABLE PRINCIPLE HOOES OF ECCS OPERATIOH ISheat 3) ': .'8, Valya Ho~

Standby A

"- Normal .. " . Injection Hex)run C Inject Ion Hlnlnua 0 Cold I.eg Reclrculatlon E Cold Leg Raclr-cutatlon Hlnl-F Hot Leg Roc lrcul at Ion 8 Hot Leg Raclr-culat ton Hlnl .. Safeguards Safagvards Naxlavn aun Safeguards Hax 1am ave Safeguards ITraln A Only) Safaguards (Train A Only) Safeguards (Train A Only) 15A i. 0 i-'... 0 0 0 0 0 0 158,' .0 .i'. ' 0 0 0 0 0 16A ' . '.'.'i' 0 ~ 0 0 0 0 ~ . . l68 . 0 : ~ = j:. 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 - 0 0 0 I78, 17A 0 ~ . 0 0 C 0 C 0 0

.Ci C

.16A 0 ~ ' 0 0' C 0 C' 0 168 . 0 . ' . 0 C 0 0 19A 0 'C 0 C 0 C Q. 198 ~ 0 0 C 0 C 0 ', .,', f 19C 0 C 0 C 0 C 0 2'0 0 ~ . C C C C C C 2IA 0 .;, " . C C C C C ~ 21B ~ 0 ~ C 0. C 0 0 22A C ~ 0 0 228 C ~ ~ ~ 0 C. 0. C. 23A C 0 0 0 0 238 0 C 0 C C C 2l C c C C C 0 C I 25 C I C C C C 0 0 26 C C C 0 'C C C 27 29h 0 ~ 0 0 0 0 0 0 298 0 0 0 0 0 0 29C 0 0 0 O. 0 0 0 ~ <<aoaao AQ ~oo ~ ~ <<>><<aa<<>>a>> <<oa>>I ggla>>+j>> p>>\a>>a>><<s rip<<>><< ~ ~ I c <<Oo<<<<>>a>><<.<<ao>>pa<<~<<<<l ao>> Li ~ >> ~ ~>>a <<<<a e aoo<<<<a>> o>>a <<pro>>I ~ <<>>>>Ip>>a<<<<<<aoo I ~. I<<<<p<<po<<ptas>>oaara>>oao>>a <<>>>> P 'KOI ~a a, L ~ <>I<<o~<<o>>~<<I&<<<< <<>>alp>>>><<a>>>>o<<<<<<>><<owaa<< <<<<>><<aa>>>>o<<>> ~ ao a>>>>>><<<<<<o<< p>>o>>o>>o>><<po aa ~ <<>> lra>> I >>>> p po>> Ia>>>> <<>>oao N Q>>opa I>>>> Iv>>p>>>>a<<r>>>>p>>>><<l>>i ~. <<>>aaa<<p<<<<IWWM u C \PL >>aAAa I ~ <<>> ~ I >>Iro>>>>o ~o ~ ~ o>> ~ ora a MI ") I ~ aao t WA. O'Rl I ~(~ ~ I ao I ~tt- ) <<IITICICP o ') '1' ~o~ g<< fo fi.. ~l i . ~ ~ r <<po<< a~ o>> I 9R o ~ ~ PPI ~a o I5~+ ..I a: .g or.;'; at ~a at o>> ~ inc<<bc*i~~ ud chal. "s 14 ~ I S~I ~ callol Il<<alit Iacccoc Ccaol tuolt tl1 coool laa to<<o ~ cllat Cora<<t css-St 3)IIstIM ZCS-V7FtSS F I WL CIPCIT JIW.TC IC ICtCAT gcs8PS>A ) ZCS-V 7 f) Sg ocaII ~po a)alac c<<III~ L PFjgz ICt CIO,ICOSA-CI~~ ltl TIOJC ~ .C 1 1 oa ~ 4 ATTACHMENT3 TO NLS-86-365 INIL WN Table 3.6-1 (Continued) CONTAINMENT ISOLATION VALVES I VALVE NO. NAXIHUN PENETRATION CP&L ISOLATION APPLICABLE NO. ~EBASCO FUKCTIOK ~TIKE SEC KOTES 13 lSI-340 SI-LOM HEAD TO COLD LEGS N/A 1 (5 I-V579) lSI-341 SI-LOM HEAD TO COLO LEGS N/A (SI"V578) 15 IRH-2 RHR PUHP SUCTION (TRAIN A) N/A 1,3 (RH-V503) 16 1RH-40 RHR PUMP SUCTION (TRAIN B) N/A . 1,3 ~ (RH-V501) 18 - 1SI-359 SI LOM HEAD TO HOT LEG N/A 3 (SI-V587) 20 151-107 SI 'HIGH HEAD TO HOT LEG N/A 2J 3 (S I-V500) 1SI-86 SI HIGH HEAD TO HOT'LEG N/A Xp 3 (SI-V501) 1SI 52 SI HIGH HEAD TO COLO LEG N/A (SI"V502) 25 1SM-92 SERVICE MATER TO FAN COOLER N/A 1,6 ('SM-B46) AH-3 26 1SM-91 SERVICE MATER TO FAN'OOLER N/A 1,6 (SM-845) AH 2 27 '1SM-225 SERVICE MATFR TO FAN COOLER N/A 1,6 (SM-852) AH-1 28 UM-227 SERVICE MATER TO FAN COOLER N/A 1,6 (SM-851) AH-4 29 1SM-97 SERVICE MATER FROM FAN COOLER N/A 1,6 -(SM-847) AH-3 30 1SM-109 .SERVICE MATER FRO!l FAN COOLER N/A 1,6 (SM-849) AH-2 31 1SM-98 SERVICE MATER FROM FAN COOLER N/A 1,6 (SM-a48) AH-1 SHEARON HARRIS - UNIT 1 3/4 6-24 HtQL Pr Table 3 6 1 (Cantfaued) RerfSlON COHTAIHMEHT ISOLATION VALVES <"G,$8 VALVE HO. MAXIMUM PEHETRATIOH CP4L ISOLATION APPLICABLE HO. ~BANCO FOHCTIOH ~TIME EEC NOTES 1SM-110 SERVICE MATER FROM FAN COOLER H/h 1,6 (SM-850) AH"4 151-3 SI TO HIGH HEAD CQLQ LEG H/A 3 (SI-V505) 17 1SI-4 SI TO HIGH HEAD COLO LEG I .H/ . H/A (SI-V506) 1MS-?0 MAIN STEAM B TO AUXILIARY 1,3,6 (MS-V8) F.W. TURBINE IMS-?2 MAIN STEAM C TO AUXILIARY N/A 1,3,6 (MS V9} F.'L TURBINE 2 CM M Hg PURGE EXHAUST 3 (CM B5)

10. MA UAL VALVES PyLVFS I ~~ . D 1SI 43 SI&IGH HEAD TO COLO LEGS 1,3 r~s~ ~A~ ~i) (Si-V30}

1LT-6 ILRT ROTOMETER N/A ZH3 (LT-V2) (LOCXEQ CLOSED) ISA 80 SERVICE AIR N/A 23 .....--- -- (SA V14) ~ (LOMK CLOSED) 1EQ-119 RCOT PUMP QISCH BYPASS 2.3 (WL-0651) cacemP 1SF 145 REFUELI~~ CAVITY CLEANUP 2.3 (SF-0164) (LOCK% CLOScQ) . 15F-144 REFUELIHG CAVITY'C~~'UP H/h 2.3 (SF-0165) (LOCKEO CLOSED) 45 1SF-118 REFUELIHQ CAVITY CLEAHUP 2.3 (SF-025) (u.'um CLOSED) 45 15F 119 REFUELIHG CAVITY CLEAHUP (SF-026) (LOCXFS CLOSED) 39 1CC-250 CCW FROM RCP THERMAL BARRIER H/A {CC-V50) - 3/4 6-25 ming yea;~1 SHEAROH HARRIS UHIT 1 r Fort &~ jAE.PCS \ I Pa/ve Po, Hppu;cA EM CP/l. ~ST FAnrCTZ+4 /VM/$ I ~ ~e II ~ldll,....~ ~...........COnhiarr,mZ'Diem@ A SPY'Pu~p ~ .~/A I. (si'- vs 70 I.. )~ e e I I je ~ ~ ~ e M k8. ~ ~ .io~duu.natu p. A /HZ Pi net P..~/4. ir- imam . I R)- tkinmrnP 'Jump ..d>,.CT.../amp f.nf/A ....: 4, 3 .Se lg (8r-pl ' Canhinneun..f.,dbmp x4 .C'7 Pi.~.p ....~.., 6../A (er-vr) ~ ~, e ~ C ~ Si/A~~ ~ ( c~A), SHNPP REVlStON FINAL Der tAU8 S86 Tabl>> 3. 6-1 (Contfnued) COHTAIHHEHT ISOLATION VALVES VALVE NO. HAXIHUH PEHETRATI OH CP4L ISOLATIOH APPLICABLE HO. ~EBASCQ FUHCTIQH ~TIRE SEC HQTES 7 CB-hC . COHTAINHEHT VACUUH RELIEF M/A N/A 98'5 (CS-V2) 1FP 349 FIRE MATER SPRIHKLER SUPPLY H/A (FP-V46) pa

11. RELIEF VALVES 1 ~

a<SZga7 bC/I /CR4PCS W ICS 10 (CS-R500) CVCS HORHAL LETOOMH H/A g-a8 1RH-7 RHR SUCTIOH FROH HOT LEG (a), Q), any/Pc) (RH-R501) 1RH-45 RHR SUCTION FROH HOT LK (RH-R500) H/h LSM-95 SERVICE MATER FROH FAH CtMLER (SM R') AH 3 30 LSM-107 SERVICE MATER FRY FAH CNLER H/A (SM-R3) AH 2 31 1SM-'96 SERVICE MATER FROH FAH COOLER (SM-R2} AH-L 1S &108 SERVICE MATER FlÃN FAH COOLER (SM-R4) AH-4 ,p iI ~ JP EB, /CL-'@8~ d ex/ i=ROM gS"gT Ice-wS) Flea+ +~cd. SHEAROH HARRIS - UHIT 1 3/4 6"28 If II ~ ~ . I ~'I lep&~$~ "AOpal'cAB ZX /o. cP/c ll ~st~ WocATrbg A/cps -V ~ 5 344 ..cl/Cs". Seal 4afcr 4 pep 'g" ]vp rv)P (cs- ajar) v (g 4>CS- Sea/ Matc/- g4 Agp "gy" (cs- vie) '->'~cs--'~/C ---<<~~-...~.~..u~/-~ nc/ "~" '...+g/c7y.2' ( ~rZ" y5'&i') q~ .....Ck.'Ze~ b~ -"-4o Lf Acing " ~a<ch/~y'~/i~-./ Vs so) <Prude's'x'- Cs'i - V/ '7 ) '" --~/i/Mc~. </c$ 2jc 4 .--,Aiph g.rag lop g d//g g~ v //( Czz- VZS > 5~/AD/y 2n)cr/i~- @ah P<~g g // A ucp .2 Dfc/ g~~ I /7 2'52'-/0 arch/ Zyec/7'ir A'jh Pgc/ u/R (s~- vzv y Wop S Br< Zap .2/~~ ~ ~ ~+ (>g- V5/o ) $~/h/2.;,/~A~ ,/o~f/~.Z @ /'y h ~l >A r -ZR ( ) l 1~-128 Sorck Za~iC k'e = A' .A.Ia>4 .- ~/~- g ~ P Az...4~. XSAM l2 0 -5~QP Wnj c:cubi ciIc . CSj li Csz- yy'e7 ~ p.3'.4z'ag,. up/ ZSZ-tu4-Csr- v~v > ~calcic,'g 2rPrcficicc PiPh A~CcccI c . Aop g/g4g.. Leg ..... ~c I Sihf&njecAnci .. I/j ig AcccI-c ~ I , 4~~p P ~ 4m~ f~ 2j ygz- to(p S~ya~~rcb~ &PA P~ -Z ~ (sx v~i ) dc op 9 ~ Lac gz, Qs'z- 72 Csx- V~> 3 'I I zz- gs~ 7> I Csx-vcr 3 P' ~ ~ ) CPBcL Coxnxnents <HNPP Proof and Review Technical S pecif ication s Record Number: 778 Comment Type: ERROR LCO Number: NRC TYPOs Page Number: SEE LIST Section Number: Comment: CHANGES HAVE BEEN MADE TO THE FOLLOWING PAGES TO CORRECT TYPOGRAPHICAL ERRORS MADE IN THE TYPING OF THE FINAL DRAFT TECH SPECS. ~~ 2-7 ~W 31 2-9 OA 3/4 3-22 7 //jj I Qo ~ 3/4 6-3 > 8rx c~ 3/4 6-20 8 21 v'p' 3/4 5 8 26 ~ 6Jj 3/4 -3 4 3/4 7-41 ~ ~OK (. Q+ ~ ~ ~ ~~@ . ~(p) 3/4 8-2 ~ OFi / 3/4 8-5 + ~g B 3/4 3-6v 1/'/q q-'/O>>< Basis TYPOGRPHICAL ERRORS TABLE'3.7-2 STEAM LINE SAFETY VALVES PER LOOP ~~~ISlON VALVE NUMBER LIFT SETTING + IX " ORIFICE SIZE STEAN GENERATOR A B C 1MS" 43 1MS-44 1MS-45 1170 psig 16. 0 1HS-46 1M 5-47 1MS-48 1185 psig 16. 0 1MS-49 1MS-50 1HS-51 1200 psig 16. 0 1MS"52 1MS-53 1MS-54 1215 psig 16. 0 1MS-55 1HS-56 1MS-57 '230 psig 16. 0 ,/ "The lift setting pressure shall correspond to ambient conditions of the valve '/4 at nominal operating ~te peratur, and pressure. ~ qL SHEARON HARRIS - UNIT 1 7-3 I FT PLANT SYSTEMS SHNPP AUXILIARY FEEDWATER SYSTEN REVlstOS~ JUL 886 LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION 3.7. 1.2 At least three independent steam generator auxiliary feedwater pumps and associated flow paths shall be OPERABLE with:

a. Two motor-driven auxiliary feedwa r p s, each capable of being .

powered from separate emergency b s/es and

b. One steam turbine-driven auxilia eedwater pump capable of being~5J<$

from an OPERABLE steam supply system., "'owered APPLICABILITY: HODES 1, 2, and 3. ACTION: With one auxiliary feedwater pump inoperable, restore the required auxiliary feedwater pumps to OPERABLE status within 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br /> or be in at least HOT STANDBY within the next 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br /> and in HOT SNTDOWN within the following 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br />. With two auxiliary feedwater pumps inoperable, be in at least HOT STANDBY within 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br /> and in HOT SHUTDOWN within the following 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br />. C. With three auxiliary feedwater pumps inoperable, iaeediately initiate corrective action to restore at least one auxiliary feedwater pump to OPERABLE status as soon as possible. SURVEILLANCE RE UIREMENTS 4.7.1.2. 1 Each auxiliary feedwater pump shall be demons4zeted OPERABLE:

a. At least once per 31 days on a STAGGER O ST BASIS by: ~~ P~lco iso

1. Verifying that each motor driven ump develops a discharge pres-sure of greater than or equal to psig at a recirculation flow of greater than or equal to 50 gpm.

l5/0

2. Verifying that the steam turbine driven/pump de elops a discharge pressure of greater than or equa to psi on a recircula-tion flow of greater than or equ 1 to 90 when the second-ary steam supply pressure is grea r th 210 psig. The pro-visions of Specification 4.0.4 are n applicable for entry into NODE 3; SHEAROK HARRIS - UNIT 1 3/4 7-4

CP &.L Coxnxnenta <HNPP Proof and Review'echnical Specifications Record Number: 722 Comment Type: IMPROVEMENT LCO Number: 3.07.01.02 Page Number: 3/4 7-4 Section Number: 4.7.1.2.l.a Comment: ITEM 4.7.1.2.1.a.l CHANGE "1510" TO "1590". ITEM 4.7.1.2.1.a.2 CHANGE "1450" TO "1510" Basis NEW VALUES HAVE BEEN PROVIDED BY THE A.E. FOR THESE DISCHARGE PRESSURES BASED ON PUMP CURVES AND TESTING RESULTS, PLANT SYSTEMS AUXILIARY FEEDWATER SYSTEM I S8NPP REViS~ON T JOL 386 LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION 3.7. 1.2 At least three independent steam generator auxiliary feedwater pumps and associated flow paths shall be OPERABLE with:

a. Two motor-driven auxiliary feedwater pumps, each capable of being powered from separate emergency bus/es, and

b. One steam turbine-driven auxiliary feedwater pump capable of being powered from an OPERABLE steam supply system.

APPLICABILITY: MODES 1, 2, and 3. ACTION:

a. With one auxiliary feedwater pump inoperable, restore the required auxiliary feedwater pumps to OPERABLE status within 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br />, or be in at least HOT STANDBY within the next 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br /> and in HOT 50TDOWN; within the following 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br />.

With two auxiliary feedwater pumps inoperable, be in at least HOT STANDBY within 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br /> and in HOT SHUTDOWN within the following 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br />. With three auxiliary feedwater pumps inoperable, imaediately initiate corrective action to restore at least one auxiliary feedwater pump to OPERABLE status as soon as possible. SURVEILLANCE RE UIREMENTS 4.7.1.2.1 Each auxiliary feedwater pump shall be demonstrated OPERABLE: a ~ At least once per 31 days on a STAGGERED TEST BASIS by: F570

1. Verifying that each motor driven pump develops a discharge pres-sure of greater than or equal, to psig at a recirculation flow of greater than or equal to 50 gpm.

j5/0

2. Verifying that the steam turbine-driven/pump develops a discharge pressure of greater than or equal to 5%8 psig on a recircula-tion flow of greater than or equal to 90 gpm when the second-ary steam supply pressure is greater than 210 psig. The pro-visions of Specification 4.0.4 are not applicable for entry into MODE 3; SHEARON HARRIS - UNIT 1 3/4 7"4

Shearon Harris Technical Specifications Resolution of Staff Comments Originator: SIC~@~ ~o~~< Page. Comment Date: 7/as/C( 7+ >7,>,> Comment: Based on our review of the final draft Technical Specifications and discussions with the FOB, it is not apparent that all of the EICSB items identified in our memorandum of Narch 11, 1986 were satisfactorily consider n the development of the final Technical Specifications. Items 12, 21, an 25 hould be resolved prior to plant startup. In addition, we found (1) that t surveillance reouire-ments of Standard Technical Specification (STS) Sections 4.8.1.1.2e(2) and (11) have been omitted from the Shearon Harris Technical Specifications and (2) that adequate justification(s) has not been provided for the ESFAS slave relays that are not testable during power operation. We recommend that these sections be included with the STS. We also recommend that for each ESFAS slave relay not testable at-power adeouate justification(s) be provided. Resolution Basis Resolution Acce ted: NRC I CP8L Date: Date: Shearon Harris Technical Specifications Resolution of Comnents Originator: Ar<c/m/4~>> Comment Date: w~ i~~ i~I< ~M Page: TS: p/p-5 CPKL Record Uo.: Comment: (ZQ Previous1y approved TS provide four (4) verification steps that are to be performed every 18 months to ensure that the auxil'iary feedwater system is operable. As presently written, the Shearon Harris TS provide verification that the auxiliary feedwater pumps start and that the respective pressure control valve responds. Justify the omission of the verification of the positions for the supply valves, suction valves, and each automatic valve in the auxiliary feedwater flow path. Sasis: Resolution: g ~ ~, ~/>>/se, Cc~'mQn g ~+W.41-~ Cf'r't ~P[ S/q i-gpSi~ Resolution Acce ted: NRC CPEiL Date: C PScL C mmmen<m SHNPP Final Drake, Technical ii S pl e c- + c a t= ic) n & Record Number': r92 Cofllment: Tvpe: ERROR LCO NumLer: 3. r,"7. 01. 0=: Paae Numbe.: 3/4 7-'? Beati an "4. 7. 1. 5 Number" . Comment.: IN 4.7. 1.5 CHANGE'l'JODE 3" TO "NODES 3 or 4." BcRSt. B A CHANGE TQ BHON I'1ODE 4 FOP, THE MBIV'e lJAB HADE SOJRE T Il'1E AGO TO RESOLVE A LONG STANDING CONFLICT LiJITH THE BTB. HQMFVER. IT IS STILL NOT POSSIBLE TQ PROPERLY TFST THE VALVES UNTIL THERE IS SUFFICENT STEAlq PRESSURE THE STB HAS ALWAYS GRANTED THE EXEhlPTIQN FOR I'1ODE 'ND THIS IS SIJ JPLY A LOGICAL ENTENB ION TO THE LOLJER l1ODE. PLANT SYSTEMS LD MAIN STEAM LINE ISOLATION VALVES LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION 3.7.1.5 Each main steam line isolation valve (HSIV) shall be OPERABLE. APPLICABILITY: HODES 1, 2, 3, and 4. ACTION: MODE 1 With one HSIV inoperable but open, POWER OPERATION may continue provided the inoperable valve is restored to .OPERABLE status within 4 hours4.62963e-5 days <br />0.00111 hours <br />6.613757e-6 weeks <br />1.522e-6 months <br />; otherwise be in HOT STANDBY within the next 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br /> and in HOT SHUTDOWN within the following 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br />. HODES 2 and 3: With one HSIV inoperable, subsequent operation in HOOE 2 or 3 may proceed provided the isolation valve is maintained closed. Otherwise, be in HOI STANDBY within the next 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br /> and in HOT SHUTDOWN within the following 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br />. The provisions of Specifications 3.0.4 are not applicable. SURVEILLANCE RE UIREHEHTS 4.7.1.5 Each HSIV shall be demonstrated OPERABLE by verifying full closure within 5 seconds when tested pursuant to Specification 4.0.5. The provisions of Specification 4.0.4 are not applicable for entry into HOD@gmH ~ SHNPP RBtjpic ~i AUG 586 SHEARON HARRIS - UNIT 1 3/4 7-9 Shearon Harris Technical Specifications Resolution of Staff Comments Originator: f'5 &- Page: ~/q 7-I t. Comment Date: ij J5'jgg Comment: Section 3/4.7,4, Item - General 1. A similar LCO and surveillance Emergency Service Water System requirement should be provided for the Page 3/4 7-12: booster pumps or the booster pumps should be included as a surveillance requirement to establish the ESW system operability.

2. Add a surveillance requirement to the effect that every 18 months verify that upon loss of their respective discharge line pressures, that emergency service water pumps start automatically, and that the lineup of valves required for the switchover occurs automatically following startup of the ESW pumps.

Resolution ~~ ~ y see ~~7" ~'asis g ps4 ~a.t:+A 5ec 4 O~ An y r-Is e 'PMM ~' , g mrsv e 7.'I Resolution Acce ted: NRC CPEL Date: g Date: PLANT SYSTEMS 3/4.7.4 EMERGENCY SERVICE WATER SYSTEM a LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION 3.7.4 At least two independent emergency service water loops shall be OPERABLE. APPLICABILITY: MODES 1, 2, 3, and 4. ACT I orr: With only one emergency service water loop OPERABLE, restore at least two loops to OPERABLE status within 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br /> or .be in at least HOT STANDBY within the next 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br /> and in COLD SHUTDOWN within the following 30 hours3.472222e-4 days <br />0.00833 hours <br />4.960317e-5 weeks <br />1.1415e-5 months <br />. SURVEILLANCE RE UIREMENTS 4.7.4 At least two emergency service water loops shall be demonstrated OPERABLE:

a. At least once per 31 days by verifying that each valve (manual, power-operated, or automatic) servicing safety-related equipment that is not locked, sealed, or otherwise secured in position is in its correct position; and

b. At least once per 18 months during shutdown, by verifying that:

Each automatic valve servicing safety-related equipment or isolating non-safety portions of the system actuates to its correct position on a safety fnlection test signal, ann ~ vwt oocL msrvvret mr~ rroo~

2. Each emergency service water pump starts automatically on a safety injection test signal.

. ) SHEARON HARRIS - UNIT 1 3/4 7-12 FlNAL tjlQF PLANT SYSTEMS 3/4. 7.4 EMERGENCY SERVICE WATER SYSTEM LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION 3.7.4 At least two independent emergency service water loops shall be OPERABLE. APPLICABILITY: MODES 1, 2, 3, and 4. ACTION: With only one emergency service water loop OPERABLE, restore at least two loops to OPERABLE status within 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br /> or be in at least HOT STANDBY within the next 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br /> and in COLD SHUTDOWN within the following 30 hours3.472222e-4 days <br />0.00833 hours <br />4.960317e-5 weeks <br />1.1415e-5 months <br />. SURVEILLANCE RE UIREMENTS 4.7.4 At least two emergency service ~ater loops shall be demonstrated OPERABLE;

a. At least once per 31 days by verifying that each valve (manual, power-operated, or automatic) servicing safety-related equipment t%at is not locked, sealed, or otherwise secured in position is in its correct position; and

b. At least once per 18 months during shutdown, by verifying that:

1. Each automatic valve servicing safety-related equipment or isolating non-safety portions of the system actuates to its

. correct position on a safety injection test signal, and

2. Each emergency service water pump starts automatically on a safety injection test signal.

rt~d emen~ePCy SCHVICC <a+em. boosWca pcs~ p SHEARON HARRIS " UNIT 1 3/4 7-12 Shearon Harris Technical Specifications Resolution of Staff Comments Originator: f'~ B- <i<< 3. 7,X Comment: F cgg R Pmpu)gee b'o'R7 ot~x'(i'ag cx>> 0 ~irrcesecrrci'Ps ger be ~cti x$a ieQ a p tliei'c rtyccprrcole. /errm/m 'Aer w 'rem 6m PIrtmf ~c-(d be Sh~fdS.u n. rl~7S Shoals'S(e.r. Pecan.rrev e<<l, Resolution Basis q<A'e9 g~ &~+',>Pe~ 9>> 4 F~4F~. Resolution Acce ted: HRC ~i/, P J l< ~ CPSL D.t'. Date: PLANT SYSTEMS 3/4. 7. 5 ULTIMATE HEAT SINK LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION 3.7.5 The ultimate heat sink shall be OPERABLE with: A minimum auxiliary reservoir water level at or above elevation 250 feet Mean Sea Level, USGS datum, or a minimum main reservoir water level at or above 205.7 feet mean sea level, USGS datum, and

b. A water temperature as measured at the respective intake structure of less than or equal to 95'F.

APPLICABILITY: MODES 1, 2, 3, and 4. ACTION: With the requirements of the above specification not satisfied, be in at least HOT STANDBY within 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br /> and in COLO SHUTDOWN within the following 30 hours3.472222e-4 days <br />0.00833 hours <br />4.960317e-5 weeks <br />1.1415e-5 months <br />. SURVEILLANCE RE UIREMENTS 4.7.5 The ultimate heat sink shall be determined OPERABLE at least once per 24 hours by verifying the water temperature and water level to be within their limits'HEARON HARRIS - UNIT 1 3/4 7-13 Shearon Harris Technical Specifications Resolution of Staff Comments fP &" Fell 1 Originator: Page: +/q 7-/5 Comment Date: ig/gJ gt, Comment: Section 3/4.7.6, Item 4.7.6.d.3, Control room leakage rate to be closed Page 3/4 7-15: out by SSER, mid-August 1986. The pressurization flow rate in Technical Specification 3/4.7.6 reflects the value Carolina Power 5 Light Company (CPSL) is currently attempting to justify. This value is in the technical specifications and the staff is in the process of completing the review of the CP&L analysis. Only a couple of questions remain on the analysis and CP8L had indicated that Ebasco Services will be coming to Bethesda to go over the analysis with the staff. Resolution Basis m Resolution Acce ted: NRC CP8L Date: Date: IN L FT PLANT SYSTEMS CONTROL ROOM EMERGENCY FILTRATION SYSTEM SURVEILLANCE RE UIREMENTS Continued Revisions 2, March 1978, and the system flow rate is 4000 cfm k 10K during system operation when tested in accordance with ANSI N510-1975; and

2. Verifying, within 31 days after removal, that a laboratory analysis of a representative carbon sample obtained in accor-dance with Regulatory Position C.6.b of Regulatory Guide 1.52, Revision 2, March 1978, meets the laboratory testing criteria of Regulatory Position C.6.a of Regulatory Guide 1.52, Revi-sion 2, March 1978,'y showing a methyl iodide penetration of less than 0.175K when tested at a temperature of 30'C and at a relative humidity of 70K in accordance with ASTM D3803.

C. After every 720 hours0.00833 days <br />0.2 hours <br />0.00119 weeks <br />2.7396e-4 months <br /> of charcoal adsorber operation, by verifying, within 31 days after removal, that a laboratory analysis of a repre-sentative carbon sample obtained in accordance with Regulatory Posi-tion C.6.b of Regulatory Guide 1.52, Revision 2, March 1978, meets the laboratory testing criteria of Regulatory Position C. 6.a of Regulatory Guide 1.52, Revision 2, March 1978, by showing'a methyl iodide penetration of less than 0.175K when tested at a temperature of 30'C and at a relative humidity of 70K in accordance with ASTM D3803.

d. At least once per 18 months by:

l. Verifying that the pressure drop across the combined HEPA fil-ters and charcoal adsorber banks is less than 5.1 inches water gauge while operating the system at a flow rate of 4000 cfm a 10K.

2. Verifying that, on a safety injection and high radiation test signal, the system automatically switches into an isolation with recirculation mode of operation with flow through the HEPA filters and charcoal adsorber banks;

3. Verifying that the system maintains the control room at a positive pressure of greater than or equal to 1/8 inch Wa Gauge at less than or equal to a pressurization flow of 15 cfm relative to adjacent areas during system operation;

4. Verifying that the heaters diSsipate accordance with ANSI N510-1975; and 14 t 1.4 kW when tested in

5. Verifying that, on a High Chlorine test signal, the system automatically isolates the control room within 15 seconds and initiates a recirculation flow through the HEPA filters and

) SHEARON HARRIS ch'arcoal adsorber banks. - UNIT 1 3/4 7-15 CP &.L Comments .NPP Proof and Review Technical Specifications Record Number,: 731 Comment Type: IMPBOVE~1E.';I LCO Number: 3.07.06 Page Number: 3/4 7-15 Section Number: 4.7.6.d,&~~ Comment: CHANGE THE FIRST LINE OF SURVEILLANCE TO THE FOI LOWING: ot1 "Verifying that,4 either a safety injection or a high radi'ation test signal, the system.... Basis THIS CHANGE IS TO CLARIFY THAT TWO DIFFER NT TESTS ARE INVOLVED IN MEETING THIS SURVEILLANC T PLANT SYSTEMS SHNP P CONTROL ROOM EMERGENCY FILTRATION SYSTEM RFVIS)A~! JUL $ 86 SURVEILLANCE RE UIREHENTS (Continued Revisions 2, Harch 1978, and the system flow rate is 4000 cfm + lOX during system operation when tested in accordance with ANSI N510-~; and >980

2. Verifying, within 31 days after removal, that a laboratory analysis of a representative carbon sample obtained in accor-dance with Regulatory Position C.6.b of Regulatory Guide 1.52, Revision 2, Harch 1978, meets the laboratory testing criteria of Regulatory Position C.6.a of Regulatory Guide 1.52, Revi-sion 2, Harch 1978, by showing a methyl iodide penetration of less than 0.175K when te'sted at a temperature of 30'C and at a relative humidity of 70X in accordance with ASTH 03803.

After every 720 hours0.00833 days <br />0.2 hours <br />0.00119 weeks <br />2.7396e-4 months <br /> of charcoal adsorber operation, by verifying, within 31 days after removal, that a laboratory analysis ofw repre-sentative carbon sample obtained in accordance with Regulatory Posi-tion C.6.b of Regulatory Guide 1.52, Revision 2, Harch 1978, meets the laboratory testing criteria of Regulatory Position C.6.a of Regulatory Guide 1.52, Revision 2, Harch 1978, by showing a methyl iodide penetration of less than 0. 175X when tested at a temperature of 30'C and at a relative humidity of 70'n accordance with ASTH 03803.

d. At least once per 18 months by:

1. Verifying that the pressure drop across the combined HEPA fil-ters and charcoal adsorber banks is less than 5. 1 inches water gauge while operating the system at a flow rate of 4000 cfm i 10X 2.

amer ~ Verifying that, on a<safety injection ~ og a high radiation test signal, the system automatically switches into an isolation with recirculation mode of operation with flow through the HEPA filters and charcoal adsorber banks;

3. Verifying that the system maintains the control room at a positive pressure of greater than or equal to 1/8 inch Water Gauge at less than or equal to a pressurization flow. of 315 cfm relative to adjacent areas during system operation;

4. Verifying that the heaters dissipate accordance with ANSI N510-%0%8; and 14 i 1.4 kW when tested in

/980

5. Verifying that, on a High Chlorine test signal, the system automatically isolates the control room within 15 seconds and initiates a recirculation flow through the HEPA.filters and charcoal adsorber banks.

SHEARON HARRIS - UNIT 1 3/4 7-15 dK CP8c.L Cornxnenta NPP Proof and Review Technical Specifications Record Number: 701 Comment Type: ERROR LCO Number: 3. 07. 06 Page Number: 3/4 7-15,16 8, B~ 7 / Section Number: VARIOUS Comment: ITEMS 4.7.6.b.l, 4.7.6.d.4, 4.7.6.e, 4.7.6.f AND BASES 4.7.6 - CHANGE ANSI N510-1975 TO*ANSI N510" 1980 IN ALL PLACES Basis THIS CHANGE IS MADE FOR CONSISTENCY WITH THE FSAR. l Ft PLANT SYSTEMS SHNPP CONTROL ROOM EMERGENCY FILTRATION SYSTEM PP/lgtgg] JUL 586 SURVEILLANCE RE UIREMENTS (Continued Revisions 2, March 1978, and the system flow rate is 4000 cfm + 10K during system operation when tested in accordance with ANSI N510-%%&; and )9$ 0

2. Verifying, within 31 days after removal, that a laboratory analysis of a representative carbon sample obtained in accor-dance with Regulatory Position C.6.b of Regulatory Guide 1.52, Revision 2, March 1978, meets the laboratory testing criteria of Regulatory Position C.6.a of Regulatory Guide 1.52, Revi-,

sion 2, March 1978, by showing a methyl iodide penetration of less than 0.175K when tested at a temperature of 30 C and at a relative humidity of 70K in accordance with ASTM 03803. C. After every 720 hours0.00833 days <br />0.2 hours <br />0.00119 weeks <br />2.7396e-4 months <br /> of charcoal adsorber operation, by verifying, within 31 days after removal, that a laboratory analysis of p: repre-sentative carbon sample obtained in accordance with Regulatogy'osi-tion C.6.b of Regulatory Guide 1.52, Revision 2, March 1978,Sects the laboratory testing criteria of Regulatory Position C.6.a of Regulatory Guide 1.52, Revision 2, March 1978, by showing'a methyl iodide penetration of less than 0.175K when tested at a temperature of 30'C and at a relative humidity of 70K in accordance with ASTM 03803.

d. At least once per 18 months by:

1. Verifying that the pressure drop across the combined HEPA fil-ters and charcoal adsorber banks is less than 5.1 inches water gauge while operating the system at a flow rate of 4000 cfm 2 10K; 2.

Cmrck 8 Verifying that, on a<safety injection ~ high radiation test signal, the system automatically switches into an isolation with recirculation mode of operation with flow through the HEPA filters and charcoal adsorber banks;

3. Verifying that the system maintains the control room at a positive pressure of greater than or equal to 1/8 inch Water Gauge at less than or equal to a pressurization flow of 315 cfm relative to adjacent areas during system operation; 4, Verifying that the heaters dissipate accordance with ANSI N510-%0%8; and 14 t 1.4 kW when tested in 1980

5. Verifying that, on a High Chlorine test signal, the system automatically isolates the control room within 15 seconds and initiates a recirculation flow through the HEPA filters and charcoal adsorber banks.

SHEARON HARRIS " UNIT 1 3/4 7"15 I'QL 51N PLANT SYSTEHS 8HNPp RE'VfStC~~ CONTROL ROON EMERGENCY FILTRATION SYSTEH JUt. SSS SURVEILLANCE RE UIREHENTS Continued

e. After each complete or partial replacement of a HEPA filter bank, by verifying that the unit satisfies the in-place penetration and bypass leakage testing acceptance criteria of less than 0.05K in accordance with ANSI N510- for a COP test aerosol while operating the system at a flow rate of 4000 cfm t '10K; and After each complete or partial replacement of a charcoal adsorber bank, by verifying that the cleanup system satisfies the in-place penetration leakage testing acceptance criteria of less than 0. 05K in accordance with ANSI N510- for a halogenated hydrocarbon refrigerant test gas while perating the system at a flow rate of 4000 cfm e 10K.

SHEARON HARRIS - UNIT 1 3/4 7-16 0 SHNPP FINAL GN 'EVt8! PLANT SYSTEMS JUL 8S BASES OR'/4.7,3 COM>ONENT COOLING WATER SYSTEM The OPERABILITY of the Component Cooling Water System ensures that sufficient cooling capacity is available for continued operation of safety-related equip-ment during normal and accident- conditions. The redundant cooling capacity of this system, assuming a single failure, is consistent with the assumptions used in the safety analyses. 3/4.7.4 EMERGENCY SERVICE WATER SYSTEM The OPERABILITY of the Emergency Service Water System ensures that sufficient cooling capacity is available for continued operation of safety-related equip-ment during normal and accident conditions. The redundant cooling capacity of this system, assuming a single failure, is consistent with the assumptions used in the safety analyses. 3/4.7.5 ULTIMATE HEAT SINK l The limitations on the ultimate heat sink level and temperature ensureQhat sufficient cooling capacity is available either: (1) provide normal cooldown of the facility or (2) mitigate the effects of accident conditions within acceptable limits. The limitations on minimum water level and maximum temperature are based on providing a 30-day cooling water supply to safety-related equipment without exceeding its design basis temperature and is consistent with the recommend-ations of Regulatory Guide 1.27, "Ultimate Heat Sink for Nuclear Plants," Rev. 2, January 1976. 3/4.7.6 CONTROL ROOM EMERGENCY FILTRATION SYSTEM The OPERABILITY of the Control Room Emergency Filtration System ensures that the control room will remain habitable for operations personnel during and following all credible accident conditions. Operation of the system with the heaters operating for at least 10 continuous hours in a 31-day period is sufficient to reduce the buildup of moisture on the adsorbers and HEPA filters. The OPERABIL-ITY of this system in conjunction with control room design provisions is based on limiting the radiation exposure to personnel occupying the control room to 5 rems or less whole body, or its equivalent. This limitation is consistent with the requirements of General Design Criterion 19 of Appendix A, 10 CFR Part 50. AN - will be used as a procedural guide for surveillance test>ng. riteria for laboratory testing of charcoal and for in-place testing of HEPA filters and charcoal adsorbers is based upon a removal efficiency of 99K for elemental, particulate and organic forms of radioiodine. The filter pressure drop was chosen to be half-way between the estimated clean and dirty pressure drops for these components. This assures the full functionality of the filters for a prolonged period, even at the Technical Specification limit 3/4.7.7 REACTOR AUXILIARY BUILDING EMERGENCY EXHAUST SYSTEM The OPERABILITY of the Reactor Auxiliary Building Emergency Exhaust System <<- sures that radioactive materials leaking from the ECCS equipment within the SHEARON HARRIS " UNIT 1 B 3/4 7-3 DP'Scl Dc)mmenCm SHNPP Final Draft. Technical B~eci+icaCiun a R-:.(. v: 2 i'(;,o(!. Cc:IAAF>c.f'. Tvpc: LCQ tJui>>ber . Paste Nunib r:;./4 7-17 8 ". -1: I S", '( 4, 1 ',Jl I t'Jl.'tll'~ I 0-7-7 8'k.'s. 12 Caeini.t;t.,: Itl I"'="HS ~~. 7. 7.b1 .'P 7" 17)'nd,4 ~ ~. 12.b. ', (P CHAt tBE "C. (i5/" . Q "0. <&~i'. CH~~RCQjiL 0 7. 7, ", (P I> ~ g '~ ~ gC., 1 ~ / II f') t C. 7-1S) and 4. ~. Il $ ~ g I II ~ ~ 1='. f,!P ~'-16) CHAt!CE L4, E:, ~ IH:" ." ILTERS COVERED BY THESE TL~JQ SPECIF I AT1GNS AR" 95 . EFF ICIEt~JT. i~CCQRDI tdC TQ GENERIC LETTFP, S.--1:~. ;JARCH Z. I~a=-. W VALuE QF 1.O': IS APPROPRIATE FQ.i FIL'":ERS ASSLltIED TQ BE 95% "-.F~ I C: EN'J . THE I tuCGRRECT Vi)LUE I~V(S ERRQtdEQUSLY SL'SHIT fEU PY CP':1 . FIN D FT PLANT SYSTEMS SHNP P 3/4. 7. 7 REACTOR AUXILIARY BUILDING RAB) EME RGENCY EXHAUST SYSTEM LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION 3.7.7 Two independent RAB,Emergency Exhaust Systems shall be OPERABLE. APPLICABILITY: MODES 1, 2, 3, and 4. ACTION: With one RAB Emergency Exhaust System inoperable, restore the inoperable system to OPERABLE status within 7 days or be in at least HOT STANDBY within the next 6 hours and in COLD SHUTDOWN within the following 30 hours3.472222e-4 days <br />0.00833 hours <br />4.960317e-5 weeks <br />1.1415e-5 months <br />. SURVEILLANCE RE UIREMENTS 4.7.7 Each RAB Emergency Exhaust System shall be demonstrated OPERABLE:

a. At least once per 31 days on a STAGGERED TEST BASIS by initiating, from the control room, flow through the HEPA filters and charcoal adsorbers and verifying that the system operates for at least 10 continuous hours with the heaters operating;

b. At least once per 18 months or (1) after any structural maintenance on the HEPA filter or charcoal adsorber housings, or (2) following significant painting, fire, or chemical release in any ventilation zone communicating with the system by:

@ah, l la c.4kecoo-L

1. Verifying that the cleanup system satisfies the in-place pene-tration and ypass leakage testing acceptance criteria of less than 0.05K and uses the test procedure guidance in Regulatory Positions C.5.a, C.5.c, and C.5.d of Regulatory Guide 1.52, Revision 2, March 1978, and the unit flow rate is 6800 cfm

+ 10K during system operation when tested in accordance with ANSI N510-%8i%; zoo

2. Verifying, within 31 days after removal, that a laboratory analysis of a representative carbon sample obtained in accor" dance with Regulatory Position C.6.b of Regulatory Guide 1,52, Revision 2, March 1978, meets the laboratory testing criteria of Regulatory Position C; 6.a of Regulatory Guide 1.52, Revi-

- sion 2, March 1978, by showing a methyl iodide penetration of less than l.OX when tested at a temperature of 30 C and at a relative humidity of 70K in accordance with ASTM D3803. C. After every 720 hours0.00833 days <br />0.2 hours <br />0.00119 weeks <br />2.7396e-4 months <br /> of charcoal adsorber operation, by verifying, within 31 days after removal, that a laboratory analysis of a representative carbon sample obtained in accordance with Regulatory Position C.6.b of Regulatory Guide 1.52, Revision 2, March 1978, SHEARON HARRIS - UNIT 1 3/4 7-17 FI DRAFT PLANT SYSTEMS SHNPp RF,>/'I;. ip~i REACTOR AUX!LIARY BUILDING RAB EHERGENCY EXHAUST SYSTEM AUG 586 SURVEILLANCE RE UIREHENTS (Continued meets the laboratory testing criteria of Regulatory Position C 6.a ~ of Regulatory Guide 1.52, Revision 2, March 1978, by showing a methyl iodide penetration of less than 1.0X when tested at a temperature of 30'C and at a relative humidity of 70X in accordance with ASTN 03803.

d. At least once per 18 months by:

1. Verifying that the pressure drop across the combined HEPA filters and charcoal adsorber bank is less than 4. 1 inches water gauge while operating the unit at a flow rate of 6800 cfm + 10X,

2. Verifying that the system starts on a safety injection test signal,

3. Verifying that the system maintains the areas served by the exhaust system at a negative pressure of greater than or equal to 1/8 inch water gauge relative to the outside atmosphere,

4. Verifying that the filter cooling bypass valve is locked in the balanced position, and

5. Verifying that the heaters dissipate 40 k 4 kW when tested in accordance with ANSI N510-~.

>980

e. After each complete or partial replacement of- a HEPA filter bank, by verifying that the unit satisfies the in-place penetration leakage testing acceptance criteria of less than 0.05X in accordance with ANSI N510-~ for a DOP test aerosol while operating the unit

-at a flow rate off6800 cfm a 10X; and After each complete or partial replacement of a charco I adsorber dank, by verifying that the unit satisfies the in-place penetration leakage testing acceptance criteria of less than in accordance with ANSI N510- for a halogenated hydrocarbon efrigerant test gas while operating the unit at a flow rate of 6800 cfm 2 10X. 680 l,o% SHEARON HARRIS - UNIT 1 3/4 7-18 CPS.L Coznmenta .NPP Pr oof and Review Technical, Specifications Record Number: 702 Comment Type; ERROR I,CO Number: 3.07.07 Page Number: 3/4 7-17, 18 5B 7 Sect ion Number: VARIOUS Comment: ITEMS 4.7.7.b.l, 4.7.7.d.5, 4.7.7.e, 4.7.7. f AND BASES 4.7.7 CHANGE ANSI N510-1975 TO ANSI N510-1980. Basis THIS CHANGE IS MADE FOR CONSISTENCY WITH THE FSAR. Fm Ft PLANT SYSTEMS SHNPP ~~<~stow 3/4,7. 7 REACTOR AUXILIARY BUILDING RAB EMERGENCY EXHAUST SYSTEM JUL 566. LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION 3.7.7 Two independent RAB Emergency Exhaust Systems shall be OPERABLE. APPLICABILITY: MODES 1, 2, 3, and 4. ACTION: With one RAB Emergency Exhaust System inoperable, restore the inoperable system to OPERABLE status within 7 days or be in at least HOT STANDBY within the next 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br /> and in COLD SHUTDOWN within the following 30 hours3.472222e-4 days <br />0.00833 hours <br />4.960317e-5 weeks <br />1.1415e-5 months <br />. SURVEILLANCE RE UIREMENTS 4.7.7 Each RAB Emergency Exhaust System shall be demonstrated OPERABLE:

a. At least once per 31 days on a STAGGERED TEST BASIS by initi@ing, from the control room, flow through the HEPA filters and charcoal adsorbers and verifying that the system operates for at least 10 continuous hours with the heaters operating;

b. At least once per 18 months or (1) after any structural maintenance on the HEPA filter or charcoal adsorber housings, or (2) following significant painting, fire, or chemical relea'se in any ventilation zone communicating with the system by:

Verifying that the cleanup system satisfies the in-place pene-tration and bypass leakage testing acceptance criteria of less than 0.05K and uses the test procedure guidance in Regulatory Positions C.5.a, C.5.c, and C.S.d of Regulatory Guide 1.52, Revision 2, March 1978, and the unit flow rate is 6800 cfm i 10K during system operation when tested in accordance with ANSI N510-%%i'; iR90

2. Verifying, within 31 days after removal, that a laboratory analysis of a representative carbon sample obtained in accor-dance with Regulatory Position C.6.b of Regulatory Guide 1.52, Revision 2, March 1978, sects the laboratory testing criteria of Regulatory Position C;6.a of Regulatory Guide 1.52, Revi-sion 2, March 1978, by showing a @ethyl iodide penetration of less than 1.0X when tested at a temperature of 30'C and at a relative humidity of 70K in accordance with ASTM D3803.

c. After every 720 hours0.00833 days <br />0.2 hours <br />0.00119 weeks <br />2.7396e-4 months <br /> of charcoal adsorber operation, by verifying, within 31 days after removal, that a laboratory analysis of a representative carbon sample obtained in accordance with Regulatory Position C.6.b of Regulatory Guide 1.52, Revision 2, March 1978, SHEARON HARRIS - UNIT 1 3/4 7-17

happ PLANT SYSTEHS SH REACTOR AUXILIARY BUILDING RAB EHERGENCY EXHAUST SYSTEH REPfpfgaj JUL S SURVEILLANCE RE UIREHENTS Continued meets the laboratory testing criteria of Regulatory Position C.6.a of Regulatory Guide 1.52, Revision 2, Harch 1978, by showing a methyl iodide penetration of less than 1.0X when tested at a temperature of 30'C and at a relative humidity of 70K in accordance with ASTH D3803.

d. At least once per 18 months by:

1. Verifying that the pressure drop across the combined HEPA filters and charcoal adsorber bank is less than 4. 1 inches water gauge while operating the unit at a flow rate of 6800 cfm i 10K,

2. Verifying that the system starts on a safety injection test signal,

3. Verifying that the system maintains the areas served by ~e exhaust system at a negative pressure of greater than oP4qual to 1/8 inch water gauge relative to the outside atmosphere,

4. Verifying that the filter cooling bypass valve is locked in the balanced position, and

5. Verifying that the heaters dissipate 40 4 4 kM when tested in accordance with ANSI N510-%HP.

/R% After each complete or partial replacement of a HEPA filter bank, by verifying that the unit satisfies the in-place penetration leakage testing acceptance criteria of less than 0.05K in accordance with ANSI N510-idi&8 for a DOP test aerosol while operating the unit i at a flow rate of 6800 cfm 10K; and / After each complete or partial replacement of a charcoal adsorber bank, by verifying that the unit satisfies the in-place penetration leakage testing acceptance criteria of less than 0.05K in accordance with ANSI N510- for a halogenated hydrocarbon refrigerant test while operating the unit at a flow rate of 6800 cfm i 10%. 'as SHEARON HARRIS - UNIT 1 3/4 7"18 SHNPP PLANT SYSTEMS pp.i]<i{.,H 886 BASES 4 REACTOR AUXILIARY BUILDING EMERGENCY EXHAUST SYSTEM Continued pump room following a LOCA are filtered prior to reaching the environment. Operation of the system with the heaters operating for at least 10 continuous hours in a 31-day period is sufficient to reduce the buildup of moisture on the adsorbers and HEPA filters. The operation of this system and the resultant effect on offsite dosage calculations was assumed in the safety analyses. ANSI for laboratory testing of charcoal and for in-place testing of HEPA filters and charcoal adsorbers is based upon removal efficiencies of 95'X for organic and elemental forms of radioiodine and 99K for particulate forms. The filter pres-sure drop was chosen to be half-way between the estimated clean and dirty pressure drops for these components. This assures the full functionality of the filters for a prolonged period, even at the Technical Specification limit. 3/4. 7. 8 SNUBBERS All snubbers are required OPERABLE to ensure that the structural integrity of the Reactor Coolant System and all other safety-related systems is maia+ined during and following a seismic or other event initiating dynamic loads. Snubbers are classified and grouped by design and manufacturer but not by size. For example, mechanical snubbers utilizing the same design features of the 2-kip, 10-kip and 100-kip capacity manufactured by Company "A" are of the same type. The same design mechanical snubbers manufactured by Company "8" for the purposes of this Technical Specification would be of a different type, as would hydraulic snubbers from either manufacturer. A list of individual snubbers with detailed information of snubber location and size and of system affected shall be available at the plant in accordance with Section 50.71(c} of 10 CFR Part 50. The accessibility of each snubber shall be determined and approved by the Manager-Technical Support. The determination shall be based upon the existing radiation levels and the expected time to perform a visual inspection in each snubber location as well as other factors associated with accessibility during plant operations (e.g., temperature, atmosphere, location, etc.), and the recommendations of Regulatory Guides 8.8 and 8.10. The addition or deletion of any hydraulic or mechanical snubber shall be made in accordance with Section 50.59 of 10 CFR Part 50. The visual inspection frequency is based upon maintaining a constant level of snubber protection to each safety-related system during an earthquake or severe transient. Therefore, the required inspection interval varies inversely with the observed snubber failures on a given system and is determined by the number of inoperable snubbers found during an inspection of each system. , In order to establish the inspection frequency for each type of snubber on a safety-related system, it was assumed that the frequency of snubber failures and initiating events is constant with time and that the failure of any snubber on that system could cause the system to be unprotected and to result in failure during an assumed initiating event. Inspections performed before that interval has I SHEARON HARRIS - UNIT 1 B 3/4 7-4 Shearon Harris Technical Specifications Resolution of Staff Comments Originator: P~ P- 4.l~ Page: /g Comment Date: Rt/5Jg4 Comment: Section 3/4.7.7, Item 4.7.7.d.3, Closed item: However, value of 1/8" water Page 3/4 7-18:. gauge relative to outside atmosphere to be subject of a later proposed generic issue. With respect to the technical specification on the emergency filtration system for ECCS pump rooms, Technical Specification 3/4.7.7, the Westinghouse Standard Technical Specifications have a number inconsistent with staff practice. The number specified for negative pressure should be 1/4" water gauge versus the 1/8" listed. In addition, the measurement of the pressure differential should be made relative to all adjoining areas versus the atmosphere. Because both of these items would involve backfit considerations for Shearon Harris, PSB will not pursue them ' Resolution for Shearon Harris but will send a separate memo to FOB regarding generic implications. Basis Resolution Acce ted: NRC CPKL Date: Date: I'INAL URN I PLANT SYSTEMS REACTDR AUXILIARY BUILDING RAB EHERGENCY EXHAUST SYSTEM SURVEILLANCE RE UIREMENTS Continued meets the laboratory testing criteria of Regulatory Position C.6.a of Regulatory Guide 1.52, Revision 2, larch 1978, by showing a methyl iodide penetration of less than 1.0X when tested at a temperature of 30'C and at a relative humidity of 70K in accordance with ASTH D3803.

d. At least once per 18 months by:

l. Verifying that the pressure drop across the combined HEPA filters and charcoal adsorber bank is less than 4.1 inches water gauge while operating the unit at a flow rate of 6800 cfm i lOX,

2. Verifying that the system starts on a safety injection test signal,

3. Verifying that the system maintains the areas served by the e aust s stem at a negative pressure f reater than or equal o nc ater gauge relative to he outs> e a os er

4. Verifying that the filter cooling bypass valve is locked in the balanced position, and

5. Verifying that the heaters dissipate 40 k 4 kW when tested in accordance with ANSI N510-1975.

e. After each complete 'or partial replacement of a HEPA filter bank, by verifying that the unit satisfies the in-place penetration leakage testing acceptance criteria of less than 0.05K in accordance with ANSI N510-1975 for a DDP test aerosol while operating the unit at a flow rate of 6800 cfm k 10X; and After each complete or partial replacement of a charcoal adsorber bank, by verifying that the unit satisfies the in-place penetration leakage testing acceptance criteria of less than 0.05K in accordance with ANSI N510-1975 for a halogenated hydrocarbon refrigerant test gas while operating the unit at a flow rate of 6800 cfm t 10K.

I SHEARON HARRIS - UNIT 1 3/4 7-18 Shearon Harris Technical Specifications Resolution of Staff Comments Originator: +it ul/r'ran Lg <<<<M (J,8rn~meg page: +/p 7-/9~ ZiP Comment Date: Comment: Se R~beJ ~ rkeJ r, (~~a, r Resolution Basis ST5-- Resolution Acce ted: CPSL V Date: PLANT SYSTEMS 3/4.7.8 SNUBBERS LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION 3.7.8 All snubbers shall be OPERABLE. The only snubbers excluded from the requirements are those installed on nonsafety-related systems and then only if their failure or failure of the system on which they are installed would have no adverse effect on any safety-related system. APPLICABILITY: MODES 1, 2, 3, and 4. MODES 5 and 6 for snubbers located on systems required OPERABLE in those MODES. ACTION: With one or more snubbers inoperable on any system, within 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br /> replace or restore the inoperable snubber(s) to OPERABLE status and perform an engineering evaluation per Specification 4.7.8g. on the attached component or declare the attached system inoperable and follow the appropriate ACTION statement for that system. SURVEILLANCE RE UIREMENTS 4.7.8 Each snubber shall be demonstrated OPERABLE by performance of the following augmented inservice inspection program the requirements of Specification 4.0.5. sb As used in this specitication, type of snubber shall mean snubbers of the same design and manufacturer, irrespective of capacity.

b. Visual Ins ections Snubbers are categorized as inaccessible or accessible during reactor operation. Each of these groups (inaccessible and accessible) may be inspected independently according to the schedule below. The first inservice visual inspection of each type of snubber shall be performed after 4 months but within 10 months of commencing POWER OPERATION and shall include all snubbers. If all snubbers of each type n an sys e are found OPERABLE during the first inservice visua snspec >on, the second inservice visual inspection 4cfg~seeshall be performed at the

~t~~ st refueling outage. Otherwise, subsequent visual inspections f a iven s s shall be performed in accordance with the following'c e u e: SHEARON HARRIS - UNIT 1 3/4 7-19 PLANT SYSTEMS SNUBBEIIS SURVEILLANCE RE UIREMENTS Continued N . of Ino erable Snubbers of Each Type Subsequent Visual on An S ste er Ins ection Period Ins ection Period" "" . 0 18 months a 25K 1 12 months + 25K 2 3,4 6 months 124 days f i 25K 25K 5,6,7 62 days f 25% 8 or more 31 days f 25K

c. Visual Ins ection Acce tance Criteria Visual inspections shall verify that: (1) there are no visible indi-cations of damage or ~impaired OPERABILITY, (2) attachments to the foundation or supporting structure are functional, and (3) fasteners for attachment of the snubber to the component and to the snubber anchorage are functional. Snubbers which appear inoperable as a re-sult of visual inspections may be determined OPERABLE for the purpose of establishing the next visual inspection interval, provided that:

(1) the cause of the, rejection is clearly established and remedied for that particular snubber and for other snubbers 1w t) affected snubber is functionally tested in the as-found condition and II determined OPERABLE per Specification 4.7.8f. All snubbers connected to an inoperable common hydraulic fluid reservoir shall be counted as inoperable snubbers. assess.i~e.~~Nunc

d. Transient Event Ins ection An inspection shall be performed of all snubbers attached to sections of systems that have~experienced unexpected, potentially damaging transients as determined from a review of operational data and a visual inspection of the systems within 6 months following such an event. In addition to satisfying the visual inspection acceptance criteria, freedom-of-motion of mechanical snubbers shall be verified using at least one of the following: (1) manually induced snubber movement; or (2) evaluation of in-place snubber piston setting; or (3) stroking the mechanical snubber through its full range of travel.

"The inspection interval for each type of snubber on a given s ste shall not be lengthened more than one step at a time unless a generic problem has been identified and corrected; in: that event the inspection interval may be lengthened one step the first time and two steps thereafter if no inoperable snubbers of that type are found n a sys e "*The provisions of Specification 4.0.2 are not applicable. SHEARON HARRIS - UNIT 1 '/4 7-20 kllIHl Uter I PLANT SYSTEMS 3/4.7.8 SNUBBERS LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION 3.7.8 All snubbers shall be OPERABLE. The only snubbers excluded from the requirements are those installed on nonsafety-related systems and then only if their failure or failure of the system on which they are installed would have no adverse effect on any safety"related system. APPLICABILITY: MODES 1, 2, 3, and 4. MODES 5 and 6 for snubbers located on systems required OPERABLE in those MODES. ACTION: With one or more snubbers inoperable on any .system, within 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br /> replace or restore the inoperable snubber(s) to OPERABLE status and perform an engineering evaluation per Specification 4.7.8g. on the attached component or declare the attached system inoperable and follow the appropriate ACTION statement for that system. SURVEILLANCE RE UIREMENTS 4.7.8 Each snubber shall be demonstrated OPERABLE by perfor a of the following augmented inservice inspection program he requir ements of Specification 4.0.5. ~ O.+ As used in this specification, type of snubber shall mean snubbers of the same design and manufacturer, irrespective of capacity.

b. Visual Ins ections Snubbers are categorized as inaccessible or accessible during reactor operation. Each of these groups (inaccessible and accessible) may be inspected independently according to the schedule below. The first inservice visual inspection of each type of snubber shall be performed after 4 months but within 10 months of commencing POWER OPERATION and s ll include all snubbers. If all snubbers of each type >are found OPERABLE during the first inservi visu s

shall be performed at the sequent visual inspections f't ectim, the second inservice visual inspection ef l'utage. shall be performed ise, in accordance with the following sc e u e: SHEARON HARRIS - UNIT 1 3/4 7-19 PLANT SYSTEMS SNUBBERS SURVEILLANCE RE UIRENENTS Continued No. ble Snubbers of Each Type Subsequent Visual er Ins ection Period Ins ection Period" "" 18 months k 25K 0 1 2 12 months 6 months ii 25K 25K 3,4 124 days + 25K 5,6,7 62 days t 25K 8 or more 31 days i 25K C. Visual Ins ection Acce tance Criteria Visual inspections shall verify that: (1) there are no visible indi-cations of damage or impaired OPERABILITY, (2) attachments to the foundation or supporting structure are functional, and (3) fasteners for attachment of the snubber to the component and to the snubber anchorage are functional. Snubbers which appear inoperable as a re-sult of visual inspections may be determined OPERABLE for the purpose of establishing the next visual inspection interval, provided that: a u ar snubber and for other snubbers J'hat at may be generically susceptible; and (2 e V~ a er is functionally tested in the as-found condition and determined OPERABLE per Specification 4.7.8f. All'nubbers connected to an inoperable common hydraulic fluid reservoir shall be counted as inoperable snubbers. common to mor e sys em, e red in e surve> llance sche u he related sy

d. Transient Event Ins ection An inspection shall be performed of all snubbers attached to sections of systems that have experienced unexpected, potentially damaging transients as determined from a review of operational data and a visual inspection of the systems within 6 months following such an event. In addition to satisfying the visual inspection acceptance criteria, freedom-of-motion of mechanical snubbers shall be verified using at least one of the following: (1) manually induced snubber movement; or (2) evaluation of in-place snubber piston setting; or (3) stroking the mechanical snubber through its full range of travel.

"The inspection interval for each type of snubber shall not be lengthened more than one step at a time unless a gen roc pro em has been identified and corrected; in that event the inspection interval may be lengthened one step the first tim d tw teps thereafter if no inoperable snubbers of that type are found, "*The provisions of Specification 4.0.2 are not applicable. SHEARON HARRIS - UNIT 1 3/4 7"20 PLANT SYSTEMS I')HAL ill%I BASES REACTOR AUXILIARY BUILDING EMERGENCY EXHAUST SYSTEM Continued C pump room following a LOCA are filtered prior to reaching the environment. Operation of the system with the heaters operating for at least 10 continuous hours in a 31-day period is sufficient to reduce the buildup of moisture on the adsorbers and HEPA filters. The operation of this system and the resultant effect on offsite dosage calculations was assumed in the safety analyses. ANSI N510-1975 will be used as a procedural guide for surveillance testing. Criteria for laboratory testing of charcoal and for in-place testing of HEPA filters and charcoal adsorbers is based upon removal efficiencies of 95K for organic and elemental forms of radioiodine and 9SX for particulate forms. The filter pres-sure drop was chosen to be half-way between the estimated clean and dirty pressure drops for these components. This assures the full functionality of the filters for a prolonged period, even at the Technical Specification limit. 3/4.7.8 SNUBBERS All snubbers are required OPERABLE to ensure that the structural integrity of the Reactor Coolant System and all other safety-related systems is maintained during and following a seismic or other event initiating dynamic loads. Snubbers are classified and grouped by design and manufacturer but not by size. For example, mechanical snubbers utilizing the same design features .of the 2-kip, 10-kip and 100-kip capacity manufactured by Company "A" are of the same type. The same design mechanical snubbers manufactured by Company "B" for the purposes of this Technical Specification would be of a different type, as would hydraulic snubbers from either manufacturer. A list, of individual snubbers with detailed information of snubber location and size and of system affected shall be available at the plant in accordance with Section 50.71(c) of 10 CFR Part 50. The accessibility of each snubber shall be determined and approved by the Manager-Technical Support. The determination shall be based upon the existing radiation levels and the expected time to perform a visual inspection in each snubber location as well as other factors associated with accessibility during plant operations (e.g., temperature, atmosphere, location, etc.), and the recommendations of Regulatory Guides 8.8 and 8.10, The addition or deletion of any hydraulic or mechanical snubber shall be made in accordance with Section 50.59 of 10 CFR Part 50. The visual inspection frequency is based upon maintaining a constant level of snubber protection to each safety-related system during an earthquake or severe transient. Therefore, the required ' n interval varies inversely with the observed snubber failures and is determined by the number of inoperable snubbers found u g an establ-'sh the inspection frequency for each type of snubbe>r it ~ was assumed that the frequency of snubber failures and sn> a in events is constant with time and that the failure of any snubber ~ ~ could cause the system to be unprotected and to result in failure dur>ng n assumed initiating event. Inspections performed before that interval has SHEARON HARRIS - UNIT 1 B 3/4 7-4