IR 05000482/2016001: Difference between revisions

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==Dear Mr. Heflin:==
==Dear Mr. Heflin:==
On March 31, 2016, the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) completed an inspection at your Wolf Creek Generating Station
O n March 31, 2016, the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) completed an inspection at your Wolf Creek Generating Station. O n April 13, 2016
. On April 13, 2016
, the NRC inspectors discussed the results of this inspection with you and other members of your staff.
, the NRC inspectors discussed the results of this inspection with you and other members of your staff.


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NRC inspectors documented one finding of very low safety significance (Green) in this report.
NRC inspectors documented one finding of very low safety significance (Green) in this report.


This finding involved a violation of NRC requirements
Th is finding involved a violation of NRC requirements. The NRC is treating this violation as a non-cited violation (NCV) consistent with Section 2.3.2.a of the NRC Enforcement Policy.
. The NRC is treating this violation as a non-cited violation (NCV) consistent with Section 2.3.2.a of the NRC Enforcement Policy.


If you contest the violation or significance of th is NCV, you should provide a response within 30 days of the date of this inspection report, with the basis for your denial, to the U.S.
If you contest the violation or significance of th is NCV, you should provide a response within 30 days of the date of this inspection report, with the basis for your denial, to the U.S.
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. If you disagree with a cross-cutting aspect assignment in this report, you should provide a response within 30 days of the date of this inspection report, with the basis for your disagreement, to the Regional Administrator, Region IV; and the NRC resident inspector at the Wolf Creek Generating Station
. If you disagree with a cross-cutting aspect assignment in this report, you should provide a response within 30 days of the date of this inspection report, with the basis for your disagreement, to the Regional Administrator, Region IV; and the NRC resident inspector at the Wolf Creek Generating Station
. In accordance with Title 10 of the Code of Federal Regulations (10 CFR) 2.390, "Public Inspections, Exemptions, Requests for Withholding,"
. In accordance with Title 10 of the Code of Federal Regulations (10 CFR) 2.390, "Public Inspections, Exemptions, Requests for Withholding,"
a copy of this letter, its enclosure, and your response (if any) will be available electronically for public inspection in the NRC's Public Document Room or from the Publicly Available Records (PARS) component of the NRC's Agencywide Documents Access and Management System (ADAMS).
a copy of this letter, its enclosure, and your response (if any) will be available electronically for public inspection in the NRC's Public Document Room or from the Publicly Available Records (PARS) component of the NRC's Agencywide Document s Access and Management System (ADAMS).


ADAMS is accessible from the NRC Web site at http://www.nrc.gov/reading
ADAMS is accessible from the NRC Web site at http://www.nrc.gov/reading
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Supplemental Information cc w/ encl: Electronic Distribution
Supplemental Information cc w/ encl: Electronic Distribution


ML16116A413 SUNSI Review By: NHT ADAMS Yes No Non-Sensitive Sensitive Publicly Available Non-Publicly Available Keyword: NRC-002 OFFICE SRI/DRP/B RI/DRP/B C:DRS/PSB1 C:DRS/PSB2 C:DRS/EB1 C:DRS/EB2 NAME DDodson FThomas MHaire HGepford TFarnholtz GWerner SIGNATURE
ML16116A413 SUNSI Review By: NHT ADAMS Yes No Non-Sensitive Sensitive Publicly Available Non-Publicly Available Keyword: NRC-002 OFFICE SRI/DRP/B RI/DRP/B C:DRS/PSB1 C:DRS/PSB2 C:DRS/EB1 C:DRS/EB2 NAME DDodson FThomas MHaire HGepford TFarnholtz GWerner SIGNATURE /RA/ /RA/ /RA/ /RA/ /RA/ /RA/ DATE 4/25/16 4/25/16 4/21/16 4/21/16 4/22/16 4/20/16 OFFICE TL/DRS/IPAT C:DRS/OB C:DRP/B NAME THipschman VGaddy NTaylor SIGNATURE /RA/ /RA/ JKirkland, for /RA/ DATE 4/19/16 4/22/16 4/25/16 Letter to Adam Heflin from Nicholas H. Taylor dated April 25, 2016
/RA/ /RA/ /RA/ /RA/ /RA/ /RA/ DATE 4/25/16 4/25/16 4/21/16 4/21/16 4/22/16 4/20/16 OFFICE TL/DRS/IPAT C:DRS/OB C:DRP/B NAME THipschman VGaddy NTaylor SIGNATURE
/RA/ /RA/ JKirkland, for /RA/ DATE 4/19/16 4/22/16 4/25/16 Letter to Adam Heflin from Nicholas H. Taylor dated April 25, 2016


SUBJECT:
SUBJECT: WOLF CREEK GENERATING STATION  
WOLF CREEK GENERATING STATION  
- NRC INTEGRATED INSPECTION REPORT 05000482/2016001 DISTRIBUTION
- NRC INTEGRATED INSPECTION REPORT 05000482/2016001 DISTRIBUTION
: Regional Administrator (Marc.Dapas@nrc.gov)
: Regional Administrator (Marc.Dapas@nrc.gov)
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RIV/ETA: OEDO (Jeremy.Bowen@nrc.gov)
RIV/ETA: OEDO (Jeremy.Bowen@nrc.gov)
RIV RSLO (Bill.Maier@nrc.gov) ACES (R4Enforcement.Resource@nrc.gov)
RIV RSLO (Bill.Maier@nrc.gov) ACES (R4Enforcement.Resource@nrc.gov)
ROPreports.Resource@nrc.gov ROPassessment.Resource@nrc.gov Enclosure 1 U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION REGION IV Docket: 05000482 License: NPF-42 Report: 05000482/2016001 Licensee:
ROPreports.Resource@nrc.gov ROPassessment.Resource@nrc.gov Enclosure 1 U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION REGION IV Docket: 05000 482 License: NPF-42 Report: 05000 482/20 16 0 01 Licensee: Wolf Creek Nuclear Operating Corporation Facility: Wolf Creek Generating Station Location: 1550 Oxen Lane NE Burlington, KS 66839 Dates: January 1 through March 31, 2016 Inspectors:
Wolf Creek Nuclear Operating Corporation Facility:
Wolf Creek Generating Station Location:
1550 Oxen Lane NE Burlington, KS 66839 Dates: January 1 through March 31, 2016 Inspectors:
D. Dodson, Senior Resident Inspector F. Thomas, Resident Inspector S. Alferink, Reactor Inspector V. Gaddy, Chief, Operations Branch Approved By: Nicholas H. Taylor Chief, Project Branch B Division of Reactor Projects  
D. Dodson, Senior Resident Inspector F. Thomas, Resident Inspector S. Alferink, Reactor Inspector V. Gaddy, Chief, Operations Branch Approved By: Nicholas H. Taylor Chief, Project Branch B Division of Reactor Projects  


=SUMMARY=
=SUMMARY=
IR 05000482/2016001; 01/01/2016
IR 05000 482/20 16 0 01; 01/01/2016


  - 03/31/2016
  - 03/31/2016
; Wolf Creek Generating Station
; Wolf Creek Generating Station
; Problem Identification and Resolution The inspection activities described in this report were performed between January 1 and March 31, 2016, by the resident inspectors at Wolf Creek Generating Station and inspectors from the NRC's Region IV office
; Problem Identification and Resolution The inspection activities described in this report were performed between January 1 and March 31, 2016 , by the resident inspectors at Wolf Creek Generating Station and inspectors from the NRC's Region IV office. One finding of very low safety significance (Green) is documented in this report. This finding involved a violation of NRC requirements. The significance of inspection findings is indicated by their color (Green, White, Yellow, or Red), which is determined using Inspection Manual Chapter 0609, "Significance Determination Process."  Their cross-cutting aspects are determined using Inspection Manual Chapter 0310, "Aspects within the Cross-Cutting Areas ," issued December 4, 2014.
. One finding of very low safety significance (Green) is documented in this report
. This finding involved a violation of NRC requirements. The significance of inspection findings is indicated by their color (Green, White, Yellow, or Red), which is determined using Inspection Manual Chapter 0609, "Significance Determination Process."  Their cross-cutting aspects are determined using Inspection Manual Chapter 0310, "Aspects within the Cross-Cutting Areas," issued December 4, 2014.


Violations of NRC requirements are dispositioned in accordance with the NRC Enforcement Policy.
Violations of NRC requirements are dispositioned in accordance with the NRC Enforcement Policy.
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: '''Green.'''
: '''Green.'''
The inspectors identified a Green non-cited violation of Technical Specification 5.4.1.a for the licensee's failure to adequately develop and adjust preventive maintenance activities in accordance with Procedure AP 16B
The inspectors identified a Green non-cited violation of Technical Specification 5.4.1.a for the licensee's failure to adequately develop and adjust preventive maintenance activities in accordance with Procedure AP 16B
-003, "Planning and Scheduling Preventive Maintenance," Revision 5. Specifically, the licensee did not adequately develop a preventive maintenance replacement task and schedule for control room air conditioning unit SGK04A refrigerant sensing lines and fittings
-003, "Planning and Scheduling Preventive Maintenance," Revision 5. Specifically, the licensee did not adequately develop a preventive maintenance replacement task and schedule for control room air conditioning unit SGK04A refrigerant sensing lines and fittings. The licensee's immediate actions included securing and declaring the SGK04A system inoperable, completing corrective maintenance to eliminate the refrigerant leak, and confirming that the impacted preventive maintenance frequency was adequately established.
. The licensee's immediate actions included securing and declaring the SGK04A system inoperable, completing corrective maintenance to eliminate the refrigerant leak, and confirming that the impacted preventive maintenance frequency was adequately established.


The licensee entered this condition into the corrective action program as Condition Reports 101862 and 101867.
The licensee entered this condition into the corrective action program as Condition Reports 101862 and 101867.
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The finding has a cross-cutting aspect in the area of human performance, resources, because leaders did not ensure that personnel, equipment, procedures, and other resources are available and adequate to support nuclear safety. Specifically, leaders did not ensure procedures and other resource materials were available to support successful work performance when setting preventive maintenance activity base dates, which resulted in the licensee failing to adequately develop and adjust preventive maintenance activities associated with control room air conditioning unit SGK04A refrigerant sensing lines and fittings [H.1].
The finding has a cross-cutting aspect in the area of human performance, resources, because leaders did not ensure that personnel, equipment, procedures, and other resources are available and adequate to support nuclear safety. Specifically, leaders did not ensure procedures and other resource materials were available to support successful work performance when setting preventive maintenance activity base dates, which resulted in the licensee failing to adequately develop and adjust preventive maintenance activities associated with control room air conditioning unit SGK04A refrigerant sensing lines and fittings [H.1].
   (Section 4OA2)
   (Section 4OA2)
 
=PLANT STATUS=


==PLANT STATUS==
Wolf Creek Generating Station began the inspection period operating at full power. On February 26, 2016, operators reduced power to approximately 84 percent to support main turbine valve cycle testing. Later that day operators reduced power to approximately 70 percent to support 345 KV switchyard insulator repairs. Plant power was restored to full power later on February 26, 2016, and the plant operated at or near full power for the rest of the period.
Wolf Creek Generating Station began the inspection period operating at full power. On February 26, 2016, operators reduced power to approximately 84 percent to support main turbine valve cycle testing. Later that day operators reduced power to approximately 70 percent to support 345 KV switchyard insulator repairs. Plant power was restored to full power later on February 26, 2016, and the plant operated at or near full power for the rest of the period.


=REPORT DETAILS=
REPORT DETAILS


==REACTOR SAFETY==
==REACTOR SAFETY==
Cornerstones:  Initiating Events, Mitigating Systems, and Barrier Integrity
Cornerstones:  Initiating Events, Mitigating Systems, and Barrier Integrity 1 R 01 Adverse Weather Protection (71111.01)
{{a|1R01}}
==1R01 Adverse Weather Protection==
{{IP sample|IP=IP 71111.01}}
Summer Readiness for Offsite and Alternate
Summer Readiness for Offsite and Alternate
-Alternating Current Power Systems
-Alternating Current Power Systems
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These activities constitute d one sample of summer readiness of off-site and alternate
These activities constitute d one sample of summer readiness of off-site and alternate
-alternating current power systems, as defined in Inspection Procedure 71111.01.
-alternating current power systems , as defined in Inspection Procedure 71111.01.


====b. Findings====
====b. Findings====
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The inspectors performed partial system walkdowns of the following risk
The inspectors performed partial system walkdowns of the following risk
-significant systems:
-significant systems:
January 11, 2016
January 11, 2016 , train A emergency diesel generator January 28, 2016, train A spent fuel pool cooling  February 8, 2016, station black out diesel generator s  February 25, 2016, train B essential service water The inspectors reviewed the licensee's procedures and system design information to determine the correct lineup for the systems. They visually verified that critical portions of the systems were correctly aligned for the existing plant configuration
, train A emergency diesel generator January 28, 2016, train A spent fuel pool cooling  February 8, 2016, station black out diesel generator s  February 25, 2016, train B essential service water The inspectors reviewed the licensee's procedures and system design information to determine the correct lineup for the systems. They visually verified that critical portions of the systems were correctly aligned for the existing plant configuration
. These activities constitute d four partial system walkdown samples a s defined i n Inspection Procedure 71111.04.
. These activities constitute d four partial system walkdown samples as defined i n Inspection Procedure 71111.04.


====b. Findings====
====b. Findings====
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The inspectors then visually verified that the system was correctly aligned for the existing plant configuration.
The inspectors then visually verified that the system was correctly aligned for the existing plant configuration.


These activities constitute d one complete system walkdown sample
These activities constitute d one complete system walkdown sample , as defined in Inspection Procedure 71111.04.
, as defined in Inspection Procedure 71111.04.


====b. Findings====
====b. Findings====
No findings were identified.
No findings were identified.
{{a|1R05}}
 
==1R05 Fire Protection==
1 R 05 Fire Protection (71111.05)
{{IP sample|IP=IP 71111.05}}
Quarterly Inspection
Quarterly Inspection


====a. Inspection Scope====
====a. Inspection Scope====
The inspectors evaluated the licensee's fire protection program for operational status and material condition. The inspectors focused their inspection on four plant areas important to safety
The inspectors evaluated the licensee's fire protection program for operational status and material condition. The inspectors focused their inspection on four plant areas important to safety
:  February 8, 2016, fire area SBO, station blackout diesel generator enclosure, elevation 2000 feet February 9, 2016
:  February 8, 2016, fire area SBO, station blackout diesel generator enclosure, elevation 2000 feet February 9, 2016 , fire area A-14, auxiliary feedwater pump room 1326, elevation 2000 feet   February 25, 2016, fire area ESW
, fire area A-14, auxiliary feedwater pump room 1326, elevation 2000 feet February 25, 2016, fire area ESW
-2, essential service water pump house B train March 29, 2016, fire area A
-2, essential service water pump house B train March 29, 2016, fire area A
-28, auxiliary shutdown panel room For each area, the inspectors evaluated the fire plan against defined hazards and defense-in-depth features in the licensee's fire protection program. The inspectors evaluated control of transient combustibles and ignition sources, fire detection and suppression systems, manual firefighting equipment and capability, passive fire protection features, and compensatory measures for degraded conditions.
-28, auxiliary shutdown panel room For each area, the inspectors evaluated the fire plan against defined hazards and defense-in-depth features in the licensee's fire protection program. The inspectors evaluated control of transient combustibles and ignition sources, fire detection and suppression systems, manual firefighting equipment and capability, passive fire protection features, and compensatory measures for degraded conditions.


These activities constitute d four quarterly inspection samples, as defined in Inspection Procedure 71111.05.
These activities constitute d four quarterly inspection sample s , as defined in Inspection Procedure 71111.05.


====b. Findings====
====b. Findings====
No findings were identified.
No findings were identified.
{{a|1R06}}
 
==1R06 Flood Protection Measures==
1 R 06 Flood Protection Measures (71111.06)
{{IP sample|IP=IP 71111.06}}


====a. Inspection Scope====
====a. Inspection Scope====
On March 21 and 22, 2016, the inspectors completed an inspection of underground bunkers susceptible to flooding. The inspectors selected two underground vaults that contained risk
O n March 21 and 22, 2016, the inspectors completed an inspection of underground bunkers susceptible to flooding. The inspectors selected two underground vaults that contained risk
-significant or multiple
-significant or multiple
-train cables whose failure could disable risk
-train cables whose failure could disable risk
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====b. Findings====
====b. Findings====
No findings were identified.
No findings were identified.
{{a|1R11}}
 
==1R11 Licensed Operator Requalification Program and Licensed Operator Performance==
1 R 11 Licensed Operator Requalification Program and Licensed Operator Performance (71111.11)
{{IP sample|IP=IP 71111.11}}
 
===.1 Review of Licensed Operator Requalification===
===.1 Review of Licensed Operator Requalification===


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On February 29, 2016, the inspectors observed an evaluated simulator scenario performed by an operating crew. The inspectors assessed the performance of the operators and the evaluators' critique of their performance. The inspectors also assessed the modeling and performance of the simulator during the requalification activities
On February 29, 2016, the inspectors observed an evaluated simulator scenario performed by an operating crew. The inspectors assessed the performance of the operators and the evaluators' critique of their performance. The inspectors also assessed the modeling and performance of the simulator during the requalification activities
.
.
These activities constitute d completion of one quarterly licensed operator requalification program sample
These activities constitute d completion of one quarterly licensed operator requalification program sample , as defined in Inspection Procedure 71111.11.
, as defined in Inspection Procedure 71111.11.


====b. Findings====
====b. Findings====
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====a. Inspection Scope====
====a. Inspection Scope====
The inspectors observed the performance of on
The inspectors observed the performance of on
-shift licensed operators in the plant's main control room. At the time of the observations, the plant was in a period of heightened risk. The inspectors observed the operators' performance of the following activities:
-shift licensed operators in the plant's main control room. At the time of the observations, the plant was in a period of heightened risk. The inspectors observed the operators' performance of the following activities:   January 28, 2016, control and shutdown rod operability testing in accordance with STS SF
January 28, 2016, control and shutdown rod operability testing in accordance with STS SF
-001, "Control and Shutdown Rod Operability Verification," Revision 28, including the pre
-001, "Control and Shutdown Rod Operability Verification," Revision 28, including the pre
-job brief February 10, 2016, operator immediate response to a partial reactor trip alarm in accordance with ALR 00-083C, "Rx Partial Trip," Revision 5A February 26, 2016, reduction in power to approximately 84 percent to support main turbine valve cycle testing
-job brief   February 10, 2016, operator immediate response to a partial reactor trip alarm in accordance with ALR 00-083C, "Rx Partial Trip," Revision 5A February 26, 2016, reduction in power to approximately 84 percent to support main turbine valve cycle testing
, and later operators reduced power to approximately 70 percent to support 345 KV switchyard insulator repairs, including the pre
, and later operators reduced power to approximately 70 percent to support 345 KV switchyard insulator repairs, including the pre
-job brief In addition, the inspectors assessed the operators' adherence to plant procedures, including AP 21
-job brief In addition, the inspectors assessed the operators' adherence to plant procedures, including AP 21
-001, "Conduct of Operations," Revision 75, and other operations department policies. These activities constitute d completion of one quarterly licensed operator performance sample as defined in Inspection Procedure 71111.11.
-001, "Conduct of Operations," Revision 75, and other operations department policies. These activities constitute d completion of one quarterly licensed operator performance sample a s defined in Inspection Procedure 71111.11.


====b. Findings====
====b. Findings====
No findings were identified.
No findings were identified.
{{a|1R12}}
 
==1R12 Maintenance Effectiveness==
1 R 12 Maintenance Effectiveness (71111.12)
{{IP sample|IP=IP 71111.12}}


====a. Inspection Scope====
====a. Inspection Scope====
On March 22, 2016, the inspectors reviewed one instance of degraded performance or condition of safety
On March 22, 2016, the inspectors reviewed one instance of degraded performance or condition of safety
-related SSC - Train A spent fuel pool cooling pump surveillance testing issues
-related SSC - Train A spen t fuel pool cooling pump surveillance testing issues
. The inspectors reviewed the extent of condition of possible common cause SSC failures and evaluated the adequacy of the licensee's corrective actions. The inspectors reviewed the licensee's work practices to evaluate whether these may have played a role in the degradation of the SSCs. The inspectors assessed the licensee's characterization of the degradation in accordance with 10 CFR 50.65 (the Maintenance Rule), and verified that the licensee was appropriately tracking degraded performance and conditions in accordance with the Maintenance Rule.
. The inspectors reviewed the extent of condition of possible common cause SSC failures and evaluated the adequacy of the licensee's corrective actions. The inspectors reviewed the licensee's work practices to evaluate whether these may have played a role in the degradation of the SSCs. The inspectors assessed the licensee's characterization of the degradation in accordance with 10 CFR 50.65 (the Maintenance Rule), and verified that the licensee was appropriately tracking degraded performance and conditions in accordance with the Maintenance Rule.


These activities constitute d completion of one maintenance effectiveness sample
These activities constitute d completion of one maintenance effectiveness sample , a s defined in Inspection Procedure 71111.12.
, as defined in Inspection Procedure 71111.12.


====b. Findings====
====b. Findings====
No findings were identified.
No findings were identified.
{{a|1R13}}
 
==1R13 Maintenance Risk Assessments and Emergent Work Control==
1 R 13 Maintenance Risk Assessments and Emergent Work Control (71111.13)
{{IP sample|IP=IP 71111.13}}


====a. Inspection Scope====
====a. Inspection Scope====
The inspectors reviewed three risk assessments performed by the licensee prior to changes in plant configuration and the risk management actions taken by the licensee in response to elevated risk:
The inspectors reviewed three risk assessments performed by the licensee prior to changes in plant configuration and the risk management actions taken by the licensee in response to elevated risk:
January 11, 2016, B emergency diesel generator planned maintenance March 9, 2016, A service water pump discharge check valve planned maintenance March 23, 2016, A centrifugal charging pump planned maintenance
January 11, 2016 , B emergency diesel generator planned maintenance March 9, 2016, A service water pump discharge check valve planned maintenance March 23, 2016, A centrifugal charging pump planned maintenance


The inspectors verified that these risk assessment s were performed timely and in accordance with the requirements of 10 CFR 50.65 (the Maintenance Rule) and plant procedures. The inspectors reviewed the accuracy and completeness of the licensee's risk assessment s and verified that the licensee implemented appropriate risk management actions based on the result of the assessment s. The inspectors also observed portions of three emergent work activities that had the potential to affect the functional capability of mitigating systems or to impact barrier integrity:
The inspectors verified that these risk assessment s were performed timely and in accordance with the requirements of 10 CFR 50.65 (the Maintenance Rule) and plant procedures. The inspectors reviewed the accuracy and completeness of the licensee's risk assessment s and verified that the licensee implemented appropriate risk management actions based on the result of the assessment s. The inspectors also observed portions of three emergent work activities that had the potential to affect the functional capability of mitigating systems or to impact barrier integrity:
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The inspectors verified that the licensee appropriately developed and followed a work plan for these activities. The inspectors verified that the licensee took precautions to minimize the impact of the work activities on unaffected SSCs.
The inspectors verified that the licensee appropriately developed and followed a work plan for these activities. The inspectors verified that the licensee took precautions to minimize the impact of the work activities on unaffected SSCs.


These activities constitute d completion of six maintenance risk assessments and emergent work control inspection samples
These activities constitute d completion of six maintenance risk assessments and emergent work control inspection samples , as defined in Inspection Procedure 71111.13.
, as defined in Inspection Procedure 71111.13.


====b. Findings====
====b. Findings====
No findings were identified.
No findings were identified.
{{a|1R15}}
==1R15 Operability Determinations==


and Functionality Assessments (71111.15)
1 R 15 Operability Determinations and Functionality Assessments (71111.15)


====a. Inspection Scope====
====a. Inspection Scope====
The inspectors reviewed five operability determinations that the licensee performed for degraded or nonconforming SSCs:  February 10 and 11, 2016, operability determination of the B motor
The inspectors reviewed five operability determinations that the licensee performed for degraded or nonconforming SSCs:  February 10 and 11, 2016, operability determination of the B motor
-driven auxiliary feedwater pump with elevated piping vibrations February 11, 2016
-driven auxiliary feedwater pump with elevated piping vibrations February 11, 2016 , operability determination and extent of condition for essential service water vacuum breaker valve EFV0484 after failing its as
, operability determination and extent of condition for essential service water vacuum breaker valve EFV0484 after failing its as
-found stroke test March 3, 2016, operability determination of the turbine
-found stroke test March 3, 2016, operability determination of the turbine
-driven auxiliary feedwater pump with high particulate count in oil samples for both the inboard and outb oard pump bearings March 18, 2016, operability determination of the leaking by B containment spray pump discharge valve March 21, 2016, operability determination of the turbine
-driven auxiliary feedwater pump with high particulate count in oil samples for both the inboard and outb o ar d pump bearings March 18, 2016, operability determination of the leaking by B containment spray pump discharge valve March 21, 2016, operability determination of the turbine
-driven auxiliary feedwater pump with the steam trap bypass valve cycling The inspectors reviewed the timeliness and technical adequacy of the licensee's evaluations. Where the licensee determined the degraded SSC to be operable
-driven auxiliary feedwater pump with the steam trap bypass valve cycling The inspectors reviewed the timeliness and technical adequacy of the licensee's evaluations. Where the licensee determined the degraded SSC to be operable , t he inspectors verified that the licensee's compensatory measures were appropriate to provide reasonable assurance of operability. The inspectors verified that the licensee had considered the effect of other degraded conditions on the operability of the degraded SSC
, the inspectors verified that the licensee's compensatory measures were appropriate to provide reasonable assurance of operability. The inspectors verified that the licensee had considered the effect of other degraded conditions on the operability of the degraded SSC
. These activities constitute d completion of five operability and functionality review sample s , a s defined in Inspection Procedure 71111.15.
. These activities constitute d completion of five operability and functionality review samples, as defined in Inspection Procedure 71111.15.


====b. Findings====
====b. Findings====
No findings were identified.
No findings were identified.
{{a|1R19}}
==1R19 Post-Maintenance==


Testing (71111.19)
1 R 19 Post-Maintenance Testing (71111.19)


====a. Inspection Scope====
====a. Inspection Scope====
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-maintenance tests to verify that the licensee performed the tests in accordance with approved procedures, satisfied the established acceptance criteria, and restored the operability of the affected SSCs.
-maintenance tests to verify that the licensee performed the tests in accordance with approved procedures, satisfied the established acceptance criteria, and restored the operability of the affected SSCs.


These activities constitute d completion of five post-maintenance testing inspection samples, as defined in Inspection Procedure 71111.19.
These activities constitute d completion of five post-maintenance testing inspection samples , a s defined in Inspection Procedure 71111.19.


====b. Findings====
====b. Findings====
No findings were identified.
No findings were identified.
{{a|1R22}}
 
==1R22 Surveillance Testing==
1 R 22 Surveillance Testing (71111.22)
{{IP sample|IP=IP 71111.22}}


====a. Inspection Scope====
====a. Inspection Scope====
The inspectors observed five risk-significant surveillance tests and reviewed test results to verify that these tests adequately demonstrated that the SSCs were capable of performing their safety functions:
The inspectors observed five risk-significant surveillance tests and reviewed test results to verify that these tests adequately demonstrated that the SSCs were capable of performing their safety functions:
In-service test s:  January 7
In-service test s:  January 7 , 2016, STS EJ
, 2016, STS EJ
-100B, "RHR System Inservice Pump B Test,"    Revision 44 February 12, 2016, STS AB
-100B, "RHR System Inservice Pump B Test,"    Revision 44 February 12, 2016, STS AB
-201D, "Atmospheric Relief Valve Inservice Valve Test," Revision 27A February 17, 2016, STS EM
-201D, "Atmospheric Relief Valve Inservice Valve Test," Revision 27A February 17, 2016, STS EM
-100A, "Safety Injection Pump "A" Inservice Pump Test," Revision 39 Other surveillance tests:
-100A, "Safety Injection Pump "A" Inservice Pump Test," Revision 39 Other surveillance tests:
January 4, 2016
January 4, 2016 , STS IC-208B, "4KV Loss of Voltage & Degraded Voltage TADOT NB02  
, STS IC-208B, "4KV Loss of Voltage & Degraded Voltage TADOT NB02  
- SEP GRP 4 ," Revision 4E February 26, 2016, STS AC
- SEP GRP 4
-001, "Main Turbine Valve Cycle Test," Revision 51 The inspectors verified that these test s met technical specification requirements, that the licensee performed the tests in accordance with their procedures, and that the results of the test s satisfied appropriate acceptance criteria. The inspectors verified that the licensee restored the operability of the affected SSCs following testing.
," Revision 4E February 26, 2016, STS AC
-001, "Main Turbine Valve Cycle Test," Revision 51 The inspectors verified that these test s met technical specification requirements, that the licensee performed the tests in accordance with their procedures, and that the results of the tests satisfied appropriate acceptance criteria. The inspectors verified that the licensee restored the operability of the affected SSCs following testing.


These activities constitute d completion of five surveillance testing inspection sample s, as defined in Inspection Procedure 71111.22.
These activities constitute d completion of five surveillance testing inspection sample s , a s defined in Inspection Procedure 71111.22.


====b. Findings====
====b. Findings====
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===Cornerstone:===
===Cornerstone:===
Emergency Preparedness
Emergency Preparedness 1 EP 6 Drill Evaluation (71114.06)
{{a|1EP6}}
==1EP6 Drill Evaluation==
{{IP sample|IP=IP 71114.06}}
Emergency Preparedness Drill Observation
Emergency Preparedness Drill Observation


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==OTHER ACTIVITIES==
==OTHER ACTIVITIES==
Cornerstones:  Initiating Events, Mitigating Systems, Barrier Integrity, Emergency Preparedness, Public Radiation Safety, Occupational Radiation Safety, and Security
Cornerstones:  Initiating Events, Mitigating Systems, Barrier Integrity, Emergency Preparedness, Public Radiation Safety, Occupational Radiation Safety, and Security 4OA 1 Performance Indicator Verification (71151)
{{a|4OA1}}
 
==4OA1 Performance Indicator Verification==
{{IP sample|IP=IP 71151}}
===.1 Unplanned Scrams per 7000 Critical Hours (IE01)===
===.1 Unplanned Scrams per 7000 Critical Hours (IE01)===


====a. Inspection Scope====
====a. Inspection Scope====
The inspectors reviewed licensee event reports (LERs) for the period of January 1, 2015, through December 31, 2015
The inspectors reviewed licensee event reports (LERs) for the period of January 1, 2015 , through December 31, 2015
, to determine the number of scrams that occurred. The inspectors compared the number of scrams reported in these LERs to the number reported for the performance indicator. Additionally, the inspectors sampled monthly operating logs to verify the number of critical hours during the period. The inspectors used definitions and guidance contained in Nuclear Energy Institute Document 99
, to determine the number of scrams that occurred. The inspectors compared the number of scrams reported in these LERs to the number reported for the performance indicator. Additionally, the inspectors sampled monthly operating logs to verify the number of critical hours during the period. The inspectors used definitions and guidance contained in Nuclear Energy Institute Document 99
-02, "Regulatory Assessment Performance Indicator Guideline," Revision 7, to determine the accuracy of the data reported.
-02, "Regulatory Assessment Performance Indicator Guideline," Revision 7, to determine the accuracy of the data reported.
Line 369: Line 330:


====a. Inspection Scope====
====a. Inspection Scope====
The inspectors reviewed LERs, and reactor power trend logs for the period of January 1, 2015, through December 31, 201 5, to determine the number of unplanned power changes that occurred. The inspectors compared the number of unplanned power changes documented to the number reported for the performance indicator. Additionally, the inspectors sampled monthly operating logs to verify the number of critical hours during the period. The inspectors used definitions and guidance contained in Nuclear Energy Institute Document 99
The inspectors reviewed LERs, and reactor power trend logs for the period of January 1, 2015 , through December 31, 201 5 , to determine the number of unplanned power changes that occurred. The inspectors compared the number of unplanned power changes documented to the number reported for the performance indicator. Additionally, the inspectors sampled monthly operating logs to verify the number of critical hours during the period. The inspectors used definitions and guidance contained in Nuclear Energy Institute Document 99
-02, "Regulatory Assessment Performance Indicator Guideline," Revision 7, to determine the accuracy of the data reported.
-02, "Regulatory Assessment Performance Indicator Guideline," Revision 7, to determine the accuracy of the data reported.


Line 389: Line 350:
No findings were identified.
No findings were identified.


{{a|4OA2}}
4OA 2 Problem Identification and Resolution (71152)
==4OA2 Problem Identification and Resolution==
 
(71152)


===.1 Routine Review===
===.1 Routine Review===
Line 409: Line 367:


====a. Inspection Scope====
====a. Inspection Scope====
The inspectors select ed two issues for an in
The inspectors select ed two issues for an in-depth follow
-depth follow
-up:  On December 29, 2015, the licensee recognized that inservice testing had not been performed for one of the vacuum breaker valves (EFV0478) that had been recently installed on the train A essential service water water hammer mitigation loop. Additionally, an inservice testing procedure had not been developed or approved. The inspectors assessed the licensee's problem identification threshold, cause analyses, extent of condition reviews and compensatory actions. The inspectors verified that the licensee appropriately prioritized the planned corrective actions and that these actions were adequate to correct the condition as described in Condition Report 101760.
-up:  On December 29, 2015, the licensee recognized that inservice testing had not been performed for one of the vacuum breaker valves (EFV0478) that had been recently installed on the train A essential service water water hammer mitigation loop. Additionally, an inservice testing procedure had not been developed or approved.
 
The inspectors assessed the licensee's problem identification threshold, cause analyses, extent of condition reviews and compensatory actions. The inspectors verified that the licensee appropriately prioritized the planned corrective actions and that these actions were adequate to correct the condition as described in Condition Report 101760.


On January 5, 2016, the control room air conditioning unit (SGK04A) was identified with low refrigerant levels, and a refrigerant leak was discovered that resulted in the SGK04A unit being declared inoperable and unavailable for maintenance.
On January 5, 2016, the control room air conditioning unit (SGK04A) was identified with low refrigerant levels, and a refrigerant leak was discovered that resulted in the SGK04A unit being declared inoperable and unavailable for maintenance.


The inspectors assessed the licensee's problem identification threshold, cause analyses, extent of condition reviews and compensatory actions. The inspectors verified that the licensee appropriately prioritized the planned corrective actions and that these actions were adequate to correct the condition as described in Condition Report 101862. These activities constitute completion of two annual follow
The inspectors assessed the licensee's problem identification threshold, cause analyses, extent of condition reviews and compensatory actions. The inspectors verified that the licensee appropriately prioritized the planned corrective actions and that these actions were adequate to correct the condition as described in Condition Report 101862. These activities constitute completion of two annual follow
-up samples as defined in Inspection Procedure 71152.
-up sample s as defined i n Inspection Procedure 71152.


====b. Findings====
====b. Findings====
Line 439: Line 394:
50 a.m. on January 6, 2015, following successful testing.
50 a.m. on January 6, 2015, following successful testing.


In response to Condition Report 101867 the licensee completed a Basic Cause Evaluation. The evaluation states, "The probable cause of this failure was determined to be a missed opportunity to replace the sensing line in a timely manner which resulted in a large scale refrigerant leak on the water regulating valve sensing line Swagelok fitting/nut. An incorrect base date for a corrective action from CR [(condition report)] 76409 to implement a time directed replacement PM for the sensing lines to eliminate failure due to aging and vibration was established, resulting in a missed opportunity to replace the sensing line in a timely manner."
In response to Condition Report 101867 the licensee completed a Basic Cause Evaluation. The evaluation states, "The probable cause of this failure was determined to be a missed opportunity to replace the sensing line in a timely manner which resulted in a large scale refrigerant leak on the water regulating valve sensing line Swagelok fitting/nut. An incorrect base date for a corrective action from CR [(condition report)] 76409 to implement a time directed replacement PM for the sensing lines to eliminate failure due to aging and vibration was established, resulting in a missed opportunity to replace the sensing line in a timely manner."


The cause evaluation discussed Table 6
The cause evaluation discussed Table 6
Line 478: Line 433:
-cited violation, consistent with Section 2.3.2.a of the Enforcement Policy.  (NCV 05000482/2016001
-cited violation, consistent with Section 2.3.2.a of the Enforcement Policy.  (NCV 05000482/2016001
-01, Failure to Adequately Establish and Adjust Preventive Maintenance Activities for Control Room Air Conditioning Unit SGK04A Sensing Lines and Fittings
-01, Failure to Adequately Establish and Adjust Preventive Maintenance Activities for Control Room Air Conditioning Unit SGK04A Sensing Lines and Fittings
)  
) 4OA 3 Follow-up of Events and Notices of Enforcement Discretion (71153)
{{a|4OA3}}
  (Closed) LER 05000482/2014 00:  Post-Fire Safe Shutdown Latent Issue May Impact Ability to Achieve Safe Shutdown On November 19, 2014, the licensee determined that a control room fire scenario could result in the shutdown of the train B emergency diesel generator due to high jacket water temperature prior to establishing essential service water cooling to the emergency diesel generator. This condition would preclude the emergency diesel generator from providing the necessary electrical power to safely shutdown the plant during specific control room fire scenarios. This issue was dispositioned as n on-cited violation 05000482/2014008
==4OA3 Follow-up of Events and Notices of==
 
Enforcement Discretion (71153)
  (Closed) LER 05000482/2014 00:  Post
-Fire Safe Shutdown Latent Issue May Impact Ability to Achieve Safe Shutdown On November 19, 2014, the licensee determined that a control room fire scenario could result in the shutdown of the train B emergency diesel generator due to high jacket water temperature prior to establishing essential service water cooling to the emergency diesel generator. This condition would preclude the emergency diesel generator from providing the necessary electrical power to safely shutdown the plant during specific control room fire scenarios. This issue was dispositioned as non-cited violation 05000482/2014008
-01 in the NRC Triennial Fire Protection Inspection Report 05000482/2014008 (ADAMS Accession Number ML14352A342).
-01 in the NRC Triennial Fire Protection Inspection Report 05000482/2014008 (ADAMS Accession Number ML14352A342).


Line 490: Line 440:


These activities constitute completion of one event follow
These activities constitute completion of one event follow
-up sample, as defined in Inspection Procedure 71153.  
-up sample, as defined in Inspection Procedure 71153. 4OA 5 Other Activities (Closed) IP 92722  
{{a|4OA5}}
==4OA5 Other Activities==
 
(Closed) IP 92722  
- Follow-up Inspection for Any Severity Level I or II Traditional Enforcement Violation or For Two or More Severity Level III Traditional Enforcement Violations in a 12
- Follow-up Inspection for Any Severity Level I or II Traditional Enforcement Violation or For Two or More Severity Level III Traditional Enforcement Violations in a 12
-Month Period On January 27, 2016, the NRC issued to Wolf Creek Nuclear Operating Corporation two Notices of Violation that represented a Severity III problem. Details are discussed in NRC Inspection Reports 05000482/2015010 and 05000482/2015011. The violations were associated with licensed reactor operator medical examinations and related NRC reporting requirements. In Inspection Report 05000482/2015010, the NRC concluded that information regarding
-Month Period On January 27, 2016, the NRC issued to Wolf Creek Nuclear Operating Corporation two Notices of Violation that represented a Severity III problem. Details are discussed in NRC Inspection Report s 05000482/2015010 and 05000482/2015011. The violations were associated with licensed reactor operator medical examinations and related NRC reporting requirements. In Inspection Report 05000482/2015010, the NRC concluded that information regarding: 1) the reasons for the violations, 2) the actions planned or already taken to correct the violation s and prevent recurrence, and 3) the date s when full compliance was achieved were already adequately addressed on the docket and no response was required. Specifically, inspectors confirmed that the Wolf Creek Nuclear Operating Corporation
: 1) the reasons for the violations, 2) the actions planned or already taken to correct the violation s and prevent recurrence, and 3) the date s when full compliance was achieved were already adequately addressed on the docket and no response was required. Specifically, inspectors confirmed that the Wolf Creek Nuclear Operating Corporation
: 1) requested the NRC amend the operators
: 1) requested the NRC amend the operators
' licenses to include a restriction for the use of prescribed medication (on July 15, 2015, the NRC issued the amended license with the new restriction), 2) initiated a causal analysis that included an extent of condition review for all operators to determine if there were any further unknown medical conditions, and 3) trained appropriate personnel on NRC medical restriction requirements. Based on these facts, the NRC considers this item to be closed and no follow
' license s to include a restriction for the use of prescribed medication (on July 15, 2015, the NRC issued the amended license with the new restriction), 2) initiated a causal analysis that included an extent of condition review for all operators to determine if there were any further unknown medical conditions, and 3) trained appropriate personnel on NRC medical restriction requirements. Based on these facts, the NRC considers this item to be closed and no follow
-up inspection activity for these two Notices of Violation is planned.
-up inspection activity for these two Notices of Violation is planned.


This item is closed.
This item is closed.


{{a|4OA6}}
4O A 6 Meetings, Including Exit
==4OA6 Meetings, Including Exit==


===Exit Meeting Summary===
===Exit Meeting Summary===
Line 526: Line 470:
: [[contact::D. Erbe]], Manager, Security  
: [[contact::D. Erbe]], Manager, Security  
: [[contact::R. Flannigan]], Manager, Nuclear Engineering
: [[contact::R. Flannigan]], Manager, Nuclear Engineering
: [[contact::J. Fritton]], Oversight
: [[contact::J. Fritton]], Oversight  
: [[contact::B. Gagnon]], Superintendent, Security
: [[contact::B. Gagnon]], Superintendent, Security
: [[contact::C. Hafenstine]], Manager, Regulatory Affairs  
: [[contact::C. Hafenstine]], Manager, Regulatory Affairs  
Line 553: Line 497:
: 05000482/2016001
: 05000482/2016001
-01 NCV Failure to Adequately Establish and Adjust Preventive Maintenance Activities for Control Room Air Conditioning Unit SGK04A Sensing lines and Fittings
-01 NCV Failure to Adequately Establish and Adjust Preventive Maintenance Activities for Control Room Air Conditioning Unit SGK04A Sensing lines and Fittings
  (Section 4OA2)   
  (Section 4OA 2)   


===Closed===
===Closed===
: [[Closes LER::05000482/LER-2014-006]]-00 LER Post-Fire Safe Shutdown Latent Issue May Impact Ability to Achieve Safe Shutdown (Section 4OA3)
: 05000482/2014 006-00 LER Post-Fire Safe Shutdown Latent Issue May Impact Ability to Achieve Safe Shutdown (Section 4OA3)
: 05000482/2015010
: 05000482/2015010
-01 NOV Incomplete and Inaccurate Medical Information Resulted in Issuance of a Renewed Operator License Without a Required Medical Restriction
-01 NO V Incomplete and Inaccurate Medical Information Resulted in Issuance of a Renewed Operator License Without a Required Medical Restriction
: 05000482/2015010
: 05000482/2015010
-02 NOV Failure to Report a Permanent Change in a Licensed Operator's Medical Status and Request a Condition be Placed on the Operator's License
-02 NO V Failure to Report a Permanent Change in a Licensed Operator's Medical Status and Request a Condition be Placed on the Operator's License


==LIST OF DOCUMENTS REVIEWED==
==LIST OF DOCUMENTS REVIEWED==
Line 590: Line 534:
===Procedures===
===Procedures===
: Number Title Revision CKL
: Number Title Revision CKL
: KJ-121 Diesel Generator NE01 and NE02 Valve Checklist
: KJ-121 Diesel Generator NE01 and NE02 Valve Checklist 39 CKL
: CKL
: KU-120 SBO DG Component Checklist
: KU-120 SBO DG Component Checklist
: SYS
: SYS
: EC-100A Spent Fuel Pool Cooling Pump "A" Inservice Pump Test
: EC-100A Spent Fuel Pool Cooling Pump "A" Inservice Pump Test
: SYS
: SYS
: KJ-121 Diesel Generator NE01 and NE02 Lineup for Automatic Operation
: KJ-121 Diesel Generator NE01 and NE02 Lineup for Automatic Operation 50C SYS
: 50C SYS
: KJ-124 Post Maintenance Run of Emergency Diesel Generator  
: KJ-124 Post Maintenance Run of Emergency Diesel Generator  
: B 62D SYS
: B 62D SYS
Line 610: Line 552:
: Number Title Revision 8025-E-1021 69-13.8KV Construction Power Distribution One Line, Sheet 1 75 E-11KU01 BO DG One Line Diagram, Sheet 1
: Number Title Revision 8025-E-1021 69-13.8KV Construction Power Distribution One Line, Sheet 1 75 E-11KU01 BO DG One Line Diagram, Sheet 1
: E-13KU00 Station Blackout Diesel Generator System Schematic Index Sheet
: E-13KU00 Station Blackout Diesel Generator System Schematic Index Sheet
: E-13KU01A Schematic Diagram Class 1E Bus NB01 Feeder Brkr. 152NB0114
: E-13KU01A Schematic Diagram Class 1E Bus NB01 Feeder Brkr. 152NB0114 1 E-13KU01B Schematic Diagram Class 1E Bus NB01 Feeder Brkr. 152NB0214 1 
: E-13KU01B Schematic Diagram Class 1E Bus NB01 Feeder Brkr. 152NB0214
: E-13KU10 SBO Power Equipment Center (PEC) 120/208 VAC Power Distribution, Sheet 1
: E-13KU10 SBO Power Equipment Center (PEC) 120/208 VAC Power Distribution, Sheet 1
: E-13KU11 SBO Power Equipment Center (PEC) 480 VAC Power Distribution
: E-13KU11 SBO Power Equipment Center (PEC) 480 VAC Power Distribution
Line 617: Line 558:
: KD-7496A Distribution System Equipment Lineup Limitations
: KD-7496A Distribution System Equipment Lineup Limitations
: M-12AL01 Piping and Instrumentation Diagram Auxiliary Feedwater System
: M-12AL01 Piping and Instrumentation Diagram Auxiliary Feedwater System
: M-12EC01 Piping & Instrumentation Diagram Fuel Pool Cooling and Clean
: M-12EC01 Piping & Instrumentation Diagram Fuel Pool Cooling and Clean-Up System, Sheet 1
-Up System, Sheet 1
: M-12EC02 Piping & Instrumentation Diagram Fuel Pool Cooling and Clean-Up 7 M-12KJ05 Piping & Instrumentation Diagram Standby Diesel Generator "B" Intake Exhaust, F.O. & Start Air Sys.
: M-12EC02 Piping & Instrumentation Diagram Fuel Pool Cooling and Clean
-Up 7 M-12KJ05 Piping & Instrumentation Diagram Standby Diesel Generator "B" Intake Exhaust, F.O. & Start Air Sys.
: M-12KJ06 Piping & Instrumentation Diagram Standby Diesel Generator "B" Lube Oil System
: M-12KJ06 Piping & Instrumentation Diagram Standby Diesel Generator "B" Lube Oil System
: M-K2EF01 Piping & Instrumentation Diagram Essential Service Water Sys.  
: M-K2EF01 Piping & Instrumentation Diagram Essential Service Water Sys.  
Line 661: Line 600:
: SF-001 Control and Shutdown Rod Operability Verification  
: SF-001 Control and Shutdown Rod Operability Verification  
===Miscellaneous===
===Miscellaneous===
: Number Title Revision LR3406001
: Number Title Revision LR3406001 Precise Control Lab#1
: Precise Control Lab#1
: 003A
: 003A
: Section 1R12
: Section 1R12
Line 679: Line 617:
, through December
, through December
: 31, 2015
: 31, 2015
: EC-01 Maintenance Rule Final Scope Evaluation February 16, 2010
: EC-01 Mai ntenance Rule Final Scope Evaluation February 16, 2010
: EC-02 Maintenance Rule Final Scope Evaluation February 16, 2010
: EC-02 Maintenance Rule Final Scope Evaluation February 16, 2010
: EC-03 Maintenance Rule Final Scope Evaluation February 16, 2010
: EC-03 Maintenance Rule Final Scope Evaluation February 16, 2010
Line 686: Line 624:
: EC-06 Maintenance Rule Final Scope Evaluation February 16, 2010
: EC-06 Maintenance Rule Final Scope Evaluation February 16, 2010
: EC-07 Maintenance Rule Final Scope Evaluation February 16, 2010
: EC-07 Maintenance Rule Final Scope Evaluation February 16, 2010
: WR9078186
: WR9078186 Functional Failure Determination Checklist March 17, 2010
: Functional Failure Determination Checklist March 17, 2010
: Section 1R13
: Section 1R13
:
:
Line 699: Line 636:
: AP 16E-002 Post Maintenance Testing Development
: AP 16E-002 Post Maintenance Testing Development
: 18A
: 18A
: AP 22C-003 On-Line Nuclear Safety and Generation Risk Assessmen
: AP 22C-003 O n-Line Nuclear Safety and Generation Risk Assessmen t 22
t 22
: AP 22C-007 Risk Management and Contingency Planning
: AP 22C-007 Risk Management and Contingency Planning
: AP 29E-001 Program Plan for Containment Leakage Measurement
: AP 29E-001 Program Plan for Containment Leakage Measurement
Line 716: Line 652:
===Miscellaneous===
===Miscellaneous===
: Number Title Date 12153 Engineering Disposition:
: Number Title Date 12153 Engineering Disposition:
: Service Water Check Valve Disc Stud Pinning August 4,  
: Service Water Check Valve Disc Stud Pinning August 4, 2006 16-103
: 2006 16-103
: Control Room Risk Assessment Log/Work Schedule: Risk Assessment Dates: January 11, 2016 through January 17, 2016 January 11, 2016
: Control Room Risk Assessment Log/Work Schedule: Risk Assessment Dates: January 11, 2016 through January 17,
: 2016 January 11,  
: 2016
: 16-103
: 16-103
: Control Room Risk Assessment Log/Work Schedule: Risk Assessment Dates: January 11, 2016 through January 17,
: Control Room Risk Assessment Log/Work Schedule: Risk Assessment Dates: January 11, 2016 through January 17, 2016 January 13, 2016
: 2016 January 13,  
: 2016
: 16-103
: 16-103
: Control Room Risk Assessment Log/Work Schedule: Risk Assessment Dates: January 11, 2016 through January 17,
: Control Room Risk Assessment Log/Work Schedule: Risk Assessment Dates: January 11, 2016 through January 17, 2016 January 15, 2016
: 2016 January 15,  
: 2016
: 16-104
: 16-104
: Control Room Risk Assessment Log/Work Schedule: Risk Assessment Dates: January 18, 2016 through January 24,
: Control Room Risk Assessment Log/Work Schedule: Risk Assessment Dates: January 18, 2016 through January 24, 2016 January 21, 2016
: 2016 January 21,  
: 2016
: 16-111 Control Room Risk Assessment Log/Work Schedule: Risk Assessment Dates: March 7, 2016 through March  
: 16-111 Control Room Risk Assessment Log/Work Schedule: Risk Assessment Dates: March 7, 2016 through March  
: 2016 March 9,  
: 2016 March 9, 2 016
: 2016
: 16-112
: 16-112
: Control Room Risk Assessment Log/Work Schedule: Risk Assessment Dates: March 14, 2016 through March 20 2016
: Control Room Risk Assessment Log/Work Schedule: Risk Assessment Dates: March 14, 2016 through March 20 2016
: March 16,  
: March 16, 2016
: 2016
: 16-112 Control Room Risk Assessment Log/Work Schedule: Risk Assessment Dates: March 14, 2016 through March 20 2016
: 16-112 Control Room Risk Assessment Log/Work Schedule: Risk Assessment Dates: March 14, 2016 through March 20 2016
: March 17,  
: March 17, 2016
: 2016
: 16-113 Control Room Risk Assessment Log/Work Schedule: Risk Assessment Dates: March 21, 2016 through March 27, 2016
: 16-113 Control Room Risk Assessment Log/Work Schedule: Risk Assessment Dates: March 21, 2016 through March 27, 2016
: March 23,  
: March 23, 2016
: 2016
: Section 1R15
: Section 1R15
:
:
Line 765: Line 688:
: EN-001 Containment Spray System Valve Verification
: EN-001 Containment Spray System Valve Verification
: STS
: STS
: EN-100B Containment Spray Pump B Inservice Pump Test  
: EN-100B Containment Spray Pump B Inservice Pump Test 29
===Drawings===
===Drawings===
: Number Title Revision M-12EN01 Piping and Instrumentation Diagram Containment Spray System
: Number Title Revision M-12EN01 Piping and Instrumentation Diagram Containment Spray System
Line 791: Line 714:
: STN
: STN
: EN-001B Train B Leakage Inspection Program of CTMT Spray System
: EN-001B Train B Leakage Inspection Program of CTMT Spray System
: Performed December 18,  
: Performed December 18, 2014
: 2014


==Section 1R19: ==
==Section 1R19: ==
Line 816: Line 738:
: GN-120 Containment Cooling System Operation
: GN-120 Containment Cooling System Operation
: 38A SYS
: 38A SYS
: KJ-121 Diesel Generator NE01 and NE02 Lineup for Automatic Operation
: KJ-121 Diesel Generator NE01 and NE02 Lineup for Automatic Operation 50C SYS
: 50C SYS
: KJ-124 Post Maintenance Run of Emergency Diesel Generator  
: KJ-124 Post Maintenance Run of Emergency Diesel Generator  
: B 62D  
: B 62D  
Line 848: Line 769:
: EM-100A Safety Injection Pump "A" Inservice Pump Test
: EM-100A Safety Injection Pump "A" Inservice Pump Test
: STS
: STS
: IC-208B 4KV Loss of Voltage & Degraded Voltage TADOT NB02 Bus  
: IC-208B 4KV Loss of Voltage & Degraded Voltage TADOT NB02 Bus - SEP GRP 4 4E  
- SEP GRP 4
: 4E  
===Drawings===
===Drawings===
: Number Title Revision E-11NB02 Lower Medium Voltage Sys. Class 1E 4.16V Single Line Meter & Relay Diagram
: Number Title Revision E-11NB02 Lower Medium Voltage Sys. Class 1E 4.16V Single Line Meter & Relay Diagram
Line 901: Line 820:
: Number Title Revision
: Number Title Revision
: AP 21-001 Conduct of Operations
: AP 21-001 Conduct of Operations
: GEN 00-004 Power Operation
: GEN 00-004 Power Operation 86 STN
: STN
: SF-001 Control Rod Parking
: SF-001 Control Rod Parking
: 18A  
: 18A  
===Miscellaneous===
===Miscellaneous===
: Number Title Revision/Date
: Number Title Revision/Date LER 0 5000482/2015-001-00 Personnel Error Causes Two Inoperable Residual Heat Removal Trains March 25, 2015
: LER 05000482/2015-001-00 Personnel Error Causes Two Inoperable Residual Heat Removal Trains March 25, 2015
: LER 05000482/2015-002-01 Two Control Room Air Conditioning Trains Inoperable Due to Failure to Meet Surveillance Requirement August 26, 2015
: LER 05000482/
: LER 05000482/2015-003-00 Manual Reactor Trip due to High Steam Generator Level Transient at Low Power July 1, 2015
: 2015-002-01 Two Control Room Air Conditioning Trains Inoperable Due to Failure to Meet Surveillance Requirement August 26, 2015
: LER 05000482/2015-004-01 Incorrect Decision Results in Two Containment Isolation Valves being in a Condition Prohibited by Technical Specifications September 14, 2015
: LER 05000482/
: 2015-003-00 Manual Reactor Trip due to High Steam Generator Level Transient at Low Power July 1, 2015
: LER 05000482/
: 2015-004-01 Incorrect Decision Results in Two Containment Isolation Valves being in a Condition Prohibited by Technical Specifications September 14, 2015
: Nuclear Energy Institute Document  
: Nuclear Energy Institute Document  
: 99-02 Regulatory Assessment Performance Indicator Guideline Revision 7
: 99-02 Regulatory Assessment Performance Indicator Guideline Revision 7
Line 960: Line 874:
: 103696  
: 103696  
===Drawings===
===Drawings===
: Number Title Revision M-622.1A-00006 SGK04A & SGK04B Air Conditioner Refrigeration Schematic, Sheet 1
: Number Title Revision M-622.1A-00006 SGK04A & SGK04B Air Conditioner Refrigeration Schematic, Sheet 1 W13 M-622.1A-00007 SGK04A & SGK04B Air Conditioner Electrical Schematic, Sheet 1
: W13 M-622.1A-00007 SGK04A & SGK04B Air Conditioner Electrical Schematic, Sheet 1
: W11 M-622.1A-00008 SGK04A & SGK04B Air Conditioner Electrical Schematic W06 M-622.1A-00089 Instruction Manual for SGK04A, SGK04B, SGK05A, and SGK05B Air Conditioning Condensers
: W11 M-622.1A-00008 SGK04A & SGK04B Air Conditioner Electrical Schematic
: W06 M-622.1A-00089 Instruction Manual for SGK04A, SGK04B, SGK05A, and SGK05B Air Conditioning Condensers
: W12  
: W12  
===Work Orders===
===Work Orders===
Line 972: Line 884:
: 2016-010 RER Reportability Determination March 14, 2016
: 2016-010 RER Reportability Determination March 14, 2016
: 1015075 Electric Power Research Institute Report "Plant Support Engineering: Life Cycle Management Planning Sourcebooks  
: 1015075 Electric Power Research Institute Report "Plant Support Engineering: Life Cycle Management Planning Sourcebooks  
- Chillers" December, 2007
- Chillers" December , 2007
}}
}}

Revision as of 11:46, 8 July 2018

Wolf Creek Generating Station - NRC Integrated Inspection Report 05000482/2016001
ML16116A413
Person / Time
Site: Wolf Creek Wolf Creek Nuclear Operating Corporation icon.png
Issue date: 04/25/2016
From: Taylor N H
NRC/RGN-IV/DRP/RPB-B
To: Heflin A C
Wolf Creek
Taylor N H
References
IR 2016001
Download: ML16116A413 (34)
v • d • e


Text

UNITED STATES NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION REGION IV 1600 E. LAMAR BLVD.

ARLINGTON, TX 76011-4511 April 25, 2016 Adam C. Heflin, President and Chief Executive Officer Wolf Creek Nuclear Operating Corporation P.O. Box 411 Burlington, KS 66839

SUBJECT: WOLF CREEK GENERATING STATION - NRC INTEGRATED INSPECTION REPORT 05000482/2016001

Dear Mr. Heflin:

O n March 31, 2016, the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) completed an inspection at your Wolf Creek Generating Station. O n April 13, 2016

, the NRC inspectors discussed the results of this inspection with you and other members of your staff.

Inspectors documented the results of this inspection in the enclosed inspection report.

NRC inspectors documented one finding of very low safety significance (Green) in this report.

Th is finding involved a violation of NRC requirements. The NRC is treating this violation as a non-cited violation (NCV) consistent with Section 2.3.2.a of the NRC Enforcement Policy.

If you contest the violation or significance of th is NCV, you should provide a response within 30 days of the date of this inspection report, with the basis for your denial, to the U.S.

Nuclear Regulatory Commission, ATTN: Document Control Desk, Washington

, DC 20555-0001; with copies to the Regional Administrator, Region IV; the Director, Office of Enforcement, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Washington, DC 20555

-0001; and the NRC resident inspector at the Wolf Creek Generating Station

. If you disagree with a cross-cutting aspect assignment in this report, you should provide a response within 30 days of the date of this inspection report, with the basis for your disagreement, to the Regional Administrator, Region IV; and the NRC resident inspector at the Wolf Creek Generating Station

. In accordance with Title 10 of the Code of Federal Regulations (10 CFR) 2.390, "Public Inspections, Exemptions, Requests for Withholding,"

a copy of this letter, its enclosure, and your response (if any) will be available electronically for public inspection in the NRC's Public Document Room or from the Publicly Available Records (PARS) component of the NRC's Agencywide Document s Access and Management System (ADAMS).

ADAMS is accessible from the NRC Web site at http://www.nrc.gov/reading

-rm/adams.html (the Public Electronic Reading Room).

Sincerely,/RA/

Nicholas H. Taylor, Branch Chief Project Branch B Division of Reactor Projects Docket No.

50-0482 License No

. NPF-42

Enclosure:

Inspection Report 05000482/2016001 w/

Attachment:

Supplemental Information cc w/ encl: Electronic Distribution

ML16116A413 SUNSI Review By: NHT ADAMS Yes No Non-Sensitive Sensitive Publicly Available Non-Publicly Available Keyword: NRC-002 OFFICE SRI/DRP/B RI/DRP/B C:DRS/PSB1 C:DRS/PSB2 C:DRS/EB1 C:DRS/EB2 NAME DDodson FThomas MHaire HGepford TFarnholtz GWerner SIGNATURE /RA/ /RA/ /RA/ /RA/ /RA/ /RA/ DATE 4/25/16 4/25/16 4/21/16 4/21/16 4/22/16 4/20/16 OFFICE TL/DRS/IPAT C:DRS/OB C:DRP/B NAME THipschman VGaddy NTaylor SIGNATURE /RA/ /RA/ JKirkland, for /RA/ DATE 4/19/16 4/22/16 4/25/16 Letter to Adam Heflin from Nicholas H. Taylor dated April 25, 2016

SUBJECT: WOLF CREEK GENERATING STATION

- NRC INTEGRATED INSPECTION REPORT 05000482/2016001 DISTRIBUTION

Regional Administrator (Marc.Dapas@nrc.gov)

Deputy Regional Administrator (Kriss.Kennedy@nrc.gov) DRP Director (Troy.Pruett@nrc.gov)

DRP Deputy Director (Ryan.Lantz@nrc.gov)

DRS Director (Anton.Vegel@nrc.gov)

DRS Deputy Director (Jeff.Clark@nrc.gov)

Senior Resident Inspector (Douglas.Dodson@nrc.gov)

Resident Inspector (Fabian.Thomas@nrc.gov)

WC Administrative Assistant (Susan.Galemore@nrc.gov)

Branch Chief, DRP/B (Nick.Taylor@nrc.gov)

Senior Project Engineer, DRP/B (David.Proulx@nrc.gov)

Project Engineer, DRP/B (Shawn.Money@nrc.gov)

Project Engineer, DRP/B (Steven.Janicki@nrc.gov)

Public Affairs Officer (Victor.Dricks@nrc.gov

) Project Manager (Fred.Lyon@nrc.gov)

Team Leader, DRS/IPAT (Thomas.Hipschman@nrc.gov)

RITS Coordinator (Marisa.Herrera@nrc.gov)

ACES (R4Enforcement.Resource@nrc.gov)

Regional Counsel (Karla.Fuller@nrc.gov)

Technical Support Assistant (Loretta.Williams@nrc.gov)

Senior Congressional Affairs Officer (Jenny.Weil@nrc.gov)

RIV Congressional Affairs Officer (Angel.Moreno@nrc.gov)

RIV/ETA: OEDO (Jeremy.Bowen@nrc.gov)

RIV RSLO (Bill.Maier@nrc.gov) ACES (R4Enforcement.Resource@nrc.gov)

ROPreports.Resource@nrc.gov ROPassessment.Resource@nrc.gov Enclosure 1 U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION REGION IV Docket: 05000 482 License: NPF-42 Report: 05000 482/20 16 0 01 Licensee: Wolf Creek Nuclear Operating Corporation Facility: Wolf Creek Generating Station Location: 1550 Oxen Lane NE Burlington, KS 66839 Dates: January 1 through March 31, 2016 Inspectors:

D. Dodson, Senior Resident Inspector F. Thomas, Resident Inspector S. Alferink, Reactor Inspector V. Gaddy, Chief, Operations Branch Approved By: Nicholas H. Taylor Chief, Project Branch B Division of Reactor Projects

SUMMARY

IR 05000 482/20 16 0 01; 01/01/2016

- 03/31/2016

Wolf Creek Generating Station
Problem Identification and Resolution The inspection activities described in this report were performed between January 1 and March 31, 2016 , by the resident inspectors at Wolf Creek Generating Station and inspectors from the NRC's Region IV office. One finding of very low safety significance (Green) is documented in this report. This finding involved a violation of NRC requirements. The significance of inspection findings is indicated by their color (Green, White, Yellow, or Red), which is determined using Inspection Manual Chapter 0609, "Significance Determination Process." Their cross-cutting aspects are determined using Inspection Manual Chapter 0310, "Aspects within the Cross-Cutting Areas ," issued December 4, 2014.

Violations of NRC requirements are dispositioned in accordance with the NRC Enforcement Policy.

The NRC's program for overseeing the safe operation of commercial nuclear power reactors is described in NUREG-1649, "Reactor Oversight Process."

Cornerstone: Mitigating Systems

Green.

The inspectors identified a Green non-cited violation of Technical Specification 5.4.1.a for the licensee's failure to adequately develop and adjust preventive maintenance activities in accordance with Procedure AP 16B

-003, "Planning and Scheduling Preventive Maintenance," Revision 5. Specifically, the licensee did not adequately develop a preventive maintenance replacement task and schedule for control room air conditioning unit SGK04A refrigerant sensing lines and fittings. The licensee's immediate actions included securing and declaring the SGK04A system inoperable, completing corrective maintenance to eliminate the refrigerant leak, and confirming that the impacted preventive maintenance frequency was adequately established.

The licensee entered this condition into the corrective action program as Condition Reports 101862 and 101867.

This finding is more than minor because it is associated with the equipment performance attribute of the Mitigating Systems cornerstone and adversely affected the cornerstone objective to ensure the availability, reliability, and capability of systems that respond to initiating events to prevent undesirable consequences. The inspectors utilized Inspection Manual Chapter 0609, Appendix A, "Significance Determination Process (SDP) for Findings At-Power," issued June 19, 2012. The inspectors determined this finding is not a deficiency affecting the design or qualification of a mitigating structures, systems, and components (SSC) that maintained its operability or functionality, the finding does not represent a loss of system and/or function, the finding does not represent an actual loss of function of at least a single train for greater than it Technical Specification allowed outage time, and the finding does not represent an actual loss of function of one or more non-Technical Specification trains of equipment designated as high safety-significant. Therefore, the inspectors determined the finding was of very low safety significance (Green).

The finding has a cross-cutting aspect in the area of human performance, resources, because leaders did not ensure that personnel, equipment, procedures, and other resources are available and adequate to support nuclear safety. Specifically, leaders did not ensure procedures and other resource materials were available to support successful work performance when setting preventive maintenance activity base dates, which resulted in the licensee failing to adequately develop and adjust preventive maintenance activities associated with control room air conditioning unit SGK04A refrigerant sensing lines and fittings [H.1].

(Section 4OA2)

PLANT STATUS

Wolf Creek Generating Station began the inspection period operating at full power. On February 26, 2016, operators reduced power to approximately 84 percent to support main turbine valve cycle testing. Later that day operators reduced power to approximately 70 percent to support 345 KV switchyard insulator repairs. Plant power was restored to full power later on February 26, 2016, and the plant operated at or near full power for the rest of the period.

REPORT DETAILS

REACTOR SAFETY

Cornerstones: Initiating Events, Mitigating Systems, and Barrier Integrity 1 R 01 Adverse Weather Protection (71111.01)

Summer Readiness for Offsite and Alternate

-Alternating Current Power Systems

a. Inspection Scope

On February 26, 2016, the inspectors completed an inspection of the station's off

-site and alternate

-alternating current power systems.

The inspectors inspected the material condition of these systems, including transformers and other switchyard equipment to verify that plant features and procedures were appropriate for operation and continued availability of off

-site and alternate

-alternating current power systems. The inspectors reviewed outstanding work orders and open condition reports for these systems

. The inspectors walked down the switchyard to observe the material condition of equipment providing off-site power sources. The inspectors assessed corrective actions for identified degraded conditions and verified that the licensee had considered the degraded conditions in its risk evaluations and had established appropriate compensatory measures.

The inspectors verified that the licensee's procedures included appropriate measures to monitor and maintain availability and reliability of the off

-site and alternate-alternating current power systems.

These activities constitute d one sample of summer readiness of off-site and alternate

-alternating current power systems , as defined in Inspection Procedure 71111.01.

b. Findings

No findings were identified.

1R04 Equipment Alignment

Main article: IP 71111.04

.1 Partial Walk

down

a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors performed partial system walkdowns of the following risk

-significant systems:

January 11, 2016 , train A emergency diesel generator January 28, 2016, train A spent fuel pool cooling February 8, 2016, station black out diesel generator s February 25, 2016, train B essential service water The inspectors reviewed the licensee's procedures and system design information to determine the correct lineup for the systems. They visually verified that critical portions of the systems were correctly aligned for the existing plant configuration

. These activities constitute d four partial system walkdown samples a s defined i n Inspection Procedure 71111.04.

b. Findings

No findings were identified.

.2 Complete Walkdown

a. Inspection Scope

On March 29, 2016, the inspectors completed a complete system walkdown inspection of the train A motor driven auxiliary feedwater system. The inspectors reviewed the licensee's procedures and system design information to determine the correct A motor driven auxiliary feedwater system lineup for the existing plant configuration. The inspectors also reviewed outstanding work orders, open condition reports, and other open items tracked by the licensee's operations and engineering departments.

The inspectors then visually verified that the system was correctly aligned for the existing plant configuration.

These activities constitute d one complete system walkdown sample , as defined in Inspection Procedure 71111.04.

b. Findings

No findings were identified.

1 R 05 Fire Protection (71111.05)

Quarterly Inspection

a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors evaluated the licensee's fire protection program for operational status and material condition. The inspectors focused their inspection on four plant areas important to safety

February 8, 2016, fire area SBO, station blackout diesel generator enclosure, elevation 2000 feet February 9, 2016 , fire area A-14, auxiliary feedwater pump room 1326, elevation 2000 feet February 25, 2016, fire area ESW

-2, essential service water pump house B train March 29, 2016, fire area A

-28, auxiliary shutdown panel room For each area, the inspectors evaluated the fire plan against defined hazards and defense-in-depth features in the licensee's fire protection program. The inspectors evaluated control of transient combustibles and ignition sources, fire detection and suppression systems, manual firefighting equipment and capability, passive fire protection features, and compensatory measures for degraded conditions.

These activities constitute d four quarterly inspection sample s , as defined in Inspection Procedure 71111.05.

b. Findings

No findings were identified.

1 R 06 Flood Protection Measures (71111.06)

a. Inspection Scope

O n March 21 and 22, 2016, the inspectors completed an inspection of underground bunkers susceptible to flooding. The inspectors selected two underground vaults that contained risk

-significant or multiple

-train cables whose failure could disable risk

-significant equipment

Train A essential service water system manhole MHE2A Train A essential service water system manhole MHE3A The inspectors observed the material condition of the cables and splices contained in the vaults and looked for evidence of cable degradation due to water intrusion.

The inspectors verified that the cables and vaults met design requirements.

These activities constitute d completion of one flood protection measures sample, which consisted of two bunker/manhole inspections, as defined in Inspection Procedure 71111.06.

b. Findings

No findings were identified.

1 R 11 Licensed Operator Requalification Program and Licensed Operator Performance (71111.11)

.1 Review of Licensed Operator Requalification

a. Inspection Scope

On February 29, 2016, the inspectors observed an evaluated simulator scenario performed by an operating crew. The inspectors assessed the performance of the operators and the evaluators' critique of their performance. The inspectors also assessed the modeling and performance of the simulator during the requalification activities

.

These activities constitute d completion of one quarterly licensed operator requalification program sample , as defined in Inspection Procedure 71111.11.

b. Findings

No findings were identified.

.2 Review of Licensed Operator Performance

a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors observed the performance of on

-shift licensed operators in the plant's main control room. At the time of the observations, the plant was in a period of heightened risk. The inspectors observed the operators' performance of the following activities: January 28, 2016, control and shutdown rod operability testing in accordance with STS SF

-001, "Control and Shutdown Rod Operability Verification," Revision 28, including the pre

-job brief February 10, 2016, operator immediate response to a partial reactor trip alarm in accordance with ALR 00-083C, "Rx Partial Trip," Revision 5A February 26, 2016, reduction in power to approximately 84 percent to support main turbine valve cycle testing

, and later operators reduced power to approximately 70 percent to support 345 KV switchyard insulator repairs, including the pre

-job brief In addition, the inspectors assessed the operators' adherence to plant procedures, including AP 21

-001, "Conduct of Operations," Revision 75, and other operations department policies. These activities constitute d completion of one quarterly licensed operator performance sample a s defined in Inspection Procedure 71111.11.

b. Findings

No findings were identified.

1 R 12 Maintenance Effectiveness (71111.12)

a. Inspection Scope

On March 22, 2016, the inspectors reviewed one instance of degraded performance or condition of safety

-related SSC - Train A spen t fuel pool cooling pump surveillance testing issues

. The inspectors reviewed the extent of condition of possible common cause SSC failures and evaluated the adequacy of the licensee's corrective actions. The inspectors reviewed the licensee's work practices to evaluate whether these may have played a role in the degradation of the SSCs. The inspectors assessed the licensee's characterization of the degradation in accordance with 10 CFR 50.65 (the Maintenance Rule), and verified that the licensee was appropriately tracking degraded performance and conditions in accordance with the Maintenance Rule.

These activities constitute d completion of one maintenance effectiveness sample , a s defined in Inspection Procedure 71111.12.

b. Findings

No findings were identified.

1 R 13 Maintenance Risk Assessments and Emergent Work Control (71111.13)

a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors reviewed three risk assessments performed by the licensee prior to changes in plant configuration and the risk management actions taken by the licensee in response to elevated risk:

January 11, 2016 , B emergency diesel generator planned maintenance March 9, 2016, A service water pump discharge check valve planned maintenance March 23, 2016, A centrifugal charging pump planned maintenance

The inspectors verified that these risk assessment s were performed timely and in accordance with the requirements of 10 CFR 50.65 (the Maintenance Rule) and plant procedures. The inspectors reviewed the accuracy and completeness of the licensee's risk assessment s and verified that the licensee implemented appropriate risk management actions based on the result of the assessment s. The inspectors also observed portions of three emergent work activities that had the potential to affect the functional capability of mitigating systems or to impact barrier integrity:

January 21, 2016, unplanned A emergency diesel generator voltage regulator handswitch replacement March 17, 2016, unplanned B containment spray discharge isolation valve troubleshooting March 24, 2016, unplanned control building air conditioning unit SGK04B refrigerant leak corrective maintenance and control room emergency ventilation radiation monitor test failure

The inspectors verified that the licensee appropriately developed and followed a work plan for these activities. The inspectors verified that the licensee took precautions to minimize the impact of the work activities on unaffected SSCs.

These activities constitute d completion of six maintenance risk assessments and emergent work control inspection samples , as defined in Inspection Procedure 71111.13.

b. Findings

No findings were identified.

1 R 15 Operability Determinations and Functionality Assessments (71111.15)

a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors reviewed five operability determinations that the licensee performed for degraded or nonconforming SSCs: February 10 and 11, 2016, operability determination of the B motor

-driven auxiliary feedwater pump with elevated piping vibrations February 11, 2016 , operability determination and extent of condition for essential service water vacuum breaker valve EFV0484 after failing its as

-found stroke test March 3, 2016, operability determination of the turbine

-driven auxiliary feedwater pump with high particulate count in oil samples for both the inboard and outb o ar d pump bearings March 18, 2016, operability determination of the leaking by B containment spray pump discharge valve March 21, 2016, operability determination of the turbine

-driven auxiliary feedwater pump with the steam trap bypass valve cycling The inspectors reviewed the timeliness and technical adequacy of the licensee's evaluations. Where the licensee determined the degraded SSC to be operable , t he inspectors verified that the licensee's compensatory measures were appropriate to provide reasonable assurance of operability. The inspectors verified that the licensee had considered the effect of other degraded conditions on the operability of the degraded SSC

. These activities constitute d completion of five operability and functionality review sample s , a s defined in Inspection Procedure 71111.15.

b. Findings

No findings were identified.

1 R 19 Post-Maintenance Testing (71111.19)

a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors reviewed five post-maintenance testing activities that affected risk

-significant SSCs: January 6, 2016, B centrifugal charging pump following planned maintenance January 11, 2016, B emergency diesel generator following planned maintenance February 9, 2016, diesel fire pump following planned maintenance February 9 through 10, 2016, B motor driven auxiliary feedwater pump following planned maintenance February 18, 2016, A containment cooler fan motor following planned maintenance The inspectors reviewed licensing- and design-basis documents for the SSCs and the maintenance and post-maintenance test procedures.

The inspectors observed the performance of the post

-maintenance tests to verify that the licensee performed the tests in accordance with approved procedures, satisfied the established acceptance criteria, and restored the operability of the affected SSCs.

These activities constitute d completion of five post-maintenance testing inspection samples , a s defined in Inspection Procedure 71111.19.

b. Findings

No findings were identified.

1 R 22 Surveillance Testing (71111.22)

a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors observed five risk-significant surveillance tests and reviewed test results to verify that these tests adequately demonstrated that the SSCs were capable of performing their safety functions:

In-service test s: January 7 , 2016, STS EJ

-100B, "RHR System Inservice Pump B Test," Revision 44 February 12, 2016, STS AB

-201D, "Atmospheric Relief Valve Inservice Valve Test," Revision 27A February 17, 2016, STS EM

-100A, "Safety Injection Pump "A" Inservice Pump Test," Revision 39 Other surveillance tests:

January 4, 2016 , STS IC-208B, "4KV Loss of Voltage & Degraded Voltage TADOT NB02

- SEP GRP 4 ," Revision 4E February 26, 2016, STS AC

-001, "Main Turbine Valve Cycle Test," Revision 51 The inspectors verified that these test s met technical specification requirements, that the licensee performed the tests in accordance with their procedures, and that the results of the test s satisfied appropriate acceptance criteria. The inspectors verified that the licensee restored the operability of the affected SSCs following testing.

These activities constitute d completion of five surveillance testing inspection sample s , a s defined in Inspection Procedure 71111.22.

b. Findings

No findings were identified.

Cornerstone:

Emergency Preparedness 1 EP 6 Drill Evaluation (71114.06)

Emergency Preparedness Drill Observation

a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors observed an emergency preparedness drill on February 17, 2016, to verify the adequacy and capability of the licensee's assessment of drill performance.

The inspectors reviewed the drill scenario, observed the drill from the Technical Support Center and Emergency Operations Facility, and attended the post-drill critique. The inspectors verified that the licensee's emergency classifications, off

-site notifications, and protective action recommendations were appropriate and timely. The inspectors verified that any emergency preparedness weaknesses were appropriately identified by the licensee in the post

-drill critique and entered into the corrective action program for resolution.

These activities constitute d completion of one emergency preparedness drill observation sample, as defined in Inspection Procedure 71114.06.

b. Findings

No findings were identified.

OTHER ACTIVITIES

Cornerstones: Initiating Events, Mitigating Systems, Barrier Integrity, Emergency Preparedness, Public Radiation Safety, Occupational Radiation Safety, and Security 4OA 1 Performance Indicator Verification (71151)

.1 Unplanned Scrams per 7000 Critical Hours (IE01)

a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors reviewed licensee event reports (LERs) for the period of January 1, 2015 , through December 31, 2015

, to determine the number of scrams that occurred. The inspectors compared the number of scrams reported in these LERs to the number reported for the performance indicator. Additionally, the inspectors sampled monthly operating logs to verify the number of critical hours during the period. The inspectors used definitions and guidance contained in Nuclear Energy Institute Document 99

-02, "Regulatory Assessment Performance Indicator Guideline," Revision 7, to determine the accuracy of the data reported.

These activities constituted verification of the unplanned scrams per 7000 critical hours performance indicator, as defined in Inspection Procedure 71151.

b. Findings

No findings were identified.

.2 Unplanned Power Changes per 7000 Critical Hours (IE03)

a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors reviewed LERs, and reactor power trend logs for the period of January 1, 2015 , through December 31, 201 5 , to determine the number of unplanned power changes that occurred. The inspectors compared the number of unplanned power changes documented to the number reported for the performance indicator. Additionally, the inspectors sampled monthly operating logs to verify the number of critical hours during the period. The inspectors used definitions and guidance contained in Nuclear Energy Institute Document 99

-02, "Regulatory Assessment Performance Indicator Guideline," Revision 7, to determine the accuracy of the data reported.

These activities constituted verification of the unplanned power outages per 7000 critical hours performance indicator, as defined in Inspection Procedure 71151.

b. Findings

No findings were identified.

.3 Unplanned Scrams with Complications (IE04)

a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors reviewed the licensee's basis for including or excluding in this performance indicator for each scram that occurred between January 1, 2015

, and December 31, 2015. The inspectors used definitions and guidance contained in Nuclear Energy Institute Document 99

-02, "Regulatory Assessment Performance Indicator Guideline," Revision 7, to determine the accuracy of the data reported.

These activities constituted verification of the unplanned scrams with complications performance indicator, as defined in Inspection Procedure 71151.

b. Findings

No findings were identified.

4OA 2 Problem Identification and Resolution (71152)

.1 Routine Review

a. Inspection Scope

Throughout the inspection period, the inspectors performed daily reviews of items entered into the licensee's corrective action program and periodically attended the licensee's condition report screening meetings. The inspectors verified that licensee personnel were identifying problems at an appropriate threshold and entering these problems into the corrective action program for resolution. The inspectors verified that the licensee developed and implemented corrective actions commensurate with the significance of the problems identified.

The inspectors also reviewed the licensee's problem identification and resolution activities during the performance of the other inspection activities documented in this report.

b. Findings

No findings were identified.

.2 Annual Follow

-up of Selected Issues

a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors select ed two issues for an in-depth follow

-up: On December 29, 2015, the licensee recognized that inservice testing had not been performed for one of the vacuum breaker valves (EFV0478) that had been recently installed on the train A essential service water water hammer mitigation loop. Additionally, an inservice testing procedure had not been developed or approved. The inspectors assessed the licensee's problem identification threshold, cause analyses, extent of condition reviews and compensatory actions. The inspectors verified that the licensee appropriately prioritized the planned corrective actions and that these actions were adequate to correct the condition as described in Condition Report 101760.

On January 5, 2016, the control room air conditioning unit (SGK04A) was identified with low refrigerant levels, and a refrigerant leak was discovered that resulted in the SGK04A unit being declared inoperable and unavailable for maintenance.

The inspectors assessed the licensee's problem identification threshold, cause analyses, extent of condition reviews and compensatory actions. The inspectors verified that the licensee appropriately prioritized the planned corrective actions and that these actions were adequate to correct the condition as described in Condition Report 101862. These activities constitute completion of two annual follow

-up sample s as defined i n Inspection Procedure 71152.

b. Findings

Introduction.

The inspectors identified a Green non

-cited violation of Technical Specification 5.4.1.a for the licensee's failure to adequately develop and adjust preventive maintenance activities in accordance with Procedure AP 16B

-003, "Planning and Scheduling Preventive Maintenance," Revision 5. Specifically, the licensee did not adequately develop a preventive maintenance replacement task and schedule for control room air conditioning unit SGK04A refrigerant sensing lines and fittings; as a result, a "large scale" leak was identified that resulted in the SGK04A unit being declared inoperable and unavailable

, required corrective maintenance

, and resulted in unplanned entries into Condition A of Technical Specifications 3.7.10 and 3.7.11.

Description.

On January 5, 2016, Condition Report 101862, documented that control room air conditioning unit SGK04A refrigerant level was found low. The control room air conditioning system is designed to maintain the control room temperature for 30 days of continuous occupancy. In response to Condition Report 101862 Wolf Creek personnel completed refrigerant leak checks in accordance with Work Order 16 410207

-000 and identified a "large scale" leak where the water regulating valve (GKV0765) capillary sensing line attaches to a Swagelok bulkhead fitting at isolation valve number 7

-this condition was documented in Condition Report 101867. A "large scale" leak is defined by Procedure MPE GK

-003, "Control Room and Class 1E A/C Units Preventive Maintenance Activity," Revision 6, as any leak greater than 5 ounces per year.

The SGK04A system was immediately secured and declared inoperable on January 5, 2016, due to the location and size of the leak. As a result, at 6:58 p.m. on January 5, 2016, the station entered Technical Specification 3.7.11, Condition A, for one control room air conditioning system train inoperable. At 12:13 a.m. on January 6, 2016, the station entered Technical Specification 3.7.10, Condition A, for one control room emergency ventilation system train inoperable while the sensing line and fitting were replaced. Following completion of corrective maintenance

, the SGK04A unit was restored to service and applicable Technical Specification conditions were exited at 4:

50 a.m. on January 6, 2015, following successful testing.

In response to Condition Report 101867 the licensee completed a Basic Cause Evaluation. The evaluation states, "The probable cause of this failure was determined to be a missed opportunity to replace the sensing line in a timely manner which resulted in a large scale refrigerant leak on the water regulating valve sensing line Swagelok fitting/nut. An incorrect base date for a corrective action from CR [(condition report)] 76409 to implement a time directed replacement PM for the sensing lines to eliminate failure due to aging and vibration was established, resulting in a missed opportunity to replace the sensing line in a timely manner."

The cause evaluation discussed Table 6

-2, "Degradation Mechanisms," of Electric Power Research Institute report 1015075, "Plant Support Engineering: Life Cycle Management Planning Sourcebooks

- Chillers," December 2007, which notes that refrigerant operated control valve capillary lines are expected to be "failu re-free for 10 years."

Evaluation determined that the preventive maintenance activity base date had been incorrectly set because the station utilized the last replacement date of the suction sensing line coming from the suction of the compressor

-the licensee determined that the replacement date of the water regulating valve sensing line and fittings should have been used instead. The water regulating valve sensing line associated with the SGK04A unit had been in place since installation of the SGK04A skid in 2004, approximately 12 years prior to the component's failure.

The inspectors noted that Procedure AP 16B

-003, "Planning and Scheduling Preventive Maintenance," Revision 5, provides direction for implementing the preventive maintenance program. Section 6.2.2 states, "PM [(preventive maintenance)] frequencies are established and adjusted in accordance with AI 16B

-002, Updating the PM Activity Module and the following considerations-The age of the installed equipment." The inspectors determined that the preventive maintenance frequency for replacement of the SGK04A water regulating valve sensing line and fittings was not adequately established and the age of installed equipment adequately considered.

The inspectors reviewed the Basic Cause Evaluation associated with Condition Report 101867 and noted the actions taken. Specifically, Wolf Creek took immediate actions to replace the impacted sensing line and Swagelok nut associated with SGK04A and returned the unit to service. The station also verified that the base date was adequately set to ensure that future SGK04A water regulating valve sensing line replacements would occur within five years (April 23, 2018) of the most recent sensing line and Swagelok nut replacement (January 6, 2016). The "Actions Planned" section stated, "No further actions are required to minimize recurrence of the failure based on the probable cause." The inspectors questioned whether any corrective actions had been taken or documented to address the probable cause

-"An incorrect base date for a corrective action from CR [(condition report)] 76409"

-and the inspectors determined that no actions had been taken to understand or correct why the base date was incorrectly set.

The inspectors determined through interviews and document reviews that procedure guidance associated with setting preventive maintenance base dates lacked sufficient detail to ensure that preventive maintenance activities associated with safety

-related equipment are completed commensurate with their safety significance. The licensee initiated Condition Report 103694 in response to the inspectors' questions and is evaluating what additional corrective actions are needed.

Analysis.

The inspectors determined that the licensee's failure to adequately develop and adjust preventive maintenance activities associated with control room air conditioning unit SGK04A refrigerant sensing lines and fittings was a performance deficiency. This finding is more than minor because it is associated with the equipment performance attribute of the Mitigating Systems cornerstone and adversely affected the cornerstone objective to ensure the availability, reliability, and capability of systems that respond to initiating events to prevent undesirable consequences.

The inspectors evaluated the finding using Attachment 0609.04, "Initial Characterization of Findings," worksheet to Inspection Manual Chapter (IMC) 0609, "Significance Determination Process," issued June 19, 2012. The attachment instructs the inspectors to utilize IMC 0609, Appendix A, "Significance Determination Process (SDP) for Findings At

-Power," issued June 19, 2012. The inspectors determined this finding is not a deficiency affecting the design or qualification of a mitigating SSC that maintained its operability or functionality, the finding does not represent a loss of system and/or function, the finding does not represent an actual loss of function of at least a single train for greater than it Technical Specification allowed outage time, and the finding does not represent an actual loss of function of one or more non

-Technical Specification trains of equipment designated as high safety

-significant. Therefore, the inspectors determined the finding was of very low safety significance (Green).

The inspectors determined that in accordance with Inspection Manual Chapter 0310 "Aspects Within The Cross

-Cutting Areas," issued December 4, 2014, the finding has a cross-cutting aspect in the area of human performance, resources, because leaders did not ensure that personnel, equipment, procedures, and other resources are available and adequate to support nuclear safety. Specifically, leaders did not ensure procedures and other resource materials were available to support successful work performance when setting preventive maintenance activity base dates, which resulted in the licensee failing to adequately develop and adjust preventive maintenance activities associated with control room air conditioning unit SGK04A refrigerant sensing lines and fittings [H.1].

Enforcement.

Technical Specification 5.4.1.a, requires, in part, that procedures shall be established, implemented, and maintained covering the applicable procedures recommended in Appendix A of Regulatory Guide 1.33, Revision 2. Section 9.b of Appendix A to Regulatory Guide 1.33, Revision 2, requires that "preventive maintenance schedules be developed to specify-inspection or replacement of parts that have a specific lifetime." The licensee established Procedure AP 16B

-003, "Planning and Scheduling Preventive Maintenance," Revision 5, which provides direction for implementing the preventive maintenance program to meet the Regulatory Guide 1.33 requirement. Section 6.2.2 of Procedure AP 16B

-003 requires that preventive maintenance activities are established and adjusted in accordance with the age of the installed equipment. Contrary to the above, until January 6, 2016, the licensee did not ensure that preventive maintenance frequencies were established and adjusted in accordance with the age of installed equipment. Specifically, the licensee did not ensure that adequate preventive maintenance activities were developed for control room air conditioning unit SGK04A refrigerant sensing lines and fittings. As a result, a large refrigerant leak was identified that resulted in the SGK04A unit being declared inoperable and unavailable

, required corrective maintenance

, and resulted in unplanned entries into Condition A of Technical Specifications 3.7.10 and 3.7.11. The licensee entered this condition into its corrective action program as Condition Reports 101862 and 101867. The licensee's immediate actions included securing and declaring the SGK04A system inoperable, completing corrective maintenance to eliminate the refrigerant leak, and confirming that the impacted preventive maintenance frequency was adequately established. Because this violation was of very low safety significance and this issue was entered into the licensee's corrective action program, this violation is being treated as a non

-cited violation, consistent with Section 2.3.2.a of the Enforcement Policy. (NCV 05000482/2016001

-01, Failure to Adequately Establish and Adjust Preventive Maintenance Activities for Control Room Air Conditioning Unit SGK04A Sensing Lines and Fittings

) 4OA 3 Follow-up of Events and Notices of Enforcement Discretion (71153)

(Closed) LER 05000482/2014 00: Post-Fire Safe Shutdown Latent Issue May Impact Ability to Achieve Safe Shutdown On November 19, 2014, the licensee determined that a control room fire scenario could result in the shutdown of the train B emergency diesel generator due to high jacket water temperature prior to establishing essential service water cooling to the emergency diesel generator. This condition would preclude the emergency diesel generator from providing the necessary electrical power to safely shutdown the plant during specific control room fire scenarios. This issue was dispositioned as n on-cited violation 05000482/2014008

-01 in the NRC Triennial Fire Protection Inspection Report 05000482/2014008 (ADAMS Accession Number ML14352A342).

This licensee event report is closed.

These activities constitute completion of one event follow

-up sample, as defined in Inspection Procedure 71153. 4OA 5 Other Activities (Closed) IP 92722

- Follow-up Inspection for Any Severity Level I or II Traditional Enforcement Violation or For Two or More Severity Level III Traditional Enforcement Violations in a 12

-Month Period On January 27, 2016, the NRC issued to Wolf Creek Nuclear Operating Corporation two Notices of Violation that represented a Severity III problem. Details are discussed in NRC Inspection Report s 05000482/2015010 and 05000482/2015011. The violations were associated with licensed reactor operator medical examinations and related NRC reporting requirements. In Inspection Report 05000482/2015010, the NRC concluded that information regarding: 1) the reasons for the violations, 2) the actions planned or already taken to correct the violation s and prevent recurrence, and 3) the date s when full compliance was achieved were already adequately addressed on the docket and no response was required. Specifically, inspectors confirmed that the Wolf Creek Nuclear Operating Corporation

1) requested the NRC amend the operators

' license s to include a restriction for the use of prescribed medication (on July 15, 2015, the NRC issued the amended license with the new restriction), 2) initiated a causal analysis that included an extent of condition review for all operators to determine if there were any further unknown medical conditions, and 3) trained appropriate personnel on NRC medical restriction requirements. Based on these facts, the NRC considers this item to be closed and no follow

-up inspection activity for these two Notices of Violation is planned.

This item is closed.

4O A 6 Meetings, Including Exit

Exit Meeting Summary

On April 13, 2016, the inspectors presented the inspection results to Adam Heflin

, President and Chief Executive Officer, and other members of the licensee staff. The licensee acknowledged the issues presented. The licensee confirmed that any proprietary information reviewed by the inspectors had been returned or destroyed.

SUPPLEMENTAL INFORMATION

KEY POINTS OF CONTACT

Licensee Personnel

T. Baban, Manager, System Engineering
W. Brown, Superintendent, Security Operations
A. Broyles, Manager, Information

Services

D. Campbell, Superintendent, Maintenance
T. East, Superintendent, Emergency Planning
J. Edwards, Manager, Operations
D. Erbe, Manager, Security
R. Flannigan, Manager, Nuclear Engineering
J. Fritton, Oversight
B. Gagnon, Superintendent, Security
C. Hafenstine, Manager, Regulatory Affairs
A. Heflin, President and Chief Executive Officer
S. Henry, Manager, Integrated Plant Scheduling
R. Hobby, Licensing Engineer
J. Isch, Operations Work Controls
B. Lee, Supervising

Instructor

D. Mand, Manager, Design Engineering
J. McCoy, Vice President, Engineering
W. Muilenburg, Supervisor, Licensing
L. Ratzlaff, Manager, Maintenance
C. Reasoner, Site Vice President
M. Skiles, Manager, Radiation Protection
T. Slenker, Supervisor, Operations Support
S. Smith, Plant Manager
M. Storts, Engineer
A. Stueve, Engineer
A. Stull, Vice President and Chief Operations Administrative Officer
M. Tate, Superintendent, Security

LIST OF ITEMS OPENED, CLOSED, AND DISCUSSED

Opened and Closed

05000482/2016001

-01 NCV Failure to Adequately Establish and Adjust Preventive Maintenance Activities for Control Room Air Conditioning Unit SGK04A Sensing lines and Fittings

(Section 4OA 2)

Closed

05000482/2014 006-00 LER Post-Fire Safe Shutdown Latent Issue May Impact Ability to Achieve Safe Shutdown (Section 4OA3)
05000482/2015010

-01 NO V Incomplete and Inaccurate Medical Information Resulted in Issuance of a Renewed Operator License Without a Required Medical Restriction

05000482/2015010

-02 NO V Failure to Report a Permanent Change in a Licensed Operator's Medical Status and Request a Condition be Placed on the Operator's License

LIST OF DOCUMENTS REVIEWED

Section 1R01: Adverse Weather Protection

Procedures

Number Title Revision CKL Zl-009 Site Reading Sheet
OFN
AF-025 Unit Limitations
SYS
OPS-008 Cold Weather Operations

Condition Reports

46940
102586
103043
103090

Miscellaneous

Title Date Wolf Creek 345

-41 Insulator Replacement Job Plan February 26, 2016

Section 1R04
Equipment Alignment

Procedures

Number Title Revision CKL
AL-120 Auxiliary Feedwater Normal Lineup
CKL
EF-120 Essential Service Water Valve, Breaker and Switch Lineup 53A CKL
JE-120 Emergency Fuel Oil System Lineup

Procedures

Number Title Revision CKL
KJ-121 Diesel Generator NE01 and NE02 Valve Checklist 39 CKL
KU-120 SBO DG Component Checklist
SYS
EC-100A Spent Fuel Pool Cooling Pump "A" Inservice Pump Test
SYS
KJ-121 Diesel Generator NE01 and NE02 Lineup for Automatic Operation 50C SYS
KJ-124 Post Maintenance Run of Emergency Diesel Generator
B 62D SYS
KU-121 Energizing NB01 From Station Blackout Diesel Generators
SYS
KU-122 Energizing NB02 From Station Blackout Diesel Generators
SYS
KU-124 SBO Generator Local or Manual Operation

Work Orders

14-386658-000 14-388619-029 14-388418-000 14-388418-002 14-388418-004 15-402601-000 15-402601-001 15-403533-000 15-403533-001 15-403931-000 15-403931-001 15-403932-000 15-403932-001 15-403932-002 15-403953-000 15-405709-000 16-411280-001 16-411280-002 16-411280-005 16-411280-009

Drawings

Number Title Revision 8025-E-1021 69-13.8KV Construction Power Distribution One Line, Sheet 1 75 E-11KU01 BO DG One Line Diagram, Sheet 1
E-13KU00 Station Blackout Diesel Generator System Schematic Index Sheet
E-13KU01A Schematic Diagram Class 1E Bus NB01 Feeder Brkr. 152NB0114 1 E-13KU01B Schematic Diagram Class 1E Bus NB01 Feeder Brkr. 152NB0214 1
E-13KU10 SBO Power Equipment Center (PEC) 120/208 VAC Power Distribution, Sheet 1
E-13KU11 SBO Power Equipment Center (PEC) 480 VAC Power Distribution
KD-7496 One Line Diagram, Sheet 1
KD-7496A Distribution System Equipment Lineup Limitations
M-12AL01 Piping and Instrumentation Diagram Auxiliary Feedwater System
M-12EC01 Piping & Instrumentation Diagram Fuel Pool Cooling and Clean-Up System, Sheet 1
M-12EC02 Piping & Instrumentation Diagram Fuel Pool Cooling and Clean-Up 7 M-12KJ05 Piping & Instrumentation Diagram Standby Diesel Generator "B" Intake Exhaust, F.O. & Start Air Sys.
M-12KJ06 Piping & Instrumentation Diagram Standby Diesel Generator "B" Lube Oil System
M-K2EF01 Piping & Instrumentation Diagram Essential Service Water Sys.

Condition Reports

2667
Section 1R05
Fire Protection

Procedures

Number Title Revision
AP 10-106 Fire Preplans
AP 10-106 Fire Preplans

Drawings

Number Title Revision E-1F9905 Fire Hazard Analysis

Condition Reports

2665
103680

Miscellaneous

Number Title Revision
XX-X-004 Combustible Loading Inf ormation Program Section 1R06
Flood Protection Measures

Condition Reports

103471 103473

Section 1R11: Licensed Operator Requalification Program

and Licensed Operator Performance

Procedures

Number Title Revision
ALR 00-081D Rod Bank Lo Limit
8A
ALR 00-083C Rx Partial Trip
5A
AP 21-001 Conduct of Operations
GEN 00-004 Power Operation
OFN
AF-025 Unit Limitations
STS
SF-001 Control and Shutdown Rod Operability Verification

Miscellaneous

Number Title Revision LR3406001 Precise Control Lab#1
003A
Section 1R12
Maintenance Effectiveness

Procedures

Number Title Revision STS
EC-100A Spent Fuel Pool Cooling Pump "A" Inservice Pump Test 25

Condition Reports

43509 54683 72220

Miscellaneous

Number Title Date
54683 Functional Failure Determination Checklist August 9, 2012
220 Functional Failure Determination Checklist September 5, 2013
EC System Health Report September 1, 2015

, through December

31, 2015
EC-01 Mai ntenance Rule Final Scope Evaluation February 16, 2010
EC-02 Maintenance Rule Final Scope Evaluation February 16, 2010
EC-03 Maintenance Rule Final Scope Evaluation February 16, 2010
EC-04 Maintenance Rule Final Scope Evaluation February 16, 2010
EC-05 Maintenance Rule Final Scope Evaluation February 16, 2010
EC-06 Maintenance Rule Final Scope Evaluation February 16, 2010
EC-07 Maintenance Rule Final Scope Evaluation February 16, 2010
WR9078186 Functional Failure Determination Checklist March 17, 2010
Section 1R13
Maintenance Risk Assessments and Emergent Work Control

Procedures

Number Title Revision
AI 26C-004 Technical Specification Application for Containment Isolation Valves
6B
AP 10-103 Fire Protection Impairment Contro

l 30

AP 16E-002 Post Maintenance Testing Development
18A
AP 22C-003 O n-Line Nuclear Safety and Generation Risk Assessmen t 22
AP 22C-007 Risk Management and Contingency Planning
AP 29E-001 Program Plan for Containment Leakage Measurement
STS
EC-100A Spend Fuel Pool Cooling Pump "A" Inservice Pump Test 25 STS
EN-100B Containment Spray Pump B Inservice Pump Test
STS
KJ-013A Hot Restart of EDG NE01

Condition Reports

103185
103311
103374
103390
103493

Miscellaneous

Number Title Date 12153 Engineering Disposition:
Service Water Check Valve Disc Stud Pinning August 4, 2006 16-103
Control Room Risk Assessment Log/Work Schedule: Risk Assessment Dates: January 11, 2016 through January 17, 2016 January 11, 2016
16-103
Control Room Risk Assessment Log/Work Schedule: Risk Assessment Dates: January 11, 2016 through January 17, 2016 January 13, 2016
16-103
Control Room Risk Assessment Log/Work Schedule: Risk Assessment Dates: January 11, 2016 through January 17, 2016 January 15, 2016
16-104
Control Room Risk Assessment Log/Work Schedule: Risk Assessment Dates: January 18, 2016 through January 24, 2016 January 21, 2016
16-111 Control Room Risk Assessment Log/Work Schedule: Risk Assessment Dates: March 7, 2016 through March
2016 March 9, 2 016
16-112
Control Room Risk Assessment Log/Work Schedule: Risk Assessment Dates: March 14, 2016 through March 20 2016
March 16, 2016
16-112 Control Room Risk Assessment Log/Work Schedule: Risk Assessment Dates: March 14, 2016 through March 20 2016
March 17, 2016
16-113 Control Room Risk Assessment Log/Work Schedule: Risk Assessment Dates: March 21, 2016 through March 27, 2016
March 23, 2016
Section 1R15
Operability Determinations and Functionality Assessments

Procedures

Number Title Revision
AI 26C-004 Technical Specification Application for Containment Isolation Valve
6B
AP 16E-002 Post Maintenance Testing Development
18A
AP 26C-004 Operability Determination and Functionality Assessment
AP 28-001 Operability Evaluations
AP 29E-001 Program Plan for Containment Leakage Measurement

Procedures

Number Title Revision I-ENG-004 Lubricating Oil Analysis
STN
FC-002 Aux Feedwater Turbine Overspeed Test
STS
EN-001 Containment Spray System Valve Verification
STS
EN-100B Containment Spray Pump B Inservice Pump Test 29

Drawings

Number Title Revision M-12EN01 Piping and Instrumentation Diagram Containment Spray System
M-12FC02 Piping & Instrumentation Diagram Auxiliary Turbines Auxiliary Feedwater Pump Turbine

Condition Report

s

017177
074533
102678
102680
102681
102715
102728
102729
103066
103150
103274
103390
103484

Miscellaneous

Number Title Revision/Date
09-1774 Document Revision Request (DRR): Technical Specification Bases
13-2562 Document Revision Request (DRR): Technical Specification Bases Maintenance Rule Database Containment Spray System (EN)
Revised March 30, 2004
STN
EN-001B Train B Leakage Inspection Program of CTMT Spray System
Performed December 18, 2014

Section 1R19:

Post

-Maintenance Testing

Procedures

Number Title Revision MGE
EOOP-05 Insulation Resistance Testing
STN
FP-211 Diesel Fire Pump 1FP01PB Monthly Operation and Fuel Level Check
STN
NB-001B B Train Breaker Operability and ECCS Pump Recirculation
STS
AL-102 MDAFW Pump B Inservice Pump Test
STS
AL-212 MD AFP Comprehensive Pump Testing, Flow Path Verification & CV Testing
STS
BG-100B Centrifugal Charging System "B" Train Inservice Pump Test 51 STS
GN-001 Containment Cooling Fans Operability Test
STS
KJ-005B Manual/Auto Start, Sync & Loading of EDG NE02
SYS
GN-120 Containment Cooling System Operation
38A SYS
KJ-121 Diesel Generator NE01 and NE02 Lineup for Automatic Operation 50C SYS
KJ-124 Post Maintenance Run of Emergency Diesel Generator
B 62D

Drawings

Number Title Revision
E-13GN02 Schematic Diagram Containment Cooler Fans A & C
M-12AL01 Piping and Instrumentation Diagram Auxiliary Feedwater System
M-12BG03 Piping and Instrumentation Diagram Chemical & Volume Control System
M-12GN01 Piping and Instrumentation Diagram Containment Cooling System
M-620-035-02 Wiring Diagram Two Speed

Condition Reports

2749
102880

Work Orders

14-386656-000 14-386658-000 14-388619-029 14-388418-000 14-388418-002 14-388418-004 14-395829-000 15-402601-000 15-402601-001 15-403533-000 15-403533-001 15-403931-000 15-403931-001 15-403932-000 15-403932-001 15-403932-002 15-403953-000 15-405709-000 15-407284-001 16-411280-001 16-411280-002 16-411280-005 16-411280-009

Section 1R22: Surveillance Testing

Procedures

Number Title Revision
APF 22C-008-01 Qualitative Risk Screening

- NB02 Undervoltage/Degraded Voltage Trip Actuating Device Operational Testing (TADOT)

STS
AB-201D Atmospheric Relief Valve Inservice Valve Test
27A STS
AC-001 Main Turbine Valve Cycle Test
STS
EJ-100B RHR System Inservice Pump B Test
STS
EM-100A Safety Injection Pump "A" Inservice Pump Test
STS
IC-208B 4KV Loss of Voltage & Degraded Voltage TADOT NB02 Bus - SEP GRP 4 4E

Drawings

Number Title Revision E-11NB02 Lower Medium Voltage Sys. Class 1E 4.16V Single Line Meter & Relay Diagram
E-13NB04 Lower Medium Voltage Sys. Class 1E 4.16V Three Line Meter & Relay Diagram
E-13NB06 Lower Medium Voltage Sys. Class 1E 4.16V Three Line Meter & Relay Diagram
M-12BN01 Piping and Instrumentation Diagram Borated Refueling Water Storage System
M-12EM01 Piping & Instrumentation Diagram High Pressure Coolant Injection System
M-12EJ01 Piping and Instrumentation Diagram Residual Heat Removal System
M-12EM03 Piping & Instrumentation Diagram High Pressure Coolant Injection System Test Line

Condition Reports

2751
102839

Miscellaneous

Number Title Revision
APF 15C-004-01 Document Revision Request (DRR) 15

-2442 23C

Section 1EP6
Drill Evaluation

Procedures

Number Title Revision
AP 06-002 Radiological Emergency Response Plan (RERP)
EPP 06-003 Emergency Operations Facility Operations
EPP 06-005 Emergency Classification
EPP 06-006 Protective Action Recommendations
EPP 06-007 Emergency Notifications
EPP 06-009 Drill and Exercise Requirements

Condition Reports

2776
102831
102846
102848
102856
102857
102885
102889
102900
102901
102998
103007

Miscellaneous

Number Title Revision/Date
16-SA-01 Emergency Planning Drill February 17, 2016
APF 06-002-01 Emergency Action Levels
17A
Section 4OA1
Performance Indicator Verification

Procedures

Number Title Revision
AP 21-001 Conduct of Operations
GEN 00-004 Power Operation 86 STN
SF-001 Control Rod Parking
18A

Miscellaneous

Number Title Revision/Date LER 0 5000482/2015-001-00 Personnel Error Causes Two Inoperable Residual Heat Removal Trains March 25, 2015
LER 05000482/2015-002-01 Two Control Room Air Conditioning Trains Inoperable Due to Failure to Meet Surveillance Requirement August 26, 2015
LER 05000482/2015-003-00 Manual Reactor Trip due to High Steam Generator Level Transient at Low Power July 1, 2015
LER 05000482/2015-004-01 Incorrect Decision Results in Two Containment Isolation Valves being in a Condition Prohibited by Technical Specifications September 14, 2015
Nuclear Energy Institute Document
99-02 Regulatory Assessment Performance Indicator Guideline Revision 7
Nuclear Plant Information System (NPIS) Log Eight-Hour Average of Reactor Power for Wolf Creek Generating Station 2015

- Full Range Chart January 1, 2015 through

December 31, 2015
Nuclear Plant Information System (NPIS) Log Eight-Hour Average of Reactor Power for Wolf Creek Generating Station 2015

- Narrow Range Chart January 1, 2015 through

December 31, 2015
Section 4OA2
Problem Identification and Resolution

Procedures

Number Title Revision
AI 16B-002 Updating the PM Activity Module
AI 16B-002 Preventive Maintenance Change Process
AI 28A-010 Screening Condition Reports
AI 28A-100 Condition Report Resolution
AP 16B-003 Planning and Scheduling Preventive Maintenance
AP 28A-100 Corrective Action Program
CNT-MM-700 Fabrication and Installation of Tubing, Tubing Supports, Instrument Supports and Instrument Installation
MPE
GK-003 Control Room and Class 1E A/C Units Preventive Maintenance Activity

Condition Reports

26247
026250
026251
027105
027228
029734
031682
040496
052753
052755
074985
076409
080575
081882
081938
101862
101867
102012
103311
103650
103694
103696

Drawings

Number Title Revision M-622.1A-00006 SGK04A & SGK04B Air Conditioner Refrigeration Schematic, Sheet 1 W13 M-622.1A-00007 SGK04A & SGK04B Air Conditioner Electrical Schematic, Sheet 1
W11 M-622.1A-00008 SGK04A & SGK04B Air Conditioner Electrical Schematic W06 M-622.1A-00089 Instruction Manual for SGK04A, SGK04B, SGK05A, and SGK05B Air Conditioning Condensers
W12

Work Orders

2-353955-000 13-378855-000 14-383745-000 14-383746-000 14-383747-000 14-383748-000 14-384346-000 16-410207-000 16-410209-000

Miscellaneous

Number Title Date
2016-001 RER Reportability Determination January 7, 2016
2016-010 RER Reportability Determination March 14, 2016
1015075 Electric Power Research Institute Report "Plant Support Engineering: Life Cycle Management Planning Sourcebooks

- Chillers" December , 2007

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