IR 05000413/1989019: Difference between revisions

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{{Adams
{{Adams
| number = ML20247G195
| number = ML20247A178
| issue date = 07/13/1989
| issue date = 08/29/1989
| title = Insp Repts 50-413/89-19 & 50-414/89-19 on 890616-0628. Violations Noted.Major Areas inspected:890616 Event Re Channels of Reactor Vessel Level Instrumentation Sys Inoperable for Period of Time in Excess of Tech Specs
| title = Forwards Summary of 890720 & 0815 Enforcement Conferences Re Findings in Insp Repts 50-413/89-19 & 50-414/89-19 on Inoperability of Reactor Vessel Level Instrumentation Sys. List of Attendees & Viewgraphs Also Encl
| author name = Lesser M, Orders W, Shymlock M
| author name = Ebneter S
| author affiliation = NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION II)
| author affiliation = NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION II)
| addressee name =  
| addressee name = Tucker H
| addressee affiliation =  
| addressee affiliation = DUKE POWER CO.
| docket = 05000413, 05000414
| docket = 05000413, 05000414
| license number =  
| license number =  
| contact person =  
| contact person =  
| document report number = 50-413-89-19, 50-414-89-19, NUDOCS 8907270354
| document report number = NUDOCS 8909120057
| package number = ML20247G192
| document type = CORRESPONDENCE-LETTERS, NRC TO UTILITY, OUTGOING CORRESPONDENCE
| document type = INSPECTION REPORT, NRC-GENERATED, INSPECTION REPORT, UTILITY, TEXT-INSPECTION & AUDIT & I&E CIRCULARS
| page count = 88
| page count = 16
}}
}}


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D, o  NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
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        .i Report No /89-19 and 50-414/89-19
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Licensee: Duke Power Company 422 South Church Street Charlotte, NC 28242 Docket Nos.: 50-413,.50-414 License Nis.: NPF-35, NPF-52 Facility.Name: Catawba 1 aiid 2 Inspection Conducted: June 16 - June 28,1989 Inspectors:  41&'//xh, j Td. T. Orde'rs    7[22I9
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!    g m 2 9 1989    L Dock 6t Nos. 50-413, 50-414 License Nos. NPF-35, NPF-S2 Duke Power Company ATTN: Mr. H. B. Tucker, Vice President
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M. B. Shymlocki Section Chief  7//d/h/
Nuclear Production Department        -
Dhte ' Signed Projects Section 3A Division of Reactor Projects SUMMARY Scope:
422 South Church Street Charlotte, NC 28242 Gentlemen:
This 'special inspection was conducted on site inspecting an event where both channels of the Reactor Vessel Level Instrumentation System (RVLIS) on Unit 2 were discovered inoperable by the licensee on June 16, 1989 and were determined  ,
SUBJECT: ENFORCEMENT CONFERENCE SUMMARY (NRC INSPECTION REPORT N05. 50-413/89-19 AND 50-414/89-19)
i to have been inoperable for a period of time in excess of the action statement allowed by Technical Specifications (TS).   !
This letter refers to the Enforcement Conference held at our request on July.20, 1989, and the Enforcement Conference followup meeting held on August 15, 1989. These meetings concerned activities authorized for your Catawba' facilit The issues d'scussed at the conference and the followup meeting related to inoperability of the Unit 2 Reactor Vessel Level Instrumentation System.
Results:
In the areas inspected the following items were identified:
One apparent violation in that both channels of RVLIS were inoperable for approximately two weeks. (paragraph 9)
One apparent violation in that channel checks required by Technic'al Specifi-cation ' surveillance were not performed on the upper and lower ranges of RVLI (paragraph 9)
I 8907270334 g99774
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l  A list of attendees, meeting summaries, and a copy of your handouts are-enclosed. We are continuing our review of these issues to determine the appropriate enforcement actio In accordance with Section 2.790 of the NRC's " Rules of Practice," Part 2,
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Title 10, Code of Federal Regulations, a copy of this letter and its enclosures l  will be placed in the NRC Public Document Roo Should you have any questions concerning this letter, please contact u
 
Sincerely, wcd  Do '
OQ A m( C b C. E h Stewart D. Ebneter Regional Administrator
,i Enclosures:
l
' List of Attendees ' Enforcement Conference Summary Enforcement Conference followup Meeting Summary Handout (s) dated July 20, 1989 l Handout (s) dated August 15, 1989 l
cc w/encls:
T. B. Owen, Station Manager Senior Resident Inspector - McGuire l  State of South Carolina bec w/encls: (See page 2)  *      ;g 8909120057 890829 L  I " *** %?        **'
 
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Duke Power Company  2 AUG 2 S 1989 bec w/encis:
K. N. Jabbour, NRR NRC Resident Inspector    '
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ENCLOSURE 1 l
LIST OF ATTENDEES I
July 20, 1989 U.S. Nuclear Reculatory Commission L M. L. Ernst. Deputy Regional Administrator l P. K. Grimes. Acting Deputy Regional Administrator C. W. Hehl, Deputy Director, Division of Reactor Projects (DRP)
E. W. Merschoff, Deputy Dirertor, Division of Reactor Safety (DRS)
G. R. Jenkins, Director Enforcement and Investigation Coordination Staff (EICS)
A. R. Herdt, Branch Chief DRP M. B. Shymlock, Section Chief, CRP K. N. Jabbour, Project Manager, Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation (NRR)
W. T. Orders, Senior Resident Inspector, Catawba, DRP M. S. Lesser, Resident Inspector, Catawba, DRP B. R. Bonser, Project Engineer, DRP R. J. Goddard, Regional Counsel F. Jape Section Chief. DRS B. Uryc, Enforcement Coordinator, EICS L. Phillips, Section Chief NRR J. Leuhman, Dffice of Enforcement Duke Power Company H. B. Tucker, Vice President, Nuclear Production Department T. B. Owen, Station Manager, Catawba P. G. Leroy, Catawba Support Engineer, Compliance R. M. Glover, Compliance Engineer, Catawba W. R. McCollum, Maintenance Superintendent, Catawba J. M. Stackley, ISE Group Manager, Catawba
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H. J. Lee, Design Engineering l
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Enclosure 1  2 LIST OF ATTENDEES August 15, 1989 l
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission B. K. Grimes, Acting Deputy Regional Administrator A. F. Gibson, Director, Division of Reactor _ Safety (DRS)
G. R. Jenkins, Director, Enforcement and Investigation Coordina^ ion Staff (EICS)
A. R. Herdt, Branch Chief, Division of Reactor Projects (DRP)
l M. B. Shymlock, Section Chief, DRP 1 K. N. Jabbour, Project Manager, Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation (NRR)
! M. S. Lesser, Resident Inspector, Catawba, DRP B. R. Bonser, Project Engineer, DRP F. Jape, Section Chief, DRS B. Uryc, Enforcement Coordinator, EICS L. Phillips, Section Chief, NRR J. Leuhman, Office of Enforcement Duke Power Company T. L Owen, ' Station Manager, Catawba R. M. Glover, Compliance Engineer, Catawba W. R. McCollum, Maintenance Superintendent, Catawba H. J. Lee, Design Engineering F. N. Mack, Jr., Project Manager, Catawbc R. N. Casler, Operations Superintendent, Catawba J. Forbes, Technical Services Superintendent, Catawba W. F. Beaver, Performance Manager, Catawba l J. Kammer, Test Engineer, Catawba l
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ENCLOSURE 2 ENFORCEMENT CONFERENCE SUMMARY On July 20, 1989, representatives from Duke Power Company (DPC) met with the NRC in the Region II Office in Atlanta, Getrgia, to discuss inoperability of-both . trains of' the Reactor Vessel' Level Instrumentation System (RVLIS) Upper
,
Railge lon Catawba. Unit ?.
Following opening remarks by M. Ernst, NRC RII Deputy Regional Administrato DPC gave a presentation (Enclosure 4) on the RVLIS inoperability. T. B. Owen, Catawba Station Manager, introduced DPCs presentation by stating that Duke had identified the RVLIS problem, reported it promptly to the NRC, and that contrary to1what was stated in a courtesy Licensee Event Report submitted
  = June 26, 1989, the RVLIS Technical Specification had beeri violated. He also
  ~ stated that DPC felt the root cause of the problem was the failure of the Catawba . supervisor to use qualified personnel in the task of restoring RVLIS and that a contributing factor had been the poor direction and guidance given in N/A'ing procedure steps. The presentation that followed covered a system
  ' description, sequence ~of events, root cause/ corrective actions, safety significance, summary and concluding remark A significant number of NRC questions and discussion during the conference were centered ' around the supervisory error, qualifications of maintenance and supervisory. personnel, how the error of assigning an unqualified maintenance worker to the job occurred, and the adequacy ~of the post maintenance test perforn.e Duke ended the meeting by giving their corrective actions and stating their conclusions. - Duke . reiterated that they had identified the inoperability, immediately taken corrective actions, communicated the situation promptly to the NRC, and issued a courtesy LER before all the facts were fully known. They also stated that they believed the contributing factors to this event were'not recurring. That is the surveillance problems resulting from N/A'ing procedural
      -
steps, assignment of unqualified personnel to tasks requiring qualifications, and performance of post-maintenance testing by unqualified personne Also, with-regard to safety significance, Duke felt the safety ramifications of this event were not significan The URC closed the meeting by stating that it had served to enhance Region II's understanding of the issues and DPC's corrective actions.
 
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ENCLOSURE 3  ,
ENFORCEMENT CONFERENCE FOLLOWUP MEETING On August 15, 1989, representatives from Duke Power Company met with the NRC in the Region II Office in Atlanta, Georgia, for a followup meeting to the  -
enforcement conierence held on July 20. The purpose of the meetirg was to discuss in greater depth subjects which DPC felt would enhance the NRCs understanding of the significance and circumstances surrounding the RVLIS inoperability on Unit 2.
 
l Following opening remarks by B. Grimes, NRC RII Acting Deputy Regional Administrator, DPC gave two presentations (Enclosure 5). The first presentation covered Post Modification Testing (PMT). The PMT presentation included a - discussion of the Nuclear Station Modification (NSM) process, a description of the System Expert program, and a description of the PMT progra The second presentation covered the safety significance of the RVLIS inoperability, outstanding questions from the enforcement conference, and a summar Duke opened by stating that they had violated the RVLIS Technical Specification (TS) and that RVLIS was important to safety; however, they did not consider it as significant as some other systems in TS. DPC went on to explain how they reached their conclusions on safety significanc The safety significance discussion was followed by answering outstanding
.
questions from the enforcement conference. This presentation covered a sun. mary l
of the event and managements expectations, the venting of the RVLIS line following reconaection, and supervisor qualifications. Duke ended the meeting by reiterating their conclusions which they had stated at the enforcement conferenc _ _ _ _ _ _ - _ _ - _ - _ _ _ _ - _ _ _ - _ -
 
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NUCLEA3 REOULATORY COMMIS$10N
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    -j  101 MARIETTA ET RE.ET, . ATl.ANTA, GEOMGI A 30323 4 .
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AUG 2 9193g Docket Nos. 50-41*i, 53-414 5-
  'l.icense Nos. NPF-36. NPF-52
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Duke Power Ccmpany    i ATTN: Mr. A B. Tucker, Vice President  I
     <Nur, lear Production Department 422 South Church Street Charlotte, NC 2824 Gentlemen:
SUBJECT: ENFORCEMENT CONFERENCE SUMMARY (NRC INSPECTION REPORT NOS. 50-413/89-19 AND 50-414/89-19)
This letter refers to the Enforcement Conference held at our request on July.20, 1989, and the Enforcement Conference followup meeting held on August 15, 1989. These meetings concerned activities authorized for your Catawba facilit The issu'es discussed at the conference and the followup meeting related to inoperability of the Unit 2 Reactor Vessel Level Instrumentation Syste A list of attendees, meeting summaries, and a copy of your handouts are
  ,  enclosed. We are continuing our review of these issues to determine the-appropriate enforcement actio lIn accordance with Section 2.790 of the NRC's " Rules of Practice," Part 2,
  : Title 10 Code-of Federal Regulations, a copy. of this letter and its enclosures will be placed in the NRC Public Document Room.
 
Should you have any questions concerning this letter, please conta'ct u
 
Sincerely, pm l
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      && -
Stewart D. Ebneter Regional Administrator Enclosures:
1  1.' -List of Attendees 2.- Enforcement Conference Sumary l Enforcement Conference Followup Meeting Sumary Handout (s) dated July 20, 1989 Handout (s) dated August 15, 1989 cc w/encls:    i T. B. Owen', Station Manager Senior Resident Inspector - McGuire State of South Carolina    3
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ENCLOSURE 1 LIST OF ATTENDEES July.20, 1989 U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
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M., Ernst. Deputy Regional Administrator B.'K. Grimes,' Acting Deputy Regional Administrator C. W.'Hehl, Deputy Director, Division of Rerctor Projects (DRP)
E. W. Merschoff, Deputy Director, Division of Reactor Safety (DRS)
      .G. R. Jenkins, Director, Enforcement and Investigation Coordination Staff (EICS)
A. R. Herdt, Branch Chief, DRP M. B. Shymlock, Section Chief DRP K. N. Jabbour, Project Manager, Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation (NRR)
W. T. Orders, Senior. Residerat Inspector, Catawba, DRP M. S. Lesser, Resident Inspector, Catawba, DRP B.-R. Bonser, Project Engineer, DRP R. J. Goddard, Regional Counsel'
F. Jape, Section Chief, DRS B. Uryc, Enforcement Coordinator, EICS L., Phillips, Section Chief, NRR J. Leuhman, Office of Enforcemen Duke Power Company H. B. Tucker, Vice President, Nuclear Prodcttion Department T. B. Owen, Station Manager, Catawba P. G. Leroy, Catawba Support Engineer, Compliance
       'R. M. Glover, Compliance Engineer, Catawba W. R. McCollum, Maintenance Superintendent, Catawba J. M. Stackley, I&E Group Mam qer, Catawba H. J. Lee, Design Engineering l
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g. [ 4 ENCLOSURE 1 LIST OF ATTENDEES July 20, 1989
  :U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission M. L. Ernst Deputy Regional Administrator B. K. Grimes, Acting Deputy Regional Administrator C. W. Hehl,. Deputy Director, Division of Reactor Projects (DRP)
E. W. Merschoff, Deputy Director, Division of Reactor Safety (DRS)
G. R.'Jenkins, Director, Enforcement and Investigation Coordination Staff (EICS)
A. R. Herdt, Branch Chief, DRP
  .M. B. Shymiock, Section Chief, DRP K. N. Jabbour, Project Manager, Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation (NRR)
W. T. Orders Senior Resident' Inspector, Catawba, DRP M. S. Lesser, Resident Inspectcr. Catawba, DRP B. R. Bonser, Project Engineer, DRP R. J. Goddard, Regional Counsel F. Jape, Section Chief. DRS B. Uryc, Enforcemer,t Coordinator, EICS L. Phillips, Section Chief, NRR
  - J. Leuhman, Office of Enforcement Duke Power Company H. B. Tucker, Vice President, Nuclear Production Department T. B. Owen, Station Manager, Catawba P. G. Leroy, Catawba Support Engineer, Compliance R. M. Glover, Compliance Engineer, Catawba W. R. McCollum, Maintenance Superintendent, Catawba J. M. Stackley, I&E Group Manager, Catawba H. J. Lee, Design Engineering
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    " Enclosure 1
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LIST OF ATTENDEES  l August 15, 1989  l U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission B..K. Grimes, Acting Deputy Regional Administrator A. F._Gibson, Director. Division of Reactor Safety (DRS)
G. R. Jenkins, Director, Enforcement and Investigation Coordination Staff (EICS)'
A. R. Herdt, Branch Chief, Division of Reactor Projects (DRP)
M. B. Shym1ock, Section Chief, DRP K. N. Jabbour, Project Manager, Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation (NRR)
M. S. Lesser, Resident Inspector, Catawba, DRP B. R. Bonser, Project Engineer, DRP F. Jape; Section Chief, DRS 8. Uryc,' Enforcement Coordinator, EICS L. Phillips, Section Chief, NRR J. Leuhman, Office of Enforcement Duke' Power Company T. B. Owen, Station Manager, Catawba 1R. M. Glover, Compliance Engineer, Catawba W. R. McCollum, Maintenance Superintendent, Catawba H. J. Lee, Design Engineering
    .
F. N. Mack, Jr., . Project Manager, Cstawba R. N. Casler, Operations Superintendent,' Catawba J. Forbes, Technical Services Superintendent. Catawba W. F. Beaver, Performance Manager, Catawba .
J. Kamrter, Test Engineer, Catawba i
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ENCLOSURE 2 ENFORCEMENT CONFERENCE SUMMARY On July 20, 1989, representatives from Dui e '"w4 e Company (DPC) met with the NRC in the Region II Office in Atlanta, Geor s:a, .o discuss inoperability of both trains of the Reactor Vessel Level Ins .vi+ ;tation System (RVLIS) Upper Range on Catawba Unit Following opening remarks by M. Ernst, NRC RI! Deputy Regional Administrator, DPC gave a presentation (Enclosure 4) on the RVLIS inoperability. -T. B. Owen, Catawba Station Manager, introduced DPCs presentation by stating that Duke had identified the RVLIS problem, reported it promptly to the NRC, and that contrary to what was stated in a courtesy Licensee Event Report submitted June 26, 1989, the RVLIS Technical Specification had been violated. He also stated that DPC felt the root cause of the problem was the failure of the
*
Catawba supervisor to use qualified personnel in the task of restoring RVLIS and that a contributing factor had been the poor direction and guidance given in N/A'ing procedure steps. The presentation that followed covered a system description, sequence of events, root cause/ corrective actions, safety significance, summary and concluding remark A significant number of NRC questions and discussion during the conference were centered around the supervisory error, qualifications of maintenance and supervisory personnel, how the error of assigning an unqualified maintenance worker to the job occurred, and the adequacy of the post maintenance test performe Duke ended the meeting by giving their corrective actions and stating their conclusion Duke reiterated that they had identified - the inaperability, immediately taken corrective actions, communicated the situation promptly. to the NRC, ano issued a courtesy LER before all the facts were fully known. They also stated that they believed the contributing factors to this event were not recurring. That is the surveillance problems resulting from N/A'ing procedural steps, assignment of unqualified personnel to tasks requiring qualifications, and performance of post-maintenance testing by unqualified personnel. Also, with regard to safety significance, Duke felt the safety ramifications of this event were not significan The NRC closed the meeting by stating that it had served to enhance Region II's understanding of the issues and DPC's corrective action _ _ _ _ _ _ - _ _ _ _ _ _ _ -
 
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I ENCLOSURE 3 ENFORCEMENT CONFERENCE FOLLOWUP MEETING On August 15, 1989, representatives from Duke Power Company met with' the NRC in the Region II Office in Atlanta, Georgia, for a followup meeting to the enforcement conference held on July 20. The purpose of the meeting was to discuss in greater depth subjects which DPC felt would enhance the NRCs understanding of the significance and circumstances surrounding the RVLIS inoperability on Unit Following opening remarks by Administrator, DPC gave two presentations Grines, NRC RII Acting)
      (Enclosure S . Deputy The Regional first presentation covered Post Modification Testing (PMT). The PMT presentation includedt a discussion of the Nuclear Station Modification (NSM) process, a description of the System Expert program, and a description of the PMT progsa The 'second presentation covered the safety significance of the RVLIS inoperability, outstanding questions from the enforcement conference, and a summar Duke opened by stating that they had violated the RVLIS Technical Specification (TS) and that RVLIS was important to safety; however, they did not consider it as significant as some other systems in TS. DPC went on to explain how.they reached their conclusions on safety significanc The safety significance discussion was followed by answering outstanding questions from the enforcement conference. This presentation covered a summary of the event and managements expectations, the veiccing of the RVLIS line following reconnection, and supervisor qualifications. Duke ended the meeting by reiterating their conclusions which they had stated at the enforcement conference.
 
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ENCt.05URE 4 Enforcement Conference Agenda Duke Power' Company Catawba Nuclear Station 10:30 AM, July 20, 1989 Atlanta, Georgia Both Trains of-. Upper Range RVLIS Isolated Introduction  T. Owen Station Manager System Description  J. M. Stackley Sequence of Events  I&E Group Manager Root Cause/  W. R. McCollum Corrective Actions  Maintenance Sup .
  -Safety Significance  H. J. Lee Design Engineering I
Summary  T. Owen Station Manager l
l Concluding Remarks  H. B. Tucker Vice President Nuclear Production
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DEDULCNI ERA SRORRE TNEMURTSNI ON :ETON      i l-viUE e ;a 4 3--e      !
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One apparent violation in that unqualified technicians were assigned to restore the safety related RVLIS system to operability after' maintenanc (paragraph 6)-  -
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One apparent violation in that the procedure used to restore the RVLIS system to an operable status was inadequate, (paragraph 7)
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One apparent violation in that the post maintenance testing was inadequate to detect the inoperabilit (paragraph 8)
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One strength . in that the licensee's monthly RVLIS system walkdown is an initiative which goes beyond minimum NRC requirements and is credited with identifying 'the inoperability. (paragraph 7)
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One weakness in that the licensee's program for N/A'ing procedural steps. lacks guidance and is inconsistent. (paragraph 7)
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REPORT DETAILS Persons Contacted -
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Licensee Empicyees     l
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H. Barron, Operations-Superintendent J. Cox, 3ite Training Manager T. Deese, Maintenance Engineering Services
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     *R. Glover, Compliance Engineer
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i R. Jones, Maintenance Engineering Services Engineer 1
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     * McCollum, Maintenance Superintendent
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    *T. Owen, Station Manager
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    *J. Stackley, Instrumentation and Electrical Engineer
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Other -licensee employees contacted included technicians, operators, and engineer _
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NRC Resident Inspectors    'l
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     * Orders
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     *M. Lesser
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    * Attended exit intervie . Brief Summary of Event On June 16, 1989 the licensee was performing a routine monthly walkdown of the Unit 2 Reactor Vessel Level Instrumentation System (RVLIS). The unit was at ~ 100% power at the time. Technicians immediately recognized a problem when the Upper Range level on both channels indicated greater than j 90% instead of the expected value of less than 60% for the existing plant '
      -
conditions. The technicians discovered the isolation valves for the upper range pressure transmitters to be closed on both channels rendering them inoperable. The RVLIS channels were required to be operable when the unit entered mode 3 on June 2, 198 q System Description The Reactor Vessel Level Instrumentation System (RVLIS) is a standard Westinghouse design for Upper Head Injection (UHI) reactors and uses differential pressure (dp) transmitters to measure reactor vessel level or relative void content of the Reactor Coolant (NC) System. RVLIS includes .j two redundant QA Condition 1 channels powered frora Class 1E busses. Each i channel consists of three dp transmitters and associated equipment to measure the pressure differential from the bottom of the reactor vessel to-the top of the reactor vessel. The transmitters correspond to three ranges of indication to cover operation under various cor.binations of forced or natcral circulation. The ranges are termed dynamic head, lower range and upper rang '
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CATAWBA STATION DIRECTIVE 4. .l-
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  "EACH PROCEDURE SHALL BE SUFFICIENTLY DETAILED FOR A QUALIFIED INDIVIDUAL TO PERFORM THE REQUIRED
, FUNCTION WITHOUT DIRECT SUPERVISION...."
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The dynamic head senses dp between the vessel bottom and the hot leg and provides indication on a display in the control room of 0-120% dp and is used when reactor coolant pumps are operating. The lower range also senses dp' between the vessel bottom and the ' hot leg and provides indication, from 0-70% vessel level and would be used during natural    j circulation. .The upper range senses dp between the hot leg and the top of the vessel and provides indication from 60-120% vessel level and would also be used during natural. circulatio ,
.
During periods when reactor coolant pumps are operating, the upper and lower ranges indicate o.ff ' scale and invalid in the control room. If    i reactor- coolant pumps are not running the dynamic head will indicate invali The equipment associated with each transmitter includes impulse tubing, temperature - detectors, in-containment sensor   bellows units, out-of-containment hydraulic isolators and the necessary electronic processing and display instrumentatio The sensor bellows is provided with two in line instrument root valves located inside containment. The dp transmitters have Magnex isolation valves located outside containmen 'The Magnex valve is a packless ball valve, hermetically sealed to eliminate the possibility of stem leakage. The Magnex valve handle is magnetically coupled through the pressure barrier to the ste . Sequence of Events:
_X'
Date Time 5/19/89 -
_
With unit 2 in a refueling outage, calibrations are complete on the RVLIS system which is then returned to servic /21/89 1015 Unit enters mode 4 in preparation for startu /23/89 1100 Failure of #1 seal on reactor coolant pump 20; unit cooldown to mode 5 to drain system and repair sea /25/89 -
.
RVLIS Upper Range channels are isolated by shutting the sensor bellows valves and the Magnex valves and tubing is disconnected in order to vent reactor vesse /28/89 -
      .
Reactor coolant pump seal work is complete and system is ready to be filled. Two Instrument and Electrical (IAE) technicians are assigned to connect RVLIS tubing    <
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and restore syste Tubing is connected and the i
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sensor bellows valves are opened however the Magnex isolation va1ves for both channels hre not opene ,
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Post maintenance test is a functional verification to ensure tubing does not lea .
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CATAWSA NUCIJ.AR STATION  ENCLOSURE 1 PROCEDURE $IGN-Of7 SNEE7  Pase 6 of 6
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    .(6420)  / M (6430)  / / /
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10.9.10        '
20.9.11    M/M199 80.9.13
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FERTOPN.D BY b  DATE E-423-89
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l MAINTENANCE MANAGEMENT PROCEDURE "A FUNCTIONAL VERIFICATION MAY BE COMPLETED DURING THE COURSE OF  l MAINTENANC AN EXAMPLE OF THIS WOULD BE AN INSTRUMENT CALIBRATION, THE SUBSEQUENT RETURNING OF THE INSTRUMENT TO SERVICE, AND VERIFICATION OF CORRECT INDICATIONS."


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CNS IAE GUIDELINE I 4
    .
  " APPROPRIATE INDICATIONS SHALL BE INDEPENDENTLY CHECKED AETER THE INSTRUMENTS ARE VALVED IN OR OTHERWISE RESTORED TO NORMAL OPERATING CONFIGURATION TO VERIFY THAT THE INSTRUMENTATION AGREES WITH CORRECT PLANT CONDITIONS. THIS WILL VERIFY THAT THE INSTRUMENT / LOOP IS PROPERLY RESTORED."
5/31/89' 2056 Unit enters mode /1/89 -
 
Operations. performs TS 4.3.3.6 surveillance monthly channel check on RVLIS by comparing dynamic range values with expected value /2/89 0043 Unit enters mode 3 at which time two channels of RVLIS 1 arei required to be operable per TS 3.3. l
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Unit enters mode /7/89 0425 Unit enters mode i 6/16/89 1130 While performing monthly walkdown of RVLIS it is noted that both channels of upper range RVLIS indicate values of 94% and 99% instead''of the expected values
 
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of less than.60% The Magnex isolation valves for the 4 upper range transmitters are found isolate !
S T I A T
   . Licensee declares both' channels of RVLIS inoperabl !
E N N P E O O M I C U T S R A T R T S O M N T P I S
  - -    i Senior Resident Inspector becomes aware of problem during a routine tour of the control room and i discussions with operator Channel B Magnex valve is opened and channel declared operable; other Magnex valve is stuck closed due to system pressur Licensee receives procedure from Westinghouse and opens the stuck valve and Channel A is declared operabl , Description of Event On May 19,1989 Unit 2 had completed its second refueling outage and was in mode 5 making preparations for restarting the unit. An 18 month calibration of both channels of the RVLIS System had been completed under work Request 5992 SWR, using IP/2/A/3122/02, System Calibration Procedure For Inadequate Core Cooling Monitor External Analog Transmitters. The  ;
G  E N
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system lineup was completed and both channels were declared operable. The unit entered mode 4 on May 21, however, exc'essive reactor coolant (NC)
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pump seal leakoff on NC pump 2D indicated a problem with the number one seal and the licensee was forced to return the unit to mode 5, drain the NC system and repair the seal. In order to vent the reactor vessel head it was decided to disconnect.the RVLIS tubing from 2NC279, RVLIS Isolation Valve, on the head and use that valve as a vent. Work Request 5345 SWR was generated to isolate RVLIS using portions of IP/2/A/3122/0 .
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i Significance
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RVLIS Upper Range is not needed to. mitigate an Inadequate Core Cooling event (NUREG 0737,. Supplement.1)
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RVLIS Upper Range-does.not meet the " split" criteria of the Technical Specification Improvement Program
   - A shutdown transient is more significant-than havin RVLIS Upper Range out of-servic Duke Power intends to move the requirements l  for RVLIS Upper Range to Catawba's Selected Licensee Commitment documen ;
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Since only the upper range RVLIS would be disconnected and rendered inoperable, the work supervisor N/A'd the non applicable steps of IP/2/A/3122/02. On May 25 the upper range of both channels was isolated by shutting the Magnex isolation valve and the two sensor bellows !
. ,    ENCLOSURE 5 1, .
isolation valves, associated with each channel and disconnecting the tubing from 2NC27 On May 28, the licensee completed work on_the NC pump l seal and the reactor coolant system was. ready to be filled. Two IAE technicians on the night shift were assigned the job of. restoring the '
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RVLIS system and closing the work request. Using the same procedure which had been tailored for the specific job by N/Aing non-applicable steps, the technicians reconnected the tubing and opened the sensor bellows isolation valves. The technicians, however, failed to open the Magnex isolation valves. Later on May 28, the post maintenance test was performed which consisted of only visual inspection of the tubing for leaks. A verifica-tion of RVLIS operability was not performe On June 1 in preparation for Mode 3, operations personnel completed !
OUKE POWER COMP ANY CATAWBA NUCLEAR STAT 1ON RVLiS ENFORCEMENT CONFERENCE FOLLOWUP AUGUST 15- 1989 OVERVIEW  T. 'B. OWEN SAFETY SIGNIFICANCE
PT/2/A/4600/03A, Monthly Surveillance Items. Included as Step 18 on enclosure 13.4 is the monthly channel check on the RVLIS channels required by Technical Specification 4.3.3.6. The acceptance criteria requires "two operable channels reading within +/- 3% of the expected value for existing i pump combination and reactor power level (refer to Unit 2 Data Book)." It should be noted that with the reactor coolant pumps on only the dynamic range of RVLIS provides a valid indication in the control room. The surveillance was performed and no discrepancies were note On June 2 at 12:43 a.m. Unit 2 entered mode 3 at which time Technical Specification 3.3.3.6 required both channels and a minimum of I channel of RVLIS to be operable. While both channels' lower range and dynamic head were operable, both channels of upper range were inoperable since the associated Magnex valves were isolated. The unit subsequently entered mode 1 and increa, sed power to 100%.
  - OPERATOR PERSPECTIVE AbD OPTIONS R. N. C'ASLER
On June 16, IAE technicians were assigned to perform a monthly walkdown of the R''LI S System under work request 6845 SWR using IP/2/A/3122/01, hadequate Core Cooling System Walkdown Checklist. The purpose of the procedure is to obtain monthly data for trending and/or analyzing of enssible system problems. The procedure is not intended to meet any NRC requirements or commitments. The walkdown includes a review of a l
  - RVLIS DES!GN BASIS & TECH SPEC. PLAftJING H J LEE OUTSTANDING QUESTIONS  W. R. McCOLLUM
  " diagnostic page" on the control room display, monitoring hardware ambient temperature and cycling of the Magnex isolation valve While the technicians were performing the procedure, it became evident while viewing the diagnostic page that there was a problem with the RVLIS upper range Train A upper range indicated 94% and Train B indicated 99%, however, both should have read 60% (off scale low). The technicians determined the i
  - EVENT SLMAARY Ato MAtuGENOJT EXPECTATIONS
  - VENTING RVLIS LibE FOL1.OWING RECortECTION
  - SLPERVISOR QUALIFICATIONS o-
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l NUREG-0737 ITEM II.F.2 REQUIREMENTS  i e  LR RVLIS INDICATES STAGNANT BOILOFF WHILE DHR RVLIS INDICATES HIGH VOID FRACTION PUMPED FLOW e  BOTH RANGES COVER THE FULL RANGE FROM NORMAL OPERATION J (ZERO VOID FRACTION) TO COMPLETE CORE UNC0VERY e  LR RVLIS DOES NOT ERR 0NE0USLY INDICATE ICC BECAUSE OF THE PRESENCE OF AN UNRELATED PHENOMENON, E.G., VOIDING IN THE REACTOR VESSEL UPPER HEAD DURING A NATURAL CIRCULATION DEPRESSURIZATION WITH SUBC00 LED LOOP FLOW
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e  BOTH RANGES GIVE ADVANCED WARNING 0F THE APPROACH OF ICC IN THAT V0IDING IS INDICATED ON EACH RANGE WELL BEFORE REACHING A VOID FRACTION INDICATIVE OF C,0RE UNC0VERY
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LR RVLIS WARNING'0F A.PPR0ACH'.'0F ICC
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TIME FROM' REACTOR TRIP        TIME FROM LR UNC0VERY (64%).
TO LR UNC0VERY-(64%)        T0: CORE.UNC0VERY (39%)
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TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION SPLIT CRITERIA e INSTALLED INSTRUMENTATION THAT IS USED TO DETECT, AND INDICATE IN THE CONTROL ROOM, A SIGNIFICANT ABNORMAL DEGRADATION OF THE REACTOR COOLANT PRESSURE B0UNDARY OR; e A PROCESS VARIABLE THAT IS AN INITIAL CONDITION OF A DESIGN BASIS ACCIDENT'(DBA) OR TRANSIENT ANALYSES THAT EITHER ASSUMES THE FAILURE OF OR PRESENTS A CHALLENGE TO THE INTEGRITY OF A FISSION PRODUCT BARRIER OR:
e A STRUCTURE, SYSTEM OR COMPONENT THAT IS PART OF THE PRIMARY SUCCESS PATH AND WHICH FUNCTIONS OR ACTUATES TO MITIGATE A DESIGN BASIS ACCIDENT OR TRANSIENT THAT EITHER ASSUMES THE FAILURE OF OR PRESENTS A CHALLENGE TO THE INTEGRITY OF A i  . FISSION PRODUCT BARRIER,
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CASE I - VOID EXISTS AND RVLIS INDICATES NO V0ID A. POSSIBLE DELAYED OPERATOR AWARENESS OF VOID B. OPERATORS ARE TRAINED ON HOW PARAMETERS REACT WHEN A VOID EXISTS 1, ABNORMAL PRESSURIZER LEVEL RESPONSE ABNORMAL NATURAL CIRCULATION PARAMETERS SUBC00 LING-MARGIN DECREASING / ALARM C. LOWER RANGE RVLIS INSTRUMENTS WILL ALERT OPERATOR PRIOR TO CORE UNC0VERY - CSF WILL DIRECT OPERATOR TO PROPER RECOVERY PROCEDURE D. UPPER RANGE RVLIS IS NOT AN INPUT TO THE ICC CRITICAL SAFETY FUNCTION NOR IS IT USED IN THE INADEQUATE OR DEGRADED CORE COOLING EP's
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F CASE II - VOID DOES NOT EXIST AND RVLIS INDICATES A VOID
, 'POTENTIALLY LEAD TO UNNECESSARY STEPS TO REMOVE THE VOID AFTER A SHORT TIME, THE OPERATOR WOULD REALIZE UPPER RANGE RVLIS INDICATION IS UNRELIABLE
' PRESSURIZER LEVEL RESPONSE UPPER RANGE RVLIS NO RESPONSE SUBC00 LING MARGIN MONITOR RESPONSE NATURAL CIRCULATION PARAMETERS RESPONSE COULD DELAY POST LOCA C00LDOWN AND DEPRESSURIZATION UNTIL OPERATOR DETERMINES A VOID DOES NOT EXIST - NOT A SAFETY J
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Magnex valves .were closed and informed appropriate personnel. At 11:30 a.m. both channels of RVLIS were declared inoperable by the Shift Supervisor and the unit was placed in the 48 hour action statement of TS 3.3.3.6. The Shift Supervisor directed the IAE technicians to return the channels to an operable status. The Magnex valve for channel B was opened and the channel was declared operable at 1:00 p.m.. However, due to the pressure differential across the ball valve, Channel A Magnex Valve was stuck closed. After consulting with Westinghouse a special procedure was used and the Channel A valve was opened and declared operable at 5:08 ,
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The licensee inspected the Magnex valves on Unit I and verified them to be ope . Use of Non Qualified Technicians It was determined that the technicians assigned to restore the RVLIS system on May 28, were not qualified under the licensee's Employee Training and Qualifications System (ETQS) program to perform work on that syste CFR 50, Appendix B, Criterion II, requires that the licensee provide training of personnel performing activities affecting quality as necessary to assure suitable proficiency is achieved and ' maintained. Duke Power Company Topical Report Quality Assurance Program, sections 17. and 17.2.2 state that the qualifications of personnel are in accordance with Regulatory Guide 1.8. Personnel Selection and Training. Regulatory Guide 1.8 incorporates ANSI N18.1-1971 which requires a training program for maintenance personnel. The training program shall be such that fully trained and qualified personnel are available at the times required and shall be to ensure the safe and reliable operation of the plant. The licensee's ETQS program is established to meet this and other industry requirements. The program is such that once employees are qualified to tasks, they may perform related procedures without direct supervisio Task qualification is an independent evaluation of an employee's ability to perform all elements of a task. The qualification process utilizes  j Training and Qualification Guides (T&Q) for establishing the prerequisites
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t T&Q Guide for Task #IE-8936 provides the qualification requirements for work on The Inadequate Core Cooling Monitor (ICCM) which includes RVLI The task requires actual performance of IP/2/A/3122/02 under direct supervision of a qualified person and an explanation of procedural steps not actually performe l Section 902 of the ETQS manual requires that supervisors assign work only to qualified individuals or ensure that a qualified person is directing the work of a non qualified person to the extent required to ensure the  l task is performed in a satisfactory manner. The supervisor failed to meet this requirement when assigning personnel to restore the RVLIS. The  '
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licensee's investigation determined that the supervisor knew the technicians were not qualified on RVLIS, but opted to allow them to
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consult over the- telephone with a qualified technician. The supervisor l apparently elected to shortcut the process because he perceived the work-to be urgent and his belief that the work was a simple tas The technicians, who. performed the work, clearly were not familiar with procedure and the system terminology. This was exemplified when they 4 l
T I S
documented opening the Magnex valves when in fact they had opened the sensor bellows valves. A detailed review of the completed isolation portion of the procedure would have revealed that both sets of valves had 3 been isolated. This is identified as an apparent violation of the licensee's quality assurance program in that personnel who were not qualified to do so, were assigned to perform maintenance activities on safety related equipmen . Procedure Adequacy
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Standing Work Request 6845 SWR is the mechanism to perform the monthly '
a CS  S AI  D S TV  O D H O TE  H M T T AR E E M
walkdown of the RVLIS system using IP/2/A/3122/01, Inadequate Core Cooling ;
H e D
System Walkdown Checklist. This procedure is an example of a licensee initiative which goes ' beyond minimum NRC requirements. In this case the performance of the procedure detected the inoperable channels. This initiative .is considered a strengt Standing Work Request 5345 SWR exists to remove and replace RVLIS tubing for reactor head removal and replacement. The work request requires the use of IP/2/A/3122/02, System Calibration Procedure For Inadequate Core Cooling Monitor External Analog Transmitters. Although the reactor head was not to be removed, in this case, the decision was made to use the standing work request and to N/A the non applicable steps in the procedur On May 25 qualified technicians performed steps to isolate RVLIS and disconnect the tubin After veri fying- initial conditions and .
N TS t t
i prerequisites, technicians performed step 10.2.1 of IP/2/A/3122/02 which states "close Magnex isolation valves on both Train A and Train B". This step was performed f or the upper range Magnex Valves and N/A'd for the dynamic head and lower range Magnex valves. The step was initialled and ,
O N f A
independently verified. Additionally, the technicians wrote " Closed !
    .
Magnex valves for 2NC6390 and 2NC6420" (Channel A and B respectively)
I C T E I yL SSY L A N F
under the " action taken" portion of the work request. The technicians j then performed step 10.2.2.B which states "Close both isolation valves for sensor bellows". Although this step was initialled and independently !
I fS IA EC E SR C PO R RT P X X  _
verified, it was not documented under the " action taken" portion of the work reques The technicians then completed steps to disconnect the tubin ,
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M F E A  S R F R V O A A E M F E  R E R L V E A L E  B
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- P A H A E R O O S S C P T T  R R E U E O C O V D N S R N E E I U S L S V V  E O O U R O R S I I S  E T G E E T R C E P R N E B S U  .
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EXPECTATION e Post-MAINTENANCE TESTING WILL BE SUFFICIENT IN SCOPE TO VERIFY OPERABILITY OF COMPONENTS AND SYSTEMS PRIOR TO RETURN TO SERVICE e PMT WILL BE STRENGTHENED TO INCLUDE SPECIFIC
    ' CRITERIA FOR MAINTENANCE ACTIVITIES e PMT HAS NOT BEEN A RE-CURRING PROBLEM IN I&E
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CATAWBA NUCLEAR STATION  i
      ,
Rick Mack Projects Manager l


  'The isolation portion of the procedure appeared to be acceptable, however, the restoration portion was inadequate as evidenced by the following: Section 10.9 of the procedure is used to restore the system back to an operational statu Step 10.9.2.H states "Open head sensor isolation valves". The sign off sheet for this step was not with the ,
Purpose:
completed work request. It is suspected the step had been mistakenly !
Discuss the Nuclear Station Modification l (NSM) process with special emphasis on Post !
N/A'd by the supervisor and since all other steps on that sheet were not applicable, the sheet was discarded. The licensee was unable to substantiate or refute this and was unable to produce the sheet in questio The licensee was also unable to determine if this step had been included as part of the restoration procedur Step 10.9.9 states "open all Magnex Isolation Valves for Train A and Train B".
Modification Testin ;
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CATAWBA NUCLEAR STATION NUCLEAR STATION MODIFICATION i'NSM)
      ,
PROCESS Origination Design Planning Implementation I
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The supervisor had intended to N/A opening the Magnex valves for the dynamic head and lower range by drawing a line through the steps on the sign off sheet, writing "N/A" and initialing by the line, however, his initials crossed into the sign off steps for the upper 10.9.9 range Magnex was not Valves. This gave the appearance that all of step applicabl .
l: ...
Since these two steps were required to adequately restore the system and the requirement to perform the steps had effectively been N/A'd, concluded that the procedure was inadequate and is identified asitanis apparent violation of Technical Specification 6. On May 28, the non qualified technicians attempted to restore the syste Having received instructions over the telephone they reconnected the tubing and opened the sensor bellows isolation valve The technicians apparently thought that step 10.9.9, requiring the Magnex valves to be opened, was not applicable due to the appearance that the step had been N/A'd. Under the " action taken" portion of the work request, they documented that they had " opened Magnex valves for 2NC6420 and 2NC6390". In fact they had only opened the sensor bellows valves and not the Magnex Valves. In summary it is hypothesized that this event probably occurred due to a combination of the following: The IAE technicians restoring the system vere not qualified on RVLIS and were not familiar with terms used in the procedure, The procedure as issued was inadequate in that:
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CATAWBA NUCLEAR STATION NUCLEAR STATION MODIFICATION l',NSM)
PROCESS Origination
    * problem identified at any level in the station, General Office, or Design Engineering
      ,
    * reviewed for need, benefit / cost, alternatives, regulatory commitment
    * compared with other problems to determine l greatest benefit l
o approved by Station Manager  l l
    * NSM request to Design Engineering w/ interface ]
Activities form  {
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The steps to open the sensor bellows valves had been mistakenly N/A'd. (cannot be substantiated).
*
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  %3mmm  INTERFACE ACTIVITIES REQUEST 1. NSM #  Rev.#
2. Scope Meeting Required  O Yes O No O Review problem to be resolved (reasons for irMTs'ui).
 
O Revew options available to resolve problem including similar completed modification O Review nuclear safety aspects of modificatb O Review QA aspects of modificatio O Review design options to reduce personnel exposur O Revew potential operability or maintainability concem O Revewconstructabdityconcem O Post,TMrs'si testing requirement O Other 3. Pre-Design Survey Required  O Yes O No Area of Station to be surveyed O Walk down for potential interferences with existing equiprcent (constructability).
 
O Wak down to optimize equipment locations (operability and maintainability).
 
O Wak down to confirm as budt configuration O Wak down to optimize ALARA desg O Wak down to mnmize personnel safety phii O Wak down to minimize nuclear security problem O Specal considerations for post-modficaton testin O Other 4. Conceptuel Client /CMD Revew Needed (20% to 40% Desgned)  O Yes ONo Reviewis needed of:  O Post-irMTG'hi testing equirenents O Operabdity  O Design enwy for intender! rnoGificaSon O MainP'~bility  O ALARAdesgn O Constructabdity  O Safetycoskiere^hs O Other      -_
Spec 4c design nwiewis requested of drawing . Detailed Clont/CMD Review Needed (60% to 80% Desgned)  O Yes O No i  Revewis needed of:  O Post,TMTG^& testingrequirements
  ' O Operabdity  O ALARA design O Maintanabilrty  O Safety corr.Jderations O Constructability  O Other Specific design review is requested of drawing . CMD Contact 7. Completed by:      Date:
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CATAWBA NUCLEAR STATION NUCLEAR STATION MODIFICATION (NSM)
PROCESS Design
  * Initial scope review
  * designers, originator, affected station groups
  *
discuss Post Modification Testing (PMT) expected
  * develop draft PMT Plan a detail design performed
  * provide instrumentation needed for PMT
  * for design basis change or when documetita-tion of dealgn basis is unclear, specify  !
S test o')}setives
  * test acceptanca criteria  {
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  * Final Scope Document  j
  * PMTAC summary  l
  * functional description of mo I
 
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PMT PLAN l
l l O DRAFT PMT Plan  O FINAL PMT Plan  Rev *  Paos of I1 l NSM #/ Exempt Change #
Rev.#
Part #
Unit #
I2 BRIEF NSM DESCRIPTION l
l I3 NSTALLATON TESTS Type of Test  Documentation  Performed by
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_      i4 VERIFICATION TESTS Typeof Test  Documentation  Performed by
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The steps to open the Magnex Valves appeared to the technicians to have been N/A' Only the opening of the Magnex valves had been documented in the
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   " action taken" portion of the work request.
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CATAWBA NUCLEAR STATION NUCLEAR STATION MODIFICATION (NSM)
PROCESS Planning
    * Planning Meeting
    * discuss system / plant impact during instsilation, Isola-tion requirements (e.g. %' train vs. 'B' train, etc.) and PMT requirement with all affected station groups
    * finalize PMT Plan
'
    *
write implementation procedure (TN)
    * controlling procedure
    * all parts of mod included
    * !solations and effect on plant l
    * PMT & responsibility for performing
!  *
PMT Summary Letter discussing thought process and conclu.slons reached on determin-ing appropriate Post Mod Testing
    *
review and approve TN
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l CATAWBA NUCLEAR STATION NUCLEAR STATION MODIFICATION (NSM)  4 PROCESS
      '
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Implementation
    * follow TN
    * perform PMT as directed
    * review documentation of PMT results prior to return to service l
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s CATAWBA NUCLEAR STATION NUCLEAR STATION MODIFICATION (NSM,'l  !
PROCESS Summary a definite, structured process during Design and planning stages to identify PMT
  * appropriate station and Design Engineering groups are involved in determining PMT
  * controlled process for performing PMT and determining that results are satisfactor l
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CATAWBA NUCLEAR STATION SYSTEM EXPERT DEFINrnON A System Expert is "an individual with an engineering degree or a strong demonstrable technical background who is
        ,
assigned the responsibility of maintaining expertise in a designated plant system (s)
and/or area (s).
 
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The inspectors reviewed the licensee's administrative requirements for N/A'ing procedure At the top of the hierarchy of requirements is Station Directive 4.2rl, Development, Approval and Use of Station Procedure This directive has no provisions for N/A'ing step ,
Operations Management Procedure 1-4, Use of Procedures and Maintenance,    {
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and Manual Procedure 6.5, Ose of Mechanical Maintenance Procedures, provide guidance on how to N/A steps, however, there is no corresponding    {
IAE procedure. Step 5.4,1 of IP/2/A/3122/02, the procedure used for the-   i i
RVLIS work, states ."Have Work Supervisor review and mark N/A steps not    i applicable 'to work being performed". There exists, however, no guidance on how to accomplish.this as there does in other. group The following inconsistencies were identified: One method to indicate non applicable steps is to line.through.the    ;
sign offs on the data sheet of a procedure. Using this method, there is no way to indicate non applicable steps for which there is no
  - associated sign off, IAE requires the supervisor to N/A step Mechanical Maintenance allows the technicians to N/A steps with the supervisors concurrence /
The performance group does not allow steps to be N/A'd, but, requires .
a procedure chang The method of drawing one line through multiple sign offs appears to be inconsistent with an " attention to detail" approach towards maintenanc The lack of requirements for N/A'ing steps in IAE procedures and the_above inconsistencies comprise a weakness in the licensee's program for the use of procedures, a weakness which contributed to this even . ' Post Maintenance Testing Section VIII of Work Request 5345 SWR documented the Post Maintenance Test (PMT) for the RVLIS tubing isolation. A " functional verification" was performed which merely inspected the tubing for leak A " retest" was documented as not being require The inspectors compared this to the licensee's PMT program to determine adequac Maintenance Manual  1.0,  Request
          .
Procedure (MMP)  Work  '
Preparation provides guidance for PMT. A retest is defined as a test to demonstrate that a component meets the minimum acceptance criteria as defined in Technical Specifications or other regulatory documents and is    ,
          '
in addition to testing which follows maintenance or incidental adjustment The retest must adequately test all components on which maintenance or incidental adjustments were perfo'rmed if a reasonable    !
possibility exists that the parameter to be tested was affected by the    '
maintenanc .
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CATAWBA NUCLEAR STATION :
SYSTEM EXPERT PURPOSE The purpose of the System Expert Program is to maximize the performance, avaliability, I and reliability of station systems and the station as a whol l l
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t Catawba Nuclear Station  !
System Expert Qualifications  '
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Four year engineering or physical science degree or a strong l demonstrable technical background At least one year nuclear power plant experience Exemplary knowledge of systems assigned Training
    * Systems
    * Components
    * Technical Specifications
    * Design Basis
    * Operational Understanding
    * Codes l
    * Case Studies
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A functional verification is defined as one which demonstrates that a component will operate as designed. The licensee's policy is that an independent verification such as a valve lineup is an acceptable functional verification if it is reasonable to expect the system will be restored to an operable status. The maintenance activity itself, however, l must not be expected to degrade the system. In the case where an instrument is valved out and impulse lines disconnected, various scenarios (
  . .
can be postulated such as crimp?d tubing, foreign material, inadequate fill and vent, etc. which would invalidate this type of functional verificatio Section 4.9.10 of MMP 1.0 provides guidance for performing functional !
4   ' i Catawba Nuclear Station    i System Expert Program Systems i
verifications and states " instruments should be placed in operation and verified for correct reading on local and remote gauges". In that MMP requires a functional verification and that the one performed on RVLIS did not demonstrate that RVLIS would, "... operate as designed," it is ;
        .
concluded that the post maintenance test was inadequate and is identified I as an apparent violation of Technical Specification 6.8.1, for failure to '
Steam Generator Browdown Recycle System Ice Condenser Refdgeration System Auxiliary Feedwater System  Safety injection System Main Condenser  Containment Spray System Feedwater dystem  Chemical & Volume Control System Condensate Syrtem  Containment Penetration Valve Inj Water System Trace Heating System  Condenser Circu! sting Water System Loose Parts Monitoring (Unit) Fire Protection System
follow procedure, MMP The licensee's proposed corrective acti'on will ensure the walkdown of the RVLIS System using IP/2/A/3122/01 is performed after maintenance, however, the broader policy issue of functional verifications of instruments in general should be reviewe : Technical Specification Requirements Technical Specification 3.3.3.6 requires the accident monitoring instrumentation shown in Table 3.3-10 to be operable in modes 1, 2, and Table 3.3-10 specifies, for the Reactor Vessel Water Level Instruments-tion, the total number of channels as 2 and the minimum number of channels operable as The action statements specify: With the number of OPERABLE accident monitoring instrumentation channels less than the Total Number of Channels shown in Table 3.3-10, restore the inoperable channel (s) to OPERABLE status within 7 days, or be in at least HOT STANDBY within the next 6 hours and in HOT SHUTDOWN within the following 6 hour With the number of OPERABLE accident monitoring instrumentation channels less than the Minimum Channels OPERABLE requirements of Table 3.3-10, restore the inoperable channel (s) to OPERABLE status within 48 hours or be in at least HOT STANDBY within the next 6 hours and in HOT SHUTDOWN within the following 6 hour :
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Radiation Monitoring (Unit)  Conventional Low Press Service Water System incore Instrumentation  Nuclear Service Water System Out of-Core Instrumentation  Exterior Fire Protection System Diesel Load Sequencing System  Main Steam Supply to Auxiliary Equipment Diese! ControlSystem  Main Steam Bypass to Condenser Refueling Water System  Main Steam Heater Drain System  Main Steam Vent to Atmosphere Containment Personnel Air Lock System Auxiliary Ventilation System Containment leak Testing System  Control Room Area HVAC System Operator Aid Computer System  Annulus Ventilation System Engineered Safety Features Actuation System Fuel PoolVentilation System Transient Monitoring System  Instrument AirSystem IWP/IVN  Containment Purge Component Cooling System  Containment Air Return & Hydrogen Skimmer System Diesel Generator Engine Cooling Water System Reactor Generator Stator Cooling Water System Fuel Recirculated Cooling Water System Special Nuclear Materials Reactor Coolant System  Appendix J Residual Heat Removal System
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i Catawba Nuclear Station System Expert    l Responsibilities
  * Detail System Understanding  -
  * Scheduling
  * System Walkdown
  * System Monitoring
  * Reliability Review
  * Operating Experience Program
  * ALARA  .
  * Problem Resolver
  * Information Review
  * Modification Review L_____________-------_--____-----__--__------------_--- - - - - . - - - .- - - - - _ - - - - -
 
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Catawba Nuclear Station System Expert Program Development
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August  Work Plan September  Modifications October  Design Basis, Technical Documentation December  Information Review
Definition 1.18 of the Technical Specifications states: >A system, subsystem, train, component or device shall be OPERABLE or have l OPERABILITY when it is capable of performing its specified function (s),
        !
and when all . necessary attendant instrumentation, controls, electrical power,. cooling or seal water, lubrication or other auxiliary equipment ~
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L I
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that are required for the system, subsystem, train, component, or device to perform its function (s) are also capable of performing their related support function (s).
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Catawba Nuclear Station Idystem Expert Skills in Perspective '
Systerns Understanding  . 66%
Component Understanding  33 %
Tech Spec Understanding  90%
Code Understanding  85 %
Design Basis Understanding  50 %
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The Technical Specification bases for accident monitoring instrumentation states: The OPERABILITY of the accident monitoring instrumentation ensures that sufficient information is available on selected plant parameters to monitor and assess these variables- following an acciden This capability is consistent with the recommendations of Regulatory Guide 1.97, Revision 3, " Instrumentation for Light-Water-Cooled Nuclear Power Plants to Assecs Plant Conditions During and Following an Accident," May 1983 and NUREG 0737, " Clarification of TMI Action Plan Requirements,"
_
November 198 The RVLIS requirements stem from NUREG 0737 Item II.F.2, Instrumentation For Detection of Inadequate Core Cooling which states: The indication of ICC must be unambiguous in that it should have the following properties: It must indicate the existence of inadequate core cooling caused by various phenomena (i.e., high-void fraction pumped flow as well as stagnant boil-off); and, It must not erroneously indicate ICC because of the presence of an unrelated phenomeno The indication must give advanced warning of the approach of ICC. The indication must cover the full range from normal operations to complete core uncovery. For example, water-level instrumentation may be chosen to provide advanced warning of two phase level drop to the top of the core and could be supplemented by other indicators such as incore and core-exit thermocouple provided that the indicated temperatures can be correlated to provide indication of the existence of ICC and to infer the extent of core uncovery. Alternatively, full-range level instrumentation to the bottom of the core may be employed in conjunction with other diverse indicators such as core-exit thermocouple to preclude misinterpretation due to any inherent deficiencies or inaccuracies in the measurement system selecte Generic Letter 83-37, NUREG 0737 Technical Specifications, required the RVLIS system to be included in Technical Specifications and that the   l system be used to provide indication of the approach to, the existence of,    !
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and recovery from inadequate core coolin j l
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Catawba Nuclear Station NSM Program System ExpertInvolvement SPR SE counsels superintendent NSM approval l
Scope meeting PMT Plan 30 days after scope document Planning meeting Commitment meeting l   PMT summary letter TN approval l
Retest Activities I
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July 12,1989 -
INTRASTATION LETTER CATAWBA NUCLEAR STATION TO: T. B. Owen SUBJECT: Catawba Nuclear St:. tion
  . NSM CN-11045, Rev. 0 & NSM CN-20432, Rev. O Keywords: NSM Retest I
The above referenced NSM's will modify the VP System controls such that all isolation val-ves can be electrically sealed closed during Modes 1 through 4 without the use of a TSM to remove power. The modification also provides for a time delay bypass of the high relative humidity isolation and trip function during startup of the VP Syste The functional that will be conducted as part ofimplementation procedures TNIA10450001A & 02A, and TN2A04320001A & 02A fully demonstrate the adequacy of the NSM to meet its intended purpose. The ability of the time delay relay to allow start of VP with a simulated high humidity for the required time intervalis tested along with the ability to start without a high humidity. In addition the new " BLOCK /CLOSE" function is verified to isolate all VP valves when placed in the required position. As an added as-surance that the required safety function of the affected circuits is not adversely altered, al-though the functional does test all such circuits, Performance will conduct IrTI(2)A420041C upon completion of the modi 5 cation prior to return to service. This is re-quired by the applicable TN Therefore, the proposed NSM implementation plan including functional and retests as out-lined above fully challenge the modification to function in both normal and design basis condition C
.X Z. Ldaylor Test Engineer For Approval:
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MM
\ .F.Bea f
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f Perfromance Manager j
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Catawba Nuclear Station Post Modification Testing Program Introduction Post Modification Testing Philosophy l
Case Studies Summary
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Catawba Nuclear Station Post Modification Testing Philosophy
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Historical Perspective i
Post Modification Testing Standard Testing Limitation Considerations Summary of Changes in Philosophy
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Catawba Nuclear Station Post Modification Testing Philosophy i
Historical Perspective
  * Performed Code Required Retests,IWP/IWV
  * Performed Post Modification Testing on Modifica- ;
tions which changed a Design Basis or created a new ;
Design Basis  j
      !
  * Assumed thatInstallationVerifications sufficient for ensuring Design Basis not affected by Modification
      )


1    ,
Example - VX Modification  I
During the period from June 2,1989 to June 16 1989-both channels of upper. range Reactor Vessel Water Level Instrumentation were isolated and {
  * An HED modification which relocated test circuit controls from the Control Room to a panel in the Auxiliary Buildin I
        '
  * No Chapter 15 Design Basis were affected by this modificatio * Assumed. that installation verifications ensured I proper wirin j l
therefore inoperable. This constitutes an apparent violation of TS 3.3.'3.6 in:that both channels were inoperable for approximately 14 days, i
  * A Post Mod Test was performed however to ensure i that the test switches still worked NOT to verify t  design basis were intac ,
which is greater than the 48 hours allowed by the action statement L Technical Specification 4.3.3.6 requires a monthly Channel Check of RVLIS'
      !
atLleast once per 31 days and a channel calibration at least once per 18 months. :The licensee's channel calibration as performed by IP/2/A/3122/02 appears to be acceptable. The monthly channel check' is accomplished by PT/2/A/4600/03A, Monthly Surveillance Items, item 18 of enclosure 1 The acceptance criteria requires two operable channels reading within +/-
      :
3% of expected values for pump combination and reactor power level. The expected valves are located in OP/2/A/6700/01, Unit Two Data Book, in tables 2.6.2, and figures 2.6.3 and 2.6.4 With reactor coolant pumps running the' licensee compares the dynamic head values to the Data Book to
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    !
Catawba Nuclear Station Post Modification Testing Philosophy
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Testi.ng to Ensure Design Basis Intact
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* Design Basis - Definition
  * FSAR Chapter 15
  * Individual System Design Basis as specified in FSAR
* Scope of Post Modification Testing
  * Fully challenge design basis in accident mode l configuration
* System Expert Responsibilities  '
Example - VX Modification
* This philosophy would require the performance of the Auxiliary Safeguards Test to ensure that the Chapter 15 Design Basis was not affected by this wor j l
    !
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perform the channel check. Since the upper and lower ranges indicate invalid'and off scale low in the control room with reactor coolant pumps on, channel checks on these are not performe A channel check is defined in Teche bei Specifications as the qualitative assessment of channel behavior during operation by observation. This is not being performed on the upper and lower ranges of RVLIS. This is identified as an apparent violation of TS 4.3. . Safety Significance In this event both channels of upper range RVLIS were isolated from June 2,1989 to June 16, 1989 while the reactor was operated in modes 1, 2, and '. The "as found" conditions of Channels A and B were 94% and 99%
.
level ' respectfully. The upper range level channels are referred to at i various points in the licensee's Emergency Procedures (EPs), generally to detert. the onset o
Catawba Nuclear Station Post Modification Tasting Philosophy Testing to Ensure Design Intent Met and Functionally Operable
      ~ f void formation in the reactor vessel and to take approt riate corrective action or as a condition for starting reactor coolant pump i I !
  * Design. Intent - Definition
Emergency Procedure, EP/2/A/5000/1A1, Natural Circulation Cooldown, i has the operator verify that a void does not exist in the upper head !
  * Those design requirements over and beyond FSAR Chapter 15 requirements
area by checking upper range RVLIS >97%. If symptoms of upper head i
  * Scope
voiding are observed a choice is made depending upon whether or not '
  * Each modification is to have its design intent fully challenged to ensure that the modifica-tion performs as intended by design and that the modification was properly installed
rapid depressurization is deemed necessary. If rapid depressuriza-tion is not required operators are directed to procedures to collapse the void which may eventually lead to venting the head. If rapid depressurization is required, the operator is tasked to start a Reactor Coolant (NC) pump. Again, upper range RVLIS is checked >97%
  * System Expert Responsibilities
as condition for startin If this condition cannot be met, pressurizer level is increased >50%, pressurizer heaters are energized and NC subcooling is established at >50 degroes F. This is done so that when voids are condensed, the resulting pressurizer outsurge would not cause pressurizer level or NC subccoling to be lost
      ,
    .
Examples
_ _ - _ _ _ _ _ - - - - - - - - - - - - -
  * ForVX Modification the performance of the VX peri-odic test would now be require * Proper CheckValve Operation
  * InterlockVerification
  * FlowTests
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,
Catawba Nuclear Station
>
Post Modification Testing Philosophy Testing Limitation Consid.erations
    * Risk to Station Equipment
    * Impact to Station Operation
    * Cost of Performing Test Deviation Documentation
    * Any deviation from performing the most conservative testing to verify Design Basis or design intent is to be documented in the Post Modification Testing Sum-mary Letter to Station Man'agement
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.8 Catawba Nuclear Station Post Modification Testing Philosophy Summary of Significant Changes
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  * Focused Responsibility - System Expert is now responsible for approval of Post Modification Test-ing Program for each modification
  ,..
  * FSAR Chapter 15 Design Basis will be verified intact after modification if work performed could have af-fected them
    ;  ,
  * No Credit taken for Installation Verifications
v
  * All modifications will be verified to have met design intent and that the system is functionally operable after the modification l
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If an NC pump cannot be started, Upper Range RVLIS is again monitored during the cooldown and depressurization to minimize the potential
       - - - _ - -
       ' for introducing voids into the loops. Operators must repressurize the NC~ system to maintain upper range level >72%.
...
As the NC system is cooled to 200 F, the upper head temperature will lag and a sufficient period of time. must be allowed for the upper.-
head to cool below' 200 F. Upper Range RVLIS must ~ be used as an indication during depressurization of when to stop cooldown and allow 4 further upper head cooling since there is no direct temperature !
indication in this region, EP/2/A/5000/1C1, Safety Injection Termination Following High Energy Line Break, and. EP/2/A/5000/1C2, Post LOCA Cooldown and Depressuri-zation, also have similar steps to check Upper Range RVLIS >97% as a condition for starting reactor coolant pumps or exiting the procedure
  .
  .
      (if. <97%) to enter.EP/2/A/5000/2F3, Void in Reactor Vesse In the event of certain accidents with reactor coolant pumps off (Natural circulation cooldown, small to medium break LOCA, excessive cooldowns) and upper range RVLIS isolated, the coritrol room display would have erroneously indicated Channels A and B RVLIS at 94% and 99% respectively, regardless of actual level. Operators using the EPs would not have had adequate instrumentation available to detect a void in the head and to monitor the approach to inadequate core cooling. .The criteria, as set forth in several steps. of the EP's, for satisfying that no voids exist, is upper range RVLIS at greater than 97%. Assuming ' a single channel failure, operators would have been deceived into believing that no voids existed. This would have led to inadequate corrective actions to collapse the void or to premature restart of forced circulation and a subsequent loss of subcooling. The expected response for come actions in turn would not have been achievable. At the very least the above discussed inadequacies would have confused the operators and hampered accident recovery. Hact the inoperability been detected the ability to restore the instrumentation to service is questionable weighing the difficulty encountered by the licensee in opening the Magnex valve on June 1 ,
Catawba Nuclear Station  l Case Study 1 S/G PORV Modification Reason for Modification    )
            !
Description of Modification  i S/G PORV Design Basis
1 Deportability The licensee promptly submitted a courtesy Licensee Event Report (LER)
    * Main Steam Isolation Signal  l
414/89-16 on June 26, 1989, 10 days after discovery of the inoperabilit It should be noted that it was the licensee's desire to provide information to the NRC and to initiate corrective action in a timely manner which prompted the courtesy LE The LER states that with the upper range channels isolated "RVLIS could still perform its functions required under NUREG 0737, Supplement 1". The licensee also states "A Technical Specification violation did not occur in this situation because the use of the dynamic head dp and lower range RVLIS scales can meet the requirements stated without reliance on the upper range scale."
    * Manual Open for S/G Tube Rupture Event Post Modification Testing    ;
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    * RVV- No Differential  l l
    * Manual Open - Normal DP, Operator DP Adjusted Summary    i i
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The .NRC does not' concur with these conclusions. NUREG 0737 required'the
      = = =: pw ' ,
   ~ RVLIS system indication to cover the full range from normal operations to complete - core uncovery. Generic Letter 83-37, NUREG 0737 ' Technical Specifications, states- the system would provide indication of the approach to, the existence of, and the recovery from inadequate core cool _ing. With'
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the Upper Range ' channels inoperable, these requirements were not met and -
        *
therefore the licensee was not' in compliance with 'the Technical Specificatio On the basis that a technical specification v'iolation did occur, the report then .would be required by 10CFR50.73, which requires any operation or conditiore prohibited by the . Technical Specifications to be reporte The LER also refers .to the McGuire Nuclear Station Technical Specifica- l tions which are different than Catawba's for the RVLIS system. The LER states that McGuire's basis for RVLIS does not require upper range. Th licensee, however, may not rely on the McGuire TS because they do not apply at Catawba. Additionally, the basis as stated in the McGuire TS has not been approved and is currently being reviewed by NRR. These items were discussed with the licensee. The licensee agreed with the position and informed the inspectors that the LER would be revised. At the writing of this report the revised LER had not been receive . Exit Interview The. inspection scope and findings were summarized on July 7,1989, with those persons indicated in paragraph 1. The inspectors described the areas inspected and discussed in detail the inspection findings listed belo The following dissenting comments were received from the licensee:
OsuOf0s*4 bans M tat #ft  '
The licensee did not consider the procedure used to restore the RVLIS system as inadequate, but agreed that the method used to N/A steps contributed to the even The licensee did not identify as proprietary any of the materials provided to or reviewed by the inspectors during this inspectio Findings One apparent violation in that both channels of RVLIS were inoperable for approximately two weeks. (paragraph 9)
outnrrth rm tas/pft AP9/97L&mwr. f'1815/9t$
One apoarent violation in that channel checks required by Technical Specification surveillance were not performed on the upper and lower ranges of RVLI (paragraph 9)
   = mm=  in p = m us a . . ..,,,.. . . ..,,.y.o,. , [e S/G PORV PMT Acceptance Criteria Data Sheet
One apparent violation in that unqualified technicians were assigned to ;
- _ _ _ _ _ - _ _ _ .
restore the safety related RVLIS system to operability after maintenanc '
 
  (paragraph 6)
        ,
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Catawba Nuclear Station  1 l  Case Study 2 Nuclear Service Water Pond Swap Logic
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Reason for Modification Description of Modification    .
Swap Logic Design Basi l Post Modification Testing
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Summary
 
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Catawba Nuclear Station Case Study 2 Nuclear Service Water Pond Swap Logic i
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Case Study 3 l 2NS 12B Cable Ground Reason for Modification  i Description of Modification I
2NS 12B Design Basis Post Modification Testing Summary
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      * Critical Path Test
      * Design Basis Verified not Affected ,
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Catawba Nuclear Station Post Modification Testing Program Summary
   * Intent of Post Modification Testing Program
  * Verify any affected Design Basis is Intact after Modification work is complete
  * Verify each modification functions as in-tended by design and the system is functional-Iy operable after modification is complete
  * Ensure Station Management is aware of any Post Modification Test which does not fully challenge the design basis or intent of the modificatio * System ExpertInvolvement
  * The System Expert is responsible for the Post Modification Testing of his assigned systems
  * Station Commitment
  * Station Resources
  * Critical Path Schedule Time i
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l      Catawba Nuclear Station Post Modification Tbsting
 
Summary I
l NSM Process Structured
    * Specific Stages for Post Modification Testing Deter-mination
    * Involvement from Station and Design Engineering Personnel
'
Responsibility
    * Defined Responsibility - System Expert
    * Logical Placement of Responsibility
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Catawba Nuclear Station Post M' modification Testing Summary Current Philosophy
    * Test to ensure FSAR Chapter 15 Design Basis Intact
    * No Credit for installation verifications toward final operability  ,
    * Test to ensure modification meets design intent and that the system is operationally functional (Beyond Chapter 15 requirements)  {
Previous Philosophy
    * Tests to ensure Design Basis intact were required to ,
be conducted only if Design B' asis changed
    * Took credit for installation verifications toward sys- l tem operability
    * Testing Criteria to ensure system operationally func-tional was not clearly defined beyond code testing l
l
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    , One apparent violation in that the procedure used to restore the RVLIS system to an operable status was inadequat (paragraph 7)
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One apparent violation in that the post maintenance testing was inadequate to detect the inoperability. (paragraph 8)
..
One strength in that the licensee's monthly RVLIS system walkdown is an initiative which goes beyond minimum NRC requirements and is credited with identifying the inoperabilit (paragraph 7)
Catawba Nuclear Station Post Modification Testing Agenda August 15,1989 Opening Comments  Tony Owen NSM Process  Rick Mack System Expert Presentation  Bill Beaver PMT Philosophy / Case Studies Jim Kammer Summary  JeffForbes
One weakness in that the licensee's program for N/A'ing procedural steps lacks guidance and is inconsistent. (paragraph 7)
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Revision as of 14:36, 24 January 2022

Forwards Summary of 890720 & 0815 Enforcement Conferences Re Findings in Insp Repts 50-413/89-19 & 50-414/89-19 on Inoperability of Reactor Vessel Level Instrumentation Sys. List of Attendees & Viewgraphs Also Encl
ML20247A178
Person / Time
Site: Catawba  Duke Energy icon.png
Issue date: 08/29/1989
From: Ebneter S
NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION II)
To: Tucker H
DUKE POWER CO.
References
NUDOCS 8909120057
Download: ML20247A178 (88)
v • d • e


Text

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! g m 2 9 1989 L Dock 6t Nos. 50-413, 50-414 License Nos. NPF-35, NPF-S2 Duke Power Company ATTN: Mr. H. B. Tucker, Vice President

Nuclear Production Department -

422 South Church Street Charlotte, NC 28242 Gentlemen:

SUBJECT: ENFORCEMENT CONFERENCE SUMMARY (NRC INSPECTION REPORT N05. 50-413/89-19 AND 50-414/89-19)

This letter refers to the Enforcement Conference held at our request on July.20, 1989, and the Enforcement Conference followup meeting held on August 15, 1989. These meetings concerned activities authorized for your Catawba' facilit The issues d'scussed at the conference and the followup meeting related to inoperability of the Unit 2 Reactor Vessel Level Instrumentation System.

l A list of attendees, meeting summaries, and a copy of your handouts are-enclosed. We are continuing our review of these issues to determine the appropriate enforcement actio In accordance with Section 2.790 of the NRC's " Rules of Practice," Part 2,

!

Title 10, Code of Federal Regulations, a copy of this letter and its enclosures l will be placed in the NRC Public Document Roo Should you have any questions concerning this letter, please contact u

Sincerely, wcd Do '

OQ A m( C b C. E h Stewart D. Ebneter Regional Administrator

,i Enclosures:

l

' List of Attendees ' Enforcement Conference Summary Enforcement Conference followup Meeting Summary Handout (s) dated July 20, 1989 l Handout (s) dated August 15, 1989 l

cc w/encls:

T. B. Owen, Station Manager Senior Resident Inspector - McGuire l State of South Carolina bec w/encls: (See page 2) * ;g 8909120057 890829 L I " *** %? **'

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Duke Power Company 2 AUG 2 S 1989 bec w/encis:

K. N. Jabbour, NRR NRC Resident Inspector '

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ENCLOSURE 1 l

LIST OF ATTENDEES I

July 20, 1989 U.S. Nuclear Reculatory Commission L M. L. Ernst. Deputy Regional Administrator l P. K. Grimes. Acting Deputy Regional Administrator C. W. Hehl, Deputy Director, Division of Reactor Projects (DRP)

E. W. Merschoff, Deputy Dirertor, Division of Reactor Safety (DRS)

G. R. Jenkins, Director Enforcement and Investigation Coordination Staff (EICS)

A. R. Herdt, Branch Chief DRP M. B. Shymlock, Section Chief, CRP K. N. Jabbour, Project Manager, Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation (NRR)

W. T. Orders, Senior Resident Inspector, Catawba, DRP M. S. Lesser, Resident Inspector, Catawba, DRP B. R. Bonser, Project Engineer, DRP R. J. Goddard, Regional Counsel F. Jape Section Chief. DRS B. Uryc, Enforcement Coordinator, EICS L. Phillips, Section Chief NRR J. Leuhman, Dffice of Enforcement Duke Power Company H. B. Tucker, Vice President, Nuclear Production Department T. B. Owen, Station Manager, Catawba P. G. Leroy, Catawba Support Engineer, Compliance R. M. Glover, Compliance Engineer, Catawba W. R. McCollum, Maintenance Superintendent, Catawba J. M. Stackley, ISE Group Manager, Catawba

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H. J. Lee, Design Engineering l

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Enclosure 1 2 LIST OF ATTENDEES August 15, 1989 l

U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission B. K. Grimes, Acting Deputy Regional Administrator A. F. Gibson, Director, Division of Reactor _ Safety (DRS)

G. R. Jenkins, Director, Enforcement and Investigation Coordina^ ion Staff (EICS)

A. R. Herdt, Branch Chief, Division of Reactor Projects (DRP)

l M. B. Shymlock, Section Chief, DRP 1 K. N. Jabbour, Project Manager, Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation (NRR)

! M. S. Lesser, Resident Inspector, Catawba, DRP B. R. Bonser, Project Engineer, DRP F. Jape, Section Chief, DRS B. Uryc, Enforcement Coordinator, EICS L. Phillips, Section Chief, NRR J. Leuhman, Office of Enforcement Duke Power Company T. L Owen, ' Station Manager, Catawba R. M. Glover, Compliance Engineer, Catawba W. R. McCollum, Maintenance Superintendent, Catawba H. J. Lee, Design Engineering F. N. Mack, Jr., Project Manager, Catawbc R. N. Casler, Operations Superintendent, Catawba J. Forbes, Technical Services Superintendent, Catawba W. F. Beaver, Performance Manager, Catawba l J. Kammer, Test Engineer, Catawba l

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ENCLOSURE 2 ENFORCEMENT CONFERENCE SUMMARY On July 20, 1989, representatives from Duke Power Company (DPC) met with the NRC in the Region II Office in Atlanta, Getrgia, to discuss inoperability of-both . trains of' the Reactor Vessel' Level Instrumentation System (RVLIS) Upper

,

Railge lon Catawba. Unit ?.

Following opening remarks by M. Ernst, NRC RII Deputy Regional Administrato DPC gave a presentation (Enclosure 4) on the RVLIS inoperability. T. B. Owen, Catawba Station Manager, introduced DPCs presentation by stating that Duke had identified the RVLIS problem, reported it promptly to the NRC, and that contrary to1what was stated in a courtesy Licensee Event Report submitted

= June 26, 1989, the RVLIS Technical Specification had beeri violated. He also

~ stated that DPC felt the root cause of the problem was the failure of the Catawba . supervisor to use qualified personnel in the task of restoring RVLIS and that a contributing factor had been the poor direction and guidance given in N/A'ing procedure steps. The presentation that followed covered a system

' description, sequence ~of events, root cause/ corrective actions, safety significance, summary and concluding remark A significant number of NRC questions and discussion during the conference were centered ' around the supervisory error, qualifications of maintenance and supervisory. personnel, how the error of assigning an unqualified maintenance worker to the job occurred, and the adequacy ~of the post maintenance test perforn.e Duke ended the meeting by giving their corrective actions and stating their conclusions. - Duke . reiterated that they had identified the inoperability, immediately taken corrective actions, communicated the situation promptly to the NRC, and issued a courtesy LER before all the facts were fully known. They also stated that they believed the contributing factors to this event were'not recurring. That is the surveillance problems resulting from N/A'ing procedural

-

steps, assignment of unqualified personnel to tasks requiring qualifications, and performance of post-maintenance testing by unqualified personne Also, with-regard to safety significance, Duke felt the safety ramifications of this event were not significan The URC closed the meeting by stating that it had served to enhance Region II's understanding of the issues and DPC's corrective actions.

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ENCLOSURE 3 ,

ENFORCEMENT CONFERENCE FOLLOWUP MEETING On August 15, 1989, representatives from Duke Power Company met with the NRC in the Region II Office in Atlanta, Georgia, for a followup meeting to the -

enforcement conierence held on July 20. The purpose of the meetirg was to discuss in greater depth subjects which DPC felt would enhance the NRCs understanding of the significance and circumstances surrounding the RVLIS inoperability on Unit 2.

l Following opening remarks by B. Grimes, NRC RII Acting Deputy Regional Administrator, DPC gave two presentations (Enclosure 5). The first presentation covered Post Modification Testing (PMT). The PMT presentation included a - discussion of the Nuclear Station Modification (NSM) process, a description of the System Expert program, and a description of the PMT progra The second presentation covered the safety significance of the RVLIS inoperability, outstanding questions from the enforcement conference, and a summar Duke opened by stating that they had violated the RVLIS Technical Specification (TS) and that RVLIS was important to safety; however, they did not consider it as significant as some other systems in TS. DPC went on to explain how they reached their conclusions on safety significanc The safety significance discussion was followed by answering outstanding

.

questions from the enforcement conference. This presentation covered a sun. mary l

of the event and managements expectations, the venting of the RVLIS line following reconaection, and supervisor qualifications. Duke ended the meeting by reiterating their conclusions which they had stated at the enforcement conferenc _ _ _ _ _ _ - _ _ - _ - _ _ _ _ - _ _ _ - _ -

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x p i *I -l ' UNITE 3 STATES '

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NUCLEA3 REOULATORY COMMIS$10N

]s .n CE280N 88 g .'

-j 101 MARIETTA ET RE.ET, . ATl.ANTA, GEOMGI A 30323 4 .

9****.*

AUG 2 9193g Docket Nos. 50-41*i,53-414 5-

'l.icense Nos. NPF-36. NPF-52

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Duke Power Ccmpany i ATTN: Mr. A B. Tucker, Vice President I

<Nur, lear Production Department 422 South Church Street Charlotte, NC 2824 Gentlemen:

SUBJECT: ENFORCEMENT CONFERENCE SUMMARY (NRC INSPECTION REPORT NOS. 50-413/89-19 AND 50-414/89-19)

This letter refers to the Enforcement Conference held at our request on July.20, 1989, and the Enforcement Conference followup meeting held on August 15, 1989. These meetings concerned activities authorized for your Catawba facilit The issu'es discussed at the conference and the followup meeting related to inoperability of the Unit 2 Reactor Vessel Level Instrumentation Syste A list of attendees, meeting summaries, and a copy of your handouts are

, enclosed. We are continuing our review of these issues to determine the-appropriate enforcement actio lIn accordance with Section 2.790 of the NRC's " Rules of Practice," Part 2,

Title 10 Code-of Federal Regulations, a copy. of this letter and its enclosures will be placed in the NRC Public Document Room.

Should you have any questions concerning this letter, please conta'ct u

Sincerely, pm l

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&& -

Stewart D. Ebneter Regional Administrator Enclosures:

1 1.' -List of Attendees 2.- Enforcement Conference Sumary l Enforcement Conference Followup Meeting Sumary Handout (s) dated July 20, 1989 Handout (s) dated August 15, 1989 cc w/encls: i T. B. Owen', Station Manager Senior Resident Inspector - McGuire State of South Carolina 3

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ENCLOSURE 1 LIST OF ATTENDEES July.20, 1989 U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission

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M., Ernst. Deputy Regional Administrator B.'K. Grimes,' Acting Deputy Regional Administrator C. W.'Hehl, Deputy Director, Division of Rerctor Projects (DRP)

E. W. Merschoff, Deputy Director, Division of Reactor Safety (DRS)

.G. R. Jenkins, Director, Enforcement and Investigation Coordination Staff (EICS)

A. R. Herdt, Branch Chief, DRP M. B. Shymlock, Section Chief DRP K. N. Jabbour, Project Manager, Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation (NRR)

W. T. Orders, Senior. Residerat Inspector, Catawba, DRP M. S. Lesser, Resident Inspector, Catawba, DRP B.-R. Bonser, Project Engineer, DRP R. J. Goddard, Regional Counsel'

F. Jape, Section Chief, DRS B. Uryc, Enforcement Coordinator, EICS L., Phillips, Section Chief, NRR J. Leuhman, Office of Enforcemen Duke Power Company H. B. Tucker, Vice President, Nuclear Prodcttion Department T. B. Owen, Station Manager, Catawba P. G. Leroy, Catawba Support Engineer, Compliance

'R. M. Glover, Compliance Engineer, Catawba W. R. McCollum, Maintenance Superintendent, Catawba J. M. Stackley, I&E Group Mam qer, Catawba H. J. Lee, Design Engineering l

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g. [ 4 ENCLOSURE 1 LIST OF ATTENDEES July 20, 1989

U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission M. L. Ernst Deputy Regional Administrator B. K. Grimes, Acting Deputy Regional Administrator C. W. Hehl,. Deputy Director, Division of Reactor Projects (DRP)

E. W. Merschoff, Deputy Director, Division of Reactor Safety (DRS)

G. R.'Jenkins, Director, Enforcement and Investigation Coordination Staff (EICS)

A. R. Herdt, Branch Chief, DRP

.M. B. Shymiock, Section Chief, DRP K. N. Jabbour, Project Manager, Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation (NRR)

W. T. Orders Senior Resident' Inspector, Catawba, DRP M. S. Lesser, Resident Inspectcr. Catawba, DRP B. R. Bonser, Project Engineer, DRP R. J. Goddard, Regional Counsel F. Jape, Section Chief. DRS B. Uryc, Enforcemer,t Coordinator, EICS L. Phillips, Section Chief, NRR

- J. Leuhman, Office of Enforcement Duke Power Company H. B. Tucker, Vice President, Nuclear Production Department T. B. Owen, Station Manager, Catawba P. G. Leroy, Catawba Support Engineer, Compliance R. M. Glover, Compliance Engineer, Catawba W. R. McCollum, Maintenance Superintendent, Catawba J. M. Stackley, I&E Group Manager, Catawba H. J. Lee, Design Engineering

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" Enclosure 1

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LIST OF ATTENDEES l August 15, 1989 l U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission B..K. Grimes, Acting Deputy Regional Administrator A. F._Gibson, Director. Division of Reactor Safety (DRS)

G. R. Jenkins, Director, Enforcement and Investigation Coordination Staff (EICS)'

A. R. Herdt, Branch Chief, Division of Reactor Projects (DRP)

M. B. Shym1ock, Section Chief, DRP K. N. Jabbour, Project Manager, Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation (NRR)

M. S. Lesser, Resident Inspector, Catawba, DRP B. R. Bonser, Project Engineer, DRP F. Jape; Section Chief, DRS 8. Uryc,' Enforcement Coordinator, EICS L. Phillips, Section Chief, NRR J. Leuhman, Office of Enforcement Duke' Power Company T. B. Owen, Station Manager, Catawba 1R. M. Glover, Compliance Engineer, Catawba W. R. McCollum, Maintenance Superintendent, Catawba H. J. Lee, Design Engineering

.

F. N. Mack, Jr., . Project Manager, Cstawba R. N. Casler, Operations Superintendent,' Catawba J. Forbes, Technical Services Superintendent. Catawba W. F. Beaver, Performance Manager, Catawba .

J. Kamrter, Test Engineer, Catawba i

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, .s

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ENCLOSURE 2 ENFORCEMENT CONFERENCE SUMMARY On July 20, 1989, representatives from Dui e '"w4 e Company (DPC) met with the NRC in the Region II Office in Atlanta, Geor s:a, .o discuss inoperability of both trains of the Reactor Vessel Level Ins .vi+ ;tation System (RVLIS) Upper Range on Catawba Unit Following opening remarks by M. Ernst, NRC RI! Deputy Regional Administrator, DPC gave a presentation (Enclosure 4) on the RVLIS inoperability. -T. B. Owen, Catawba Station Manager, introduced DPCs presentation by stating that Duke had identified the RVLIS problem, reported it promptly to the NRC, and that contrary to what was stated in a courtesy Licensee Event Report submitted June 26, 1989, the RVLIS Technical Specification had been violated. He also stated that DPC felt the root cause of the problem was the failure of the

Catawba supervisor to use qualified personnel in the task of restoring RVLIS and that a contributing factor had been the poor direction and guidance given in N/A'ing procedure steps. The presentation that followed covered a system description, sequence of events, root cause/ corrective actions, safety significance, summary and concluding remark A significant number of NRC questions and discussion during the conference were centered around the supervisory error, qualifications of maintenance and supervisory personnel, how the error of assigning an unqualified maintenance worker to the job occurred, and the adequacy of the post maintenance test performe Duke ended the meeting by giving their corrective actions and stating their conclusion Duke reiterated that they had identified - the inaperability, immediately taken corrective actions, communicated the situation promptly. to the NRC, ano issued a courtesy LER before all the facts were fully known. They also stated that they believed the contributing factors to this event were not recurring. That is the surveillance problems resulting from N/A'ing procedural steps, assignment of unqualified personnel to tasks requiring qualifications, and performance of post-maintenance testing by unqualified personnel. Also, with regard to safety significance, Duke felt the safety ramifications of this event were not significan The NRC closed the meeting by stating that it had served to enhance Region II's understanding of the issues and DPC's corrective action _ _ _ _ _ _ - _ _ _ _ _ _ _ -

. - - - - _ _-_

, . t L

< .

.:

I ENCLOSURE 3 ENFORCEMENT CONFERENCE FOLLOWUP MEETING On August 15, 1989, representatives from Duke Power Company met with' the NRC in the Region II Office in Atlanta, Georgia, for a followup meeting to the enforcement conference held on July 20. The purpose of the meeting was to discuss in greater depth subjects which DPC felt would enhance the NRCs understanding of the significance and circumstances surrounding the RVLIS inoperability on Unit Following opening remarks by Administrator, DPC gave two presentations Grines, NRC RII Acting)

(Enclosure S . Deputy The Regional first presentation covered Post Modification Testing (PMT). The PMT presentation includedt a discussion of the Nuclear Station Modification (NSM) process, a description of the System Expert program, and a description of the PMT progsa The 'second presentation covered the safety significance of the RVLIS inoperability, outstanding questions from the enforcement conference, and a summar Duke opened by stating that they had violated the RVLIS Technical Specification (TS) and that RVLIS was important to safety; however, they did not consider it as significant as some other systems in TS. DPC went on to explain how.they reached their conclusions on safety significanc The safety significance discussion was followed by answering outstanding questions from the enforcement conference. This presentation covered a summary of the event and managements expectations, the veiccing of the RVLIS line following reconnection, and supervisor qualifications. Duke ended the meeting by reiterating their conclusions which they had stated at the enforcement conference.

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ENCt.05URE 4 Enforcement Conference Agenda Duke Power' Company Catawba Nuclear Station 10:30 AM, July 20, 1989 Atlanta, Georgia Both Trains of-. Upper Range RVLIS Isolated Introduction T. Owen Station Manager System Description J. M. Stackley Sequence of Events I&E Group Manager Root Cause/ W. R. McCollum Corrective Actions Maintenance Sup .

-Safety Significance H. J. Lee Design Engineering I

Summary T. Owen Station Manager l

l Concluding Remarks H. B. Tucker Vice President Nuclear Production

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RVLIS Upper Range is not needed to. mitigate an Inadequate Core Cooling event (NUREG 0737,. Supplement.1)

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RVLIS Upper Range-does.not meet the " split" criteria of the Technical Specification Improvement Program

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OUKE POWER COMP ANY CATAWBA NUCLEAR STAT 1ON RVLiS ENFORCEMENT CONFERENCE FOLLOWUP AUGUST 15- 1989 OVERVIEW T. 'B. OWEN SAFETY SIGNIFICANCE

- OPERATOR PERSPECTIVE AbD OPTIONS R. N. C'ASLER

- RVLIS DES!GN BASIS & TECH SPEC. PLAftJING H J LEE OUTSTANDING QUESTIONS W. R. McCOLLUM

- EVENT SLMAARY Ato MAtuGENOJT EXPECTATIONS

- VENTING RVLIS LibE FOL1.OWING RECortECTION

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l NUREG-0737 ITEM II.F.2 REQUIREMENTS i e LR RVLIS INDICATES STAGNANT BOILOFF WHILE DHR RVLIS INDICATES HIGH VOID FRACTION PUMPED FLOW e BOTH RANGES COVER THE FULL RANGE FROM NORMAL OPERATION J (ZERO VOID FRACTION) TO COMPLETE CORE UNC0VERY e LR RVLIS DOES NOT ERR 0NE0USLY INDICATE ICC BECAUSE OF THE PRESENCE OF AN UNRELATED PHENOMENON, E.G., VOIDING IN THE REACTOR VESSEL UPPER HEAD DURING A NATURAL CIRCULATION DEPRESSURIZATION WITH SUBC00 LED LOOP FLOW

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e BOTH RANGES GIVE ADVANCED WARNING 0F THE APPROACH OF ICC IN THAT V0IDING IS INDICATED ON EACH RANGE WELL BEFORE REACHING A VOID FRACTION INDICATIVE OF C,0RE UNC0VERY

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TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION SPLIT CRITERIA e INSTALLED INSTRUMENTATION THAT IS USED TO DETECT, AND INDICATE IN THE CONTROL ROOM, A SIGNIFICANT ABNORMAL DEGRADATION OF THE REACTOR COOLANT PRESSURE B0UNDARY OR; e A PROCESS VARIABLE THAT IS AN INITIAL CONDITION OF A DESIGN BASIS ACCIDENT'(DBA) OR TRANSIENT ANALYSES THAT EITHER ASSUMES THE FAILURE OF OR PRESENTS A CHALLENGE TO THE INTEGRITY OF A FISSION PRODUCT BARRIER OR:

e A STRUCTURE, SYSTEM OR COMPONENT THAT IS PART OF THE PRIMARY SUCCESS PATH AND WHICH FUNCTIONS OR ACTUATES TO MITIGATE A DESIGN BASIS ACCIDENT OR TRANSIENT THAT EITHER ASSUMES THE FAILURE OF OR PRESENTS A CHALLENGE TO THE INTEGRITY OF A i . FISSION PRODUCT BARRIER,

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CASE I - VOID EXISTS AND RVLIS INDICATES NO V0ID A. POSSIBLE DELAYED OPERATOR AWARENESS OF VOID B. OPERATORS ARE TRAINED ON HOW PARAMETERS REACT WHEN A VOID EXISTS 1, ABNORMAL PRESSURIZER LEVEL RESPONSE ABNORMAL NATURAL CIRCULATION PARAMETERS SUBC00 LING-MARGIN DECREASING / ALARM C. LOWER RANGE RVLIS INSTRUMENTS WILL ALERT OPERATOR PRIOR TO CORE UNC0VERY - CSF WILL DIRECT OPERATOR TO PROPER RECOVERY PROCEDURE D. UPPER RANGE RVLIS IS NOT AN INPUT TO THE ICC CRITICAL SAFETY FUNCTION NOR IS IT USED IN THE INADEQUATE OR DEGRADED CORE COOLING EP's

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F CASE II - VOID DOES NOT EXIST AND RVLIS INDICATES A VOID

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' PRESSURIZER LEVEL RESPONSE UPPER RANGE RVLIS NO RESPONSE SUBC00 LING MARGIN MONITOR RESPONSE NATURAL CIRCULATION PARAMETERS RESPONSE COULD DELAY POST LOCA C00LDOWN AND DEPRESSURIZATION UNTIL OPERATOR DETERMINES A VOID DOES NOT EXIST - NOT A SAFETY J

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E O P I S D M T X L E E E L E H I G K I C T F A C W N I I N O L D A W L .

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EXPECTATION e Post-MAINTENANCE TESTING WILL BE SUFFICIENT IN SCOPE TO VERIFY OPERABILITY OF COMPONENTS AND SYSTEMS PRIOR TO RETURN TO SERVICE e PMT WILL BE STRENGTHENED TO INCLUDE SPECIFIC

' CRITERIA FOR MAINTENANCE ACTIVITIES e PMT HAS NOT BEEN A RE-CURRING PROBLEM IN I&E

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CATAWBA NUCLEAR STATION i

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Rick Mack Projects Manager l

Purpose:

Discuss the Nuclear Station Modification l (NSM) process with special emphasis on Post !

Modification Testin ;

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CATAWBA NUCLEAR STATION NUCLEAR STATION MODIFICATION i'NSM)

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PROCESS Origination Design Planning Implementation I

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CATAWBA NUCLEAR STATION NUCLEAR STATION MODIFICATION l',NSM)

PROCESS Origination

  • problem identified at any level in the station, General Office, or Design Engineering

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  • reviewed for need, benefit / cost, alternatives, regulatory commitment
  • compared with other problems to determine l greatest benefit l

o approved by Station Manager l l

  • NSM request to Design Engineering w/ interface ]

Activities form {

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%3mmm INTERFACE ACTIVITIES REQUEST 1. NSM # Rev.#

2. Scope Meeting Required O Yes O No O Review problem to be resolved (reasons for irMTs'ui).

O Revew options available to resolve problem including similar completed modification O Review nuclear safety aspects of modificatb O Review QA aspects of modificatio O Review design options to reduce personnel exposur O Revew potential operability or maintainability concem O Revewconstructabdityconcem O Post,TMrs'si testing requirement O Other 3. Pre-Design Survey Required O Yes O No Area of Station to be surveyed O Walk down for potential interferences with existing equiprcent (constructability).

O Wak down to optimize equipment locations (operability and maintainability).

O Wak down to confirm as budt configuration O Wak down to optimize ALARA desg O Wak down to mnmize personnel safety phii O Wak down to minimize nuclear security problem O Specal considerations for post-modficaton testin O Other 4. Conceptuel Client /CMD Revew Needed (20% to 40% Desgned) O Yes ONo Reviewis needed of: O Post-irMTG'hi testing equirenents O Operabdity O Design enwy for intender! rnoGificaSon O MainP'~bility O ALARAdesgn O Constructabdity O Safetycoskiere^hs O Other -_

Spec 4c design nwiewis requested of drawing . Detailed Clont/CMD Review Needed (60% to 80% Desgned) O Yes O No i Revewis needed of: O Post,TMTG^& testingrequirements

' O Operabdity O ALARA design O Maintanabilrty O Safety corr.Jderations O Constructability O Other Specific design review is requested of drawing . CMD Contact 7. Completed by: Date:

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CATAWBA NUCLEAR STATION NUCLEAR STATION MODIFICATION (NSM)

PROCESS Design

  • Initial scope review
  • designers, originator, affected station groups

discuss Post Modification Testing (PMT) expected

  • develop draft PMT Plan a detail design performed
  • provide instrumentation needed for PMT
  • for design basis change or when documetita-tion of dealgn basis is unclear, specify  !

S test o')}setives

  • test acceptanca criteria {

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  • Final Scope Document j
  • PMTAC summary l
  • functional description of mo I

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PMT PLAN l

l l O DRAFT PMT Plan O FINAL PMT Plan Rev * Paos of I1 l NSM #/ Exempt Change #

Rev.#

Part #

Unit #

I2 BRIEF NSM DESCRIPTION l

l I3 NSTALLATON TESTS Type of Test Documentation Performed by

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_ i4 VERIFICATION TESTS Typeof Test Documentation Performed by

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CATAWBA NUCLEAR STATION NUCLEAR STATION MODIFICATION (NSM)

PROCESS Planning

  • Planning Meeting
  • discuss system / plant impact during instsilation, Isola-tion requirements (e.g. %' train vs. 'B' train, etc.) and PMT requirement with all affected station groups
  • finalize PMT Plan

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write implementation procedure (TN)

  • controlling procedure
  • all parts of mod included
  • !solations and effect on plant l
  • PMT & responsibility for performing

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PMT Summary Letter discussing thought process and conclu.slons reached on determin-ing appropriate Post Mod Testing

review and approve TN

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l CATAWBA NUCLEAR STATION NUCLEAR STATION MODIFICATION (NSM) 4 PROCESS

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Implementation

  • follow TN
  • perform PMT as directed
  • review documentation of PMT results prior to return to service l

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s CATAWBA NUCLEAR STATION NUCLEAR STATION MODIFICATION (NSM,'l  !

PROCESS Summary a definite, structured process during Design and planning stages to identify PMT

  • appropriate station and Design Engineering groups are involved in determining PMT
  • controlled process for performing PMT and determining that results are satisfactor l

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CATAWBA NUCLEAR STATION SYSTEM EXPERT DEFINrnON A System Expert is "an individual with an engineering degree or a strong demonstrable technical background who is

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assigned the responsibility of maintaining expertise in a designated plant system (s)

and/or area (s).

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CATAWBA NUCLEAR STATION :

SYSTEM EXPERT PURPOSE The purpose of the System Expert Program is to maximize the performance, avaliability, I and reliability of station systems and the station as a whol l l

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System Expert Qualifications '

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Four year engineering or physical science degree or a strong l demonstrable technical background At least one year nuclear power plant experience Exemplary knowledge of systems assigned Training

  • Systems
  • Components
  • Technical Specifications
  • Design Basis
  • Operational Understanding
  • Codes l
  • Case Studies

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4 ' i Catawba Nuclear Station i System Expert Program Systems i

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Steam Generator Browdown Recycle System Ice Condenser Refdgeration System Auxiliary Feedwater System Safety injection System Main Condenser Containment Spray System Feedwater dystem Chemical & Volume Control System Condensate Syrtem Containment Penetration Valve Inj Water System Trace Heating System Condenser Circu! sting Water System Loose Parts Monitoring (Unit) Fire Protection System

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Radiation Monitoring (Unit) Conventional Low Press Service Water System incore Instrumentation Nuclear Service Water System Out of-Core Instrumentation Exterior Fire Protection System Diesel Load Sequencing System Main Steam Supply to Auxiliary Equipment Diese! ControlSystem Main Steam Bypass to Condenser Refueling Water System Main Steam Heater Drain System Main Steam Vent to Atmosphere Containment Personnel Air Lock System Auxiliary Ventilation System Containment leak Testing System Control Room Area HVAC System Operator Aid Computer System Annulus Ventilation System Engineered Safety Features Actuation System Fuel PoolVentilation System Transient Monitoring System Instrument AirSystem IWP/IVN Containment Purge Component Cooling System Containment Air Return & Hydrogen Skimmer System Diesel Generator Engine Cooling Water System Reactor Generator Stator Cooling Water System Fuel Recirculated Cooling Water System Special Nuclear Materials Reactor Coolant System Appendix J Residual Heat Removal System

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i Catawba Nuclear Station System Expert l Responsibilities

  • Detail System Understanding -
  • Scheduling
  • System Walkdown
  • System Monitoring
  • Reliability Review
  • Operating Experience Program
  • Problem Resolver
  • Information Review
  • Modification Review L_____________-------_--____-----__--__------------_--- - - - - . - - - .- - - - - _ - - - - -

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Catawba Nuclear Station System Expert Program Development

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August Work Plan September Modifications October Design Basis, Technical Documentation December Information Review

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Catawba Nuclear Station Idystem Expert Skills in Perspective '

Systerns Understanding . 66%

Component Understanding 33 %

Tech Spec Understanding 90%

Code Understanding 85 %

Design Basis Understanding 50 %

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Catawba Nuclear Station NSM Program System ExpertInvolvement SPR SE counsels superintendent NSM approval l

Scope meeting PMT Plan 30 days after scope document Planning meeting Commitment meeting l PMT summary letter TN approval l

Retest Activities I

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July 12,1989 -

INTRASTATION LETTER CATAWBA NUCLEAR STATION TO: T. B. Owen SUBJECT: Catawba Nuclear St:. tion

. NSM CN-11045, Rev. 0 & NSM CN-20432, Rev. O Keywords: NSM Retest I

The above referenced NSM's will modify the VP System controls such that all isolation val-ves can be electrically sealed closed during Modes 1 through 4 without the use of a TSM to remove power. The modification also provides for a time delay bypass of the high relative humidity isolation and trip function during startup of the VP Syste The functional that will be conducted as part ofimplementation procedures TNIA10450001A & 02A, and TN2A04320001A & 02A fully demonstrate the adequacy of the NSM to meet its intended purpose. The ability of the time delay relay to allow start of VP with a simulated high humidity for the required time intervalis tested along with the ability to start without a high humidity. In addition the new " BLOCK /CLOSE" function is verified to isolate all VP valves when placed in the required position. As an added as-surance that the required safety function of the affected circuits is not adversely altered, al-though the functional does test all such circuits, Performance will conduct IrTI(2)A420041C upon completion of the modi 5 cation prior to return to service. This is re-quired by the applicable TN Therefore, the proposed NSM implementation plan including functional and retests as out-lined above fully challenge the modification to function in both normal and design basis condition C

.X Z. Ldaylor Test Engineer For Approval:

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Catawba Nuclear Station Post Modification Testing Program Introduction Post Modification Testing Philosophy l

Case Studies Summary

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Catawba Nuclear Station Post Modification Testing Philosophy

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Historical Perspective i

Post Modification Testing Standard Testing Limitation Considerations Summary of Changes in Philosophy

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Catawba Nuclear Station Post Modification Testing Philosophy i

Historical Perspective

  • Performed Code Required Retests,IWP/IWV
  • Performed Post Modification Testing on Modifica- ;

tions which changed a Design Basis or created a new ;

Design Basis j

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  • Assumed thatInstallationVerifications sufficient for ensuring Design Basis not affected by Modification

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Example - VX Modification I

  • An HED modification which relocated test circuit controls from the Control Room to a panel in the Auxiliary Buildin I
  • No Chapter 15 Design Basis were affected by this modificatio * Assumed. that installation verifications ensured I proper wirin j l
  • A Post Mod Test was performed however to ensure i that the test switches still worked NOT to verify t design basis were intac ,

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Catawba Nuclear Station Post Modification Testing Philosophy

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Testi.ng to Ensure Design Basis Intact

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  • Design Basis - Definition
  • Individual System Design Basis as specified in FSAR
  • Scope of Post Modification Testing
  • Fully challenge design basis in accident mode l configuration
  • System Expert Responsibilities '

Example - VX Modification

  • This philosophy would require the performance of the Auxiliary Safeguards Test to ensure that the Chapter 15 Design Basis was not affected by this wor j l

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Catawba Nuclear Station Post Modification Tasting Philosophy Testing to Ensure Design Intent Met and Functionally Operable

  • Design. Intent - Definition
  • Scope
  • Each modification is to have its design intent fully challenged to ensure that the modifica-tion performs as intended by design and that the modification was properly installed
  • System Expert Responsibilities

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Examples

  • ForVX Modification the performance of the VX peri-odic test would now be require * Proper CheckValve Operation
  • InterlockVerification
  • FlowTests

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Catawba Nuclear Station

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Post Modification Testing Philosophy Testing Limitation Consid.erations

  • Risk to Station Equipment
  • Impact to Station Operation
  • Cost of Performing Test Deviation Documentation
  • Any deviation from performing the most conservative testing to verify Design Basis or design intent is to be documented in the Post Modification Testing Sum-mary Letter to Station Man'agement

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.8 Catawba Nuclear Station Post Modification Testing Philosophy Summary of Significant Changes

  • Focused Responsibility - System Expert is now responsible for approval of Post Modification Test-ing Program for each modification
  • FSAR Chapter 15 Design Basis will be verified intact after modification if work performed could have af-fected them
  • No Credit taken for Installation Verifications
  • All modifications will be verified to have met design intent and that the system is functionally operable after the modification l

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Catawba Nuclear Station l Case Study 1 S/G PORV Modification Reason for Modification )

Description of Modification i S/G PORV Design Basis

  • Manual Open for S/G Tube Rupture Event Post Modification Testing  ;

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  • RVV- No Differential l l
  • Manual Open - Normal DP, Operator DP Adjusted Summary i i

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Case Study 1 S/G PORV Modification

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Catawba Nuclear Station 1 l Case Study 2 Nuclear Service Water Pond Swap Logic

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Reason for Modification Description of Modification .

Swap Logic Design Basi l Post Modification Testing

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Summary

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l Catawba Nuclear Station ,

Case Study 2  !

Nuclear Service Water Pond Swap Logic {

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Catawba Nuclear Station Case Study 2 Nuclear Service Water Pond Swap Logic i

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Catawba Nuclear Station ,

Case Study 3 l 2NS 12B Cable Ground Reason for Modification i Description of Modification I

2NS 12B Design Basis Post Modification Testing Summary

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  • Critical Path Test
  • Design Basis Verified not Affected ,

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V-. e NS 12B Grounded Cable Schematic i

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Catawba Nuclear Station Post Modification Testing Program Summary

  • Intent of Post Modification Testing Program
  • Verify any affected Design Basis is Intact after Modification work is complete
  • Verify each modification functions as in-tended by design and the system is functional-Iy operable after modification is complete
  • Ensure Station Management is aware of any Post Modification Test which does not fully challenge the design basis or intent of the modificatio * System ExpertInvolvement
  • The System Expert is responsible for the Post Modification Testing of his assigned systems
  • Station Commitment
  • Station Resources
  • Critical Path Schedule Time i

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l Catawba Nuclear Station Post Modification Tbsting

Summary I

l NSM Process Structured

  • Specific Stages for Post Modification Testing Deter-mination
  • Involvement from Station and Design Engineering Personnel

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Responsibility

  • Defined Responsibility - System Expert
  • Logical Placement of Responsibility

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Catawba Nuclear Station Post M' modification Testing Summary Current Philosophy

  • No Credit for installation verifications toward final operability ,
  • Test to ensure modification meets design intent and that the system is operationally functional (Beyond Chapter 15 requirements) {

Previous Philosophy

  • Tests to ensure Design Basis intact were required to ,

be conducted only if Design B' asis changed

  • Took credit for installation verifications toward sys- l tem operability
  • Testing Criteria to ensure system operationally func-tional was not clearly defined beyond code testing l

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Catawba Nuclear Station Post Modification Testing Agenda August 15,1989 Opening Comments Tony Owen NSM Process Rick Mack System Expert Presentation Bill Beaver PMT Philosophy / Case Studies Jim Kammer Summary JeffForbes

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