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| {{Adams | | {{Adams |
| | number = ML20207K403 | | | number = ML20209E650 |
| | issue date = 07/17/1986 | | | issue date = 08/28/1986 |
| | title = Insp Repts 50-348/86-10 & 50-364/86-10 on 860411-0510 & 0603.Violations Noted:Electrical Breaker Open & Valve Remain Open & Fire Door Not Functional as Fire Barrier While Blocked in Open Position | | | title = Ack Receipt of 860814 Ltr Informing NRC of Steps Taken to Correct Violations Noted in Insp Repts 50-348/86-10 & 50-364/86-10 |
| | author name = Bonser B, Bradford W, Dance H | | | author name = Grace J |
| | author affiliation = NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION II) | | | author affiliation = NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION II) |
| | addressee name = | | | addressee name = Mcdonald R |
| | addressee affiliation = | | | addressee affiliation = ALABAMA POWER CO. |
| | docket = 05000348, 05000364 | | | docket = 05000348, 05000364 |
| | license number = | | | license number = |
| | contact person = | | | contact person = |
| | document report number = 50-348-86-10, 50-364-86-10, IEIN-84-58, NUDOCS 8607290419 | | | document report number = NUDOCS 8609110288 |
| | package number = ML20207K319
| | | document type = CORRESPONDENCE-LETTERS, NRC TO UTILITY, OUTGOING CORRESPONDENCE |
| | document type = INSPECTION REPORT, NRC-GENERATED, INSPECTION REPORT, UTILITY, TEXT-INSPECTION & AUDIT & I&E CIRCULARS | | | page count = 1 |
| | page count = 15 | |
| }} | | }} |
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| {{#Wiki_filter:* | | {{#Wiki_filter:' ik AUG 2 81r' |
| UNITED STATES
| | labama Power Company ATTN: Mr. R. P. Mcdonald Senior Vice President P. O. Box 2641 Birmingham, AL 35291 Gentlemen: |
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| | SUBJECT: REPORT NOS. 50-348/86-10 AND 50-364/86-10 Thank you for your response of August 14, 1986, to our Notice of Violation issued on July 17, 1986, concerning activities conducted at your Farley facility. We have evaluated your response and found that it meets the requirements of 10 CFR 2.201. We will examine the implementation of your corrective actions during future inspection We appreciate your cooperation in this matte |
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| o NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
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| ,j 101 MARIETTA STREET, ATLANTA, GEORGI A 30323
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| Report Nos.: 50-348/86-10 and 50-364/86-10 Licensee: Alabama Power Company 600 North 18th Street Birmingham, AL 35291 Docket Nos.: 50-348 and 50-364 License Nos.: NPF-2 and NPF-8 Facility name: Farley 1 and 2 Inspection Conducted: April 11 - May 10 and June 3, 1986
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| Inspection at Farley site near Dothan Alabama Inspectors: ( A+ E 1 /Datb
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| /7/ Signed
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| W. H. BradfoM /
| | Sincerely, h . |
| $ C $++ k~
| | J. Nelson Grace Regional Administrator cc . O. Whitt, Executive Vice President |
| ~B.' R. BonterT '
| | . D. Woodard, General Manager - |
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| | j Nuclear Plant v W. G. Hairston, III, General Manager - |
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| | / Nuclear Support VJ. W. McGowan, Manager-Safety Audit |
| ~/Datd Signed Accompanying Inspectors: H. O. Christensen S. D. Stadler Approved by: -( A-4u
| | / and Engineering Review VJ. K. Osterholtz, Supervisor-Safety Audit and Engineering Review bcc/.RC Resident Inspector E. Reeves, Project Manager, NRR Document Control Desk State of Alabama |
| ' H. C. Dancei Section Chief 7 /7 8/ | | /J. Axc1 rad RII R RI RIE RI / RII |
| Oate Signed Division of Reactor Projects SUMMARY Scope: This routine and reactive inspection and enforcement conference included onsite inspection in the areas of monthly surveillance observation, monthly maintenance observation, operational safety verification, inoperable ECCS subsystem, inoperable fire door, engineered safety system inspection, part 21 reports, and refueling activitie Results: Two violations were identified: (1) Violation of Technical Specification 3.5.2.d - exceeding limiting condition for operation. Paragraph (2) Violation of Technical Specification 3.7.12 -
| | ! enos:blm HDance DVerrelli eyes RaJker GJenki 8/2186 8/21/86 8/ /86 8/gy86 8/l/86 7 8/g86 4 8609110288 860828 ADOCK 05000340 O s |
| inoperable fire barrie Paragraph PDR ADOCK 05000348 G PDR
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| REPORT DETAILS 1. Licensee Employees Contacted: -
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| J. D. Woodard, General Plant Manager D. N. Morey, Assistant General Plant Manager W. D. Shipman, Assistant General Plant Manager R. D. Hill, Operations Superintendent C. D. Nesbitt, Technical Superintendent R. G. Berryhill, Systems Performance and Planning Superintendent L. A. Ward, Maintenance Superintendent L. W. Enfinger, Administrative Superintendent J. E. Odom,. Operations Sector Supervisor B. W. Vanlandingham, Operations Sector Supervisor T. H. Esteve, Planning Supervisor J. B. Hudspeth, Document Control Supervisor L. K. Jones, Material Supervisor R. H. Marlow, Technical Supervisor L. M. Stinson, Plant Modification Supervisor J. K. Osterholtz, Supervisor, Safety Audit Engineering Review Other licensee employees contacted included technicians, operations personnel, maintenance and I&C personnel, security force members, and office personne . Exit Interview The inspection scope and findings were summarized during management interviews throughout the report period and on May 9, 1986, with the general plant manager and selected members of his staff. The inspection findings were discussed in detail. The licensee did not identify as proprietary any material reviewed by the inspector during this inspection. Additionally the violation for exceeding of a limiting condition of operations was the subject of an enforcement conference on June 3,1986; refer to paragraph 1 . Licensee Action on Previous Enforcement Matters (92702)
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| This area was not inspecte . Monthly Surveillance Observation (61726)
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| The inspectors observed and reviewed Technical Specification (TS) required surveillance testing and verified that testing was performed in accordance with adequate procedures; that test instrumentation was calibrated; that limiting conditions were met; that test results met acceptance criteria and were reviewed by personnel other than the individual directing the test; that any deficiencies identified during the testing were properly reviewed and resolved by appropriate management personnel; and that personnel conducting the tests were qualified. The inspector witnessed / reviewed portions of the following test activities:
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| STP-4 Safety Injection with LOS FNP-0-FHP -
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| Controlling Procedure for Unit 2 Refuelin FP-ARP-R-4 -
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| J. M. Farley Nuclear Plant Unit 2 Cycle IV - V Refueling Procedur STP-256.11 -
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| Reactor Trip Breaker Response Time Tes STP-4 "A" Train LOSP Load Shed Tes STP- RCS Leakag STP- Quadrant Power Tilt Rati STP- B Charging Pump Monthly Tes STP-213.16 -
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| High Energy Line Break Sensor Tes ETP-1014 -
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| Steam Generator Support Plate Flushing Procedur STP-8 C Diesel Generator Operability Tes STP- Section 4.7 - Lowering the Refueling Cavity Level Using RHR Syste SOP- Reactor Coolant System Filling and Ventin ETP-4193 - Reactor Vessel Head Modificatio STP-60 A Battery Tes Unit 2 Local Leak Rate Testin STP-15 Main Turbine Overspeed Tes MP-6 Reactor Coolant Pump Motor 5 Year Inspectio STP-7 Main Control Room Remote Valve Verificatio STP-80.16 - Degraded Grid and Loss of Voltage Relay Operational Tes No violations or deviations were identifie . Monthly Maintenance Observation (62703)
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| Station maintenance activities of safety-related systems and components were observed / reviewed to ascertain that they were conducted in accordance with approved procedures, regulatory guides, industry codes and standards, and were in conformance with Technical specification The following items were considered during the review: limiting conditions for operations were met while components or systems were removed from service; approvals were obtained prior to initiating the work; activities were accomplished using approved procedures and were inspected as appli-cable; functional testing and/or calibrations were performed prior to returning components or systems to service; quality control records were maintained; activities were accomplished by qualified personnel; parts and materials were properly certified; radiological controls were implemented; c
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| and fire prevention controls were implemented. Work requests were reviewed to determine the status of outstanding jobs to assure that priority was assigned to safety-related equipment maintenance which may affect system performance. The following maintenance activities were observed / reviewed: | |
| - Unit 2 containment valves pipe plug change out (Part 21).
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| Unit 2 main steam isolation valves modificatio Unit 2 A auxiliary feed pump inspectio Unit 2 FCV-12 ,
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| MP 28.173 - motor starters verificatio Unit 2 refuelin Unit 2 steam generator AVB modificatio Unit 2 reactor vessel level measuring syste Unit 2 reactor coolant pump inspection and maintenanc Steam generator eddy current testin Unit 2 containment penetration modules modificatio Main control board modificatio Hydraulic and mechanical snubber testin No violation or deviations were identified.
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| 6. Operational Safety Verification (71707)
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| The inspectors observed control room operations, reviewed applicable logs and conducted discussions with control room operations during the report perio The inspectors verified the operability of selected emergency systems, reviewed tagout records, and verified proper return to service of affected component Tours of the auxiliary building, diesel building, turbine building and service water structure were conducted to observe plant equipment conditions, including fluid leaks and excessive vibrations. The inspector verified compliance with selected Limiting Conditions for Operations (LCO) and results of selected surveillance tests. The veri-fications were accomplished by direct observation of monitoring instrumentation, valve positions, switch positions, accessible hydraulic snubbers, and review of completed logs, records, and chemistry results. The licensee's compliance with LCO action statements were reviewed as events occurre The inspectors routinely attended meetings with certain licensee management and observed various shift turnovers between shift supervisor, shift foremen and licensed operators. These meetings and discussions provided a daily status of plant operations, maintenance, and testing activities in progress, as well as discussions of significant problem :
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| The inspector verified by observation and interviews with security force members that measures taken to assure the physical protection of the
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| facility met current requirements. Areas inspected included the organiza-tion of the security force; the establishment and maintenance of gates, doors, and isolation zones; that access control and badging were proper; and procedures were followe No violations or deviations were identifie . Inoperable ECCS Subsystem, Unit 1 On April 25, 1986 two electricians found a hold order tag on the Unit 2 electrical penetration room floor. The tag was taken to the Shift Foreman's Office by the electricians and given to the Unit 1 Shift Foreman Inspecting (SFI) who was assisting the Unit 2 SFI. Information was given to the SFI on where the tag was found. A search of the tagging records determined that the tag was from Unit 2 MOV 8811-B electrical breaker FV-85, (Unit 2 containment sump suction valve to RHR pump 2B) and that the tagging order was still in effec An extra SFI assigned to the shift to help carry out the Unit 2 refueling outage work load took the hold tag and stated he would take care of getting the tag replaced. He mistakenly went to breaker FV-85 in the Unit 1 electrical penetration room and noted that the breaker was closed instead of open as required on the tagging order. He returned to the control room and observed no indicating lights on Unit 2 8811-B hand switch on the control board. The SFI returned to the Unit 1 electrical penetration room and, assuming there was a problem with the Unit 2 MCB indicating light circuit, opened the Unit 1 FV-B5 breaker and hung the hold tag. He did not recognize that he had gone to the wrong unit. The Unit 2 SFI was then informed that the breaker was open and the tag had been hung. The Shift Supervisor was not notified and was not aware of the tagging proble This rendered the "B" train containment sump suction to IB residual heat removal (RHR) pump inoperable at approximately 10:00 a.m. on April 25, 198 This condition was not found and corrected until 9:45 a.m. on April 29, 1986; a period of 96 hours. The limiting condition for operation of 72 hours as defined in TS 3.5.2 was exceeded by approximately 14 hour MOV 8811-8 is controlled from the main control board and aligns the "B" train RHR system suction to the containment sump for long term cooling of the RCS after a LOCA. The valves will automatically open on a lo-lo level in the RWST if a safety injection signal is presen This valve is a encapsulate valve located in the RHR pump room and cannot be operated manually at the valve. The electrical power supply to MOV 8811-B is fed from electrical breaker FV-85 in the electrical penetration room. During certain accident conditions the electrical penetration room is inaccessible due to extremely high radiation. Therefore, with the electrical breaker open, the valve would remain inoperable. This is a violation (348/86-10-01).
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| The resident inspectors verified that train "A" of the RHR recirculation flow path from the containment sump to RHR pump 1 A was operable during this period. Emergency electrical power was available at all times and MOV 8811-A was capable of performing its intended function.
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| The violation above was perpetuated by various procedure violations of Administrative Procedures (AP). These procedural violations are incorporated as part of violation 348/86-10-01 as follows:
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| AP-14 " Safety Clearance and Tagging" Section 6.1.3.2 of AP-14 was not followed in that the SFI is not authorized to execute' tagging order Section 6.1.2.3 of AP-14 requires that the Unit Shif t Supervisor review the tagging order and signify his review and approval . He will determine if verification is necessary in accordance with Appendix 3 of AP-52. The Shift Supervisor was not notified and was not aware of the tagging proble The same degree of review, approval and verification as required in AP-14 for new and additional tagging orders on systems important to
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| safety and requiring verification of line up was not carried out to retag a breaker / component after the original tag had fallen of AP-16, " Conduct of Operations - Operations Group", Section 4.2 - Shift Relief states that shift relief is to be a formal turnover. A Shift Supervisor, Shift Foreman, Plant Operator, Systems ' Operator, or Switchboard Operator is considered to be properly relieved when the individual assigned to relieve him has been informed of the' status of the plant, operations in progress, and any special instruction. It is the responsibility of the relieving individual to adequately inform himself of these items by reviewing logs and data sheets, discussing operations with on-duty personnel, reading special' instructions and for the Shift Supervisor and Plant Operator to walk dow, the area of responsibility with the off going individua ,
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| Appendix B of AP-16 requires that annunciators, indicators, switch positions, position indicator lamps shall be observed for correctness and off normal conditions and shall be discussed with .the off going operato The shift relief control board walk down was not adequate in that 12 shift relief and board walk downs were performed without identifying MOV 8811-B to be inoperabl Sections 3.2.9.1 and 3.2.9.2 of AP-16 requires that all licensed personnel on shift must be aware. of and responsible for the plant status at all times and be particularly attentive to the instrumen-tation and controls located within these areas at all time Surveillance of the control room operating board controls, switch indicating lights and maintaining awareness of plant status by licensed personnel on shif t was not adequate in that there was a failure to identify that MOV 8811-B was inoperable from 10:00 a.m. on April 25 to 9:45 a.m. until April 29, 1986.
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| 8. A supplementary reactive inspection relating to the wrong unit event detailed above was conducted by Regional personnel on May 5-7, 1986. The primary objectives of this additional inspection effort were to ascertain whether this was an isolated or repetitive event and to determine the contributing causes. In the course of this inspection, the inspectors reviewed applicable tagging orders, maintenance work requests, job descriptions, radiati'on zone maps, plant equipment labeling, and Farley Licensee Event Reports (LERs) and incident reports for 1985 and 1986. The inspectors also interviewed staff personnel, reactor operator (RO) and senior reactor operator (SRO) licensed operators and supervisors, and STAS, and conducted a detailed walkthrough of the event with the Shift Foreman Inspecting (SFI) who was primarily responsible for the error. The results of this additional inspection effort indicated that the event was safety significant, and that it was not totally isolate Safety Significance A review of the applicable post-LOCA radiation zone map (EL.139'O Revision 2) indicated that the electrical penetration room in which the breaker for MOV 8811-B is located is designated a post-LOCA radiation zone VIII (greater than 50,000 R/hr) and would be inaccessible under Following a design basis LOCA, the | |
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| reactor water storage tank (RWST) inventory would be depleted in approximately one-half hour, and the operators would be procedurally required to manually transfer RHR suction to the recirculation mode with RHR suction from the containment sum Since the Unit 1B RHR containment suction valve's MOV breaker was erroneously tagged in the open position, the Motor Control Center (MCC) that contains the breaker and the MOV would both be inaccessible during the accident. Therefore, train 8 of RHR would be incapable of taking a suction from the containment sump (recirculation mode) in the event of a design basis LOCA on Unit 1. If a coincident single failure of the redundant RHR train or its associated EDG is assumed, no RHR, safety injection or containment spray system flow would have been available to mitigate the accident after the RWST emptie Event Background The STAS at Farley are co-titled SFIs and are utilized during non-event conditions as protective tagging planners. They are not authorized by procedures to actually place protective tags, nor to manipulate valves or breakers for tagging purpose In addition, plant procedures require that the Shif t Supervisor (SS) review all tagging orders involving equipment under the control of Operations prior to implementatio The SFI involved in this event violated these procedural controls in placing a tag, operating a breaker, and in not obtaining SS review and approval. An interview and detailed event
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| walkthrough with this individual indicated that he was unsure of why he deviated from these procedures, or why he twice went to the wrong unit, Unit 1, while attempting to replace a tag associated with Unit 2, which was shutdow The indications were, however, that he believed something was wrong at the time, but was reluctant to consult the S At one point during the event, he and another SFI involved contacted the R0 on Unit 2 to change the control room indicating lights for this MOV 8811-B. Since he had observed the breaker to be closed, he did not understand the absence of an indicating light (the breaker observed was on Unit I which was operating). Apparently, the Unit 2 R0 did not question why the SFI expected an indicating light on a tagged-out and deenergized position indicatio The other SFI involved indicated that he was aware that this SFI had opened a breaker and placed a tag and also believed something was wrong. He too was reluctant to consult the SRO and decided instead, to rely on the more senior SFI's judgemen This sequence of events indicates a reluctance on the part of three individuals to communicate or to seek SR0 advice even when a problem is suspecte c. Similar Events A review of the Farley LERs and incident reports for 1985 and 1986 indicated a significant number of events involving work on the wrong unit or wrong train, or safety related tagging or work order error Several examples included the following:
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| Both trains of the control room emergency air cleanup system inoperable due to I&C technicians working on the wrong train (LER 85-11/IR 85-129). The contributing causes listed included that the I&C technicians were not familiar with the system, the maintenance work request was not properly completed by operations and the equipment labeling was not adequate. The technicians involved were counsele On three separate occasions, health physics (HP) technicians valved out the wrong containment radiation monitors for maintenance orders (IR's 1-85-016 and 86-013 and 86-050). On one of these occasions, the operators failed to investigate or report a substantial decrease (6000 CPM to 1500 CPM) in readings they logged on the monitors which were supposed to be in service. Each of these valving / tagging errors by HP technicians was treated as an isolated event and only the individuals involved were counsele An operator removing tags to restore a system to service misread a breaker label and thus could not locate a tag to be removed (IR 2-85-074). He did not report the missing tag, and initialed the work order that he had removed the tag. On discovery of the tag inadvertently left hanging on the correct breaker, the SFI/STA removed the tag which is not authorized by procedure . .
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| On other occasions, tagging or work order errors by operators and/or technicians resulted in potential or actual radiation releases to the environment (IR's 1-85-007, 1-86-011, 2-86-054).
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| Twice in one day, these errors resulted in inadvertent release of 5000 mrem of gas with technicians in the immediate are On at least four occasions, errors by electricians resulted in the deenergization of, or work on, the wrong equipment (IR's 1-85-098, 1-85-13, 1-85-504, 2-85-226). In one case, the electrician inadvertently tripped the IB battery charger output breaker which causes a IB battery fault alarm. Operator followup of the alarm-included several deficiencies:
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| Apparently, the operator who acknowledged the alarm did not investigate or report i The operators did not walk down this section of the control
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| board during shift turnover and did not notice the alar The operator did not investigate a 45 amp drop in the battery readings logge On at least three occasions EDG support system isolation valves were found out of the required position necessary to support EDG operation (IR's 85-492, 85-417, and 2-85-244). In one of these events the operations group had apparently failed to conduct the return to service checklist following a five year outage inspection on an ED RHR Loop B suction valve 8702A failed to reopen after stroke testing (IR 2-85-091). The subsequent investigation revealed a series of errors:
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| The electricians did not complete the work request for PCN 2663 in reterminating all wiring and signed the work request complet The electrical foreman signed the work request complete but did not verify the wor An engineer inspected the work but did not remove the wiring cover plate to actually check the wiring as indicated by his signature on the work reques The SFI and the Shif t Supervisor functionally accepted the work request based on a plant operator indicating that the MOV had been satisfactorily stroke teste .
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| The operator was in error in indicating that the MOV had been satisfactorily stroke tested in that the stroke timing he was utilizing, had been performed the day before the work was complete The above reports included items that were treated as licensee identified violations and consistent with the NRC enforcement guidance in 10 CFR Part 2 Appendix C, no violations will be issued. However, it appears that there is inadequate trending of these incident reports involving wrong unit / wrong train events, wrong equipment or tagging errors. Most of the reports reviewed in this area indicated that the licensee focused narrowly on each event, treating each as an isolated case and counseling only the individuals involved. Increased trending of these incident reports could identify repetitive and programmatic problem These internal reports are periodically audited and evaluated by the resident inspector d. Response to IE Notice 84-58, Inadvertent Defeat of Safety Function Covered by Human Error Involving Wrong Unit / Wrong Train Events The licensee's internal response to IE Notice 84-58 has not been completed after two years. The draft response, however, indicates that no action is required and that adequate controls are already in existence to prevent wrong unit / wrong train events at Farley. One of the controls cited as an example is that separate keys are utilized for access doors to each of the two units which should prevent personnel from entering the wrong unit. Since a large number of people including Shift Supervisors, SFIs, and licensed and non-licensed operators carry
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| " master" keys which provide access to either unit, the separate key concept does not appear to be effective in controlling wrong unit / wrong train event In addition, the numerous wrong unit / wrong train and wrong equipment errors committed by HP, I&C, and electrical technicians raised a concern whether this key control is effective at all, and more importantly, whether the licensee's response to IE Notice 84-58 requires reconsideratio e. Contributing Causes The following appeared to be contributing causes to the recent RHR wrong unit tagging error, as well as other wrong unit / wrong train, wrong equipment and tagging, and work order errors that have occurred at Farley in 1985 and 1986: | |
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| A lack of unit specific labeling on breaker cabinets supplying safety related equipment. Most breaker labels are identical for both units, with the exception of those associated with pumps which may contain the pump designation such as 1A or 2 Administrative procedures require that all plant valves contain a tag with a unique identifying number that includes the unit number, but this requirement is not applied to breaker *
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| A total lack of numbering and/or color coding on Unit 1 and Unit 2 access doors including the main entrance to each unit. The two units are not in separate buildings, and individuals interviewed indicated that they had, on several previous occasions, found themselves in the wrong unit while performing evaluations or tagging. The yellow and green color coding associated with Unit 1 and Unit 2 work orders and procedures, or a numerical designation, or a combination of these could reduce the potential for full time employees or contractors to enter the wrong uni Protective tagging performed by " designated operators" such as health physics technicians and electricians without adequate training and familiarity with systems and tagging procedure Multiple and repetitive tagging errors involving wrong train by HP technicians were attributed to a lack of familiarity with the systems and to being new on the job. On numerous occasions, electricians and I&C technicians made tagging errors or began work on the wrong equipment resulting in both trains out of service or inadvertent trips or ESF initiation A lack of specific information on protective tags. The plastic protective tags contain only a serial number and are used, repeatidly, on different work orders. The tags are selected randomly from a drawer with no requirement to assign a block of consecutive serial numbers to a single work order. Many utilities utilize a protective tag only one time, destroying it after the work is complete, and including specific information on each tag including:
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| The work order number - This information uniquely relates a given tag to a work order. This can expedite the restoration of protective tags which fall off or the removal of out-of-date tags left hanging which can interfere with operations or testing evaluation The specific component tagged - The name and number of a component tagged can help ensure that the correct component on the right unit and train is tagged. This information can also greatly expedite the restoration of a protective tag that falls of The date the tag was placed - This information can help ensure that a tag which has been erroneously left hanging following restoration of the equipment is found and removed on a timely basis through routine plant inspections or audit The name/ signature of the person hanging the tag - Signing each protective tag tends to impart an added sense of responsibility for each tag place This information can also expedite obtaining permission to remove a tag inadvertently left hanging to support emergency operations or tes _
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| Adequate reference to work requests - A number of the incident reports reviewed indicated that inadequate information on the maintenance work requests (MWRs) was a contributing caus Examples involved failing to designate the train to be worked on or the status of the uni For one event, the MWR for a job in progress could not be located and the electricians wanted to remove an ' installed jumper. This jumper was on the "A" containment sump pum Instead of locating the correct MWR, the operators reviewed the tagging book and determined that the "B" sump pump had been tagged out and assumed this was the correct work order. When the electricians proceeded to remove the jumper from the "A" pump, which was energized, an individual received an electric shock requiring a trip to the hospital. If the correct MWR had been utilized, this injury and wrong train error could have been avoided. It also could have been avoided if adequate information regarding the MWR number and equipment tagged had been on the tags hung on the "B" sump pum Shift and Relief Turnover Procedures Action Item I.C.2 of NUREG-0737 required all plants to review procedures for shift and relief turnover to ensure that the oncoming shift is aware of critical plant status information and system availabilit In the licensee's procedure, FWP-0-AP-16, " Conduct of Operation - Operations Group, Appendix B," instructions are provided for shift relie The plant Operator Shift Relief Instruction; specifically list valves which the licensee considers are "iaportant enough to require increased visibility and attention." The containment sump suction valves (MOV 8811-A & B) were not liste Thus, the ,
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| operators failed to notice that there were no indicating lights illuminated for MOV 8811-B for four days through 12 shift turnover FNP-0-AP-16 also requires that the control boards be walked down each shift change and specify that the indicating lights should be checke Interviews with operations personnel indicated that they would probably not have looked at these lights during shift turnover control board walkdowns. Their walkdowns emphasized abnormal valve alignments, work in progress, and those indicating lights associated with ECCS system The open breaker for the MOV should have been detected during the first shift change following the event. When this event is considered with the previously noted failure to respond to a safety related battery charger alarm on shift change, and failures to investigate and report significant changes in logged parameters, it is indicative of a lack of attention and a programmatic proble . Inoperable Fire Door On April 29, 1986 at 9:20 a.m., the inspector observed Fire Door 2406, " Hot Machine Shop", located in the Unit 1 and Unit 2 auxiliary building was unable to be closed due to a rubber hose blocking the door opening. Fire door 2406 is located on the Unit 2 side of the Hot Machine Shop on elevation 155 ft. in the auxiliary building and is a part of the fire boundary for
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| 12 that area. There was no fire watch posted nor was an hourly fire patrol established as required by TS 3.7.1 Fire door 2406 was not functional as a fire barrier while blocked in the open position. This is a violation (50-364/10-01). ,
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| i 1 Engineered Safety Systems Inspection (71710)
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| The inspectors performed various system inspections during the inspection period. Overall plant conditions were assessed with particular attention to equipment condition, radiological controls, security, safety, adherence to technical specification requirements, systems valve alignment, and locked
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| : valve verificatio Major components were checked for leakage and any general conditions that would degrade performance or prevent fulfillment of
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| functional requirements. The inspectors verified that approved procedures l and up-to-date drawings were use Portions of the following systems were observed for proper operation, valve alignment and valve verification:
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| I Auxiliary Feedwater Systems Chemical Volume Control Systems Service Water Systems Boric Acid Transfer System Containment Spray System Including Chemical Additive System Residual Heat Removal System The inspector performed a system inspection of the diesel generators. This inspection included the engine starting air system, engine Jacket cooling water system, service water system alignment in the diesel generator building, diesel generator building fire protection and detection system, diesel generator building ventilation system, electrical switch gear alignment, annunciator response procedures, operating procedures, operator logs and housekeepin The systems were assessed to be operable in accordance with the Technical Specifications, appropriate drawings, procedures, and the Final Safety Analysis Repor No violations or deviations were identifie . Reactor Vessel Level Monitoring System Reactor Vessel Level Monitoring System (PCN85-3195) work was observed in Unit 2 containment building and the final documentation package was reviewed. As a result of the documentation review the inspector had questions concerning the quality control of the reactor vessel head modifications (FNP-2-ETP 4193). Important quality assurance documentation appeared to be missing from the final PCN documentation package. The
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| licensee immediately requested and promptly received the QA documentation from the vendor (Westinghouse) and provided it to the inspector. Documen-tation reviewed and found satisfactory, consisted of: NDE Reports, Welder Qualifications, Quality Releases for parts installed, Calibration Records, Personnel Qualifications, Weld Procedure Qualification, and Tool Shipping list The inspector had no further question . Part 21 Reports Evaluation The inspectors reviewed 10 CFR 21 evaluations of the following notifications which had been received by the licensee. These were reviewed to determine that an adequate review had been conducted by the licensee, to determine that the Part 21 reports were applicable to the facility, and to determine the actions taken by the licensee were adequat Emergency Diesel Generator Fuel Injection Pump Delivery Valve Holde This item is dispositioned and documented by a licensee letter to file dated January 28, 198 Diesel Generator Failure at Calvert Cliffs Nuclear Station and IE Notice 85-08. This item is dispositioned and documented by a licensee letter to file dated April 30, 198 Containment Building Purge Valve. This item is dispositioned and documented by a licensee letter to file dated April 30, 198 Temperature Compensation Error: Barton Transmitter. This item is dispositioned and documented by a licensee letter to file dated May 1, 198 The inspectors had no further questions.
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| 13. Refueling Activities (60710)
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| The inspectors witnessed refueling activities of Farley Unit 2. The inspectors observed these activities from the control room, reactor building and spent fuel pool to verify that activities were being accomplished in accordance with TS, license conditions, and NRC requirement The inspectors observed the defueling and refueling to verify the following: Direct communication was established between the control room and reactor buildin Staffing requirements were in accordance with T Control of personnel access to the spent fuel pool areas was established.
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| 14 Changes to procedures were made in accordance with administrative procedure The licensee maintained good housekeeping in the refueling area Radiological controls were maintained in accordance with approved procedure Appropriate procedure steps and QA hold points were signed of No violation or deviations were identifie . Enforcement Conference On June 3, 1986, R. P. Mcdonald, Senior Vice President, Alabama Power Company and members of his staff met with J. Nelson Grace, Regional Administrator and other members of the Region II staff to discuss the inoperability of the flow path of one train of the system from the containment sum During the discussion, the licensee addressed the management and technical issues related to the inoperability of one train of the RHR syste The licensee acknowledged the errors made by the SFI and the shift turnover group The licensee categorized this event as an isolated inciden Additionally, it was stated that using realistic assumptions on core gap and resultant dose rates, the RHR suction valve's MOV breaker would be accessible following a LOCA. A realistic estimate of personnel exposure to perform this task would be on the order of 200 mrem. The licensee discussed the corrective actions being taken to resolve the deficiencies and prevent their recurrence. Management Procedure No. 400-004 had been revised to establish a formal trending program that would monitor safety systems when they .are rendered partially or totally inoperabl Attendees at the enforcement <
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| conference are listed below:
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| Licensee Attendees R. P. Mcdonald, Senior Vice President W. G. Hairston III, General Manager J. D. Woodard, General Plant Manager R. D. Hill, Operations Manager ,
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| B. D. McKinney Jr., Supervisor Licensing
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