ML20205A261

Advises of NRC Planned Insp Effort Resulting from Farley Plant Performance Review on 980202.Historical Listing of Plant Issues & Details of NRC Insp Plan for Next 8 Months Encl

ML20205A261
Person / Time
Site:	Farley
Issue date:	03/19/1999
From:	Skinner P NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION II)
To:	Dennis Morey SOUTHERN NUCLEAR OPERATING CO.
References
NUDOCS 9903300344
Download: ML20205A261 (17)

Text

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I March 19, 1999 i

Southem Nuclear Operating Company, Inc. I ATTN: Mr. D. Morey Vice President - Farley  ;

P.O. Box 1295 l Birmingham, AL 35201-1295 ^

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SUBJECT:

PLANT PERFORMANCE REVIEW- FARLEY l

Dear Mr. Morey:

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. On February 2,1999, the NRC staff completed a Plant Performance Review (PPR) of Farley.

The staff conducts these reviews for all operating nuclear power plants to develop an integrated understanding of safety pacformance. The results are used by NRC management to facilitate -

planning and allocation of inspection resources. PPRs provioe NRC management with a current summary of licensee performance and serve as inputs to the NRC's Senior Management  ;

Meeting (SMM) reviews. PPRs examine information since the last assessment of licensee 1 performance to evaluate long term trends, but emphasize the last six months to ensure that the assessments reflect current performance. The PPR for Farley involved the participation of all 1 technical divisions in evauating inspection results and safety performance information for the '

period May 1998 through January 1999. The NRC's most recent summary of licensee i performance was provided in a letter of June 29,1998, and was discussed in a public meeting l with you on July 23,1998.

- As discussed in the NRC's Administrative Letter 98-07 of October 2,1998, the PPR provides an ,

assessment of licensee performance during an interim period that the NRC has suspended its .

1 Systematic Assessment of Licensee Performance (SALP) program. The NRC suspended its SALP program to complete a review of its processes for assessing performance at nuclear power plants. At the end of the review, the NRC will decide whether to resume the SALP program or

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terminate it in favor of an improved process.

During the last six months, Unit 1 operated at or near full power until the unit was shut down on August 18,1998, to repair a steam generator tube leak on the 1B steam generator. On September 9,1998, a card failure in the solid state protection system caused an automatic trip of -

the main turbine and the reactor. The unit restarted the next day and operated at full power until October 17,1998, when the unit was shutdcwn for a refueling outage. The unit restarted on December 26,1998, and reached full power on January 3,1909.

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SNC 2 Unit 2 restarted from a refueling outage on May 17,1998. The unit operated L power the entire ,

assessment period. The licensee initiated planned load reductions to perfcrm steam generator l flushing, reactor coolant pump motor oil additions, and turbine valve testing. j

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Overall performance at Farley was acceptable. Management oversight, involvement, and

, emphasis on plant safety and equipment problem resolution continued to be strong. Preventive

and corrective maintenance is generally performed well, however, stearr - 2nerator tube integrity i continues to be a major concem. Engineering support for operations F. .naintenanca activities continued to be effective. Overall, the performance in the Nant Support area was consistent with l performance during the previous assessment period. Problems regarding adequacy of Kaowool, j fire main integrity problems, and chronic pre-action sprinkler failures persisted.

In the operations area, performance was consistent. Operators continued to perform with a high level of competency during both routine and transient plant operations. Management oversight was effective and shift supervisor command and control was evident. Procedure and policy adherence issues receive continued management attention and were improving. Licensed operator examinations were technically adequate and discriminating. Operations performance l during this assessment period does not warrant any additional inspection effort above the normal NRC core program.

in the maintenance area, performance was consistent. Corrective maintenance activities were generally well performed. Instrument calibration and surveillance activities were efficiently i planned and executed. Minor procedure adherence problems continued to occur throughout this assessment period. Overall material condition was good, but the material condition of the steam  ;

. generators continues to be a concern. Inservice inspection and testing activities were conducted i in accordance with procedures and regulatory requirements. In addition to the NRC core inspections, a regional initiative inspection during the Unit i steam generator inspection outage and the Unit 2 refueling outage to assess steam generator tube integrity and licensee

. administrative controlis planned. Also, a regionalinitiative inspection of the flow assisted corrosion activities will be performed.

In the engineering area, performance was consistent. Engineering self-assessments of safety i systems were effective in identifying problems. Safety evaluations of plant modifications per 10CFR50.59 were generally adequate. Engineering performance during this assessment period i does not warrant any additional inspection effort above the NRC core program.

)' in the plant support area, performance was consistent. Improvements were noted in radiation monitoring systems and the labeling of radioactive material. Problems continued regarding 4

adequacy of Kaowool, fire main integrity problems, and chronic pre-action sprinkler failures.

. Routine core inspections are planned. A regional initiative inspection is planned for follow-up of previously identified items related to fire barrier penetration seals and other fire penetration issues.

e SNC 3 Enclosure 1 contains a historicallisting of plant issues, referred to as the Plant issues Matrix (PIM), that were considered during this PPR process to arrive at an integrated view of licensee performance trends. The PIM includes items summarized from inspection reports or other docketed correspondence between the NRC and Southem Nuclear Operating Company. The NRC does not attempt to document all aspects of licensee programs and performance that may be functioning appropriately. Rather, the NRC only documents issues that the NRC believes warrant management attention or represent noteworthy aspects of performance.

This letter advises you of our planned inspection effort resulting from the Farley PPR review. It is provided to minimize the resource impact on your staff and to allow for scheduling conflicts and personnel availability to be resolved in advance of inspector arrival onsite. Enclosure 2 details our inspection plan for the next 8 months. The rationale or basis for each inspe: tion outside the core inspection program is provided so that you are aware of the reason for emphasis in these program areas. Resident inspections are not listed due to their ongoing and continuous nature.

We willinfomi you of any changes to the inspection plan. If you have any questions, please contact me at (404) 562-4520.

Sincerely, l l

(Original signed by  ;

Pierce H. Skinner)

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Pierce Skinner, Chief Reactor Projects Branch 2 Division of Reactor Projects Docket Nos. 50-348 and 50-364 License Nos. NPF-2 and NPF-8

Enclosures:

1. Plant lasues Matrix

2. Inspection Plan cc w/encis:

M. J. Ajiuni, Licensing Services Manager, B-031 Southern Nuclear Operating Company, Inc.

42 inverness Center Parkway '

Birmingham, AL 35201-1295 cc w/encls cont'd: (Sec Page 4)

i SNC 4 cc w/encis: Continued M. Stinson General Manager, Farley Plant Southern Nuclear Operating Company, Inc.

P. O. Box 470 Ashford, AL 36312 J. D. Woodard Executive Vice President Southem Nuclear Operating Company, Inc.

P. 0. Box 1295 Birmingham, AL 35201-1295 State Health Officer Alabama Department of Public Health 434 Monroe Street Montgomery, AL 36130-1701 M. Stanford Blanton Balch and Bingham Law Firm P. O. Box 306 1710 Sixth Avenue North Birmingham, AL 35201 Chairman Houston County Commission P. O. Box 6406 Dothan, AL 36302 Distribution w/encis:

L. Plisco, Ril P. Skinner, Rll S. Collins, NRR J. Zwolinski, NRR W. Dean, NRR T. Boyce, NRR

~H. Berkow, NRR J. Zimmerman, NRR G. Tracy, EDO J. Lieberman, OE PUBLIC Distribution w/encls cont'd: (See Page 5)

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I f SNC' 5 I Distribution w/encis: Continued NRC Resident inspector - i U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission 7388 N. State Highway 95 Columbia, AL 36319 1 I

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• SEE PREVIOUS CONCURRENCE

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RJt:u po:MU RH:pno: M ), Ril:DR5:OLMP5 Mil:uno:P55 f N'll . h/ W- V \Y)

NAME CWRapp:dka' G W H eleV" Klondl9i' O HGhristensen fyBarf DATE- 31 199 g g3 199 3/ Q 199 3/ 199 3/ 199

Q 199 A F 199 ,

j COPY 7 YE5 NO [ YE5) NO fYE5) NO /YE5] NO (YE5) ND YE5 NO YE5 NO l l OFFICIAL RECORDtOMf DOCg NAME: G:PARt2YPPRLETR.WPD l

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l l l SNC 5 Distribution w/encis:

l i G. Tracy, EDO i

! W. Dean, NRR PUBLIC NRC Resident inspector.

U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission 7388 N. State Highway 95 l l

Columbia, AL 36319 l

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OFFICE Ril:DRP Ril:DR5;MB Ril:DR5:EB RII;DR5:OLHPB Ril:DR5:P5B SIGNATURs NAME CWRapp:d, a GBelisle KLandis HChristensen KBarr ,

DATE 2/ (g/9C , 2/ /99 2/ 19 9 2/ /99 2/ /99 2/ /99 2/ /99 COPY 7 YE5 710) YE5 NO YES NO YES NO YES NO YES NO YES NO OFFICIAL RECORD COPY DOCUMENT NAME: G:\FARLEY\PPRLETR.WPD l

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Page: 1 of 10 Date: 02/18/1999 United States Nucicar Regultt:ry C:mmi=ian Time: 12:s0:2s Region il PLANT ISSUE MATRIX '

FARLEY By Primary Functional Area Functional Template Date Source Area ID Type Codes item Description 11/28/1998 1998007 Pri: OPS NRC NEG Pri: 18 The Shift Superv*sor was not informed of an automate start of the Penetration Room Filtration system, and the licensee did not initially recognize that the event was reportable.

Sec: Sec: 38 l

Ter:  ;

10/21/1998 1998-005-00 Pri: OPS Licensee LER Pri: 1B Control room operators referre! ? annunicator response procedures and promptly carried out the required steps.

Sec: Sec: 3A Ter: 3B 10/17/1998 1998006 Pri: OPS NRC NEG Pri: 1C The minct departure process lacked pre-implementation independent review by system specialists, qualrty assurance, and the onsite safety committee. The lack of these reviews contnbuted to an error in developing a minor departure.

Sec: Sec: 5A Ter:  ;

10/17/1998 1998006 Prl: OPS NRC STR Pri: 1A Operator response to abnt.,, mal and routine plant conditions was strong, including a Unit 1 automatic reactor trip, a startup of Und 1 following a steam generator tube repair activity, a shutdown of Unit 1 for refueling, and Unit 2 partial Sec: Sec: 1B loss of cooling to the reactor coolant pumps.

Ter: 3A 10/17/1998 1998006-01 Pri: OPS NRC NCV Pri: 1C Operations staff failed to assemble the fire brigade as required by AOP-29.0 for hydrogen stack fires on three seperate occassions.

Sec: PLTSUP Sec:3A Ter:

08/29/1998 1998005 Pri: OPS NRC POS Pri: 1 A The licensee adequately prepared for and satisfactorily conducted Unit 1 mid-loop operations. All level indicators were operable and closely monitored by the operators. Shutdown safety assessment was performed continually. (Also IR Sec: Sec: IC 98-03,98-07)

Ter: 3A 08/29/1998 1998005 Pri: OPS NRC POS Pri:1B Response to Unit 1 Circulating Water Pump trip and Component Coobng Water heat exchanger tube leak was prompt, demonstrated good piant awamess, and was well coordinated. Supervisory command and control was evident.

Sec: Sec: 3A Ter: SA 08/29/1998 1998005 Pri: OPS NRC POS Pri:1C The licensee a9propriately and conservatively responded to steam generator tube leakage including enhanced training and plant procedure revisions.

Sec: PLTSUP Sec:38 Ter:

05/30/1998 1998003 Pri: OPS NRC POS Prt: 1 A Mode transitions, initial startup and power ascension following refueling were weit controlled and performed in a conscientcus and conservatsve manner. (Also IR 97-03,97-06. 98-02,96-15,98-08)

Sec: Sec: 2A Ter: 3A ttan Type (Compliance. Followup,Other), From 10/01/1997 To 01/31/1999 Enclosure 1

Page: 2 of 10 Date: 02/18/1999 United States Nucirr Regul:.tsry Comm.i= ion Time:12:s0:2s Region il PLANT ISSUE MATRIX -

FARLEY By Primary Functional Area Functional Template i Date Source Area ID Type Codes item Description  !

05/30/1998 1998004 Pri: OPS NRC POS Prl:1A Operator attentrveness to MCB alarms and changing plant cond!tions were excellent. Operators were consistently aware of plant status and ongoing work activites. Onshift SRO command and control, and Ops management cversight ,

Sec: Sec:3A remained at a high level. (Also IR 97-15,14,10,08,06,05,98-01,98-02,03) ,

Ter:

04/11/1998 1998002 Pri: OPS NRC NEG Pri: 2A The assened priontization did not ensure that freeze protection equipment for safety-related equipment was correded or compensated for in a timely manner. The guidance in the Cold Weather Contingences procedure did not distinguish Sec: MAINT Sec: 2B between safety and non-safety related freeze protection circuits. (Also IR 96-15,97-14)

Ter: 1C 04/11/1998 1998002-01 Pri: OPS NRC NCV Pri: 3A The Shift Supervisor failed to use 'imergency Response Procedure placekeeping aids dunng response to a manual reactor inp initiated for a droppec' control rod. This was previously identrfed as a negative training issue.

Sec: PLTSUP Sec: 18 Ter:

03/08/1998 1998002 Prl: OPS NRC POS Pri:10 Licensee response to elevated river levels due to heavy rain was appropriate. Sufficient preparations were rnade and necessary equipment obtained as conditions worsened.

Sec: MAINT Sec: 1C Ter:

02/21/1998 1998001-01 Prf: OPS NRC NCV Pri:3A Conduct of Operations procedure required oncoming system operators to walkdown all areas unter their responsibilrty after completing tumover. Observations of and intervews with system operators found they were only touring a eas See: Sec: SA identified on the data loggers or as directed t>y the Main Control Room. Since the data loggers did not address all areas under the opeators responsibility, many areas were not routinely toured 02/11/1998 1998001 Pri: OPS NRC POS Prl:3A Plant operators performed well during on-line replacement of the 1B Main Feedwater Regu!ating Valve control dnver card. The Shift Supervisor maintained command and communications with the operators and technicians dunng the Sec: MAINT Sec: 18 power reduction and card replacement. Troubleshooting activities correctly diagnosed the problem with the control driver card.

Ter-01/10/1998 1997015-01 Pri: OPS NRC NCV Prl: 2A THE CONTAINMENT AIR COOLER CONDENSATE LEVEL MONITORING (CCLM) SYSTEM WAS INOPERABLE (DUE TO MISPOSITIONED VALVES) WHILE THE CONTAINMENT ATMOSPHERE GASEOUS AND PARTICUt^iE See: ENG Sec: 2B RADITION MONITORING SYSTEMS (R-11 AND R-12) WERE SIMULTANFOUSLY INOPERABLE. THIS CONSTITUTED A CONDITION PROHIBITED BY TS. The procedures for the entmnt air cooler cond level monitonng Ter: 4B (CCLM) system failed to list the throttled position for the drain valves rendering the CCLM inoperable.

11/29/1997 1997014-01 Pri: OPS NRC NCV Pri:28 Major portions of " Extreme Cold Weather Contingencies" were not complete prior to below freezing temperatures, including operations and maintenance responsibilties.

Sec: MA!NT Sec: 3C Ter:

10/18/1997 1997011 Pri: OPS NRC POS Pri: 1C Operations management implemented prompt and effective compensatory measures (i.e., r luced RCS activity limit) to address safety concems regarding a projected increase in end-of-cycle SG conditional tube seakage.

Sec: Sec: 3A Ter: SC item Type (Compliance.Foilowup,Other), From 10/01/1997 To 01/31/1999

"*'* ' " Date: 02/18/1999 United States Nucirr Regulit:ry Comm.r=mn um. 52:s0-2:

Region il PLANT ISSUE MATRIX -

FARLEY By Primary Functional Area Functional Template Date Source Area ID Type Codes item Desc@on 10/18/1997 1997011 Pri: OPS NRC POS Pri: 1A Engineennq test procedure (ETP-3607) for fully withdrawing Unit 2 control rods to a new position was well written and controlled. The evolution was conducted in a smooth and deliberate manner.

See: ENG Sec: 1C Tec 48 01/09/1999 1998003 Pri: MAINT NRC STR Pri: 2B The hcensee continued to inipiement an ef'ective Flow Accelerated Corrosion program to maintain high energy carbon piping wall thickness withui acceptable hmits.

Sec: Sec:2A Ter:

01/09/1999 1993008 Pri: MAINT NRC STR Pri:2B The Preventue Matntenance program effectrvely identrTed potential failures of a Unit 2 control rod power supply and ,

the Unrt 1 isophase bus duct cooung fan _ Corrective maintenance was performed prior to any affect on plant Sec: Sec: 2A operations.

Tec 3A 11/28/1998 1998007 Pri: MAINT NRC STR Pri:48 The hcensee had conservatsely and comprehensively planned the Unit 1 Baffle Former Bolt replacement. Personnel involved were knowledgeable of the process, system, and requirements associated with the actwity. The inspectors Sec: ENG Sec: 3A noted that the licensee effectuely captured and used " lessons leamed' during the evolution.

Tec 3B 07/11/1998 1998004 Pri: MAINT NRC STR Pri: 3A Maintenance and surveillance testing actwities were generally conducted in a thorough and competent manner by quahfed indrviduals in accordance with plant procedures and work instruebons. Close coordination was maintained with Sec: OPS Sec: 2B the main control room during surveillance testing activites. (Also IR 98-01,02,03,05)

Tec 3B 05/30/1998 1998003 Pri: MAINT NRC POS Pri: Sg The corrective actions following several dropped rod events appeared to be comprehensive and effective, pending completion of the icensee's root cause determination.

Sec: Sec: SC Ter:

05/30/1998 1998003 Pri: MAINT NRC NEG Pri:28 The licensee issued a procedure that permited the use of high temperature liquid penetrant outside the allowable temperature range of 60 F to 125 F without first quahfrying the procedure as required by the ASME Boiler and Pressure Sec: ENG Sec:4B Vessel code.

Ter:

05/04/1998 1998-002-00 Pri: MAINT Licenree LER Pri:2B TURBINE AUTO STOP TRIP (AST) OIL PRESSURE SWITCH SETPOINTS FOUND OUT OF TECHINICAL SPECIFICATIONS LIMITS. PROBABLE CAUSE OF SETPOINT DRIFT WAS VIBRATION INDUCED WEAR OF Sec: See: MECHANICAL LINKAGE COMPONENTS .

Ter:

04/17/1998 1998009-01 Pri: MAINT NRC NCV Pri:3A The licensee identifie:I a weld that was not in compliance with the ASME B&PV Code, corrected the weld, and took actions to correct the root causes.

Sec: See: 2B Ter:

L ltem Type (Comphance. Followup,Other), From 10/01/1997 To 01/31/1999

Page: 4 of 10 Date: 02/18/1999 United States Nucl:cr Regulitary Commi =isn nme: 52:s0:28 Region il PLANT ISSUE MATRIX '

FARLEY By Primary Functional Area Functional Temptate Date Source Ama ID Type Cases i m Desc @ on 04/11/1998 1998002 Pri: MAINT NRC POS Prt: 3A Main Steam Safety Valve testing was performed by kne.,* dgeable contractor personnel with oversight by the assigned licensee personnel Technical issues were resolved porptty and conservatnrely.

Sec: Sec: 2B Ten 3B 02/21/1998 1998001 Pri: MAINT NRC POS Pri: 2A Surveillance testing of the 2A Containmert Spray pump was adequately performed and the personnel demonstrated caution while trying to determine sourt.s and ex*ent of the system vibrations.

Sec: OPS See: 3A Ter: 58 01/10/1998 1997015-02 Pri: MAINT NRC NCV Pri: 3A Craft personnel failed to sign-in on the Personnel and Material Accountability Log whe:6 working in the controlled refuehng area boundary as required by plant procedure.

Sec: Sec: 1C Ter: 3C 11/29/1997 1997014 Pri: MAINT NRC STR Pri:2B Corredive actions to address multiple pre-action spnnkler system failures identifed in 1996 have been comprehensive, thorough, and successful An additional corrective action plan was initiated to resolve the small number of remaining Sec: Sec: failures.  !

Ter: ,

11/29/1997 1997014-02 Pri: MAINT NRC NCV Pri:3A During observations of work on safety related equipment, maintenance personnel were not signing o3 completed steps I of "Continous Use" procedures.

Sec: Sec: 3C i Ter:

11/29/1997 1997014-04 Pri: MAINT NRC NCV Pri:3A During maintenance activities, both trains of automatic Service Water isolation to the Turbine Building were rendered i inoperable.

Sec: OPS Sec: 3C Ter:

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10/18/1997 1997011 Pri: MAINT NRC POS Pri:3A Maintenance and testing activities associated with the replacement of Unit 2 pressurizer pressure transmitter (PT 456)  :

were well controlled, performed in accordance with plant procedures and work instructions, and accomphshed without Sec: OPS Sec: 3B incident.

Ter: 2B 10/30/1998 1998003 Pri: ENG NRC STR Pri:48 Changes, tests and expenments were property screened for 10 CFR 50.59 applicability, and adequately evaluated to ,

ensure an unreviewed safety question (USO) did not exist. i Sec: Sec: l Ter: l l

10/22/1998 136 Prl: ENG NRC LIC Pri:4B Technical content of the initial license amendment (U1 - #136, and U2 - #128) request to revise and relocate TS I

' Pressure-Temperature curves was not complete. Important information needed to approve this amendment was '

Sec: Sec: 4C lacking. Also, the bcensee did not clearty justify deviating from methodologies referenced in their submittals.

Ter:  !

item Type (Compliance, Followup,Other), From 10/01/1997 To 01/31/1999

Page: 5 of 10 Date: 02/18/1999 United States Nucl=r Regulttnry Comm.a:cn Time: i2:s0:2s Region 11 PLANT ISSUE MATRIX '

FARLEY By Primary Functional Area Functional Template Date Source Area ID Type Codes item Description 08/29/1998 1998005-01 Pri: ENG NRC NCV Pri:4C Licensee determined that the service water lines t 7 moderate energy lines; therefore, flooding due to line breaks was not required to be analyzed.

Sec: Sec: SA Ter: SC 08/29/1998 1998005-02 Pri: ENG NRC eel Pri: 4C 10 CFR 50.59 REVIEW OF ONE UFSAR DISCREPANCY PACKAGE WAS INADEQUATE AND FAILED TO IDENTIFY AN USQ. INSPECTORS IDENTIFIED TWO ADDITIONAL UFSAR DISCREPANCIES THAT WERE OVERLOOKED BY Sec: Sec:48 LICENSEE.

Ter:

07/11/1998 1998004-04 Pri: ENG NRC NCV Pri:4A Use of no+ conservative fluid temperatures in the Component Coohng Water and Spent Fuel Pool pipe stress anafysis calculations.

Sec: Sec:4B Ter:

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07/01/1998 1998003-06 Pri: ENG NRC VIO IV Pri: 3B Three conditions adverse to quahty regarding Control Room Ventilation System Functional System Design (FSD) Open items were either inadvertently or inappropriately closed out before they were adequately corrected.

Sec: Sec:48 Ter: 4C 07/01/1998 1998003-04 Pri: ENG NRC VIO IV Pri:3A The original safety assessment for LER 97-10 failed to address the safety consequences of the possible inabihty to achieve and maintain the plant in a safe shutdown condition.

Sec: OPS See: 5B Ter:

05/30/1998 1998003 Prl: ENG NRC STR Pri:4C Licensee had established suitable programmatic guidance to ensure that the regulatory requirements of 10 CFR 50.59 would be met by the vanous onsite and offsite organizations. Training of safety evaluation preparers and reviewers was Sec: Sec: adequate. Personnel preparing and reviewing safety evaluations were quahfied.

Ter:

05/30/1998 1998003 Pri: ENG NRC WK Prt: 4C Documentation that addressed the 10 CFR 50.59 USQ cnteria in several safety evaluations lacked spectfoty and very few of the safety evaluation forms provided any direct evidence of a cross-disciplinary review.

Sec: Sec: 3A Ter:

i 04/11/1998 1998002 Pri: ENG NRC NEG Pri:2A A Deficiency Report dated 9/16/97 identified leakage on the 1B RHR pump but the leakage was not included in total primary leakage. The licensee initially did not use any type of measunng device to accurately quantify the leaktate.

Sec: Sec: 3A Also, the primary leakage procedure did not provide specific directions to evaluate leaks under actual operating Ter: 5B 02/21/1998 1998001 Pri: ENG NRC POS Pri:4A The licensee's self-initiated sakty system assessment of the containment ventilation and spent fuel pool systems were thorough and effective in identifying design discrepancies and weak areas.

Sec: Sec: 5A Ter SB item Type (Compliance. Followup.Other). From 10/01/1997 To 01/31/1999

Page: 6 of 10 Date: 02/18/1999 MW hta hdn Rephtm Qmmb.a Ti - 12 s0 2 negion : PLANT ISSUE MATRIX '

FARLEY By Primary Functional Area Functional Template Date Source Area ID Type Codes Item Description 12/29/1997 1997014-05 Pri: ENG NRC ViO IV Prl:2A The TDAWFP pump went sta:k was not housed in a Cat 1 structure to protect against tomado generated missles.

Sec: Sec:4A Ter: 1C 11/17/1997 1997011-02 Pri: ENG NRC VIO IV Pri: 1C Inservice testing (IST) program did not include revese flow testing of the turbine <$ riven auxiliary feedwater (TDAFW) pump dtscharge check valve.

Ter: 5A 11/17/1997 1997011-04 Prl: ENG NRC VIO IV Pri: 1C Lack of a service test program for the TDAFW pump uninteruptible power supply (UPS) battery to ensure required duty cycles would be met.

Sec: Sec: 2A Ter:48 11/17/1997 1997011-05 Pri: ENG NRC VIO IV Pri:4C Design control measures did not ensure that calculations were verified and controlled adequately.

Sec: Sec: 3A Ter:

11/17/1997 1997011-06 Pri: ENG NRC VIO IV Pri:48 Mequate corrective actions were not taken to resolve differences between plant procedures and CCW system P&lDs identified by a licensee 1990 self-essessment.

Sec: Sec:4C Ter: SC 11/17/1997 1997011-07 Pri: ENG NRC VIO lV Pri: 48 Surveillance testing acceptance criteria for the auxiliary building vital 125 VDC batteries were revised without recognizing that they exceeded TS requirements.

Sec: Sec:4C Ter: SA 11/17/1997 1997011-03 Prl: ENG NRC VIO lV pri:2A inappropriate IST acceptance enteria for forward flow testing of a TDAFW check valve and failure to follow drawings in the installation of Unit 2 TDAFW battery structural / electrical components.

Sec: MAINT Sec: 2B Ter: 3A 10/18/1997 1997011 Pri: ENG NRC NEG Pri: 4B Resolution of UFSAR discrepancy #089, of the UFSAR Reverification Program, was not thorough and used non-conservative calculations.

Sec: Sec:4C Ter: SC 10/18/1997- 1997011 Prl: ENG NRC POS Pri: 2A Licensee actions to assess and correct corroded conditions of the service water discharge piping were prompt and effective.

Sec: Sec:4B Ter: SC ltem Type (Compliance, Followup,Other), From 10/01/1997 To 01/31/1999

Page: 7 of 10 ,

Date: 02/18t1999 MM DM WCleU Repl2m %mm,ere,im . = 32 so 2:

Region il PLANT ISSUE MATRIX

• FARLEY By Primary Functional Area Functional Template Date Source Ares ID Type Codes item Description 10/18/1997 1997011 Pri: ENG NRC POS Pri:4B NRC staff determined that SNC's compensatory measures, reporting, and safety assessment in response to GL 95-05 Sec: OPS Sec:4C Ter: SC 10/06/1997 1997010-08 Pri: ENG NRC VIO IV Pri:4A Installation of Half-hour Kaowool Fire Bamers Without Appendix R Exemption.

Sec: PLTSUP Sec: 4B Ter: SA 10/17/1998 1998006 Prl: PLTSUP NRC NEG Pri:3A Two instances ofinattentive Security Guards were observed. These appeared to be isolated cases.

Sec: Sec: 3C  !

Ter: F 09/11/1998 1998010 Pri: PLTSUP NRC NEG Pri: 1C OSC communcations were not fully effective in communicating important plant conditions. The potential hazard from a radcactive plume to site personnel using the Secondary Access Point was not considered by either the TSC or OSC.

Sec: Sec: 3B High Prionty teams were not dispistched m a timely manner from the OSC.  !

Ter:

09/11/1998 1998010 Pri: PLTSUP NRC POS Prl: 1C Command and control of TSC operations was effective and the TSC staff was proactive in formulating mitigation strategies to minimize offsite releases.

Sec: Sec: 3B Ter-09/11/1998 1998010 Pri: PLTSUP NRC POS Pri:1C Command and control of EOF operations by the Recovery Manager was generally vey gooi Effeebve working relationships were observed between hcensee personnel and State and county representatives.

Sec: Sec: 3B '

Ter:  ;

07/11/1998 1998004 Pri: PLTSUP NRC POS Pri: 3A A reactor vessel speomen transfer from the Spent Fuel Pool to the transfer cask was property executed and adequately planned. Personnel were property trained and briefed. Conduchng the transfer underwater significantly reduced Sec: Sec: 28 accumulated dose.

Ter:

07/01/1998 1998003-07 Pri: PLTSUP NRC VIO IV Pri: 3A The fadure to include a documented process in access control procedures for contractors to timely inform the Secun'y Department of terminated indrviduals contributed to a violation for failure follow procedure to immediately terminate Sec: See: 2B eight individuals' unescorted access.

Ter:

05/30/1998 1998003 Pri: PLTSUP NRC STR Pri: 3A Worker Shallow Dose Equivalent (SDE) exposures resulting from personnel contamination events and work activities l during refueling activities were evaluated property. Controls for minimizing workers'intemal exposure during refuehng Sec: Sec: SB activites were effective. Respiratory protection training, fit tests, medical qualifications, and equipment status met 10 CFR 20.1703 requirements. The Health Physics (HP) and Dosimetry (DOS) observation program continued to be Ter: 38 implemented effedively and contnbuted to the reduced personnel errors. (Also IR 97-14, IR 98-07)

Item Type (Compliance. Followup,Other), Frorn 10/01/1997 To 01/31/1999

Page:. Sof10 Date: 02/ts/1999 MM Dies Nutri Regubtm Comm,=,iari i Tim.:12:so:2s R.gion n PLANT ISSUE MATRIX -

FARLEY ~ By Primary Functional Area Functional Template Date Source Ama ID Type Codes Mem Description 05/30/1998 1998003 Pri: PLTSUP NRC STR Pri:3C Emergency Response Facilites (ERFs) were well-equipped and operationally ready to support an emergency response.

Emergency response personnel were adequately trained and responded appropnately to a scheduled dnti. The See: Sec: emergency declaration on March 8,1998, was made in accordance with the Emergency Plan.

Ter:

05/30/1998 1998003 Prl: PLTSUP NRC POS Pri: 2A The evaluated Radiaton Monitor System (RMS) equipment was installed property and the reviewed detector calibrations and functional tests were conducted in accordance with and met procedural,10 CFR Part 20, and Offsite Sec: MAINT Sec: 28 Dose Calculaton Manual (ODCM) requirements i Ter:

03/23/1998 1998001-08 Pri: PLTSUP NRC VIO IV Pri:3A During observed maintenance activites in contaminated areas. the inspectors witnessed several examples of improper contamination control pratices. Workers removed PCs outside the contaminated area boundary and breached the Sec: MAINT Sec:3B boundary during work.

Ter: 1C 02/21/1998 1998001 Pri: PLTSUP NRC NEG Prl:2A Additionai pre-action sprinkler system failures indicate that prior corrective actions were not completely effective.

Sec: ENG Sec:50 Ter: SC 02/21/1998 1998001 Pri: PLTSUP NRC POS Pri 2A Immediate corrective actions for pre-acten fire protection sprinkler system failures were prompt and conservative.

Sec: MAINT Sec: 2B Ter:

02/21/1998 1998001 Pri: PLTSUP NRC POS Pri: 3B The licensee's requal:fication program complied with the requirements and standards of plant procedures as well as the requirements of 10 CFR 55.59 for the areas inspected. The licensee developed and administered simulator Sec: OPS Sec: 1C examinatens that effectrvely identified areas in need of improvement.

Ter:

02/21/1998 1998001 Prl: PLTSUP NRC POS Pri:2A Licensee actons in response to SAER HP, Chemistry and Radwaste audit findings were thorough and appropriate.

Sec: OTHER Sec: 2B Ter:

11/29/1997 1997014-06 Pri: PLTSUP NRC NCV Pri: 3A HP personnel used the current date and time instead of the intake date and time to perform followup assessments of radionucide intakes for two individuals. Reanalysis using the correct date and time did not signi'icantly change the Sec: Sec: 1C assessment results.

Ter:

11/29/1997 1997014-07 Pri: PLTSUP NRC NCV Pri: Equipment failures, poor procedures, and inadequate personnel followup were root causes for not taking routine grab samples when both Unit 2 gaseous and particulate radiation monitors were inoperable.

Sec: Sec:

Ter:  !

item Type (Compliance, Followup,Other), From 10/01/1997 To 01/31/1999 i

N: 'd" Date: 02/10/1999 United States Nucle:r Regul; tory Comm.eri:n Tim.: 12:so:2s Region n PLANT ISSUE MATRIX -

FARLEY By Primary Functional Area Functional Template Date Source Ama ID Type Codes Hem Descd A 11G9/1997 1997014-08 Prt: PLTSUP NRC NCV Pri: Individual failed to conduct requred Emergency Preparedness equipment inventories and falsified the checkhsts to hide thrs fadure.

Sec: Sec:

Ter:

11/17/1997 1997011-08 Pri: PLTSUP NRC VIO IV Prl:1C Copes of the site secunty plan, contgency plan, and procedures were being stored in an unlocked drawer in the control room without maintaining posdive control at a!! tenes Ter: SA

- 10/06/1997 1997010-05 Prt: PLTSUP NRC VIO IV Pri: 2A Corrugated flexible steel tubing ar'd plastic hose used in samlpe lines for various plant vent and w J.;.uiu st pugre particulate samplers instead of smooth stainiees steel tubing with minimum bend radis.

Sec: ENG Soc:4A '

Ter: SA 7

i 1

i item Type (Compliance, Followup,Other) From 10/01/1997 To 01/31/1999

Page: 10 of 10 Date: 02ttattses United States Nucle:r Regul tory Comm.minn Tim.:12:so:2s PLANT ISSUE MATRIX

• By Primary Functional Aree Legend Type Codes: Template Codes Functional Areas:

[Bil Bulletin } [1A Norma! Operations Operations l j [ OPS Constructen i 18 Operations During Transients j j MAINT Maintenance lCDR

DEV Deviation 1C Programs and Processes  ! 'ENG Engineering eel Escalated Enforcement item 2A Equipment Condition PLTSUP Plant Support IFl Inspector follow-up item f

j2B Programs and Processes  ; ,OTHER Other j

{LER Licensee Event Report

~-

j3A Work Performance  !

Licensing issue '

j3B KSA lLIC

! MISC Miscellaneous

• 13C Work Environment MV Minor Violation l4A Design NCV NonCited Violation !4B Engineedng Support NEG Negative l4C Programs and Processes NOED Notee of Enforcement Discretion  !SA identification l NON Notice of Non-Conformance l58 Analysts l P21 Part 21 lSC Resolution l t _ _3 POS Positive ID Codes:

SGI Safeguard Event Report l [NRC 'NRC l STR Strength lSelf Self-Revealed URI Unresolved item l Licensee Licensee

VIO Violation l

1" W'8ka'$$

Eels are apparent violations of NRC Requirements that are being considered for escalated enforcement action in accordance with the " General Statement of Policy and Procedure for NRC Enforcement Action"(Enforcement Policy) NUREG-1600. However, the NRC has not reached its final enforcement decision on the issues identifed by the Eels and the PIM entries may be modified when the finst decisions are made.

URis are unresolved dems about which more information is required to determine whether the issue in question is an acceptable item, a deviation, a nonconformance, or a violation. A URI may tiso be a potential violation that is not likely to be considered for escalated enforcement action. However, the NRC has not reached its final conclusions on the issues, and the PIM entries may be modifed when the final conclusions are mace.

i item Type (Compliance Followup,Other), From 10/01/1997 To 01/31/1999

FARLEY INSPECTION PLAN INSPECTION TITLE / PROGRAM AREA NUMBER OF PLANNED INSPECTION TYPE OF INSPECTION - COMMENTS PROCEDURE / INSPECTORS DATES-TEMPORARY INSTRUCTION 83750 Radiation Protection 1 March 1999 Core 84750/86750 HP & Chemistry 1 May 1999 Core NUREG-1201 initial Exams 3 May 1999 initial Exams for 8 Candidates 49001 Erosion / Corrosion 1 May 1999 Regional Initiative - Review of Flow Assisted 92903 Engineering Follow up 1 May 1999 Regional Initiative - Follow up of Fire Protection Outstanding issues t

50001 Steam Generator Replacement 1 September 1999 Regional Initiative 50002 Steam Generator - Midcycle 1 September 1999 SG Midcycle Review 83750 Radiation Protection 1 September 1999 Core 81700 Security 1 September 1999 Core 73753 Inservice Inspection 1 October 1999 Core 50001 Steam Generator Replacement 1 November 1999 Regional Initiative 40500 Corrective Actions 3 October 1999 Core 84750/86750 HP & Chemistry 1 November 1999 Core 92904 Engineering Follow up 1 November 1999 Regional Initiative - Follow up Fire Protection issues Enclosure 2 i