ML20211B921
| ML20211B921 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Farley  |
| Issue date: | 08/17/1999 |
| From: | Dennis Morey SOUTHERN NUCLEAR OPERATING CO. |
| To: | NRC OFFICE OF INFORMATION RESOURCES MANAGEMENT (IRM) |
| References | |
| 50-348-99-09, 50-364-99-09, NEL-99-0298, NUDOCS 9908250123 | |
| Download: ML20211B921 (5) | |
Text
.g.
Dave Mirey SIuth:rn Nuclear
%ce President Operating Cornpany. Inc.
f arley Project Post Othce Box 1295 Bamingnam. Alatama 35201 Tei 205 992 5131 k
SOUTHERN L COMPANY August 17, 1999 Energy ro serve lbur %rld '
Docket Nos.:
50-348 NEL-99-0298 50-364 I
U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission ATTN: Document Control Desk Washington, DC 20555 Joseph M. Farley Nuclear Plant i
Reply To Notice Of Violation (VIO)
NRC Insnection Renort Numbers 50-348/99-09 and 50-364/99-09 Ladies and Gentlemen:
As requested by your transmittal dated July 23,1999, this letter responds to VIO 50-348,364/99-09-01,
Security Force Members Failed to Intercept and Engage a Mock Adversary Force to Protect Against i
Radiological Sabotage." The Southern Nuclear Operating Company (SNC) response is provided in the enclosure.
Should you have any questions, please advise.
Respectfully submitted, P
N Dave Morey MJA/maf: 99-09-01
Enclosure:
1.
SNC Response to VIO 50-348,364/99-09-01
/
I 9908250123 -790817 PDR ADOCK 05000348 G
PDR o.
r i
- Page 2..
. U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
-cc:
Southern Nuclear Operatine Company Mr. L. M. Stinson, General Manager - Farley U. S. Nuclear Reculatory Commission. Washincton. D. C.
Mr. L. M. Padovan, Licensing Project Manager - Farley U. S. Nuclear Reculatory Commission. Renion 11 Mr. L. A. Reyes, Regional Administrater Mr. T. P. Johnson, Senior Resident Inspector - Farley i
4 i
k 1
l 1
1 i
j t
i l'
-2.
l
!()
n, i1
.1 ;
o ENCLOSURE u
1
- Southern Nuclear Operating Company Response VIO'50-348,364/99-09-01
" Security Force Members Failed to Intercept and Engage a Mock Adversary Force to Protect Against Radiological Sabotage" l
i j
j i
i i
I
g I
l ENCLOSURE Southtm Nuclear Operating Company Response VIO $0-348,364/99-09-01
" Security Force Members Failed to Intercept and Engage a Mock Adversary Force to Protect Against Radiological Sabotage" Notice of Violation VIO 50-348,364/99-09-01," Security Force Members Failed to Intercept and Engage a Mock Adversary Force to Protect Against Radiological Sabotage, states:
Facility Operating Licenses NPF-2, Amendment 90, and NPF-8, Amendment 83, dated November 22,1991, require the licensee to fully implement and maintain in effect all provisions of the Commission approved physical security, guard training and qualification, and safeguards contingency plans including amendments made pursuant to the provisions of the Miscellaneous Amendments and Search Requirements revisions to 10 CFR 73.55 and to the authority of 10 CFR 50.90 and 10 CFR 50.54(p).
10 CFR 73.55(a) requires licensees, in part, to have a physical protection system designed to protect against the design bases threat of radiological sabotage. Section 73.55 also requires, in part, that licensees have an onsite physical security protection system and security organization with capabilities to achieve this general objective.
Section 1.3 of the Physical Security Plan, Revision 0, dated September 29,1997, defines an armed response individual whose primary duty, in the event of attempted radiological sabotage, is to respond, armed and equipped, to delay or prevent such an act.
Section 7.1.2 of the Physical Security Plan, Revision 0, dated September 29,1997, provides that under normal conditions, from the time of receipt of an alarm until arrival at any vital area, security force members have sufficient time to intercept and engage an adversary force.
Contrary to above, on two occasions on March 9,1999, from the time of receipt of an alarm until arrival at three different vital areas, the response objective of 10 CFR 73.55
' and the Physical Security Plan were not met in that security force members failed to intercept and engage a mock adversary force to protect against radiological sabotage.
This is a Severity Level IV Violation (Supplement 111).
Admission or Denial The violation occurred as described in the Notice of Violation.
1
.g t
d I
i Reason for Violation The adverse condition was personnel error in that management failed to recognize the potential historical vulnerability to the Physical Security Plan. There was also a failure of management to recognize the need to assess the Physical Security Plan vulnerabilities immediately following the drills and to take timely action until after the inspection exit.
Corrective Steps Taken and Results Achieved i
The Security Response Plan was revised to address the vulnerabilities identified during the NRC L
inspection. Necessary compensatory measures were taken, and all security force members were l
trained on the new strategy. The changes to the Response Plan have been validated by performance of a force-on-force drill and a tabletop exercise.
Corrective Steos That Will be Taken to Avoid Further Violation Appropriate procedure (s) will be revised or written to address the management actions, including timeliness, that should be taken if vulnerabilities to the Physical Security Plan are identified.
Date of Full Compliance FNP is currently in full compliance; all planned corrective actions will be completed by October 13,1999.
.,