Text

Forwards 10CFR50.59 Rept Summarizing 1985 Approved Safety Evaluations for Determining Unreviewed Safety Question
	ML20207P213
Person / Time
Site:	Susquehanna
Issue date:	12/31/1986
From:	Keiser H; PENNSYLVANIA POWER & LIGHT CO.
To:	Murley T; NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION I)
References
	PLA-2776, NUDOCS 8701150242
	Download: ML20207P213 (159)
	v • d • e

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1 PPaL Pennsylvania Power & Ught Company

- Two North Ninth Street

Allentown, PA 18101 + 215 I 7705151 Harold W. Keiser SUBMITTED PURSUANT Vice President-Nuclear Operations TO 10CFK50.59 215/770-7502 December 31, 1986 Dr. Thomas E. Murley Regional Administrator, Region'I U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Consnission 631 Park Avenue King of Prussia PA 19406 {

SUSQUEHANNA STEAM ELECTRIC STATION ;

10CFR50.59 REPORT FILE R41-2A Docket No's. 50-387 PLA- 2776 50-388 -

Dear Dr. Murley:

In accordance with 10CFR50.59, enclosed is the Susquehanna SES Unit I and Unit 2 report which summarizes the safety evaluations approved from January 1, 1985 to December 31, 1985.

The format of the report is as follows:

SER No. - Unique number for each safety evaluation.

Cross Reference - Reference to the document which contained the safety evaluation.

Description of Change - A brief description of the change made to procedures, equipment or tests.

Sunanary - This contains a summary of the three requirements for determining an unreviewed safety question as contained in 10CFR50.59(a)(2).

If you have any questions, please contact us.

Very truly yours, h IG/

JJm H. W. Keiser Vice President-Nuclear Operations Enclosures cc: NRC Document Control Desk w/ original M. Thadani USNRC L. R. Plisco USNRC ,I l \\

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PPaL Pennsylvania Power & Light Company Two North Ninth Street

Allentown, PA 18101 = 215 / 770-5151 Harold W. Keiser SUBMITTED PURSUANT Vice Fresident-Nuclear Operations TO 10CFR50.59 215/770-7502 December 31, 1986 Dr. Thomas E. Murley Regional Administrator, Region I U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Comission 631 Park Avenue King of Prussia PA 19406 SUSQUEHANNA STEAM ELECTRIC STATION 10CFR50.59 REPORT FILE R41-2A Docket No's. 50-387 PLA- 2776 50-388

Dear Dr. Murley:

In accordance with 10CFR50.59, enclosed is the Susquehanna SES Unit 1 and Unit 2 report which summarizes the safety evaluations approved from January 1, 1985 to December 31, 1985.

The format of the report is as follows:

SER No. - Unique number for each safety evaluation.

Cross Reference - Reference to the document which contained the safety evaluation.

Description of Change - A brief description of the change made to procedures, equipment or tests.

Summary - This contains a summary of the three requirements for determining an unreviewed safety question as contained in 10CFR50.59(a)(2).

If you have any questions, please contact us.

Very truly yours, H. W. Keiser Vice President-Nuclear Operations Enclosures cc: NRC Document Control Desk w/ original M. Thadani USNRC L. R. Plisco USNRC

Page 2 SSES PLA-2776 File-R41-2A bec: C. T. Coddington A2-3 W. H. Hirst .AE D. J. Walters A2-3 SRMS Corres File A6-2 Date File A2-2 djw/krp

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SER NO.: 85-001 CROSS

REFERENCE:

PMR 84-9021 DESCRIPTION OF CHANGE:

Relocate the signal iso'ators B31-ATIA&B for Unit 2 recirculation system scoop tube positioners from the extreme rear of cabinet 2C612 to the front of 2C612.

SUMMARY

I. No. This PMR is strictly a relocation activity with no wiring separation or functional changes and does not change the design basis of the Reactor Recirculation System. The new mounting details for the isolators have been reviewed and found acceptable from a seismic standpoint.

II. No. The proposed action does not constitute a change in the deuign or functional bases of the affected system.

III. No. See Item II above.

SER No.: 85-002 CROSS

REFERENCE:

Technical Specifications Figure 3.2.3-1 DESCRIPTION OF CHANGE:

With the EOC-RPT system inoperable and control rods fully withdrawn, the existing MCPR Technical Specification Operating Limit (curve labelled "EOC-RPT Inoperable," Figure 3.2.3-1) may not assure sufficient operating margin to the MCPR Safety Limit with the Bottom Burn core. In order to offset the effect of the Bottom Burn and assure adequate MCPR margin, partial control rod insertion per PLI-36573 is proposed.

SUMMARY

I. No. The Bottom Burn core operating strategy results in an all-rods-out scram reactivity curve which is slightly worse at end-of-cycle than the scram reactivity curve assumed in the FSAR analysis. Analyses were performed (CM-1-01-052, 12/6/84) which show that partial control rod insertion results in scram reactivity characteristics that are more conservative than that assumed in the FSAR analysis. Therefore, with the control rods positioned as recommended in PLI-36573, the existing MCPR Technical Specification Operating Limit will assure sufficient MCPR margin to the MCPR Safety Limit. Also, the current margins (about 20%)

to the MCPR Operating Limit more than offset the small degradation (about 2%) associated with the Bottom Burn.

II. No. The proposed partial insertion of control rods does not change any input parameters or initial conditions for any analyzed events.

III. No. See Item I above.

SER No.: 85-003 CROSS

REFERENCE:

PMR 82-051, Rev. 1 DESCRIPTION OF CHANCE:

Replace existing RHR 24-inch throttling valves (HV-151F017A&B) during a Unit 1 outage because of vibration and possible failure during operation in the shutdown cooling mode. The new valves will be 20 inch cage / drag type valve designed for throttling application.

SUMMARY

I. No. These new RHR valves will be designed for the dynamic effects of throttling service and therefore decrease the vibration problems experienced with the existing valves. Also, these new RHR valves will be replaced during a unit outage while the reactor is in cold shutdown. A redundant RHR flow path to cool the reactor core will be made available.

During installation and removal of HV-151F017A&B certain conduits and cables need to be temporarily removed to avoid interference with the welding machine. The cables and conduits that are ESW " Bypass Indication" on Unit 2, will not affect the normal operation of ESW.

These cables allow " Bypass Indication" to indicate upon loss of power for certain ESW valves. Because the bypass indication is only for indication purpose, and since there are other ways of observing valve problems, the removal of these cables and conduits will not affect the safe operation of ESW.

II. No. See Item I above.

III. No. See Item I above.

SER No.: 85-004 CROSS

REFERENCE:

PMR 82-214 DESCRIPTION OF CHANGE:

Install a handrail around the Unit 1 turbine lube oil reservoir. No welding will be permitted in the reservoir room to avoid a fire hazard.

SUMMARY

1. No. This change has no effect on the function of any plant system or any effect on the design basis of any plant structure. The installation is in a non-safety-related structure and, therefore, no safety impact can occur.

II. No. See Item I above.

III. There are no Technical Specifications concerning the structural I

requirements of the Turbine Building.

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4 SER No.: .85-005 CROSS

REFERENCE:

PMR 82-434

DESCRIPTION OF CHANGE

.f (A). Modify connections to the Unit 1 Remote Shutdown Panel-(RSP) transfer switches such that transfer of loop B of RHR is possible without defeating the automatic LPCI initiation capability of loop A.-

$ (B)' Add. mimics to the RSP to show what function.the transfer switches and control switches perform in their different positions,'and upgrade labeling on the panel to meet human factors engineering standards.

SUMMARY

i I. No. (A) This PMRlwill place all valves which defeat loop A LPCI

' automatic initiation on one transfer switch. Therefore LPCI loop A automatic initiation will not be defeated until the transfer switch is-t used, which is only required during Head Spray mode. (B) The Mimic additions increase the efficiency of operations by reducing the potential-for operator error. There are no changes made to equipment function or interfaces.

j II. No. A&B. See Item I above.

I

! III. No. A&B. This change does not affect any Technical Specification bases j -or criteria.

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! SER No.: 85-006

! CROSS

REFERENCE:

- PMR 85-1001

) DESCRIPTION OF CHANCE:

1 l Add flex connections (vibration inhibitors) to the suction and discharge

piping'on Unit 2 Emergency Switchgear Room Cooling "Q" Compressors 2K210A(B) to' eliminate freon leaks created by vibration. i 8

SUMMARY

I. No. This PMR will increase reliability by eliminating vibrations

. transmitted throughout the system via hard piping.

II. No. This PMR does not change FSAR Subsection 9.4.2.2.2 evaluations; j rather, it will enhance the ability for the system to meet its design

intent.

! III. No. This system is not a part of the Technical Specifications.

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SER No. : 85-007 CROSS

REFERENCE:

Hot Functional Test HF-293-074 DESCRIFTION OF CHANCE:

This test verifias Unit 2' bypass valve capacity. Main steam flow is correlated with generator output between 80%'and 100% power. With power stabilized between 90% and 95%, each bypass valve will be. individually stroked. Data will then be assembled and individual bypass valve capacities evaluated.

SUMMARY

1. No. Credit for turbine bypass valves is taken in the FEAR analysis of the Feedwater_ Controller failure event. With the bypass. valve already open, upon a reactor / turbine trip, the event will be less severe as there will be no delay in opening the valve.

II. No. Opening a bypass valve will not create a different type of accident or malfunction then evaluated in the FSAR.

III. No. No basis of safety limits will be approached during the test.

SER No.: 85-008 CROSS

REFERENCE:

PMR 82-680 DESCRIPTION OF CHANGE:

Originally, the refueling bridge "over-the-core" interlock microswitches did not remain picked.up during the bridge traverse over the Unit 1 core area due to low spots along the trip plate. "Therefore, PMR 82-287 was performed to provide a horseshoe non-spring return platform switch to permit an "over-the-core" interlock to frmction during initial fuel load. The trip plate has now been milled into spec. This modification will return the microswitch to its original design.

SUMMARY

I. No. The Fuel Handling related accident analyses in FSAR subsections l 15.7A. 15A.6.2.3.12, and 15A.6.2.3.14 are not affected by this modification. This action will return the Refueling Bridge to its j original design.

II. No. Since this PMR returns the plant to its original design, no new accident condition will result from the normal functioning or failure of this modification.

! III. No. All Technical Specifications remain unchanged, therefore the margin of safety as defined in the bases are unaffected.

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SER No.: 85-009 CROSS

REFERENCE:

PMR.83-092, Rev. 1 DESCRIPTION OF CHANGE:

The "A" loop of ESW will be repiped to supply the A&D RHR pump motor oil coolers, seal cooler, and room coolers. The "B" loop of ESW will be repiped to supply the same components but on the B and C RHR pumps. Isolation valves will be installed on the supply and return lines of the ESW piping. This DCP also cuts and caps the loop A ESW supply and return lines to the Emergency Switchgear and Load Center Room Cooler (IE-257A). Routing of the new lines on loop B also requires rerouting of an existing service air line (SP-JBD-170-6) and relocation of several hangers.

SUMMARY

I. No. This DCP cross ties ESW to the RHR pumps such that the loss of one loop of ESW causes the loss of cooling to only one RHR pump in each division. The worst case single failure is the loss of an ESW loop rendering the equipment it serves inoperable. The failure would leave available one LPCI pump in each division and one core spray loop. This i scenario is bounded by the LPCI injection valve failure as analyzed in the FSAR. Cross tying the ESW loops to the RHR pumps does not create a common mode single failure. All piping and pipe supports are designed in accordance with the original Construction Codes.

The Emergency Switchgear and Load Center Room is normally cooled by reactor building chilled water and during an emergency by control structure chilled water. It was originally planned to have ESW cool this room directly during and emergency, however the temperature of ESW can get high enough that adequate cooling cannot be achieved. As a consequence the control structure chiller supplies the cooling water for this room and ESW is valved out with locked closed valves, and loop A ESW supply and return lines will be cut and capped by this modification.

Section 9.2 of the FSAR does not list this room as an ESW load and this load was not included in the two unit ESW flow balance.

The service air line that is being rerouted is not safety related.

II. No. This DCP does not create a common mode failure. It modifies the ESW system so that it conforms to the requirements of FSAR subsection 9.2.5.1.

The service aPJ line is not safety related.

III. No. This modification only effects the RHR system and ESW system. The basis for these technical specifications were reviewed and the margins of safety defined therein are not reduced.

The service air line that is rerouted is not in any Technical Specification.

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SER No.: 85-010 CROSS

REFERENCE:

PMR 84-3112 DESCRIPTION OF CHANCE:

This modification seals cable / conduit entries of class IE electrical devices in and-out of containment, and changes terminal block connections to cable splices in and out of containment. This modification also changes out unqualified cable with qualified high temperature cable.

SUMMARY

I. No. The proposed modification enhances the affected devices' abilities !

to function properly and to mitigate the consequences of an accident.

Further, by virtually eliminating moisture intrusion and/or standing water from collecting in a device's electrical enclosure, this modificat"on reduces _the probability of equipment malfunction. The replacement of the terminal blocks with splices and the replacement of unqualified cable with qualified cable will also reduce the probability.

of equipment malfunction.

II. No, See Item I above.

III. No. See Item I above.

SER NO.: 85-011 CROSS

REFERENCE:

_PSPD Change for Device No. 2B141-074 DESCRIPTION OF CHANCE:

PMR 83-561 DES'CRIPTION OF CHANGE:

This PMR. relocates the Unit 1 HPCI and RCIC temperature elements TE51-1N025-A,B,C,D because they do not meet the redundancy and separation criteria of FSAR Subsection 7.6.la.4.3.3.2.4."

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SUMMARY

t.

1. No. Adding redundancy and' diversity will provide an extra safety margin to isolate steam lines should a leak occur.

1 II. No. The function of the leak detection system is not changed.

III. No. The basis of the Technical Specification does not discuss the location.of the leak detection temperature elements. This basis only discusses minimum operable channels, which will remain the same.

SER NO.: 85-015 CROSS

REFERENCE:

PMR 83-593, Rev 2 DESCRIPTION OF CHANCE:

This DCP eliminates physical interferences to perform IHSI on Unit 1 Recirculation System and RHR piping welds. The following actions will be

, performed: (a) remove 4 pipe whip restraints. (b) remove and replace 5 pipe whip restraints; (c) remove and replace 2 sections of Drywell Air Supply ducting; (d) remove a portion of a non-load bearing structural member; (e) remove and replace seismic and deadweight supports on the Recirculation and l RHR Systems; (f) remove and replace supports for small. diameter and cold pull

- piping to achieve the required clearance in the Reactor Recirculation, RHR,

Vessel Instrumentation and LRW Collection Systems.

SUMMARY

I. No. (a) These pipe whip restraints are not required per FSAR Figure

3.6-14; (b) Work on the required restraints will be performed in plant

) condition 4 or 5, and USNRC BTP MEB-3-1 does not require pipe whip

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protection in those systems with operating conditions greater than 200*F J or 275 PSIG; (c) The Drywell Air Supply Ducting provides no safety function; (d) This beam is a non-load bearing member; (e)&(f) These operations will occur during plant conditions where the affected systems are not required.

II. No. See Item I above.

' III. No. See Item I above.

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I SER No.: 85-016 - -l l

1 CROSS'

REFERENCE:

PMR 84-9038 DESCRIPTION OF CHANCE:

u Add a vent 1to the 18" DBD line near the Unit 1.feedwater flow element on the horizontal run on 729' elevation near HV-10603A,B,C.

SUMMARY

1.' No. .The change is being made to a non-safety related, non-quality related portion of the feedwater system, and has been designed to the requirements of ANSI B31.1 and is a non-functional change. 1 II. No. FSAR Subsections 15.2.7 and 15.2.8, analyze failures of the

_feedwater system. This modification does not affect these analyses and is.in-fact bounded by the Chapter 15 evaluations.

III. No.. The subject change is a non functional change to the feedwater.

system (a non-safety related system) and, therefore, does not affect the basis of any Technical Specification.

SER No.: 85-017.

CROSS

REFERENCE:

PMR 85-001 1

DESCRIPTION OF CHANCE:

l

' Change the FSL-B31-2N008A&B Recire Pump Motor Winding Cooling Water flow (Low) j Setpoints from 95 gpm to 90 gpm per GE FDDR No. KR2-10B.

1

SUMMARY

I. No. The flow instruments are non-safety related switches, on non-safety.

! related equipment. The sole function of these switches is annunciation on low' cooling water flow. In the event of failure of these switches other. alarms will annunciate; i.e., High Motor, Winding Temperature and

High Motor Winding Cooling Water Temperature.

i.

II. No. See Item I above.

III No. FSL-B31-2N008A&B are non-safety related. There is no Technical Specification for these switches.

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4 SER NOJ: 85-018 CROSS

REFERENCE:

SE 85-NL001 DESCRIPTION OF CHANCE:

The following actions will be performed in the course of Unit 1 IHSI implementation: .(a) Supply a temporary power feed to the IHSI equipment from load center IB250;.(b) Attach and remove IHSI heating coils and welded thermocouples to the subject pipe; (c) Operate the subject plant system in order to provide cooling water flow; (d) Energize the IHSI equipment and inductively heat the. subject pipe welds; (e) Removo and reinstall piping supports to facilitate' heating coil installation; and (f) Install a temporary loop in the Reactor. Recirculation System consisting of a temporary pump and temporary 4" hose. connection between the two cleanout flanges to provide cooling water flow for six specific IHSI welds.

SUMMARY

I. No. (a) The temporary power for the IHSI equipment is a Non-Q supply fed from Load' Center 1B250 which has available capacity to handle this load on a-continuous basis. (b) Thermocouples are welded via a capacitor discharge method and will not result in any throughwall penetration.

These will be removed at the completion of IHSI such that each systea will be returned to its design condition prior to the system being declared operable. . The attachment of the_ coils is by mechanical means only and has no. impact on the plant. (c) The system pump speeds and flow rates required for IHSI are less than the normal operating parameters addressed in the Technical Specifications for each system and do not violate the design analysis in Chapter 15 of the FSAR. (d) The effect of the IHSI process is to greatly improve the piping system's ability to resist IGSCC. The IHSI process is in the conservative direction from that previously evaluated. (e) Deadweight supports are being installed in accordance with 1REIR-100667, and satisfy design considerations to facilitate placing the system into service for the IHSI Process. Piping j

supports are being removed from the system under test and also adjacent

-systems during the IHSI process. Technical Specification Limiting l_ Conditions for Operation are being implemented for each effected system.

l All supports removed will be reinstalled per the design drawings. (f)

'_ The installation of the temporary loop in the Reactor Recirculation i System will be performed while the unit is defueled.

II. No. See-Item I-above.

- III. No. The IHSI process does not reduce the margin of safety as defined in the basis for any Technical Specification. The CS, RHR, and RWCU will be i operated under normal conditions during the IHSI process. The Reactor Recirculation System is not required to be operational while in Condition 4,5 or defueled. IHSI will be performed only while in Condition 4,5 or defueled. All equipment affected by this work will be returned to its operable status prior to achieving a plant condition where they would be required to mitigate a postulated accident.

SER No.: 85-019

' CROSS

REFERENCE:

PMR 85-3086

- DESCRIPTION OF CHANGE:

Add three time delay relays, one each in the A, B and C Feedwater Heater Hi-Hi-Hi Level isolation logic schemes.

SUMMARY

I. No. This modification significantly reduces the probability of isolation.

of each of the three feedwater heater strings after a unit trip due to

. . flashing in either the #1 or the #2 feedwater heaters. . Isolation of all three strings would shut off feedwater flow to the reactor after a unit trip and wound cause ECCS actuation.

II. No .' The time delay for the relay has been set based upon ASME and turbine vendor recommendations and observed level transient times.

' Consequently, no increase in the probability of main turbine damage similar to INPO significant event report #87-84 will occur.

i ' III. No. These instruments are non-Q and do not affect the normal operation of the unit. As such they do not form the basis for any Technical Specification.

2 1

SER NO: 85-020 CROSS

REFERENCE:

PMR 84-9008 DESCRIPTION OF CHANCE:

Provide indicating lights for Unit 2 RHR pump motor heaters while in service.

f

SUMMARY

- I. No. The heater circuits are Q-affiliated and do not perform a safety-related function. The proposed action does not violate any separation of

. isolation requirements. This change will allow for more positive j_ verification of heater' operation as required by OI-AD-016-9. FSAR Sections 3.12; 5.4.7; 7.1.2a.1.25 and 8.1.6 have been reviewed.and are l unaffected.

l II. No. See Item I above.

III. No. Technical Specification 3/4.4.9 has been reviewed. The motor heaters are not addressed in the Technical Specifications.

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w SER NO. :: 85-021

. CROSS

REFERENCE:

PMR 84-9009 .

5 DESCRIPTION OF CHANCE:

Provide'in'dicating. lights for core spray pumps motor heaters while in service.

SUMMARY

I.- No. The heater circuits'are Q-affilicated and do not perform a safety related function. The heater is only for equipment protection. The proposed action does not violate any separation / isolation requirements, and will allow for more positive verification of operation as required by OI-AD-016-9. FSAR Subsections 6.3.2.2.3, 7.3.1.12.1.5 and 8.1.6 have been reviewed and are unaffected.

- II. No. See Item I above.

1 III. No. Technical Specifications 3/4.3.3 and 3/4.5 have been reviewed. The motor heaters are not addressed in the Technical Specifications.

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SER NO.: 85-022, CROSS

REFERENCE:

PMR 85-3084 4 I DESCRIPTION OF CHANGE:

The existing steel rack used for mounting. Unit 1 EPA breakers 1CBS003A-A and ICBS003A-C does not provide compatible seismic mounting for Class IE equipment. ~This problem;is corrected by: - 1) relocating the breakers in the rack, and 2)- upgrading the stiffness of the rack structural ~ members.

SUMMARY

I. No.- This PMR increases reliability by conforming to required seismic criteria for.the EPA breakers, per FSAR Subsection 8.3.1.6. There will be no changes to the RPS Electrical Power Monitoring wiring scheme. To perform the structural repairs and equipment relocation, it will be r necessary to take the RPS M-G set "A" out of; service and operate on the alternate power supply source. This generates a half scram signal, which will be reset when switching to the alternate source.

I. II. No. The r'epairs will be done during a Unit I refueling outage when the possibility of a load surge on the electrical power system could not impact the performance of the alternate power supply source.

III. There is a possibility that while operating on the alternate power supply and M-G set "A" is still out of service, that one or both EPA's in the alternate supply could go out of service. This scenario is covered in Technical Specification 3.8.4.3 by stating that the power supply should be taken out of service (and operate with a half scram signal) until j- either M-G set "A" or the alternate power supply are operable.

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SER No.: 85-023 CROSS

REFERENCE:

PMR 85-3086, Rev. 1 DESCRIPTION OF CHANGE:

Add three time delay relays, one each in the A, B, and C feedwater heater Hi-Hi-Hi level isolation logic schemes. The delay will be 30 sec. +

tolerance.

SUMMARY

I. No. This modification reduces the probability of isolation of each feedwater heater string after a unit trip due to flashing in either the

1 or the #2 feedwater heaters. Isolation of all three feedwater heater strings would stop feedwater flow after a scram and would cause ECCS actuation.

This change affects the Recire Runback sequence in that, for a runback resulting from combined Reactor Water Low Level L3 and FWH level isolation, the associated FWH string won't isolate until 30 seconds later. This is more conservative than a Recirc runback concurrent with a FWH string isolation.

II. No. The time delay is based upon ASME and turbine vendor recommendations and observed level transient times. consequently no increase in the probability of main turbine damage will occur.

III. No. These non-Q instruments and do not affect normal operation. As such they do not form the basis for any Technical Specification.

SER NO.: 85-024 CROSS

REFERENCE:

PMR 85-3000 DESCRIPTION CF CHANGE:

Replace existing Unit 1 Reactor Mode Switch (CE PPD 163C1487G009) with new Reactor Mode Switch (GE PPD 188C8035C002).

SI'MMARY:

l I. No. The following actions will assure reliability of the replacement switch: (1) statically and dynamicelly test the switch after installation but prior to use, (2) verify make-before-break characteristics by dynamically testing at least once per cycle to detect any trend toward premature contact change and possibly the onset of a

" false" detent position, (3) the switch and switch area will be kept clean, consistent with good housekeeping practice, (4) the switch will be replaced every 20 years or anytime there are signs of excessive wear.

II. No. The new switch will increase reliability.

III. No. Replacement of the Mode Switch does not change the function or reduce the margin of safety as defined in the Technical Specifications.

SER NO.: 85-025 CROSS

REFERENCE:

PMR 83-592, Rev. 2 DESCRIPTION OF CHANGE:

Modify the ESW System to mitigate the effects of water hammer. This DCP adds vacuum breakers to the control structure chillers and Dx units; installs MOVs in the return line from the control structure chillers and Dx units; removes the motor operators from and installs manual operators on HV08613 A&B, and HV01101 A,B.C and D; adjusts the time delays; adds isolation valves to the fuel pool make-up and the supply and return to the Emergency Switchgear and Load Center room coolers (Unit I loop B only); adds a check valve to the supply line to the control structure chillers; and opens TV08612 A&B to the pond and opens HV08693 A&B to purge the air from the chiller piping. Also this DCP modifies the diesel cooler valve transfer scheme, such that on low ESW flow, only the df sel cooler valves are transferred, instead of tripping the "A" ESW pump.

SUMMARY

I. No. Electrical separation is maintained, fire protection concerns are met and there is no common mode single failure created by this DCP, II. No. New control structure chiller MOVs will functionally replace existing valves. Electrical separation is maintained for these valves and the MOVs on the Dx unit. The ESW pumps initially had manual operators, and this package returns them to that design. The two time delay changes adjust existing timers to maintain the design philosophy for those timers. The diesel valve transfer scheme allows more equipment

("A" ESW pump) to operate after an accident.

III. No. These changes are being made to ESW and RHRSW. The Bases for Technical Specification for these systems were reviewed and the margin of safety as defined therein is not reduced.

l l SER NO.: 85-026

, CROSS

REFERENCE:

PMR 85-3087 l

l DESCRIPTION OF CHANGE:

1 Modify the side rails on the Unit 1 Refueling Shield to cover the area from the refueling pool to the reactor vessel to prevent a dropped fuel bundle from falling into an unshielded area.

l l

SUMMARY

l I. No. The modification does not affect any FSAR Safety Analysis.

II. No. This modification has no effect on any safety related equipment.

l III. No. This modification does not affect any equipment covered by Technical l Specifications.

I \ . .

. SER NO.: 85-027 CROSS

REFERENCE:

PMR 83-335,'Rev 1-

-DESCRIPTION OF CHANCE:

1 Replace 50 -.480v circuit breakers' equipped with " magnetic only" trip units n

with circuit breakers containing both thermal and magnetic trip units.

SUMMARY

I. . =No. This PMR will increase the probability of detecting and isolating a 4180v arcing type short circuit inside containment. Sensitive short circuit detection, which coordinates with containment penetration assembly time-current characteristics, will be obtained. The new thermal-magnetic circuit breakers will trip before the load device fails catastrophically.

II. No. The proposed' action creates the possibility that several (1B219022, 1B236052, 1B237082, & IB229022) thermal-magnetic circuit breakers could trip and isolate the connected valve motor if the motor does not start

, when. voltage is applied. The subject possibility is acceptable because the thermal-magnetic. circuit breaker will trip only if the valve motor fails to stroke the valve and the valve remains stuck for at least three ;

j times as. long as the valve stroke time.

l III. No. The proposed action increases the margin of safety for the Technical Specification governing penetration overcurrent protection by_ increasing the probcbility of detecting and Isolating arcing short circuit currents.

^

SER NO.: 85-028 CROSS

REFERENCE:

PMR 83-408 DESCRIPTION OF CHANGE:

4 A low flow nuisance alarm is annunciated when a Unit 1 Condensate Demineralizer vessel is in the'off or standby modes because there is no flow

, through the vessel. In this condition the low-flow alarm is not necessary.-

This modification interlocks the low flow alarm with the demineralizer vessel mode selector switch.

SUMMARY

1. No. The condensate system as well as all plant annunciators are not safety related.

II. No. See Item I above.

III. No. The condensate demineralizer system and plant annunciators are not

~ included in the Technical Specifications.

SER NO.: 85-029 CROSS

REFERENCE:

PMR 84-3082 DESCRIPTION OF CHANGE:-

Modify the Unit 2 Reactor Building Process Sample Panel 2C210 by installing sample. connections downstream of existing shutoff valves in each of the following lines: RWCU influent and A&B effluents, CRD water, Reactor Recire, Fuel Pool Filter Demin effluent, and Fuel Pool Cooling Pump Discharge. This will allow the use of a portable metal products sampler.

SUMMARY

I. No. The sample connections are not safety related and will be part of a non-safety related system. Failure of a sample line would be covered by the FSAR Chapter 15 analysis, " Decrease in Reactor Coolant Inventory." A sample line break can be isolated by isolating the line affected by the failure.

II. No. Failure of the sample lines has been already evaluated in the FSAR.

III. No. The Process Sampling System is not safety related and is not discussed in the Technical Specifications.

I SER NO.: 85-030 CROSS

REFERENCE:

PMR 84-9011 DESCRIPTION OF CHANCE:

Provide demineralized water for chemical mixing in tanks OT-504, 505 & 506 by:

(a) removing clarified water piping to tanks; (b) running new SS piping to the tanks from demin line JCD-47; and (c) re-establishing clarified water connection to reactivator.

SUMMARY

I. No. Per FSAR Subsection 9.2.8.1, the raw water treatment system has no safety related function nor does it convey radioactive materials. Also, FSAR Subsection 9.2.9.3 states that the failure of the make-up demineralizer system will not compromise any safety related system or component.

II. No. The action does not change the relationship between the raw water

~ treatment and makeup demineralizer systems.

III. No.. The proposed modification does not affect any of the systems addressed in the Technical Specifications.

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SER NO.: 85-031 CROSS

REFERENCE:

PMR 84-9028 DESCRIPTION OF CHANGE:

Addition of mangates to the inner security fence at four locations.

SUMMARY

I. No. The security commitment. contained in the SSES security plan will not be lessened by this modification. The change only affects the security mangates and does not affect any plant equipment.

II. No. See Item I above.

.III. No. The security plan is not addressed in the Technical Specifications.

SER NO.: 85-032 CROSS

REFERENCE:

PMR 85-1003 DESCRIPTION OF CHANGE:

Redesign the GETARS extension bracket used on the Unit 2 HPCI Stop Valve.

SUMMARY

1. No. This nodification will prevent the GETARS extension bracket from working loose and damaging the HPCI stop valve. GETARS is only used for collecting data and is not addressed the FSAR.

II. No. See Item I above.

i III. No. See Item I above.

, _ . _ _ _ . __ ._ , . ~ ,

SER NO. : 85-033 CROSS

REFERENCE:

PMR 85-1004 2

DESCRIPTION OF CHANCE:

Replace the SPSV air' tubing and isolation valve to each Unit 1 CRD housing

SUMMARY

I. No. The proposed action permits better serviceability for any work at the HCUs which interface with instrument air. The modification has no effect on the scram operation of the CRD system. The modification will slightly lengthen reset time of the inlet / outlet scram valves due to reduced size of air supply tubing, however, this time will.be on.the order of milliseconds and is physically independent from the scram discharge volume vent and drain reset time and function.

II. No. See Item I above.

III. No. The proposed modification does not adversely affect.the probability of exceeding the shutdown margin, control rod insertion times, probability of a rod drop accident, scram discharge volume operability, HCU accumulator operability, control coupling integrity or position

, system operability.

SER NO.85-034 CROSS

REFERENCE:

PMR 85-032 DESCRIPTION OF CHANGE:

Increase the setpoint on Unit 1 PDIS-11698 Condensate Demineralizer Regenerator Skid Trap high differential pressure alarm from 5 to 10 paid. The

, trap differential pressure is between 5 and 10 psid during normal operations.

, This change will eliminate a nuisance alarm on control panel IC121.

4

SUMMARY

1. No. The proposed change is within the condensate demineralizer system, which has no safety related functions per FSAR Subsection 10.4.6.1.

II. No. The propcsed change is within a non-safety related system and cannot affect any safety related equipment.

III. No. Technical Specifications address the safety operability of systems

- and this change cannot affect any safety related systems.

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SER No. : :85-035 1

2

. CROSS

REFERENCE:

PMR 85-033 DESCRIPTION OF CHANGE:-

Increase the setpoint on Unit 2 PDIS-21698 Condensate Demineralizer Regenerator Skid Trap High differential. pressure alarm.from 5 to 10 paid.- The trap differential. pressure is between 5 and 10 psid daring normalLoperations;-

thus,tthe change will eliminate a nuisance alarm on control panel.2C121.

SUMMARY

,, I. No. The proposed change is within the Condensate Demineralizer System, which has no safety related functions per FSAR Subsection 10.4.6.1.

e LII. No. The proposed change is within a non-safety related system and cannot-affect any safety.related equipment. ,

III. No. Technical-Specification address the safety operability of systems and this change cannot affect any safety related systems.

, SER NO.: 85-036 CROSS

REFERENCE:

.PSPD 85-039,85-040 (RSCN 85-030,85-021)

-DESCRIPTION OF CHANGE

Apply settings to breakers to supply temporary power to IHSI process load during.the Unit 1 refueling outage.

a-

SUMMARY

l I

I. No...The breakers used are not safety related and have no effect on any safety syrc: ems. The settings are chosen to protect the cable servicing "

.the IHSI frequency charger unit as well as providing backup to the unit's internal power source breaker.

II. No. The proposed setpoints provide temporary power from existing non-IE equipment.

III. No. The breakers to be set are not associated with any safety related system; they are not addressed in the Technical Specifications.

i 1

i _ _ _ . . _ . _ _ _ ._.__________-_. _._ _ __.____ _ _ __

SER NO.: 85-037 CROSS

REFERENCE:

PMR 85-9000 DESCRIPTION OF CHANGE:

(1) -Panel.1C201A: (RCIC section only) Install an additional bolt in the support steel for the Bailey shelf unit.

(2) Panel 2C201A: (RCIC section only)- Install four bolts in the power supply support plate to secure it to the panel steel.

(3) Panel OC8/6A/B: (Common to both Units 1 & 2) Fabricate and install an additional support bracket for the Bailey rack units.

SUMMARY

I. No. There will be no physical disturbance, rewiring, or functional change to any active device as a result of this PMR. These corrective actions will be implemented to meet seismic design requirements.

II. No. See Item I above.

ITI. No. See Item I above.

SER NO.: 85-038 CROSS

REFERENCE:

Test Procedure TP-183-005, Rev. O DESCRIPTION OF CHANGE:

TP-183-005 will develop performance curves for the Unit 1 MSIV LCS inboard and outboard blowers by operating the blowers with the dilution air valves throttled to various positions in order to plot suction pressure versus flow.

These curves will be incorporated into the 18-month system logic surveillance test in place of vendor supplied curves.

SUMMARY

I. No. This procedure will allow development of accurate performance curves for the system blowers to assure compliance with the FSAR.

II. No. See Item I above.

III. No. The prerequisites for the procedure assure that the test will be performed under plant conditions which do not require the MSIV-LCS to be operable per Technical Specification 3.6.1.4.

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SER No.:'85-039

. CROSS

REFERENCE:

PMR 84-3043B DESCRIPTION OF CHANGE:

.An auxiliary relay actuated by the' lead Recirculation System fan motor: starter-coil or.a 100% closed limit switch contact from the damper associated with the

~1ead fan will start the standby fan when the lead fan fails. With this ..

modification, lead fan failure will be detected by the starting coil remaining de-energized or the fan damper remaining closed after a legitimate start signal has been received, and either event will start the backup fan providing <

a fan failure alarm on the main: control board.

SUMMARY

I. ~No. The recirculation system failure mode'and effect analysis which is described in.FSAR Table 6.5-4 is not affected by this action. There is no locs of safety function on a loss of one fan since the standby fan automatically starts and failure mode detection is provided.

II. No. See Item I above.

, III. No. The modification has no effect .cm the operability of SGTS, or its ability-to establish and maintain a vacuum in the reactor building.

SER NO: 85-040 CROSS'

REFERENCE:

PSPD 85-041 i

l. DESCRIPTION OF CHANGE:

Change the 'High' setpoint of the Unit 2 main turbineflube oil tank switch

'LSHL-21931 to eliminate a nuisance alarm. The original estimate of normal level was incorrect. Change the high setpoint from 64" to 68".

SUMMARY

I. No. The change affects only a high level switch and does not' interact or affect any safety related equipment.

II. No. See Item I abov..

III. No. .The main turbine lube oil tank is not defined in the basis for any

. Technical Specification.

l '.

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SER NO.: 85-041 CROSS

REFERENCE:

PMR 84-9020 DESCRIPTION OF CHANCE:

Relocate Unit I signal isolators B31-ATIA&B for Recircu!3 tion System scoop tube positioners from the extreme rear of cabinet IC612 to the front of IC612.

SUMMARY

I. _No. The modification is strictly a relocation with'no wiring separation or functional' changes and does not change the design. basis of the Reactor Recirculation System. .The new mounting details for the isolators meet seismic design criteria.

II. No. The proposed ~ action does not constitute a change in the

design / functional basis of the affected system.

l'

!. III. No. ~ See Item.II above.

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SER No.: 85-042 CROSS

REFERENCE:

PMR 85-1002 f

DESCRIPTION OF CHANGE:

This PMR removes the interlock between the primary coolant degasifier control i panel and the degasifier filter 0F373 outlet damper to allow the damper to close in.the-event of fire in the charcoal bed. It'also provides capability to manually operate the damper.

SUMMARY

1. No. This modification' reinstates the automatic closure of the OF373 outlet damper in the event of a fire in the charcoal bed. Therefore, the safety evaluation provided in FSAR Subsection 9.4.3.3 is not compromised.

II. No. See Item I above.

PMR 85-3020 u

DESCRIPTION OF CHANGE:

Install a permanent aluminum platform projecting from the Unit 2 Cooling Tower Basin wall out.into the Basin around a flowmeter (on a 24" blowdown line). .'

SUMMARY

-I. No. The Cooling Tower System is non-safety related.

II. No. Even if this new access platform were to collapse, it could not impact any existing safety related functions or equipment.

III. No. The Cooling Tower System is not safety related and not included in the Technical Specifications.

i SER NO.: 85-046 CROSS '

REFERENCE:

Test Procedure TP-169-005 DESCRIPTION OF CHANGE:

4 Test of Logic and Operability of Unit 1 Drywell Unidentified Leakage System Equipment.' Measured amounts of water will be drained into drywell sumps and pumped out/ measured under controlled conditions.

SUMMARY

I.- No. This procedure does not affect equipment which can affect any previously evaluated accident or malfunction considered in FSAR Chapter 15.

, II. No. This test procedure uses existing plant equipment or equipment installed utilizing approved plant procedures.

i III. No. This procedure is to be completed prior to leaving conditions 4 or 5

and has no effect on Technical Specifications applicable during these

,- . conditions.

J 4

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- SER NO. : 85-047 CROSS

REFERENCE:

Test Procedure TP-155-008 DESCRIPTION OF CHANGE:

FlushLthe Unit 1 CRD-Instrument Air System with Freon 113 to remove all contaminants. Visual cleanliness and dryness acceptance criteria are used to determine successful ~ flush of the piping.- .'

SUMMARY

I. jNo. The intent of the; procedure is to remove contamination which has previously conduced the failure of the scram pilot. solenoid valves and scram discharge volume vent and drain valves. Successful completion of the flush and air blow will ensure the operability of the CRD Instrument Air. piping.

II. No. The proposed' flush procedure is a one-time evolution which alters

'the system configuration only during a unit outage after which the system is restored to its' normal operating configuration.

4 III.'No. The proposed test will be performed when the CRD System is not

. required to be operable.

D

.. SER NO.: 85-048

! CROSS:

REFERENCE:

Test Procedure TP-164-005, Rev. 1; SE #85-NLOO3 i DESCRIPTION OF CHANGE: ,

J Operate Unit 1 Reactor Recirculation "A" Pump at a max flow rate of 17,000 GPM with vessel water level at 40 inches above instrument zero to provide flow fer IHSI.

SUMMARY

1 I. -No. The pump speed and flow rate required for IHSI are less than normal operating parameters and so do not violate the FSAR Chapter 15 analysis.

Design NPSH for the pump is to be maintained during the IHSI process by maintaining vessel water level at or above 40 inches minimum above

instrument .zero and maintaining flow rates less than 40% generator speed.

II . - No. The FSAR already addresses Reactor Recire pipe breaks that are more

severe than could result from the IHSI process.

III. No. No Technical Specification pertains to avoidance of jet pump or recire pump cavitation.

4 i

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SER-NO.: .85-049 CROSS

REFERENCE:

Maintenance Procedure MT-TY-007, Rev. O DESCRIPTION OF CHANGE:

Transfer a 28.7 ton load using a reactor building crane main hook through crane travel exclusion area " Zone B,"_over the west side of the refueling deck..

SUMMARY

I. No. Safety analysis SEA No. ME-041 analyzed the transfer over the west side of the floor and specified the. required measures to ensure the access platform stays over the floor. Those required measures are included in MT-TY-007.

II .~ No. See Item I above.

III. No. See Item I above.

SER NO.': 85-050 CROSS

REFERENCE:

Maintenance Procedure MT-TY-008, Rev. O DESCRIPTION OF CHANCE:

Transfer of 40.0 ton load using a reactor building crane main hook through travel exclusion area " Zone B," over the west side of the refueling deck.

SUMMARY

I. No. Safety analysis SEA No, ME-041 analyzed the transfer over the west side of the floor and specified the required measures to ensure the steam dryer stays over the floor. Those required measures are included in

MT-TY-008.

II. No. See Item I above.

! III. No. See Item I above.

)

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SER NO.: 85-051'

]

. CROSS

REFERENCE:

. Test. Procedure TP-062-012, Rev. O DESCRIPTION OF CHANCE:

This procedure sets the conditions necessary to support the moving of the Unit 1 Steam Dryer in accordance.with MT-TY-008. The steam dryer is highly radioactive and certain radiation detectors will trip. This procedure addresses the' actions required to allow Unit 2.to continue to operate while-the: dryer is being moved.

SUMMARY

I. No. All actions performed in the procedure are done to ensure that safety.related equipment is able to perform its intended function during the Steam Dryer movement.

1 II. No. All safety equipment assumed to operate in FSAR Chapter 15 will not i; be-prevented from performing their intended function.

III. No. This procedure will ensure the action statements associated with Technical Specifications 3.3.2.C, 3.3.7.1, 3.3.7.5 and 3.3.7.11 are implemented if the moving of the Steam Dryer will cause their associated LCOs to be entered.

SER NO.: 85-052 CROSS

REFERENCE:

PMR 83-812A 4

PMR 85-3099 DESCRIPTION OF CHANGE:

Ten strain gages will be installed on the Unit I steam dryer. Five rtrain gages will be placed in three areas where cracks were discovered on the dryer banks. Five strain gages will be located on the dryer support ring and the seismic blocks located at 94* and 184*. Tour accelerometers will be located on the dryer support ring.

SUMMARY

I. No. All steam dryer instrumentation will be recured to the steam dryer by being directly welded to the dryer or by being clamped to the steam dryer by welded clamps. All subcomponents of the instrumentation which form a portion of the reactor vessel pressure boundary have been constructed and tested to ASME Code Section III, Class I criteria. All out-of-vessel cabling is non-safety related and does not interface with any other plant systems.

II. No. See Item I above.

III. No. The proposed modification does not alter any plant system or component which is addressed in the Technical Specifications with the exception of the RPV. This modification's interface with the RPV has been constructed and tested to ASME Code Section III, Class I.

SER NO.: 85-056 '

CROSS

REFERENCE:

PMR 85-3016 DESCRIPTION OF CHANGE:

Add a 1". valve to allow testing the CO2 fire Protection systems with station air. Without this modification, CO must 2 be used which would pose a personnel safety hazard.

SUMMARY

I. No. The system being modified will still operate as before. Only the ability to test is being modified. No other system will be affected by this modification.

II. No. All normal operations of the CO2system are unaffected.

III. No. The operability of the CO 2systems remains unaffected by this modification.

SER NO.: 85-057 CROSS

REFERENCE:

PSPD 85-045 DESCRIPTION OF CHANGE:

Lower the Unit 1 Reactor Recirculation System Flow Instruments FISL-IN008A&B setpoints from 140 gpm to 90 gpm to accommodate the 20 gpm reset requirements af ter a trip (per FDDR-KR2-1013RI) . This change will allow reset within the normal system flow rates.

S_U_ MMARY:

I. No. This instrumentation is for recire pump motor protection and longevity. It provides the operator with information on motor winding parameters which if exceeded may require tripping of the motor for its protection and not for plant safety requirements.

II. No. See Item I above.

III. No. See Item I above.

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SER NO.: 85-058 CROSS

REFERENCE:

PSPD 85-046 DESCRIPTION OF CHANGE:

Lower the Unit 1 Reactor Recirculation pump motor instrument TRSH-lR6Cl-SWl4 setpoint from 110*F to 75'F.to conform to the requirements of FDDR-KR2-1013R1 to compensate for motor winding cooling water flow changes.

SUMMARY

I. No. This instrumentation is for recirc pump motor protection and.. !

longevity. It providen the operator with information on motor winding parameters which if exceeded may require tripping of the motor for its protection and not for plant safety requiremente.

II. No. See Item I above.

III. No. See Item I above.

J

, SER NO.: 85-059 CROSS

REFERENCE:

PSPD 85-047,85-048, 85-049 DESCRIPTION OF CHANCE:

Lower the setpoints for Zones I/III Supply Fan Suction Filter differential pressure at PDSLs 17569, 17590 and 27569 from 0.50" WG to 0.40" WG. These PDSL's detect low flow for the associated supply fans by monitoring DP across the outside air filters. New, clean filters yield about 0.50" WG DP., which is too near the low flow / low DP trip setpoint. This new setpoint will allow installation of new filters without tripping the supply fan (s), while still being able to detect true fan failure.

SUMMARY

I. No. This setpoint change affects non-Q equipment only. This change will make the normal HVAC equipment more reliable by ensuring reliable operation with clean filters.

II. No. FSAR Subsection 9.4.2.1.3 provides the safety evaluation for the Reactor Building HVAC system. This setpoint change has no impact on that evaluation.

III. No. Section 3/4.6.5.1 of the Technical Specifications addresses secondary containment isolation as a margin of safety and this setpoint change does not affect secondary containment.

fL i SER No.: 85-060 CROSS

REFERENCE:

PSPD 85-053 DESCRIPTION OF CHANCE:

' Increase the Unit 2. Reactor Recire pump motor cooling water temperature L

instrument TRSH-2R601-SWi4 setpoint from-56*F to 75*F to conform to the -

requirements of FDDR-KR2-1013R1 to be. compatible with the cooling water flow changes in the same FDDR.

SUMMARY

I. No. This irstrumentation is for recire pump motor protection and longevity. 'It provides the operator with information on motor winding parameters which if exceeded may require tripping of the motor for its protection and not for plant safety requirements.

II. No. See Item I above.

III. No.- See Item I above.

SER No.85-061 CROSS

REFERENCE:

PMR 82-0186 DESCRIPTION OF CHANCE:

The existing load sharing circuit component of the Unit 1 battery chargers 1D653A and 1D653B will be replaced by an improved version.

SUMMARY

I. No. With the existing load sharing circuit component, the battery chargers do not share the load proportionately. The replacement component will allov the battery chargers to share the load proportional to their output ratings.

II. No .- The proposed action does not change the rating of the equipment or the configuration of 250 VDC system.

III. No. The proposed action does not change the rating or capacity of the 250 VDC battery chargers 1D653A and 1D653B.

i s

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SER NO.: 85-062 CROSS

REFERENCE:

PMR 83-091 DESCRIPTION OF CHANGE:

Install pulsation dampers on the discharge lines:of OP311, OP303 Radwaste Filter / Filter Air pumps.

I I

SUMMARY

I. No. FSAR Chapters'12 and 15 have been reviewed. No safety related '

related equipment will be-affected by this installation or by failure of <

this equipment.

II. No. See Item I above.

t

-I. No. The proposed modification does not alter the design bases of the Reactor Feed Pumps or the Feedwater system.

II. No. A malfunction of the RFPs or transient resulting from the proposed modification would cause a decrease in reactor coolant inventory and/or loss of all'feedwater flow which are previoucly evaluated in FSAR Chapter 15.

III. No. Technical Specification 3.3.9 addresses Feedwater Turbine trip system actuation instrumentation with respect to the Reactor vessel high water level trip instrumentation only. The proposed modification does not affect that trip system.

t..

SER NO.: 85-070 CROSS

REFERENCE:

PSPD 85-052 DESCRIPTION OF CHANGE:

This setpoint change increases the high flow alarm on the Unit 1 A and B offgas subtrains from 45 to 70 SCFM. Testing has shown that indicated flow is higher than the actual offgas flow.

SUMMARY

I. No. This change does not alter offgas system operation. This change elements a nuisance alarm and allow the operator to have annunciation which provides him with meaningful information.

II. No. See Item I above.

III. No. This change will allow the operator to better guard against high effluent releases by knoaing when his offgas exceeds its high flow limit.

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~SER No.: 85-071 CROSS

REFERENCE:

PMR 83-592, Rev. 3 DESCRIPTION OF CHANCE:

Modification are made to the ESW System to mitigate the effects of water hammer. PMR 83-592 adds vacuum' breakers to the control structure chillers and

'Dx units; installs motor operated valves in the return line from-the control structure chillers and Dx units; increases the time delay _to activate flow switch FSLO8612A&B on the control structure chiller; removes the motor operator from and installs manual operators on HV08613A&B,.and HV01101A,B,C and 'D; adjusts the time delay on the bypass valve HV01222A&B; adjusts the time j ' delay on the diesel transfer from A loop to B loop upon-low flow in the A loop; adds isolation valves to the fuel pool make-up and the supply and return to the Emergency Switchgear and Load Center room coolers (Unit 1 loop B only);

adds a check valve to the supply line to the control structure chillers; and opens TV08612A&B.100% to the pond and. opens HV08693A&B to purge the air from the chiller piping. Also this DCP modifies the diesel cooler valve transfer scheme, such that on low ESW flow, only the diesel cooler valves are transferred, instead of tripping the "A" ESW pump.

SUMMARY

I.. No . . Electrical separation is maintained, fire protection concerns are

, met and there is no common mode single failure created by this DCP.

-II. No. The control structure chiller motor operated valves already exist

~

and the new ones will functionally replace.the existing valves.

. Electrical separation is maintained for these valves and the MOV's on the Dx unit. . The ESW pumps initially had manual operators, this package returns them to that design. The two time delay changes being made only adjust existing timers to-maintain the design philosophy for those timers. The diesel valve transfer scheme allows more equipment ("A" ESW pump) to operate after an accident.

III. No. These changes are being made to ESW and RHRSW. The basis for Technical Specification for these systems was reviewed and the margin of safety as defined therein is not reduce.

4 t

SER NO.: 85-072 CROSS

REFERENCE:

PMR 85-9002 DESCRIPTION OF CHANGE:

NCR 85-0147 documents that the drain line from Unit 1 Reactor Recire valve F031B was bent and is to be left in it's as found condition. Hanger SP-DCA-151-H2008 will be modified to support the F031B drain line at its new elevation.

SUMMARY

I. No.- The proposed modification will' support the piping system as design intended.

II. No. See Item I above.

III. No. The modification conforms to the specifications of the original design.

SER NO.: 85-073 CROSS

REFERENCE:

PSPD 85-064 DESCRIPTION OF CHANGE Change the Unit 1 Condensate Demineralizer sluice header flow annunciator low flow setpoint from 18 gpm to 64 gpm.

SUMMARY

I. No. There is no accident / malfunction associated with this switch addressed in FSAR.

II. No. This is a non-safety related switch in non-Q system, it provides annunciation only.

III. No. This switch is not involved in the basis for any Technical Specification.

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? SER NO.: 85-0741 ~ G 7

- CROSS

REFERENCE:

- NL-85-06 DESCRIPTION OF CHANGE: ,

= Revise the functional test acceptance criteria for safety related mechanical.

snubbers in Unit 1: .

( 1) Increase the maximum breakaway / drag-Force criterion

.from 1% to 4% of rated load for snubbers sizes 1/4 and 1/2, and increase from

~1% to 2% for snubber sizes.1,3,10,35, & 100; (2). increase the Activation Acceleration. criterion from 0.02g to 0.027g. The original criteria shall

remain in effect only for various special case snubbers.

SUMMARY

I.. No. Snubber operability at the higher breake.way/ drag force has been assured by the manufacturer's tests and experience. System function is assured by the generic ~ analysis at the higher breakaway / drag force levels which demonstrates that system. stresses are still within Code allowable limits. In addition, the increase in activation acceleration has been evaluated and shown to have no adverse effects. All special case snubbers are required to satisfy testing criteria which assures that they function to original design requirements.

II. No. The proposed increase in breakaway / drag force does not exceed the h E recommended linit necessary to assure snubber operability as stated by the manufacturer. In addition, the generic analysis demonstrates that-safety related systems utilizing snubbers will not be overstressed due to the higher breakaway / drag forces; hence, the system performance is equivalent to that which was originally evaluated.

III. No. 1The Technical Specifications require snubbers to be operable in order to ensure that the structural integrity of the reactor coolant system and all other safety related systems'is maintained during and

following a seismic cn other event initiating dynamic loading. Through

generic analysis and the manufacturer's input, it has been shown that the revised functional test acceptance criteria is acceptable for use as an indicator of operability for the general snubber population.

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SER NO: 85-075 CROSS

REFERENCE:

PMR 83-601 DESCRIPTION OF CHANGE:

Room 11-410 on Elevation 719'-1" of the Unit 2 Reactor Building will be modified to permit'the decontamination and rebuilding of CRDs removed during refueling ~ outages. A shielded section of the room will be used for storage of contaminated as well as clean, rebuilt CRDs during operation of the plant.

SUMMARY

I. No. None of the equipment being installed as related to safety. There are two safety related piping systems (unit cooler drain and ESW) and a safety related HVAC duct located in room II-410. The shield wall, hoist system, duct supports, and conduit supports will be seismically designed to eliminate any safety impact concerns. Likewise, the pipe supports for the mechanical services will be seismically designed in the areas around the safety related equipment. The change to door No. 428 does not adversely affect the FPRR analysis, since fire zone 2-4E does not contain safety related equipment.

II. No. See Item I above.

III. No. This modification will not adversely affect any safety related system covered by the Technical Specifications.

SER NO.: 85-076 CROSS

REFERENCE:

PMR 83-806 DESCRIPTION OF CHANCE:

Install an underground ductbank for DG "E" Building power supplies (non-seismic Caterary I) running south from existing manholes MH-038 and MH-039 to existing ductbank section under main plant entrance road.

SUMMARY

I. No. This additional underground ductbank and the existing ductbanks it ties into are not safety-related. Also, the area where this ductbank will be installed does not contain safety-related systems.

II. No. See Item I above.

4 III. No. Sea Item I above.

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- SER NO.: 85-077 CROSS REFEREUCE: PMR 84-3104-

- DESCRIPTION OF CHANGE: 4 4

Modify existing Unit 2 Emergency Switchgear Room Cooler pressure. controller

'PC-27203A(B) and associated circuits to set controller to auto mode (instead

- of manual mode) upon recovery of power after a loss of. power event.

SUMMARY

I.- No. .There is no change to the normal function of the controllers. The controllers are normally operated in the auto mode. This modification

+

will provide for the controllers to return to' auto mode upon power-recovery'after a loss of power event, but still allow operator-initiation

+

' of manual mode when desired, provided it-is not coincident with loss of

. power.

II. No. See Item I above.

III. No. This modification assures maintaining the pressure controller circuit in the auto mode upon recovery from loss of power. The function of the Energency Switchgear Room Cooling System and the ESW System are not affected by this mcdification.

SER NO.: 85-078 CROSS

REFERENCE:

PMR 85-1010 DESCRIPTION OF CHANGE:

Revise. SPOTMOS Thermal Printer Power Supply' Board (APP-48) as recommended by the manufacturer, DATEL.

SUMMARY

l I. No. This modification will alleviate a fuse-blowing anomaly.

II. No. Modification of the SPOTMOS printer power supply boards is in l accordance with the existing basis of the plant.

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! III. No. See Item II above, t-I.

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SER NO.: 83-079 CROSS

REFERENCE:

PMR 83-805 DESCRIPTION OF CHANGE:

(SAFEGUARDS INFORMATION)

_SENMARY:

I. No.

II. No, III. No.

SER No. : 85-080 CROSS

REFERENCE:

PMR 83-814C DESCRIPTION OF CHANGE:

Relocate 4 annunciator alarms on Panel OC653 (DG A through D, Room Flooded).

SUMMARY

I. No. The relocation of the annunciator windows is in non-safety related cabinets 1C664-E&F and ITC611-D.

II. No . , The proposed modification does not change the design criteria for any system,or function as described in the FSAR.

I. No. FSAR Chapter 11 specifies that vent stack effluent' samples are to be continuously extracted to monitor particulates, iodine and noble gases.

The proposed sample taps will ensure that grab samples can be taken continuously even if the existing system is not functional.

II. No. The addition of ventilation stack sample taps will not adversely affect the operation of any existing system. This change represents essentially _an instrumentation upgrade and does not change the design basis of the system.

III. No. Technical Specifications Table 3.3.7.11-1 specifies that a minimum of one monitoring channel must be operable all the time (continuously).

Otherwise, effluent release may continue up to 30 days provided samples are continuously collected. The proposed action will enable the taking of continuous grab samples when the single monitoring channel is inoperable.

SER NO.: 85-084 CROSS

REFERENCE:

PMR 85-1007 DESCRIPTION OF CHANGE:

Remove FDSL-10604A,B,C and SV-10604A,B,C to eliminate the 10% low travel limit on the Unit 1 RFP Min. Flow Valves. Recalibrate instrument loop components to optimize performance of the system in the " Auto" mode.

SUMMARY

I. No. The equipment is not safety related.

II. No. See Item I above.

III. No. See Item I above.

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SER NO.: =85-085 CROSS

REFERENCE:

PMR 85-1012 >

DESCRIPTION OF CHANCE:

~.'; z Remove FDSL-20604A,B,C and SV-20604A,B,C which prevent the Unit: 1 RFP recire.

Lyalves from modulating in the lower 10% of their travel range.

SUMMARY

I. No. The. equipment-is not safety related.

II. No. See Item I above.

III. No. See Item I:above.

SER NO.: 85-086 r

- CROSS

REFERENCE:

PMR 85-3094 DESCRIPTION OF CHANGE:

Unit 1 SPDS software will be modified t.s follows: (1) relabel 1 EPG curve; i (2) alter 4 curves in conservative direction due to recalculation; (3). alter 1 curve in non-conservative direction due to recalculation; (4) add I curve to an existing SPDS display; (5) delete one curve from an existing SPDS display; and (6) add a new SPDS display containing a new EPG curve.

i

SUMMARY

3 I. No. The modification to the SPDS EPG curve displays will not affect any FSAR analyses. A description of the refined calculational procedures, as well as Rev. 3 of the procedures guideline, were approved by the NRC with

letter LS05-83-11-045, dated November 1983.

II. No. SPDS is only a monitoring system and has no controlling processes.

i III. No. The modification to the SPDS EPG curves has no effect on any Technical Specification bases, setpoints, or margins, nor can it cause any adverse affect to any safety related systems.

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'SER No.: 85 LO87 CROSS

REFERENCE:

PMR 85-3095 DESCRIPTION OF CHANGE:

Unit'2 SPDS software will be modified as follows: (1) . relabel 1 EPG curve; (2) alter 4 curves in conservative direction due to recalculation; (3) alter 1 curve in non-conservative direction due to recalculation; (4) add 1 curve to an existing SPDS display; (5) delete one curve from an existing SPDS display; and (6) add a new SPDS display containing a new EPG curve.

SUMMARY

I. No. The modification to the SPDS EPG curve displays will not affect any FSAR analyses. A description of the refined calculational procedures, as well as Rev 3 of the procedures guideline, were approved by the NRC with letter LS05-83-11-045, dated November 1983.

II. No ._ SPDS is only a monitoring system and has no controlling processes.

III..No. The modifiestion to the SPDS EPG curves has no effect on any Technical Specification bases, setpoints, or margins nor can it cause any_

adverse affect to any safety related systems.

SER No.: 85-088 CROSS

REFERENCE:

PSPD 85-054,85-055, 85-056,85-057, 85-058,85-059, 85-060,85-061 DESCRIPTION OF CHANGE:

These PSPDs change the setpoints of the SGTS heater thermal' cutouts and the cooling mode initiation.

SUMMARY

I. No. The Relative Humidity or the air and the' temperature of the SGTS charcoal are critical to the adsorption of iodine. These PSPDs will ensure the temperature and relative humidity are maintait.ed below the point where the FSAR and Regulatory Guides state that charcoal would not perform most efficiently.

II. No. These changes do not alter the function of the equipment related to safety as previously evaluated in the FSAR.

III. No - These setpoint changes ensure the margin of safety is maintained as defined in the Technical Specifications and Regulatory Guide 1.52.

SER No.: 089 CROSS

REFERENCE:

PSPD 85-062 DESCRIPTION OF CHANGE:

Lower the setpoint of Unit 2 Condenser Area Cooling Fan Low DP to allow 2 fan operation during high temperature conditions in the ccndenser area.

SUMMARY

I. No. Condenser area cooling is not safety related and does not interface with any safety related equipment.

II. No. The proposed action will allow for more cooling when high temperatures occur in the condenser area.

III. No. The turbine building cooling system is not the basis for any Technical Specification.

+

SER NO.: 85-090 CROSS

REFERENCE:

PSPD 85-069 DESCRIPTION OF CHANGE:

Increase the setpoint of Unit 2 condenser area instruments TSH27441A.C to 120*F to eliminate nuisance alarms and auto-start of standby fans. New setpoint is consistent with Unit 1.

SUMMARY

1. No. The Turbine Building cooling system is not safety related. The proposed action will allow for system operation per design.

II. No. See Item 1 above.

III. No. The Turbine Building cooling system is not the basis for any Technical Specification.

(

1 i

SER No.~: 85-091 CROSS

REFERENCE:

Test Procedure TP-72-002 DESCRIPTION OF CHANCE:

Inject a helium / nitrogen mixture into the inlet of the Unit 1-Offgas HEPA Filter Housing to determine the actual Offgas flowrate.

SUMMARY

I. No. The Offgas system is not safety related. The helium / nitrogen mixture will be injected downstream of the hydrogen analyzers, so the analyzers will not see the helium as hydrogen.

II. No. ' Failure of the Offgas system has previously been evaluated.

III. No. The action will help improve future performance of the system.

SER NO.: 85-092 CROSS

REFERENCE:

Test Procedure TP-272-003 DESCRIPTION OF CHANGE:

Inject a helium / nitrogen mixture into the inlet of the Unit 2 Offgas HEPA Filter Housing to determine the actual Offgas flowrate.

SUMMARY

I. No. The Offgas system is not safety related. The helium / nitrogen mixture will be injected downstream of the hydrogen analyzers, so the analyzers will not see the helium as hydrogen.

II. No. Failure of the Offgas system has previously been evaluated.

III. No. The action will help improve future performance of the system.

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SER No.: 85-093

+

CROSS

REFERENCE:

PMR 85-1011

- DESCRIPTION OF CHANCE:

Revise Unit 2 SPOTMOS' Thermal Printer Power Supply Board (APP-48)'as recommended.by.the manufacturer, DATEL.

SUMMARY

1 I. No. This modification alleviates a fuse-blowing anomaly.- 1 l

II. No. This modification is in accordance with the existing b.i. sis of the I I

plant.

P III. No. See Item I.above. l

$ SER NO.: 85-094 l

CROSS

REFERENCE:

140t 85-3093 l

, DESCRIPTION OF CHANGE:

The diesel generator governor oil coolers are presently cooled with ESW, which has led to erratic diesel starting due to seasonal ESW temperature variations.

To enhance diesel reliability, engine jacket water will be supplied as the coolant to the governor oil coolers, since it maintains a more constant temperaturc. I l l

SUMMARY

I. No. This modification will enhance diesel starting reliability. No

common mode failures will be introduced,'since each governor oil cooler j will be connected to its own jacket water system. The new cooling water ;

tubing will be seismically installed.

)

. II. No. See Item I above.

l Technical Specification bases for the diesel generators and ESW have III. No.

been reviewed. This change will not affect these bases.

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SER No.: 095' CROSS

REFERENCE:

PSPD 85-078,85-079, 85-080,'85-081 DESCRIPTION OF CHANGES These setpoint changes will increase the trip setting for the overexcitation relay'(device 76) at each diesel generator to minimize the chance of

.overexcitation trips-while the diesels are in test.

4

SUMMARY

- I. No. The' trip function of the overexcitation relay is blocked in the emergency mode. -Setpoint changes on theses relays will not alter the diesel generators' response to an accident condition.

II. No.- See Item I above.

s - III. No. See Item I above.

i SER NO. : 85-096 CROSS

REFERENCE:

- Test Procedure TP-255-001 DESCRIPTION OF CHANCE:

Run the Unit 2 A CRD pump with the discharge valves closed to determine the pump's shut-off head.

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SUMMARY

i I. No. The B CRD pump will be in operation at all times during this test of

.the A pump. Therefore, the CRD System will be in a normal configuration at all times. The proposed procedure will not cause a decrease in reactor core coolant temperature, reactor core coolant flow rate or j reactor coolant inventory; nor will it cause an increase in reactor I- pressure or reactor coolant inventory.

i II. No. The proposen action does not adversely impact Primary Containment, Secondary Containment, Control Room Habitability, Pipe Break Analysis or Instrument Response Time.

III. No. The CRD pumps are not required to maintain: Minimum Shutdown Margin, control rod insertion times or the limitation of a rod drop l accident. The pumps have no effect on any other subsystem than those of

the CRD System.

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T SER NO.: 85-097 CROSS

REFERENCE:

PMR 83-806B DESCRIPTION OF CHANGE:

Install and terminate 15 kV Non-Class IE cables (for 13.8 kV service) in underground ductbanks between new splices in manholes MH-038, MH-039, and the following equipment located in the DG-E Facility: (a) 13.2 kV/480V Outdoor Power Transformer Fused Disconnect Switch OS555 (Powered from Bus 10), and (b) 13.2 kV/480V Outdoor Power Transformer Fused Disconnect Switch OS556 (Powered from Bus 20).

SUMMARY

I. No. These 15 kV cables and the existing cables they will be spliced to are not safety related. Also, the installation of these cables is in conformance with existing plant separation requirements.

II. No. See Item I above.

III. No. See Item I above.

SER NO.: 85-098 CROSS

REFERENCE:

PMR 84-3015 DESCRIPTION OF CHANGE:

The modification replaces the existing diesel generator electro-mechanical voltage relays, Westinghouse type "SV", which are frequency sensitive and have a tendency to misoperate during manual (test position) diesel starts, with new solid state voltage relays, ITE type "59D". In addition, the existing overvoltage timing relays, Westinghouse type "TD-5", shall be removed.

SUMMARY

1. No. System design and function as previously evaluated in FSAR Chapter 8 is not altered by this modification.

II. No. See Item I above.

III. No. This modification does not degrade the performance of any engineered safety feature required by the Technical Specifications.

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i SER NO.: 85-099 CROSS

REFERENCE:

1-PMR 84-3122A

~

- DESCRIPTION 0F CHANCE:

Modify labels, annunciator engravings, and meter scales on Unit 2 control

. boards 2C-601,'2C-651, 2C-652 and 2C-688, to correct Human Engineering Discrepancies.

SUMMARY

I. No. There is no change to the existing function of any components. This-modification is in accordance with NRC recommendations per NUREG 0700 recommendations.

II. No. The modification provides a consistent and uniform identification of controls, annunciators and meter displays, which reduces the likelihood of misinterpretation. The modification does not alter the original function of any equipment.

III. No. The function of any equipment for which these labeling changes are made is not affected by this modification.

SER NO.: 85-100 CROSS

REFERENCE:

.PMR 84-3122B DESCRIPTION OF CHANCE:

Implement modifications to Unit 2 to correct certain specific Human Engineering Discrepancies: (1) labeling / demarcation technique for lift pump status lighta & control switch on 2C651 to enhance their control / display relationship,'(2) scale modification on recorders 24201A/B on 2C601 to improve legibility and' readability, (3) the addition of legends to unlabeled

mimics on 2C601 and (4) the addition of guards to prevent inadvertent

actuation of control on the TIP panel, t-1

SUMMARY

I. No. There is no change to the existing function of any of the components addressed in this task. The proposed modification provides consistent and clearer information to the operator for Items 1, 2 and 3 and prevents

inadvertent operation of the controls on the TIP panel (Item 4). This modification is in accordance with NUREG 0700.

II. No. The modification reduces the likelihood of misinterpretation, misoperation or inadvertent action. The modification does not alter the original function of any equipment.

III.'No. The function of equipment to which these changes are made is not affected by this modification.

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[ SER'NO.: 85-101 CROSS

REFERENCE:

PMR 84-3131 DESCRIPTION OF CHANGE:

Disconnect Unit 1 SPDS cable from existing' interconnections to SRM drive "out"'

position indicator circuitry and reconnect to adjacent SRM drive "in" position indicator circuit terminal point's within IC651-06C. This corrects present SRM (A to D) position inputs.-

SUMMARY

I. No. Proposed change is limited to non-safety-related systems and their

' associated interface boundaries.

II._ No Proposed action does change previously established SPDS design interface with~SRM drive position indicator circuitry, but only revises the necessary interconnections to obtain appropriate SPDS monitoring inputs.

III. No. The Technical Specifications do not address or define bases for SPDS. Proposed reconfiguration of SPDS interface interconnections does not reduce the availability or operability of the Source Range Monitor System.

SER NO.: 85-102 CROSS

REFERENCE:

PMR 84-3132 DESCRIPTION OF CHANCE:

Disconnect Unit 2 SPDS cable from existing interconnections to SRM drive "out" position indicator circuitry and reconnect to adjacent SRM drive "in" position indicator circuit terminal points within 2C651-06C. This corrects present SRM (A to D) position inputs.

SUMMARY

I. No. Proposed change is limited to non-safety-related systems and their associated interface boundaries.

II. No Proposed action does change previously established SPDS design interface with SRM drive position indicator circuitry, but only revises the necessary interconnections to obtain appropriate SPDS monitoring inputs.

III.'No. The Technical Specifications do not address or define bases for SPDS. Proposed reconfiguration of SPDS interface interconnections does not reduce the availability or operability of the Source Range Monitor System.

SER NO.: 85-103:

CROSS

REFERENCE:

PMR 85-1013

DESCRIPTION OF CHANGE:

Increase flow output of Unit 1 Drywell Sump Pumps by increasing bore of

. orifices.

SUMMARY

I. No. This modification does'not change any process or active component.

II. No. The orifice modified by the subject PMR is entirely contained within a pressure boundary previously established.

III. No. No Technical Specifications are affected by this modification.

SER No.: 85-104

. CROSS

REFERENCE:

PMR 85-3100A DESCRIPTION OF CHANGE:

This DCP implements the mechanical portion-of the Alternate Rod Injection (ARI) design required by 10CFR50.62.C.3. This modification will install CRD system scram air header block and vent valves and isolation hand valves which will not affect the CRD system scram function until the control valves are activated by the completion of DCP 85-3100B. When the ARI design is completed and fully implemented by DCP 85-3100B, these. hand valves will all change position.

SUMMARY

1. No. This design change will not affect normal CRD operation or its scram action. Only when the ARI system is completely installed under a separate DCP will this modification have any effect on Unit 1 operation.

II. No. This design change creates no new system operating modes or system configurations. This modification will interface with the operating CRD system only through passive isolation hand valves; no active system components or functions'are affected.

III. No. This modification produces no active functional change in any system. Therefore, it does not affect any Technical Specification basis,

SER NO.: 85-105 CROSS

REFERENCE:

PSPD to PSV-05916 DESCRIPTION OF CHANGE:

The N,, Purge' system is designed for 90 psi and' protected by PSV-05916, which is set for 100 psi. This PSPD lowers the setpoint to 75 psi.

SUMMARY

I. No. The proposed action will protect the section of N P"#8* 1i"*

2 between the ILRT pressurizing skid and FV-05721 from overpressure.

II. No. The change is conservative.

III. No. The margin of safety is increased.

SER No. : 85-106 CROSS

REFERENCE:

RSCN 83-809Q, 83-810Q, 83-811Q, 83-812Q DESCRIPTION OF CHANGE:

These setpoint changes will increase the trip setting for the overexcitation relay at each dieral generator to minimize the chance of overexcitation trips while the diesels are in test.

SUMMARY

1. No. The overexcitation relay trip function is blocked when the diesci is in the emergency mode.

II. No. The trip function of the overexcitation relay is blocked in the emergency mode. Setpoint changes on theses relays will not alter the diesel generator's response to an accident condition.

III. No. The diesel generator overexcitation relays are not addressed in the Technical Specifications.

SER NO.: 85-107 CROSS

REFERENCE:

PMR 83-449 DESCRIPTION OF CHANGE:

Replace existing RHR throttling valves 24 inch 251F017A&B during a Unit 2' outage because of vibration and failure during operation in the shutdown cooling mode. The new valves will be 20 inch cage / drag type valve designed for. throttling application.

SUMMARY

I. No. These new RHR valves will be designed for the dynamic effects of throttling service and therefore decrease the vibration problems experienced with the existing valves. To provide clearance for the new valves, alternate fuel pool cooling line HBC-217 will be rerouted. The rerouted line will have no impact on the operation of the system. To gain valve access, doors 204 & 206 may be temporarily removed. Temporary doors may be installed to assure the requirements of FSAR Section 3.6A are met.

II. No. See Item I above.

III. No. See Item I above.

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SER NO.:'~85-108 CROSS'

REFERENCE:

PMR 84-3092C, Rev. O DESCRIPTION OF CHANGE ~

c Under this DCP, a new motor operated valve will be installed in each Spray Pond spray array drain line to isolate the spray arrays from the drain pumps.

The:new drain valves (HV-01201 A1,'A2, B1 and B2) will be. interlocked with the drain pumps and the riser level instrumentation to allow automatic prepdown'of the spray risers. A high riser level signal produced in a given array will open the appropriate drain valve. An interlock will prevent automatic

~

4 pumpdown when the spray array isolation valves are not 100% closed.

SUMMARY

- I. No. Neither the drain pumps nor the level detection system are safety related since these systems are used only to maintain the spray arrays in l an operable condition. The drain valves will be designed to ASME Section III Class 2 and are Seismic Category I. The motor operators will be Class 1E and are to be powered from existing Class 1E motor control

, . centers OB517 and OB527 in the ESSW pumphouse. Proper separation between Class 1E and non-Class 1E circuits will be provided.

, The proposed modification will allow automatic pumpdown of the spray arrays, thereby providing protection against freezing. This decreases I the dependency on operators and thus contributes to safety. This modification does not jeopardize the capability of the spray arrays, ESW, or RHRSW to perform their safety functions.

II. No. The proposed action does not alter the function or operation of any safety related systems. This DCP does not compromise separation criteria nor does it allow a single failure to prevent any safety related systems from performinF their safety functions.

III. No. This modification does not affect the ability of the Spray Pond, ESW 4

or RHRSW to provide sufficient cooling nor does it affect the redundancy i of these systems.-

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SER N0;: . 85-1G9 J

CROSS

REFERENCE:

PMR 85-3101A DESCRIPTION OF CHANCE:

~

This DCP implements-the mechanical portion of the Alternate Red Injection (ARI) design required by 10CFR50.62.C.3.. This modification will install CRD -

system scram air header block and vent valves and isolation hand valves which will not affect the CRD system scram function until the control valves are activated by the completion of DCP 85-3101B.. When the ARI design is completed and fully implemented by DCP 85-3101B, these hand valves will all change position..

~ SUmfARY:

l I. No. This design change will not affect the normal CRD operation or its scram action. Only when the ARI system is completely installed under a separate DCP will this modification-have any effect on Unit 1 operation.

II. No. This design change creates no new system operating modes or system configurations. This modification will interface with the operating CRD system only through passive. isolation hand valves; no active system-components or functions are affected.

III. No. This modification produces no active' functional change in any i system. Therefore.-it does not affect any Technical Specification..

i SER No.: 85-110 CROSS

REFERENCE:

Plant Engineering Procedure PE-100-003, Rev. 1, and j Surveillance Engineering Procedure SE-100-003, Rev. O.

DESCRIPTION'0F CHANGE:

Because the FSAR requirement to drain and vent the RBCW system outside the

containment cannot be met due to leaking system valves, the system will be '

, left filled for the ILRT and the prescribed penalty added to ILRT results.

SUMMARY

i I. No. The RBCW system will be in its normal operating alignment. The ,

plant will be in Condition 4. The combined leakage for all RBCb

penetrations is 2340 SCCM - well within acceptable limits.

II. No. The RBCW will be able to provide designed cooling since it will not

, be drained.

i III. No. See Items I & II above.

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e SER NO.: 85-111

- CROSS

REFERENCE:

PMR 85-3027

- DESCRIPTION OF CHANGE:

- Add air capacity tanks with associated valving and tubing to the Unit 2 FW heater dump valves LV-20306A, B & C to enable the valves to open and remain in the open position upon loss of air. In addition, add additional holes to the condenser sparger to reduce the system back pressure to a level which allows design flow to pass through the control valve.

SUMMARY

I. No. The affected valves and the sparger are non-safety related and are not required for safe shutdown of the plant. Further, all engineering has been performed in accordance with applicable plant design criteria to assure that the required installation will not impact safety related systems.

II. No.. Design of the proposed change is in accordance with the existing design basis of the plant as described in FSAR Subsection 10.4.10.2. The addition of the volume tanks and the sparger modificaticn will permit the FW heater No. 2 dump valve to perform according to the FSAR.

III. No. This change does not reduce the operability of any equipment nor require surveillance to ensure plant safety.

SER NO._: 85-112 CROSS

REFERENCE:

PMR 85-3123 DESCRIPTION OF CHANGE:

Increase the horsepower rating of the motor operator for Unit 1 Main Steam System Valve HV-B21-1F019 from 0.5 Hp to 1.083 Hp to meet LLRT requirements.

SUMMARY

I. No. The modified motor / valve combination meets the original design i criteria.

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RII. No. See Item I above.

III. No. See Item I above.

4 A

SER NO.: 85-113 CROSS

REFERENCE:

Reactor Engineering Procedure RE-0TP-050 DESCRIPTION OF CHANCE:

Record data at criticality with the moderator temperature at various points

'during reactor heatup. This will allow a more accurate evaluation of the Moderator Temperature Reactivity Coefficient.

SUMMARY

I. No. The reactor will be brought to criticality, per the established startup procedures, G0-100(200)-002. All safety systems required by Technical Specifications will be operable. This procedure limits the reactor period to be greater than or equal to 30 seconds, which is the same limitation as the startup procedure.

II. No. See Item I above.

III. No. All required neutron monitoring instrumentation systems will be operable for each criticality.

SER NO.: 85-114 CROSS

- _ . , . . . _ _ _ _ , _ _ - ,,4 _ _ - ,_, . , ..._ _ _ . , , _ _ _ _ , . _ _ _ . _ _ , _ . . ~ . . ________._- _ ,.

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SER NO.: 85-117 CROSS

REFERENCE:

PMR 83-746 ,

DESCRIPTION ~OF CHANGE:

This The N2DCP deletes is makeup-line the tie between rerouted to provithe N,de a penetration to Both the drywellMakeu and suppression pool and provide two divisionalized bidirectional isolation valves for each penetration. Each valve is to be operated by a dedicated switch on the main control board and intertied with Div. I & II containment-isolation signals. This modification also deletes the "R" (SGTS Exhaust High Radiation) isolation signal from the containment atmosphere sample return inboard isolation valves. In addition, because of qualification and pressure boundary problems, PSH-15711 drywell pressure switch is to;be removed and high drywell pressure switch PSHL-15728 used in its place.

SUMMARY

I. No. The addition of the N2makeup line design is compatible with the FSAR requirements. All engineering has been performed in accordance with plant design criteria. The ILRT has been performed and a penalty will be included for the added N9 makeup lines to the containment penetration.

Bypass leakage effects discussed in FSAR Subsections 6.2.3 and 6.2.1.1.5 remain unchanged by this proposed action.

II. No. See Item I above.

III. No. No changes are being made to any plant equipment by this design that will result in any adverse effects on any safety related systems.

t

m-SER NO.: 85-118 !

. CROSS

REFERENCE:

PMR 84-3092C, Rev. 1

~ DESCRIPTION OF CHANGE Under this DCP, a new motor operated valve will be installed in each Spray Pond spray array. drain line to isolate the spray arrays from-the drain pumps.

The new drain valves (HV-01201 Al, A2, B1 and B2) will be interlocked with the

drain pumps and the riser level signal produced in a'given array will'open-the appropriate drain valve. An interlock will prevent automatic pumpdown when the spray array isolation valves are not 100% closed. During the warmer months, when the drain system is not required, the automatic drain system can-be deactivated.,

SUMMARY

I. No. Neither the drain pumps nor the level detection system are. safety related since these systems are used only to maintain the spray arrays in an operable condition. The drain valves provide a boundary between the ASME section III RHRSW/ESW piping and the non-quality drain pumps and are safety,related.

, The proposed modification will allow automatic pumpdewn of the spray ,

?

arrays, thereby providing protection egainst freezing. This decreases the dependency on operators and thus contributes to safety. This l modification does not jeopardize the capability of the spray arrays, ESW, or RHRSW to perform their safety functions.

~

II . - No. _The proposed action does not_ alter the function or operation.of any safety related systems. This DCP'does'not compromise separation criteria nor does it allow a single failure to prevent any safety related systems

'from performing their safety functions.

SUMMARY

I. 'No. The only safety related items in the area pertain to the RPS. As per FSAR Subsection 7.2.1.1.2, RPS circuits located within the Turbine Building do not have to meet seismic design. criteria. Therefore, safety impact is.not a concern.

II. 'No. See Item I above.

III. No. Turbine Building Main Stop Valve Platforms are not addressed in the Technical Specifications.

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SER NO.: 85-125

. CROSS

REFERENCE:

PMR 85-3119 DESCRIPTION ~0F CHANCE:

Construct permanent platforms between the Unit 2 Control Valves in the Turbine Building.

SUMMARY

~I .~ , No. The only safety related items in the area pertain to the RPS. As per FSAR Subsection 7.2.1.1.2, RPS circuits located within the Turbine Building do not have to meet seismic design criteria. Therefore, safety impact is not a concern.

LII._ No. See Item I above.

III. No. Turbine Building Control Valve platforms are not addressed in the Technical Specifications.

SER NO.: 85-126 CROSS

REFERENCE:

PMR.85-3120 DESCRIPTION OF CHANGE:

! Construct ladders to access the roofs of the moisture separator enclosures

. (elevation 756'-6") from the Turbine Deck (elevation 729'-0").

SUMMARY

I. No. The two ladders of concern are non-Quality related. Safety impact is not possible.

II. No. See Item I above.

III. No. Ladders in the Turbine Building are not addressed in the Technical Specifications.

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SER No.: 85-127 CROSS

REFERENCE:

Test' Procedure TP-155-009 t ?

DESCRIPTION OF-CHANCE:

Run the Unit 1 A CRD pump with theLdischarge valves closed to determine the pumps's shut-off head.

L -

SUMMARY

1. =No. 'The B CRD pump will be in operation at all times during this test on the A pump. Therefore the CRD System will be in a normal _ configuration at all times. The proposed procedure will not cause a decrease in:

reactor core coolant temperature, reactor core coolant flow rate or p

reactor coolant inventory; nor will it cause an increase in reactor-b pressure or reactor coolant inventory.

II. No. The proposed action does not adversely impact primary containment, secondary containment, control room habitability, pipe break analysis or instrument response time.

. III. No. The "RD pumps are not required'to maintain: Minimum Shutdown Margin, e. trol ~ rod insertion times or the limitation of a rod drop accidett. The pumps have no effect on and other subsystem or components other than those of the CRD System.

SER NO.: 85-128 CROSS

REFERENCE:

PSPD 85-102,85-103, 85-104,85-105 DESCRIPTION OF CHANGE:-

Change the setpoints on the following instruments: devices TDSHL 07811A&B, l change setpoint to 5'F from 10*F;.and devices 62TDSHLX07811A&B, change setpoint to 14 minutes from 4 minutes.

l-

1. No . - (1) Additicnal equipment will be Class IE and qualified in accordance with applicable Codes, Standards and Regulatory Guides. (2)

Modifications to existing Class 1E equipment will be such that they will not affect the safety-related functions of this equipment. (3) All additional conduit raceways and modifications to existing raceways will

+

be. seismically supported. (4) The effects of. penetrations and new

, equipment loads on the integrity of the existing D.G. Building have been evaluated and do not degrade the ability of the structure to perform all of its safety functions. (5) Installation of all cables / conduit and modifications to existing cables / conduits are in accordance with FSAR separation requirements. (6) The proposed transfer scheme is designed so th'at no creditable event (i.e., operator error) could cause two or more existing D.G. channels to be electrically tied together. (7) When D.C. "E" uses loop B ESW for testing, the potential exists that the loop B system, if called upon, will have insufficient capacity for the four

'in-service diesels if LOCA or LOOP or Loop A failure occurs during test.

To ensure that the in-service diesels receive the required ESW supply, should the need arise, the ESW valves for Diesel "E" will be automatically closed and Diesel "E" will be tripped. Also, the ESW valves for Diesel "E" are powered from dC to ensure a reliable power supply.

II. No. The basic Standby Diesel Generator power distribution and control / instrumentation design has not been changed.

III. No. The addition of Diesel Generator "E" increases the margin of safety; 4 also, D.C. "E" will be tested periodically in accordance with the Technical Specifications in order to establish its readiness to replace any of the existing diesels.

I

JSER NO.: 85-1321

. CROSS

REFERENCE:

PMR 84-3088 DESCRIPTION OF CHANCE:

Modify the. control logic for Unit 1 RHR heat exchanger outlet valves HV-E11-1F003A&B to allow throttling at intermediate valve positions.

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SUMMARY

I.. No. Failure of the control logic could cause the valve to fail full open, full closed or to any intermediate position. FSAR Subsections 15.1.6 and 15.2.9 evaluate the two worst case single failures of the RHR t system. Any failure of components from this modification would be-beunded by these analyes.

II. .No. See Item I above.

III. No. Any failure as a result of this modification would still allow manual control of the RHR heat exchanger outlet valve. The system operation would not be affected.

i SER No.: 85-133 CROSS

REFERENCE:

PMR 84-3089 JDESCRIPTION OF CHANGE:

Modify the control-logic for Unit 2 RHR heat exchanger outlet valves HV-E11-2F003A&B tx) allow throttling at intermediate valve positions.

SUMMARY

I. No. Failure of the control logic could carse the valve to fail full open, full closed or to any intermediate position. FSAR Subsections 15.1.6 and 15.2.9 evaluate the two worst case single failures of the RHR system. Any failure of components from this modification would be bounded by.these analyes.

{ 'II. No. ~See Item I above.

III. No. Any failure as a result of this modification would still allow manual control of the heat exchanger outlet valve. The system operation

, would not be affected.

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- SER NO.: 85-134 3 CROSS

REFERENCE:

PMR 84-9020 DESCRIPTION OF CHANGE:

Relocate the Unit 1 Reactor Recibculation System signal isolators B31-ATIA&B for scoop tube positioners from the extreme rear of cabinet IC612 to the front of IC612.

SUMMARY

I.. No. This is strictly a relocation activity with no wiring separation or functional changes and does not change the design basis of the Reactor Recirculation System. The new mounting details are acceptable from a seismic standpoint.

II. No. The proposed action does not constitute a change in the design / functional basis of the affected' system.

III. No. See Item II, above.

SER No.: 85-135 CROSS

REFERENCE:

PMR 84-9021 l DESCRIPTION OF CHANGE:

Relocate the Unit 2 Reactor Recirculation System signal isolators B31-ATIA&E for scoop tube positioners from the extreme rear of cabinet 2C612 to the front of 2C612.

SUMMARY

I. No. This is strictly a relocation activity with no wiring separation or functional changes and does not change the design basis of the Reactor Recirculation System. The new mounting details are acceptable from a seismic standpoint.

II. No. The proposed action does not constitute a change in the design / functional basis of the affected system.

III. No. See Item II, above.

l

' SER NO: 85-136 CROSS

REFERENCE:

PNR 85-3003A

- DESCRIPTION OF CHANCE:

. Reactor Building recirculation system ducting connecting recirculation plenums

~to various zones of reactor building do not have sufficient balancing dampers .

Install balancing dampers in duct connections for the following: Unit 1-Zone III filtered exhaust, fans IV217A&B; Unit 2-Zone III filtered exhaust, fans 2V217A&B; Unit 2-Zone II supply, fans 2V202A&B; Unit 2-Zone II exhaust, fans 2V205A&B; Unit 2-Zone II filtered exhaust, fans 2V206A&B; and Unit 2-Zone III exhaust, fans 2V213A&B.

SUMMARY

I. No. The proposed action will help achieve better mixing of secondary containment following an accident.

II. No. See Item I, above.

III. No. Teahnical Specification 3/4.6.5 defines the basis for the secondary containment. Proposed action does not alter this or any other basis for the Technical Specifications.

SER NO.: 85-137 CROSS

REFERENCE:

PMR 85-3022 DESCRIPTION OF CHANGE:

Present design of-the Unit 2 Condensate Demineralizer Trouble alarm creates a nuisance alarm in the control room. The alarm is annunciated when a local alarm occurs'on Panel 2C121. This modification will require the installation of a relay in Panel 2C121 so that, when the~ alarm is acknowledged locally, the control room alarm will receive a return to normal signal.

SUMMARY

1. No. This modification alleviates a nuisance slarm in the main control room. The condensate system is designated non-safety related.

II. No. See Item I, above.

III. No. The condensate demineralizer system and associated plant annunciator are not discussed in the Technical Specifications.

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.SER NO.: 83-138 CROSS

REFERENCE:

PMR 85-3043 DESCRIPTION OF CHANCE:

Replace capillary tubing on Unit 1 RWCU instruments in IC039. Capillary tubing is to be replaced with 3/8" stainless steel tubing and Swagelok fittings. New flanges will be provided at the element to accommodate the 3/8" tubing.

SUMMARY

I. No. The FSAR analysis is based on a 4" pipe break. The 3/8" instrument tubing can be isolated, therefore it has no effect on the FSAR analysis.

II. No. The possibility.of a line break is analyzed by the FSAR.

III. No. The instrument tubing has no effect on any margin of safety as defined by the Technical Specifications.

SER NO.: 85-139 CROSS

REFERENCE:

PMR 85-3054 DESCRIPTION OF CHANGE:

l Replace capillary tubing on Unit 2 RWCU instruments in 20039. Capillary I

tubing is to be replaced with 3/8" stainless steel tubing and Swagelok l fittings. New flanges will be provided at the element to accommodate the 3/8" tubing.

SUMMARY

I. No. The FSAR analysis is based on a 4" pipe break. The 3/8" instrument tubing can be isolated, therefore it has no effect on the FSAR analysis.

II. No. The possibility of a line break is analyzed by the FSAR.

III. No. The instrument tubing 's no effect on any margin of safety as defined by the Technical S tfications.

SER NO.: 85-140 l CROSS

REFERENCE:

PMR 85-3114 DESCRIPTION OF CHANGE:

i Install a shelter in the Unit 2 Turbine Building for cleaning of major steam path parts.

SUMMARY

1. No. This-action is not safety related and the shelter is not a safety impact hazard. Access to the shelter by maintenance personnel will be controlled. The airborne radiation levels in the filtration system will be monitored.

II. No. See Item I above.

III. No. Cleaning of turbine parts is not addressed in the Technical Specifications.

SER NO.: 85-141 CROSS

REFERENCE:

PMR 85-9004 DESCRIPTION OF CHANGE:

Upon Unit 1 SPDS system restart, execute a new software command that is received by additional circuitry in the display generator hardware and cause a

-reset in the display generator.

SUMMARY

I. No. The.new code and additional circuitry will only be activated on computer restart and it will not affect the system at run time.

II. No. SPDS is only a monitoring system and has no controlling processes.

III.-No. This modification has no affect on any Technical Specification bases, setpoints, or margins, nor can it cause any adverse affect on any safety related systems.

l f

l SER No.: 85-142

, CROSS

REFERENCE:

PMR 85-9005 DESCRIPTION OF CHANGE:

Upon Unit 2 SPDS system restart execute a new software command that is received by additional circuitry in the display generator hardware and cause n reset in the display. generator.

SUMMARY

I. No. _The new code and additional circuitry will only be activated on computer restart and it will not affect the system at run time.

II. No. SPDS is only a monitoring system and has no controlling processes.

III. No. This modification has no affect on any Technical Specification

. bases, setpoint,'or margins, nor can it cause any adverse affect on any safety related systems.

J

-l SER NO: 85-143

,. CROSS ~

REFERENCE:

PMR 80-50 DESCRIPTION OF CHANGE Installation of a level monitoring system in the phase separator and reactor

~

water cleanup phase separators to provide interface indication between sludge, water and air.

1

SUMMARY

-I., No. The proposed modifications are not safety related and are part of a non-safety related system. . Failure analysis for the proposed changes are enveloped by accident analysis " Postulated Radioactive Releases;due to Liquid Radwaste Tank Failure" (FSAR Section 15.7.3) which is applicable to both liquid and solid radwaste tanks. ,

II. No. Worst case scenario for an accident or malfunction of the radwaste system have been conservatively analyzed in the FSAR. The change does not alter system operation or create mode.

III. No. This change provides new level indication through the addition of level interface devices and improved level indication. The change does not affect system operability therefore there is no reduction margin of safety as defined in the basis for any Technical Specification.

SER No.: 85-144 t

CROSS

REFERENCE:

PMR 82-504

DESCRIPTION OF CHANGE

i Addition'of a 3000-1b. electrical hoist to the trolley of the radwaste

-building crane to accommodate radwaste filter element removal.

SUMMARY

I I. No. The modification does not add to the source term for radwaste handling accidents previously analyzed. The proposed modification will decrease the possibility of handling accidents and reduce personnel exposure.

II. No. The material handling operations previously ar.alyzed in the FSAR are

! not altered by this modification.

t-III. No. The radwaste building crane is not covered by any Technical

Specification.

0

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SER No.: 85-145 CROSS

REFERENCE:

Test Procedure 054-051 DESCRIPTION OF CHANCE:

Treating the spray pond with chlorine and Aquathol-K. . Chlorine will be injected to obtain a 0.5 ppm residual twenty minutes af ter chlorination is completed. The Aquathol-K will be introduced to the pond in such quantities as to obtain a 1.5 ppm concentration in the treated area. This process is being carried out to kill algae and aquatic plant life.

SUMMARY

, I. No. The proposed water treatment will not reduce or degrade the supply of water required for the safe shutdown of the plant. The water treatment will increase heat exchanger heat transfer. A chlorine concentration of 0.5 ppm will have no corrosive effect on either the ESW/RHRSW system piping and components. The pH of the Aquathol-K is buffered and runs between 8.0 and 9.0. The spray pond pH is normally measured in the same range therefore spray pond pH should be unaffected.

II. No. In addition to Item I above, the water treatment program is environmentally acceptable and has been approved by appropriate environmental agencies. The water treatmer.t program will not reduce or degrade the supply of water required for safe shutdown.

III. No. Technical Specification 4.7.1.3 only contains requirements of Emergency Spray Pond temperature and level. The proposed water treatment program poses no effect on these parameters.

SER NO.: 85-146 CROSS

REFERENCE:

PMR 82-639 L DESCRIPTION OF CHANCE:

Installation of an iso-lock sampler to the solid radwaste transfer lines for bead resin filter sludge.

SUMMARY

I. No. The proposed modification is intended to decrease the probability of

a miscellaneous spill or incident of contamination during the sample

!. taking operation. FSAR Subsection 15.7.2.1 analyzes miscellaneous small

! releases outside containment. Also, the new sample station is part of a non-safety related system.

II. No. See Item I above.

III. No. There are no Technical Specifications which govern the sampling l operation for the Solid Radwaste Collection system. The proposed modification is intended to eliminate a potential ALARA concern over the current sampling techniques.

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5 j SER NO.:- 85-147 CROSS

REFERENCE:

~PMR 84-3067 DESCRIPTION OF CHANGE:

Disconnect relief-discharge piping on valves PSV-12644 and PSV-12646 from the existing. instrument gas system relief header and route new relief piping from the valves to the~ Zone I HVAC exhaust duct, t

SUMMARY

I. No. The new piping is not safety related but_does terminate at safety related components (PSV-12644 & PSV-12646 and the Zone I equipment

- compartment exhaust system). All engineering has been performed in accordance with plant design criteria. The relief valve discharge pipe does not perform a safety related function and is not addressed in FSAR

, - Chapter 15.

II. No. This modification provides a_more conservative method of disposal of compressed nitrogen in the unlikely actuation of the relief valves. A failure of the new relief discharge pipe will not impact secondary containment integrity or the reactor building HVAC. The_ reactor building Zone I equipment exhaust system and containment instrument gas system as discussed in FSAR-Subsections 9.4.2 and 9.3.1.5 are not altered. .

- III. No. The relief valves and discharge piping are not addressed in the i Technical Specifications.

P SER NO.: 85-148 CROSS

REFERENCE:

DCP 83-0016 DESCRIPTION OF CHANGE:

Installation .of flood barriers in the pipe tunnels joining the Unit 1 Turbine, Unit 2 Turbine and Radwaste buildings (Elevation 646'-0").

SUMMARY

L l I. No. The buildings are non-seismic Category I therefore the addition of l

flood barriers will not impact safety.

II. No. See Item I above.

III. No. Leakage and/or flooding of the Turbine Building pipe tunnels not I

addressed in the Technical Specifications.

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SER NO.: 85-149 CROSS

REFERENCE:

PMR 84-3117' DESCRIPTION OF' CHANGE:

Safety Parameter Display System (SPDS) enhancements:

Implement SPDS containment isolation algorithm and display Implement Regulatory Guide 1.97 SPDS ex-core neutron flux, reactor water level and pressure inputs to algorithms and displays Implement hard copy terminal for SPDS computer Implement SPDS CRT freeze function Implement Standby Liquid Control (SLC) flow input to the plant process computer.

SUMMARY

I. No. The SPDS design and it's interface with plant systems is compatible with FSAR analyses. Engineering for these enhancements has_been performed in accordance with applicable codes, standards, and plant design criteria to assure. installation does not impact safety related equipment. Use of qualified IE input multiplexers for tie-in of plant

, systems to SPDS prevents non-1E portions to interface with safety systems.

II. No. Tying of non-1E equipment to IE equipment through IE qualified isolating multiplexer units is an acceptable method per FSAR Subsection 8.1.6.1n.

III. No.~ Changes are not being made to any plant equipment by these enhancements that will impact any Technical Specification setpointslor margins or cause any adverse effect on safety related systems.

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SER NO.: 85-150 CROSS

REFERENCE:

PMR 84-3118 DESCRIPTION OF-CHANCE:

Safety Parameter Display System (SPDS) enhancements:

Implement SPDS containment isolation algorith'm and display Implement Regulatory Guide 1.97 SPDS ex-core neutron flux, reactor water level and pressure inputs to algorithms and displays Implement hard copy terminal for SPDS computer Implement SPDS CRT freeze function Implement Standby Liquid Control (SLC) flow input to the plant process computer.

SUMMARY

I. No. The SPDS design and it's interface with plant systems is compatible with FSAR analyses. Engineering for these enhancements has been performed in accordance with applicable codes, standards, and plant design criteria to assure installation does not impact safety related equipment. Use of qualified IE input multiplexers for tie-in of plant systems to SPDS prevents non-1E portions to interface with safety systems.

II. No. Tying of non-1E equipment to IE equipment through IE qualified isolating multiplexer units is an acceptable method per FSAR Subsection 8.1.6.In.

III. No. Changes are not being made to any plant equipment by these enhancements that will impact any Technical Specification setpoints or margins or cause any adverse effect on safety related systems.

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-SER NO.: 85-151 CROSS

REFERENCE:

PMR 84-9010 I!2SCRTPTION OF CHANCE:

Provide indication for the standby liquid control injection pumps. motor heaters while in service. The indicating lights will be mounted on component boxes next.to the motor control centers feeding the respective pumps.

SUMMARY

I. No. The heater circuits are Q-affiliated and do not perform any safety related function.. The proposed action does not violate any-separation / isolation requirements. FSAR Subsections 9.3.5 & 8.1.6.1 have been reviewed and are unaffected.

II. No. See Item I above.

III. No. Technical Specification 3/4.1.5 has been reviewed. The motor heaters and heater indications are not addressed.

SER NO.: 85-152 CROSS

REFERENCE:

PMR 85-3108 DESCRIPTION OF CHANCE:

Replacement of the three Unit i low pressure turbine rotors in the 'A', 'B' and 'C' hoods with three new rotors of a different design. The existing rotors area shrunk on wheel design and the new rotors are an integral design.

SUMMARY

I. No. The existing rotors have a service life of approximately 3-12 years before stress corrosion cracking (scc) creates the need to replace them.

The probability of a catastrophic wheel burst of this design is evaluated in FSAR Subsection 3.5.1.3 and 10.2.3. In the new rotors stresses are lower due to the absence of shrink fit stresses and keyway stress concentration effects. Crack initiation is reduced.

II. No. The FSAR analyses are only concern with the probability of any

! turbine component creating a missile that could damage any reactor safety system. As stated in Item I above, appropriate FSAR sections have been j reviewed and are not impacted.

III. No. The Technical Specification does not address LP turbine rotors.

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SER NO.: 153 CROSS

REFERENCE:

PMR 85-9026 DESCRIPTION OF CHANGE:

Addition of strainer discharge isolation valves and local seal water-pressure-indicators in the river water makeup system.

SUMMARY

1. No. 'The river water makeup system is not addressed in the FSAR.

Operation of the system is enhanced by this modification and as such the

. probability.of occurrence or consequences of an accident or malfunction of equipment'is decreased.

II. No. See Item I above.

III. No. TheLTechnical Specifications do not address the river water makeup-system.

SER NO.: 85-154 CROSS

REFERENCE:

Setpoint-Change Procedures J852112 and J852111 DESCRIPTION OF CHANGE:

Modification to the loose parts detector high alarm sensitivity setpoints.

i Recorder Channel Existing Setpoint New Setpoint

. Channel 1 . 5 x Background 8 x Background Channel 3 8 x Background 10 x Background 4

Channel 4 8 x Background 10 x Background

SUMMARY

!' I. No. Providing alarm setpoints which which eliminate nuisance alarms due to high power background noise is in compliance with Regulatory Guide 1.133. Sensitivity requirements for Channels 3 & 4 remain within the recommendations of Regulatory Guide 1.133. The sensitivity for Channel 1 may be outside the guidelines however, it is-recognized in the Regulatory Guide that adjustments maybe necessary due to specific plant conditions.

II. No. Providing alarm setpoints at the level necessary to eliminate nuisance alarms will allow true alarms to be identified more clearly, thereby improving system function. -These new setpoints will not adversely affect operation of any existing systems, safety or non-safety.

III. No. Technical Specification 3/4.3.7.12 applies to the L. Loose Parts Monitoring System. The basis for this Specification has been reviewed

! and determines to be unaffected by the proposed modification. Therefore

-the margin of safety is not impacted.

4 i

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SER NO.: 35-155 CROSS

REFERENCE:

PMR 85-3138 DESCRIPTION OF CMANCE:

Diesel generator starting air system enhancements:

Increase design pressure of-the piping between starting air compressors and the accumulator inlet check valve from 215 psig to 300 psig.

Reclassify the piping from Q to non-Q. . .

Change set pressure of compressor discharge safety valves from 265 psig to 300 psig. '

Replace existing diesel generator starting air compressor rated at 250 psig with compressors having a rating of.at least 300 psig.

SUMMARY

I. No. The only possible failure which would threaten safety related equipment-would be a structural failure of the new compressor during a seismic event. This event has been analyzed and the results show that

, such a failure will not occur.

II. . No . The proposed changes do not prevent the air starting system from performing its intended function. The proposed changes-provide a more reliable source of charging for the starting air accumulators.

f

III. No. The capability of the air system is based on the maximum requirement

, pressure in the acculators (240 psig). .These accumulators must provide starting air without.any credit taken for makeup after the. signal to start is received. Since the. changes affect only the makeup rate capability there is no effect on Technical Specification safety margins.

SER NO.~: 85-156 CROSS

REFERENCE:

' PMR 85-9003 DESCRIPTION OF CHANGE:

Rerouting.the Sampler discharge from the sewage treatment plant to the cooling tower blowdown (CTBD) pipe, and rerouting of the sampler suction line.

SUMMARY

o

PMR 85-9022, PMR 85-9023 DESCRIPTION OF CHANCE:

Reconfigure the tubing to the oxygen analyzer panel meter such that the reference side and measuring side of the meter are fed in parallel.

SUMMARY

I. No. The proposed modification results in providing a more accurate assessment of containment atmosphere. Appropriate FSAR sections have been reviewed and remain unaffected by this modification.

II. No. The FSAR sections dealing with containment atmosphere monitoring and sections dealing with seismic and environmental effect-have been reviewed and are not impacted. The new tubing arrangement does not alter system function. Plant operations is enhanced due to stebili:<d meter indication.

III. No. Technical Specifications 3/4.6.6.4. 3/4.10.5 and 3/4.3.7.5 have been reviewed. The margin of safety is not reduced.

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i SER NO.: 85-161- 4 CROSS

REFERENCE:

PMR 84-2001, PMR 84-2002 DESCRIPTION OF CHANCE:

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Revise t,he;Q und inystem boundaries of the Emergency Service Water (ESW). system and service water system to conform with in-service inspection boundaries and ,

hydrostat boundaries'per NCR-84-369. U'

SUMMARY

I.. No. This change does not involve any hardware modifications only dr awing [?

changes. .The sections of pipe being reclassified were constructed in accordance with ASME Section III and were outside the in-service

-inspection boundary. This reclassification will not result in degradation of construction or ins'ection p requirements.

II. No. See Item I above. >

-III. No. The margin ofjmafety is not impacted since the changes are drawing changes only. '3 4

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SER NO.: 85-162 IN'.

! af '

l CROSS

REFERENCE:

PMR 85-1005 i DESCRIPTION OF CHANGE:

3 hLt Replace the SPSV air tubing and isolation valve to each Hydraulic Control Unit (HCU) in the control rod drive' system.

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SUMMARY

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I. No. The proposed action Will permit.better service ability in a more timely fashion for 'any work at the HCU's which interfaces with instrument air. There'is no effect on the scram operation of the Control Rod Drive system. Thikmodificationwillnotcauseadecreaseinreactorcoolant temperature;. increase in reactor pressure, decrease in reactor coolant system flowirate, increase or decrease reactor coolant inventory, J increase in the probability of a radioactive release from a y .7 subsystem / component or increase the probability of reactivity and power anomalies as evaluated in FSAR Chapter 15.

1 II. No. ' See Item I above.

. III. No. The' proposed modification does not adversely affect the probability

'v of exceeding the shutdown margin, control rod insertion times, probability of a rod drop accident, scram discharge volume operability, HCU accumulator operability, control coupling integrity or position system operability therefore the margin of safety is not reduced.

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.SER NO.: 85-163 CROSS

REFERENCE:

PMR 85-3021 DESCRIPTION OF CHANGE:

Interlock the high conductivity alarm on the condensate demineralizer with the domineralizer. vessel mode selector switch such that the high conductivity alarm will only be activated when a vessel is in the service or recycle mode.

9

SUMMARY

I. No. _This modification changes the logic which operates seven annunciator points. The condensate system annunciators are non safety related therefore a. failure of any annunciator point cannot increase the

~

probabifity of occurrence or the consequences of an accident or malfunction of safety related equipment.

II. No. See Item I above.

i.

III. No. The condensate system is not addressed by the Technical Specifications.

SER No.: 85-164 CROSS

REFERENCE:

PMR 85-3069 and 85-3068 DESCRIPTION OF CHANGE:

Installation of a dual seat disc on Reactor Core Isolation Cooling (RCIC) pump discharge check valves 2F014 and 1F014.

SUMMARY

I. No. The dual seat disc design eliminates the possibility of the elastomer seat blowing-out under system pressure thereby not increasing the probability of occurrence or the consequences of an accident or malfunction of safety related equipment as previously evaluated.

II. No. See Item I above.

III. No. The function and operability of the valve are not adversely affected by the proposed action therefore the margin of safety is not reduced.

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.e SER NO.: 85-165 CROSS

REFERENCE:

PMR 84-3121A DESCRIPTION OF CHANGE:

Modification of labels, annunciator engravings and meter scales on_ Unit 1 control boards 1C-601, IC-651, IC-652 and IC-688. These modifications are part of the resolution of Detailed Control Room Design Review human factors-engineering concerns.

SUMMARY

I. No. There is no change to the function of'any component addressed in this task. These modifications respond to certain human factors discrepancies and,the work is in accordance with NRC' recommendations per NUREG 0700. Review of-FSAR Section 15 indicates that this modification

'does not increase the probability of occurrence or the consequences of.an i

accident or malfunction of equipment related to safety as previously evaluated.

II. No. The modification provides the operating staff with a consistent and uniform identification of controls, annunciators and meter displays. The

~

presentation of data to the operator in a clear and consistent manner reduces the likelihood of risinterpretation and/or inappropriate-action.

III. No. The modification contributes to reducing the likelihoc3 of an operator error and does not reduce tha margin of safety.

SER NO.: 85-166 CROSS

REFERENCE:

PMR 84-3122C DESCRIPTION OF CHANCE:

l Labeling, demarcating and addition of mimics to the Remote Shutdown Panel.

These changes are the result of the resolution of Detailed Control Room Design Review human factors engineering concerns.

SUMMARY

I. No. .These changes do not alter the function of any component. The addition of mimics will improve operator interface thereby reducing the chance of error during operation from the panel. ,

.II. No.. See Item I above.

III. No. The control panel mimics are not addressed in the Technical Specification bases however the addition of mimics will help reduce operator error.

E SER NO.: 85-167 CROSS

REFERENCE:

PMR 84-3121C

- DESCRIPTION OF CHANGE:

Replace 3 labels on Trend' Recorders 1-3 on panel IC651 and meter scales on panel OC673. These changes are the result of the resolution of Detailed-Control Room Design Review human factors engineering concerns.

SUMMARY

- I. No. The changes do not alter the function of the component. The changes do enhance the presentation of available information to the operator thereby reducing the likelihood of error.

II. No. -See Item I above.

III. No. Technical Specifications do not-address labels or scale forms.

SER NO.: 85-168 CROSS

REFERENCE:

PMR 84-31220 DESCRIPTION OF CHANGE:

Modifications to wiring and metering scales on the H 0 rec rder as a result of resolution of Detailed Control Room Design Review 22 human factors engineering concerns.

SUMMARY

-I. No. These changes do not alter the functioning of the H,/0 nnalyzer or any other component. Review of FSAR Section 15 indicatei modification does not increase the probability of occurrence vi the 4

consequences of an accident or malfunction of equipment related to safety as previously evaluated.

II. No. See Item I above.

III. No. The function of the H /0 analyzer is not altered therefore the 2 2 margin of safety is not reduced.

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. SER NO.: 85-169

- CROSS

REFERENCE:

PMR 85-3024

-DESCRIPTION OF CHANGE:

Interlock the condensate low flow alarm with the condensate demineralizer-vessel mode ' selector switch such that the low flow alarm'will only be active when a vessel is in the service or recycle mode.

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SUMMARY

-I. No. This modification changes the logic which operates seven annunciator' points. The condensate system as well as all plant annunciators are designated as non-safety related therefore there is no increase in.the c probability.of occurrence or the consequences of an accident or malfunction of equipment as previously evaluated.

- II.. No. ' See' Item I'above.

III. No. The condensate demineralizer system and plant annunciators are not discussed in the Technical Specifications.

1 SER No.: 85-170 CROSS

REFERENCE:

PMR 85-3085B i

DESCRIPTION OF CHANGE:

. Modify _ labels, annunciator engravings and meter scales on Plant operating bench board DC-653. These' changes are the result of resolving Detailed Control Room Design Review human factors engineering concerna.

SUMMARY

11 LNo. These changes do not alter the functioning of any components. This

. modification' responds to certain human factors discrepancies and the work is being done in accordance with NRC recommendations per NUREG 0700.

Review of FSAR Section 15' indicates that this modification does not increase the probability of occurrence or the consequences of an accident.

or malfunction of equipment previously evaluated.

II. No. This modification provides the operators with a consistent and uniform identification of controls, annunciators and meter disp 3r.ys. The presentation of data to the operator in a clear, consistent manner reduces the likelihood of operator error.

III. No. The modification contributes to reducing the likelihood of an s

operator error and as such reduces the margin of safety as defined in the Technical Specifications.

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SER NO.:1.85-171.

CROSS

REFERENCE:

-PMR 85-3085D DESCRIPTION OF CHANCE:

Provide a consistent labeling scheme for identifying light box coordinates on main control panel annunciators. This modification is the result of resolving Detailed Control Room Design Review human factors engineering concern.

SUMMARY

I. No. There is no altering of the function of' components. The modification is in accordance with NRC recommendations in NUREG 0700.

FSAR Section 15 has been reviewed and is not impacted by these changes.

II. No. In addition to. Item I, the modification will enhance operator information thereby~ reducing the chance of operator error.

III. No. The modification contributes to the lowering of the likelihood of an operator error and as such does not reduce the margin of safety as defined in t he basis for the Technical Specification.

SER NO.: 85-172 CROSS

REFERENCE:

Bypass Procedure 2-85-053 DESCRIPTION OF CHANGE:

Place Reactor Protection System relays C72-K3A and C72-K3B in the tripped de-energized condition by removing fuses C72-F3A and C72-F3B.

SUMMARY

I. No. Placing relays C72-K3A and C72-K3B in the tripped condition does mot prevent any portion:of the MSIV closure circuitry from performing its-intended function and hence, does not increase the probability of occurrence or the consequences of an accident or malfunction of equipment as previously evaluated.

II. No. See 15:em I above.

III. No. Operation outside of design or operational units will not occur due to this change.

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/ s SER NO.: 85-173 CROSS

REFERENCE:

PMR 85-3101 DESCRIPTION OF CHANCE:'

Replacement of-SR-C-registers on the drywell unit coolers - both safety

-related and non-safety related.

SUMMARY

I. No. The replacement registers and duckwork have bee designed and procured in accordance with existing plant design criteria. All.

components being added are designed per Seismic' Category I. The modification does not affect the design basis and system function of the drywell unit coolers as discussed in FSAR Subsection 9.4.5. The

-modification does not impact post accident hydrogen mixing as discussed

I. No.- The affected pumps and piping are non-safety related and are not required'for safe shutdown of the plant. All engineering has been performed in accordance with applicable plant design criteria to assure the required installation will not impact safety related systems.

II. No. In addition to Item I above, the proposed modification will reduce the possibility of an accident due to overpressure and will not increase

the. possibility of a different type of accident previously evaluated.

[ III. No. The proposed change does not reduce the operability of any equipment or require surveillance to ensure safety.

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LSER NO.: 177' -

CROSS

REFERENCE:

PMR 83-151 DESCRIPTION OF CHANCE:

Install ultrasonic' level control sensors for e'ach radwaste filter'at~the same location as~the existing conductivity elements and installL a differential pressure. transmitted with sealed capillary diaphrages which will provide an

' analog input to an existing level indicator on Panel OC307.

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SUMMARY

I. No. The changes are made to a non-safety system. There :Lis no impact on any station design features that are used in radioactive release analysis for postulated radwaste system failures.

II. No.; Worst case scenarios for an accident or malfunction of the radwaste

system have been conservatively analyzed in the FSAR. The proposed

,- - change does not impact system operation or add a more severe type of failure mode which would alter the current FSAR analyses.

III. No. This modification will upgrade the existing level instrumentation.

lThe tech specs do not address level instrumentation.

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SER NO.: 85-178 CROSS

REFERENCE:

PMR 83-809A

' DESCRIPTION OF CHANGE:

Extension of the. emergency service water (ESW) system to diesel generator 'E'.

SUMMARY

I. . No . - The proposed. action.is an extension of an existing piping system.

Motor operated. butterfly valves are provided on the ESW piping in the

' diesel generator 'E' building so that the diesel generator 'E' supply and return loops can be isolated from the balance of the ESW system. The

. normal position of these valves will be closed which ensures the ESW system will be aligned to serve only four diesel's at one time. The control of flood effects of a moderate energy leakage crack has been evaluated'and found to be enveloped by existing FSAR analyses.

~II. No. In addition to Item I above, the proposed change does not alter ESW system design. Only four of the five diesel generators will receive ESW at any one time.

III. No..

The ESW system is being extended to service an additional diesel generator however, the system will'only be able to service four diesel generators at'one time therefore the margin of safety is not impacted.

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'SER NO.:- 85-179 CROSS

REFERENCE:

PMR 84-3055,' Rev. I and 84-3056, Rev. 1

' DESCRIPTION OF CHANCE:

Change the design pressure of the Reactor Core Isolation Cooling (RCIC) from 150 psig to-180 psig and reset relief valves PSV-E51-1F017 and PSV-E51-2F017 to'180 psig. This action will-prevent the valve from discharcing water into the RCIC compartment. ,

SUMMARY

I. No. The piping associated with this change has a maximum working pressure of 1143 psig and has been successfully hydrotested to 205 psig which exceeds the ASME Section XI test pressure required for this' modification. . Increasing the setpoint on PSV-1F097 to 180 psig does not impact the shutdown cooling mode of RHR as described in FSAR Subsection 7.4.1.3.

II. No. These lines have been demonstrated capable of withstanding a pressure of 180 psig. Also, existing instrumentation is capable of maintaining integrity at the higher-pressure. Further, RCIC is not an ECCS and a loss of pump suction would not be caused by this modification.

III. No. This modification affects no other part of the RCIC system than the pump suction which does not. increase the probability of failure for this line. There is no impact on system performance as defined in the

~ Technical Specifications.

SER NO.: .85-180 CROSS

REFERENCE:

PMR 85-3136 and PMR 85-3137 DESCRIPTION OF CHANGE:

Cut and cap drain lines from RHR system valves 1-51-037, 1-5?-049, 1-51-077 and 2-51-077 to ; tovide a second barrier against containment leakage. - These drain lines are currently hard piped to Liquid Radwaste funnel / sliced.

SUMMARY

I. No .~ The proposed modification reduces the probability of inadvertently opening a leak path from the primary containment. It reduces the consequences of a LOCA by providing one more barrier for fission product release to the environment. The requirement for an ANSI B31.1 threaded cap can be found in FSAR Subsection 6.2.4.1 and 6.2.4.3.

II. No. The capped piping is not considered safety-related and as such is not designed in accordance with ASME Boiler and Pressure Vessel Code Section III however it is analyzed and supported for all loads normally associated with a Section III, Class 2 desi En.

III. No. By increasing the isolation capability of the RHR drain line(s) margin of safety'is increased. The drains are not required to be operated for any safety function.

SER No.:: 85-181 CROSS

REFERENCE:

PMR 84-3121B DESCRIPTION OF CHANGE:

-Labeling / demarcation for lift pump status lights and control switches to

-enhance their control / display relationship. Scale modifications to recorders 14201A on panel 10601 to improve legibility and readability. Modify the H2/02 recorders wiring / meter scales to improve legibility and readability. Addition of legends to unlabeled mimics on panel IC601. Addition of guards to prevent inadvertent actuation of controls on the TIP panel. These changes are the-result'of resolving Detailed Control Room Design Review human factors engineering concerns.

SUMMARY

I. No. There is no change in the functioning of the components in these changes.- The proposed modificatione provide consistent and clearer information to the operator. The modifications are installed in-accordance with NRC recommendations in NUREG 0700. Review of FSAR Chapter 15 indicates these modifications will not increase the probability of occurrence or the consequences of an accident or malfunction of equipment as previously evaluated.

II. No. These changes reduce there likelihood of misinterpretation, misoperation or inadvertent operation and are made to the standards of the original equipment utilizing qualified materials.

III. No. The modifications contribute to reducing operator error and as such do not reduce the margin of safety.

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SER NO.: 85-182 CROSS.

REFERENCE:

PMR 85-3102A and PMR 85-3102B-DESCRIPTION OF CHANGE:

Removal of ductwork between drywell. unit coolers 2V415A&B and duct penetrations to the CRD undervessel area; and installation of.new ductwork.

(including supports) from the coolers to serve that general area of the drywell. Removal of ductwork from drywell unit coolers 2V411A&B between the 711'-0" elevation and the ring headers supplying the RPV skirt area; and

-installation of new ductwork (including supports) above the 711'-0" elevation to serve that general area of the drywell. Also new non safety related fans will be installed to serve the CRD undervessel' area and RPV skirt area.

SUMMARY

I. No. -These modifications will improve the capability of the drywell cooling system to meet the minimum temperature requirements in the RPV skirt area as well as supplying additional cooling in the drywell. The safety related function - hydrogen mixing following a LOCA - is not changed except in the undervessel area where recirculation fans will provide the air mixing instead of the unit cooler fans. JThis is acceptable since the new fans will provide the same hydrogen mixing capability.

. II. No The proposed chang- 'et all design criteria for drywell atmosphere recirculation and cool. , ilectrical separation and seismic integrity plus'all"other applicable criteria are met. Therefore the proposed action does not create a possibility for an accident normal function of a different type.

III. No. The proposed modifications will enhance the drywell cooling systems capability to maintain the drywell atmosphere average temperature below the requirements of Technical Specification 3.6.1.17.- There is no reduction in the margin of safety.

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. SER NO.: 85-183 o

CROSS

REFERENCE:

Calibration Procedure SI-278-325 " Semi-Annual Calibration of RBM Channels'A,B" DESCRIPTION OF CHANGE:

Change theLRod Block Monitor (RBM) upscale trip setpoint from'.66W +'38% to

.66W + 40%.

i

SUMMARY

I.. No. The new setpoint was determined to specifically meet technical specification setpoints and. allowable values. This setpoint is more conservative than the allowable technical specification limit therefore '

there is no increase in the probability of occurrences or consequences of accidents or malfunctions evaluated in the FSAR.

II. No. See Item I.

III. No. The setpoints have been determined to support the margin of safety which technical specification setpoints and allowable values are intended to ensure.

1 SER NO.: 85-184 i

CROSS

REFERENCE:

PMR 82-0336 DESCRIPTION OF CHANGE:

l

. . Install vent _ pipes on the discharge of the existing radwaste evaporator 4

condenser rupture discs and route to a convenient corner of the room to prevent' contamination of nearby equipment.

SUMMARY

.I. No. The evaporator packages are non-safety related and are not required for safe shutdown of the plant. This vent pipes will not change the probability of overpressure in the evaporator package from relieving through the rupture disc. The vent pipe will cause increased backpressure when the rupture disk is relieving. The vent pipes are.

' designed such that this backpressure will be less than the 10%

accumulation for pressure relieving devices allowed by ASME Code.

II. No. The vent pipes will direct an overpressure discharge to an area of the radwaste room where cleaning is easier thus reducing the effects of contamination of the evaporator package. The modification will not increase the possibility of a different type of a accident not previously evaluated in FSAR Subsections 15.7.1, 15.7.2 and 15.7.3.

III. No. The proposed action does not reduce the operability of any equipment or require surveillance to ensure plant safety. Therefore the margin of safety is not reduced.

t-SER NO.: 85-185 CROSS

REFERENCE:

.PMR 85-3009

. DESCRIPTION OF CHANCE:

Add a test connection for Reactor vessel head leak detection system excess flow check valve XV-B21-1F009 outside of containment out-board of manual valve 1-41-005.

SUMMARY

I.. No.- The proposed modification meets the design requirements for test connections, vents, and drains to piping inboard of containment isolation

- valves ~and for reactor coolant pressure boundary. The valves will be open to perform testing on the excess flow check valve. The test connection is isolable from containment and the reactor coolant pressure boundary by closing manual valve 1-41-005.

II. No. In addition to Item I above, the proposed change is designed to requirements commensurate with the safety function which is isolation.-

III. No. The containment penetration for the RPV head seal leak detection line is designed in accordance with ASME B&PV Code Section III, Class A; and Regulatory Guide 1.11. The margin of safety is not impacted by this charge.

SER NO.: 85-186 CROSS

REFERENCE:

PMR's 85-3097A and 85-3097B DESCRIPTION OF CHANCE:

Standby Liquid Control system modifications to meet the requirements of 10CFR50.62 (ATWS). The proposed change will make the standby liquid control system a two-pump system which will increase the injection rate of sodium pentaborate solution into the reactor.

SUMMARY

I. No. Standby Liquid Control System (SLC) operation is discussed in FSAR Section 15.1. As a special safety system; SLC is not required to perform its intended function during a design basis event. It is required to be reliable to a degree consistent with its role as a special safety system.

Functionally, SLC is not altered by this change. The proposed modification does not create a condition that exceeds the design basis of the original system.

II. .No. The effects of dual pump operation have been investigated and determined to.be within design limits. Erosion problems are minimized by the stainless steel construction of the components in the discharge line, potentially higher vibrations in the discharge line will be mitigated by the discharge line accumulators, and the operating pressure which increase from approximately 1200 psig to approximately 1300 psig is still well below the relief valve setpoints and the 1500 psig system design i

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. pressure. The resulting high flow through the:' injection sparger was

~

evaluated-'and found acceptable both from a mixing criteria and power oscillation criteria.

III. No. The SLC system is being modified to increase the injection rate of sodium pentaborate. The system will now add negative reactivity twice as fast thereby reducing reactor power more quickly and actually increasing 1

the margin of safety.

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SER No.: 85-187.

CROSS

REFERENCE:

Boundary Tag Requests85-005 and 85-006 DESCRIPTION OF CHANGE:

Valves 1-65-026, 1-65-020, 2-65-006 and 2-65-007 on the Unit 1 and 2 Turbine Building Vent Stack Monitoring system will be' closed'and tagged thereby establishing the flowpath of samplings from the vent stack array to the. flow monitoring panel. This-isolation will facilitate installation of tees, isolation valves.and switching solenoid valves in the existing sampling tubing.

SUMMARY

{

I. No.- The proposed isolation will maintain a sample flow path from the Turbine Building sampling array to the flow monitoring panel. The proposed tagging will isolate the operating sampling line system so'that' it is not impacted by work being. performed under another plant-modification. Therefore there is no increase in the probability of occurrence or consequences of an accident or malfunction of equipment.

II. No. Maintaining the boundary tagged isolation valves in the closed position maintains the sample flow path from the Turbine Building Sampling Array to the flow monitor and isolates the additional piping being added by PMR 82-046. No new accident or malfunctions of equipment are created.

III. No. With the valves tagged and closed, the vent stack sample is confined to its intended flow path to panel IC159A and the sampling flow is isolated from the area of remaining work. The margin of safety is not reduced.

4 8-

SER NO.: 85-188 CROSS

REFERENCE:

PMR 83-812C DESCRIPTION OF CHANCE:

I. No. The proposed changes involve no changes to existing systems. The modifications involved are for radiation protection only and have been evaluated for safety impacts and found satisfactory.

II. No. The proposed modification affects no installed systems and are being made only to address ALARA concerns.

III. No. This modification is being made to reduce personnel exposure and will not reduce the margin of safety as defined in the technical specifications.

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SER NO. : .85-192 CROSS

REFERENCE:

PMR's-84-9015 and 84-9016

~

1RIPTION OF CHANCE:

The' automatic calculation of core thermal power will be performed every 10 seconds.. In addition, a 3.3 minute weighted average value and an 8 hour9.259259e-5 days 0.00222 hours 1.322751e-5 weeks 3.044e-6 months simple average value will also be provided. ~These 3 variables in megawatts electric and % rated power will be displayed and updated automatically on a DCS CRT format.

SUMMARY

I. No. The proposed calculations of core thermal power are identical to the calculations currently performed in OD-3, using identical inputs. The only difference is that the proposed calculations will be performed every

'10 seconds where.as OD-3 must be demanded by the operator. In addition, a 3.3 minute and 8 hour9.259259e-5 days 0.00222 hours 1.322751e-5 weeks 3.044e-6 months average are provided on DCS Displays to assist the operator. The proposed changes to not impact any FSAR analysis or effect any safety related systems.

II. No. The . Core Thermal Power Calculations are being provided as additional information to the operator. These calculations are part of an information system and have no controlling processes.

III. No. Technical Specification compliance for safety will continue to be performed by the existing computer programs - Process Computer and Powerplex.

SER NO.: 85-193 CROSS

REFERENCE:

PMR 85-3050 DESCRIPTION OF CHANGE:

Modify the Balance of Plant (B0P) Performance Calculation Software on the ACR Computer to reflect the 'as-built' condition of the Plant.

SUMMARY

1. No. The BOP calculations are for information only, to assist the operator in accessing plant performance. They are not used for any safety related functions.

II. No. See Item I above.

III. No.. The proposed modification will not alter any setpoints or safety margins as defined in the Technical Specifications.

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[,6 SER=NO.: '85-194~ '

CROSS

REFERENCE:

PMR 83-31391 DESCRIPTION OF CHANGE:

Provide a permanent storage foundation for two additional Unit 2 spare main I transformers.

SUMMARY

1. No. Both transformers are spares and consequently do.not perform any safety.related function. The foundation will be constructed adjacent to the Unit I spare' main transformer and spare start-up transformer foundation facility which is in an area which does not impact.any operational equipment related to safety.

II. No. In addition to Item I above, the spare transformers are in a remote location with respect _to the power block therefore the proposed action does not create a possibility for an accident or malfunction of a different type than any previously evaluated.

III. No. - Both transformers are spares and non-operational therefore there is ,

-no impact on the margin of safety as defined in the basis for any Technical Specification. '

SER No.: 85-195 CROSS

REFERENCE:

Setpoint Change Procedure #J852113 DESCRIPTION OF CHANCE:

. Change the following Unit 2 Loose Parts Monitoring System setpoints such that they provide sufficient sensitivity while preventing nuisance alarms:

Recorder Channel Existing Setpoint New Setpoint Ch 9 5 x Background 3 x Background Ch 11 5 x Background 8 x Background Ch 12 5 x Background 6 x Background Ch 13 5 x Background 3 x Background cit 14 5 x Background 3 x Background Ch 15 5 x Background 3 x Background Ch 16 5 x Background 3 x Background ,

SUMMARY

I. No. FSAR Subsection 7.7.1.14 states " . . . the Loose Parts Monitoring System will monitor, alarm and record the reactor vessel acoustics for the presence of internal loose parts in eccordance with Regulatory Guide 1.133.". The proposed changes are in compliance with the FSAR. Regulator Guide 1.133 recognizes that these type of sensitivity adjustments may be necessary due to plant specific conditions. The proposed change will not affect any safety-related equipment or FSAR analyses.

II. No. The combination.of sensitivities for the Loose Parts Monitoring System channels will provide alarms for any sustained, migratory, metal-to-metal noise. Providing alarm setpoints at the level necessary to eliminate nuisance alarms will allow true alarms to be identified more clearly, thereby improving system function. The LPMS is non-safety related and does not interface with any safety-related equipment.

III. No. Technical Specification 3/4.3.7.12 provides the basis for the LPMS.

The proposed changes do not finpact the -margin of safety defined therein.

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SER No.: '85-196' I

-CROSS'

REFERENCE:

Boundary Tag Request 85-002 DESCRIPTION OF CHANCE:

Application of boundary. tags to the 'E' diesel generator building Emergency Service Water (ESW) ~ supply and return' lines to permit tie-in of the 'E' building to the ESW system.

SUMMARY

I. No. During boundary tag implementation, ESW will be operational. The operational loops will not have any of their design requirements compromised - such as line size, design flow, pressure drops or missile protection. Applicable FSAR Subsections (9.2.5.3, 9.2.6.3 and 6.3.1.2).

have been reviewed and are not impacted by the proposed change.

~

II. No.- As indicated in item I above, the proposed change does not add a

.different type of failure mode which has not been previously evaluated in the FSAR.

III. No. The margin of safety is not jeopardized since the redundancy, seismic design criteria, and other design criteria of the ESW system are maintained.

SER No.: 85-197 CROSS

REFERENCE:

Boundary Tag Request 85-003 DESCRIPTION OF CHANGE:

The service air system will be extended to the diesel generator 'E' building.

-The flange at the 'E' building will be tagged thus ensuring the operating part I of the Service Air System is isolated from the piping extension.

I. No. The proposed change installs a two-inch line through the existing

'D' diesel generator fuel oil vault. There is no impact on the 'D' fuel oil systems ability to support the diesel generators for mitigation of any accident previously evaluated in FSAR Subsection 9.5.4.

II. No. See Item I above.

III. No. The design criteria of the 'D' diesel generator fuel oil storage and transfer system remain unchanged therefore the margin of safety is not compromised.

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SER NO.: 85-201 CROSS

REFERENCE:

PSPD 85-106,85-107 DESCRIPTION OF CHANCE:

Change the Fuel-Pool high temperature alarm setpoint of TSH 15333 and TSH 25333 from 150*F to 125'F.

SUMMARY

I. No. A high Fuel Pod Temperature alarm at 125'F is more conservative and conforms to the safety evaluation in FSAR Subsection 9.1.3.3.

II. No. See Item I above..

III. No. There is'no Technical Specification pertaining to Fuel Pool cooling.

SER NO.: 85-202 CROSS

' CROSS

REFERENCE:

Test Procedure TP-055-005 DESCRIPTION OF-CHANCE:

Each CRD'will be isolated from the HCU components and insert and withdrawal signals will be applied while opening and closing HCU isolation valves. A

. change-in' drive l water flow will indicate a defective ' component.

SUMMARY

I. No. This test procedure,first fully'inserth.the control rod to position

00. Should a scram occur with this rod out.of service, it will already

.be fully inserted and can be verified to be as such since indication is not interrupted by test.

II. No. The. proposed test, procedure will not adversely impact primary or secondary containment, control room habitability, pipe break analysis or instrument response time.

III. No. The only Technical Specification bases which concern this procedure are for the shutdown margin and the number of inoperable control rods specifications. Since the rod will be fully inserted while this test is being performed neither of these bases are affected.

SER No.: 85-208 CROSS

REFERENCE:

PMR 83-0374

-DESCRIPTION OF CHANCE:

Modify the Unit 1 Condensate Demineralizer System resin transfer line high pressure alarm on panel 1C121 by installing a two position control switch and indicating status lights for valve PV-11640. Also, modify valve PV-11640 control scheme to close upon loss of power or loss of air pressure. Valve will'still close upon initiation of high pressure signal by pressure switch PSH-11640. Modify alarm circuit to alarm on high pressure when the new control switch for PV-11640 is in auto position.

SUMMARY

I. No. The components affected by this modification are in a non-safety system. FSAR Chapter 15 is not relevant to this modification. Failure of'the valve will prevent regeneration but will not otherwise affect the primary coolant system.

II. No. This modification adds valve position status of indicating lights for operator information. In the event of failure, the valve will close to the preferred safe position, closed. The added switch will provide the ability'for the operator to eliminate an existing nuisance alarm by placing the valve in the safe position.

III. No. The Condensate Demineralizer System is not discussed in the Technical Specifications.

g 2

SER NO.:<L85-209-CROSS

REFERENCE:

PMR 84-3110 DESCRIPTION OF CHANCE:

- This modification will provide both HPCI room and RCIC room cooling water from

' both loops.of Emergency Service Water.

SUMMARY

I. No. The proposed piping change makes the HPCI and RCIC systems more reliable by supplying the cooling for these rooms from two separate sources. ,The required cooling water flow rates for HPCI and RCIC room-coolers lis relatively small and are~about the same hence there is no

-anticipated problem flow balancing the system. This modification does not create a situation for a common mode failure.

1~ II. No. . This modification only involves ESW piping and does not connect both i: loops together, nor create any credible common mode single failure.

t t, III._No. The; basis for the ESW Technical Specification has been reviesad and p is not compromised by this. modification.

e SER NO.: 85-210 i . . .

. CROSS

REFERENCE:

PMR~85-3023 i DESCRIPTION OF CHANGE:

- Modify the Unit 2 Condensate Demineralizer. System resin transfer line high' i . pressure alarm on panel 2C121 by installing a two position control switch and p indicating status lights for valve PV-21640. Also, modify valve PV-21640

, control scheme to close upon loss of power or loss of air pressure. Valve

will still close upon initiation of high pressure signal by pressure switch-

, PSH-21640. Modify alarm circuit to alarm on high pressure when the new control ~ switch for PV-21640 is in auto position.

SUMMARY

1 I. No. The components affected by this modification are in-a non-safety

system. FSAR Chapter 15 is not relevant to this modification. Failure-of the valve will prevent regeneration but will not otherwise' affect the primary coolant system.

[ II. No. This modification adds valve position-status of indicating lights

.for operator information. In the event of failure, the valve will close i to the preferred safe position, closed. The added switch will provide the ability for the operator to eliminate an existing nuisance alarm by placing the valve in the safe position.

III. No. The Condensate Demineralizer System is not discussed in the Technical Specifications.

i l

L

~ , . . - - . -. . .

a SER NO.':- '85-211 r -

CROSS

REFERENCE:

PMR 85-3027-DESCRIPTION OF CHANCE:

Add air'capacitytt'anks with. associated valving and tubing to the Unit 2; feedwater heater dump valves LV-20306A,B&C to enable the valves to open and remain in the open position upon loss of air. Additional holes will be added to the Condenser sparger to reduce the system back pressure to a level which allows design flow to pass through the control valve.

SUMMARY

No. The affected valves and the sparger are non-safety related and are I.

not required for safe shutdown of the plant. All engineering has been performed in accordance with applicable plant design criteria to. assure that.the required installation will not impact safety related systems.

II. No. The proposed change is in accordance with the existing design basis as described in FSAR Subsection 10.4.10.2. The addition of the volume i tanks and the sparger modification will permit the feedwater heater No. 2

" dump-valve to perform according to the FSAR.

III. No. This change does not reduce the operability of any equipment nor.

require surveillance to ensure plant safety.

SER No.: 85-212 CROSS

REFERENCE:

PMR 85-9003, Rev. 1 DESCRIPTION OF CHANGE:

Presently the Cooling Tower Blowdown (CTBD) sampler has its discharge piped to the Sewage Treatment Plant (STP). This configuration constitutes a violation.

. of PA DER regulations. . This PMR will route the CTBD sampler discharge piping i~ to the CTBD pipe, and reroutes the Sampler Suction Line to prevent a future interference problem when the STP Expansion Program adds a new 25,000 gallon surge tank.

SUMMARY

I. No. The FSAR has been reviewed and the CTBD Sampling system is not addressed. The CTBD does not have a safety function.

II. No. See Item I above.

III. No. Technical Specification Sections 3/4.3.7.10 and 3/4.11.1.1.2 have ,

been reviewed and the CTBD sampling system is not discussed.

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SER NO.: 85-213 CROSS

REFERENCE:

Emergency Support Procedures ES-134-001, ES-234-001, ES-034-001 DESCRIPTION OF CHANCE:

These Emergency Operating Procedures temporarily defeat Drywell Cooling Logic

' Isolation signals in order to restore:

(a) Drywell Cooling (ES-134-001, ES-234-001 only),

(b) Containment Instrument Gas, and (c) Instrument Air.

These interlocks may be bypassed when directed by an E0P if drywell pressure exceeds 1.72 psig or to allow opening the MSIVs in accordance with ES-184-001 or ES-284-001.

SUMMARY

I. No.

(1) Possibility of radioactive release due to execution of the proposed procedures is remote. However, if such a release were to occur, operator actions per E0Ps would terminate the release and minimize the effects of the release.

(2) Drywell coolers are designed to run in slow speed in a LOCA environment and run in fast speed if drywell pressure is below 2.0 psig. Guidance is given in the procedures.

(3) The equipment to be restored is load-shed during a LOCA to prevent ESS bus overloading during the first three minutes when large loads are being started. This procedure cannot be implemented in less than three minutes, therefore, the reliability of the ESS buses will not be reduced.

Therefore the risks associated with these procedures are acceptable based on the benefits of re-establishing drywell cooling and thereby reducing the challenge to primary containment.

i i

I. No. -These procedures would be used only-if there is a total failure of the-SLC system. Since_this system is reliable and redundant, its failure is beyond the scope of events analyzed in the'FSAR.

This procedure complies with guidance from the BWROG EPG Rev. 3.

II. No.

The.NRC SER on EPG Rev. 3 finds the risk for execution of this procedure q

acceptable.

III. No. The bases for the Technical Specifications do not-cover beyond- j design basis events.

4 SER NO.: 85-217 ,

CROSS

REFERENCE:

Emergency Support Procedures ES-152-002, ES-252-002 DESCRIPTION OF CHANGE:

l i These procedures temporarily defeat HPCI suction auto transfer to the

! suppression pool on high suppression pool level or low CST level. This i i interlock is bypassed when directed by an Emergency Operating Procedure if the suppression pool temperature reaches 150*F and continued HPCI operation is required to maintain adequate core cooling.

I

SUMMARY

I. No. Reanalysis of hydrostatic and hydrodynamic loads on the containment due to increased suppression pool water level has been performed by the 1 BWROG Emergency Procedure Committee, which determined that the limiting i

level is well in excess of the current suction transfer interlock. In

fact, if the entire CST was transferred to the suppression chamber, this t limiting level would still not be attained. Therefore, transferring HPCI

! suction to the CST is not a problem in this regard.

. Proper precaution has been placed in the Emergency Procedures to prevent l execution of the proposed procedures if insufficient water inventory is 4

present in the CST.

II. No. See Item I above.

III. No. See Item I above. !

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SER NO. : 85-218 CROSS

REFERENCE:

Emergency Support Procedures ES-155-001, ES-255-001 DESCRIPTION OF CHANCE:

This procedure installs temporary tubing and quick disconnects to vent the over-piston area of control rods which are stuck out of the core. This is done to shutdown the reactor if control rods cannot otherwise be inserted.

SUMMARY

1. No. These procedures would be used only if there is a failure of control rods to scram. Since the CRD scram system is reliable and redundant, its failure is beyond the scope of events analyzed in the FSAR.

II. No. This procedure complies with guidance from the BWROC EPG Rev. 3.

The NRC SER on EPG Rev. 3 finds the risk for execution of this procedure acceptable.

III. No. The bases for Technical Specifications do not cover beyond design basis events.

SER No.: 85-219 CROSS

REFERENCE:

Emergency Support Procedures ES-156-001, ES-256-001 DESCRIPTION OF CHANCE:

This procedure temporarily defeats RSCS rod blocks to allow control rods to be manually inserted. This is done to shutdown the reactor if control rods cannot be scramed.

SUMMARY

I. No. These procedures would be used only if there is a failure of control rods to scram. Since the CRD scram system is reliable and redundant, its failure is beyond the scope of events analyzed in the FSAR.

II. No. This procedure complies with guidance from the BWROG EFG Rev. 3.

The NRC SER on EPC Rev. 3 finds the risk for execution of this procedure acceptable.

III. No. The bases for Technical Specifications do not cover beyond design basis events.

i

, 'SER No.: 85-220

. CROSS

REFERENCE:

Emergency Support. Procedure ES-070-001 DESCRIPTION OF CHANGE:

This procedure installs temporary jumpers to place SEGT in operation'on secondary containment from the control room. This is required because there is no other means to manually initiate SBGT when required.

SUMMARY

I. No. This procedure complies with guidance from the BWROG EPG Rev. 3.

The NRC SER on EPG Rev. 3 finds the risk for execution of this procedure acceptable.

II. No. See Item I above.

III. No. See Item I above.

SER NO.: 83-221 CROSS

REFERENCE:

PMR 85-3006 DESCRIPTION OF CHANGE:

SER NO.: 85-224 CROSS

REFERENCE:

PMR 85-3107 DESCRIPTION OF CHANCE:

Remove ductwork from Unit 2 unit coolers IV411A&B between elevation 711'-0" and the ring headers supplying RPV skirt-area. Install new ductwork and supports above Elevation 711'-0" for unit coolers IV411A&B to serve the general drywell area. Install two non-safety related f ans IV419A&B to serve RPV skirt area. Install ductwork to connect these fans to the ring headers supplying air to the RPV skirt-area. Provide supports for the fans and the additional ducting. Fans IV419A&B will be powered from a non-class 1E power source and both fans will operate continuously. They will be automatically stopped upon LOCA. Controls and alarms for fans IV419A&B will be added to panel 1C681 in the control room.

SUFMARY:

1. No. This modification will provide for meeting the minimum temperature requirements in RPV skirt-area and supply additional cooling for the general drywell areas. These fans have no safety function. These are not operated after a LOCA and they do not adversely impact the operation of safety systems.

II. No. Proposed action meets the design criteria for drywell atmosphere recirculation and cooling system. Electrical separation and seismic criteria will be met and the proposed action does not adversely affect the function of any other safety system.

III. No. Proposed change will improve the capability of the drywell cooling system to maintain the drywell atmosphere average temperature below the requirement specified in Technical Specification 3/4.6.1.7.

SER NO.: 85-225 CROSS

REFERENCE:

PMR 85-3118 DESCRIPTION OF CHANCE:

Install 480V power receptacles, 120V utility receptacles PA system handsets and a telephone outlet in the Unit 2 turbine building.

SUMMARY

I. No. The equipment is nonessential and the power sources are nonessential.

II. No. See Item I, above.

III. No. See Item I, above.

'/

SER No.: 85-226 CROSS

REFERENCE:

PSPD 85-112,85-118

' DESCRIPTION OF CHANCE::

Change the automatic start of Unit 2 RBCCW stand-by reactor building chiller to occur at 80*F vs.'70'F return water temperature. The setpoint increase

'will result in a load on the chiller when it is started thus reducing the unloaded running time of the stand-by chiller. Also, the RBCCW sway will be changed to 85'F from 75'F.

SUMARY:

I. No. The reactor building chillers are not safety related equipment.

II. No. The setpoint changes proposed ~do not adversely impact primary or secondary containment, control room habitability, pipe break analysis or instrument response time.

III. No. The Technical Specification limits for drywell average air l temperature and internal pressure are not affected by this setpoint l change since these limits will never be approached any time other than-

during accident conditions at which time'the reactor building chilled

water is assumed out of service.

i l SER NO.: 85-227 i CROSS SERVICE: PSPD 85-120,85-121 DESCRIPTION OF CHANCE:

Increase the setpoint for Unit 1/2 RCIC PSH-1/2N020 from 125 psig to 190 psig to prevent the minimum flow valve from cycling with suction line pressures at keep-fill pressure.

I

SUMMARY

I. No. The setpoint of greater than 125 psig for the minimum flow valve to open is designed for RCIC pump protection in the event of pump operation with no flow. The minimum pump operating pressure is 125 psig per FSAR Section 5.4.6. The pump is designed for rated flow at 1172 psia.

Therefore increasing the pressure setpoint to 190 psig will not affect l the intended function of the minimum flow valve.

i II. No. The setpoint change falls within the minimum and rated pressure range for which the pump is designed.

III. No. The setpoint and minimum flow valve are not addressed by the Technical Specifications and are within the original design parameters of the RCIC discharge piping and pump pressures.

l L

SER No.: 85-228-CROSS

REFERENCE:

PMR 85-3013 DESCRIPTION OF CHANCE:

The proposed modification connects an annunciator to Unit 2 GETARS. Both a local (TSC) audio alarm and unit operating bench board 2C651 annunciator will be installed to alert operations to reset GETARS after trips, either real or spurious.

SUMMARY

PMR 85-8005 DESCRIPTION OF CHANCE:

Plant Auxiliary LOCA Load Shed fuses in Unit 1 B0P ESS Relay Panels 1C222B and IC221A are currently wired so that their positive leg is fed through another fuse - ESW Loop 'B' BIS fuse in Panel 1C222B and ESW Loop 'A' BIS fuse-in Panel IC221A. The positive legs of the LOCA Load Shed fuses will be reconnected directly to the positive bus in Panels 1C222B and IC221A, respectively.

SUMMARY

I. No. Relocation of fuses does not alter the power supply capability of psnels, nor the performance of the fusea.

II. No. The relocation of the fuses enhances power supply load distribution, thus decreasing the probability of a malfunction of equipment important to safety.

III. No. The basis for Electrical Equipment Protection Devices Technical Specification B3/4 8-3, is not violated by the relocation of Plant Auxiliary LOCA Load Shed fuses.

SER NO.: 85-235 CROSS

REFERENCE:

Reactor Engineering Procedure RE-081-100 DESCRIPTION OF CHANGE:

For new fuel receipt and inspections, the inner metal containers of fuel bundles are kept in the outer wooden shipping containers during transport to the Reactor Building. This change proposes to remove the metal inner containers at an outside designated unloading area. An entire shipment of metal containers will then be placed on a fuel transport vehicle for transport to the Reactor Building.

SUMMARY

1. No. The metal boxes will be secured with hold-down bars which will prevent any movement of the containers during transport to the reactor building. The wooden shipping boxes provide minimal protection since the lids are removed per FSAR Section 9.1.

II. No. Container lifting methods will not he changed.

III. No. First, dropping new fuel which is enclosed in a metal shipping container will not endanger the general health and safety of the public.

Secondly, the metal containers have accelerometers which are used to detect forces applied to the new fuel during shipment and movement.

c.

,. SER NO.:- 85-236' CROSS

REFERENCE:

DC E Temporary Cooling Water System DESCRIPTION OF CHANCE:

.A temporary cooling water system will be inst, tiled.at the DC-E facility to cool DG-E during pre-op testing in lieu of the permanent plant ESW system.

SUMMARY

1. No. The system will be isolated from the operating portion of the ESW system via the isolation valves installed per DCP 83-404B. All temporary piping installed will be removed prior to opening the isolation valves and prior to declaring the DC-E unit operational.

II. No. See Item I above.

III. No. See Item I above.

SER NO.: 85-237 CROSS

REFERENCE:

PMR 85-9054 DESCRIPTION OF CHANCE:

The valve control sequence of both the Unit 2 RWCU A and B Filter /Demin.

Systems will be modified to provide double valve isolation through the l precoating and precoat " Hold" cycle.

SUMMARY

I. No. Operation of the valve control sequence is not addressed in the FSAR. The proposed modification will affect the valve control sequence only. This change will allow for the more desirable condition of dual valve isolation which should preclude exposure of the low presaura portion of the Filter /Demin. system to full reactor pressure. The net result is a reduced probability of prosaurizing the low pressure piping.

II. No . - The proposed change does not change the designed function of the RWCU Filter /Demin. System.

III. No. 'the Unit 1 Technical Specifications and bases have been reviewed,

! (cpecifically sections 3/4.3.2. 3/4.7.7, 3/4.4.5. 3/4.6.1.1 and Table 3.3.2-1) and are unaffected by the proposed changes.

I l

,I--

SER NO.:- 85-238 CROSS

REFERENCE:

PMR 85-3031 l

DESCRIPTION OF CHANGE:

l-l Relocate the 3-way mixing valves (TV-08602A&B) in the Service Water System used for cooling the Control Structure Chillers. The valve are to be moved from the suction side of the Condenser water circulating pumps (OP170A&B) to the discharge side. Also, revise the temperature controller setpoints as required for proper system operation.

SUMARY:

1. No. As discussed in FSAR Subsection 9.2.1.1, the normal condenser cooling water system (Service Water) being modified is non-safety related. The safety related condenser cooling water system (ESW) is not

( affected.

I

( II. No. "This modificaiton does not alter the intended function of the l

system, as described in FSAR Subsection 9.2.1.2. The Control Structure Chiller system will perform according to the existing deLign basis.

III. No. The Technical Specifications do not include any requirements for either the Service Water or Control Structure Chilled Water systems.

SER NO.: 85-239 CROS$

REFERENCE:

PMR 85-3034 l

DESCRIPTION OF CHANCE Revise the Unit 2 RPS-Half Scram input into GETARS to eliminate che time delay incurred by deenergisation of a multiplying relay between the scram trip system and the GETARS input to allow CETARS to more precisely record the

i. control rod insertion time during a reactor scram.

l

~

SUMMARY

I 1. No. The new wiring scheme is in coop 11ance with the electrical separation criteria (Spec E-1012 SCN-1. Table B.2)

II. No. This modification affects an exchange of non-1E functions between IE l relays in the RPS relay cabinets. No new operating conditions which L affect the safe operation of the plant are created.

III. No. This modification affects only the means by which compliance to the existing Technical Specification requirements are determined.

SER NO.: 85-240 CROSS

REFERENCE:

PNR 8f-3075 DESCRIPTION OF CHANCE:

Install additional non-safety related level instrumentation to the Unit 1 SLC Storage Tank for redundant annunciator level setpoint alarm and level monitoring capabilities. Existing " Standby Liquid Tank High/ Low Level" annunciator (1C601-16A) alarm logic input circuit will be modified to include a combined one-out-of-two high/ low alarm feature incorporating high/ low fail-safe contacts of newly installed level instrumentation. An ultrasonic level detector (Seismic Class II) will be mounted and seismically retained on the top of the SLC tank (Seismic Class I) using a field constructed tank nozzle.

Modify the existing instrument air line piping and connection to SLC tank dip tube / bubbler system to include provision for ready maintenance entry into the dip tube for periodic cleaning of tube internal deposits created from tank solution crystallization.

SUNMARY:

1. No. The addition of a redundant SLC tank level alarm / level monitoring instrument does not change the function or affect the operation of the existing non-safety related tank level system. Furthermore, this installation does not adversely affect any safety-related designs, equipment, safety evaluations or potential accident situations as referenced in FSAR Subsection 9.3.5.3, FSAR Chapter 15 and FSAR Chapter 15A. The modification of the existing SLC tank bubbler tube piping does not change the function or affect the operation of the existing non-safety related tank level system.

II. No. See Item I above.

III. No. The addition of redundant level alarm / level monitoring instrumentation does not conflict with the basis for Technical Specification B3/4.1.5 but reinforces methods for demonstration of SLCS status determination. The modification of the bubbler system does not conflict with the basis for Technical Specification B3/4.1.5, but assures validity of operational performance in the demonstration of SLCS status determination.

i

SER NO.: 85-241 CROSS

REFERENCE:

Safety Evaluation for JNPE-SE-010 DESCRIPTION OF CHANGE:

The proposed action is to provide setpoints for the Unit 2 Looso Parts Monitoring System that provide sufficient sensitivity while preventing nuisance alarms from occurring. Setpoints are changed from 3X to 5X background.

SUMMARY

1. No. The new setpoint is high enough so that nuisance alarm should not occur. Reasonable sensitivity will still be provided. In addition, FSAR analysis does not take credit for advanced warning or action based upon this system. Those systems for which credit is taken for the detection of internal vessel damage (e.g. Main Steam Line 111 Radiation Monitors) are unaffected by this change.

II. No. Providing alarm setpoints at the level necessary to eliminate nuisance alarms will allow true alarms to be identified more cicarly, thereby improving the system function. The LPMS is a non-safety system and does not interface with any safety-related equipment.

III. No. Technical Specification 3/4.3.7.12 applies to the LPMS. This setpoint change does not conflict with the basis for this or any other Specification.

SER No.: 85-242 CROSS

REFERENCE:

Administrative Procedure AD-QA-323 DESCRIPTION OF CHANCE:

Procedure for use of a heating system for purification of contaminated oil.

SUMMARY

1. No. The proposed action does not affect any equipment related to safety, or subsystems or components which contain radioactive material as previously analyzed in FSAR Section 15.7.

II. No. Monitoring of potential releases is not required, since: (1) processing of oil containing Noble Cas activity is not permitted per this procedure, (2) any particulate activity will remain entrained until the finni filtering process, and (3) todino activity han historien11y never been present in the contaminated oiln.

III. No. This procedure does not conflict with the basis for any Technical Specification.

-_ . - . , --- -~ -

SER No.: 85-243 CROSS

REFERENCE:

PMR 83-809A. Rev. 2 DESCRIPTION OF CHANCE:

Tie the "E" diesel generator into the Emergency Service Water (ESW) system.

SUMMARY

I. No. Motor operated butterfly valves will be provided on the ESW piping in the DG-E building so that the DC-E supply and return loops can be isolated from the balance of the ESW system. The normal position of these valves will be closed, thereby ensuring that the ESW system will be aligned to serve only four DC's at one time.

II. No. This work will require excavation in the area of buried safety related or critical non-safety related piping or ductbanks, however, such equipment will be protected in accordance with C&H Document No.

3544-SP-2. The proposed change does not involve a change in the system design basis, because only four of five DCs will receive ESW at any one time. The proposed change does not add a different type of failure mode which has not been evaluated in the FSAR.

III. No. Redundancy, seismic design criteria, and other design criteria of the ESW system are maintained.

REFERENCE:

PMR 85-3059 DESCRIPTION OF CHANCE:

The Unit 2 Steam Seal Evaporator Makeup Water control loop has operated erratically and caused spurious isolations of the makeup water to the Steam Seal Evaporator. The problem has been caused by an unstable output from LT-20750, a Fisher Model 3120 capacitance type level transmitter. To upgrade the level control system hardware, the capacitance level control loop will be replaced with a differential pressure transmitter loop.

SUMMARY

I. No. The change in system hardware upgrades the performance of the system. Failure analysis of this loop is enveloped in the accident analysis. " Malfunction of the Main Turbine Gland Sealing System " (FSAR Subsection 15.7.1.2.).

II. No. Per FSAR Subsection 10.4.3.1. the Steam Seal System has no safety related function. The consequence of a failure of the differential pressure transmitter loop will add no new failure mechanism.

III. The Turbine Steam Seals and Drains System is a non-safety related system and is not discussed in the Technical Specifications.

SER NO.: 85-248 CROSS

REFERENCE:

PMR 85-9027 DESCRIPTION OF CHANCE:

During normal Unit 1 operation the Reactor Building Chilled Water (RBCW) system has experienced flow perturbations which have caused the monitoring flow switch to trip. These minor disturbances were of short duration with system flow rato rapidly returned to normal. However, the in-place logic string causes an instantaneous isolation of the Reactor Water Cleanup (RWCU)

Non-Regenerative Heat Exchangers from the RBCCW system. The proposed change is to install a time delay in the heat exchanger logic equal to the time delay present in the chiller pump (1P217A.B) logic.

SUMMARY

1. No. The proposed change will eliminate spurious flow perturbations as an initiator of RWCU Non-Regenerative Heat Exchanger isolation from RBCCW.

FSAR Subsections 5.2. 5.4.8. 6.2.2. 6.2.4. 9.2.2 and 9.2.12 are unaffected by this change.

II. No. The proposed change will bring the installed valve logic for operation into agreement with the original design.

III. No. Technical Specifications 3/4.3.2, Table 3.3.2-1, 3/4.4.4. 3/4.4.5.

3/4.6.1.1 and 3/4.6.1.7 have been reviewed. The change in valve isolation logic does not reduce the margin of safety in the applicable Bases.

SER No.: 85-249 CROSS

REFERENCE:

PMR 85-9028 DESCRIPTION OF CHANGE:

During normal Unit 2 operation the Reactor Building Chilled Water (RBCW) system has experienced flow perturbaticas which have caused the monitoring flow switch to trip. These minor disturbances were of short duration with system flow rate rapidly returned to normal. However, the in-place logic string causes an instantaneous isolation of the Reactor Water Cleanup (RWCU)

Non-Regenerative Heat Exchangers from the RBCCW system. The proposed change is to install a time delay in the heat exchanger logic equal to the time delay present in the chiller pump (2P217A,B) logic.

SUMMARY

1. No. The proposed change will eliminate spurious flow perturbations as an initiator of RWCU Non-Regenerative Heat Exchanger isolation from RBCCW, FSAR Subsections 5.2, 5.4.8, 6.2.2, 6.2.4, 9.2.2 and 9.2.12 are unaffected by this change.

II. No. The proposed change will bring the installed valve logic for operation into agreement with the original design.

III. No. Technical Specifications 3/4.3.2, Table 3.3.2-1, 3/4.4.4, 3/4.4.5, 3/4.6.1.1 and 3/4.6.1.7 have been reviewed. The change in valve isolation logic does not reduce the margin of safety in the applicable Bases.

SER No.: 85-250 CROSS

REFERENCE:

pMR 85-3033 Rev. 2 DESCRIPTION OF CHANCE:

Install two key-lock switches to provide a means to easily isolate or unisolate Zone I Reactor Building HVAC System from the recirculation system and remove Zone 1 from secondary containment. Each switch will be connected to block one LOCA master trip relay and the associated recirculation dampers.

SUMMARY

I. No. The SGTS and Recirculation System Failure Mode and Effect Analysis in FSAR Subsection 6.5 and Tables 6.5-3 and 6.5-4 is not affected by this modification.

II. No. See Item I above.

PMR 85-8020 DESCRIPTION OF CHANCE:.

Addbypassswitches'$ortheUnit1RWCUhighflowsignalandprovidethehigh differential flow signal contacts with a status annunciator. ,

SUMMARY

I. No. The addition of bypass switches with a status alarm will eliminate the possibility for isolation' malfunction due to the possibility of temporary jumpers (used during monthly channel functional testing) being

-left across the output contacts. The installation of bypass switches and the tie into an existing alarm point do not change the unbypassed function of any existing systems.

II. No. The proposed change is in accordance with existing design criteria.

and will have no adverse effects on any system's safety operation. The installation of these switches and bypass otatus alarm will improve the system reliability.

III. No. Technical Specification 3/4.3.2 permits bypassing one isolation channel for'brief intervals to conduct the requ(red channel functional surveillance test.

SER NO.: 85-256 CROSS

REFERENCE:

PMR 85-8022 DESCRIPTION OF CHANCE:

Add bypass switches for the Unit 2 RWCU high flow signal and provide the high differential flow signal contacts with a status annunciator.

SUMMARY

I. No. The addition of bypass switches with a status alarm will eliminate the possibility for isolation malfunction due to the possibility of temporary jumpers (used during monthly channel functional testing) being left across the output contacts. The installation of bypass switches and the tie into an existing alarm point do not change the unbypassed function of any existing systems.

II. No. The proposed change is in accordance with existing design criteria and will have no adverse effects on any system's safety operation. The installation of these switches and bypass status alarm will improve the system reliability.

III. No. Technical Specification 3/4.3.2 permits bypassing one isolation channel for brief intervals to conduct the required channel functional surveillance test.

SER NO.: 85-257

'C*nCC DFFERENCE: PMR 85-9020-DESCRIPTION OF CHANGE:

Add a drain / sample valve to the drain piping on the Security Backup Diesel Generator. fuel oil tank.

SUMMARY

I. No. The equipment modified is not related to safety.

II. No. See Item I above.

III. No. The Security Backup Diesel Generator is not included in the Technical Specifications.

SER NO: 85-258 CROSS

REFERENCE:

PMR 85-3042 DESCRIPTION OF CHANGE:

The existing service water start-up strainers (SUS-18726A/B) on the suction side of the Unit 1 Chiller Condenser water circulating pumps (1P-235A/B) will be removed and replaced with flushable strainers. Each new strainer will be provided with a valved 2" flush line and hose connection.

SUMMARY

J I. No. As discussed in FSAR Subsection 9.2.1, this service water piping modification is non-safety related, non-seismic and not required for safe shutdown of the plant. Per FSAR Subsection 9.2.12.3.3, the Reactor Building Chillers have no safety related function.

II. No. The modification does not alter the intended function of the Service Water System. The Reactor Building Chiller System will perform according to the existing design basis.

III. No. The Technical Specifications do not include any requirements for either the Service Water System or the Reactor Building Chillers. This modification does not reduce the operability of any equipment nor-require surveillance to ensure plant safety.

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SER NO.: 85-259 CROSS

REFERENCE:

PMR 85-306'3

- DESCRIPTION OF CHANCE:

' This modification replaces the four Unit 1 inboard MSIV-LCS high leakage flow bypass. timers'(E32-N602B,F,K and P) with equivalent Class 1E timers having a ,

- range of 0-15 minutes instead of the present 0-5 minute range. The new timers !

will be set at 13 minutes, which is an increase over the existing 3 minute setting. The existing setting is not sufficient to permit the leakage flow to stabilize.~ The 13 minute setting will avoid an unnecessary trip and will not result in overloading SGTS or unacceptable dose releases.

SUMMARY

1. No. There is no degradation of qualification or function of existing "

Class 1E equipment as a result of this modification. This modification does extend the time that high flow leakage can occur before the system trips. Calculation EA-B-NA-017 assessed the-dose increases and total doses for-2-hour site boundary,'30-day. low population zone, and 30-day .

. Control Room conditions. All of the'resulting calculated doses were well

- within acceptable limits per 10CFR100 at the low population zone and site .

boundary and FSAR commitment to.GDC 19 at the Control Room.

II. No. This modification will meet the standards of the original equipment j- and allow the system to function as originally intended.

~

III. No. Technical Specifications Section B 3/4-6.1.4 refers to 10CFR100 l limits and MSIV-LCS contributions to dose under LOCA conditions. The increased contributions as a result of this modification are well below the limits considered in.the Technical Specification basis.-

' SER NO.: .85-260 CROSS

REFERENCE:

PMR 85-3133

. DESCRIPTION OF CHANGE:

This PMR' connects the previously installed Unit 1 Steam Dryer Instrumentation sensors to the CETARS system. -

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SUMMARY

I. No. The instrumentation signals are non-class 1E and used for indication only. _They do not interface with any control systems or have any control function.

II. No. See Item I above.

! III. No. This modification does not involve or interface with any of the systems referenced in the bases of the Technical Specifications.

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SER No.: .85-261 t

. CROSS'

REFERENCE:

PMR 85-8015 .

DESCRIPTION OF' CHANGE:

~

' Install a new heat. trace system on the common 2" nitrogen make-up 1ine HBD-57.

The heat trace will be designed to raise the nitrogen temperature from -20*F to +60*F, which is well above the minimum allowable nitrogen temperature.

SUMMARY

I. 'No. 'The only ~ safety.related portion of the N, Makeup System is the containment isolation valves, which will not Be affected by this

-modification.- Subsequently, bypass leakage effects discussed in FSAR Subsections 6.2.3.2.3, 6.2.1.1.5.1, and Table 6.2-15 remain unchanged.

EII . No. The proposed action decreases the probability of impingement of very cold nitrogen gas on safety related structures or equipment.

- III . No . The. Technical Specifications do not address the portion of the N MakeupSystembeingmodified,nordoesthismodificationimpactanyokher section of the Technical Specifications.

SER NO.: 85-262 CROSS

REFERENCE:

PSPD 85-198 DESCRIPTION OF CHANGE:

Increase the Control Structure Battery Room Exhaust System Low Flow switch FSL-07871A setpoint from 834 CFM to 1000 CFM.

SUMMARY

I. No. The proposed setpoint change will raise the A low flow switch of the p Battery Roon Exhaust System to bring the A's setpoint consistent with'the B's. This higher flow trip setpoint is more conservative resulting in a more conservative mode of system operation. The Battery Room Exhaust'

. System has no effect on the accident analyses in FSAR Chapter 15.

II. No. System operation remains unchanged as described in FSAR Subsection

9.4.1.2.6 and 9.4.1.3 as'well as Tables 9.4-2 and 9.4-21. 13ua proposed l setpoint change results in a more conservative mode of system operation.

l III. No. Trip of the Battery' Room Fans affects no other equipment other than its related dampers.

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SER NO.: ~LES-263 CROSS

REFERENCE:

SE #NL'85-007,.PSPD Nos.85-168 thru 85-173,85-175 thru.

85-177-DESCRIPTION OF CHANGE:

The ex'isting design calls for the Unit i RFPT Lube Oil Reservoir normal

. operating level to be 29 1/2 inches from the bottom of the vessel. The high-high, high-low and low-low level alarm switches are. set up using the normal operating level as a reference. The current setpoints have used a normal operating level'of 38 inches as e reference. Correct the switch setpoint values by using a-normal operating level of 29 1/2 inches as the reference point.

l

SUMMARY

I. No. 1Num proposed action lowers the RFPT LO Reservoir level alarm switch setpoints which serve alarm functions only.. The proposed lower normal operating level is adequate recognition of an impending loss of lube oil incident. Proper functioning is still ensured-due to control room as

well as local high-low and low-low annunciation.for a 1 1/2 inch and 2 1/2' inch level drop below normal.

II. No. The proposed action will restore RFFT LO Reservoir normal operating level to the original design intent.

III. No. .RFPT LO Reservoir operating level is not addressed in the Technical Specifications.

SER No.: 85-264 l-

~

CROSS

REFERENCE:

SE #NL'85-008, PSPD 85-174

- DESCRIPTION OF CHANGE:

, The proposed action is to re-establish the design setpoint of 32 inches for

- the high level portion of the Unit 1 B RFPT Lube Oil Reservoir 2T-102B High i Low Level. Switch LSHL-21912B in accordance with the design value given on

. . Level Setting Diagram J-653 SH 45.

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SUMMARY

i l

I. No. The RPFT Lube Oil. System has no safety related function and is not

, evaluated in the FSAR. The Loss of Feedwater Flow accident analyzed in

- FSAR Subsection 15.2.7 is not affected by this setpoint change because L the design operating oil level for the reservoir remains unchanged and the RFP/RFPT trip signals which are triggered by low lube oil pressure are not changed. <

II . - The proposed action will restore RFPT B Lube Oil Reservoir level alarm

(; setpoints to the original design intent.

i III. No. The _ RFPT Lube Oil System is not addressed in the Technical Specifications.

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U SER NO.i 85-266~

- CROSS

REFERENCE:

PMR 83-400 DESCRIPTION OF CHANGE:

Addition of aLresin sampling system tosthe condensate demineralizer.

- regeneration / cleaning system transfer lines.

SUMMARY

- I. No. The condensate demineralizer system is non-safety related'and

' failure of the resin samplers will.not affect operation of any safety.

related systems or components. Installation of the samplers will allow

- plant personnel to obtain~ representative samples of condensate demineralizer resin as required by FSAR Subsection 10.4.6.5 and monitor the condition of resin per Regulatory Guide 1.56. The proposed action does not increase the probability of occurrence or the consequences of an accident or malfunction previously evaluated.

II. No. Worst case scenarios for an accident or malfunctioning of the condensate demineralizer system has been conservatively analyzed in the-FSAR. The addition of the sample system and associated' piping does not create a different type of failure mode than any previously evaluated.

III. No. The demineralizer regeneration system is not addressed in the

+ Technical Specifications.

4 SER No.: 85-267 v

+

CROSS

Reference:

PMR 85-3070 and PMR 85-3073

, DESCRIPTION OF CHANGE:

' Replace four High Pressure Coolant Injection (HPCI) lube oil system ball valves with orifices sized to deliver required flow at desired pressure.

Replace one ball valve to the hydraulic trip unit oil supply line with a 1" globe valve.

SUMMARY

l. I.- No. The proposed modification reduces the likelihood of operation without sufficient oil supply because the four orifices will preclude inadvertent closing. The new 1" globe valve will require positive action I by the operator to change its position. FSAR Subsections 6.3.1.2.1, and 6.3.2.2.1 were reviewed and it was determined that the proposed r modifications do not increase the probability of occurrence or the consequence of an accident or malfunction previously evaluated.

F-II. No. See Item I above.

III. No. Technical Specifications 3/4.5.1 and 3/4.5.2 have been reviewed and determined to not be impacted by the proposed modifications.

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'SER NO.: 85-268.

CROSS

REFERENCE:

PMR's 85-9006 and 85-9007

DESCRIPTION OF CHANGE:

-Redesign six Service Water System piping supports to accommodate Turbine Generator alignment.

SUMMARY

._ I . - No. FSAR Subsection 9.2.13 states that operation of the Service Water System has no safety related function and failure of the system will not.

compromise any safety related system or component. Therefore there is no increase in the probability of occurrence or the consequences of an accident.or malfunction previously evaluated.

II. No. .In addition to Item I above, the new hanger designs are of equal or greater structural. capacity-as the existing supports. The proposed change is non-functional and will not alter the system's intent.

III. No. The Service Water System supply to the turbine generator hydrogen coolers is not specifically addressed by the Technical Specifications.

.SER NO.: 85-269 CROSS

REFERENCE:

PMR 85-9029 iDESCRIPTION OF CHANCE:

~

Installation'of two pipe supports on the piping runs from pumps OP-503A and OP-503B on the River Water Make-Up System.

SUMMARY

I. No. The River Water Make-Up System is a commercial grade, non-seismic system located in a non-safety grade building. The design criteria for this modification are in accordance with standard commercial grade power

. piping standards and meet all original design codes and standards. The installation of two supports is a non-functional change, has only a beneficial effect on the pump and system, and does not effect FSAR analyses.

II. No. See Item I above.

III. No. The River Water Make-Up System is not addressed in the Technical Specifications.

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- SER No.: 270 CROSS

REFERENCE:

PMR 85-9055 DESCRIPTION OF CHANGE:

~

Modify the valve'. control sequence of the A and B filter /demineralizer systess to provide double valve isolation throught he precoating and precoat ' Hold' cycle.

SUMMARY

I. No. FSAR Sections 5.4.8.2 and 7.7.1.8.1 have been reviewed and they are

.not impacted by the proposed change. Operation of the valve control

! sequence as part of the subsystem is not addressed in the FSAR. The proposed change will allow for the more-desirable conditio of dual valve isolation which should-preclude exposure of the low pressure portion of the Filter /Demineralizer-system ^to full reactor pressure.

I In addition to Item I above, all electrical / control components of

~

II. No.

the Filter /Demineralizer system are commercial grade. The proposed change does not alter the design function of the System as described in the FSAR.

III. No. The Technical Specifications have been reviewed and are not altered by this change. ,

- SER No.: 85-271 g' CROSS'

REFERENCE:

Interim Procedare for Feedwater Heater Cooldown to the Reactor Pressure Vessel. PORC Meeting 85-172.

DESCRIPTION OF CHANCE:

Interim' procedure for cooling and warming a single feedwater heater string in

-lieu of using cooldown valves with the Plant at power.

l

SUMMARY

I. No.. FSAR Sections 10.4.7.1 states that the'feedwater system has no safety realted function. Section 10.4.7.3 states that portions of the

! feedwater system upstream of the outermost containment isolation valves are not essentia1{for safe shutdown of the plant. The proposed procedure j will not degrade ghe function of any safety-related equipment.

?

II. No. In addition to Item I above, to assure MCPR will not drop below the

_ existing operating limit during this maneuver, a 0.03 margin above the MCPR oper^ ting limit will be required. This transient is bounded by the analysis in place in FSAR Chapter 15 which assumes a 100*F feedwater temperatura drop with the reactor at full power.

r

. III. No. By maintaining sufficient margin above the MCPR operating limit to I

accomodate the feedwater temperature transient anticipated with the t

propored mode of operation, the operating limits established in the Technical Specifications will not be violated. There is no reduction in the-margin of safety. l

SER No.: 85-272-CROSS

REFERENCE:

PMR 82-186

-DESCRIPTION OF CHANGE:

Replacement of existing load sharing circuitry for 250V DC battery charges 1D653A and 1D653B with an improved version of' load sharing circuity.

SUMMARY

I. No. The new load sharing circuitry is in full compliance with previous:

analysis completed in support >of FSAR Subsections 8.3.2.1.2,~8.3.2.1.1.4,.

8.3.2.1.1.5 and 8.3.2.2.1. There is no increase in the probability of occurrence or the consequences of an accident or malfunction of equipment previously evaluated.

II. No. The proposed action does not change equipment rating or the 250V DC

-system configuration. The proposed action will improve operability of

the 250V DC battery chargers. All components installed as a result of this modification were provided by the original equipment vendor and do not cause the FSAR analyses to be altered.

l III. No. The proposed changes do not reduce the margin of safety as defined in the Technical Specifications. The proposed action provides for equal sharing of the output current between the battery chargers.

l.

SER NO.: 85-273 i'

. CROSS

REFERENCE:

PMR 84-3113 i'

DESCRIPTION OF CHANCE:

Reconfigure the degraded grid circuit to permit monthly testing without disabling other safety systems to comply with Regulatory Guide 1.47.

SUMMARY

I. No. The proposed modification provides a test switch at the 4KV switch gear which will disable and test the degraded grid scheme. The test circuit design is such that the control room alarm for degraded bus voltage can not be reset if the switch is inadvertently left in the

" test" position or if the disabling logic does not result to reestablish the trip path. The proposed design assures that the modification does not increase the probability or consequences of malfunction.

II. No. In addition to Item I above, the proposed modification does not alter the function or design parameters of any safety system. Therefore no new accident or malfunction conditions are created.

III. No. Technical Specifications address the setting and test requirements for degraded grid relays. This modification does not impact these requirements.

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.SER No.: 85-274 CROSS

REFERENCE:

PMR 84-9004-

~ DESCRIPTION OF CHANCE:

-Provide valves (including reach rods for_those valves)' ca the drain lines for-the Emergency Core Cooling rooms' drain - valve pits.

~

SUMMARY

I. No. FSAR Subsection 9.3'.3.3 states that failure of the equipment and floor drainage system cannot affect plant safety. The proposed-modification will permit drainage of the valve. pits when they become filled with water. The reach rods are supported so as to maintain B31.1 design criteria. There is no impact on system operation, function, nor design criteria, therefore the FSAR evaluation remains unchanged.- :

II. Nou In addition to Item-I above, any. failure resulting'from this modification is bound by previous FSAR' analyses.

III. No. The equipment and floor drainage system is not covered in the Technical Specifications.

'SER NO.: 85-275

' CROSS

REFERENCE:

PMR 85-3044 c ..

DESCRIPTION OF CHANCE:

Resizing the start'ing resistor on motors in the High Pressure Coolant Injection (HRI) System because of excessive starting currents and the need to optimize the 250.V DC load profile.

SUMMARY

I. No. . fThe proposed ' action will result in optimum in-rush currents that provide adequate starting torque for proper motor operation. Motor ,

starting time will not be impacted by the proposed change since resistor cutout times and in-rush currents will be obtained. There is no increase l in the probability of occurrence or the consequences of an accident or L malfunction of equipment related to' safety.

I II. No.- In addition to Item I above, the proposed action replaces motor starting resistors to obtain the motor starting currents in accordance L with manufacturers recommendations. The system design basis and function

'is not altered. Therefore the possibility of an accident or malfunction i

[ of a different type than any evaluated previously in the FSAR is not j created.

l l III. No. The proposed action lowers cumulative starting currents and will provide more margin against the existing 250V DC load profile. Therefore l the margin of safety is not reduced.

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SER NO.: 85-276 CROSS

REFERENCE:

PMR 85-3062 DESCRIPTION OF. CHANGE:

Replacement of four Class 1E inboard Main Steam Isolation Valve - Leakage Control'. System (MSIV-LCS) high leakage flow bypass timers with equivalent Class 1E timers having a range of 0-15 minutes instead of.the present 0-5 minutes.

SUMMARY

I. .No. The proposed action replaces existing time delay relays with equivalent plug-in Class 1E relays having a longer time range. The proposed change does extend the time that high flow leakage.can occur before the system trips. A calculation has been performed and'all-resulting doses are well below acceptable limits of 10CFR100. FSAR Sections 6.7 and 15.6 have been reviewed and determined to not be impacted by the proposed action.

II. No. In addition to Item I above, the proposed modification will be made to the standards of the original equipment and the system will function as originally intended. Therefore, the proposed change does not provide a; possibility for an accident or malfunction of a different type than previously identified in the FSAR.

1. No. The calibrations are a result of installation of nev noble gas detectors in the Post Accident Vent Stack Sample System. There is no impact on plant equipment related to safety.

II. No. The proposed action is an isolated calibration which has no impact i on safety related equipment.

I III. No. The subject system is not addressed by the Technical Specifications.

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i 4

SER No.:1 8 5-281 CROSS

REFERENCE:

PMR 85-3106

- DESCRIPTION OF CHANCE:'

Revise control circuitry in the two positive closing, non-return check valves installed in the turbine extraction steam feedline to the steam seal evaporator.

SUMMARY

1. No. The Steam Seal System has no safety.related function per.FSAR Subsection 10.4.~3. The proposed action provides additional ~ protection t

against main turbine overspeed as discussed.in FSAR Subsection 3.5'1.3.4.

~

Therefore there is no increase in the probability of occurrence or the

, consequences of an accident or malfunction of equipment related to safety.

- II. No. See Item I-above.

III. No. The_ Steam Seal System is not addressed in the Technical Specifications.

SER No.: 85-282 CROSS

REFERENCE:

PMR 83-807M

, 1s

-SER NO.:.85-285. .

. , . CROSS

REFERENCE:

PMR 85-8010 DESCRIPTION OF CHANCE:

Residual-Heat / Removal (RHR) pipe GBB-109-H10 will be strengthened by adding steel stiffener plates to several.of its connection points.

SUMMARY

I. 'No. The proposed action will strengthen the pipe connections thereby reducing the probability of a localized failure.

II. -No. By strengthening the support, piping integrity is further maintained therefore there is no increase in the probability of an accident or malfunction not evaluated.

III. No. Operation outside the parameters established by the margin of safety is not impacted by this change.

SER NO.: '85-286 CROSS RZFERENCE: Test Procedure 79-002 DESCRIPTION OF CHANCE:

The subject procedure performs the necessary functional tests to ensure proper operation of the Post Accident Vent Stack Sample System (PAVSSS).

I-

SUMMARY

}

I. No. The test does not utilize or. affect safety related equipment except for one Standby Cas Treatment System (SGTS) fan. The use of this fan is l in its normal mode of operation and as a result cannot increase the

, probability of occurrence or the consequences of an accident or l malfunction of equipment related to safety, i

II. No. In addition to Item I above, a review of FSAR Chapter 15 for types-

. of. accidents or malfunctions important to safety did not reveal that this j test would create any additional accidents or malfunctions of a type

different from any of those previously evaluated.

! III. No. The performance of this test requires certain Limiting Conditions f for Operation (LCO's) and associated action statements to be met.

However, these actions are within the margin of safety as defined in the i Technical Specifications.

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SER No. : 85-287 4

CROSS

REFERENCE:

PMR 82-046 DESCRIPTION OF CHANCE:

Installation of a post-accident vent stack sampling and monitoring system for each the unit's Turbine-Building and Standby Cas Treatment Systems vent stacks.

SUMMARY

I. No. The work will not be performed in any area where any safety-related equipment is le:ated. Operation of this systen, when installed, will not affect the function of any safety related equipment.

II. No. In addition to Item I above, a' review of FSAR Chapter 15 did not result in the creation of any additional accidents or malfunctions of safety related equipment.

III. No. This new system is designed to monitor plant performance and to provide' operator information as opposed to providing process control.

There is no impact on the bases for any Technical Specifications.

SER No.: 85-288 CROSS

REFERENCE:

Boundary Tag Request 001

- DESCRIPTION OF CHANCE:

1 Valves 0-65-025 and 0-65-016 on the Standby Gas Treatment System (SGTS) vent stack monitoring equipment will be closed and tagged to establish the normal i flow path of samplings from vent stack array AN-07801 to the flow monitoring l panel 9C539A.

i-

SUMMARY

s I. No. The proposed action maintains the sample flow path from SGTS i

sampling array to the flow monitor thereby isolating the operating sample

?

system from additional work being performed under another plant i modification. Therefore there is no increase in the probability of

, occurrence or consequences of an accident or malfunction of equipment.

! II. No. Maintaining the boundary tagged isolation valves in the closed i' position maintains the sample flow path from the Standby Gas Treatment System array to the flow monitor and isolates the additional piping being

added by another plant modification.

III. No. With the valves closed, the vent stack is confined to its intended path and sample flow is isolated from other work. The margin of safety is not reduced.

r

PLA-2776, Forwards 10CFR50.59 Rept Summarizing 1985 Approved Safety Evaluations for Determining Unreviewed Safety Question

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