PLA-4854, Provides Summary of Investigations That PP&L Performed in Response to Concerns Identified by Former Nuclear Plant Operator.Summary Requested by Cj Anderson on 980213

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Provides Summary of Investigations That PP&L Performed in Response to Concerns Identified by Former Nuclear Plant Operator.Summary Requested by Cj Anderson on 980213
ML20202G405
Person / Time
Site: Susquehanna  Talen Energy icon.png
Issue date: 02/27/1998
From: Byram R
PENNSYLVANIA POWER & LIGHT CO.
To: Hehl C
NRC
Shared Package
ML20202F480 List:
References
FOIA-99-36 PLA-4854, NUDOCS 9902050163
Download: ML20202G405 (7)
v • d • e


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Robert G. Byram PP&L. Inc.

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Senior Vice President Two North Ninth Street

  • Generation and Chief Nuclear Omcer Allentown. PA 18101-1179 , .

Tel 610.774.7502 Fax 610.774.5019 Tel 610.774.5151 s,',,,

E-mail: rgbyramgpaptcorn ht1/www paptcom/

I FEB 2 71998 Mr. Charles W. Hehl 475 Allendale Road King of Prussia, PA 19406 SUSQUEHANNA STEAM ELECTRIC STATION

SUMMARY

OF INVESTIGATIONS Docket Nos. 50-387 (PLA-4854 FILE R41-2 and 50-388

Dear Mr. Hehl:

The purpose of this letter is to provide a suntmary of the investigations that PP&L performed in response to concems identified by a former Nuclear Plant Operator (NPO). This summary was requested by Mr. ClitTord J. Anderson of your staff on Friday, February 13, 1998. As also i requested by Mr. Anderson, corrective actions related to individuals are not addressed.

Former PP&L Emplovee Concerns A former NPO contacted PP&L's Corporate Audit Services Department and identified four concerns: These concerns were:

a) PP&L correspondence to the'NRC, dated April 9,1997, misrepresented alarm test information,

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1 b) Reliability of computer data associated with NPO testing of the Engineered Safeguard System (ESS) transformer alarms was questioned.  :

c) At times, Plant Con 2ol Operators (PCO) failed to perform control room annunciator panel testing; and there were inconsistencies between shifts regarding the testing of

- inner vs. outer control room annunciator panels. and d) At times. Auxiliary Systems Operators (ASO) failed tc perform radwaste control room offgas panel alarm testing.

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l FILE R41-2 PLA-4854 Mr. Charles W. Hehl Conduct pfInvestinations The individual (s) conducting the investination were indeoendent of the organization affected bv the concern and were oroficient in the soecified functional area.

Members - of the Corporate Audit Services investigation team that performed the j investigations are independent of the Nuclear Department. Additionally, the individuals who performed the investigation are knowledgeable of Nuclear Department procedures and ,

processes and were sufficiently proficient to perform the investigation.

The evaluation was of sufficient deoth and scone. l The investigative team's efforts included: reviewing pertinent documentation associated with _,

the concems identified, conducting interviews with appropriate personnel, and analyzing results and developing conclusions.

Investination Results a) PP&L correspondenee to the NRC. dated Acril 9.1997. misrecresented alarm test information.

The investigative team reviewed the circumstances of the issue and concluded that l the concern was not substantiated. ,

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The investigation team found no evidence that Nuclear Department Management ,

(Management) personnel involved in developing and reviewing the April 9,1997 letter, had any knowledge of other missed alarm tests as of April 9,1997. The investigation determined that Management generally relied on a Nuclear Assessment-Service surveillauce (review) of approximately 125,000 individual tasks to substantiate the basis for making certain statements in the April 9,1997 letter.

b) Reliability of comouter data associated with NPO testine of the Enuineered Safecuard Svstem (ESST transformer alarms was ouestioned.

The Unit I computer data did not reliably record NPO performance of the ESS transformer alarm tests. However, the Unit 2 computer does provide a reliable record of at least two of the ESS transformer alarm tests.

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FILE R41-2 PLA-4854 Mr. Charles W. Hehl The Unit I computer monitors computer noints associated with the ESS transformer alarms at a slow speed; therefore, it did not reliably demonstrate NPOs performance of the alarm tests. A review of the Unit 2 computer data indicated that NPO's were testing a least two of the ESS transformers during the period January 1996 through July 1996. Due to the Unit 2 computers inability to record computer points associated with the other two ESS transformers, conclusive evidence that NPOs tested these ESS transformer alarms could not be obtained.

l c) At times. PCO's failed to nerform control com annunciator canel testine: and there were inconsistencies between shifts recardine the testine of inner vs. outer control room annunciator nanels.

The investigative team reviev<ed the circumstances of the issue and, based on personal interviews, concluded that most PCO's believed to the best of their knowledge that they tested the alarms during the review period of January 1996 through June 1996. The investigation did not disclose documentary evidence (computer points) to validate or disprove the concern.

Evidence also exists that, between January 1996 and June 1996, there were inconsistencies between shifts regarding management's expectations for the testing of control room inner vs. outer annunciator panels. This conclusion was based upon the incensistent understanding by PCO's as to management's expectations for testing the inner vs. outer control room annunciator panels.

d) At times. Auxiliarv Svstems Onerators (ASO) failed to nerform radwaste control room offeas nanel alarm testine.

The investigative team reviewed the circumstances of the issue and concluded that the concern was substantiated.

This conclusion was based upon a determination that the required testing for the time period identified in the concern was. at times. not performed. This determination was based upon personnel interviews and an analysis of computer point testing data. The detailed analysis of computer point testing data verified that the testing was, at times, not performed.

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FILE R41-2 PLA-4854 Mr. Charles W. Hehl Corrective Actions Upon review of each concern, enhancements to existing conditions or programs were identified. PP&L considers that the enhancement actions developed to be proactive and timely. Revisions to procedures and administrative actions to enhance supervisory oversight have been taken. Engineering and modification evaluations are ongoing.

Specific corrective actions are identified below.

The concerns identified by the former NPO. with one exception that was determined to be unsubstantiated, occurred prior to the "E" Emergency Diesel Generator (EDG) event that occurred in July 1996. Since corrective actions associated with the "E" EDG event, in part, addressed the necessity to perform required procedural activities, some of the corrective actions associated with the "E" EDG also applied to these concerns. _

Specific corrective actions developed in response to the "E" EDG event that also '

generically apply to the concerns identified by the former NPO include:

. Operations personnel were retrained on management expectations regarding standards and procedural adherence.

. Operations shift supervisory oversight was enhanced. This is being implemented, in part, by providing Shift Supervision expectations for performance. and expanding the entire Operations supervisory oversight of rounds.

. An " Operations Improvement Plan" was develop and is being implemented. This Plan addresses a range of characteristics, such as communications and work management. that will improve the erTectiveness of Operations, and

. Improving the quality of first-line supervision. This is being implemented through attendance in Leadership Academy training which provides instruction in advanced leadership skills.

Based on internal reviews of operator rounds that have been performed since the "E" EDG event. PP&L believes that the corrective actions taken have been effective in addressing the causes of the event. and will also assist in mitigating similar future events.

Additional corrective actions, where necessary. were also taken to address each specific l issue. These corrective actions are identified below:

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FILE R41-2 PLA-4854 Mr. Charles W. Hehl a) PP&L corresoondence to the NRC. dated April 9.1997. misrepresented alarm test information.

This concern was not substantiated; therefore. no corrective actions were required.

b) Reliability of computer data associated with NPO testine of the Encineered Safecuard Svstem (ESS) tmnsformer alarms was ouestioned.

Reliable computer data was available that validated ESS transformer alarm testing for two of the four ESS transformers. The Unit I computer is scheduled to be _

upgraded during the Unit 1 10th Refueling and Inspection Outage scheduled to begin in April 1998. This upgrade will. in part, enhance monitoring the four ESS transformer alarm tests.

c) At times PCO's failed to cerform control room annunciator canel testine: and there were inconsistencies between shifts recardine the testine of inner and outer control room annunciator canels. ]

In July 1997. Nuclear Operations clarified the alarm test requirements to help i enable consistency between shifts.

d) At times. Auxiliarv Svstems Operators ( ASOT failed to cerform radwaste control ,

l room offcas canel alarm testine, e In July 1996, Nuclear Operations management clarified the necessity to completely and concisely document operations activities, and

. In November 1997, Nuclear Operations made procedural revisions which moved the radwaste control room offgas panel alarm testing requirements to a different procedure which contains other ASO equipment checks.

As a result of the above noted investigations. and associated corrective actions, PP&L considers these concerns closed.

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Mr. Charles W. Hehl L

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  • we trust that you will find this submittal responsive. If you have any questions please contact -;

Mr. J. M. Kenny at (610) 774 7535.  ;

E Sincerely, ,

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Attached are copies of PP&L correspondence to the NRC related to the former NPO concerns:

Date NRC

, Subject Submitted PLA # Recipient Investigation Report

  • 12/1/97 None K. Logan Redacted Investigation Report 12/4/97 PLA-4818 K. Logan Redacted Investigation Report 1/26/98 PLA-4833 K. Logan Response-Requested Infonnation 2/18/98 PLA-4851 C. W. Hehl Non-Redacted Investigation Report #739459-2-98 2/18/98 PLA-5852 D. Vito Summary ofInvestigations** 2/27/98 PLA-4854 C. W. Hehl Non-Redacted Investigation Reports 3/11/98 PLA-4865 D. Vito This non-redacted copy of the control room annunciator alarm testing report was sent directly by the Manager- Corporate Audit Services

" This correspondence was returned to PP&L marked " undeliverable" by US Post j Office. The correspondence was re-submitted on March 10,1998.

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