Text

Forwards Summary Rept of Safety Evaluations Approved During 1988.Changes Include Backseating Control Box to Electrically Backset HV-202168 to Reduce Steam Leakage & Rerouting Condensate Supply Line to Main Condenser Keepfill
	ML18040B250
Person / Time
Site:	Susquehanna
Issue date:	06/20/1989
From:	Keiser H; PENNSYLVANIA POWER & LIGHT CO.
To:	Russell W; NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION I)
References
	PLA-3215, NUDOCS 8906270092
	Download: ML18040B250 (107)
	v • d • e

ACCZ&W REGULATORi+NFORNKTIQN DISTRIBUTION TEN (RIDE)

ACCESSION NBR:8906270092 DOC.DATE: 89/06/20 NOTARIZED: NO DOCKET ¹ FACZL:50-387 Susquehanna Steam Electric Station, Unit 1, Pennsylva 05000387 50-388,Susquehanna Steam Electric Station, Unit 2, Pennsylva 05000388 AUTH. NAME AUTHOR AFFILIATION KEZSERFH.W. Pennsylvania Power & Light Co.

RECIP.NAME RECIPIENT AFFILIATION RUSSELL,W.T. Region 1, Ofc of the Director

SUBJECT:

Forwards summary rept of safety evaluations approved during periodf DISTRIBUTION CODE: IE47D Jan-Dec 1988. ~~>~

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j ENCL TITLE: 50.59 Annual Report of Changes, Tests or Experiments Made Transcripts.

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Pennsylvania Power 8 Light ompany Two North Ninth Street ~ Allentown, PA 18101 ~ 215/7706151 Submitted pursuant to Harold W. Kelser 10CFR50.59 Senior V/ce President-Nuclear 215/770.4194 JUN 20 Isg Mr. William T. Russell Regional Administrator, Region I U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission 475 Allendale Road King of Prussia, PA 19406 SUS(UEHANNA STEAM ELECTRIC STATION 10CFR50.59

SUMMARY

REPORT PLA-3215 FILE R41-2A

Dear Mr. Russell:

Pursuant to 10CFR50.59(b), enclosed please find a summary report of the safety evaluations. approved during the period from January 1, 1988 to December 31, 1988 for Susquehanna SES Units 1 5 2.

The report format is as follows:

SER No. - Unique number for each safety evaluation.

Cross Reference - Reference to the document for which the safety evaluation was prepared.

Description Change - A brief description of the change made to procedures, equipment or tests.

Summary - A summary of the three requirements for determining an unreviewed safety question as defined in 10CFR50.59(a)(2).

If you have any question, please contact D. J. Walters at (215) 770-6536.

Very truly yours, H. W. Keiser 8906270092 890620 PDR ADOCK 05000387 Enclosure P PNU CC: c oclimenC -aG.

Mr. G. S. Barber, NRC Sr. Res1 ent nspector - SSES Mr. M. C. Thadani, NRC Project Manager - Bethesda

SER NO: 88-001 CROSS

REFERENCE:

TP-247-008 Rev. 0 DESCRIPTION OF CHANGE Use the backseating control box to electrically backseat HV-202168 to reduce steam leakage.

SUMMARY

I. No. All components which are required for safe shutdown of the plant will not fail as a result of a failure in a high energy or moderate energy piping system as all components required to perform this function are analyzed for this event.

II. No. If the proposed action resulted in a crack in the valve casing of HV-20216B there is a potential to cause an imbalance in the steam flow to the Main Turbine. This could result in a Turbine trip which is an already analyzed event.

III. No. The feedwater heaters, moisture separator drains and related valves are not addressed in the basis for any Technical Specification.

SER NO.: 88-002 CROSS

REFERENCE:

PMR 83-632 Rev. 3 DESCRIPTION OF CHANGE:

This revision deletes the automatic acquisition of Vent Monitor Data from the Eberline Vent Monitor System for input to the STREAM software system. Vent data wild be entered manually through keyboard entry as required to support dose pro)ection calculations.

SUMMARY

I. No. The intent of FSAR Section 11.5 relating to vent monitoring will not be changed. The modification to the control units will not affect any safety-related systems.

II. No. STREAM is only an information system and has no controlling processes.

III. No. STREAM enhancements are entirely consistent with the Technical Specifications basis sections including B3/4.11.2.1, B3/4.11.2.2, B3/4.11.2.3 and B3/4.11.4

. 8906270092

SER NO.: 88-003 CROSS

REFERENCE:

PMR. 87-7030 Rev. 0 DESCRIPTION OF CHANGE:

This change strengthens the Unit 2 78-inch cooling tower bypass diffuser grid to prevent failures.

SUMMARY

I. No. The proposed action does not alter the function, prevent the operation or reduce the redundancy of any safety related components.

II. No. As discussed in FSAR Sections 10.4.5.1, 10.4.5.3 and 9.2.1.3, the failure of the cooling tower bypass diffuser grid will not compromise any safety related systems and will not prevent a safe nuclear shutdown.

III. No. The circulating water system, service water system and the cooling tower are not safety related and are not addressed in the bases of the Technical Specifications.

SER NO.: 88-004 CROSS

REFERENCE:

PMR 86-9002 Rev. 0 DESCRIPTION OF CHANGE:

This modification adds heat-trace and insulation to the 3/8 inch sample tubing for the c'ontainment atmosphere H20 analyzers to eliminate the condensation and maintain the containment atmosphere sample in a vapor state.

SUMMARY

I. No. The heat-trace and insulation will be added such that the seismic category I qualification of the analyzer panels will not be degraded.

The Analyzer panels are not subject to specific environmental qualification requirements.

II. No. This modification affects sample tubing downstream of the containment isolation valves only, therefore, containment isolation considerations are not affected. Also, see above.

III. No. The modification does not affect any of the safety limits or limiting safety settings of equipment required for safety as discussed in Technical Specification Section 3/4.3.7.5 and 3/4.6.6.3.

SER NO.: 88-005 CROSS

REFERENCE:

PMRs 87-9052, Rev. 0 and 87-9053, Rey. 0 DESCRIPTION OF CHANGE:

Reroute the condensate Supply Line to the Main Condenser keepfill and add two new Isolation/Supply Valves on Units 1 and 2.

SUMMARY

I. No. The'ondenser Vacuum Breaker Keepfill is a branch of the Condensate system which has no safety related function per FSAR Section 10.4.7 and this change will not affect any safety related equipment.

II. No. Failure of this line will not cause any flooding problems because it is only a 1-inch line and there is no safety related equipment in the area. Also see above.

III. No. The Condensate System and the Condenser Vacuum Breaker Keepfill are not addressed in the bases of the Technical Specifications.

SER NO.: 88-006 CROSS

REFERENCE:

PMRs 87-9121 Rev. 0 and 87-9122, Rev. 0 DESCRIPTION OF CHANGE:

This change will replace the Historical Recording and Program Development (HRPD) disc drive and controller to increase spare capacity and aid in maintenance of the disc drive for Units 1 and 2.

SUMMARY

I. No. There are no safety-related systems in the Plant Computer Room and the disc drive does not interface with any plant equipment.

II. No. The proposed change does not change the design criteria for any

.system or function as described in the FSAR.

III. No. The installation of the disc drive does not conflict with the basis for any technical specification.

ERR NO.: 88-007 CROSS

REFERENCE:

SCP E872034, Rev. 0 DESCRIPTION OF CHANGE:

Replace existing Westinghouse thermal overload relay heater, catalog !IFH41 with similar heater coil //FH37.

SUMMARY

I. No. This change is necessary to provide better motor protection for radwaste liquid pump by decreasing overload relay actuation value from 10.3-11.2 amps to 7.1-7.7 amps.

II. No. The proposed action does not change the function of the overload nor the operation and is in accordance with engineering specifications.

III. No. Selection of the overload relay heater coil is not discussed in the Technical Specifications.

SER NO.: 88-008 CROSS

REFERENCE:

NL-88-001, Rev. 0 DESCRIPTION OF CHANGE:

Place the operation of the Low Level Radwaste Holding Facility (LLRWHF), with no physical changes or modifications, under the jurisdiction of the 10CFR Part 50 Operating Licenses for SSES, Unit 1 (NPF-14) and Unit 2(NPF-22), and to terminate the existing 10CFR Part 30 License No. 37-06554-4 using the method established by NRC Generic Letter 81-38.

SUMMARY

I. No. The LLRWHF is a subsystem of the Solid Waste Management System (SWMS, reference FSAR Subsection 11.4.1). The SWMS has no safety related functions, and the LLRWHF does not contain or interface with any safety related equipment, systems, components or structures.

I. No. The reanalysis is in accordance with the original design basis and as such addresses all affected aspects of the existing qualification calculations.

II. No. The original design basis and code requirements are still met.

Reference FSAR Table 3.9-27. Code Case N-4.11, which provides increased damping factors for piping analysis, has been utilized.

III. No. Since the proposed action only reduces the overall snubber population at SSES, the bases described in Section 3/4.7.4 are not directly affected.

SER NO.: 88-013 CROSS

REFERENCE:

PMR 87-3033, Rev. 0 DESCRIPTION OF CHANGE:

Provide controlled personnel access by installing electronic card readers at doors 150, 106 and 106A.

SUMMARY

I. No. The installation will not impose a functional concern to any system used to mitigate transients or accidents/analyzed in Chapter 15. FSAR.

II. No. A review of FSAR Chapter 8, Sections 8.1.3b, 8.3.1.2 and 8.3.1.2.1 and Chapter 15 for system 107 and Sections 9.5.1, 9.5.1.1.21 and Chapter 15 for system 012, shows no effect by the proposed design change.

III. No. Units I & II Technical Specifications and Bases have been reviewed for lighting and miscellaneous distribution system, specifically Section 3/4.8, Electrical Power Systems and for the building system, specifically plant systems Section 3/4.7.7, Fire Rated Assemblies, and no effects were found as a result of the proposed design change.

SER NO.: 88-014 CROSS

REFERENCE:

PLIS-29256 DESCRIPTION OF CHANGE:

The evaluation addresses the strategy to install the piping,and valves associated with Residual Heat Removal Waterhammer Mod (PMR 87-3025B&C).

SUMMARY

I. No. The postulated accident for this particular action is the accidental dropping (heavy load drop) of t'e pipe and valve on the RHR piping. If this should occur, the safety function of RHR (LPCI) would be unaffected since the valves are normally closed and upstream of the postulated heavy load drop.

No. The valve is part of the condensate and feedwater system described in FSAR Section 10.4.7. The systems have no safety related functions; the valve is a non-safety related valve; no safety related equipment is impacted by this modification.

SUMMARY

I. No. FSAR Sections 3.6A, 15.6.6 or 6.2 do not evaluate the function of the F008 valve as related to safety specifically in conditions 4 and 5.

The proposed actions maintain the valve functional and enhance the Plant's ability to prevent or reduce consequences of accidents.

II. No. The proposed action provides a means to isolate a potential drain down path through the normally open F008 valve and therefore reduces the possibility of an accident.

III. No. Operability of the F008 valve is not required in conditions 4 and 5 per Technical Specification 3/4.6.3.

SER NO.: 88-029 CROSS

REFERENCE:

PMRs 87-9149, Rev. 0 and 87-9150, Rev,. 0 DESCRIPTION OF CHANGE:

Installation of a permanent public'ddress (PA) station in the Unit 1 Reactor Building, EL. 719,, drywell personnel airlock and at the Unit 2 drywell control point in the Reactor Building, EL.719, outside the personnel airlock.

REFERENCE:

NL-88-008 DESCRIPTION OF CHANGE:

Performance of Hydrolaze Cleaning of the Reactor Pressure Vessel Feedwater Nozzle Thermal sleeve areas in accordance with TP-062-024.

SUMMARY

I. No. The minimum potential accidents analyzed in the FSAR will not occur as the Reactor is defueled, depressurized and in Condition 5. The cleaning activity has no physical effect on the system other than to remove activated buildup products.

II. No. An analysis has been performed to demonstrate that no damage to the sparger, nozzle, or thermal sleeve area will result from the activity.

TP-062-024 will control work performed.

No adverse impacts will result to primary containment, secondary containment, control room habitability, ECCS evaluation, pipebreak analysis, overpressure analysis, instrument response or Class lE distribution.

III. No. The plant will be in Condition 5. The only affect can be loose parts upon startup. Joints of hydrolaze equipment will be mechanically connected with safety cables and welded at each connection. Material inventories will also be conducted.

SER NO.: 88-042 CROSS

REFERENCE:

NL-99-009 DESCRIPTION OF CHANGE:

Placing the fuel pool cooling systems in a configuration for cooling the Unit 2 Fuel Pool with Unit 1 Fuel pool cooling system and Unit 1 fuel pool available.

SUMMARY

I. No. A review was conducted of FSAR Section 9.1, Appends 9A, and Chapter

15. Postulated consequences of utilizing the proposed configuration were analyzed and shown to be less significant than previously analyzed.

II. No. There is no new accident possible beyond loss of fuel pool cooling as previously analyzed in the FSAR.

III. No. There is no Technical Specification or basis applicable to this configuration as the Technical Specification is only applicable when irradiated fuel is in the reactor vessel.

SER NO.: 88-043 CROSS

REFERENCE:

TP-237-001, NL-88-010, TP-237-001, Rev. 1; TP-237-001, Rev. 2 DESCRIPTION OF CHANGE:

Draining the Unit 2 Condensate Storage Tank to the Liquid Radwaste (LRW)

Collection System.

SUMMARY

I. No. FSAR sections 9.2.10.3 and 9.3.3 were reviewed. Performance of this letdown does not change the probability of tank rupture. Failure of discharge piping does not affect plant safety. Actuation of the Unit 1 Turbine Building. Outer Area Sump alarm (High-High) will require termination of the draindown and restoration of piping to pump'he sump to LRW. The possibility of temporary pipe breaking was analyzed, and the consequences considered with respect to FSAR requirements. The affects of temporary piping on permanent plant equipment was analyzed and determined compatible.

II. No. In the event of a break in the temporary piping and no operator action, water would not affect any safety related equipment in the turbine building. Radiologically, such a break is bounded by FSAR analysis.

III. No. The basis for Technical Specification 3/4.3.3, was reviewed. No systems required t'o be operable in this plant condition are affected by the performance of the TP.

Radiological doses, assuming a CST rupture, were calculated and shown not to exceed Technical Specification 3.11.2.3 and 3.11.4.

SER NO.: 88-044 CROSS

REFERENCE:

PMR 87-8002 DESCRIPTION OF CHANGE Removal of nuisance alarms from the alarm CRT connected to the plant computer system.

SUMMARY

I. No. The modification affects the plant computer system, which is defined as a non-safety-related system. The alarm CRT displays do not interfere with or impact the control room annunciator system.

I. No. A review of FSAR Sections 9.1.3, 9.2.10, 12.2.1.3, 12.2.1.4.2 and 15.7 was performed. A technical review did not identify any concerns relative to piping or component failure. The release of the total inventory to the reactor building is more conservative than the Condensate Storage Tank rupture which is less severe than the concentrates storage tank rupture analyzed in FSAR Section 15.7.3.5.

II. No. The TP will not affect the operation of Unit 1 fuel pool system.

The test does not affect the design basis of the system. The test also does not; affect any ECCS power supplies or essential water inventories required for the safe shutdown of Unit 1. The Unit 2 core is being maintained in the Unit 2 fuelpool and cross-tied to the Unit 1 fuel pool cooling system. This TP does not affect operation in this mode. Unit 2 service water is out of service for flushes with the heat exchanger isolated and vented. Samples will be taken on the service water side to ensure against leakage.

III. No. Technical Specifications 3.9.8 and 3.9.9 refer to required water levels during refueling operations. This TP will not affect the ability to maintain level.

SER NO.: 88-048 CROSS

REFERENCE:

NL-88-012, NL-88-012, Rev. 2 DESCRIPTION OF CHANGE:

Use of the Unit 2 Condensate Storage Tank (CST) as a receiving tank for powdered resin and activated corrosion products from common fuelpool filter demineralizer.

SUMMARY

I. No. FSAR Section 9.2.10.3 addresses the rupture of the tank and retaining of its volume within the tank dike. The probability the occurrence of the event is not increased by the TP as the tank is designed and operates as a receptor for flush effluents. No design parameters are exceeded during the process. The rupture of the CST is not specifically analyzed in FSAR Chapter 15. However, the worst case of a similar type is analyzed in Section 15.7.3.5.

II.~ No. FSAR Section 9.2.10.3 evaluates the rupture of the Unit

~ ~ 2 Condensate Storage Tank. ~

I. No. The functions of both the pre-action sprinkler system and the electrical detection system are not affected by this action.

Implementation of this change increases the reliability and availability of fire protection in the plant area affected.

II. No. The design criteria of this. change is non-quality, non-seismic, and me'ets all the original design inputs and codes imposed upon the original equipment.

III. No. Unit Technical Specifications 3/4.7.6.2 and 3/4.8 were reviewed.

1 It was determined that the proposed modification had no affect on the technical specification or the margin of safety provided in the bases thereto.

SER NO.: 88-052 CROSS

REFERENCE:

NL-88-014, Rev. 0, OP-068-140 DESCRIPTION OF CHANGE:

Use of the Westinghouse-Hittman Nuclear Incorporated mobile system to perform in-cask dewatering of radioactive waste.

SUMMARY

I. No. FSAR Section 15.7.3 analyzed a rupture of a radwaste tank in the Radwaste Building. This evaluation bounds the postulated failure of a dewatering radwaste liner/high integrity container within the Radwaste Building. The use of a mobile radwaste system in the Unit 2 Reactor Building does not increase the probability of occurrence or consequences of the limiting accident as analyzed in the FSAR for the Solid Radwaste System. The FSAR notes provisions provided for mobile processing services in Section 11.4.

II. No. Use of the mobile dewatering system does not create any adverse impact to safety-related systems, equipment, or structures. The dewatering process does not create any new accidents not previously evaluated in FSAR Section 15.7.3. The review of this issue considered containment of radioactive material. The dewatering process, dewatering system safeguards, hydrogen gas production, electrical loading, crosstie of waste transfer lines, fire protection, QA, QC, and personnel training.

III. No. Technical Specifications related to solid r'adwaste processing address only the aspects of the process control program which will be adhered to as if the waste was processed in the Radwaste Building.

SER NO.: 88-053 CROSS

REFERENCE:

PMR 88-3003, Rev. 0 DESCRIPTION OF CHANGE:

Relocate a fire line around the location of the new warehouse off-load facility.

SUMMARY

I. No. FSAR Section 9.5.1 defines fire protection system requirements.

Activities associated with this modification do no affect safety-related portions of the Fire Protection Yard Piping System.

II. No. The modification does not involve a change to the system design basis. All work takes place in an area where no safety-related or critical non-safety-related piping or duct banks are located.

III. No. The portion of piping affected is not address by Technical Specifications.

SER NO.: 88-054 CROSS

REFERENCE:

PMR 87-1048 DESCRIPTION OF CHANGE:

Replace existing Cutler Hammer standard trip eutectic alloy, thermal overload relay heater coil, with similar heater coil.

SUMMARY

I. No. The proposed action will serve to improve the availability of the Security Control Center Room Exhaust Fan through increasing the actuation value of the thermal overload relay. This action serves to prevent overload caused by misoperation during normal plant operation.

II. No. The action does not change the function of the overload nor the operation, and is in accordance with engineering specifications. This action improves availability.

III. No. Neither the selection of overload relay heater coils or the security system discussed in the Technical Specifications.

SER NO.: 88-055 CROSS

REFERENCE:

SCP NL-88-013, Rev. 0, TP-237-002 DESCRIPTION OF CHANGE:

Removal of contaminated sludge from the Unit 2 Condensate Storage Tank (CST) to a high integrity container.

SUMMARY

I. No. The radiological consequences of the rupture of the Unit 2 CST is bounded by the analysis for the rupture of the concentrates waste tank in Section 15.7.3.5 of the FSAR. The cleaning of the CST will be performed while the tank is isolated from all plant systems except the overflow to Liquid Radwaste. Since the plant will be in Condition 5 and maybe defuel, ECCS systems are not required, no impact on safety-related equipment is present.

II. No. The worse case scenario resulting from the pumping evolutions would be rupturing of the hose leading from the top of the CST to the Reactor Building Truck Bay and releasing its entire expected contents. Due to its lesser volume, associated lower curie content, and piping encapsulation, rupture of this line is of a lesser consequence than the rupture of the Unit 2 CST, which is discussed in FSAR Section 9.2.10.3.

Operational, radiological, and personnel safety concerns were addressed.

III. No. Radiological doses have been calculated and are below appropriate technical specification limits. This calculation is conservative in that it did not factor in shielding from the concrete berm around the tank or attenuation from buildings. All proposed operations are within the requirements of Unit 1/Unit 2 Technical/Specification 3/4.11.3.

SER NO.: 88-056 CROSS

REFERENCE:

PMR 85-8026 DESCRIPTION OF CHANGE:

Convert the 3-packing set seal on valves B31-2F023A&B and B31-2F031A&B to 1-packing set seal design.

SUMMARY

I. No. The proposed action will not adversely affect the function of the valves as related to safety. The packing change will eliminate problems associated with alignment of the flanges and maintenance of the packing.

The single packing has the advantage of simplified installation and ease of repacking, which reduces radiation exposure.

I. No. Raceway structural seismic, and ampacity requirement were assured to be satisfied.

II. No. This modification does not interface with logic, control, or operation of any plant systems or components. The addition of fire enclosures enables safe shutdown circuits to function in the event of a fire.

No. Structural and seismic integrity is not compromised by the

'II.

additional weight of the protective material. Power cables have been derated to assure they will be operating within their design temperature after the raceways are enclosed. No plant parameters are affected by this modification.

SER NO.: 88-060 CROSS

REFERENCE:

Partial Implementation of PMR 87-3025 During U2-2 Refueling and Inspection Outage (RIO).

DESCRIPTION OF CHANGE:

Partial Implementation of the RHR Waterhammer Modification during the Unit 2-2RIO due to the inability to procure qualified valve actuators.

SUMMARY

I. No. The nonfunctional piping supports, and valves are not connected to exi'sting plant systems mechanically or electrically. The installation has been reviewed for all applicable design requirements such as Seismic II/I and will not present a hazard to safety-related equipment in the area. The piping and valves will be "laid-up" in a way which preserves the quality level for future use.

II. No. The non-function piping, valves and supports do not interface with existing systems and are supported for all design basis loads. No new failure mechanisms are introduced. The design has been evaluated against all applicable review programs. The portions of the modification which will be installed and functional have been evaluated. There are no interactions between the installed scope and the deferred scope which are important to safety.

III. No. The Technical Specifications evaluated by the original PMR safety evaluation were reviewed in light of partial implementation. Technical Specification 3/4.5, ECCS is related to'HR system performance which is not affected. Technical Specification 3/4.6 Containment Systems has to do with leakage. The valves which are not tied-in do not contribute to leakage. The F)11 valves which are converted to locked manual will continue to be leak tested and added to all other tested valves. Total leakage is not increased.

SER NO.: 88-061 CROSS

REFERENCE:

PMR 87-7029, Rev. 2 DESCRIPTION OF CHANGE:

Replacement of the Offgas Recombiner Vessel, drain valve, and heating system.

This action is being taken to preclude cracking as a result of IGSCC.

SUMMARY

I. No. Section 15.7.1 of the FSAR evaluates a failure of the offgas system due to system boundary rupture. The vessel being installed is not as susceptible to cracking as the old vessel. The heating system upgrade reduces the stress levels in the vessel and thereby reduces susceptibility to cracking. The heating system upgrade involves local changes that will not affect local distribution. The drain valve is designed in accordance with the design requirements for D-augmented for gaseous radwaste systems.

II. No. The modification does not change the evaluation of FSAR Section 15.7.1.

III. No. This modification does not, affect any of the system performance requirements concerning radioactive releases or explosive mixtures discussed Technical Specification 3/4.11.2. The new vessel will perform the same as the current vessel with additional protection against IGSCC.

The upgraded heating system will perform better than the old heating system in terms of preventing heater burn out and minimizing vessel cracking.

SER NO.: 88-062 CROSS

REFERENCE:

PMR 87-9092A,B, Rev. 1 DESCRIPTION OF CHANGE:

Residual Heat Removal (RHR) system enhancements to include: 1) removal of the time delay interlock that prevents operation of the heat exchanger bypass valves for ten minutes after receipt of a LOCA signal, 2) consolidation of the containment spray valve initiation permissive switches and the containment spray valve LOCA isolation manual override switches, 3) replace the control switches for the RHR heat exchanger shell side bypass valves (3 position, spring return to auto position) with 3 position, maintain contact models, and

4) rearrange the RHR system panel inserts.

SUMMARY

I. No. As initially designed, the time-delay relay acts to prevent the operator from closing the RHR heat exchanger bypass valve for ten minutes following a LOCA signal. The object is to take advantage of the full flow capability of the RHR pumps for LPCI injection following a LOCA.

Present emergency operating procedures are symptom based. Operators are trained to monitor RRV water level to assure adequate core cooling exists. Once assured, the operator has the option to secure LPCI injection. The symptom-based EOPs direct actions that are not based upon time, but upon specific symptoms such as increasing suppression pool temperature. With the present design bypassing the ten-minute interlock can be achieved with administrative controls to achieve conformance with approved EOPs. The elimination of the ten-minute timer does not alter any actions necessary to protect for heat exchanger damage. It only impacts when these actions can be performed. The operator by incorrect actions has the capability to damage the RHR heat exchanger both before and after the deletion of the timer. A review of FSAR Chapters 6,7 and 15 determined that no accident analysis is dependent on the ten-minute delay. The modified design will not adversely affect any FSAR analysis and will provide sufficient interlocks to provide enough time for a satisfactory start of the LPCI mode of RHR when required.

The consolidation of the containment spray valve initiation permissive and containment spray valve LOCA isolation manual override switches simplifies actions necessary for the operators to respond to an abnormal event. The simplified control circuit reduces the probability that the containment spray mode of RHR will not be available during an accident due to failures of these components.

The use of maintained contact switches for the heat exchanger bypass valves allows the operator to perform other actions during this evolution. All functions of the switch remain the same. It will open and remain open following a LOCA signal independent of switch position, until the operator reinitializes the circuit and then placing the switch in the desired closed or open position. The rearrangement of the panel inserts does not alter the design of those controls which are functionally unaffected. The new inserts are design to the same standards and requirements as the present inserts.

No. Revision 3 to the EPQs produced by the BWROG in response to symptoms characteristic of an ATWS have been reviewed by the NRC and an SER has been issued. The EOPs direct reduction in vessel injection till water level is maintained between -38 and 0129 inches and initiation of suppression pool cooling as soon as possible. PP&L's EOPs are more conservative in their response to an ATWS. A safety evaluation on this deviation from Rev. 3 of the EPGs has been submitted to the NRC.

For a true ATWS event, concern exists regarding initiation of suppression pool cooling until after the time delay relay timer. In general, the time-delay relay can be an impediment to the quick and safe accomplishment of SSES EOPs. Removing the timer allows the EOP response to be implemented rapidly and safely without the need to install jumpers between terminal points as required under the present design. The result is an increase in plant safety.

With respect to terminating vessel injection and initiating suppression pool cooling during an ATWS events, PP&L believes the NRC SER applies to and bounds SSES EOPs and that the elimination of the time-delay relay function is consistent with the NRC accepted accident response scenario.

The removal of the timer would allow the operator to place one or both loops of RHR in suppression pool cooling during the first ten minutes of a LOCA if he misinterpreted plant symptoms and come to the wrong conclusion that an ATWS had occurred in lieu of a LOCA. This mistake is considered to be non-credible. The logic detailing this conclusion is contaminated in the SSES Individual Plant Evaluation which has been submitted to the NRC for review.

A single failure in either the pre- or post- modification heat exchanger bypass valve circuitry will result in a loss of one loop of RHR which has been analyzed in the FSAR. The loss of a RHR heat exchanger due to operator error in placing the loop in suppression pool cooling during the first ten minutes of a LOCA is also bounded by this analysis. Per FSAR Section 15.0.3.2.1.1 an operator error is a single failure and additional failures of active components are not considered in transient evaluations. Circuit techniques are such that common mode failures of both RHR divisions due to this modification are not credible.

The combination of the containment spray valve initiation permissive switches and containment spray valve LOCA isolation manual override switches do not create the possibility of a new situation or malfunction that did not exist prior to the modification. Circuit techniques are such that common mode failures of both RHR divisions due to this modification are non-credible.

The change of the RHR heat exchanger bypass valve control switch to maintain contacts does not change the function of the switch. The consequences of a failure of the control switch and circuitry do not change as a result of the modification. The worst case malfunction due to a single failure, loss of one loop of RHR during a LOCA, is evaluated in the FSAR. Common mode failures of both RHR division due to this modification are non-credible.

The redesign of the RHR control panel inserts does not functionally alter the RHR system. Human factors and operator experience have been incorporated into the panel design.

III. No. The modification does not alter the automatic functioning of the RHR system. The ability to comply with any technical specification is not altered. The improved ease of RHR system operation and the ability to enter suppression pool cooling early in an ATWS event improve the margin-of-safety. The modification will not alter the system's conformance to the Bases for Emergency Core Cooling System (Section 3/4.5)

SER NO.:

~

88-063 CROSS

PMR 88-3028 DESCRIPTIO OF CHANGE:

Install temporary instrumentation to monitor the exterior surface differential temperature across the RPV feedwater nozzle safe ends.

SUMMARY

I. No. Electrical separation will be maintained between temperature detector cables and any safety related cabling precluding an increase in the probability of any electrical common mode failure due to this modification. The Transient Monitoring System will be used to transmit data from the drywell to the TSC. This modification will not alter the non-safety related function of the system. Since this system does not directly interface with any safety or power generation systems and the system output is not readily available to the plant operator, the malfunction of this system will not impact the probability of occurrence of any accident or malfunction analyzed in FSAR Chapters 6 or 15.

No. The modification would not affect normal or accident operation.

I. No. These fans are non quality having no safety related function.

Failure of the fans will not compromise any safety related system or component or prevent a safe shutdown of the plant.

II. No. See Item I above.

III. No. The proposed modification affects non-safety related equipment not addressed in the Technical Specifications.

SER NO.: 88-084 CROSS

REFERENCE:

PMR 87-9056 DESCRIPTION OF CHANGE:

The proposed modification is a one-for-one replacement of the inlet Emergency Service Mater (ESW) check valves to the diesel generators.

SUMMARY

I. No. The proposed modification is a one-for-one replacement of the existing check valves. System operation will remain the same. 'he new check valves will be designed to be more reliable than the original check valves.

II. No. The proposed modification makes the ESW system functionally the same as it originally was.

III. No. The proposed modification does not effect the function and operation of any safety-related equipment.

ERR NO.: 88-085 CROSS

REFERENCE:

NCR 88-0084 DESCRIPTION OF CHANGE:

The purpose of this evaluation is to assess the replacement of Temp-Mat fibrous blanket insulation with NUKON fibrous blanket-type insulation.

SUMMARY

I. No. NUKON fibrous blanket-type meets all the criteria of the FSAR.

I. No. The conduit sealing requirements are consistent with the methods described and committed to in the Fire Protection Review Report (FPRR)

Revision 3.

II. No. Conduit sealing does not impose any changes to the performance capability of those cables encased by the seal. Heat transfer characteristics of the conduit sealing materials are such that cable ampacity derating is not required.

III. No. Conduit sealing does not affect the design basis of the systems whose conduits are being sealed.

SER NO.: 88-092 CROSS

REFERENCE:

PMR 88-3019A DESCRIPTION OF CHANGE: ~

PMRs 88-3011 A&B, 88-3012 AGB DESCRIPTION OF CHANGE:

Enhancements to the Safety Parameter Display System (SPDS), which include:

implementing the 'Drywell Spray Initiation Pressure Limit'mergency Procedure Guideline (EPD) curve CRT display format and revising the SPDS reactor water level algorithm to make the displayed value more accurate.

SUMMARY

I. No. The SPDS design is compatible with FSAR analyses. All hardware and software engineering has been performed in accordance with applicable codes, standards, and plant design criteria. There will not be any impact on the plant equipment and systems to which the SPDS inputs are attached.

II. No. The installation, routing and termination of cables does not create a possibility of an accident malfunction of a different type than any

-previously evaluated in the FSAR. Only non-lE cables are being affected which will be connected to non-1E terminations.

III. No. No changes are being made to any plant equipment by this design that will affect any Technical Specification setpoints, or margins or cause any adverse affect on safety related systems.

SER NO.: 88-105 CROSS

REFERENCE:

PMRs.85-3098D and 85-3097D DESCRIPTION OF CHANGE:

Installation of a control valve and several orifices in the Standby Liquid Control (SLC) system to allow pump throttling during SLC surveillance testing.

SUMMARY

I. No. The proposed action will install a new valve and orifices in the Non-Q portion of the SLC test line. This operation of the line is isolated from the normal system flow path by two normally closed valves.

Therefore failure of the new valve would have no direct effect on system function.

II. No. I In addition to Item above, the new valve is designed to prevent the generation of missiles which could affect other systems.

III. No. The margin of safety is not impacted since the modification is being installed in a non-Q portion of the SLC system.

SER NO.: 88-106 CROSS

REFERENCE:

PMR 88-9030 DESCRIPTION OF CHANGE:

Relocation of a temperature element in the Reactor Water Cleanup (RWCU) room to a wall mounting so it will be capable of detecting ambient temperature rises due to steam leaks and provide redundancy.

SUMMARY

I. No. The improved coordination of the 125V DC load center breakers with the DC distribution panel branch circuit breakers will decease the probability of occurrence and the consequences of an accident or malfunction. Proper coordination ensures that an electrical fault at the load site can be isolated by the branch circuit breaker.

No. The redesigned supports will not change their design function. The proposed change has a positive impact on safety and reliability by providing a less damage prone support configuration while maintaining design function. The proposed change does not increase the probability of any accident previously analyzed.

II. No. "

In addition to Item I, the proposed action will install a better designed support more capable of withstanding the vibratory environment of the mainsteam system.

III. No. The margin of safety is not compromised. The redesigned supports help ensure they will be available during a seismic event.

SER NO.: 88-116 CROSS

REFERENCE:

NL-88-019, TP-115-003, TP-215-003 DESCRIPTION OF CHANGE:

These procedures provide the actions for removing the Turbine Building Closed Cooling Mater (TBCCW) system from service, drain, fill, vent, and return to service during a refueling outage. Provisions are included to provide a source of oil free, dry wait to replace the air compressors and, a source of cooling for the Control Rod Drive (CRD) pumps.

SUMMARY

I. No. The effected systems required to be in service are: Instrument Air, Service Air, and the CRD system. FSAR Subsections 9.3.1.1 and 9.3.1.2 discuss Instrument and Service Air. Instrument air operated components essential for safe shutdown assume the safe position upon loss of air pressure. Service air has no safety design basis. Two temporary air compressors will be installed during the outage. No individual or combination of failures described in FSAR Sections 4.1 and 4.6 prevents the CRD system from performing its primary function of reactivity control.

II. No. In addition to Item I above, failure of a CRD pump would effect at most, the one rod that could be in test mode. Reactivity control would not be effected since no fuel would be loaded in the proximity of the test rod.

III. No.

~ ~ Technical Specifications 3/4.9.9, 3/4.1.3.5 and 3/4.9.3 were reviewed. The margin of safety is not reduced.

~

SER NO.: 88-117 CROSS

REFERENCE:

NL-88-020, Procedures RE-081-034 and,RE-081-035 NL-88-021 DESCRIPTION OF CHANGE:

Procedures for "Determination and Inspection of Failed Fuel Rods" and "Inspection and Repair of Failed Fuel Bundles."

SUMMARY

I. No. The inspection to be performed in accordance with the subject procedures are not addressed in the FSAR however, the FSAR Fuel Handling Accident Analysis (Section 15.7.4) results are bounding for the inspection activities.

I. No. The addition of the fire protective enclosures decreases the probability of occurrence or the consequences of an accident or malfunction of equipment related to safety, as previously evaluated in the FSAR because of the additional protection provided for the safe shutdown circuits. Program requirements assure the structural integrity of the wrapped conduits and junction boxes and their associated supports due to the addition of the fire wrap material. The design ampacities of power cables have been derated for the respective fire protective enclosures and compacted to their full load currents to assure that the cables will operate within their design temperature values. An electrical calculation defines the wrapped derated cables, breaker coordination requirements, and procedures for derating under future modification programs.

By assuring that the conduits and )unction boxes structural and seismic requirement are met and that the cable ampacity requirements are met, the probability of occurrence or the consequences of an accident or malfunctions of equipment related to safety, as previously evaluated in the FSAR is not increased, but is actually decreased as a result of the additional protection that the fire enclosures provide for the circuits.

II. No. This modification does not interfere with the logic, control or operation of any plant systems or components. The modification increases the scope of the visual inspections of fire rated assemblies required, but does not impact the periodic maintenance, calibration, or surveillance activities of the plant systems or components. Therefore, the possibility for an accident or malfunction of a different type than any evaluated previously in the FSAR is not created. The addition of the fire enclosures enables safe shutdown circuits to function in the event of a fire.

III. No. The margin of safety is not reduced because additional protection is provided to safe shutdown circuits.

SER NO.: 88-121 CROSS

REFERENCE:

PMR 88-9031 DESCRIPTION OF CHANGE:

Replace damaged cable on the 480V AC power supply by splicing in a new section of cable.

No. Electrically, power will be furnished from the S&A building switchgear which is non-safety related. The electrical configuration feeding the S&A building is such that the mainfeeder is totally independent from direct nuclear plant operation and as a result subsequent failure of any S&A building switchgear will not impact the safe operation of Units 1 and 2. A review of the FSAR has been performed, specifically, Chapter 8 - Electric Power, Section 8.3, Onsite Power System. The plant PA station installed within the DAW facility satisfies the requirements of FSAR section 9.5.2.2.1 for the Emergency Evacuation Alarm syst: em.

Mechanically, a fire protection connection will be furnished from the Radwaste Building and designed to provide sufficient demand of water for sprinkling systems inside the temporary passageway and the DAW trailer.

The extension of the fire protection line does not degrade the, existing fire protection system as described in FSAR, Section 9.5.1.

Civil/Architecturally, a 6 inch penetration will be installed in the north wall of the Radwaste Building. The in'stallation of the penetrqtion will not structurally degrade the Radwaste Building..'he location of this penetration is totally independent of, and will have no impact on, any safety related structure. Once the fire protection piping is installed, the penetration will be sealed such that the building environment will be maintained.

The enclosed passageway will be located on the north side of the north wall of the Radwaste Building. The enclosure will not be attached and totally independent from any site structures. This temporary self-supporting structure will be designed to withstand wind loading per FSAR chapter 3, Subsection 3.3.1 "Wind Loadings". This type of structure is not required to be designed for tornado loads per the FSAR subsection 3.3.2. However, any portion of the structure which could fail during a tornado has been evaluated to have no effect on any safety related equipment or structures as defined in subsection 3.3.2.3 "Effect of Failure of Structures or Components Not Designed for Tornado Loads".

No. See Item I above.

No. The proposed modification involves non-safety related systems and structures serving non-safety related functions. By review of the appropriate Technical Specifications, it has been determined that the proposed modification does not affect the Technical Specification or the margin of safety provided in the bases for the Technical Specification.

SER NO.: 88-129 CROSS

REFERENCE:

PMR 87-3044 A/B DESCRIPTION OF CHANGE:

Replacement of the Unit 2 Offgas Recombiner Vessel with a new vessel made of upgraded material, improved heat tracing and other system improvements.

SUMMARY

I. No. FSAR Section 15.7.1 evaluates a failure of the Offgas System due to a system boundary rupture. The proposed replacement will reduce the susceptibility of the vessel to cracking, improve the system's resistance to failure and decrease the probability of failure.

II. No. See Item I above.

III. No. The new vessel will perform the same function as the current vessel in meeting Technical Specification requirements. Its enhanced design will increase the margin of safety by reducing its susceptibility to cracking.

SER NO.: 88-130 CROSS

REFERENCE:

PMR 87-9091 DESCRIPTION OF CHANGE:.

Replacement of the con trol switch for the Residual Heat Removal (RHR) Heat Exchanger shell side bypass valves. Removal of the ten minute time delay on the heat exchanger bypass valve. Consolidation of the Containment Spray Valve initiation permissive switches and the Containment Spray Valve LOCA isolation manual override switches.

SUMMARY

I. No. The proposed modification does not change the automatic safety function of the system. The use of a maintained contact switch for the hea't exchanger bypass valves will relieve the operator to allow him to perform other reactions.

The consolidation of the Containment Spray Valve Initiation Permissive and Containment Spray valve LOCA Isolation Manual Override switches will simplify the actions necessary for the operators to respond to.an abnormal event. A design review of the control logic and review of the associated operating procedures directing the use of these switches was performed. It was determined that the interlock with the injection valve served no function and is therefore being removed by this modification.

The removal of this interlock does not affect normal operation of the valves.

This modification also provides LOCA signal override control for the heat exchanger bypass valve. This capability will allow the operator to override a LOCA signal and throttle closed the bypass valve.

The present design provides a time-delay to remove the LOCA signal interlock after 10 minutes and allow the operator to manually throttle closed the heat exchanger bypass valve. With the'added capability of the LOCA signal override added by this modification, the function of the time delay no longer serves any purpose and will be deleted. A review of FSAR chapters 6, 7 and 15 provided no design requirement for the time delay.

However, a FSAR change will be submitted to reflect the revised description of the system operation.

II. No. See Item I above.

III. No. The margin of safety is not reduced since the automatic function of the heat exchanger bypass valves is not changed. In fact the margin-of-safety is, if anything, increased by allowing suppression pool cooling to be initiated earlier to maintain a lower suppression pool temperature.

SER NO.: 88-131 CROSS

REFERENCE:

PMRs 88-3004 and 88-3005 DESCRIPTION OF CHANGE:

Permanent wall penetrations into the Reactor Building from the east side to.

accommodate temporary services required during outages.

SUMMARY

I. No. The proposed modification will conform to all appropriate design requirements specified in FSAR Sections 3.3 thru 3.8 and will not affect the Reactor Building in any adverse manner. Per FSAR Section 9.4.1.2.3, secondary containment isolation is a safety related function of the Reactor Building HVAC. This function remains intact as the penetration will be sealed.

II. No. See Item I above.

III. No. Technical Specification 3/4.6.5 discusses secondary containment integrity. The proposed modification will comply with the Technical Specifications.

SER NO.: 88-132

.CROSS

REFERENCE:

Safety Evaluation NL-88-027, TP-243-005 DESCRIPTION OF CHANGE:

Modify the condenser tube leak test to allow SF to be injected into the circulating water system.

S SENARY:

I. No. The likelihood of an event listed in FSAR Table 11.3-6 or an event listed in FSAR Section 15.7.1.1.1 will not be increased by the proposed change.

II. No. The breakdown products of SF6 (Sulfate and Fluorine) could create an environment susceptible to stress corrosion cracking of the recombiner vessel. However the maximum concentration of SF6 that would reach the recombiner vessel is much lower than the limit set by the vendor.

III. No. The design of the Offgas Treatment System as discussed in Technical Specification 3.11.2.6 is not impacted.

SER NO.: 88-133 CROSS

REFERENCE:

PMR 88-3016 DESCRIPTION OF CHANGE:

Relocate the Division I Standby Gas Treatment System (SGTS) Equipment room temperature switch from its original location to a location 18 feet south, on the same wall.

SUMMARY

I. No. The switch is mounted in accordance with Seismic Category I requirements and its relocation will not alter the design or performance requirements of the system per FSAR Sections 7.3.1 and 9.4.1. Division I components are required for fire protection safe shutdown Paths 1 and 2.

Therefore this modification ensures compliance with our commitments to 10CFR50 Appendix R.

II. No. The modification is in accordance with existing design criteria and does not impact system function. Appendix R compliance, seismic integrity and other design criteria are met.

III. No. Technical Specifications 3/4.3.7.8, 3/4.6.5.3, 3/4.7.2, 3/4.8.3.1 and 3/4.8.3.2 were reviewed. The 'margin safety has not been compromised.

SER NO.: 88-13S CROSS

REFERENCE:

( PMR 88-3018E DESCRIPTION OF CHANGE:

Installation of isolation circuitry and thermal overload bypass circuitry to Residual Heat Removal (RHR) Heat Exchanger valves to assure control capability at the Remote Shutdown Panel during a fire.

S SENARY:

I. No. During normal operation and Design Basis Accident (DBA) conditions, the auxiliary relay associated with the isolation circuitry is in the fail safe de-energized position. The relay contacts associated with the thermal overload bypass are also in the fail safe position. Energization of the relays is only required to perform safe shutdowns with a control room fire.

II. No. The proposed modification assures that the valves are not made inoperable by a fire in the Control Room, therefore the analysis in FSAR Section 7.4.14 remains valid.

III. No. The proposed modification includes installation of thermal overload protection. Per Technical Specification 3.8.4.2.1 continuous bypass circuitry has also been installed. Therefore the margin of safety remains intact.

SER NO.: 88-135 CROSS

REFERENCE:

88-9024 DESCRIPTION OF CHANGE:

Relocation of four (4) temperature elements utilized to monitor Reactor Building steamline tunnel supply (low) temperature from their existing location in the recirculation plenum to the main steamline tunnel supply duct in the Reactor Building Zone II HVAC system.

SUMMARY

I. No. FSAR Section 15.6.4 discusses a main steamline break downstream of the outboard Main Steam Isolation Valves (MSIVs) and subsequent MSIV closure. The proposed modification has no effect this analysis. The relocation of the supply temperature sensors is in accordance with the locations described in FSAR Subsection 7.3.l.la.2.4.1.3 and meets the redundancy requirements of FSAR Subsection 7.3.1.1a.2.4.1.3.5.

II. No. The proposed modification does not change the method in which the instrument performs its safety function. The new location for the supply temperature elements allows temperature sensing by these four devices in a common flow path for supply aid to the Reactor Building steamline tunnel without running either recirculation plenum fan.

III. No. Technical Speci'fications 3/4.3.2 was reviewed. The margin of safety is not reduced by the proposed modification.

SER NO.: 88-136 CROSS

REFERENCE:

PMR 87-9008 DESCRIPTION OF CHANGE:

Installation of an inlet isolation valve and a tank bypass on the Chemical Waste Tank.

SUMMARY

I. No. FSAR Sections 11.2, 15.7.2 and 15.7.3 have been reviewed. Piping details are not specifically discussed. The proposed modification does not impact any station design features that are used in radioactive release analysis for postulated radwaste system failures. The Liquid Radwaste System is relied on solely for normal plant operation and not to mitigate any transient or accidents described in the FSAR.

II. No. In addition to Item I above, the proposed modification does'not alter the function or design intent of the Liquid Radwaste System.

III. No. The bases for Technical Specification 3/4.11.1 have been reviewed.

The proposed modification will not reduce the margin of safety described therein.

SER NO.: 88-137 CROSS

REFERENCE:

PMR 88-3017A DESCRIPTION OF CHANGE:

Isolation of the Emergency Switchgear Room Cooling Fan (B) from its existing control circuitry and control power fuse. Automatic fan operation is initiated through a new dual setpoint temperature switch powered from a second (redundant) control power fuse.

SUMMARY

I. No. The proposed modification provides for the automatic start of the safety related fan should the existing control circuit for the fan become disabled due to a fire. The existing system functions are retained for normal operation. FSAR Section 9.4.2.2.2 provides a discussion of the emergency switchgear ventilation system. The proposed modification does not alter the design or performance requirements of the present system.

II. No. In addition to Item I above, the proposed modification is in accordance with existing design criteria for the system and does not adversely affect the systems function. The failure modes identified in FSAR Section .9.4, Table 9.4-5 are not impacted.

III.'o. The Emergency Switchgear and Load Center Room cooling system is required to support the operation and availability of the Onsite Power Distribution system as discussed in Technical Specification. The margin of safety is not reduced by the proposed modification.

SER NO.: 88-138 CROSS

REFERENCE:

SCP E88-2031 DESCRIPTION OF CHANGE:

Replace existing Cutler Hammer standard trip eutectic alloy, thermal overload relay heater coal in the Reactor Feed Pump Turbine valves with a similar heater coil. This replacement increases the trip range of the overload relay.

SUMMARY

No. The thermal overload relay actuation value is being increased to prevent overloads from unnecessary tripping during normal valve operation. The increased actuation value has been evaluated and determined not to significantly increase the possibility of motor failure. If motor damage does occur, the operation of these valves is not required for any safety related valves.

No. In addition to Item I above, the proposed action does not change the function of the overloads and is in accordance with engineering specifications, calculations and FSAR Subsection 8.3.1.3.13.

III. No.

~ ~ Selection of overload relay coils is not discussed in the bases for any Technical Specification.

SER NO.: 88-139 CROSS

REFERENCE:

PMR 88-3016D DESCRIPTION OF CHANGE:

Relocate the existing Control Structure Chilled Water flow transmitter and its five valve manifold to a new location 13 feet north on the same wall and elevation.

S SENARY:

I. No. The transmitter will be mounted per Seismic Category I requirements.

SUMMARY

I. No. The CIG compressor drain traps are in the non-safety related portion of the CIG system. The proposed modification will not alter the design criteria of the system but will increase reliability. The proposed modification will improve the overall operation of the compressors.

II. No. The portion of the CIG system being modified is non-safety related per FSAR Section 3.2.2. The new drain collection tanks will ensure availability and operability of the compressors.

III. No. Technical Specification 4.5.1.d.2.c requires channel calibration for the CIG low pressure alarm. The proposed modification will not impact this Specification. The margin of safety is not reduced.

ERR NO.: 88-144 CROSS

REFERENCE:

PMR 87-9178 DESCRIPTION OF CHANGE:

Install permanent flow integrating counters to measure flow totalization on the discharge side of both Liquid Radwaste (LRW) filters and on the suction side of the LRW demineralizer.

SUMMARY

I. No. The proposed modification will provide reliable instrument loops to support operations with respect to both process control and visual awareness of flow totalization involving LRW filter and demineralizer operation. FSAR Chapter 11 was reviewed. The proposed modification will not increase the probability of occurrence or consequences of an accident previously evaluated.

II. No. Item I above.

III. No. Technical Specification 3/4.3 was reviewed. The margin of safety is not reduced.

SER NO.: 88-145 CROSS

REFERENCE:

PMR 88-3017H DESCRIPTION OF CHANGE:

Reroute Residual Heat Removal (RHR) valve controls associated with Head Spray to bypass the Remote Shutdown Panel (RSP).

SUMMARY

I. No. The proposed action will not affect components and cables required for Path 1 safe shutdown. This assures that in the event of a fire in the RSP, the RHR system is capable of performing its safe shutdown functions from the Control Room as described in FSAR Section 7.4. The proposed modification eliminates the possibility of a fire in the RPS from affecting the Division I RHR system.

I. No. The core spray keepfill is a branch of the condensate transfer system which has no safety related function, per FSAR Section 10.4.7.

The failure mechanism for the new valves is the advertent opening of one of the valves. This potential for human error exists elsewhere and administrative controls protect against incorrect positioning of the valves. The new valves will normally be locked open and if inadvertently closed, will only provide a third level of isolation for the suppression pool fillline.

II. No. These valves will not affect the operation of any safety related systems since the function and valve alignment of the existing condensate supply to the core spray system is unchanged. Potential failure mechanisms have been previously evaluated in FSAR Subsection 6.3.2,9.

III. No. The condensate supply to the core spray keepfill system and the addition of the shutoff and vent valves serve no safety functions and are not addressed in the Technical Specifications.

SER NO.:.88-150 CROSS

REFERENCE:

PMR 87-9154 DESCRIPTION OF CHANGE:

Modifications to the plant PA system located in the diesel generator bays.

This includes relocating PA stations from one wall to another, upgrading the handset stations and installing additional speakers.

SUMMARY

I. No. The PA system is not safety related and does not perform a safety function. The proposed modifications will make the system more effective during normal day to day activities and during operation of the diesel generators.

II. No. In addition to Item I above, FSAR Chapters 9 and 15 were reviewed and it has been determined that they are not impacted by the proposed modifications.

III. No.

~ ~ The PA system is not addressed in the plant Technical Specification.

ERR NO.: 88-181 CROSS

REFERENCE:

PMR 87-9200 I DESCRIPTION OF CHANGE:

Modification of the closing logic for the main steam to steam )et air ejector isolation valve.

SUMMARY

I. No. The Drywell Leakage Detection System is a non-safety system and is not required to operate following an accident. The systems'ability to measure unidentified drywell leakage as discussed in FSAR Subsection 5.2.5.1.2.4, will not be affected by the proposed modification.

II. No. The proposed action enhances the system's operating performance by reducing the frequency of check valve related pump-out failures and ensuring that the level sensors remain functional following an OBE.

III. No. The function of the Drywell Leakage Detection System described in Technical Specification 3/4.4.3 is not impacted by the proposed action.

SER NO.: 88-158

~

CROSS

REFERENCE:

PMRs 88-9034 and 88-9035 DESCRIPTION OF CHANGE:

Increase the maximum allowable pressure of the Residual Heat Removal (RHR)

Pump motor oil coolers from 100 psi to'00 psi.

SUMMARY

I. No. The oil coolers are required for the RHR pumps to perform their intended safety function and to contain Emergency Service Water (ESW) which is the coolant. No changes are being made to the cooler itself.

I. No. The temporary spool piece is schedule 40 carbon steel pipe. The new temperature control valve is smaller than the existing valve but system performance will not be affected since during the winter months the control valve is controlling at nearly a full closed position. The smaller valve will control in a band where it is open slightly more than the permanent valve. In the summer months it will be nearly full open.

The bypass is hard piped and consists of similar material as the original piping system.

II. No. See Item I above.

III. No. Technical Specifications are not affected by this installation.

ML18040B250

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