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Category:CORRESPONDENCE-LETTERS
MONTHYEARPLA-5120, Forwards Change J to SSES Security Training & Qualification Plan.Without Encl1999-10-22022 October 1999 Forwards Change J to SSES Security Training & Qualification Plan.Without Encl ML18040B2951999-09-0808 September 1999 Requests Info Re Any NRC or Susquehanna Documented Concerns with MSIV Reliability Prior to Plant Trip & Assurance to Public That NRC Able to Detect Mgt Problems Early PLA-5094, Forwards,For Review,Change 00 to SSES Physical Security Plan.Without Encl1999-08-24024 August 1999 Forwards,For Review,Change 00 to SSES Physical Security Plan.Without Encl ML18040A9741999-07-0808 July 1999 Forwards Rev 30 to SSES Emergency Plan, Adding EAL to Account for Potential Conditions Associated with Dry Cask Storage Sys Being Installed at Plant ML20207G5051999-06-0707 June 1999 Informs That NRC Office of NRR Reorganized Effective 990328.As Part of Reorganization,Divison of Licensing Project Management Created PLA-5072, Forwards Change Nn to SSES Physical Security Plan.Util Determined That Changes Do Not Decrease Safeguards Effectiveness of Plan,Per 10CFR50.54(p).Encl Withheld from Public Disclosure,Per 10CFR73.211999-06-0404 June 1999 Forwards Change Nn to SSES Physical Security Plan.Util Determined That Changes Do Not Decrease Safeguards Effectiveness of Plan,Per 10CFR50.54(p).Encl Withheld from Public Disclosure,Per 10CFR73.21 ML18040A9731999-05-24024 May 1999 Submits Response to RAI Re Exemption from Biennial Exercise Schedule.Changing of Drill Date Will Not Reduce Level of Emergency Preparedness at Plant ML20195B2181999-05-20020 May 1999 Forwards Proprietary Decommissioning Status Rept for 10% Interest in Sses,Units 1 & 2.Proprietary Info Withheld,Per 10CFR2.790 ML18040B2901999-04-30030 April 1999 Forwards Summary Rept of Safety Evaluations Approved During Period from 961024-981029,per 10CFR50.59(b).Format of Rept, Listed PLA-5041, Forwards Proprietary & Redacted Decommissioning Rept of Financial Assurance for Util 90% Interest in Sses,Units 1 & 2,per 10CFR50.75(f)(1).Proprietary Info Withheld,Per 10CFR2.7901999-03-29029 March 1999 Forwards Proprietary & Redacted Decommissioning Rept of Financial Assurance for Util 90% Interest in Sses,Units 1 & 2,per 10CFR50.75(f)(1).Proprietary Info Withheld,Per 10CFR2.790 ML18040A9691999-03-12012 March 1999 Forwards Revised Proposed Amend 227 to License NPF-14, Proposing Changes to ANFB-10 Critical Power Correlation & MCPR Safety Limits ML17164A9891999-03-12012 March 1999 Informs That Util 990312 Ltr (PLA-5040) Submitted to NRC, Missing Encl C.Requests to Replace Package in Entirety with Encl ML18040A9721999-03-11011 March 1999 Requests That Date for full-participation SSES Exercise, Scheduled for Week of 991115,be Changed Due to FEMA Region III Scheduling Conflicts.Fema Requests That Exercise Date Be Changed to Week of 001031 PLA-4852, Forwards non-redacted Version of Pp&L,Inc Corporate Auditing Rept 739459-2-98,dated 980210.Informs That Document Contains Info to Be Withheld IAW 10CFR2.7901999-02-18018 February 1999 Forwards non-redacted Version of Pp&L,Inc Corporate Auditing Rept 739459-2-98,dated 980210.Informs That Document Contains Info to Be Withheld IAW 10CFR2.790 ML20203G5821999-02-17017 February 1999 Second Final Response to FOIA Request for Documents. Documents Listed in App C Being Released in Entirety. Documents Listed in App D Being Withheld in Part (Ref FOIA Exemption 5) ML20202F4761999-01-29029 January 1999 First Partial Response to FOIA Request for Documents.Records in App a Encl & Being Released in Entirety.App B Records Being Withheld in Part (Ref FOIA Exemption 7C) ML18040A9671999-01-29029 January 1999 Notifies That Util Implemented Severe Accident Mgt Strategy in Accordance with Ltr Dtd 950327.Emegency Plan Revs Which Were Required to Implement Strategy Were Submitted by Ltr Dtd 981125 ML18040A9681999-01-29029 January 1999 Requests Exemption from Requirements of 10CFR50 App E,Items IVF.2.b & C,To Allowed to Reschedule Federally Observed Full Participation Emergency Exercise for SSES from Wk of 991115 to Wk of 001031 ML18040A9651999-01-12012 January 1999 Submits Addl Info Re Proposed Amend 184 to License NPF-22 for ANFB-10 Critical Power Correlation & MCPR Safety Limits ML18030A1021998-12-16016 December 1998 Forwards Tables as Requested During 981202 Telcon Re Proposed Amend 184,dtd 980804,re ANFB-10 Critical Power Correlation & MCPR Safety Limits.Tables Provide Roadmap Identifying Applicability of References to TSs ML18030A4331998-11-25025 November 1998 Forwards Rev 29 to SSES Emergecny Plan.Changes Has Been Made Without Commission Approval as It Does Not Decrease Effectiveness of Plan & Plan as Changed Continues to Satisfy Applicable Requirements of App E to 10CFR50 ML20195J9101998-11-18018 November 1998 Forwards Notice of Withdrawal of Application for Amends to Facility Operating Licenses (Notice).Notice Has Been Filed with Ofc of Fr.Amends Would Have Revised TS to Eliminate HPCI Pump auto-transfer on High Suppression Pool Level ML20155F7201998-11-0303 November 1998 Final Response to FOIA Request for Documents.Documents Listed in App B Being Encl & Being Released in Entirety. Documents Listed in App C Being Withheld in Part (Ref Exemption 7C) ML18026A2941998-10-19019 October 1998 Forwards SSES ISI Outage Summary Rept for Unit 1 Tenth Refueling & Insp Outage ML18030A4321998-10-12012 October 1998 Forwards Rev 28 to SSES Emergency Plan, IAW Requirements of 10CFR50.54q.Change Is Summarized PLA-4993, Forwards Change Mm to SSES Physical Security Plan.Encl Withheld,Per 10CFR73.211998-10-12012 October 1998 Forwards Change Mm to SSES Physical Security Plan.Encl Withheld,Per 10CFR73.21 ML18030A1001998-10-12012 October 1998 Forwards Rev 27 to SSES Emergency Plan. Changes Become Effective Upon Implementation of Improved Tech Specs ML18030A4311998-09-29029 September 1998 Forwards Rev 27 & 28 to SSES Emergency Plan ML20151W4951998-09-10010 September 1998 Informs That as Part of NRC Probabilistic Risk Assessment Implementation Plan,Commission Assigned Two Senior Reactor Analysts (Sras) to Each Regional Ofc.T Shedlosky & J Trapp Has Been Assigned SRAs for Region I IR 05000387/19980081998-09-0808 September 1998 Provides Response to Violations Noted in Insp Repts 50-387/98-08 & 50-388/98-08.Corrective Actions:Current Administrative Controls on Fuel Level in EDG Day Tanks Will Remain in Effect Until TS Change is Approved ML18030A0991998-09-0808 September 1998 Provides Response to Violations Noted in Insp Repts 50-387/98-08 & 50-388/98-08.Corrective Actions:Current Administrative Controls on Fuel Level in EDG Day Tanks Will Remain in Effect Until TS Change Is Approved ML18026A4961998-08-31031 August 1998 Responds to NRC 980731 Ltr Re Violations Noted in Insp Repts 50-387/98-03 & 50-388/98-03.Corrective Actions:Procurement & Affected User Group Personnel Visited EDG Vendor Facilities to Appraise Vendor Work Practices & Discuss Expectations IR 05000387/19980031998-08-31031 August 1998 Responds to NRC 980731 Ltr Re Violations Noted in Insp Repts 50-387/98-03 & 50-388/98-03.Corrective Actions:Procurement & Affected User Group Personnel Visited EDG Vendor Facilities to Appraise Vendor Work Practices & Discuss Expectations ML20202F5501998-07-17017 July 1998 Responds to PP&L Corp Auditing Repts 739459-97,739459-1-97 & 739459-2-98 Re SSES Investigations Into Missed Alarm Tests ML20236P9451998-07-15015 July 1998 Forwards Emergency Response Data Sys Implementation Documents Including Data Point Library Updates for Oconee (Number 255),Dresden (Number 257) & Susquehanna (Number 258) ML18030A4291998-07-0808 July 1998 Forwards Final Version of SSES TS Implementing Improved TS of NUREG-1433.Implementation of Proposed Amend Is Predicted on NRC Issuance of Amends & Proposed to Not Exceed 90 Days from Date of Amend Issue ML18017A2181998-07-0808 July 1998 Forwards Final Version of SSES TS Implementing Improved Tech Specs of NUREG 1433.Implementation of Proposed Amend Is Predicated on NRC Issuance of Amends & Is Proposed to Not Exceed 90 Days from Date of Amend Issuance ML18026A2901998-06-0909 June 1998 Forwards Rev 26 to Emergency Plan IAW 10CFR50.54q.Summary of Changes Listed ML18026A2891998-05-22022 May 1998 Submits Withdrawal of Expedited Review/Approval of Tech Specs/Bases 3/4.3.7.11 & 3/4.11.2.6 & Response to Request for Addl Info Re Offgas Sys Mods ML18026A4941998-05-12012 May 1998 Responds to NRC Request to Resubmit Proposal to Change TS for Plant,Units 1 & 2,to Support Implementation of Improved TS & to Implement Provisions of GL 86-10 Re Relocation of Plant'S Fire Protection Program from TS to Another Document ML20202H1331998-04-16016 April 1998 Partially Deleted Ltr Re Concerns Raised to NRC Concerning PP&L Susquehanna Facility NUREG-0619, Informs That Staff Finds PP&L 980330 Request for Relief from Requirements of Section 4.3 of NUREG-0619,exams of Feedwater Nozzle Bore & Inner Radius for Another Operating Cycle to Be Acceptable1998-04-15015 April 1998 Informs That Staff Finds PP&L 980330 Request for Relief from Requirements of Section 4.3 of NUREG-0619,exams of Feedwater Nozzle Bore & Inner Radius for Another Operating Cycle to Be Acceptable ML20216B6811998-04-0101 April 1998 First Partial Response to FOIA Request for Documents. Forwards Documents Listed in App a Being Released in Entirety ML17159A2341998-03-30030 March 1998 Forwards LER 97-007-01,per 10CFR50.73(a)(2)(i)(B).Revised LER Submitted to Modify Previous Position W/Regards to Entry Into TS 3.0.3 for Event PLA-4865, Forwards Listed non-redacted Pp&L,Inc Corporate Auditing Repts.Informs That Document Contains Info to Be Withheld IAW 10CFR2.7901998-03-11011 March 1998 Forwards Listed non-redacted Pp&L,Inc Corporate Auditing Repts.Informs That Document Contains Info to Be Withheld IAW 10CFR2.790 ML17159A1781998-03-0202 March 1998 Forwards Proposed Amends 203 & 161 to License NPF-14 & NPF-22,revising Tech Specs to Be Consistent w/NUREG-1433,rev 1, Std Tech Specs for GE Plants,Bwr 4. PLA-4856, Forwards Proposed Amends to Licenses NPF-14 & NPF-22, Revising TS to Be Consistent w/NUREG-1433,rev 1, Std TS for GE Plants,Bwr 4. Proposed TS Consistent w/NUREG-1433,rev 1, Encl1998-03-0202 March 1998 Forwards Proposed Amends to Licenses NPF-14 & NPF-22, Revising TS to Be Consistent w/NUREG-1433,rev 1, Std TS for GE Plants,Bwr 4. Proposed TS Consistent w/NUREG-1433,rev 1, Encl PLA-4854, Provides Summary of Investigations That PP&L Performed in Response to Concerns Identified by Former Nuclear Plant Operator.Summary Requested by Cj Anderson on 9802131998-02-27027 February 1998 Provides Summary of Investigations That PP&L Performed in Response to Concerns Identified by Former Nuclear Plant Operator.Summary Requested by Cj Anderson on 980213 ML20203M5071998-02-26026 February 1998 Final Response to FOIA Request for Documents.Records in App a Being Placed in PDR & Encl.Records in App B Partially Withheld (Ref FOIA Exemption 6) ML20203B5931998-02-23023 February 1998 Ack Receipt of & Wire in Amount of $55,000 in Payment for Civil Penatly Proposed by NRC Ltr . Corrective Actions Will Be Examined During Future Inspections 1999-09-08
[Table view] Category:INCOMING CORRESPONDENCE
MONTHYEARPLA-5120, Forwards Change J to SSES Security Training & Qualification Plan.Without Encl1999-10-22022 October 1999 Forwards Change J to SSES Security Training & Qualification Plan.Without Encl ML18040B2951999-09-0808 September 1999 Requests Info Re Any NRC or Susquehanna Documented Concerns with MSIV Reliability Prior to Plant Trip & Assurance to Public That NRC Able to Detect Mgt Problems Early PLA-5094, Forwards,For Review,Change 00 to SSES Physical Security Plan.Without Encl1999-08-24024 August 1999 Forwards,For Review,Change 00 to SSES Physical Security Plan.Without Encl ML18040A9741999-07-0808 July 1999 Forwards Rev 30 to SSES Emergency Plan, Adding EAL to Account for Potential Conditions Associated with Dry Cask Storage Sys Being Installed at Plant PLA-5072, Forwards Change Nn to SSES Physical Security Plan.Util Determined That Changes Do Not Decrease Safeguards Effectiveness of Plan,Per 10CFR50.54(p).Encl Withheld from Public Disclosure,Per 10CFR73.211999-06-0404 June 1999 Forwards Change Nn to SSES Physical Security Plan.Util Determined That Changes Do Not Decrease Safeguards Effectiveness of Plan,Per 10CFR50.54(p).Encl Withheld from Public Disclosure,Per 10CFR73.21 ML18040A9731999-05-24024 May 1999 Submits Response to RAI Re Exemption from Biennial Exercise Schedule.Changing of Drill Date Will Not Reduce Level of Emergency Preparedness at Plant ML20195B2181999-05-20020 May 1999 Forwards Proprietary Decommissioning Status Rept for 10% Interest in Sses,Units 1 & 2.Proprietary Info Withheld,Per 10CFR2.790 ML18040B2901999-04-30030 April 1999 Forwards Summary Rept of Safety Evaluations Approved During Period from 961024-981029,per 10CFR50.59(b).Format of Rept, Listed PLA-5041, Forwards Proprietary & Redacted Decommissioning Rept of Financial Assurance for Util 90% Interest in Sses,Units 1 & 2,per 10CFR50.75(f)(1).Proprietary Info Withheld,Per 10CFR2.7901999-03-29029 March 1999 Forwards Proprietary & Redacted Decommissioning Rept of Financial Assurance for Util 90% Interest in Sses,Units 1 & 2,per 10CFR50.75(f)(1).Proprietary Info Withheld,Per 10CFR2.790 ML17164A9891999-03-12012 March 1999 Informs That Util 990312 Ltr (PLA-5040) Submitted to NRC, Missing Encl C.Requests to Replace Package in Entirety with Encl ML18040A9691999-03-12012 March 1999 Forwards Revised Proposed Amend 227 to License NPF-14, Proposing Changes to ANFB-10 Critical Power Correlation & MCPR Safety Limits ML18040A9721999-03-11011 March 1999 Requests That Date for full-participation SSES Exercise, Scheduled for Week of 991115,be Changed Due to FEMA Region III Scheduling Conflicts.Fema Requests That Exercise Date Be Changed to Week of 001031 PLA-4852, Forwards non-redacted Version of Pp&L,Inc Corporate Auditing Rept 739459-2-98,dated 980210.Informs That Document Contains Info to Be Withheld IAW 10CFR2.7901999-02-18018 February 1999 Forwards non-redacted Version of Pp&L,Inc Corporate Auditing Rept 739459-2-98,dated 980210.Informs That Document Contains Info to Be Withheld IAW 10CFR2.790 ML18040A9681999-01-29029 January 1999 Requests Exemption from Requirements of 10CFR50 App E,Items IVF.2.b & C,To Allowed to Reschedule Federally Observed Full Participation Emergency Exercise for SSES from Wk of 991115 to Wk of 001031 ML18040A9671999-01-29029 January 1999 Notifies That Util Implemented Severe Accident Mgt Strategy in Accordance with Ltr Dtd 950327.Emegency Plan Revs Which Were Required to Implement Strategy Were Submitted by Ltr Dtd 981125 ML18040A9651999-01-12012 January 1999 Submits Addl Info Re Proposed Amend 184 to License NPF-22 for ANFB-10 Critical Power Correlation & MCPR Safety Limits ML18030A1021998-12-16016 December 1998 Forwards Tables as Requested During 981202 Telcon Re Proposed Amend 184,dtd 980804,re ANFB-10 Critical Power Correlation & MCPR Safety Limits.Tables Provide Roadmap Identifying Applicability of References to TSs ML18030A4331998-11-25025 November 1998 Forwards Rev 29 to SSES Emergecny Plan.Changes Has Been Made Without Commission Approval as It Does Not Decrease Effectiveness of Plan & Plan as Changed Continues to Satisfy Applicable Requirements of App E to 10CFR50 ML18026A2941998-10-19019 October 1998 Forwards SSES ISI Outage Summary Rept for Unit 1 Tenth Refueling & Insp Outage ML18030A4321998-10-12012 October 1998 Forwards Rev 28 to SSES Emergency Plan, IAW Requirements of 10CFR50.54q.Change Is Summarized ML18030A1001998-10-12012 October 1998 Forwards Rev 27 to SSES Emergency Plan. Changes Become Effective Upon Implementation of Improved Tech Specs PLA-4993, Forwards Change Mm to SSES Physical Security Plan.Encl Withheld,Per 10CFR73.211998-10-12012 October 1998 Forwards Change Mm to SSES Physical Security Plan.Encl Withheld,Per 10CFR73.21 ML18030A4311998-09-29029 September 1998 Forwards Rev 27 & 28 to SSES Emergency Plan ML18030A0991998-09-0808 September 1998 Provides Response to Violations Noted in Insp Repts 50-387/98-08 & 50-388/98-08.Corrective Actions:Current Administrative Controls on Fuel Level in EDG Day Tanks Will Remain in Effect Until TS Change Is Approved IR 05000387/19980081998-09-0808 September 1998 Provides Response to Violations Noted in Insp Repts 50-387/98-08 & 50-388/98-08.Corrective Actions:Current Administrative Controls on Fuel Level in EDG Day Tanks Will Remain in Effect Until TS Change is Approved ML18026A4961998-08-31031 August 1998 Responds to NRC 980731 Ltr Re Violations Noted in Insp Repts 50-387/98-03 & 50-388/98-03.Corrective Actions:Procurement & Affected User Group Personnel Visited EDG Vendor Facilities to Appraise Vendor Work Practices & Discuss Expectations IR 05000387/19980031998-08-31031 August 1998 Responds to NRC 980731 Ltr Re Violations Noted in Insp Repts 50-387/98-03 & 50-388/98-03.Corrective Actions:Procurement & Affected User Group Personnel Visited EDG Vendor Facilities to Appraise Vendor Work Practices & Discuss Expectations ML18017A2181998-07-0808 July 1998 Forwards Final Version of SSES TS Implementing Improved Tech Specs of NUREG 1433.Implementation of Proposed Amend Is Predicated on NRC Issuance of Amends & Is Proposed to Not Exceed 90 Days from Date of Amend Issuance ML18030A4291998-07-0808 July 1998 Forwards Final Version of SSES TS Implementing Improved TS of NUREG-1433.Implementation of Proposed Amend Is Predicted on NRC Issuance of Amends & Proposed to Not Exceed 90 Days from Date of Amend Issue ML18026A2901998-06-0909 June 1998 Forwards Rev 26 to Emergency Plan IAW 10CFR50.54q.Summary of Changes Listed ML18026A2891998-05-22022 May 1998 Submits Withdrawal of Expedited Review/Approval of Tech Specs/Bases 3/4.3.7.11 & 3/4.11.2.6 & Response to Request for Addl Info Re Offgas Sys Mods ML18026A4941998-05-12012 May 1998 Responds to NRC Request to Resubmit Proposal to Change TS for Plant,Units 1 & 2,to Support Implementation of Improved TS & to Implement Provisions of GL 86-10 Re Relocation of Plant'S Fire Protection Program from TS to Another Document ML17159A2341998-03-30030 March 1998 Forwards LER 97-007-01,per 10CFR50.73(a)(2)(i)(B).Revised LER Submitted to Modify Previous Position W/Regards to Entry Into TS 3.0.3 for Event PLA-4865, Forwards Listed non-redacted Pp&L,Inc Corporate Auditing Repts.Informs That Document Contains Info to Be Withheld IAW 10CFR2.7901998-03-11011 March 1998 Forwards Listed non-redacted Pp&L,Inc Corporate Auditing Repts.Informs That Document Contains Info to Be Withheld IAW 10CFR2.790 PLA-4856, Forwards Proposed Amends to Licenses NPF-14 & NPF-22, Revising TS to Be Consistent w/NUREG-1433,rev 1, Std TS for GE Plants,Bwr 4. Proposed TS Consistent w/NUREG-1433,rev 1, Encl1998-03-0202 March 1998 Forwards Proposed Amends to Licenses NPF-14 & NPF-22, Revising TS to Be Consistent w/NUREG-1433,rev 1, Std TS for GE Plants,Bwr 4. Proposed TS Consistent w/NUREG-1433,rev 1, Encl ML17159A1781998-03-0202 March 1998 Forwards Proposed Amends 203 & 161 to License NPF-14 & NPF-22,revising Tech Specs to Be Consistent w/NUREG-1433,rev 1, Std Tech Specs for GE Plants,Bwr 4. PLA-4854, Provides Summary of Investigations That PP&L Performed in Response to Concerns Identified by Former Nuclear Plant Operator.Summary Requested by Cj Anderson on 9802131998-02-27027 February 1998 Provides Summary of Investigations That PP&L Performed in Response to Concerns Identified by Former Nuclear Plant Operator.Summary Requested by Cj Anderson on 980213 ML20216B7031998-02-22022 February 1998 Partially Deleted Ltr Requesting Copy of OI Rept on Plant, Unit 2,case 1-96-039 PLA-4851, Provides Info That Was Requested by Cj Anderson on 980213 Re Former Util Employee Concern on Radwaste Control Room Offgas Panel Alarm Testing1998-02-18018 February 1998 Provides Info That Was Requested by Cj Anderson on 980213 Re Former Util Employee Concern on Radwaste Control Room Offgas Panel Alarm Testing ML20203M5791998-02-10010 February 1998 Enters Appeal Due to Lack of Response to FOIA Request 97-473 ML18030A0971998-02-0202 February 1998 Forwards Proprietary Response to RAI Re Proposed License Amend 209 to TS Supporting Cycle 11 Reload.Proprietary Info Withheld,Per 10CFR2.790 ML20203G6071998-01-26026 January 1998 Forwards Redacted Version of Pp&L,Inc Corporate Auditings Interim Rept 739459-97,dtd 971015 & Affidavit Pursuant to 10CFR2.790 Justifying That Redacted Portions Be Withheld from Public Disclosure.Without Rept IR 05000387/19970031998-01-0606 January 1998 Provides Updated Response to Violations Noted in Insp Repts 50-387/97-03 & 50-388/97-03.Corrective Actions:Util Currently Scheduling Issuance of All Procedural Revs by End of First Quarter 1998 ML18017A2931998-01-0606 January 1998 Provides Responses to Improved TS Section 3.8 Per 970324 NRC Rai.Schedule 980628 for Improved TS Implementation. Submittal of Revised Specifications Is Planned for Jan 1998 ML18030A4071998-01-0606 January 1998 Provides Updated Response to Violations Noted in Insp Repts 50-387/97-03 & 50-388/97-03.Corrective Actions:Util Currently Scheduling Issuance of All Procedural Revs by End of First Quarter 1998 PLA-4828, Expresses Appreciation for Support Received by Former Project Manager C Poslusny1997-12-29029 December 1997 Expresses Appreciation for Support Received by Former Project Manager C Poslusny IR 05000387/19970041997-12-22022 December 1997 Resolves Commitments Made in Response to NOV Issued As Part of NRC Insp Repts 50-387/97-04 & 50-388/97-04 Dtd 970805. Proposed FSAR QA Program Description Changes,Reason for Changes & Basis Included for Approval ML18026A4901997-12-22022 December 1997 Resolves Commitments Made in Response to NOV Issued as Part of NRC Insp Repts 50-387/97-04 & 50-388/97-04 Dtd 970805. Proposed FSAR QA Program Description Changes,Reason for Changes & Basis Included for Approval ML20203M5741997-12-0505 December 1997 FOIA Request for Copy of Latest OI Rept on Susquehanna Ses Including All Exhibits & for Any Other Communication Between NRC & Susquehanna Ses/Pp&L PLA-4818, Forwards Redacted Version of Pp&L,Inc Corporate Auditings Rept 739459-1-97,dtd 971201 & Affidavit Pursuant to 10CFR2.790 Justifying That Redacted Portions Be Withheld from Public Disclosure.Without Rept1997-12-0404 December 1997 Forwards Redacted Version of Pp&L,Inc Corporate Auditings Rept 739459-1-97,dtd 971201 & Affidavit Pursuant to 10CFR2.790 Justifying That Redacted Portions Be Withheld from Public Disclosure.Without Rept 1999-09-08
[Table view] Category:UTILITY TO NRC
MONTHYEARML18026A3941990-09-0101 September 1990 Requests Waiver of Compliance from Tech Spec 3.8.1.1 to Evaluate Increase in Action from 72 H to 15 Days Re Ac Sources Based on 900829 Borescopic Insp of Emergency Diesel Generator ML17157A2741990-08-0808 August 1990 Forwards Topical Rept PL-NF-90-001, Application of Reactor Analysis Methods for BWR Design & Analysis. IR 05000387/19900801990-08-0303 August 1990 Responds to Violations Noted in Insp Repts 50-387/90-80 & 50-388/90-80.Corrective Actions:Util Conducted Operator Training on How to Implement Eops If Suppression Chamber Pressure Not Available ML18030A0741990-08-0303 August 1990 Responds to Violations Noted in Insp Repts 50-387/90-80 & 50-388/90-80.Corrective Actions:Util Conducted Operator Training on How to Implement EOPs If Suppression Chamber Pressure Not Available ML18026A2351990-07-0202 July 1990 Forwards Application for Proposed Amend 132 to License NPF-14,revising Tech Spec to Support Cycle 6 Reload ML18030A0721990-06-19019 June 1990 Forwards Rev 1 to SEA-EE-183, Evaluation of Unit 1 Computer Class 1E - Non-Class 1E Interfaces & Rev 1 to SEA-EE-184, Evaluation of Unit 1 Annunciator Class 1E - Non-Class 1E Interfaces. ML18026A3931990-06-0707 June 1990 Requests NRC Approval to Install Mod at Plant Determined to Constitute Unreviewed Safety Question When Evaluated.Util Will Implement Administrative Controls to Ensure Larger Min Vol Met for Diesel E Prior to Tech Spec Change ML18030A3671990-05-14014 May 1990 Forwards Proprietary Conclusions of Investigation Re Two False Negative Analytical Results from Two Blind Spike Urine Samples.Investigation Satisfactorily Evaluated Samples. Encl Withheld (Ref 10CFR2.790) ML20043A2461990-05-11011 May 1990 Forwards Draft of Proposed Decommissioning Financial Assurance Plan,Per 10CFR50.33 & 50.75,for Review.Telcon Scheduled for 900515 to Discuss Comments ML18030A0711990-03-19019 March 1990 Responds to Questions Delineated in 900131 Ltr Re Diesel Generator Events That Occurred During Sept & Oct 1989.Draft Procedures for Proposed Intake Air Temp Test Program Transmitted to NRC on 900205.Revised Procedures Encl ML18017A1871990-02-15015 February 1990 Forwards Books 1 & 2 to, Unit 2 Third Refueling & Insp Outage;Outage Summary Rept. IR 05000387/19890331990-02-0505 February 1990 Responds to NRC 900105 Ltr Re Violations Noted in Insp Repts 50-387/89-33 & 50-388/89-31.Corrective Actions:Rhr Svc Water Pump 2P506B Remains in Inoperable Status Until Cause of Deviation Determined & Condition Corrected ML18030A0701990-02-0505 February 1990 Responds to NRC 900105 Ltr Re Violations Noted in Insp Repts 50-387/89-33 & 50-388/89-31.Corrective Actions:Rhr Svc Water Pump 2P506B Remains in Inoperable Status Until Cause of Deviation Determined & Condition Corrected ML18040A9601990-02-0202 February 1990 Forwards Schedules That Provide Details of Tasks Required to Complete Activities Re Diesel Generators & Advises of Plan to Have Spare Parts on Site in Timely Manner to Support Each Diesel Insp ML20006B4501990-01-25025 January 1990 Forwards Preliminary Scope & Schedule for Security Upgrade Project.Encl Withheld (Ref 10CFR73.21) ML17156B6031990-01-25025 January 1990 Forwards NPDES Discharge Monitoring Rept for Dec 1989 & State of Pa,Dept of Environ Resources Monthly Facility Rept Form (01-112).Noncompliances for Zinc on Cooling Tower Blowdown on 891228 & for Missed Sample Noted ML18040B2671990-01-0505 January 1990 Forwards Rev 0 to SEA-CW-037, Analysis of B & C 1989 Diesels Failure. Rept Details Util Analysis of Overpressurization Incidents Which Occurred in Sept & Oct 1989 of Diesel Generators ML18040B2651989-11-27027 November 1989 Forwards Response to Generic Ltr 89-21.Table of USIs for Which Technical Resolution Has Been Achieved Encl ML19325F1991989-11-0909 November 1989 Responds to Generic Ltr 89-07, Power Reactor Safeguards Contingency Planning for Surface Vehicle Bombs. Util Has Developed & Issued Procedure Which Includes Safeguards Contingency Planning Using Approach Noted in Generic Ltr ML19325D7411989-10-19019 October 1989 Forwards Application for Amends 126 & 77 to Licenses NPF-14 & NPF-22,respectively,requesting Emergency Temporary Relief from Certain Requirements of Tech Specs 3.2.2 on One Time Basis for Period of 3 Months ML19325C3771989-10-11011 October 1989 Forwards Change DD to Physical Security Plan.Change Withheld (Ref 10CFR73.21) ML18040B2581989-10-0202 October 1989 Forwards Final Response to Request for Addl Info Re Generic Ltr 88-01, NRC Position on IGSCC in BWR Austenitic Stainless Steel Piping. Listed Items Included in Previous & Current Ref Responses ML18040A9441989-09-12012 September 1989 Responds to Remaining Questions Raised During NRC Insp of Training Programs.Training Procedure Re Technical Exam Bank Instrumentation & Control Training Exams.Health Physics Technicians Trained Re High Radiation Levels PLA-3251, Forwards Response to Regulatory Effectiveness Review Rept. Util Established Team to Evaluate Appropriate Scope for Planned Major Project to Upgrade Security.Scope of Project to Be Finalized & Approved in Nov 1989.Response Withheld1989-08-31031 August 1989 Forwards Response to Regulatory Effectiveness Review Rept. Util Established Team to Evaluate Appropriate Scope for Planned Major Project to Upgrade Security.Scope of Project to Be Finalized & Approved in Nov 1989.Response Withheld ML18040A9421989-08-22022 August 1989 Requests Concurrence W/Scheduling of 1990 Annual NRC Observed Emergency Preparedness Exercise at Plant on 900502. Concurrence Requested by 890930 ML18040B2531989-08-10010 August 1989 Discusses Insp of Operational Status of Emergency Preparedness Program.Susquehanna Review Committee 1987 & 1988 Emergency Plan Audits Encl W/Other Supporting Documentation ML20246A0191989-06-30030 June 1989 Submits Comments on Containment Performance Improvement Program (Cpi).Believes Program Will Be Generic Approach to Improving Containment Performance During Severe Accident PLA-3218, Submits Info Re Settlement Agreements for Discrimination Matters Arising Under Energy Reorganization Act of 1974. No Settlements Made Between Licensee & Any Employees in Section 210 Proceedings1989-06-27027 June 1989 Submits Info Re Settlement Agreements for Discrimination Matters Arising Under Energy Reorganization Act of 1974. No Settlements Made Between Licensee & Any Employees in Section 210 Proceedings ML18040B2501989-06-20020 June 1989 Forwards Summary Rept of Safety Evaluations Approved During 1988.Changes Include Backseating Control Box to Electrically Backset HV-202168 to Reduce Steam Leakage & Rerouting Condensate Supply Line to Main Condenser Keepfill PLA-3194, Forwards Change CC to Physical Security Plan.Change Withheld (Ref 10CFR73.21)1989-05-30030 May 1989 Forwards Change CC to Physical Security Plan.Change Withheld (Ref 10CFR73.21) ML18040A9301989-04-28028 April 1989 Responds to 890322 Request for Addl Info Re Plant Fire Protection Review Rept.Analysis of Circuits Having Potential for Being Impacted by Fire Resulting in Multiple High Impedence Faults Will Be Completed by Last Quarter 1989 ML18040B2441989-04-14014 April 1989 Forwards Application for Amends to Licenses NPF-14 & NPF-22, Resulting from Mods Performed to Essential Svc Water Sys,Per 10CFR50,App R,Consisting of Proposed Amends 23 & 70 PLA-3173, Forwards Change Bb to Physical Security Plan.Encl Withheld (Ref 10CFR73.21)1989-03-22022 March 1989 Forwards Change Bb to Physical Security Plan.Encl Withheld (Ref 10CFR73.21) ML18040A9271989-03-10010 March 1989 Forwards Rev 6 to ISI-T-100.0 for Unit 1 & Rev 3 to ISI-T-200.0 for Unit 2 Pump & Valve Inservice Insp Testing Program. ML18040A9261989-03-0707 March 1989 Discusses Util Position Re Completion & Implementation of NRC Requested Actions Specified in Suppl 1 to NRC Bulletin 88-007, Power Oscillations in Bwrs. ML17156B0131989-02-0202 February 1989 Forwards Proprietary Rept & Affidavit Supporting Proposed Amend 119 to License NPF-14 ML17156A9771988-12-15015 December 1988 Forwards Rev 11 to Susquehanna Units 1 & 2 Emergency Plan ML18040B2331988-11-22022 November 1988 Forwards Listed Addl Info Re Plant Fire Protection Review rept.W/16 Oversize Drawings ML17156A9211988-11-0909 November 1988 Forwards Proprietary GE Rept, Tech Spec Improvement Analysis for Reactor Protection Sys for Susquehanna Steam Electric Station,Units 1 & 2. Rept Withheld (Ref 10CFR2.790) ML18040A9111988-09-15015 September 1988 Informs That Mods Re Fire Barrier Upgrades,Hvac Fan Switches,Ct Secondaries & Raceway Wrapping Completed Except as Listed ML18040A9101988-08-10010 August 1988 Forwards Application for Amend to License NPF-14,extending Operation During Cycle 4 W/One Circulation Loop Out of Svc. Fee Paid ML18040B2221988-08-10010 August 1988 Responds to Generic Ltr 88-01, NRC Position on IGSCC in BWR Austenitic Stainless Steel Piping. Staff Position on Matls, Water Chemistry,Crack Evaluation & Repair Criteria & Insp Schedules Among Topics Addressed.Flaw Evaluations Encl ML18040B2201988-07-27027 July 1988 Forwards Comments to Each Specific SALP Category,Per 880707 Meeting W/Nrc.Presentations from Meeting Also Encl ML18040A9061988-07-21021 July 1988 Forwards GE Rept, Susquehanna Unit 1 CRD Housing Cap Screw Corrosion. Rept Completes Action on Item ML18040A9031988-07-19019 July 1988 Forwards Approved Version of Topical Rept PL-NF-87-001-A, Qualification of Steady State Core Physics Methods for BWR Design & Analysis, Per 880428 Ltr ML18040A9041988-07-19019 July 1988 Forwards Rev 39 to Updated FSAR for Susquehanna Steam Electric Station Units 1 & 2 Per 10CFR50.71 ML18040B2131988-06-24024 June 1988 Forwards 1987 Annual Rept for Allegheny Electric Cooperative,Inc ML18040A9021988-06-15015 June 1988 Provides Revised Response to NRC 871130 Ltr Re Violations Noted in Insp Repts 50-387/87-19 & 50-388/87-19.Corrective Actions:Incumbent Will Be Removed from Emergency Plan Position of Radiation Protection Coordinator PLA-3028, Responds to Suppl 1 to Bulletin 85-003, Motor-Operated Valve Common Mode Failures During Plant Transients Due to Improper Switch Settings. No Revs to Design Review for Original Bulletin Required as Result of Suppl1988-05-31031 May 1988 Responds to Suppl 1 to Bulletin 85-003, Motor-Operated Valve Common Mode Failures During Plant Transients Due to Improper Switch Settings. No Revs to Design Review for Original Bulletin Required as Result of Suppl ML18040A8691988-04-0606 April 1988 Forwards Application for Proposed Amends 110 & 61 to Licenses NPF-14 & NPF-22,respectively,revising Tech Specs Re Radiation Monitoring Instrumentation.Fee Paid 1990-09-01
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REGULATORY INFORMATION DISTRIBUTION SYSTEM (RIDS)
'ACCESSION NBR:8904200364 DOC.DATE: 89/04/14 NOTARIZED: YES DOCKET g FACIL:50-387 Susquehanna Steam Electric Station, Unit 1, Pennsylva 05000387 50-388 Susquehanna Steam Electric Station, Unit 2, Pennsylva 05000388 AUTH. NAME AUTHOR AFFILIATION KEISER,H.W. 'ennsylvania Power 6 Light Co.
RECIP.NAME RECIPIENT AFFILIATION BUTLER,W.R. -
Project Directorate.I-2
SUBJECT:
Forwards application for amends to Licenses NPF-14 6 NPF-22 re App R ESW mods.
DISTRIBUTION CODE: A006D COPIES RECEIVED:LTR ENCL SIZE-TITLE: OR/Licensing .Submittal: Fire Protection 8 NOTES:LPDR 1 LPDR 1 cy Transcripts.
cy Transcripts.
05000387 05000388 l RECIPIENT COPIES RECIPIENT COPIES ID CODE/NAME LTTR ENCL ID CODE/NAME LTTR ENCL D-PD1-2 LA 1 0 PD1-2 PD 5 5 THADANI,M, 1 1 INTERNAL: ACRS 3 3 NRR WERMEIL,J 1 0 NRR/DEST/ADS 7E 1 1 NRR/DEST/CEB 2 2 NRR/DEST/PSB 8D l. 1 NUDOCS-ABSTRACT 1 1
&7~M 1 0 OGC/HDS2 1 0 REG FILE 01 1 1 EXTERNAL: LPDR 1 4 1 NRC PDR 1 1 NSIC 1 1 NOTES 2 2 R
I h
NOTE K) ALL "RIDS" RECIPIENTS PLEASE HELP US IQ REDUCE %ELSE CDNTACr 'XHE DOQJMEVZ CCjNHK)L DESKS RCjOM Pl-37 (EXT. 20079) KO EIZKLNATE YOUR NAME PRCH DISTRZKTZIGN LISTS FOR DOCUKWIS YOU DON'T NEED.'OTAL NUMBER OF COPIES REQUIRED: LTTR 24 ENCL 20
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Pennsylvania Power & Light Company Two North Ninth Street ~ Allentown, PA 18101 ~ 215/77&5151 APR 1 4 tgsg Harold W. Kelser Senior V/ce President. Nuclear 215l770 4194-Director of Nuclear Reactor Regulation Attention: Dr. W. R. Butler, Project Director Project Directorate I-2 Division of Reactor Projects U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, DC 20555 SUSQUEHANNA STEAM ELECTRIC STATION PROPOSED AMENDMENT 123 TO LICENSE NO.
NPF-14 AND PROPOSED AMENDMENT 70 TO LICENSE NO. NPF-22:
APPENDIX R ESW MODIFICATIONS Docket Nos. 50-387 PLA-3180 FILES A17-2/R41-2 and 50-388
Dear Dr. Butler:
The purpose of this letter is to propose changes to both the Susquehanna SES Unit 1 and Unit 2 Technical Specifications. These changes are as a result of modifications being done to Susquehanna SES in order to comply with 10CFR50, Appendix R.
DESCRIPTION OF CHANGE
)
The following changes, which are illustrated on the attached marked-up pages, are proposed for, both Units 1 and 2:'u i
o Table 3.8.4.2.1-1: Delete the ESW valves associated with each diesel generator. Also delete Footnote ~.
o Table 3.8.4.2.2-1: Add the following ESW Loop' valves:
HV-011'12E ESW HV-01122E ESW o Specification 4.8.2.ld: Revise the load profile for Channel "H" battery OD595 as follows:
253 amperes for 60 seconds 75 amperes for the next 239 minutes 8904200364 8904i4 PDR ADOCK 05000387 P PDC
FILES A17-2/R41-2 PLA-3180 Dr. W. R. Butler SAFETY ANALYSIS The proposed Technical Specification changes are a result of proposed modifications to the ESW System. These modifications are a result of our 10CFR50 Appendix R evaluation and other enhancements to the ESW system. A detailed description of the proposed modifications are included in Attachment l.
The modifications involve removing the auto-loop transfer for each diesel generator's ESW valves, adding an auto closure to the loop A ESW valves for Diesel Generator E, and revision to the battery load profile for the Diesel Generator E 125V DC battery.
When the auto-loop transfer logic is removed, the Diesel Generator A through E ESW valves no longer have a safety-related function other than maintaining the flowpath integrity or an isolation boundary when the diesel generator is not aligned. Therefore, the thermal overload protection for these valves does not need to be continuously bypassed nor does it need the capability of being bypassed. The thermal overload protection bypass will be removed.
With the removal of the auto-loop transfer and the addition of the auto-closure, the Diesel Generator, E loop A ESW valves'nly safety-related function (other than flowpath integrity and isolation boundary) is to automatically close during a LOOP and/or LOCA condition when the diesel generator is not aligned but is being tested. This modification adds the auto-closure and automatic bypass of the thermal overload protection to the loop A ESW valves for DieselGenerator E. 'his modification is the same design as on the loop B valves which was part of the original Diesel Generator E design.
The battery load profile for the Diesel Generator E 125V DC battery is reduced due to the removal of the auto-loop transfer logic. This'liminated the load associated with the valves operating during the final minute of the profile.
NO SIGNIFICANT HAZARDS CONSIDERATIONS I. Does the proposed change involve a significant increase in the probability or consequences of an accident previously evaluated?
No. Since once the auto-loop transfer logic is removed, the Diesel Generator A through D ESW valves no longer have a safety related function other than maintaining the flow path integrity or an isolation boundary when the diesel generator is not aligned. These valves will be open when diesel generators are aligned and will have no automatic actuation functions thus the thermal overload protection does not need to be continuously bypassed nor does it need the capability of being bypassed.
With the auto-loop transfer logic de-energized, the Diesel Generator "E" valves'nly safety related function (other than flowpath integrity and isolation boundary) is to automatically close during a LOCA and/or LOOP condition when the diesel generator is not aligned but is being tested.
The Diesel Generator "E" ESW loop B valves had this auto-close feature
FILES A17-2/R41-2 PLA-3180 Dr. W. R. Butler incorporated in their design since their installation. The installation of the auto-closure for the loop A valves has the same basis as for the loop B valves. The Technical Specification changes for the loop B valves were approved in Amendment No. 61 for NPF-14;and Amendment No. 32
'for'PF-22 dated 3/16/87.
FSAR Subsection 8.3.2.1.1.4 stated that the station batteries have sufficient capacity without the charger to independently supply the required loads, for four hours. The Technical Specifications require that the batteries be 'surveilled to dummy loads which are greater than design loads. An assessment has been performed by our engineering department which verifies that the battery has adequate capacity to power the actual loads on the 125V DC system. The new load profile contained in the proposed amendment to the Technical Specifications envelop the actual loads.
II. Does the proposed change create the possibility of a new or different kind of accident from any accident previously evaluated?
No. Since the proposed changes do not change the function of the ESW system, they will not introduce a new or different kind of event. Any postulated accident resulting from these changes are bounded by previous analysis.
At stated in Part I, the batteries have sufficient capacity to power the actual battery loads thus enabling them to perform their intended function. Any postulated accident resulting from this change is bounded by previous analysis.
III. Does the proposed change involve a significant reduction in a margin of safety'7 No. Since the diesel generator,ESW valves no longer provide an automatic safety function, the removal of the continuous thermal overload protection bypass does not reduce a margin of safety. The addition of the auto-close and automatic thermal overload protection bypass for the Die'sel Generator "E" Loop A ESW valves does not degrade the margin of safety of the ESW system or diesel generators. This change has already been approved for the Loop B ESW valves.
IEEE 485 requires that the related battery capacity include a margin for aging of the battery and the temperature of the batteries'nvironment at the beginning of battery life. This margin allows replacement of the battery when its capacity is decreased to 80X of its rated capacity (100% design load). Our engineering department has determined that with the revised reduced load profile the Class lE 125V DC battery will supply its connected emergency loads with greater margins of safety at the battery electrolyte temperatures equal to or greater than 60'F and with 25X aging margins relative to load as recommended by IEEE-485-1983.
With the decreased battery loads it can be concluded that the overall safety margin of the plant is not diminished.
FILES A17-2/R41-2 PLA-3180 Dr. W. R. Butler IMPLEMENTATION These proposed modifications are as a result of our 10CFR50, Appendix R reanalysis which has been committed to be completed by December 31, 1989. In order to meet this completion date and also in order not to create problems with coordination of systems being out of service, these modifications are scheduled to be completed after the 1989 Unit 1 Refueling Outage and before the 1989 Unit 2 Refueling Outage. Therefore PP6L requests that this proposed amendment be approved prior to July 1, 1989.
Any questions on this submittal should be directed to Mr. C. T. Coddington at (215) 770-7915.
Very truly yours, H. W. Keiser Attachment cc: LHRQ NRC cument Region I Control Desk or gina'~
Mr. F. I. Young, NRC Sr. Resident Inspector Mr. M. C. Thadani, NRC Project Manager Mr. T. M. Gerusky, PA DER
ATTACHMENT 1 Page 1 of 7 MODIFICATION TO ESW The Emergency Service Water (ESW) System provides cooling water to the Emergency Diesel Generators which are required for Appendix R shutdown.
10CFR50 Appendix R Part III requires as a design basis that "during the postfire shutdown, the reactor coolant system process variables shall be maintained within those predicted for a loss of normal a.c. power..." The ESW System has Loop A and Loop B flow loops (see attached figure). Each loop supplies cooling water to the diesel coolers through separate inlet and outlet motor operated valves. Control of the valves is from Main Control Room Panel OC653.
In addition to the diesel generators, the ESW System supplies cooling water to the Reactor Building Coolers, Reactor Building Room Coolers and the Control Structure Chillers which have separate A and B loop heat exchangers. However, there are not redundant diesel coolers for each loop, although either ESW loop can be aligned to the diesels. Loop A of ESW is normally aligned to those diesel coolers of the diesel generators which are aligned to the safety related 4.16 kv buses for standby automatic operation. In the event of low flow on Loop A or loss of an ESW pump, an auto-loop transfer logic in the ESW System automatically transfers the'diesel coolers to the Loop B for the aligned diesel generators provided both Loop B pump breakers are closed. The transfer logic also closes the Loop B ESW valves of Diesel Generator E and trips the'utput breaker if it is not aligned but is, being tested.
t During fire in the Main Control a Room and other fire areas/zones, the control cables associated with either the ESW valve controls on OC653 or the auto-loop transfer logic can be damaged and the operability of ESW is lost. The valves on both loops may also spuriously close due to a short in the control cables.
Such spurious closure of the valves must be immediately corrected whenever the diesel engine is running for the Appendix R safe shutdown.
There are two prerequisites to performing this modification. First, the ESW check valves (0-11-033 through 0-11-040) at the inlets to Diesel Generators A through D must be replaced with more reliable valves. The Diesel Generator E check valves do not require replacement. Second, a test must be performed to verify that the new ESW valve alignment will not reduce ESW flows to safety-related coolers below their flow balance acceptance criteria (with the failure of one ESW pump). Both of these prerequisites must be completed prior to implementing the proposed modification.
The proposed action is to modify the controls of the ESW valves for the Emergency Diesel coolers as follows:
- 1. The valve controls on Main Control Room Panel OC653 are removed. The valve position indicating lights are not removed so that the control room operator has valve position status for the aligned diesel generators. A fire in the control room can result in shorting the indicating lights which blows the control power fuse, but the valves will not change position once the modification is complete.
ATTACHMENT 1 Page 2 of 7
- 2. Local valve controls are added to the Engine Control Panel OC521 in Diesel Generators A through D bays and the Building Auxiliary Services Panel OC577E in the Diesel Generator E building. The local controls are used to close the ESW valves to isolate the diesel generator during maintenance and to open the valves when the diesel generator is aligned.
- 3. The auto-loop transfer logic is removed and both loops of the ESW System are normally aligned to the coolers of the four diesel generators in service.
- 4. Auto-closure logic is added to the Loop A valves of Diesel Generator E.
The logic is the same as the existing Loop B logic which closes the valves and trips the output breaker if a LOOP and/or LOCA occur when the Diesel Generator E is not aligned but is being tested.
- 5. The continuous bypass of the thermal overload protection for the aligned diesel generators is deleted. Automatic bypass of the thermal overload protection is added to the Loop A ESW valves for Diesel Generator E when it is not aligned and is being tested.
Items No. 1, 2 and 3 are required to meet 10CFR50 Appendix R concerns about a fire damaging the Main Control Room switches or control cables associated with these valves. It is desirable to eliminate the auto-loop transfer logic for several other reasons which include:
II
- a. The auto-loop transfer logic requires the operation of numerous subcomponents which results in an overall complexity that increases the probability for a'single failure.
- b. Due to the tolerances on ESW pump start timers, it is possible for the D pump to start prior to the C pump, on a LOCA signal. This, again, can lead to an undesired auto-loop transfer. The toleranc'es allow the pumps to start within the Technical Specification requirements.
- c. There is no auto-loop transfer to Loop A from Loop B. Since an unwanted transfer and a single failure on Loop B of ESW is not within the design basis of the plant, this scenario could result in an unsafe condition.
- d. The Loop A ESW pumps get far more run time than the Loop B pumps, since the diesels are normally aligned to the Loop A. This leads to uneven wear on the pumps.
- e. This modification reduces the probability of a station blackout due to a diesel failure by a factor of two.
The continuous bypass of the thermal overload protection for the ESW system is only applicable to the aligned diesel generators. The bypass was from normally closed contacts of switches on panel OC697 in the Main Control Room which are in parallel with the thermal overload protection. This modification deletes the normally closed parallel contacts from all of the ESW valve control circuits.
ATTACHMENT 1 Page 3 of 7 The automatic bypass of the thermal overload protection for the Diesel Generator E is a normal open contact of a relay which closes if a LOCA, LOOP or auto-loop transfer occurs w'ith the Diesel Generator E not aligned. At present, only the Loop B valves have the automatic bypass. This modification deletes the auto-loop transfer input to the relay. In addition, the modification provides a similar automatic bypass scheme for the Diesel Generator E Loop A valves, so that the Loop A and/or Loop B ESW valves can be opened to the Diesel Generator E when it is not aligned, but is being tested.
At present, the breakers for the Loop A -ESW valves of the unaligned diesel generator are required to be opened in accordance with plant procedures as required by Appendix R fire analysis. This modification deletes the requirement to open the breakers.
The modification provides new setpoints for the low flow alarms on Loop A and Loop B of the ESW System. The setpoint is based on previous testing performed and the flow checks required by the prerequisites.
It should be noted that there will no longer be the capability to open or shut the ESW valves from the control room. The control of the valves will now be local, in their respective diesel bays. This is not viewed as a problem.
Currently, if an ESW leak occurs such that it would be desired to isolate a loop of ESW at one of the diesels, an alarm would come to the control room.
If this were a flood detector alarm, an operator would need to go to the diesel bay in question in order to determine which ESW loop is leaking, or if the leak is from a demineralized water or fire protection line. Therefore, removing the remote valve control would not increase isolation time. If an ESW leak caused high process temperatures on a diesel, a trouble alarm would be received in the Main Control Room. Once again, an operator would need to go to the diesel bay in question, in order to determine what was causing the alarm condition. Therefore, removing the remote valve control would not increase isolation time. The local switches are located far enough away from ESW lines to alleviate any concerns about spray from an ESW leak damaging the local switches.
Since the proposed modification cross-ties both loops of ESW at the diesel, it must be demonstrated that a moderate energy leakage crack in ESW does not adversely effect flows in both ESW loops. A crack must be postulated in accordance with FSAR Section 3.6. Such leaks were analyzed and determined to be acceptable by PP&L.
ESW flow balances are performed with the diesel coolers aligned only to the loop being balanced. After the proposed modification, both ESW loops are aligned to the diesel coolers at the same time. This alignment will cause increased flow rates on all loop A ESW coolers. PPGL has analyzed this situation, and found it to be acceptable. Note that cooler throttle valves cannot be throttled back to reduce these higher flow rates because a single failure of control power to the pump motor breakers can cause both ESW pumps on one loop to fail. This would leave ESW in its current configuration with two pumps feeding one loop (including the diesel coolers) of ESW. Also, note
ATTACHMENT 1 Page 4 of 7 that with the current configuration, the loop of ESW which does not have the diesel coolers aligned has high heat exchanger tube velocities. Since there is no automatic throttling capability on ESW, flow balance throttling positions are set based on the worst-case which is to assure that minimum flow rates are met with the diesels valved in. Currently, some of the Reactor Building heat exchangers, on the ESW loop which is not valved into the diesels, will have tube velocities which are higher than normal. Leaving both ESW loops aligned to the diesel would decrease these tube velocities.
FSAR Section 3.6 (which references Branch Technical Position APCSB 3-1) addresses with pipe breaks and cracks. Per its definition, the ESW system would be considered moderate energy. As such, a circumferential pipe break does not need to be postulated. Only a moderate energy leakage crack must be considered.
The proposed action does not alter the system piping or the maximum system.
pressure. Therefore, it does not in any way increase the probability of occurrence of a pipe crack. Likewise, it does not in any way increase the severity of the spray pattern from such a leak. Since both loops of ESW will be cross-tied at the diesels, it is necessary to consider whether a leakage crack can adversely affect both loops of ESW. PP&L investigated this issue and determined that a leakage crack does not cause a problem. In the event of a leakage crack upstream of the ESW check valves to the diesels, these check valves would prevent any reverse flow between loops. Existing flow balances demonstrate that one loop can adequately supply both the diesels and Reactor Building/Control Structure heat exchangers. Therefore, a leak upstream of the check valves would not adversely affect plant safety. In the event of a leakage crack between HV-01110 (HV-01112) and HV-01120 (HV-01122), the leak could not be isolated without taking that particular diesel out of service.
This would be acceptable, since in accordance with FSAR Section 3.6 a LOOP does not need to be postulated along with the leakage crack (and therefore the diesels will not be required). PP&L determined that the amount of water leaking out does not have an adverse effect on other coolers in the system.
This calculation also considered leaks downstream of the coolers and determined that a leak on one loop does not adversely affect flows to coolers on the other loop.
Per BTP APCSB 3-1, no other failure needs to be considered in the ESW system, along with a leakage crack. Therefore, failure of check valves 0-11-034 through 0-11-040, 0-11-513, or 0-11-514 do not need to be considered with a leak. However, the leakage rates determined by calculation indicates that even in the event of failure of one of these valves, the ESW system is still able to perform its design function in the event of a pipe leak, or in the event of any other single failure.
PP&L examined the proposed valve configuration and determined it to be acceptable, provided the diesel inlet check valves are re-installed and provided the previously mentioned flow check is performed.
ATTACHMENT 1 Page 5 of 7 FSAR Section 9.2.5.1 states that the ESW system has sufficient redundancy so that a single failure of any active component, assuming the loss of off-site power, cannot impair the capability of the system to perform its safety-related function.
FSAR Section 1.2.2.8.3 states that the ESW System is designed with sufficient redundancy so that no single active or passive system component failure can prevent it from achieving its safety objective.
Criterion 44 of 10CFR50 Appendix A states that cooling water systems which transfer heat from systems and components important to safety must accomplish their function, assuming a single failure, for either on-site or off-site electric power system operation.
The power and control to the ESW pumps is divisionalized such that loss of one channel of 125V DC control power to the ESW pump motor breakers or cable failures can result in both ESW pumps not starting on one loop. This is the worst-case single failure in the ESW system. The diesel inlet check valves will prevent flow from the operating loop into the failed loop, on the upstream side of the diesels. Also, the check valves at the ESW pump discharges on the failed loop provide a second barrier for this function.
Although ESW will be cross-tied downstream of the diesels, the spray pond isolation valves prevent cross flow from the operating loop into the failed loop. For the postulated failure, the spray pond bypass valve on the failed loop would not automatically open since it opens after an ESW pump on its loop starts. RHRSW pumps on the failed ESW loop could be manually started and a spray pond valve could be opened for this reason.
Considering a loss "of either A,(or B) Diesel Generator, the effect is the same as mentioned in the paragraph above. There would be no power to open the spray pond bypass valve so one loop of ESW and RHRSW would be unavailable. As mentioned before, the spray pond valves prevent ESW loop cross-flow upstream of the diesels. Eventually the spray pond bypass valve could be manually opened on the failed loop and the C (or D) ESW and RHRSW pump started on this loops A single failure of one ESW pump would be no more severe than the case just mentioned.
FSAR Sections 9.2.5.2 through 9.2.5.5 were reviewed, since they discuss the ESW System. This modification does not change anything mentioned in those sections.
FSAR Section 3.1.2.1.5 was reviewed to assure that this modification will not affect compliance with General Criterion 5 of 10CFR50 Appendix A. This modification does not cause any changes to this section.
FSAR Section 3.1.2.1.4 was reviewed to assure compliance with General Criterion 4 of 10CFR50 Appendix A. This FSAR section references Section 3.5 on missile protection criteria. Section 3.5.1 considers rotating component failure missiles and pressurized component failure missiles. This
ATTACHMENT 1 Page 6 of 7 modification does not alter the analyses in this section. There are three known catastrophic failures of Cooper nuclear service diesel's reciprocating parts. One involved failure of piston pin bolts, one involved failure of a connecting rod, and one involved failure of articulated rod bolts. These failures, as well as any other conceivable diesel missiles, would project radially from the diesel cylinders. Since the ESW piping in the diesel bays is located axillary away from the cylinders, an engine missile damaging the ESW pipe is not credible. However, it would be credible to have such a missile damage the engine control panel of one of the A through D engines. If this event caused a spurious valve position change on one or both ESW loops, it would not be a concern, since the diesel in question would already be inoperable. If an engine failure damaged the ESW valve handswitches, such that they could not close the valves, and there was a concurrent moderate energy leakage crack on that engine's ESW piping, the engine could either be isolated with its manual throttle valves, or the MOVs could be manually isolated (depending on where the leak was). Design ESW flows would need to be met, since neither a LOCA nor LOOP needs to be postulated concurrently with the ESW leak (per NRC BTP APCSB 3-1). The A through D diesel air start compressors are located such that a failure of their reciprocating parts could damage either the ESW pipe or the engine control panel. These failures are not considered credible for the following reasons: The compressors will not overspeed since they are powered by ac motors. The compressor reciprocating parts are relatively small, so their chance of failure is slight and their kinetic energy in the event of failure is relatively low. The parts would also need to fly a considerable distance in a non-radial direction to hit ESW piping.
A single-failure of a Spray Pond Bypass Valve (HV-01222A and B) to close must be considered for water hammer concerns. Prior to this modification, only part of one loop'would have a potential to drain when one bypass valve failed to close (return from the control structure chiller). This modification does not make potential drain down worse in either particular loop, and does not
'prevent the ESW/RHRSW systems from .fulfilling their design function. The control structure chiller lines and direct expansion (Dx) unit lines are the only piping which is high enough to drain. The single failure of a bypass valve will not normally allow these lines to drain, since there are isolation valves for these lines at relatively low elevations. The only time they could drain would be if a LOOP occurred while ESW was supplying cooling water to the control structure chiller or the Dx unit (such that these other isolation valves would not be closed). In this case the installed vacuum breakers would open and eliminate a waterhammer problem. Bechtel performed an ESW waterhammer analysis assuming these lines were drained, vacuum breakers were installed and the bypass valves were closed. The closed valve assumption was made to simplify the analysis. They found stresses under that situation to be acceptable. Clearly, the waterhammer impact is less if a bypass valve is opened, rather than closed, since the collapsing air pocket would be impacting a movable water column rather than a fixed water column. Therefore, the postulated scenario is acceptable.
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0 ATTACHMENT 1 Page 7 of 7 In response to additional concerns about the combined effects of the various changes being considered for the ESW System, PPSL performed a comprehensive review of the ESW System configuration and all available recent single failure studies on ESW. The results of the review concluded that the changing of all diesel cooler inlet and outlet isolation valves to be normally open, removing the automatic transfer logic for the aligned diesels and the installation of diesel cooler inlet check valves does not cause a degradation to plant safety.
In fact, it is an improvement to plant safety. A review of proposed ESW System changes also established that the changes do not individually or aggregately create a problem 'from a single failure standpoint. All of the proposed changes either have no effect'on system availability, or causes it to be improved.
I PPGL had evaluated the risk significance of selected changes to the ESW System. Their results show that removing the auto loop transfer logic and changing the ESW System so that both loops supply the aligned diesels reduces the estimated frequency of core damage.
The Diesel Generator E motor operated valves require DC power and control from the 125V DC battery OD595. The existing 4 hour4.62963e-5 days <br />0.00111 hours <br />6.613757e-6 weeks <br />1.522e-6 months <br /> load profile for battery surveillance testing is a three step profile with the final one minute (Step 3) representing a worst case condition of an auto-loop transfer occurring simultaneous with the continuous loads of Step 2. Since the proposed action deletes the auto-loop transfer logic, the 4 hour4.62963e-5 days <br />0.00111 hours <br />6.613757e-6 weeks <br />1.522e-6 months <br /> load profile is changed from a three step profile to a two step profile. This change is to eliminate the load associated with the valves operating during the final minute of the profile. The continuous load calculation for the auto-loop transfer logic and the valve controls was conservative. Therefore, the new two step 4 hour4.62963e-5 days <br />0.00111 hours <br />6.613757e-6 weeks <br />1.522e-6 months <br /> profile is slightly reduced to reflect changes in the continuous load.