ML20212B327

Forwards Exercise Evaluation of Implementation of State & Local Radiological Emergency Plans, for Exercise Conducted on 860826.No Deficiencies Observed,However 13 Areas Observed as Requiring Corrective Actions

ML20212B327
Person / Time
Site:	Quad Cities
Issue date:	12/17/1986
From:	Krimm R Federal Emergency Management Agency
To:	Jordan E NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE)
References
NUDOCS 8612290222
Download: ML20212B327 (1)

Text

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q Federal Emergency Management Agency J* '

Washington, D.C. 20472 1..

0 0 DEC I T 1986 MEMORANWM EOR: Edward L. Jordan Director Division of Emergency Preparedness and Engineering Response Office of Inspection and Enforcement U. S. Nuclear R ulatory Comnission FROM: ITicIa W. Tr Assistant Associate Director Office of Natural and Technological Hazards Programs

Subject:

Exercise Report of the August 26, 1986, Exercise of the Iowa Offsite Radiological Emergency Preparedness Plans for the Quad Cities Nuclear Power Station.

His is to transmit a copy of the Exercise Report of the August 26, 1986, joint exercise of the offsite radiological emergency preparedness plans for the Quad Cities Nuclear Power Station, near Cordova, Rock Island County, Illinois. B is was a joint, full participation exercise for the State of Iowa and Clinton and Scott Counties. These two counties are inpacted by the Quad Cities plume exposure 10-inile Emergency Planning Zone (EPZ). The report, dated November 12, 1986, was prepared by the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) Region VII.

In the August 26, 1986, exercise there were no Deficiencies observed, but there were thirteen areas observed as requiring corrective actions. The State of Iowa has received a copy of the exercise report and will respond to FEMA Region VII with a schedule for corrective actions. After the Region has received the schedule, and consulted with appropriate members of the Regional Assistance Ccmr.ittee, it will forward an evaluated schedule

• or the corrective action to this office. 'Ihe schedule will be transmitted to NRC after FEMA review and analysis.

If you have any questions, please contact Mr. Robert S. Wilkerson, Chief, Technological Hazards Division, at 646-2861.

Attachment 2

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MAm o o EXERCISE EVALUATION OF THE IMPLEGNEL"' ION OF STATE ARD IDCAL RADICIOGICAL EMERGENCY RESPOESE PLANS CONDUCTED AUGUST 26, 1986 for the

@AD CITIES EUCLEAR POWER STATION Near Cordova, Rock Island County, Tllinois Commeonwealth Edison, Licensee PARTICIPARTS:

State of Iowa Clinton County Scott County Novaber 12, 1986 Prepared by ,

Federal Buergency Management Age acy l l Region VII I

911 Walnut Street  ;

ranama City, Missouri 64106  :

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Jerome D. Overstreet, Regional Director ,

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1 INTRODUCTION 1.1 EIERCISE BACKGROUND On December 7,- 1979, the President directed the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) to assume lead responsibility for all off-site nuclear planning and response.

FEMA's responsibilities in radiological emergency planning for fixed

, nuclear facilities include the following:

Taking the lead in off-site emergency planning and in the review and evaluation of radiological emergency response plans developed by State and local governments.

Determining whether such plans can be implemented on the basis of observation and evaluation of exercises of the plans conducted by State and local governments.

Coordinating the activities of the following Federal agencies with responsibilities in the radiological emergency planning process:

U.S. Department of Commerce (DOC)

U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC)

U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA)

U.S. Department of Energy (DOE)

U.S. Department of Health and Human Services (HES)

U.S. Food and Drug Administration (FDA)

U.S. Public Health Service (PHS)

U.S. Department of Transportation (DOT)

U.S. Department of Agriculture (USDA)

U.S. Department of the Interior (DOI)

Representatives of these agencies serve as members of the Regional Assistance Committee (RAC), which is chaired by FEMA.

Formal submission of the radiological emergency response plans for the Quad Cities Nuclear Pover Station (QCNPS) to the RAC by tha State of Iowa and affected local jurisdictions was followed by a critique and evaluation of these plans.

The joint radiological emergency preparedness exercise was caraucted for the QCNPS on August 26, 1986, between the hours of 0535 and 140 to assess the capability of State and county emergency preparedness organizations to: 1) implement their radiological emergency preparedness plans and procedures; and 2) protect the public during a radiological emergency at the Commonwealth Edison Quad Cities Nuclear Power Station. The plans evaluated included the " Iowa Radiological Emergency Response Plans", and the Emergency Response Plans for Clinton and Scott Counties. This was the sixth exercise held for the Quad Cities Nuclear Power Statien. It was classified as Full Scale with the State of Iowa and the counties of Clinton

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x and Scott participating. The State of Illinois,lincluding Rock Island and Whiteside Counties also participated. However, this report will>' address '

the State of Iowa only.

1.2 EIERCISE E/ALUATORS Eleven Federal agency personnel and seven FEMA contract staff evaluated the off-site emergency response functions. These individuals and their exercise assignments are given below: ,a OBSERVER AGENCY ASSIGEMENTS Bob Bissell FBIA Overview Bill Brinck EPA Field Team Coordination Marlee Carroll FEMA EOF John Colemcn FEMA Regional Office Coordination Dee Demmitt ANL Scott Co. EOC Bill Gasper ANL Ambulance Drill Joseph Hayes FD!A Clinton Co. EOC Caroline Herzenberg AHL State EOC Roxanne Izzo ANL Reception /Decon Center Steve Kouba DOE Field Monitoring Team Rich Leonard FEMA Overview Jim Levenson ANL Clinton Co. EOC Mark Lickers DOT /USCG Forward Command Post Brad Salmonson INEL Reception /Decop., Centers /

Field Monitoring Team Dick Sumpter FEMA Scott Co. EOC '

John Tatar ANL Clinton Co. Reception Center Alyce Williams FEMA JPIC Dianne Wilson FEMA State EOC 1.3 EVALUATION CRITERIA The evaluation criteria for this exercise were:

1. hk Code of Federal Regult.tions (CFR), Part 350.9

2. NUREG-065h/ FEMA-REP-1, Rev. 1 (All applicable requirements).

2.a. The thirty-five standardized objectives developed as a su= mary of observable elements contained in NUREG-065h. These objectives will be referenced throughout the report.

3 Iowa Radiological Emergency Response Plan, Section B, Nuclear Power Plant Accident / Incident (all current revis'.ons through March, 1986).

h. Quad Cities - Site Specific Nuclear Power Plant Emergency Response Plans for Clinton and Scott Counties (all current revisions through March, 1986).

~1.4 EIERCISE OBJECTIVES Exercise objectives included full-scale participation from the State of Iowa and Clinton -and Scott Counties. . State activities included 'the activation of the Forward Cnmmand Post, Radiological Field Monitoring Teams, and participation at the Joint Public Information Center. The Iowa State Emergency Operations Center in Des Moines was activated to support the utility and local counties. Both Scott and Clinton County Emergency Operation Centers were fully activated. The alert and notification system,- consisting of sirens and activation of the Emergency Broadcast System (EBS), was simulated during this exercise. The utility activated the Emergency Operations Facility, Radiological Field Monitoring Teams and the Joint Public Information Center.

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The Exercise was ~ intended to demonstrate many, but not necessarily all, of the Quad Cities Nuclear Power Station capabilities to respond to a vide range of emergency conditions. The scenario was designed to activate the State and local radiological emergency response plans for the Quad Cities Nuclear Power Station and Commonwealth Edison's radiological emergency response plan. through their various levels. The exercise demonstrated a number of primary emergency. preparedness functions. At no time was the exercise permitted to interfere with the safe operations of the plant, and the plant management, at its discretion, could have suspended the exercise for any period of time necessary to ensure this goal.

Free play was encouraged and the exercise controllers interfered only if operator or player action- prematurely terminated the exercise or deviated excessively from the drill schedule, f On June 13, 1986, the State of Iowa submitted formal objectives for State and local jurisdictions for. this exercise. The format of this submission utilizes the thirty-five standardized objectives referred to under 1.3. (2.a.) above. They vill be referred to by number throughout this evaluation report and are as follows:

Iowa State Emergency Operations Center OBJECTIVE NUMBER 1 Demonstrate ability to mobilize staff and activate facilities 1 promptly.

2 Demonstrate ability to fully staff facilities and naintain j staffing around the clock.

3 Demonstrate ability to make decisions and to coordinate emergency activities.

k Demonstrate adequacy of facilities and displays to support emergency operations.

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5 .' Demonstrate ability-to' communicate with all appropriate locations, organizations, and field personnel.

10 Demonstrate ability to project dosage to the public via plume exposure, based on plant and field data, and to determine appropriate protective measures, based on PAG's, available shelter, evacuation time estimates, and all other appropriate factors.

13 Demnstrate ability to alert the public .vithin the 10-m11e EPZ and disseminate an initial instructional message 'vithin 15 minutes.

1h Demonstrate ability to formulate and distribute appropriate instructions to the public, in a timely fashion.

15 Demonstrate the organizational ability and resources necessary to manage an orderly evacuation of all or part of the plume EPZ.-

17 Demonstrate the organizational ability and resources necessary to control access to an evacuated area.

21 Demonstrate the ability to make the decision, based on predetermined criteria, whether to issue KI to emergency workers and/or the general _ population.

22 Demonstrate the ability to supply and administer KI, once the decision has been made to do so.

25 Demonstrate ability to provide advance coordination of information-released.

Emergency Operations Facility OBJECTIVE NUMBER 1 Demonstrate ability to mobilize staff and activate facilities promptly.

2 Demonstrate ability to fully staff facilities and maintain staffing around the clock.

k Demonstrate adequacy of facilities and displays to support emergency operations.

10 Demonstrate ability to project dosage to the public via plume exposure, based on plant and field data, and to determine appropriate protective measures, based on PAG's, available shelter, evacuation time estimates, and all other appropriate factors.

• 6

~5-Joint Public Infomation Center OBJECTIVE NUMBER 1 Demonstrate ability to mobilize staff and activate facilities promptly.

2 Demonstrate ability to fully staff facilities and =aintain staffing around the clock.

h Demonstrate adequacy of facilities and displays to support emergency operations.

5 Demonstrate ability to communicate with all appropriate locations and organizations.

2h Demonstrate ability to brief the media in a clear, accurate and timely canner.

25 Demonstrate ability to provide advance coordination of information released.

State Forward C - nd Post OBJECTIVE NUMBER 1 Demonstrate ability to mobilize staff and activate facilities promptly.

2 Demonstrate ability to fully , staff facilities and maintain staffing around the clock.

3 Demonstrate ability to make decisions and to coordinate energency activities.

I h Demonstrate adequacy of facilities and displays to support emergency operations.

5 Demonstrate ability to coc=unicate with all appropriate locations and organizations.

Dose Assessment and Field Team Coordination OBJECTIVE NUMBER 3 Demonstrate ability to make decisions and to coordinate e=ergency activities.

h Demonstrate adequacy of facilities and displays to support emergency operations.

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5 Demonstrate ability to communicate with all appropriate locations and organizations.

10 Demonstrate ability to project dosage to the public via plume exposure, based on plant and field data, and to determine appropriate protective measures, based on PAG's, available shelter, evacuation time estimates, and all other appropriate factors.

Radiological Field Monitoring Teams OBJECTIVE NUMBER 5 Demonstrate ability to communicate with all appropriate locations, organizations, and field personnel.

6 Demonstrate ability to mobilize and deploy field monitoring teams in a timely fashion.

7 Demonstrate appropriate equipment and procedures for determining ambient radiation levels.

8 Demonstrate appropriate equipment and procedures for measurement of airborne radioiodine concentrations as lov as 10-7 uCi/CC in the presence of noble gaces.

20 Demonstrate ability to continuously monitor and control emergency worker exposure.

Medical Emergency OBJECTIVE NUMBER 20 Demonstrate ability to continuously monitor and control emergency worker exposure control. (Illini Hospital-Based Ambulance Service.)

30 Demonstrate adequacy of ambulance facilites and procedures for handling contaminated individuals. (St. Luke's Hospital-Based Ambulance Service.)

Clinton County I!hmergency Operations Center OBJECTIVE NUMBER 1 Demonstrate ability to mobilize staff and activate facilities promptly.

2 Demonstrate ability to fully staff facilities and =aintain staffing around the clock.

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-T-3 Demonstrate ability to make decisions and to coordinate emergency activities.

k Demonstrate adequacy of facilities and displays to support emergency operations.

5 Demonstrate ability to communicate with all appropriate locations, organizations, and field personnel.

13 Demonstrats ability to alert the public within the 10-mile EPZ, and disueminate an initial instructional messa6e, within 15 minutes.

1h Demonstrate ability to formulate and distribute appropriate

, instructions to the public in a timely fashion.

15 Demonstrate the organizational ability and resources necessary to manage an orderly evacuation of all or part of the plume EPZ.

'17 Demonstrate the organizational ability and resources necessary to control access to an evacuated area.

20 Demonstrate ability to continuously monitor and control emergency worker exposure.

22 Demonstrate ability to supply and administer KI, once the decision has been made to do so.

Clinton County Relocation / Reception - Devitt Central High School and Goose Iake High School OBJECTIVE NUMBER 1 Demonstrate ability to mobilize staff and activate facilities promptly.

2 Demonstrate ability to fully staff facilities and maintain staffing around the clock.

27 Demonstrate adequacy of procedures for red istration, radiological monitoring and decontamination of evacuees and vehicles.

28 Demonstrate adequacy of facilities for reception of evacuees.

Scott County Emergency Operations Center OBJECTIVE NUMBER 1 Demonstrate ability to mobilize staff and activate facilities promptly.

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2 Demonstrate ability to fully staff facilities and maintain i Y staffing around the clock.

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l 3 Demonstrate ability to make decisions and to coordinate emergency-activities.

h Demonstrate adequacy of ' facilities and displays to support' e.mergency operations.

5 Demonstrate ability to en=municate.vith all appropriate locations, organizations, and field personnel.

13 Demonstrate ability to alert the public vithin the 10-mile EPZ, and disseminate an initial. instructional message, within 15 minutes.

1h Demonstrate ability to formulate and distribute appropriate instructions to the public in a timely fashion.

15 -Demonstrate the organizational ability and resources necessary to manage an orderly evacuation of all or part of the plume EPZ.

17' Demonstrate the organizational ability and resources necessary.

to control access to an evacuated area.

35 Demonstrate ability to determine and implement appropriate measures for controlled recovery and reentry.

Scott County Relocation / Reception Center OBJEC1'IVE NUMBER i

1 Demonstrate ability to mobilize staff and activate facilities

.promptly.

2 Demonstrate ability to fully staff facilities and maintain staffing around the clock.

27 Demonstrate adequacy of procedures for registration, radiological monitoring and decontamination of evacuees and vehicles.

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=.. ~9-r 15 nrunr'ISE SCERARIO The scenario for the exercise consisted of a sequence of events resulting in a release of radioactivity of sufficient. =agnitude to warrant the declaration of a General Emergency. This release of radioactivity, or plume, traveled in a vestern direction from the - plant - into the. State of Iowa.

Protective Action Recommendations resulted in the evacuation and/or sheltering of '. residents . vithin Clinton and Scott Counties, ' Iowa. Ingestion pathway '

protective action recommendations was implemented in downwind sectors out

..to ten miles in both Clinton and Scott Counties.

The following narrative summary is an excerpt from the senario submitted to this office by Commonwealth Edison on July 11, 1986.

Unit one is operating normally at full power (82h MWe, 2509 MWth) and has been at high power since starting up from a weekend maintenance outage in May. The- diesel is out of service, three days into a seven day Limiting Condition of Operation (LCO) before unit- shutdown vill be required.

Mechanical Maintenance reports that the diesel should be returned to service in two to three days.

Unit Two is operating normally at high power (770 MWe, 2360 MWth) and is controlling ' load automatically. The unit has been on line all summer without outage. The unit is in an LCO for . the diesel out of service.

Unit two is out of ' service for trip throttle valve repairs. Unit two has been operating with a significant condenser tube leak for the last two weeks.

Due _ to load demand, the unit has been kept on line requiring one or two condensate ' filter demineralizers to be backwashed, precoated and returned-to service per shift. A Unit Two shutdown - to repair the leaking condenser

-tubes is scheduled to commence on the upcoming weekend.

For the last week there has been an Offgas System leak in the turbine l building. Personnel exiting through the trackway portals are found to have contaminated clothing after being in the Turbine Building for any extended period of time.

A large amount of condensate filter demineralizer resin was recently delivered to the station. One order of resin is contaminated with a powdered chemical cleaning agent known as Baxite 86. The contaminated resin will be used to precoat three demineralizers (1C, 2A, and 2E) and vill cause chemical. contamination of the reactor feedvater when the demineralizers are placed in service. The Baxite '86 v111 cause degradation of elastomer seals and a crud release in the reactor, which eventually leads to a release from the station.

At 0555 2A condensate filter demineralizer, coated with Baxite, is placed in service. Unit Two chemistry parameters begin to diverge from normal due to chemical intrusion.

At 0600 crud release begins in the Unit Two dryvell. Main steam line radiation levels begin to trend upward.

At 0645 1C condensate filter demineralizer, coated with Baxite, is placed in service. Unit One chemical intrusion begins.

At 0650 reactor recirculation pu=p seals and reactor water clean up pu=p mechanical seals begin to degrade as a result of the chemical intrusion.

At 0730 a seal leakage alarm is received due to failure of the Unit Two reactor recirculation pu=p seal. Leakage is a 2 gpm and rapidly increasing. Chemistry technician draws his daily Unit Two chemistry sa=ple.

At 0810 Unit Two offgas and =ain steam line radiation monitors begin to trend upward due to fission release from failed fuel.

At 0830 loss of primary coolant greater than 25 gpm is calculated for the Unit Two dryvell drain su=p. Dryvell pressure and te=perature continue to increase. Unit Two begins power reduction to prepare for shutdown.

An " Unusual Event" is declared at this time.

At 0900 Unit one dryvell equip =ent sump leakage exceeds 25 gpm. Unit One begins power reduction to prepare for shutdown.

At 0920 a dramatic increase in Unit Two crud concentration causes dryvell radiation levels to reach 200 Rem per hour (R/hr). Airborne, main steam line, and offgas radiation levels continue to increase due to fuel ele =ent failure. An Alert is declared at this time.

At 09k5 Unit one dryvell radiation level reaches 200 R/hr.

At 1000 Unit Two isolates on high main steam line radiation levels as fuel element failure accelerates. High Pressure Core Injection (HPCI) is started to control reactor pressure. Steam leakage occurs around the HPCI turbine seals which significantly increases reactor building airborne levels. Reactor building ventilation system trips on high radiation level.

Control failure occurs allowing supply fans to continue to run and supply da=pers to re=ain open. The control system starts and runs nor= ally but cannot control reactor building pressure increase resulting in overpressurization of the reactor building.

At 1020 Unit One "A" filter desineralizer is inadvertently placed in service. Since the 1A filter demineralizer hold pu=p is out of the system and the isolation valves leak, a large quantity of reactor coolant is released to the demineralizer room as the 1A desineralizer is placed on line. This source also significantly increases reactor building airborne levels.

At 10h0 Unit Two dryvell radiation level has reached k00 R/hr., and dryvell pressure exceeds 2 lbs. A " Site Area Emergency" is declared".

At 10k5 failure to the reactor building over and under pressure protection system allows overpressurization of the reactor building to continue until the simultaneous rupture of the blow-out panel and the reactor building roof occurs. This results in a loss of secondary contain=ent and initiates an uncontrolled, unmonitored release from the reactor building.

, Security reports to the control room that debris from the reactor building is "all over the place". A " General Emergency" is declared at this time.

At 1050 rapid shutdown of Unit One co==ences.

At 1100 Unit One dryvell radiation level exceeds h00 R/hr.

At 1115 Unit One forced cooldown begins by dumping steam to the. =ain condenser. Unit Two cooldown continues via HPCI.

At 1200 Unit Two drywell average air te=perature reaches 290 degrees due to continued RR pump seal leakage while drywell cooling re=ains isolated.

At 1220 Unit One and Unit Two dr;vell radiation levels stabilize at h50 and 560 R/hr., respectively.

At 1255 release rate begins to taper off.

At 1300 a twenty-four hour time ju=p occurs. Shortly after the time jump, both Unit One and Unit Two successfully enter shutdown cooling.

At 1320-13h5 several' Residual Heat Removal (RHR) pur:p seals fail due to the ongoing chemical intrusion. A steady-state release of 1.0E+06 microcurie per second (uCi/sec) is maintained.

At 1400 the reactor building is temporarily repaired ending the uncontrolled release. The SBGT system is operating normally.

At 1h30 end of scenario.

A list of =ajor events with planned and actual times follow:

Planned Actual Time Event Time 0815 Unusual Event 0809 0915 Alert 0937 1030 Site Area E=ergency 1042 1200 General E=ergency 1155 1200 Release to Environ =ent 1155 1h00 Release is Terminated 1h00

. 1h30 Exercise Terminated 1435 1.6 STATE AND IDCAL RESOURCES Listed below are organizations that planned to participate:

State of Iowa

1. Iowa Office of Disaster Services

2. Iowa State Department of Health

3. Iowa National Guard

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h. Iowa Department of Public Safety (Iowa Highway Patrol) 5 Iowa Department of Natural Resources

6. Iowa Department of Transportation

7. Un:.versity of Iowa Hygienic Laboratory

8. Office of the Governor 9 Office of the Attorney General

10. Iowa Department of Human Services

11. Iowa Department of Agriculture

12. Iowa Commission on Aging

13. Iowa Conservation Commission

14. Iowa Commerce Commission 15 Office of the Adjutant General

16. American Red Cross Clinton County Scott County Civil Defense Sheriff's Department Sheriff's Department Highway Department Highway Department Health Department County Supervisor Public Information Office Social Services American Red Cross Public Information Office Human Services American Red Cross Environmental Health Area Education Agency Area Education Agency Amateur Radio Club Municipal Fire and Police Municipal Fire and Police Civil Defense Municipal Mayors: Municipal Mayors:

City Clinton City of Princeton Town of Comanche Town of LeClaire Town of Low Moor Town of McCausland

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i 2 EIERCISE EVALUATION l.

2.1 IOWA OPERATIOES 2.1.1 State Emergency Operations Center (SEOC)

The following objectives were to be demonstrated at this facility:

1, 2, 3 h, 5, 10, 13, lh, 15, 17, 21, 22, and 25 The call to activate the Iowa State EOC vas received at 0932 from the utility. The call was verified and staff mobilization procedures were adequately demonstrated with full staffing completed at 1000. Organizations represented at the EOC vere the Office of Disaster Services, State Departments of Public Health, Natural Resources, Transportation, Agriculture, Hu=an Services, Commerce, and Aging. Also represented were the State Highway Patrol, University Hygienic Laboratory and National Guard. Based on the above, Objective Number 1 was fully demonstrated.

Objective Number 2, ability to staff facilities around-the-clock, was partially demonstrated. The State Departments of Transportation and Agriculture and the Iowa National Guard demonstrated this objective by shift change. However, the remaining State Agencies provided rosters to demonstrate this capability. The use of rosteer :1uded a full demonstration of 2h-hour staffing.

The ability to make decisions and to coordinate emergency activities, Objective Number 3, was not fully demonstrated. The State EOC failed to notify the Forward Command Post (FCP), located at the State Highway Patrol Headquarters, at the Alert stage. Consequently, the FCP was not activated in accordance with the State Plan. Actual activation of the facility occurred when a representative of the State Highway Patrol overheard the status (Alert) via their internal radio system. As the FCP is an integral part of emergency activity coordination, it is imperative that the facility be activated promptly. State procedures must be reviewed to assure that notification of this facility occurs in accordance with the State Plan.

In addition, the State EOC failed to notify FEMA of the General E=ergency declaration. As FEMA is responsible for notifying other Federal Agencies with responsibilities during a radiological emergency, prompt notification of emergency classification must be made in accordance with the State Plan.

The State procedures must be reviewed to assure that FEMA is pro =ptly notified of emergency classification levels.

Objective Number h, adequacy of facilities and displays to support emergency operations, was fully demonstrated. Status boards were clearly visible and kept up-to-date on significant events. All appropriate maps and displays were posted or available.

The ability to co=municate with all appropriate locations, organizations and field personnel, Objective Nu=ber 5, was fully demonstrated. All appropriate pri=ary communication systems were demonstrated. The Nuclear Accident Reporting System (NARS) provides a direct com=unication link with the utility and is continuously monitored.

Objective Number 10 is included under the Dose Assessment ' and Field

Team Coordination section-(2.1.5) of this report.

The . ability to alert the public within the 10-m11e EPZ and disseminate an initial instructional message within 15-minutes was fully demonstrated.

The State function for the objective is limited to providing basic Emergency

. Broadcast Station (EBS) message content to the counties. The county will .

in' turn . add landmark - descriptions and release; the completed instructions to the EBS station. The basic messages prepared by the State were' appropriate and distributed to the local level in a timely manner. . Based on the above facts, Objectives Number 13 and 14 were fully demonstrated.

Evacuation and access control were- effectively coordinated at

• the SEOC.

• The Iowa State Highway Patrol and the Department of Transportation adequately

demonstrated the. ability and resources necessary to control road, water, and rail traffic into the affected area. Estimates of expected . traffic volume were discussed with activation of ~ traffic control points promptly ordered. Resources are available to assist in keeping evacuation routes clear during inclement weather. Based on the above facts, Objectives Number 15 and 17 vere fully demonstrated at the State. level.

The ability to make decisions based on predetermined criteria whether -

-to issue KI to emergency workers, Objective Number 21, was fully demonstrated.

The appropriate decision to issue KI was . reached at 120h and subsequently ~

transmitted to the counties.

Objective Number 22, ability to. supply / administer KI once the decision has ' been made, could not be evalue.ted. - As stated above, the decision to use KI ie made at the State EOC; however, the actual distribution is performed at the local . level, as the State EOC is well outside the Emergency Planning

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Zone of the power plant. i The ability to provide advance coordination of emergency information '

releaned. Objective Number 25, was funy demonstrated. The State function was only to provide basic EBS messages to the counties for release to the EBS. This same information was also provided to the Joint Public Information Center located near the Emergency Operations Facility.

Summary: There were no inadequacies identified during the previous exercise that required corrective action or subsequent demonstration for reevaluation during this exercise.

Objectives Number 2 and 3 were not funy demonstrated during this exercise.  ;

Areas Requiring Corrective Action

1. The State EOC failed to notify the Forward Command Post (FCP) at the Alert stage. Consequently, the FCP was activated when a representative of the State Highway Patrol overheard the status via their internal radio system. As a result, the FCP was not activated f- a timely manner and in accordance with the State Plan. (NURM-0Gk, E.2. )

2. The State EOC failed to notify FEMA of the General Emergency

, classification level. As FEMA contacts other Federal Agencies i

with responsibilities during a radiological emergency, prompt notification of emergency classifications must be made in accordance with the State Plan. (NUREG-0654, E.1.)

2.1.2 Emergency Operations Facility (EOF)

The following objectives were to be demonstrated at this facility:

1, 2, h, and 10.

The ability to =obilize staff and activate facilities promptly was adequately demonstrated. Round-the-clock staffing was demonstrated by roster.

On-coming staff were briefed and generally displayed adequate training and

-knowledge. The State of Iowa dispatched two representatives from the Iowa Office of Disaster Services and one from the Department of Public Health.

This was a staffing increase which corrected an inadequacy identified during the previous exercise concerning insufficient staffing levels. Based on the above facts, Objective Number 1 was fully demonstrated. Objective Number 2 was partially demonstrated as rosters were provided in lieu of a shift change.

Objective Number h, adequacy of facilities and displays to support emergency operations, was fully demonstrated. Message logs were kept with appropriate distribution to all EOF staff members. This corrected an inadequacy identified during the previous exercise concerning message distribution. All maps, status boards and other visual aids were clearly displayed.

The ability to project dosage to the public via plume exposure, based on plant data.and field data, and to determine appropriate protective measures based on PAG's, Objective Number 10, was demonstrated to the extent of the State participation. The State responsibilities at this facility consists of liaison roles only. All decisions within this objective were made at the State EOC in Des Moines.

Summary: The two inadequacies identified during the previous exercise conducted August 27, 1985, vere corrected during this exercise.

Objective Number 2 was not fully demor.strated during this exercise.

There vere no inadequacies observed that would require corrective action at the EOF.

2.1.3 Joint Public Information Center (JPIC)

The following objectives were to be demonstrated at the JPIC: 1, 2, h, 5, 2h, and 25 The ability to mobilize staff and activate facilities promptly, Objective Number 1, was adequately demonstrated. The facility activation was initiated

at the Alert stage in accordance. vith the State and Utility ' Plans.

Representative from the Office of Disaster Services, and Commonwealth Edison managed the Public Information function of this facility. Objective Number 2 was not fully demonstrated as round-the-clock staffing was demonstrated by presentation of a roster.

Objective Number k, adequacy of facilities and displays, was fully demonstrated. Maps utilized for displays were well done and of sufficient size to be seen from any point in the briefing area. Telephones were available for the media.

The ability to communicate with all appropriate locations and organizations, Objective _ Number 5, was fully demonstrated. A dedicated communication link was established with the State EOC, local EOC's and Emergency Operations Facility. Commercial phone lines were utilized for a back-up communication system. A hard copy device was available at the JPIC and effectively demonstrated.

The ability to brief the media in a clear, accurate and timely manner, Objective Number 24, was fully demonstrated. However, one area was noted as a recommendation for improvement. During the four press briefings conducted, the affected areas were described by sectors only. Landmark descriptions of the affected areas were not provided. The failure to accurately describe the affected areas vill leave interpretation of the landmark boundaries by media personnel. This may lead to erroneous or conflicting information regarding protective action recommendation areas.

During future press briefings, landmark descriptions should be included with descriptions of affected sectors.

With the exception noted above, the briefings conducted were accurate and complete. Technical jargon was avoided or explained. Media kits were available which included background information on the utility, nuclear power plants, radiation, and the local areas'that may be affected.

A correct rumor control number was published during the first press briefing, correcting an inadequacy identified during the previous exercise.

However, it was not repeated during the subsequent meetings. During the third press briefing, a media person asked if there was a rumor control number. The State PIO responded that there was a number, but failed to provide the actual telephone number. It is recommended that the rumor control number be provided during each press briefing or be prominently posted for reference to ensure that the media provides as much useful infor=ation to the public as possible.

Objective Number 25, ability to provide adequate coordination of information provided, was fully demonstrated. The State and utility PIO's discussed the current status of the emergency prior to each press briefings.

A consensus was reached on what vould be said, by whom and in what order presentations vould be made.

Summary: The one inadequacy noted during the previous exercise conducted August 27, 1985, was corrected during this exercise.

I co bjective . Number 2 was not fully- demonstrated during this exercise. s

'There vere no inadequacies ' observed that would require corrective action at the JPIC.

Areas Re W -4 For Iserovement

1. Rumor control numbers should be provided during each press briefing.

This vill ensure that the media provides as much useful information to the public as possible.

2.

Landmark . descriptions of affected sectors were ~ not provided during the press briefings. To ensure that the media provide the public with accurate information concerning protective action recommendations within the affected sectors, landmark descriptions should be provided during press briefings to eliminate the potential for any erroneous or conflicting information.

2.1.4' Forward Comsand Pbst (FCP)

The . following objectives were to be demonstrated at the FCP: 1, 2, 3, 4 and 5 The FCP, located at the Iowa State Highway Patrol Headquarters, was not activated until 09k5, after the Alert stage. The State EOC in Des Moines failed to contact the FCP to initiate activation of this facility. Activation of this facility finally occurred when a representative of the State Highway Patrol overheard the status (Alert) via their internal radio system. The facility was subsequently fully staffed by 1213. However, the failure to activate the FCP in a timely manner was caused by the State EOC.

Consequently, this inadequacy is addressed in that section of this report (2.1.1) relative to the State EOC. Mobilization procedures were demonstrated correcting an inadequacy identified during the previous exercise concerning prepositioning of Iowa Conservation Commission staff. Other organizations represented at the FCP vere the Iowa Departments of Transportation and Natural Resources, Highway Patrol, Office of Disaster Services and National Guard.

, Based on the above facts, Objective Number 1, activation and mobilization of staff was adequately demonstrated.

Objective Number 2, ability to fully staff facilities and maintain staffing around-the-clock, was partially demonstrated. Round-the-clock capability was demonstrated by presentation of a roster. The use of rosters in lieu of double staffing or shift change, precluded a full demonstration of 24-hour' staffing.

The ability to make decisions and coordinate emergency activities, Objective Number 3, was fully demonstrated with good interaction among the various organizations present. Traffic control points" and estimates of expected traffic volumes were discussed and conclusions coordinated with the State EOC.

Objective Number h, adequacy of facilities and displays, was fully demonstrated. Status boards were updated and clearly posted. All appropriate maps were posted or available concerning the plume EPZ, access control points and radiological monitoring points.

The ability to communicate with all appropriate locations, Objective Number 5, was fully demonstrated. Direct telephone lines were the primary communication link between the State EOC, local EOC's and Emergency Operation Facility. Commercial telephones were utilized as back-up.

Summary: The one inadequacy noted during the previous exercise conducted August 27, 1985, was corrected during this exercise.

Objective Number 2 was not fully demonstrated during this exercise.

There were no inadequacies observed that would require corrective action at the FCP. 1

. 2.1 5 Radiological Assessment and Field Team Coordination The following objectives were to be demonstrated for the Radiological Assessment and Field Team Coordination function: 3, h, 5, and 10.

Radiological Assessment was performed at the State EOC in Des Moines by the Iova Department of Public Health. Field Team Coordination was performed at the Clinton County EOC by the University of Iowa's Hygienic Laboratory staff.

The ability to project dosage to the public via plume exoosure, Objective Number 10, was fully demonstrated. Dose projections were derived from both plant release data and field readings. Protective action recommendations for the plume pathway were promptly reviewed and updated as conditions changed. This corrected an inadequacy noted during - the previous exercise

' conducted on August 27, 1985, concerning staff response to high radiciodine field monitoring data.

Objective Number 3, ability to make decisions and to coordinate emergency activities, was not fully demonstrated. The Dose Assessment staff at the State EOC did not update the Field Team Coordination staff, located at the Clinton Ccunty EOC, of plant and off-site events in an adequate or timely manner. For example, the Field Team Coordinator did not learn of the initiation of the release until one hour after it occurred. Obviously, if the Field Team Coordinator is not aware of the release or the direction of the plume, he could unknowingly endanger the field teams, due to excessive or unnecessary exposure. In addition, the Field Team Coordinator was not promptly updated on plant conditions which caused the release or whether or not any protective action recommendations were implemented. Based on the above, procedures must be implemented or existing procedures amended to assure that the Field Team Coordinator is updated concerning all plant and off-site events that would impact on this function.

Objective Number h, adequacy of displays to support emergency operations, was adequately demonstrated. However, it should be noted that displays available to support the field team coordination operation consisted only of a radiological monitoring point map and table for posting data. During the previous exercise an inadequacy was identified concerning the maps which

, show off-site radiological monitoring points. Monitoring points, as shown on the Iowa side, were identified by the same reference names as shown on the Illinois side causing considerable confusion during the exercise. This was corrected during this exercise as one map was utilized showing both states without duplicating the reference points.

Objective Number 5, ability to communicate with all appropriate locations, organizations and field personnel, was fully demonstrated. A backup communication system was demonstrated between the Field Team Coordinator and the field teams when the base station failed. A hand-held unit in conjunction with a repeater was quickly and efficiently utilized to resolve the problem. Radio contact between the Dose Assessment staff located at the State EOC, the Field Team Coordinator and the Field Teams was maintained throughout the exercise.

r b ', r Summary:- The two inadequacies identified during the previous exercise . ,

conducted August 27, 1985, were corrected during this exercise.

Objective Number- 3 was not fully demonstrated during this'

- exercise.

^

Area Roeniring Corrective Actice

3. The Dose Assessment staff (Iowa Department' of L Public Health) did not. update the Field Team Coordination' staff concerning plant and off-site events in'a timely manner. (NUREG-065k..I.8.)

2.1.6 Field Monitorias Teams The following objectives were to be demonstrated by the Field Monitoring Teams: 5, 6, 7, 8, and 20..

During this exercise two field teams were utilized consisting of two members each, both from the University Hygienic Laboratory. i Field team activation and mobilization. Objective Number 6, was fully demonstrated. Both field teams were dispatched from the University Hygienic Laboratory in Iowa City. Activation from work /home to the Oakdale facility was simulated due to . the - time constraint of the exercise scenario. Rapid deployment was enhanced -as equipment utilized by the field- teams was pre packed in footlockers at the Oakdale facility.

The appropriate equipment and procedures for determining ambient radiation levels, Objective Number 7, was fully demonstrated for both teams with one exception. Radiation detection instruments and air sampling equipment were not calibrated within a year- in accordance with the manufacturers' specifications as outlined in NUREG-065k, H.10. Specifically, the radiation detector instruments were last calibrated in June 1985 The air sampling equipment vas calibrated in August 1984 In order to accurately determine ambient radiation levels and/or measure airborne radiciodine, the equipment must be calibrated on a periodic basis per the manufacturers' specification.

Objective Number 8, appropriate equipment and procedures for measurement of airborne radioiodine concentrations in the presence of noble gases, with the exception of the calibration noted above, was fully demonstrated by one of the field teams (Blue Team). This corrected an inadequacy identified during the previous exercise.

The ability to communicate with all appropriate locations, Objective Number 5, was fully demonstrated for both teams. Radio contact was maintained throughout the exercise. Representatives from the Clinton County amateur radio club accompanied - the field teams in separate vehicles to provide a source for backup radios which was adequately demonstrated during this exercise.

The ability to continuously monitor and control emergency worker exposure, Objective Number 20, was not fully demonstrated for the Blue Team.

Each team had adequate protective equipment including anti-contamination suits, boots, gloves, tongs and respirators. Both teams had the appropriate dosimetry and were aware of procedures for decontamination. However, the Blue Team was not aware of the maximum dose allowed without authorization.

It is recommended that additional training be provided to the field team members on emergency exposure control limits. This lack of knowledge could result in excessive exposure to field team members. In addition, it should be noted that the potassium iodide (KI) supply that the Blue Team had on hand was out of date (January 1986, expiration date). As the ability to supply and administer KI was not an objective during this exercise, corrective action vill not be required. However, this must be included as an objective during the next exercise.

Summary: The one inadequacy identified during the previous exercise conducted August 27, 1985, was corrected during this exercise.

Objectives Number 7 and 20 vere not fully demonstrated during this exercise.

Area Requiring Corrective Action

h. Radiation detection instruments and air sampling equipment vere not calibrated within a year in accordance with the =anufacturers' specifications. (NUREG-0654, H.10) 5 The Blue Team members were not aware of the maximum exposure dose allowed without authorization. (NUREG-0654, K.5.a.) -

1 2.1.7 Medical Ehergency The following objectives were to be demonstrated by the St. Luke's and Illini Hospital based area ambulance services: 20 and 30.

The ability to continuously monitor and control emergency worker exposure, Objective Number 20, was fully demonstrated by the Illini Hospital

, based ambulance service. This objective was demonstrated to correct an inadequacy identified during the previous exercise. The appropriate dosimetry was available including per=anent record dosimeters (TLD's). The ambulance service staff displayed an adequate knowledge of procedures concerning the use of both pocket dosimetry and TLD's.

Objective Number 30, adequacy of ambulance facilities and procedures for handling contaminated individuals, was fully demonstrated for the St.

Luke's Hospital based area ambulance service with one exception. The ambulance crew evaluated for this exercise performed an excellent demonstration of this objective. The crew demonstrated adequate procedures to restrict the spread of contamination within the vehicle. Injuries were treated and the patient was transported in accordance with appropriate standards. However, upon arrival at the hospital, the ambulance crev vent to the vrong receiving area. As the area was not prepared for receiving

_ - .__ __ _ ~ _ _ . . _ _ _ . . _ _

e individuals exposed to radioactivity, the spread of contamination could possibly have occurred. Obviously, the crev was not familiar with the proper receiving area at the hospital. All ambulance crev members =ust be made aware of the designated areas for receiving contaminated patients.

Summary: The one inadequacy identified during the previous exercise conducted August 27, 1985 for the Illini Hospital based area ambulance service was corrected during this exercise.

Objective Number 30 was not fully demonstrated during this exercise.

Area Requiring Corrective Action

6. The St. Luke's Hospital based area ambulance service transported the contaminated patient to the wrong receiving area of the hospital.

This vould cause the unnecessary spread of contamination at this facility. (NUREG-065h, L.1.)

2.2. COUNTY OPERATIONS 2.2.1 Clinton County Bnergency Operations Center (CCEOC)

The following objectives were ta be demonstrated at the CCEOC: 1, 2, 3, h, 5, 13, ih, 15, 17, 20, and 22.

The ability to mobilize staff and activate facilities promptly was partially demonstrated. The CCEOC received notification of the Alert at 0932; ECC staffing was complete at 1115 with the exception of the Mayor's of Low Moor and DeWitt. Round-the-clock staffing capability was demonstrated by the majority of the responders by double staffing. However, some agencies demonstrated 24-hour staffing by presentation of a roster which precluded a full demonstration of this objective. Based on the above facts, Objective Number 1 and 2 vere not fully demonstrated.

Objective Number 3, ability to make decisions and to coordinate emergency activities, was fully demonstrated. Periodic briefings were held by the Director to update the staff concerning the status of the emergency. The briefings were informative and involved all appropriate staff members.

Decision-making was strongly demonstrated. The EOC staff was well trained and displayed much enthusiasm during this exercise.

The adequacy of facilities and displays to support emergency operations.

Objective Number h, was fully demonstrated. The EOC has all the necessary resources and supplies to operate on a 2h-hour basis. The plume EPZ, evacuation routes, relocation centers, and access control points, vere all displayed and updated.

The ability to communicate with all appropriate locations, organizations and field personnel. Objective Number 5, was adequately demonstrated. The primary communication system was a dedicated administrative line connecting Clinton County, Scott County, the E=ergency Operations Facility and the

State EOC. In one instance the line was lost during the exercise, but was quickly restored. An indoor varning ec11 system has been established with the local schools; however, it was not demonstrated during this exercise.

Objective Number 13, ability to alert the public within the 10-mile EPZ and disseminate an initial instructional message within 15-minutes was fully demonstrated. At 10h0 the utility notified 011nton County over the administrative line that a Site Area Emergency was declared. Siren activation was simulated at 10k5 A simulated call was subsequently made to the Emergency Broadcast Station (EBS) with an initial instructional message at 10h6. This objective was completed within approximately six minutes, which is well within the guidelines established pursuant to NUREG-065h.

This corrected an inadequacy iientified during the prey wus exercise.

In addition, as Clinton County has areas vithin the 5 to 10 mile portion of the EPZ vithout fixed siren coverage. Mobile route alerting is provided to alert residents within these areas. NUREG-065h requires that route alerting be completed in areas such as these within h5 minutes. This objective was fully demonstrated during this exercise. Per the County Plans, the Clinton County Sheriff's Department performed this function. Mobilization was demonstrated as the deputies initiated route alerting from various l locations outside the city limits thereby si=ulating routine patrol. Routes

! R.9 5, A.7 and A.9 5 vere initiated from county road F12 at the vest side of the Clinton city limits. Routes Q.7 and Q.7 5 vere initiated from the intersection of Highway 30 and county road Zh6. Finally, Route P.7 was ,

initiated at Highway 67 at the vest side of the Ca=anche city limits. Each l of the six routes were independently verified by FEMA evaluators on August 27, 1986. "'he routes and the respective time to complete the alerting are as follows:

Route P.7 h0 minutes Route Q.7 31 minutes Route Q.7.5 33 minutes Route R.9.5 43 minutes Route A.7 32 minutes Route A.9.5 37 minutes Objective Number ik, ability to formulate and distribute appropriate instructicns to the public in a timely manner, was fully demonstrated.

The EBS messages were clear and apprepriate to each situation. Protective action areas were described in terms of familiar boundaries and landmarks.

Evacuation instructions included infor=ation concerning school children, institutionalized and mobility i=caired individuals.

The final protective action recommendations made by the Clinton County EOC vere to evacuate all sectors from 0 to 2 miles and sectors M. N, and P from 2 to 5 miles and shelter sectors M, N, and P frot 5 to 10 miles.

As the plume traveled in a vesterly direction into Iowc from the plant, the protective action reco=cendations were appropriate.

The organizational ability and resources necessary to manage an orderly evacuation of all or part of the plume EPZ, was adequately demonstrated.

-2h- ,

Water traffic on the Mississippi River was controlled (si-ulated) by the State Conservation Co= mission. The Reception Center located at the DeWitt Central High School was activated (simulated) at 1115 and fully staffed by 1202. However, activation of access control points were not pro =ptly ordered to control access into the affected areas. During the Site Area Emergency deelsration at 10h2, protective action recom=endations were made to shelter the public in the O to 2 mile radius and from 2 to 5 miles ir.

sectors M, N, and P. However, access control was not nitiated until the General Emergency declaration was cade at 1155 Obviously, without accese control, the general public has unrestricted access into protective action recommendation areas and may be unnecessarily exposed to radiation. This inadequacy occurred because the County's Plan and procedures for access control are aligned with emergency classification levels, rather than protective actions. Consequently, per the County Plan, access control was not initiated until the General Emergency. The plans and procedures =ust be amended to align access control with protective actions and not with emergency classifications levels. Based on the above, Objective Number 15 was fully demonstrated and Objective Number 17 was partially demonstrated.

Objective Number 20, ability to continuously monitor and control emergency worker exposure, was fully demonstrated. All appropriate dosimetry was available, including pcreanent record dosimetry (TLD's). This corrected an inadequacy identifed during the previous exercise concerning an insufficient supply of TLD's. The EOC staff was aware of the procedures for reading and recording dosimeter values.

The ability to supply and administer potassium iodide (KI) to emergency workers once the decision has been made, Objective Number 22, was fully demonstrated. An adequate supply of KI was available for the entire staff of emergency workers at the EOC. This corrects an inadequacy identified during the previous exercise. Procedures were also demonstrated for distribution *o emergency workers.

Su==ary: The three inadequacies identified during the previous exercise conducted August 27, 1985, were corrected during this exercise.

Objectives Number 1, 2, and 17 vere not fully demonstrated during this exercise.

Area Requiring Corrective Action

7. Access Control into protective action reco==endation areas was not implemented during the Site Area E=ergency and was delayed until the General Emergency declaration. This occurred because the County Plans and procedures do not require implementation of access control until the General E=ergency. (NUREG-065h, J.10.J.)

d

~25-2.2.2 Clinton County Reception and Decontam h tion - DeWitt Central High

School The _ following objectives were to be demonstrated at this facility:

1, 2, and 27.

The ability to mobilize staff and activate facilities promptly was fully demonstrated with one exception. The Standard Operating Procedures (SOP's) - for the Clinton County Reception Centers show the Area Education Agency, County Civil Defense Agency and the local Fire Departments as participating organizations. However, there were numerous additional organizations participating during this exercise that are not reflected in the SOP ' and are as follows: City of DeWitt Police Department, Iowa National Guard, American Red Cross, local amateur radio group, and representatives from the Clinton County Medical Nurses Staff. As the majority of the organizations have an integral responsibility at the Reception Centers, their participation must be reflected in the SOP's in accordance with NUREG-065h, P.h. The SOPS must be updated to reflect all the organizations who actively participate at the Reception Centers.

Objective Number 2, ability to fully staff facilities, was fully demonstrated. Monitoring staff and appropriate equipment was available for ten teams, consisting of two persons per team. Sufficient staff was available to perform all the required responsibilities at this center.

Objective Number 27, adequacy of procedures for registration, radiological monitoring, and decontamination was fully demonstrated to the extent of current FD4A guidance. The American Red Cross was available for registration and was very well trained and prepared to perform this function.

The National ~ Guard and DeWitt Fire Department staff composed the- ten monitoring teams and performed an excellent job in demonstrating monitoring techniques for both evacuees and vehicles. This corrected an inadequacy identified during the previous exercise concerning adequate staffing and monitoring capabilities.

Procedures were adequately demonstrated for determining the need to decontaminate. Decentamination of evacuees and vehicles was demonstrated.

The registration, monitoring and decontamination areas were appropriately segregated to prevent cross contamination, which corrected an inadequacy identified during the previous exercise. Procedures for handling radioactive vastes were also demonstrated.

Trained personnel and equipment were available to monitor approximately 5,0h0 evacuees and 1,608 vehicles within a twelve hour period. This is based on monitoring time of 90 seconds per evacuee and four minutes per vehicle. An average of three persons per vehicle is assumed based on the Evacuation Time Estimate Study for the Quad Cities Nuclear Station.

The ability to continuously monitor and control emergency worker exposure was not an objective during this exercise. However, the evaluator noted that there was an insufficient number of self-reading dosimeters available for the emergency worker staff. As this was not an objective during this exercise, it will not be identified as an inadequacy requiring corrective

action; however, it must be fneluded as an objective to be demonstrated during the next exercise.

Congregate care vill be provided at a separate location from the DeWitt Higa ' School. The Clinton County School District will provide buses to be utilized to transport- evacuees to this facility. However, these transportation procedures are not reflected in the SOP's. The SOP's must be amended to reflect this resource per NUREG-065h, P.h.

Summary: The two inadequacies identified during the previous exercise conducted August 27, 1985, were corrected during this exercise.

Areas Requiring Corrective Action

8. The Iowa National Guard, City of DeWitt Police Department, American Red Cross, the local amateur radio group and the Clinton County Medical Nurses were participants during this exercise. However, these organizations are not reflected in the SOP's. As the majority of these organizations have an integral responsibility at this facility, their function must be reflected in the SOP's.

(NUREG-065h, P.h.)

9 Per . the Reception Center Emergency Operations staff, the Clinton County School District would provide buses to transport evacuees to congregate care centers. However, this procedure is not reflected in the SOP's. The appropriate amendment must be made. (NURE-065h, P.h.)

2.2.3 Clinton County Reception and Decontamination - Goose Lake High School The objective to be demonstrated was: 28; adequacy of facilities for reception of evacuees.

This facility would be used as a alternate to the DeWitt Central High School. The same staff utilized at the DeWitt Central High School vould be utilized at the Goose Lake High School. The registration, monitoring and decontamination procedures were fully demonstrated at the DeWitt High School as stated in Section 2.2.2 of this report. Therefore, only the adequacy of the facilities for reception of potential evacuees was evaluated.

This was fully demonstrated. The shelter could accommodate approximately 1,100 evacuees. Food supplies could be obtained within 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> by the l American Red Cross.

Su==ary: There were no inadequacies identified during the previous

, exercise which required corrective action during this exercise.

There were no inadequacies observed at this facility that vould require correction action.

l l

l l

2.2.4 Scott County Ehnergency Operations Center (SCEOC)

The following objectives were to be demonstrated at the SCEOC: 1, 2, 3, h, 5, 13, 14, 15, 17, and 35 The ability to mobilize staff and activate facilities promptly, Objective Number 1, was fully demonstrated. The SCEOC received notification of the Alert at 09h5 from the State EOC with full staffing completed by 1118.

Round-the-clock staffing capability, Objective Number 2, was partially demonstrated as only the American Red Cross, County Public Information Officer and City of LeClaire officials demonstrated an actual shift change. The remaining staff at the EOC demonstrated 2h-hour staffing by presentation of a roster which precluded a full demonstration of this objective.

Objective Number 3, ability to make decisions and to coordinate emergency activities, was adequately demonstrated. Periodic briefings were held to update the staff concerning the status of the emergency. Messages received over the Nuclear Accident Reporting System (NARS) were appropriately copied and handled efficiently. However, the evaluator noted that messages over the Administrative Hot Line were neither consistently logged nor distributed.

The Administrative Hot Line is a direct communication link between the utility, State EOC and both counties and is the primary notification system for the Site Area and General Emergencies and the protective action reco=mendations. Based on the above, it is recommended that the same procedures utilized for tracking messages on the NABS be utilized for the Administative Hot Line to assure that all pertinent messages be distributed to the appropriate staff within the EOC.

The adequacy of facilities and displays to support emergency operations, Objective Number h, was fully demonstrated. The EOC has all the necessary resources to operate on a 2h-hour basis. All appropriate =aps and displays were posted and clearly visible. The plume EPZ, evacuation routes, relocation centers, access control points and radiological monitoring points were posted and updated in a timely =anner. Access to the EOC was controlled.

The ability to communicate with all appropriate locations, organizations and field personnel, Objective Number 5, was fully demonstrated. Primary

, and secondary com=unication systems were demonstrated to the State EOC, utility and Clinton County EOC. Telephone capabilities were available to and from the Joint Public Infor=ation Center.

Objective Number 13, the ability to alert the public vithin the 10-mile EPZ and disseminate an initial instructional message within 15 minutes was fully demonstrated. At 1040, the utility notified Scott County over the administrative hot line that a Site Area E=ergency was declared. Siren activation was simulated at 10hT. A call was simulated to the E=ergency Broadcast Station (EPS) with an initial instructional message at 10hT.

This objective was co=pleted within approxi=ately seven minutes which is within the 15 minute guidelines established in NUREG-065h. This corrected an inadequacy identified during the previous exercise. ,

l

. _ __ ._. _ .-- . _ - _ l

~28-As with Clinton County, Scott County has areas within the 5 to 10 mile portion'of the EPZ vithout siren coverage which require mobile route alerting.

NUREG-065h requires that- route ' alerting -be completed in these areas within h5' minutes of initial . notification. This objective was adequately demonstrated during this exercise. Per .the County Plans, volunteer fire departments located in the communities of Princeton, _LeClaire and McCausland performed this function. Actual . mobilization was not demonstrated as the volunteer fire department staff were prepositioned at each fire station.

The County Plans require mobilization at the Alert stage. Therefore, the staff vould be readily available to begin route alerting at the subsequent Site Area Emergency declaration. However, this does not account for a fast breaking emergency. Mobilization time must. be added to the time required to perform route alerting. As the average mobilization time for the volunteer fire departments staff during fires and other emergencies is two to four minutes and the majority of the responders live within close proximity of the stations, five minutes were added to each route. As with Clinton County, all ten routes were independently verified by FEMA evaluators on August 26, 1986. The routes and the respective time to complete the alerting, including mobilization time of five minutes, are as follows:

Route M.5 5 37 minutes Route M.6 37 minutes Route L.5.5 39 minutes Route L.6 37 minutes Route L.6.5 h2 minutes Route L.8.5 33 minutes Route N.T 38 minutes

~

Route N.7 5 26 minutes Route N.8 32 minutes Route K.6 h3 minutes Objective Number ik, ability to formulate and distribute appropriate instructions to the public in a timely manner, was fully demonstrated.

The EBS messages were clear and appropriate to the situation with one exception. During the General Emergency, the first Protective Action Recommendation (PAR) received from the State during this status was to evacuate in all sectors in the O to 2 mile radius and shelter in sectors M, N, and P from 2 to 5 miles. However, the State liaison at the EOC misunderstood the PAR and recommended to the Civil Defense Director to evacuate in sectors M, N, and P from 2 to 5 miles. The erroneous PAR was broadcast (simulated) over the EBS at 1208. Shortly afterward, the mistake was discovered and corrected. The Public Information Officer (PIO) quickly prepared a corrected EBS message explaining the mistake and simulated the call to the station at 1213 In addition, the PIO activated a local rumor cc trol number to resolve any concerns that would have resulted and also notified the Joint Public Information Center of the mistake. The quick and decisive reaction by the PIO vas commendable.

Protective action areas were described in terms of familiar boundaries and landmarks. Evacuation instructions included infor=ation concerning institutionalized and mobility impaired individuals.

The final PAR's made by the Scott County EOC vere to evacuate all sectors -

in the O' to 2 mile radius and from 2 to 5 miles in sectors M, N, and P and -

to shelter in sectors M, N, and P from 5 to 10 miles. As the plume traveled in a vesterly direction into Iowa from the plant, the PARS were correct.

The organizational- ability and resources necessary to manage an orderly evacuation -of all or part of the - plume EPZ was adequately demonstrated.

Activation of access control points was promptly - ordered to prevent entry into the affected areas. A call to activate the Reception Center located at the North Scott High School was simulated. Based on the above, Objectives Number 15 and 17 vere fully demonstrated.

t The ability to determine and implement appropriate measures for controlled. recovery and reentry - Objective Number 35, was adequately demonstrated. Procedures were developed controlling reentry to evacuated areas for essential servicer, which corrected an inadequacy identified during

the previous exercise. Arrangements were made to provide the public with information concerning safety precautions during recovery and the effects of low level exposure on health. Individual State and local agency responsibilities were discussed for recovery and reentry.

4 Summary: The two inadequacies identified during the previous exercise conducted August 27, 1965, were corrected during tnis exercise.

Objective Number 2 was not fully demonstrated during this exercise.

There were no inadequacies observed that would require i corrective action at the Scott County EOC.

l I

Area Recommended For Improvement t

3 Messages received over the Administrative Hot Line were not consistently copied and distributed. Aa the Administrative Hot Line is a direct communication link between the utility, State EOC and Clinton County and is the primary notification system for i the Site Area and General Emergencies and PAR's; messages received should be copied and distributed to the appropriate staff within the EOC. The system utilized to record messages received over the NARS could be implemented for the Administrative Hot Line.

~

2.2 5 Scott County Reception and Decontamination - North Scott High School i

The following objectives were to be demonstrated at this facility

1, 2, and 27.

The ability to mobilize staff and activate facilities promptly was

, fully demonstrated with one exception. The Standard Operating Procedures (SOP's) for the Scott County Reception Centers do not show the American Red Cross and the Eldridge Police Department as participating organizations.

j ,

As the American Red Cross and local Police Department have responsibility i for registration and access control, respectively, their participation nust i be reflected in the SOP's in accordance with IUREG-065h, P.h. The SOP's must be updated to reflect all the organizations who actively participate at the Reception Center. l

Objective Number 2, ability to fully staff facilities, was adequately demonstrated. Members of the Eldridge Fire Department comprised the five monitoring teams available at this facility. Each team consisted. of two monitors.

Adequacy of procedures for registration, radiological monitoring and decontamination of evacuees, was adequately demonstrated to the extent of current FEMA guidance with the following exceptions. There_ vere two areas of concern noted by the evaluator regarding the SOP's. An " evacuee monitoring record" form is included in the SOP's, and is to be completed if contamination is detected. However, the form was neither utilized during this exercise nor vere the monitors avare of its existence. As this form and instructions for its use are ' in the SOP's, the monitors must be instructed to follow this procedure. Secondly, the SOP's state that a NaI (Sodium Iodide) probe vill be used to survey evacuees if it is suspected, based on initial contamination survey, that radiciodine exposure has occurred. However, the equipment was neither available nor were the procedures demonstrated.

Trained personnel and equipment were available to monitor approximately 2,520 evacuees and 8h0 vehicles within a twelve hour period. This is based on monitoring time of 90 seconds per evacuee and four minutes per vehicle.

An average of three persons per vehicle is assumed based on the Evacuation Time Estimate Study for the Quad Cities Nuclear Station. The registration, monitoring and decontamination areas were appropriately segregated to prevent

, cross contamination. Procedures for handling contaminated clothing and other items were also demonstrated.

4 With the exception noted above concerning the SOP's, the Eldridge Fire Department adequately demonstrated Objective Number 27, correcting two inadequacies identified during the previous exercise concerning monitoring and proper segregation of evacuees.

As congregate care vill be provided at a separate location from the North Scott High School, transporation of evacuees to these centers must be provided. However, the SOP's do not reflect the means for this transporation. The SOP's must be amended to show this resource per NUREG-065h, P.h.

Sum =ary: The two inadequacies identified during the previous exercise i conducted August 27, 1985, were corrected during this exercise.

Objective Number 27 was not fully demonstrated during this exercise.

, Areas Requiring Corrective Action

10. The American Red Cross and Eldridge Police Department were i

participants during this exercise. However, these organizations

! and their responsibilities are not reflected in the SOP's. As these organizations have responsibility for evacuee registration and access control respectively, their function must be reflected in the SOP's. (NUREG-065h, P.k.)

i I

11.' The SOP's require that an " evacuee monitoring record" form be completed if the evacuee is contaminated. However, this form was neither utilized nor vere the monitors aware of its existence.

(NUREG-0654, P.h.)

12. The SOP's state that a NaI - (sodium iodide) probe vill be used to survey an evacuee if it is suspected that radioiodine exposure has occurred. Ho. aver, the equipment was not available and consequently, the procedures were not demonstrated. (NUREG-065h, P.h.)

13. As congregate care facilities vill be provided at separate locations from the Reception Center at North Scott High School, transportation

. of evacuees to these centers must be provided. However, the SOP's do not reflect how this transporation vill be accomplished. The SOP's must be amended to show this resource. (NUREG-065h, P.h) 4

3 SCERARIO The initial scenario submitted by Commonwealth Edison was adequate for allowing the off-site objectives to be demonstrated with one exception.

In order for off-site doses to reach or exceed the Protective- Action Guide (PAG) dose at a distance of two miles and drive State Objective Number 15, an exposure . time of greater than a six hour default time vould have to be projected. This was subsequently corrected by the utility by adding maintenance information which would allow an exposure time of greater than 16 hours1.851852e-4 days <br />0.00444 hours <br />2.645503e-5 weeks <br />6.088e-6 months <br />. This amendment to the scenario was adequate to allow demonstration of all the off-site objectives.

r h SIDelARY OF AREAS REEJIRING CORRECTIVE ACTIONS IOWA OPERATIONS State Bmergency Operations Center (SEOC)

1. The State EOC failed to notify the Forward Com=and Post (FCP) at the Alert stage. Consequently, the FCP was activated when a representative of the State Highway Patrol overheard the status via their internal radio system. As a result, the FCP was not activated in a timely manner and in accordance vi t', the State Plan. (NUREG-065h, E.2.)

2. The State EOC failed to notify FEMA of .the General Emergency classification level. As FEMA contacts other Federal Agencies with responsibilities during a radiological emergency, prompt notification of emergency classifications must be made in accordance with the State Plan. (NUREG-065h, E.1.)

Radiological Assessment and Field Team Coordination

3. The Dose Assessment staff (Iowa Department of Public Health) did not update the Field Team Coordination staff concerning plant and off-site events in a timely manner. (NUREG-065h, I.8.)

Field Monitoring Teams

h. Radiation detection instruments and air sa=pling equipment vere not calibrated within a year in accordance with the manfacturers' specifications. (NUREG-065h, H.10.)

5. The Blue Team members were not aware of the maximum exposure dose allowed without authorization. (NUREG-065h, K.5.a.)

Medical Bnergency

6. The St. Luke's Hospital based area ambulance service transported the contaminated patient to the wrong receiving area of the hospital. This vould cause the unnecessary spread of contamination at this facility. (NUREG-065k, L.1.)

COUNTY OPERATIONS Clinton County Bnergency Operations Center (CCE00)

7. Access Control into protective action recommendation areas was not implemented during the Site Area E=ergency and was delayed until the General Emergency declaration. This occurred because the County Plans and procedures do not require i=ple=entation of access control until the General Emergency. (NUREG-065h, J.10.J.)

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Clinton County Reception and Decontamination - DeWitt Central High School

8. The Iowa National Guard, City of DeWitt Police Department, American Red Cross, the local a=ateur radio group and the Clinton County Medical Nurses were participants during this exercise. However, these organizations are not reflected in the SOP's4 As the majority of these organizations have an integral responsibility at this facility, their function must be reflected in the SOP's.

(NURm-065h, P.k. )

9 Per the Reception Center Emergency Operations staff, the Clinton County School District vould provide buses to transport evacuees I to congregate care centers. However, this procedure is not reflected in the SOP's. The appropriate amendment must be made.

(NUREG-065h, P.h.)

Scott County Reception and Decontamination - North Scott High School

10. The American Red Cross and Eldridge Police Department vere participants during this exercise. However, these organizations {

and their responsibilities are not reflected in the SOP's. As these organizations have responsibility for evacuee registration and access control respectively, their function mut,t be reflected in the SOP's (NURm-065h, P.h. )

11. The SOP's require that an " evacuee monitoring record" form be completed if the evacuee is contaminated. However, this form was neither utilized nor vere the monitors aware of its existence.

(NURm-065h, P.h. )

12. The SOP's state that a NaI (sodium iodide) probe vill be used to survey an evacuee if it is suspected that radiciodine exposure has occurred. However, the equipment was not available and consequently, the procedures were not de=onstrated. (NUREG-065h, P.h.)

13. As congregate care facilities will be provided at separate locations from the Reception Center at North Scott High School, transportation of evacuees to these centers must be provided. However, the SOP's do not reflect how this transportation vill be accomplished.

The SOP's must be amended to show this resource. (NURE-065h)

CONTENTS '

s ABEREVIATIOES AND ACROEY)E. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . iii EXERCISE SUB04ARY.................................................... v 1 INTRODUCTION..................................................... 1 1.1 Exercise Background......................................... 1 1.2 Exercise Evaluators......................................... 2 1.3 Evaluation criteria......................................... 2 1.h Exercise Objectives......................................... 3 1.5 Exercise Scenario........................................... 9 1.6 State and Local Recources................................... 11 2 EXERCISE EVALUATION.............................................. 13 2.1 Iowa Operations............................................. 13 2.1.1 State Energency Operations Center. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13 2.1.2 Emergency Operations Faci 11ty........................ 15 2.1.3 Joint Public Information Center...................... 15 2.1.h State Forward Command Post........................... 17 2.1 5 Dose Assessment and Field Team Coordination. . . . . . . . . . 19 2.1.6 Field Monitoring Teams............................... 20 2.1.7 Medical Dri11........................................ 21 2.2 County Ope re.tions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22 2.2.1 Clinton County E0C................................... 22 2.2.2 Clinton County Reception and Decon - Devitt High School............................................... 25 I

2.2.3 Clinton County Reception and Decon - Goose Lake High School............................................... 26 2.2.h Scott County E0C..................................... 27 2.2.5 Scott County Reception and Decon - North Scott High School............................................... 29

, 3 SCERARI0......................................................... 32 h SUlstARY OF AREAS RE4JIRING CORRBCTIVE ACTIONS.................... 33

ABIEtEVIATIOBB AND ACRONDS s

ANL Argonne National Laboratory ARC American Red Cross CCEOC Clinton County Emergency Operations Center DOC Department of Commerce DOE Department of Energy DOI Department of Interior DOT Department of Transporation EBS Emergency Broadcast System EOC Emergency Operations Center EOF Emergency Operations Facility EPA Environmental Protection Agency EPZ Emergency Planning Zone FEMA Federal Emergency Management Agency FCP Forward Command Post GPM Gallons Per Minute HHS/PHS Health and Human Services /Public Health Service EPCI High Pressure Core Injection JPIC . Joint Public Information Center KI Potassium Iodide LCO Limiting Condition of Operation t

mci M1111 curie i

MWe Megawatt, electrical MWth Megawatt, ther=al NARS Nuclear Accident Reporting System NRC Nucient Regulatory Commission 111

NUREG-065h Criteria for Preparation and Evaluation of Radiological Emergency Response Plans and Preparedness in Support of Nuclear Power Plants (NUREU-065h/FDfA-REP-1, Rev.1)

PAG Protective Action Guide PAR Protective Action Reco==endation PIO Public Infor=ation Officer QCNPS Quad Cities Nuclear Power Station RAC Regional Assistance Committee RER Residual Heat Removal R/hr Rem Per Hour SCEOC Scott County Emergency Operations Center SEOC State Energency Operations Center S0P Standard Operating Procedure TLD Thermoluminescent Dosimeter uCi Microcuri USCG United States Coast Guard USDA United States Department of Agriculture iv

EIENCISE SIESIARY The purpose of an exercise is to determine the ability of appropriate off-site agencies to respond to an emergency covered by State and local Radiological Emergency Response Plans. The evaluation of such an effort vill, of necessity, tend to focus on the negative aspects of the exercise, on inadequacies in planning, preparedness and performance.

This focus of attention on the negative should not be taken to mean that there were not a great many positive accomplishments as well. Indeed there were; however, in the interest of brevity, only inadequacies vill herein be summarized.

FEMA classifies exercise inadequacies as deficiencies or areas requiring corrective action. Definitions of these categories follow:

Deficiencies are demonstrated and observed inadequacies that would cause a finding that off-site emergency preparedness was not adequate to provide reasonable assurance that appropriate protective measures can be taken to protect the health and safety of the public living in the vicinity of a nuclear power facility in the event of a radiological emergency.

Areas requiring corrective actions are demonstrated and observed inadequacies of State and local government performance, and although their correction is required during the next scheduled exercise, they are not considered, by themselves, to adversely impact public health and safety.

In addition, FD(A identifies areas recommended for improvement, which are problem areas observed during an exercise that are not considered to adversely impact public health and safety. While not required, correction of these vould enhance an organization's level of emergency preparedness.

There were no deficiencies identified at any location or activity during this exercise. Generally, the mobilization of staff and activation of facilities was successfully accomplished, and the appropriate response was carried out according to plan.

It should be noted that all of the inadequacies identified during the previous exercise, conducted August 27, 1985, were adequately corrected during this exercise.

However, our evaluation disclosed thirteen areas requiring corrective action and three recommendations for improvement. These items are explained in detail in Section Two of this report under the respective facility.

A summary of the areas requiring corrective action are as follows:

IOWA OPERATION 8 State Emergency Operation Center

1. The State EOC failed to notify the Forwar. Command Post (FCP) v

at the Alert stage in accordance with the plan. The facility was subsequently activated when a representative of the State Highway Patrol overheard the status via their internal radio system.

As the FCP coordinates State resources to support access control into the EP2, timely notification is imperative.

2. The State EOC failed to notify FEMA of the General Emergency classification level in accordance with the plan. As FLMA contacts other Federal Agencies with responsibilities during a radiological emergency, prompt notification of emergency classifications must be made.

Radiological Assessment and Field Team Coordination

3. The dose assessment staff at the State EOC did not update the Field Team Coordinator concerning plant and off-site events in a timely manner. For example, the Field Team Coordinator was not made aware of the initiation of the radiological release until one hour after it occurred.

Radiological Field Monitorina Teams

h. Radiation detection instruments and air sampling equipment were not calibrated within a year in accordance with the manufactures' specifications. To ensure accurate readings, the equipment must be appropriately calibrated.

5. Field team members of one of the two field teams were not aware of the maximum exposure dose allowed without authorization. This lack of knowledge could result in excessive exposure to field team members.

Medical Bueraency

6. The St. Luke's Hospital based ambulance service transported a contaminated patient to the wrong receiving area of the hospital.

This vould cause the unnecessary spread of contamination at this facility as the area was not prepared for recovery of contaminated patients.

Clinton County heergency Operations Center

7. During the Site Area Emergency, protective action recoc:=endations were cade to shelter the public in sectors within the county.

However, access control was not implemented at this time and was delayed until the General Emergency declaration. This inadequacy occurred because the County's Plan and procedures for access control are aligned with emergency classification levels, rather than protective actions.

Clinton County Reception and Decontamination

8. Some of the organizations, such as the Iown National Guard, American vi

Red Cross and others who vere participants during this exercise, are not reflected in the Standard Operating Procedures (SOP's).

As the majority of these organizations have an integral responsibility at this facility, their function must be reflected in the SOP's.

9 Per the Reception Centers E=ergency Operations staff, the Clinton County School District vould provide buses to transport evacuees to congregate care centers. However, this procedure is not reflected in the SOP's.

Scott County Reception and Decontamination

10. The American Red Cross and local police departments, who were participants during this exercise, are not reflected in the Standard Operating Procedures (SOP's). As both of these organizations have responsibility for evacuee registration and access control respectively, their function must be reflected in the SOP's.

11. The Standard Operating Procedures require that an " evacuee monitoring record" form be completed if an evacuee is contaminated.

However, this form was not utilized nor vere the monitors aware of its existence.

12. The Standard Operating Procedures state that a NaI (Sodium Iodine) probe vill be used to survey an evacuee if it is suspected that radioiodine exposure has occurred. However, the equipment was not availabic and, conocquently, the procedures were not demonstrated.

13. Per the County Plans, congregate care vould be provided at separate locations from the reception center. However, the Standard Operating Procedures do not indicate how transportation vill be accomplished.

FD4A requests that the State of Iowa submit a " Schedule of Corrections" su=marizing the measures they intend to take to correct inadequacies noted above and the dates the measures vill be accomplished. This must be submitted no later than 60 days from receipt of the exercise report.

vii