ML20210A250

Ack Receipt of Informing NRC of Steps Taken to Correct Violations Noted in NRC & Forwards Comments on Util Disagreement W/Certain Statements in Rept. Liquid Effluent Mgt Practices Subj of Ongoing Investigation

ML20210A250
Person / Time
Site:	Rancho Seco
Issue date:	01/23/1987
From:	Chaffee A NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION V)
To:	Julie Ward SACRAMENTO MUNICIPAL UTILITY DISTRICT
References
NUDOCS 8702060440
Download: ML20210A250 (3)

Text

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. s JAN 2 3 gggy Docket No. 50-312 Rancho Seco Nuclear Generating Station 14440 Twin Cities Road Herald, California 95638-9799 Attention: J. E. Ward Deputy General Manager, Nuclear Gentlemen:

1 Thank you for your letter dated December 19, 1986, informing us of the steps you have taken to correct the items which we brought to your attention in our \

letter dated November 14, 1986. Your corrective actions will be verified during a future inspection.

In your December 19, 1986 letter, you disagreed with certain statements in the report. Enclosure (1) of this letter provides the Region V assessment of your comments.

Your cooperation with us is appreciated.

Sincerely, ,

h/ft , at[jeL(pa A. E. Chaffee, Deputy Director Division of Reactor Safety and Projects E

YES NO

-COPY REQUESTED YES N0 YES N0 ES

'\NO N0 Y 0 YES YES NO RV (pr Wang:jb LMi ler k

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Enclosure (1)

Region V Assessment of Licensee Comments to the SMUD June 1, 1985 to June 30, 1986 SALP Report (1) Licensee Comment:

With regard to the Operations functional area, the District considers that the statement on Page 11 of the SALP report, "...the absence of all t'te instruments and parameters to control the plant in a transient from inside the control room...", is technically incorrect. The control room is designed in accordance to and in compliance with regulatory requirements and commitments concerning indication, annunciation and remote operation of pumps, valves, breakers, and other equipment necessary to mitigate the effects of plant transients. The District has also installed additional computer and annunciator points in response to past transients. These improvements can assist transient recovery, but are not necessary to control the plant during transient conditions. An auxiliary shutdown panel is also available to provide remote shutdown capability in the event of a control room evacuation.

Region V Response:

With regard to the Operations functional area, several examples were noted regarding the licensee's inability to resolve technical safety issues, including the potential for abser.ce of all instruments needed to control the plant in a transient. This generalization specifically referred to the ambiguous integrated control system status in the control room during the December 26, 1985 event. The statement is l

correct when taken in this context.

"In the area of approach to the resolution of technical i issues from a safety standpoint, in dealing with j technical issues and satisfactorily resolving them, the licensee has sometimes delayed resolution, or failed to correct, problems on the initial attempts. This can be demonstrated by: . . . the absence of all the instruments and parameters need to control the plant in a transient from inside the control room."

(2) Licensee Comment:

On page 12 of the SALP report, it states, "....the event involved failure to construct an operational Post Accident Sampling System....". The ..

District considers this statenient to be misleading in that it does not fully describe the circumstances surrounding the Post Accident Sampling j System issue. Although startup testing of the system did not test all i functions and equipment failures did lead to repeated operational l delays, a Post Accident Sampling System was constructed. Post-construction problems were primarily equipment oriented and significant

( resources and management effort have been, and continue to be, directed to their resolution. At present, essentially all modifications of the

! PASS have been completed with the exception of the in-line ion chromatograph. Efforts are under way to complete this item prior to restart.

._ c. -

i Region V Assessment (continued)

Region V Response:

The discussion in the SALP report was not intended to provide a full description of all the circumstances surrounding the Post Accident Sampling System. The NRC recognizes that efforts were expended in construction of a PASS. However, the PASS was never demonstrated to be fully operational or that it could reliably meet the commitments made in response to NUREG 0737. The District's response to Section 2,

" Radiological Controls" of the SALP report identifies a course of action which apparently will lead to an acceptable PASS.

(3) Licensee Comment:

The

" District also considers the statement on page 32 of the SALP report,

...when it became necessary to reduce the accumulated liquid radwaste inventory, the licensee manipulated sampling techniques to release the liquid radwaste to the environment...the liquid effluent limits were exceeded...", to be misleading and it eppears to imply that procedures were intentionally disregarded.

Region V Response:

The liquid effluent management practices that existed at Rancho Seco are the subject of an ongoing NRC investigation. It is therefore inappropriate to ccmment on this issue.

O