Text

Application for Amend to License DPR-54,revising &/Or Adding Addl Sections to Tech Specs & Addressing Safety Impact of Bringing Tdi Diesel Generators Into Svc. Description of Proposed Changes Encl
	ML20206H128
Person / Time
Site:	Rancho Seco
Issue date:	04/01/1987
From:	Julie Ward; SACRAMENTO MUNICIPAL UTILITY DISTRICT
To:	Miraglia F; Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
Shared Package
ML20206H133	List: ML20206H128; ML20206H162;
References
	JEW-87-358, TAC-63030, NUDOCS 8704150267
	Download: ML20206H128 (57)
	v • d • e

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$SMUD SACRAMENTO MUNICIPAL UTILITY DISTRICT O P. O. Box 15830, Sacramento CA 95852-1830,(916) 452-3211 AN ELECTRIC SYSTEM SERVING THE HEART OF CALIFORNIA i

I APR 011987 i JEW 87-358 i

Director of Nuclear Reactor Regulation Attn: Frank J. Miraglia, Jr.

Division of PWR Licensing-B U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, D. C. 20555 Docket 50-312 Rancho Seco Nuclear Generating Station f' License No. OPR-54 Proposed Amendment 147, Revision 2

Dear Mr. Miraglia:

By letters dated October 2, 1986, and December 19, 1986, the District 1 submitted to the Commission Proposed Amendment No. 147 and No. 147, Revision 1. This proposed amendment requests permission to operate two Transamerica DeLaval (TDI) Diesel Generators to provide additional onsite emergency power. The enclosed amendrr.ent revises and/or adds additional sections to the Rancho Seco Technical Specifications and addresses the safety impact when the TDI Diesel Generators are brought into service.

The NRC's technical review of the TDI information raised technical questions which have resulted in clarifying revisions to the proposed Technical Specifications. Enclosure 1, the Description of Proposed j Changes, Associated Safety Analysis and the "No Significant Hazards Evaluation," and Enclosure 2, the proposed Technical Specifications, are being resubmitted in their entirety, and are attached. The conclusions of the previous Safety Analyses and the "No Significant Hazards Evaluation" have not been altered by the revisions to the proposed Technical Specifications. l l

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8704150267 870401 00 PDR ADOCK 05000312 p[1 P PDR , D RANCHO SECO NUCLEAR GENERATING STATION O 14440 Twin Cities Road, Herald, CA 95638-9799;(209) 333 2935

Frcnk J. Miraglia, Jr. APR 011987

, JEW 87-358 During its review meeting with the District on. Proposed Amendment 147, i Revision 1, the NRC asked thirty questions. Enclosure 10 is the response to the thirty qtestions. Further, during conference calls and other meetings, the NRC raised eleven other questions related to civil engineering design and fire protection. Enclosure 11 responds to questions about the civil engineering design, and Enclosure 12 answers questions concerning fire protection.

The responses to the 45 questions do not significantly alter the information contained in the original Enclosures 3 through 9 of the December 19, 1986, submittal. Where minor changes in the information of Enclosures 3 through 9 do occur, the responses to the 45 questions provide sufficient documentation for the changes. Consequently, the original Enclosures 3 through 9 are not included in this package.

Pursuant to 10 CFR 50.91(b)(1), the Radiological Health Branch of the California State Department of Health Services has been informed of this proposed amendment by mailed copy of this submittal.

Because this is a revision to Proposed Amendment No. 147, no additional ,

license fee is required.

l If you have any questions concerning this submittal, please contact Mr. Ron Colorabo at (209) 452-3211, extension 4236.

Sincere

%h . Ward Deputy General Manager, Nuclear Attachments I

cc: A. D'Angelo G. Kalman Region V (2)

MIPC (2)

INPD 4 5+

Sworn to and subscribed before me this dayofApj,1987.

LDn O Notary Public i

) * ' OFFIC'IAL SEAL l

DAWN DARUNG .

tr' NOTARYIEuc CAtr/ORNIA l SACfMMENTO COU:4TY -

, My Comm. Expires kn 12,1990 l

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.I MCLOSURE 1 l

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FACILITY CHANGE SAFETY ANALYSIS H

PROPOSED AMENDMENT 147 REV.'2 LOG NO. 760 REV. 2' Descrigtiggi Proposed Amendment.147 consists of changes and additions to the Rancho.Seco Technical Specifications to permit operation of two TDI diesel generators in the essential electrical system, the revision to the inverter power supply system and-the r undervoltage/overvoltage' protection system.

Regsgg ign Cbegggi The saf ety analysis /50. 59 revi ew ' f or ECN R-0955,' ECN R-1045, ECN

'A-3660 and ECN A-3748 determined.that Technical ~ Specification 4 changes were required for these Mods. .2 Eyglyatigg god Bagig fgr gafgly Eindigggi 1The following is a discussion of each Technical Specification change.- The changes are divided into five groups.or sections depending on the type of change. Each section lists the existing specification, the new specification, and a discussion of~the change. Each section also includes a safety analysis and a no significant hazards consideration for the changes.

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'i~ Oilsting @gectilcat[gagt:

j- . 3.7N.D. -Emergency. diesel generators A'and'B are operable and"at-least.35,000, gallons of: fuel are in each storage ~ tank.

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. Bases:

All of the normal power" supply to plant auxiliary loads is.provided through the two unit auxiliary.

transformers connected to the generatorcbuses.

Emergency power for;the-nuclear' service-loads is obtained-from two on-site diesel generators.

The. 35,000 gallons..of f f uel . stored in each. storage : tank -

permit operation of the two diesel; generators-for~seven J' days. l l

New E2ectitcattent 3.7.1.F. Two separate and=independen't diesel generator trains (train A is both diesel generators-A and A2, train B is both diesel generators B and B2) are operable each with:

1. Separate day) tanks containing a minimum-volume of 65 percent of tank capacity-.

(265 gallons)'of fuel f or: each A ' and B andR50 percent of-tank capacity (315 gallons) of fuel'for A2.and B2.

2. A separate - f uel storage system containing a minimum usable volume.of 35,000 gallons of fuel for each: A and 'B and .42,000 gallons of fuel for each-A2 and B2.

3. A separate fuel transfer-pump'for each engine of a train.

Bases:

All of the normal power. ' suppl y. .to - pl ant auxiliary

, loads can be provided through the two unit au'xiliary.

+

. transformers connected to.the generator buses.

E~mergency power for'the nuclear service loads is obtained from two on-site diesel ge,nerator trains- q

i. .( train A is both diesel generators A and'A2,' train B-is-

both diesel generators.B and B2).

j- The 35,000 gallons of fuel stored in each storage tank permit. operation of the diesel. generators Aand B for seven days. The 42 3 000 gallons of fuel stored in.each L .s

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storagertank,.permitfoperation'ofEthe' diesel} generators ,

-A2 andjB2Lfor.sevenfdays. -

Discussiggi- ,

- This . change adds the,two ne'w TDI diesel- generators k2 ~'

'and B2. Diesel generators ' A. and A2 ::(one - old Land one . >

new)~ comprise train.,A4and diese15generatorsLB.~,and B2'

~(on'eLold and one new) comprise train: B.- ~Allediesel

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1 generator-specifications'are. written:usingathis1traif approachsto simplify ~.the: required 11imiting condition for This.isnaJ

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operation , f or. the ~ operating staf f.- e

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co'nservative approachisincefthereiar,e onlyl? limited "y . instances'where aisafetyffunction cannotlbe_provided by.

.only one'old diesel. generator.peritrain.- .

Toe. requirements for1,the day tanks and the-fuelstransfer pumps for each diesel ~-generat'orfaie new' additions ta the' l specification.- :These support systems (are1 presently

~

required _to be operable:by; plant procedures. :This change is-consistent with~the recommendations 1.ofJGeneric'~

~

Letter 84-15.

2.- Egisting Sgecificatiggi.

~

3.7.1.K. The interconnections between 480Lvolt' 1

switchgear 3A and 3A2, and'3Biand 3B2 are operable.

New Spegifigatiggi N/A Digeggsiggi This specification has been1 proposed to be deleted. LThis requirement was originally added;to' reflect;the Cycle 7 interim power supply configuration. Buses 3A2'and 3B2-will be powered by the new=-TDI diesel generators andzwill no-longer require the interconnect.

3. Enisting _Specifigatiggi 3.7.1.E. Plant batteries are charged;and:in'iservice.

3.7. Bases

~

The set of four 125 volt DC control panelboards (SOA, -

SOB, SOC, SOD)' and'the set of two 125 voltlDC;controll

l. panelboards (SOA2,- SOB 2) -are arranged so 'that loss of-ji cne bus will not preclude.safershutdown-or operation cof?

,, safety features systems.. During periods when one plant: '

battery..is de-energized'.for testior maintenance, the

... associated 3 125 volt DC bus can be suppliedEfrom its b battery charger. .

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' 3. 7. 1. G'.- ' Nuclear Service batteries.BA,.BB, BC, BD,'_BA2,:

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2BB2, BC2 and BD2,- which supply vital'125' volt-

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buses SOA,. SOB. . SOC, SOD,.:SOA2,:. SOB 2, SOC 2,

. , y and SOD 2 are. charged and.in service.

f3.7 Bases:

-The set.of eight 125 volt: DC control panelboards i(SOA,- -

SOB,-SOC,. SOD, SOA2 SOB 2,JSOC2, and, SOD 2);are arranged ~

- so that loss- of nne. bus will inot preclude saf e shutdown

, or operation of safety features systems. LDuring periods when:eneJplant-battery is_de-energized'forLtest.or ~

maintenance, the associatedJ: 125-volt'DC bus can be-supplied from.its battery charger.

4 Discussigni , ,

' Proposed Amendment.135 dated June 13, 1986~ revi ses _-

Specification 3.7.1.E'shown_to;3.7.1.G (above).- without batteries BC2 and BD2 and buses; SOC 2:andl SOD 22. -Th i s -.

change adds batteries BC2 and BD2 and buses SOC 2 and.

SOD 2. , These batteries and buses are being added to support loads being a'dded'to the electrical ~

distribution system. This. change-' maintains consistency-in the specifications by listing all nuclear service batteries and the vital buses.they supply.

4. Egisting Spegifigatiggi N/A I

nee SR ecifigatiggi Table 3.14-1_

FIRE DETECTION ~ INSTRUMENTS'FOR SAFETY SYSTEMS

~

Minimum Operable Zone Instrument Location Heat Flame Smoke 105 Diesel Generator-Building- 0 3 6' ,

106 Diesel Generator Building; 0 3 6 3.14.3.1 m. Diesel Generator? Building ^ (Zone 105)-

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n. Diesel Generator _ Building.~(Zone-106)

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3214-2f INSIDEl BUILDING ~ FIRE HOSE STATIONS ~

. ID~No. Location III' Diese1~ Generator Building Hose Stations' FPHS-D-OO1 Train:A Engine' Room Elevation O*I FPHS-D-OO2 Train A-Control Room Elevation-O'

- FPHS-D-OO3 Train A Mezzanine Elevation 18'6"

= FPHS-D-OO4- Train B Engine Room Elevation.O' FPHS-D-OO5 Train B- Control ~ Room : Elevation: O' FPHS-D-OO6 Train B Mezzanine Elevation 18' 6" Discyssiggi These changes add.the fire detection instruments,.the sprinkler systems, and the fire hose stations in theinew diesel generator building. . 'These are additions to the specifications.that provide-fire protection features for ^

portions of redundant systems-important:toisafe shutdown as-described in the' Rancho Seco Fire Hazard Analysis:

Report.

5. Egisting @gecificatigg-3.7.1.F. Two out of.three b'attery chargers are.. operable for 125 volt DC. buses "A"-and "C", and - "B" thru "D".

3.7.1.G. One out of two. battery chargers are operable for each 125 VDC bus "A2" and "B2."

Bages Each redundant pair;("A"1and "C", "B" and "D") of safety features actuation and. reactor protection 125 volt-DCJ buses has a standby battery charger in addition to a battery charger for'each bus. ' The 125 volt DC buses:

"A2" and "B2" each, has a standby battery charger. < Loss of power from.one battery charger per pair of redun' d ant ~

DC buses of-for DC-bus."A2" or "B2" has no significant-consequence since a standby battery charger'is-1

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!available. 'In* addition, each1125 volt DC bus'can

. continue.to receive powerffrom.its respective batter [

- without interruption.' ,

.Sgggifigatiggi_

Ngw 3.7.1 H. Each' vital 125 volt lDC bus'SOA,. SOB,-SOC,-SOD, .

' . - SOA2,. SOB 2,' SOC 2,2and; SOD 2lshall have its-normal-battery charger aligned.to it.

'Baggg

Each redun' dant, pair _ 1.( " A " and "C", "B" and "D")'of-the eights 125 volt 1DC control buses (SOA and SOC, SOB and-SOD, SOA2.and SOC 2, and: SOB 2 and-SOD 2) has a: standby-battery chargercin. addition' 'i its-normal' battery .

< charger. On the_ loss of power from one battery _ charger per" pair the standby battery;chargeriis pu,t in service.. ; ,

However,.the. standby _ charge can befaligned in. place.of.

its normal charger forLonlyi48 hours because-th'e; standby battery charge is powered f rom' a dif f erent- diesel:

generator 1than the normal battery charger. There'are potential interactionszafter"2 hours2.314815e-5 days 5.555556e-4 hours 3.306878e-6 weeks 7.61e-7 months that could occur upon the loss of off-site power'and a-single' diesel generator failure. This situation has not been analyzed but by limiting-the time.this configuration could exist",

the probability of occurrence is sufficientlyLlow to-justify limited operation in this condition.

Discgssiogt This change adds the. battery chargers for vit'al 125 volt DC buses SOC 2 and SOD 2 which are not presently in the specifications. The change: is revised to only-address 1 the normal-nuclear service battery chargers-required.for reactor criticality and does notLaddress the' installed ~

spare battery; chargers. The changes in designation f or-vital buses (A,B,C,D,A2,B2Lvs. SOA,-SOB, SOC, SOD, SOA2, SOB 2, SOC 2, SOD 2) is addressed in proposed amendment 135 dated June 13, 1986. This requirementfon the standby:

charger is addressed in specifi~ cation 3.7.2J.

6. Eji isting Sp_gc_Lf_i cati _. ggt N/A 3

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7 Ngy'Sggcificgtiggi 3.2s - IDL DLeget' Genecatet Cgnitet.Rggs EssentLal Ventilatten-System 6anticabtLitx BenticabtLity This specification' applies to the operability of the-TDI Diesel Generator-Control Room-Essential Ventilation System..

Obigctive To assure that this' system will"be.able to perform-its design function.

SgecLficatiga 3.28.1 Both'TDI Diesel Generator-Control-Room Essential Ventilation' trains shall be operable.

at all times except as noted.in 3.20.2 and 3.29.3.

3.28.2 With one-TDI Diesel Generator Control Room ,

Essential Ventilation train inoperable, demonstrate the operability of the-remaining-train. Restore the. inoperable train to operable status within 15' days or be in at least hot shutdown within six hours and in

~

cold shutdown withinLthe;fo11owing 30 hours3.472222e-4 days 0.00833 hours 4.960317e-5 weeks 1.1415e-5 months .

~

3.28.3 With both TDI Diesel Generator Control Room Essential Ventilation trains _ inoperable, restore at'least one inoperable train to operable. status-within~2 hours or be.in at least hot shutdown within-six hours and in cold shutdown within the following 30. hours.

With one inoperable-train restored to operabl'e status, follow-3.28.2.

ESSES The TDI Diesel Generator ControleRoom Essential.

Ventilation System is required to maintain the temperature in the control room below 122 F to protect required electrical components.

Discussigni .

~

This new specification is added'to assure; operability of_'

this ventilation system. The ventilation system is required to provide cooling for-the electrical- J components in the TDI Diesel-. Generator Contr61~ Room.and not human Habitability considerations.

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Seisty 80alysis fgr Items-ig.Sestigo 11 ,

1 T'he addition of the'TDI diesel generators and the modification of the electrical distribution system, results in a two train, two diesel generator per train limiting condition for operation power-system. The1 District has reviewed this modification in accordance-with'10' CFR 50.59 and determined that it required a ~

change in the technical specifications, but was not an unreviewed s'afety question.

A review of the Licensing documents for Rancho Seco show' the following:

1. The Baseg for Technical Specification 3.7, Gugiliaty Electcical Systems states "The auxiliary.

electrical power systems are arranged so that no single failure can inactivate enough safety f eatures equipment to jeopardize plant saf ety. "

2. USAR section 8.2.3.4 gigglg Egilurg Baglysis igt thg Huglggt ggryigg System, states "...a single fault within the system, with postulated loss of offsite power combined with a design basis accident, does not preclude the reactor protective system, safety features actuation system, and the safety features equipment.from performing their safety function."

3. USAR -section 14.1.2.8 Less'gi Electcic Pgwet states that "The unit is designed to withstand the effects of load rejection or loss of all ac power.

Emergency systems are described in Section 8.2.3."

Based on this review, it was concluded that the design basis f or the emergency power system is that a single failure of the system (including diesel generators) will not preclude the reactor protection system and safety feature system from performing their' intended safety function.

The loads on the new diesel generators were evaluated to determine the effects of loss of one diesel generator and associated power distribution system in the two diesel generator per train contiguration. The systems interaction evaluation included a review of system components with regard to their power supplies and whether failure of components within a system could escalate or aggravate an event or pr,esent confusing information to the control room operators (i . e. , . failure of one diesel generator in a train would not cause confusion or an unacceptable plant configuration). The )

evaluation found that the diesel generators and associated power distribution systems for each train were independent and that no unacceptable i nteracti ons e>:ist.

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.The L f ollowing' three ~ sets Lof1 electrical :. loads Jwerei c

identified.as system, interactions. Each-of these! cases- 4 were2individua11yi evaluated and- no:' adverse system; F -

int'eractions~were identified.; , ,

^The Freeze Prot'ection C rcuit's'o'f-Pining ~and Tubing'

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.Cgnngc_t_ed, tg . Og;ii Li aty Ee_edtfilttet Egmas,_ l(P-318_ and_ )

P-319)-

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'These. pumps are, powered from theinew{ diesel ~^

generators GEA2?and GEB2'while:the' freeze

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protectionfcircuitsfare'poweredLfrom-the.old. diesel f generators-GEA, GEB,MCC's S2A1 and S2B1.

E These-circuitsfwillfnoticause system failure.< .

2. -~Ibe Cggttgl'Circgit---for the Main Feedwater Pumg.

Iuthige Jsglatigo y31ve Muy 29ssg1 y The MOV/is powered.from[the old[ diesel lgeneratort'

- 'GEB, MCC S2B1,_while theuEFICl initiated close. .

signals are. powered from. batteries off;the=new; _

diesels GEA2 and~GEB2. This is not an. interaction but a single-failure-which71s7 addressed in'the.EFIC' Design Basis - Report (see ' Proposed Amendment. 152' submitted December ~ 5, 1986). Additionally, .the scenario 'would have happened even :in Ja - single '

diesel generator per train system.

3. -Hydt qqen MgnLtgti ng Analyzet Panels-id4HMAt:H4HMBl.

These panels are supplied by either..the A2Eand B2' diesel generators while the-hydrogen sample pumps are supplied by either.A or B unit, respectively.

.However, based on failure-analyses of each; individual power supply?to each hydrogen monitor'_

system, the hydrogen monitors ^will_go'downscaleito zero. This same downscale reading woul'd result even if each system.was fed by a' single power:

source. Hence, there is no:confusingsinformation presented to the control room operators.

The DBR and Systems Interaction Stud show i that the 4 Diesel Generators and associated electrical? systems arel load independent and that the safety related loads '

powered by.the Diesel" Generators are redu'ndant,;i'.e.,-

GEA2 and GEB2 are redun' dant'-and GEA-and GEB-are redundant. Based on this'the-Diesel Generator combinations available are not;only GEA and_GEA2 or GEB and GEB2 for the two train configuration discussed in Technical Specifications, but also'GEA:and GEB2[or"GEB .

and GEA2. Based on this.the District-'is taking;a- ;

conservative approach, 2 trains with 2 diesel-generators

per train _(GEA and GEA2,,GEB-and.GEB2).- However,1for.

emergency situations 4 dieseligenerator combinations are available; GEA and GEA2, GEB and GEB2, GEA and1GEB2, and. I 1

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' Based on'this review the' District concludes'that.this modification does not change the single failure requirements in JUSAR Chapter;B,or; Technical Specification 3.7 Bases because redundancy of trains and' ,

system. independence is.still. maintained. jIt also does.

Enot reduce the margin provided in the accident analysis of USAR-Chspter 14 because'the additional capacity will'-

support required safety'related loads.

-Basislfot 89 Si EGlitcant Uggat ds Dgtgtginatige igt~1Lggs ill; Seckl9G 11-

'TheLproposed change does not involve a'significant hazards consideration.because operation;of Rancho:Seco-in accordance with this change.wouldinot:

(1) involve a significant increase.in the;probab'ility or consequences of an accident previously evaluated. .This modification does not significantly alter the accident analysis in-Chapters-8 and-14 of the USAR. The modification of-the electrical distribution system was designed to meet, single . .t failure criteria and withstand the effects of load rej ecti on. - The systems interaction evaluation concluded-that-a failure of one diesel. generator and.

associated' power distribution system would not introduce-any unacceptable interactions or;any.

failures in the remaininggelectrical di'stri buti on .

with its train. Therefore, this change ldoes not-increase the probability or consequences of'an accident.

(2) create the possibility of a new or different kind ~

of accident from any previously analyzed._ .The.

accident analysis inLChapter 14 of the USAR is not changed because the-additional capacity. ensures that the power distribution system will support required safety related loads. 'Thee systems-interaction review shows that no new or different failures modes were created. This modification does not therefcre create the possibility of a new or different kind of accident.

(3) involve a significant reduction in a margin of-safety. The design basis for the emergency power-system is that a gingle f ailure- of the system ~

(including diesel generators)-will not_ preclude the reactor protection system and safety features- ~

system from performing their safety function. The.

modification.of the emergency power system does not i change this basis. Based on1the systems-interaction review and the decign basis documents l

4

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, this1 change'will.not reduce the~ margin of safety.

.The modification to the. emergency power system'will provide redundant emergency power sources for.the control' room,~-TSC,'and NSEB essential'.HVAC systems.

It will also provide' additional capacity for future

~

loads while ensuring.that the existing emergency power system is not overloaded. This therefore

. increases the existing margin 1of safety.;

The emergency power system al Rancho Seco is> based' on a dual train (A and B) . concept. ;The existing diesel generators'(A and B) primarily support ECCS' loads. ;With the addition of'theEnew diesel generators (A2 and B2);the dual train concept ~is maintained. ~The ECCS loads are still on A and B, with'(U2 and B2 supporting HVAC loads, loads required by NUREG 0737-modifications, AFW/EFIC4 loads and other loads'duelto modifications.to the.

plant'.,-This change therefore does not-' involve a

~

significant reduction in the margin-of safety..

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Sgetigg 11 - Changes to'thg laygtt et Egwet Suggly System Ol i sting Snecificationi 3.7.1.H. Three out of four inverters S1A, S1B, sic,.and S1D, and both inverters S1A2 and S1B2 are operable for 120 volt AC vital bus power.

Bases-3.7:

Sufficient redundancy is available with any three of the four-120 volt AC vital power buses (S1A, S18, S1C, S1D) in service such that reactor safety is assured. Every reasonable effort will be made to maintain.all safety instrumentation in operation. - Following criticality, continued operation with inverters out-of-service as stated in Specification 3.7.1.H is governed by the-individual LCOs for the components powered by the out-of-service inverter.

New sp_ecificationi 3.7.1.I. Nuclear service' inverters S1A2, S1B2, S1C2, and 51D2, and static switches H8TA3, H8TB3,

H8TC3 and H8TD3, are operable for 120 volt AC l vital bus power.

3.7.2.K. Nuclear service inverters and static switches as listed in 3.7.1.I shall be operable except should one inverter or static switch become inoperable for greater than 24 hours2.777778e-4 days 0.00667 hours 3.968254e-5 weeks 9.132e-6 months , the reactor shall be in hat shutdown within the next 6 hours6.944444e-5 days 0.00167 hours 9.920635e-6 weeks 2.283e-6 months and in' cold shutdown within the i following 30 hours3.472222e-4 days 0.00833 hours 4.960317e-5 weeks 1.1415e-5 months . A static switch shall not be aligned to the backup source in place of an operable nuclear service inverter except during switching periods. If more than one nuclear service inverter or static switch as listed in 3.7.1.I should becomeLinoperable, within one hour take action to place the reactor in hot shutdown within the next 6 hours6.944444e-5 days 0.00167 hours 9.920635e-6 weeks 2.283e-6 months and in cold shutdown within the following 30 hours3.472222e-4 days 0.00833 hours 4.960317e-5 weeks 1.1415e-5 months .

Bases-3.7:

Four nuclear service inverters (S1A2, S192, S1C2, and SID2) and static switches (H8TA3, H8TB3, H8TC3, and H8TD3) are required to be operable to power the 120 volt AC vital buses. The nuclear service inverters are power from diesel generators A2 and B2 and the static switches are powered from diesel generators A and B.

This design ensures that upon loss of an inverter or a single diesel generator the 120 volt AC vital buses will continue to receive power and that there are no system

interactions. 'One nuclear service inverter or static switch is permitted to be inoperable for up to~24 hours.

The static switchlis only used as a backup for the inverter. It is.not permitted to be used when-an.

inverter-is operable except for switching period _because-it receives power from the nuclear service 480 V buses and there is no battery backup available.

Qi scussi oni This change identifies the nuclear service inverters in the NSEB as the power sources for.the.120 volt AC vital buses in the Auxiliary Building and the.NSEB. .It also.

identifies the static transfer switches which provide an independent vital 480 volt AC~ backup source for each nuclear service inverter. The existing specification allows one inverter to be out of: service indefinitely.

The new spec!fication requires that all the listed- -

inverters-be operable.for startup-and defines'.the-amount of time inverters can tue inoperable. prior to shutting down the plant.

F

. . - . . ~ .- -- . . - - . .- . . - - - _ - - - - _ - - - - - _ _

SAFETY ANALYSIS FOR ITEE IN SECTION II:

Systems, Subsystems, Components Affected NSEB . inverters SLA2, S1B2, S1C2, and SlD2 presently s'upply vital 120V. ac power .

to their. associated inverter buses S1A2-l, S1B2-1, S1C2-1 and S1D2-1.- This' modification relocates the power sources of the Auxiliary Building inverter.

buses SLA,' SIB, SIC, and SlD from their dedicated inverters to the NSEB inverters of.the same channels. This power source reassignment affects the loading of the NSEB inverters, their associated . batteries and battery .

chargers, and in addition, the loads served by inverter buses S1A, S1B, S1C, and S1D.

Safety Functions of Affected Systems / Components and Effects of Safety -Functions -

Batteries BA2, BB2, BC2, and BD2 and the associated: battery chargers provide

! 125V de power to the NSEB vital 125V de buses . SOA2, SOB 2, SOC 2, and SOD 2. -

l The loads on these de buses include NSEB inverters S1A2, S182, S1C2, and S1D2. . The reassignment of the power sources for the Auxiliary Building inverter buses (S1A, S1B, S1C, and S1D) to the NSEB inverters of the same channel increases the actual load on the NSEB inverters and subsequently on the associated batteries and battery chargers.- The NSEB batteries, battery chargers and inverters have adequate capacity to supply the additional. loads.

The Districe has verified that the backup ac power supply,'. regulating.

transformer and cable sizes are satisfactory for load capacity and voltage regulation. The sizing ensures that acceptable voltage levels will be l mainttined from the inverters or the backup supplies.

I Analysis of Effect on Safety Functions l

This modification does not change the assignments of individual loads on their respective inverter buses. It changes only the power sources to the Auxiliary.

Builclng inverter buses. The design change and the associated calculations

~

verif y that adequate power is available at the assigned sources _ and acceptable

voltage levels are maintained feeding either from.the inverters or the backup

! sources. This design change improves the' availability and reliability. of the power supplied to the Auxiliary Building inverter buses without any.

~

detrimental affects on the power supplied to the NSEB inverter buses. 'This design.will provide two paths of standby ac power to each inverter bus backed with the second diesel generator of the same train. .One path is through the standby battery charger, vital 125V de bus and inverter; the second path is i

through the voltage regulating transformer to' the vital 120V ac bus, i Additionally, a systems interaction study of the "Two Diesel Generator Electrical Train Design (ERPT-E0179)" was performed and results- confirm that I there is very good "intratrain load separation" of electrical loads. The study concluded that no unacceptable system interactions were .noted in cases -

l where plant systems are supplied by both diese1~ generators in an electrical train.-

Two additional failure modes are introduced by this modification. They are failures of the static switch or manual bypass switch. These failures meet.

the single failure requirements of the USAR and are additions to the. failure-i

__ ~ -_ . - _ . - _

SAFETY ANALYSIS FOR ITEMS IN SECTION II: (Continued) l-Analysis of Effect on Safety Functions (Cont.)

modes that do not change the bases in the USAR. ' The District considers that the transferability of the inverter bus oto the standby power source more than compensates for these 2 additional failure modes.

Summary The changes covered by this modification represent improvement over the existing arrangement regarding the reliability and availability of power supplies to vital 120V ac buses S1A, S1B, S1C, and SlD.

The District has verified the following:

1 (1) NSEB inverters S1A2, SlB2, SlC2, and S1D2 can carry the additional loads i assigned to buses SlA, S1B, SlC, and S1D, as the result of this design change. .

I i (2) Batteries RA2, BB2, BC2 and.BD2 have adequate capacity to supply the C loads assigned to 120V ac buses SLA, S1B, SlC, SlD, S1A2-1, S1B2-1, S1C2-1, and SID2-1.

(3) Circuit breakers of the vital 120V ac system, affected by-this design change, are properly coordinated.

(4) Cable sizes are satisfactory for ampacity and voltage regulation, and the sizing ensures that acceptable voltage levels will be maintained. supplied from the inverter or the backup power supply. -

USAR Section 8.2 is impacted by this modification. Sub-Section 8.2.2.7-and Figure 8.2-4 will be modified to reflect this design change. Based on the

, discussion above, the District has determined that this is not an Unreviewed j Safety Question.

Basis for No Significant Hazards Determination for Items in Sectfon II:

The proposed change does not involve a significant hazards consideration because operation of Rancho Seco in accordance with this change would not (1) involve a significant increase in the probability or consequences of an 4 accident previously evaluated. This modification does net change the accident analysis in Chapters 8.and 14 of the USAR. The modification increases the availability of the inverter buses by providing two diesel backed pcthe for power to each inverter. Therefore, this modification

does not increase the probability or consequences of an accident.-

(2) create the possibility of a new or different kind.of accident from any previously analyzed.- The accident analysis in the USAR is not changed.by this modification.- It returns the vital 120 VAC power system to a 4 t

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Basis for No Significant Hazards Determination for Items in Section II: (Cont.) )

l inverter configuration while providing an additional power path'to each inverter. Therefore,' this modification does not create the possibility of a new or different kind of accident.

(3) involve a significant reduction in a margin of safety. This modification increases the availability -of the inverter buses. It also provides a reliable inverter system capable of supporting the vital 120 VAC loads.

This modification therefore does not involve a significant reduction in the margin of safety.

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-gggtign-III - Changes 'to the Overvoltagg4Uddgtvgitage Ptgtectign SYstgm

1. Egisting Sgecificationi TABLE'3.7-1 VOLTAGE PROTECTION SYSTEM RELAY TRIP VALUES

~ ~~~~

EQUIVALENT- TIME DELAY ~

UNDERVOLTAGE RELAYS- 4160 BUS VOLTS (SECONDS); NOTE 2 3

--_-- _( V96191 - - - - - - - - _

Trip' Set Point 3771 138-(Note 1).

'98% of set point .3695- 18.2 t.O.'82 90% offset' point 3394 5.2 1 0.52 70% of set' point 2640- 3.1 1 0.31_

0% of_ set point ~ O'. . -1.5 1'O.15'

~~~ ~

. EQUIVALENT .

TIME DELAY

- OVERVOLTAGE RELAYS' '4160 BUS VOLTS-. ~(SECONDS) NOTE.2

_ _ - - -- - _ - - - _ = _ _ _ _ 1YO61S) ______ ____

Trip Set Point 4580 146' 102% of set point 4672 -7.'2 10.72 1 NOTE 1 - The relay voltage values shown have been' converted bylthe PT ratio (40:1) for review convenience NOTE 2 - For bus tripping an additional O.5 time delay must~be added.

NOTE 3 - The delay times shown are. based on an initial bus voltage of 4160 volts.

TABLE 3.7-2 Minimum Total Number Channels Channels Action Functional Unit Of Channel s To Trip : OPERABLE (Note 1)

Undervoltage 3/ Bus 2/ Bus 2 A Overvaltage 3/ Bus 2/ Bus 2 A 1

l

__:-_=_--__-__________=___________--__--_ - - _ _ _ _ - _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ :____ _ -

h

'Acti90.Stgtgmggts

- Action'A'- WithLthe. number of? OPERABLE channels.one'1ess than the-total ' Number e of _ Channels ' operation may proceed;provided-both ofi.the ' f ollowing ; conditions : are satisfied::

~ a. _The Inoperable channel?is placed in.the tripped

condition within'one hour.-

b. The. Minimum: Channels OPERABLE requirement'is. met; however, oneqadditional Echannel' may be _ bypassed i

.for surveillance testing..

~

- Note 1: The:above; table ~is.not applicable-when.the plant'isLin:

cold shutdown. '

Basgst The voltage protection systemnis designed'to isolate the nuclear. service buses';from the.startup~ transformers when the bus voltage: exceeds the allowablefoperating limits '

of.the' equipment'. The' allowable operating' range.for the; 4160 volt nuclear service buses is.3733 to 4626' volts-j' and 397 to 521 volts for the 480 volt nuclear service buses. This corresponds to a switchyard, voltage range.

l of 215-to 244 KV. _This. range of switchyard, voltage encompasses the normal operating range of-221 to 239:KV.

i Ngw Sggcificatkgo TABLE-3.7-1

.< VOLTAGE PROTECTION SYSTEM RELAY TRIP VALUES EQUIVALENT 1 TIME. DELAY 1

UNDERVOLTAGE RELAYS 4160 BUS VOLTS (SECONDS) NOTES 1 (VOLTS) -

l.

A. Definite 3771 ! 38 5.0-1 0.5 Time Delay Trip (Note 1)

Set Point (Drop I Out)

B. Inverse f3771 1 38- N/A Time Delay Trip Set Point-(Drop Out) 70 Percent of Set 2640-t 27 , '3.0 t 0.5 i

I Note 1 - For bus tripping, an additional 0.5.second time del'ay, must-be added.

4 1

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--.-_--._---l_----._-__.__-_-- .-___._.L......

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+ - . ,

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".; 2. Existing Sgecificatigni. y ,

Table"4.1-1~

INSTRUMENT-SURVEI'LL NCE REQUIREMENTS

- - - - - - - - - = _ _ _

= --------- -

Channel Description. Check Test Calibrate- ~ Remarks- ,

7-

57. - ~ Voltage Protection- S(1) (1)" Compare voltmeter.

' readings-

. a'. Undervaltage M- -R b . -. Overvoltage M R' -

c. Time Delay M R ,

New S R egifiqahign

57. Voltage Protection S(1)- (1) Compare =-

' voltmeter readings.

a. Undervoltage M_(2) R (2) Testlusing Relay Setpoint undervolt- ,

j b. Undervoltage M (2) . R -age relay's. ,

Relay Time Delay "TestLTrip"-

pushbutton--

, no quanti-tative-measurement's Discgssiggi 1

This revision deletes the monthly surveillancef .

requirement associated with the overvoltage relay which

is being deleted from' Table 3.7-1.

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s i SAFETY ANALYSIS FOR. ITEMI IN SECTION III:

Systems, Subsystems, Components Affected

> The primary system affected is the electrical' distribution system (USAR.-

Section 8.2) which encompasses the 4160 VAC,.480 VAC,-120 VAC and 125 VDC.

voltages. Each voltage is used in its own unique power distribution scheme,

'however, all function together-to supply'the vital plant electrical loads.-

- . This modification is confined to:the 4160 VAC distribution scheme (USAR Section 8.2.2.4).

The 4160 VAC vitial distribution scheme is comprised of nuclear. service buses

-S4A, S48, S4A2 and S4B2. . These buses have independent and redundant

. electrical schemes, whose normal power sources are two different switchyard ring buses. The power from the ring buses is supplied to S4A, S4A2 and.S4B, S4B2 through separate startup transformers.- Normally S4A, S4A2 is supplied-from startup transformer No. 1, and S4B, S4B2 is supplied from startup.

transformer No. 2. Either startup transformer is capable of supplying either set of vital buses. The transfer of S4A, S4A2, S4B or S452 from one startup.

l transformer to another can only be done manually. There is no automatic j transfer of power supplies between the buses. .Each bus is provided with its j own emergency. diesel generator, which automatically starts and picks up the j bus loads upon loss of bus voltage from the normal power supply.

! All the components in the facility modifications associated with this 4 modification are Quality Class 1 and Seismic Category I, including all-installed cabling and raceways.

2 The relays, transducers and cabling. associated with the modifications are environmentally and seismically qualified to IEEE 323/344.-

There are no adverse effects from this facility change on other' power sources l within the Electrical Distribution System.

4 Effects on Safety Functions This facility change provides enhanced control (alarm only instead of trip) .of j bus voltages and prevents bus trips from overvoltage conditions. Currently, i requirements are to trip the 4160 V Class 1 busses when they are in an l overvoltage condition. i The decision to alarm only for overvoltage conditions instead of trip is based on the need to reduce the probability of inadvertent actuation of ~ the Standby Diesel Generator from overvoltages that'are transient in nature. It will also give the operator an opportunity to bring the Class 1, 4160 ESF bus voltage to the acceptable limit by following plant operating procedures.

If the operator cannot reduce the overvoltage to the normal operating range of the 4160 V Class 1 bus, the operator must start the diesel generator, parallel it with the offsite power source, reduce the load on the 4160V ESF buses to j the allowable limit of diesel generator loading, and then manually trip the .

offsite power circuit breaker. The operator must transfer from offsite power j to diesel generator before 4626V ESF bus voltage (244KV Switchyard voltage) is

j. reached.

I i.

f 1 SAFETY ANALYSIS FOR ITEMS IN SECTION III: (Continued) l N .

l The high voltage alarm is set at 4500 volts. . The allowable operating range l

for 4160 V Class 1 buses is 3733 to 4626 volts, which cerresponds to a l switchyard voltage range of 215kV to 244kV. : This range of. switchyard voltage encompasses the normal operating range of 221 to 239kV.- 4500 volts-at the .

4160 V Class 1 bus corresponds to a switchyard voltage of 237.5KV.- The.

i operator will start taking action at 4500 V and completes transferring loads j to diesel generator before the bus voltage reaches 4626 V.

).

For undervoltage protection the total number of protection channels is 3 per-

f. bus and the number of relays per channel is 2. Both undervoltage relays ITE-27N and ITE-27 in each trip channel are connected to the same bus l potential transformer. Output contacts that open when the~ input' voltage dropa.

below the relay dropout setting are connected.in series to operate an auxiliary relay. The auxiliary relays are deenergized for:an undervoltage detection by either ITE-27N or ITE-27. The auxiliary trip relays and bus-i tripping logic is exactly the same as the existing scheme; that is_ the .

contacts from the auxiliary relays are arranged in a two-out-of-three logic.

l This logic string is used to operate a bus unloading relay with a 0.5 sec.

time delay upon energization. The 0.5 sec. time delay is used to prevent an accidental bus unloading when the logic circuit is initially energized. The 1 ITE-27 relay is used for first level of undervoltage (UV) protection, loss of offsite power (70% of trip setpoint or less). The ITE-27N relay is used for i the second level of UV protection, long time degraded bus ~ voltage (98% of trip.

setpoint).

3 ,

Analysis of Effects on Safety Functions A single failure of any of the following new devices (voltage transducers and l undervoltage relays) installed per-this modification will not prevent the-scheme from operating properly or cause it to operate when it is not ~

i required. Overvoltage conditions will be mitigated by the operator.'. _

l l The two-out-of-three logic used in the design, to detect an undervoltage, condition allows a single failure of the previously mentioned undervoltage j relays without any effect on the operation of the system.

j Summary j This modification is an operational enhancement to the Electrical Distribution

, System and is bounded by the Licensing Design Basis. Failure modes were-4 analyzed and it has been determined that there'are no significant failures to compromise plant safety. No adverse impact on nuclear safety has been identified and no Unreviewed Safety Question is involved.

Basis'for'No Significant Hazards Determination for Items in Section III:

l I

, The proposed change does not involve a significant hazards consideration because operation of Rancho Seco in accordance with this change would not i

i

d s 'y Basis for No Significant Hazards Determination fer Items in Section III:(Cont.)

.(1) involve a significant increase-in-the probability or consequences of an-accident previously evaluated. The elimination of the overvoltage-trip reduces the probability of standby-diesel: generator actuation due to transient overvoltage conditions while providing enhanced control (alarm instead of trip). Therefore, this modification does not increase the:

probability or consequences of an accident.

(2) create the possibility of a new or different kind of accident from any previously analyzed. This modification is an operational enhancement and is within the USAR design basis. Therefore, this modification does-not create the possibility of a new or different kind of. accident.

(3) involve a significant .reductilon 'in a margin of safety.' . This modification does not change the switchyard voltage allowable operating .

range and it reduces the probability of standby diesel generator actuation. Therefore, this modification does not involve a significant reduction in the margin of safety.

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- 2 1Enigting ppegifiggtiggi.

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' - :13.' 7.1. C. \One 6900'voltfreactor$ coolant pump' motor bus y, l' '

.is energized.'

LNew Sgggifiggliggi ,

! N/A' -t Disggstiggit i.-

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Specification 3.7.1.C has,been proposed to be deleted'since this-specification is alreadyJaddressedcin Specification?

? - . 3 .~ 1. ~ 1. 1. - This change is consistent with'~the overalllformate 7

.of the Technical!S,pecification and eliminates a redundant. z

requirement.

i.

2. - guigtigg' Specification:

7.7.2.E. The essential / nuclear service electrical-4 buses,;switchgear, load shedding, and

_ automatic diese1Lstart, systems shall be

~

operable:except as.provided in C above'and as -

. . re' quired f or surveill ance. testing'.1-i NNW EGEEiflEst190if LN/A ( i 3

Diggysgigni.

~

. This specification has been" proposed to:be deleted. EThes requirements for the buses,Jswitchgear, loadLshedding .

i and automatic diesel start systems are addressed i~n j Specifications 3.7.i.D, 3.7.1.E,.3.7.1.F,fand 3.7.'2.

l, This' change is consistentawi'th .the overall. format.~ofTthe

! specifications.

i..

3' @iigtiqq Suggitigatigq-

. 3.7.5 The voltage protection 1 system tripfsetting-

, shall'be as' stat'ed in'TableL3.741.

l 3.7.6 Voltage Protection System. Limiting; Conditions q

A. Startup and operationnare not" permitted. I unless the minimum requirements _and- i action ~ statements- of LTable 3.7-2 arez. met. 'l

~B. - In the event';the number of protective-s channels falls below:that listedLin' Table n

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the plant will'be brought to a hot' shutdown within'48 hours5.555556e-4 days 0.0133 hours 7.936508e-5 weeks 1.8264e-5 months .. 4 Ued EREEifiSali9Di j 3.7.3 The voltage protection'. system trip setting .-

shall-be as stated in Table 3.7-1.

1 3.7.4 Voltage Protection-System Limiting Conditions l 1

A.. Startup and' oberation are not permitted 1 unless-the minimum requirements and .l.

action statements of Table 3.7-2 are. met. !

'B. In the event the number of protective channels falls below the listed in Table 3.7-2,.the plani will be brought to a hot-shutdown within 48 hours5.555556e-4 days 0.0133 hours 7.936508e-5 weeks 1.8264e-5 months .

Digggggiggi This changes-the numbering of these specifications only, i.e., 3.7.5 to 3.7.3 and 3.7.6 to 3.7.4. Existing Specification 3.7.3 is being' incorporated.into 3.7.2 and existing specification 3.7.4 is being changed to 3.1.1.7.

4. Egisting $gegifiggtiggi 4.6.6 The pressurizer.shall be tested as follows:

A. The pressurizer water level shall be determined to be within its limits at i

12 hours1.388889e-4 days 0.00333 hours 1.984127e-5 weeks 4.566e-6 months .

least once.\per B. The power ':4upply for the pressurizer- l' heaters shall be demonstrated OPERADLE at least once per 18 months by using the Q Nuclear Service Bus to energize the heeters.

New $ppgifiggtigg;

c 4.5.2.2.C.The prensar- a hall be tested as follows: -6 . ,. .

g

1. The pressurtzer water level shall be determined to be within its limits at least once per 12 hours1.388889e-4 days 0.00333 hours 1.984127e-5 weeks 4.566e-6 months .

2. The power supply for the nuclear service backed pressurizer heaters shall be demonstrated OPERABLE at least once per refueling interval by using the Nuclear Service Bus to energize the heaters. l

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4 '. 5. Bases: .

The operability of'the' nuclear-service bus-backed pressuriner heaters is demanuttated by energizing the.

heaters once per refueling (intervail. :

s 9155995i901

~

This change moves'this specification from'the Emergency.

Power System Periodic. Testing section to the components tests section. It also adds clarification to identify the specific pressurizer heaters to Le. tested. -This change enhances the f or mat of the Technical

-Specifications. '

5. E:l ist.ing Sneg_i_fic_a,t_i_ons;_

3.7.1.B. Two 220.KV. lines.are in service.

3.7.1.I. Both startup transformers, No. 1 and 2, are in service.

^

deM EGggifigatiggi 3.7.1.A. At least two 220 KV lines are in service.

3.7.1.C. Both startup transformers,.No.-1 and No. 2, are in service.

. 9155995i901 This change renumbers these specifications to be consistent wiyh the other changes'to this section. It also clari f tes the requirement for two 220 KV linen to make it clear that more than two lines may be in service.

6. EgistiOD Spegificationi 3.7.1.J. The switchyard voltage is 215 KV or above.

09W E9.?E i fi.cgtiag; 3.7.1.B. The switchyard voltage is 219 KV or above. -

915C992i991 This change corrects an err or in th'e voltage at which the reactor can be brought critical. The undervoltage ,

trip setpoint listed in Table 3.7-1 results in an equivalent 216.5 KV setpoint (3771 138 volts on the

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1 E4160V Bus). 4 Based on;this, the' reactor:cannot be?

- , -brought'criticalfwithout_the switchyard. voltage above!

@ .216.5 KV.

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~7.. E:jisting ggggifigatiggi 3.7.1.A. All'nucleartservice buses, nuclear > service

' switchgear,_'and nuclear service load; shedding systems'are-operable.

4 _

-Ugy Egggifigatiggi 3.7.1.D. . Nuclear ' services 4160V buses f4A; 4A2,14B,'and 4B2'are operable.

~

m z 3.7.1;E. Nuclear - servi ces 480V buses 3A, .-3A2, _- 38, q3B2,:

2A1, 2B1, 2A3,;2B3, 2A4,.andi2B4'are.. operable.

Dissyggiggi_

This:is a: clarification to specifically; identify.which)

nuclear services ibuses are required to bey operable. 'The)

nuclear service _switchgear~and load shedding systems $are deleted from this specification. They'are'part of_the l' nuclear service buses'and without~them being operable,

, the bus is not' operable.

8. E Eisting Eget i ficatigni

! 4.31 Bases:

The system.is automatically started when the temperature in the NSEB_-Switchgear Room' exceeds 95:F;_

(. except upon loss of offsite power; fin /which case,:the system can be manually started by-the. operator.

Ngg @ggcification 4.31' Bases:

-The. system is automatically started when-the-temperature in the N3EB-Switchgear Room exceeds'95_F.

Disgusgigni

-The modified' electrical. distribution system will now automatically start the= system without operator action upon' loss of offsite power.

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'9. Egistigg Specifigatiggi 4.10 Bases:

During an SFAS and a loss of offsite power,"the "B" Train of essential HVAC equipment is.. sequenced to automatically start upon its actuation' signals approximately 6 minutes after the diesel generator -

breaker closes. The "A" Train cf HVAC equipment can-be-manually energized and started as before following ~!

automatic application of all essential loads.

.Ngw ggggifiggtiggi i

4.'10 Bases:

The ' filtering system is automatically started and.the normal system isolated when the radiation level or when the chlorine level increases.

Diggussiggi This section is deleted from the bases. The modified electrical distribution-system will now automatically start the system without operator action upon loss of offsite power.

Sgigty Anglysis iqt items in Sgctigg LYL The changes listed above are administrative changes.

They are made to improve the overall Technical Specification editorial consistency and format, clarify requirements and correct errors.

Bgsis [gt Uq giquiticent Hgzatd s Detetminationi The proposed change does not involve a significant hazards consideration because operation of Rancho Seco in accordance with this change would not:

1) involve a significant increase in the probabili'.y or consequences of an accident previously evaluated. This enhanced clarity should decrease the potential for unacceptable consequences or accidents. These are editorial and administrative changes which do not increase the probability..or consequences of an accident.

]

2) create the, possi bili ty of a ne,w or different kind of accident from any previously evaluated. A new or different kind of accident will not be created due to these editorial and administrative changes.

These administrative changes'do riot create the possibility of a new or different kind of accident.

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safety. . Theseleditorial-and administrative! changes ,

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ensure.that:the7Technical-iEpecificationsfaddress ,

proper. plant configuration:f611owing the' ~ #

. ' installation .of the 'new -dieselr generators and will-

- s ,- preserve the' margin of? safety. - Therefore,._

the administrative changes will'not; reduce the; '

margiri. of safety.:

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SgetLgn y -Llactggsg at Additign to Sutvgillancg Rgggingegets -

.and 6Lettatiens

1. - Ei.ist_i_nq Spacifi_c3t iga;.

- 3. 7. 4 : The,pressuri=er shall be' OPERABLE'with.at _.

least-126 kwLof pressuri=er heaters. With the-pres?curizer ' inoperable! due to ' inoperable.:

emer,gendy power supplies c to the pressurizer heater either restore the inoperable emergency .

power supply within 72: hours or be in at:least:

. HOT STANDBY within the_next'6 hours6.944444e-5 days 0.00167 hours 9.920635e-6 weeks 2.283e-6 months 'and in:HDT SHUTDOWN within the.'f o11owing :12. hours.

Bases-3.7:

.The requirement that 126 KW ofLpressurizer heaters'and their associated controls being-capable of being<

supplied with' electrical power-from an emergency bus provides. assurance'that these heaters can be' energized (during a loss lof--offsite power conditionfto maintain-natural circulation at HOT-SHUTDOWN.

New Sgecifiqatiggi 7 3.1.1.7 The pressurizer shall?be operable, except when the reactor is -in cold shutdown',.with-3Jgroups of heaters in two. separate banks that4 are capabl,e of being' powered by the diesel generator trains. . With the heaters in1one bank inoperable,.either restore the bank ~to=

operable status within 15 days or be:in.atL least hot = standby within the next 6 hours6.944444e-5 days 0.00167 hours 9.920635e-6 weeks 2.283e-6 months and in hot shutdown;within the.following 12 hours1.388889e-4 days 0.00333 hours 1.984127e-5 weeks 4.566e-6 months .

With the heaters in both banks' inoperable,.

either restore one bank-to. operable status, within 2 hours2.314815e-5 days 5.555556e-4 hours 3.306878e-6 weeks 7.61e-7 months or be in at-least hot standby within the'next 6 hours6.944444e-5 days 0.00167 hours 9.920635e-6 weeks 2.283e-6 months and in hot' shutdown within the following 12 hours1.388889e-4 days 0.00333 hours 1.984127e-5 weeks 4.566e-6 months .

Bases-3.1:

There are 3 groups of heaters in' bank'2, and.3 groups.of .

heaters in bank 3 that are capable of.being powered:by the diesel generator. Eachiset of-the 3'groupn of heaters has a nominal rating of.126 kw which;provides assurance that these heaters can be energized during a loss of offsite power' condition to maintain natural circulation aE HOT SHUTDQWN.

Diss;.u3 sign I' Specification 3.7.4 is renumbered to 3.1.1.7 (3.7.4 and Bases from 3.7 deleted, 3.1.1.7 and Bases for 3.1-added). This change makes this item consistent wi th the i>

gm x _ -

G , .

e overall format'ofJthe! Technical: Specifications. The:

4 . revisionfto this. specification '

1) More-clearly 1identifiesLthe requirementscfor. .

,; operability;of.-pressurizer heaters 1by;specifically '

identifying the' number of heaters-required.

' :2) ' Reduces.the time. permitted =in a' limiting' condition

~for operation'(LCO)Nto be consistent"with' Specification 3.7.2.B and.3.7.2.E.-

.This change more clearly reflects the ev'aluation made by jthe NRC in their.:May 1, 1980: letter.whichievaluatedithe

' Districts actions to satisfy NUREG 0578. J 2e E>1Lst Lug Sgec Litcatiggi - ,

[

~

3.7.2.A. ~One'220!KV line shall be-fully operationalfand i I

capable-of. carrying;nuc1' ear' service and Z auxiliary power except as_specified inLD below.

Ngw Saggifigatiggi 3.7.2.A. At least two 220'KV lines shallEbe-in service.

except should all-but one 220 KV;1ine'be removed from service the operability:of the remaining 220 KV line shall be demonstrated by performing surveillance-requirement 4.'6.1.A within.1. hour and at least once per 8 hours9.259259e-5 days 0.00222 hours 1.322751e-5 weeks 3.044e-6 months thereafter and surveillance requirementi . .

4.6.3.A.4 is performedfwi' thin 24 hours2.777778e-4 days 0.00667 hours 3.968254e-5 weeks 9.132e-6 months . If at least two 220 FO/ lines tare not . in service j

~

within 72 hours8.333333e-4 days 0.02 hours 1.190476e-4 weeks 2.7396e-5 months ,'th'e reactor shall be in hot shutdown within the'next 6Lhours,'and in cold shutdown within the following 30. hours.

Disguggiggi This change incorporates the recommendations of Gener'ic Letter 84-15. It-provides clear requirements-for_ number' of lines in service and defines the actions required if this requirement is-not met. The present' Technical

' Specifications allow indefinite. operation' with only one 220 KV line in service. .The new specification limits the time only one 220 KV line is in service.

3. Egisiigg 59 e51115a11901 3.7.2.C. Both diesel generators shall be operable .I

~

except that from and after the date that one ~

of the diesel generators is made or found to I be inoperable for any reason, reactor l

d l

, 4 , 4 .

. , , ~

w 7 s

_ _ ,, -}

. 1 operation.isipermiusible[for the. succeeding'15i f days provided ,~thats during - such ' 15. days -_the.

ope'r ableL diesel _: generator shall' be ' l oa'd - tested --

daily,andlbothistartup transformers.are avai1able. -IC the~ diesel.is'not

returned to4-

' : service atEthe,endiof 15' days, thelot'her sdiesel.wi1l'be started-and run.'withcat 1 east ~

minimum' load continuously fo'r an_additionale15

~

days. If atothe.end of;the second"15'daysithe_;

. diesel ^is not returned to. service,.theLreactor:

j~

~

shallLbe_ brought.to the cold shutdonn condition'within an additional 24' hours._ uAt . ~ '

- the ' number of f ailures;for the: inoperable -

-dieseligenerator' indicated--intTable 4.6-if perform the addit'ional Reliability JAction's c <

. prescribed in-Table ~4.6-2.

lUey Sgggifigahigdi -

i. 3.7.2.B. Both'dieseligenerator--trainsishall;be operablez l

except-:should one-dieselfgenerat'or trainL i becomeLinoperable'the operability of at least' two 220~KV lines circuits lshall be . ,

demonstrated by performing 1 surveillance

, requirement 4.6.1.A within l'hourfand at least once per 8 hours9.259259e-5 days 0.00222 hours 1.322751e-5 weeks 3.044e-6 months 'thereafter and. surveillance.

requirement 4;6.3.A.4?is: performed within 24

f. hours.;and.at least;once per'7 days thereafter..

If the diesel generator-train is not-restored to operable status within 15 de.ys, the reactor:

shall be in hot shutdown'within the next.6 hours6.944444e-5 days 0.00167 hours 9.920635e-6 weeks 2.283e-6 months and'in cold! shutdown within'the following 30 hours3.472222e-4 days 0.00833 hours 4.960317e-5 weeks 1.1415e-5 months .

Digguggiggi This change _ incorporates the recomm9ndations of:-IE Information Notice 84-69, Supplemert I, " Operation.of ~

Emergency Diesel Generators." It' eliminates 1the-15 dayL period where the operable diesel is.run continuously with minimum load. Running-the diesel with minimum load may reduce its operability. The surveillance

! requirements are revised to reduce theinumber of starts' L and more clearly define'the operability.of offsite sources to be consistent with the recommendations ~of i Generic Letter 84-15. ,

l

4. E:ligting Sueci ficationt .,

e N/A ~

.i Ugy Sgggifiga,tiggi 3.7.2.C. At least two 220 KV lines and both diesel l

_____.____-.._.1________._'___._

7 _

~

l L' ;; - .

"91 s s

fgbneratorJtrains-shal.1 be' operable'except'

~ shouldLall,butJone~220 KV linerand'one dieselv generator. train both-become' inoperable the: operability'of-the remaining 1 220 KV;line shallibe demonstrated ~by. performing s surveillance requirement.4.6.1.A5withinT1 hou'r~

'and1at--least once~per.8:hoursLthereafter',La6d the.diese11 generator (trainishalltbe Edemonstrated tolbe-operable by performing ~

surveil'1ance'equirementn4.'6.3.A.4 r within 8'

~ hours. If either > the 220 KV ::line or the diesel generator train is not-restoredito operable; status within~12 hours, theEreactor.shall'be ini hot shutdown within the'next 6thour's and i ni cold shutdown within the ~ f o11owing 130; hours.;

With the diese1 L generator' train restored : to' -

operable' status within"12 hours1.388889e-4 days 0.00333 hours 1.984127e-5 weeks 4.566e-6 months ,Efollow-3.7.2.A. WithJther220 KV line restored <to

~

service within-!12 hours1.388889e-4 days 0.00333 hours 1.984127e-5 weeks 4.566e-6 months ,. follow'3.7.2.B.

L -

EDisgyssiggi ,

i' The-new specification is-being added'to clearly 1 identify the requirements'if only.one 220 KV line and~ane diesel ~

. generator train are operable. .It also incorporates the

~

recommendation in Generic Letter:84-15..

i

5. E: listing Sgecificatigni 3.7.2.D. If the plant is separated f rom the ' system while carrying its own auxiliaries, or.if al1~

220 KV lines are, lost, continued' reactor-operation-is permissible provided that=ene emergency diesel generator.:is started and run continuously until a transmission line'is restored.

i Usw Enscificatis01 3.7.2.D. At least two 220 KV lines shall be in service except~should all 220'KV lines became-inoperable the operability offthe two diesel generator trains shall be demonstrated by performing surveillance requirement:4.6.3.A.4 within 8 hours9.259259e-5 days 0.00222 hours 1.322751e-5 weeks 3.044e-6 months . This surveillance requirement does not have.to be performed if the two diesel generator trains are already~in' service. If at least one~220 KV line is not:

! returned to servicem in 24 hours2.777778e-4 days 0.00667 hours 3.968254e-5 weeks 9.132e-6 months ' , ttue reactor-shall be in hot shutdown within the next-6' hours. -With one off-site circuit restored to service within 24 hours2.777778e-4 days 0.00667 hours 3.968254e-5 weeks 9.132e-6 months ,' follow 3.7.2.A.

f 91959221901-The existing specification allows continuous operation with the loss of all 220 KV- line's_ provided one diesel generator is running continuously., The change incorporates the recommendations of Generic Letter 84 and IE Information Notice 84-69 by requiring restoration of one 220 KV line.within,24 hours2.777778e-4 days 0.00667 hours 3.968254e-5 weeks 9.132e-6 months and eliminating the

. requirement to continuously run;a diesel generator.

6. Enistigg Spegifigationi

3. 7. 3 - If both diesel generators become inoperable, the unit shall be placed in.the cold shutdown condition.

I Ney EDeSiiiSatiggi

_1 3.7.2.E. Both diesel generator trains shall be operable l except should both trains be inoperable the !

operability of at least.two 220 KV lines shall

! be demonstrated by performing surveillance requirement 4.6.1.A within i hour and at least once per 8 hours9.259259e-5 days 0.00222 hours 1.322751e-5 weeks 3.044e-6 months thereafter. If one diesel generator. train is not restored to operable status within 2 hours2.314815e-5 days 5.555556e-4 hours 3.306878e-6 weeks 7.61e-7 months , the reactor shall be in hot shutdown within.the next 6 hours6.944444e-5 days 0.00167 hours 9.920635e-6 weeks 2.283e-6 months and in y cold shutdown within the following 30 hours3.472222e-4 days 0.00833 hours 4.960317e-5 weeks 1.1415e-5 months .

With one diesel generator train restored to operable status within 2 hours2.314815e-5 days 5.555556e-4 hours 3.306878e-6 weeks 7.61e-7 months , follow 3.7.2.B.

D1999251901 This change identifies the specific actions required if both diesel generator trains are inoperable. This change is consistent with the recommendations in Generic Letter 84-15.

7. E:li st i ran Spj2ci f i catign t 3.7.2.B. Both startup transformers shall be in service except that one will be sufficient if during.

the time one startup transformer is inoperable, the associated diesel generator is started and run continuously.

i Uey Spegifiggtiag- ,

3.7.2.F. Both startup ~ transformers shall be in service I except should one startup transformer become )

inoperable the operability of at least two 220 )

KV lines shall be derionstrated by perf orming ,i surveillancr 4.6.1.A within 1 hour1.157407e-5 days 2.777778e-4 hours 1.653439e-6 weeks 3.805e-7 months and at l

T'

y- .

e .r

. er - . ,

~

-~

n -

, =, .

.y n -

y ac~

~

> <1 east once per[8 hours thereafterEand'the-

~diese1' generator-trains shall'be.demonstratsd'-'

.-with 8_ hours.- -If_startup-transformer no'. 1Sisc. >

not restored.toioperable status within 242

hours,;.the reactorfshall be'in hot shutdown within the'next.6-hours <and;in1 cold shutdown

~

-j within.the-following:205 hours.. If1startup.

. - tr'ansf ormer no. 2 is"not L restored to -operable? -

j

status'within'48: hours, the reactor shall1 be' fin hot' shutdown'within the next 16' hours and in.

^ cold shutdown within theLfo11owing'-205fhours.

~

.Digggggiggi This 'hange c provides operabi1[ty requirements 1forithe L'

m startup~ transformers that eliminates ~the: requirement to ,

. continuously run a diesel generator.=.This-is' consistent

with the recommendations in Generic'.LetterJ84-15..

8. Exigting Sgecificatigni -

l N/A l

! NEW E99EifiS911901 l

L 3.7.2.G. If both startup' transformers.become-inoperable, within.one hour take action to

! place the reactor.in hot' shutdown within:the next 6 hours6.944444e-5 days 0.00167 hours 9.920635e-6 weeks 2.283e-6 months and-in cold: shutdown;within the following 205 hours0.00237 days 0.0569 hours 3.38955e-4 weeks 7.80025e-5 months .

Digggggiggi The existing specifications.do not address lossEof both startup transformers. This change defines.the actions

, required if both startup' transformers are inoperable.

I This change is consistent with'the recommendations of Generi c Letter 84-15. , The 205 hour0.00237 days 0.0569 hours 3.38955e-4 weeks 7.80025e-5 months ' time' is consistent with the Districts November 7, ~1985 revised request for-exemption to.some: requirements of 10.CFR'50, App.- R.

l' l 9. EHigting Egggifiggliggi l

3.7.2.G. Both sets'of' nuclear services; buses 4A,14A2,- _

i and 4B, 4B2 are operable except that one' set of nuclear service buses (4A, ~4A2 ' orj 4B, ,'4D2) may be removed from service for not more than l 24 hours2.777778e-4 days 0.00667 hours 3.968254e-5 weeks 9.132e-6 months provided that al'1 equipment on the other set of nuclear service buses is op erabl e.-

l'.,

, g , _

.m m.m . , . ,

a _~ -

_-u

.q _, .g . ,

c .

.e . <

~

7 c-

' TABLE.3.792J(Note 1)l _

I? LTotal- No. of . Minimum Functional. ' Number:of Relays /. Channels ; Channels Action l .

. Unit - _ ~ Channels: Channel Ig It i g DEER 6BLE C 'Under - ~ 3/ Bus' 2-: '"2/ Bus ~ 12' .A; Lvoltage

_-. _ =----------- __ _ _ - - - - -

GCIION i gIBIEdENIS.

l Action"A - With-the. number of OPERABLEichannels~one less than the - -

L total Number _of.. Channels,.operationJmay: proceed

provided.both the.following conditions ^are satisfied: -

ca. The-I'noperableLChannel is'placed in.the tripped *

. condition within one hour.

b. The Minimum Channels l OPERABLE ireqdirement is met;-

however, one additional channel-may'be bypassed for 1

up to 2 hours2.314815e-5 days 5.555556e-4 hours 3.306878e-6 weeks 7.61e-7 months .for,survei'llance testing.

Note 1: The table is not applicable when the. plant is'in

! cold shutdown.

Basesi The -voltage protection . system .is- designed to. isolate. the nuclear service buses from the.startup trarisformers ,

before the voltage drops below the allowable operating- _

' limit of the equipment. . The undervoltage: protection for l- the 4160 volt nuclear service buses is 3771't 38 volts.

l This corresponds to'a nominal switchyard voltage: range of'219 KV.

Discugsiggi l- The overvoltage protection was: deleted to prevent automatic' diesel generator start due'to transient-overvaltage conditi ons (i . e. overvoltage conditions occurring with the starting of the. reactor coolant'

'~ pumps.or the occurrence of hi'gh. grid voltage of short duration). This will prevent unnecessary:

challenges to the plant's' safety features system in' the 4160 V buses. Also added is a definite time h delay, undervoltage trip relay,in.eachl trip channel .

y parallel with the existing relays within each'4160 i V bus. l 1

I

^

l i

__1__E___._m_.__.___U_.._-__.. __._[_m...

Ney Spegifigatiggi 3.7.2.H. Nuclear service buses as listed in 3.7.1.D and

'3.7.1.E shall.be operable except should.one nuclear service bus become inoperable for greater than 24 hours2.777778e-4 days 0.00667 hours 3.968254e-5 weeks 9.132e-6 months ,Ethe reactor shall be in hot shutdown within the next 6 hours6.944444e-5 days 0.00167 hours 9.920635e-6 weeks 2.283e-6 months and in-cold shutdown-within the fo110 wing 130 hours0.0015 days 0.0361 hours 2.149471e-4 weeks 4.9465e-5 months .

If-more than one nuclear service bus as' listed in 3.7.1.D and 3.7.1.E should-become inoperable, within one hour take action to place the reactor in hot shutdown within the-next 6 hours6.944444e-5 days 0.00167 hours 9.920635e-6 weeks 2.283e-6 months 'and in cold shutdown-within the following 30 hours3.472222e-4 days 0.00833 hours 4.960317e-5 weeks 1.1415e-5 months .

Disgggsiggi This change-more clearly defines the actions required if one nuclear service bus becomes inoperable. 'It also defines the actions required if more than one-bus becomes inoperable. This change is consistent.with the format and intent of the other changes to'the specifications.

10. Existing Sgecifig,atigni 3.7.2.F. Nuclear service batteries are charged and in service except that one nuclear service battery may be removed from service for not more than 24 hours2.777778e-4 days 0.00667 hours 3.968254e-5 weeks 9.132e-6 months .

Ngg Spegifigatiggi 3.7.2.I. Nuclear service batteries as listed in 3.7.1.G shall be charged and in service except should one nuclear service battery become inoperable for greater than 24 hours2.777778e-4 days 0.00667 hours 3.968254e-5 weeks 9.132e-6 months , the reactor shall be in hot shutdown within the next 6 hours6.944444e-5 days 0.00167 hours 9.920635e-6 weeks 2.283e-6 months and in cold shutdown within the following 30 hours3.472222e-4 days 0.00833 hours 4.960317e-5 weeks 1.1415e-5 months . If more than one nuclear service battery as listed in 3.7.1.G should become inoperable, within one hour take action to place the reactor in hot shutdown within.the next 6 hours6.944444e-5 days 0.00167 hours 9.920635e-6 weeks 2.283e-6 months and in cold shutdown within the-following 30 hours3.472222e-4 days 0.00833 hours 4.960317e-5 weeks 1.1415e-5 months . 3

_Di sgyssiggi This change defines actions required if one or more i nuclear service batteries are out of service. This change is consistent with the recommendations of Generic l Letter 84-15. l

p -

-q

11. ' Existing Saeci ficationi N/A New Specifigatiggi 3.7.2.J. Nuclear service battery chargers as listed i n 3. 7.. l . H 'shal 1' be operable except should one nuclear service battery have no [

. battery charger ^for greater'than 24 hours2.777778e-4 days 0.00667 hours 3.968254e-5 weeks 9.132e-6 months , the reactor.shall be in hot = shutdown within-the next 6 hours6.944444e-5 days 0.00167 hours 9.920635e-6 weeks 2.283e-6 months and in col'd shutdown within the j following 30 hours3.472222e-4 days 0.00833 hours 4.960317e-5 weeks 1.1415e-5 months . If a standby charger is. J aligned in place of~its normal charger for i greater that.48 hours5.555556e-4 days 0.0133 hours 7.936508e-5 weeks 1.8264e-5 months , the reactor shall be in hot shutdown within the next 6 hours6.944444e-5 days 0.00167 hours 9.920635e-6 weeks 2.283e-6 months and in cold shutdown'within the following 30 hours3.472222e-4 days 0.00833 hours 4.960317e-5 weeks 1.1415e-5 months .

If more than one-nuclear service battery has no battery charger as listed in 3.7.1.H, within one hour take action to place the reactor in hot shutdown within the next 6 hours6.944444e-5 days 0.00167 hours 9.920635e-6 weeks 2.283e-6 months 'and in cold shutdown within the following 30. hours.

Disgysgiggi This revision adds operability requirements for nuclear service battery chargers. This revision incorporates the recommendations of Generic Letter 84-15.-

12. Egisting ggegificatiggi 3.7.2.H. If the switchyard voltage goes below 219KV, positive actions, within the District's procedures, will be implemented in an attempt to return the voltage to 219KV. If the switchyard voltage goes below 217KV or remains below 219KV for 8 hours9.259259e-5 days 0.00222 hours 1.322751e-5 weeks 3.044e-6 months , one electrical division will be operated on its diesel generator independent of off-site power. The other electrical division will be operated on off-site power with its associated diesel generator on standby status. The switchyard voltage must be returned to 219KV within the next 24 hours2.777778e-4 days 0.00667 hours 3.968254e-5 weeks 9.132e-6 months . Switchyard voltage above 219KV will allow unrestricted plant operation.

92w Seecificat1901 .

-d 3.7.2.L. Should the switchyard voltage drop below 219KV, positive actionh, within the District's procedures, will be implemented in an attempt to return the voltage to at least 219 KV. If the swi tchyard voltage goes below 219 KV, both

(.

7 diesel generator trains shall be' demonstrated-operable within 8 hours9.259259e-5 days 0.00222 hours 1.322751e-5 weeks 3.044e-6 months by performing surveillance requirement 4.6.3.A.4. Should the switchyard voltage not be restored.above-219 KV within1the'next 24 hours2.777778e-4 days 0.00667 hours 3.968254e-5 weeks 9.132e-6 months ,.the reactor shall be in hot shutdown within the next 6 hours6.944444e-5 days 0.00167 hours 9.920635e-6 weeks 2.283e-6 months and in cold shutdown within the following 30 hours3.472222e-4 days 0.00833 hours 4.960317e-5 weeks 1.1415e-5 months .

Diggussiggi The change eliminates the requirement to continuously run a diesel generator. The revised surveillance requirements are consistent with the recommendations of-Generic Letter 84-15 and IE Information Notice 84-69, Supplement'I.

13. gxistieg ggesifigatiggi N/A Ngw @gectitcatiget 3.27 Nucleat getvice Electt i cal Building Emetgency Heating Ventilatiga and 6it Cggditigging System BanticabtLi ty This specification applies to the operability of the Nuclear Service Electrical Building.

Emergency Heating Ventilation and Air Conditioning System.

Obiggtive To assure that this system will be able to perform its designed function.

SR eciitgattgg 3.27.1 Both Nuclear Service Electrical Building Emergency Heating Ventilation and Air Conditioning trains shall be operable at all times except as noted in 3.27.2.

3.27.2 With one Nuclear Service Electrical BLilding Emergency Heating Ventilation end Air Conditioning train inoperable, restore the train to operable status within 7 days or be in at least hot standby within 6 hours6.944444e-5 days 0.00167 hours 9.920635e-6 weeks 2.283e-6 months and in cold shutdown within following 30 hours3.472222e-4 days 0.00833 hours 4.960317e-5 weeks 1.1415e-5 months . With both Nuclear Service Electrical Building Emergency Heating Ventilation and Air

y, ,

. , is _ ,

s w

^

Conditioning.-trains; inoperable,irestore the

' trains to operablefstatus within'3.5 days or.-

^

.beEin at least' hothtandby within.theinent'6

_ ' hours and in. cold' shutdown within'the- "

following 30' hours.

. Bases.

LThe Nuclear. Service. Electrical,BuiIdingE(NSED)-Emergency .

(q Heating; Ventilation and' Air Conditioning system is

. required toiprovide cooling to protect required electrical. components in.thetjSEB.. .

'Dtscusstggt-l'- _

This'new'section;is'added to' provide a LCO for the _

surveillances required by.Specificationj4.31.- .It defines ~

the operability requirements for;the' system..torbe-consistent with Amendment 68 ' dated June, 3, '1985 where the NRC stated.that'the. system was requiredfto.be: operable l even1though a LCO specification was not providedC Since the. system is now backed by tNe diesel) generators during-loss of.offsite, power,~the' time:to-restore the system toe operable status'if it is found to.be, inoperable has been increased from 24 hours2.777778e-4 days 0.00667 hours 3.968254e-5 weeks 9.132e-6 months to 7Ldays'for one train-and 3.5-days.for-both. trains. This approach:is consistent with-

.the requirements?of specification 3.13.3 on.the Control Room /TSC Emergency. Filtering System.'

j 14. Egistigg ggecificatiggi i

! N/A L Neu-Enectitcatigut 4.6.1 Offsite Power Sources l

i A. Each of the 220 KV lines. required by I 3.7.1.A shall be ~ Determined 10PERAELE at l- least. weekly by verifying correct' breaker. l' alignments and indicated power availabil'ity, and l B. Each Start-up Trar,sf ormer required in I

3.7.1.C shall be demonstrated OPERABLE at least once per refueling interval by trpnsferring nuclear servico buses as listed in 3.7.1.D'fr'am the normal startup_

transformer supply circuit to the alternate startup tr'ansformrrr supply circuit.

I 1

l l;

_ u __ __ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ - _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ . _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _

y , , . -

E95ES The operability of the 220 KV lines, the. nuclear. service 4160V buses, and the nuclear service 480V buses are demonstrated by verifying correct. breaker alignments and indicated power availability. Surveillance-4.6.1.B can-only be performed during a refueling shutdown when both diesel generator trains are operable or the care is flooded to 37 feet to ensure the required decay heat removal capability is available.

Discussigni This new specification adds surveillance requirements to demonstrate the-operability of the 220 FG/ lines and startup' transformers required by Specifications 3.7.1.A and 3.7.1.C. This is a.new surveillance requirement since the existing specifications do not require a surveillance to demonstrate operability of the 220 KV t.

lines or startup transformers.

15. Enigting ggegifiggtiggi N/A Med E9eC_i f.i c_gti on_t 4.6.2 Nuclear service buses required by 3.7.1.D and 3.7.1.E shall be determined to be OPERABLE at least weekly by verifying correct breaker l alignment and indicated power availability.

Discuggiggi This adds surveillance requirements to demonstrate the operability of the nuclear service 4160 V and 480V buses required by Specifications 3.7.1.D and 3.7.1.E. This is consistent with the overall format of these technical specifications.

16. Egigiigg Specificatiggi 4.6.1 At intervals not to exceed one month, a test

! of the diesel generators will be performed to verify proper operation of these emergency power sources and associated equipment. This test will be performed to assure that:

A. Each diesel generator can be started from the control room.

B. Each diesel generator can be nynchronized with itu associated 4160 volt rauclear service bus.

y 4.6 5' Dihsel generatori f uel! oil! supply 'sha11H be:

tested as.Lfo11ows:1-

A ~. During the: monthly diesel generator testf the dieselffuel oil? transfer 1 pumps shall be. monitored;for' operation.:

B.~ _Once"a. month,fquantity of.the. diesel fuel *

-oil shall1be logged and_ checked:against-minimum.ispecifications.

=The tests specifiedLwillibe considered satisfactory i'f control; room _ indication--

and/or. visual examination ~ demonstrates 1 r

.that all components have operated-properly.

L. . USH.ggggifigatiggi t

..4.6.3 Each diesel generator shall be' demonstrated OPERABLE by verifying that both diesel generators in the' train-are OPERABLE'.(A and A2, ' B and 182) . . 'Each diesel-generator.shall be-demonstrated OPERABLE.

A. In accordance with?the frequency specified in. Table 4.6-1-by:

1

1. Verifying the fuel level.in the' day j t a n k ,-

f-l 2. Verifying the fuelflevel'in the fuell storage tank,_

l 3.* Verifying.the fuel _ transfer pump starts and transfers fuel'from the l storage system to the day-tank, l

4. Verifying the diesel starts from a manual. signal:and-accelerates to a. l nominal 900 rpm for.A and B and 450 ,

rpm f or A2 and :B2.' LThe-generator voltage and frequency shall be 4160 (1420) volts and 60:(ti.2) H: after l the start signal.- f(Note 1)~

5.* Verifying the generator is synchronized and operates'with.its load between 2550.and 2750 kw for 4

, and B and 3000 and 3300 kw for.A2 and 82 for at l' east 60 mi'nutes, (Note 1).

6.* Verifying the diesel generator is l aligned to provide emergency power to the nuclear services buses at the concluulon of the1 test. j .

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<* Surveillance'ishal11notfbe performed whenla'" diesel) ,

Jgenerator' train is,not:operablef in accor, dance:with TS.._

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.:,-. 3.7.2- _

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Note 1:' ' Alls planned: enginei starts < may be : preceded byL 4

Jan. engine prelubelperiod.,(WithLthe. exception; i of.once_per1184 days,,all.nplanned' starts'may' be preceded by. warmup procedures recommended ,

m by' the : manuf acturer: and = may lalso'. include '. slow '

Estarting and gradualC1'oading so that:

mechanical--- stress ,and wear l on f the; diesel' ,

engine-is' minimized. ...The; testing _ perf ormedi

~

once every 194fdays7shall include. fast: , .

starting . (less. .than or. - equal to 110l. seconds) . - ,

Iable at6:1 _ .

RIESE6 GENEB6 IQS IESI @CHEQU6E Number of Failures in

-Last:29 Yalid.Issts* Iest?Ecgguency-

-1 'At.leastcmonthly' _

2 ' At least: weekly **

Criteria for determining number'of: failures and number of valid test shall be in accordance with Regulatory-Position C.2.e ofLRegulatory Guide 1.108, Revision'1,' ~

August 1977, where the numberfofl tests'and failures'is determined on a per diesel generator basis. Forithof purposes of this test schedule,~only valid-tests l

conducted after the license amendment' issuance:date

shall be included in the. computation of the "last 20 l valid tests."

l

~

- This test frequency shall be' maintained until seven consecutive failure free demands have_been; performed and the number of f ailures :in the .last 20 , valid demands has been reduced to one or less. l l

___._..i.______._____-.__.______.m. ___.________._______1._[__._____________

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?i, BDDIII9N6L REbl6BJb1Il.BCIlgNS -

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No.'of failures -No. of failures in last 20 valid ' in last 100Lvalid.

' tests *'

.! test * . Action

.----------------------------------------- . _ = _ - -----.

+- .

3 < 6 .Withinf14 days prepare and: maintain a report

~

'for NRC'audittdescribing -

t ethe diesel _. generator

' rel l'abili ty n improvement program implemented at the site.- Minimum

requirements for: Lthe.

report are indicated (int p ' Note 1 to this: table.

5- 11 Perform a requalifi ation test program for the affected diesel generator.

l Requalification test.

L program r'equirements are indicated in Note 2 toe this table.

For the purpose of this schedule,Eonly valid tests conducted after the license issuance date shallLbe included 'in the

, computation of "last 20 valid tests" and "last.100 valid tests."

L NQIE 1 IQ IBBLE St6:2 BEEQBIIN@ EEQULEEUENI As a minimum the Reliability Improvement Program report ~for NRC audit shall include:

a) a summary of all tests (valid and invalid) ~ that occurred within the time period over which'-the last 20/100; valid tests were performed l

b) analysis of failuros and determination of root causes of i failures

! c) evaluation of each of the recommendations of NUREG/CR-l

, 0660, " Enhancement of Onsite Emergency' Diesel. Generator l Reliability in Operating Reactors," with respect to i

their application to the. plant s d) identification of all actions taken or to be taken to 1) correct the root causes of failures defined in b)'above.

t

w andE2): achieve a generalfimprovemant of'dieselfgenerator.-

reliability.

e) the-schedule'for implementationLof'each action from d) above-f) an assessment of the existing reliability-of~ electric power.'to engineered-safety-feature equipment Once'a licensee'has prepared and maintain an: initial report

~

detailing the diesel generator' reliability-improvement program at his site, as defined above,-the licensee need prepare only a supplemental report within 14 days after eachl failure during a valid demand forJso long as'the affected diesel generator. unit continues to violate the criteria :(3/20 t or 6/100) .for the reliability improvement program; remedial action. The supplemental report'need only update the-failure / demand history for the affected diesel. generator. unit l since the-last report for that. diesel generator. The supplemental report shall. also'present an analysis of the:

failure (s) with a root cause determination,,if possible, and shall delineate any further procedural, hardware or operational changes to~be incorporated into the site diesel-generator improvement program and the schedule for implementation of those changes.

-In addition to the above, submit a yearl'y data report'on the diesel generator reliability.

NQIE 2 IQ IGE 6g as6:2 Q1ESEL RENEBBIQB BEQU661ElG8110N Es0088N (1) Perform seven consecutive successful demands without'a failure within 30 days of diesel generator being restored to operable status from the last failure and l fourteen consecutive successful demands without a >

failure within 75 days of diesel generator being restored to operable status from the last failure.-

(2) If one failure occurs during.the first seven tests in the requalification test program, perform seven.

successful demands without an additional failure within 30 days of diesel generator being restored to operable j status after the first failure of the requalifications test program and fourteen consecutive successful demands without a failure within 75 days of being restored to operable status after the first failure of the requalification program. ,

(3) If one failure occurs during the second seven tests (tests 8 through 14) of (1) above, perform fourteen. .

consecutive successful demands without an' additional h failure within 75 days of the f ailure which occurred during the requalification testing. i

1 (4) Following the second failure during the requalification test program, declare the. diesel generator inoperable and follow the applicable requirements of Specification 3.7.2. The' diesel generators shall not be considered operable until the diesel generator has successfully requalified.

(5) During requalification testing the diesel generator

'should not be tested more frequently than at 24-hour intervals.

After a diesel generator has been successfully requalified, subsequent repeated requalification tests will not be required for that diesel generator under the following conditions:

(a) The number of failures in the last 20 valid demands is less than 5. .

(b) The number of failures in the last 100 valid demands is less than 11.

(c) In the event that following successful requalification of a diesel generator, the number of failures is still in excess of the remedial action criteria (a and/or b above) the following exception will be allowed until the diesel generator is no longer in violation of the remedial action criteria (a and/or b above).

Requalification testing will not be required provided that after each valid demand the number of failures in the last 20 and/or 100 valid demands has not incteased. Once the diesel generator is no longer in violation of the remedial action criteria above the provisions of those criteria alone will prevail.

Eases The limiting of the maximum load on the TDI diesel generators A2 and B2 to less than the qualified load of 3300 ku provides assurance that the crankshafts will stay within the proven limits for high-cycle fatigue cracku.

Diesel generators A2 and B2 will be loaded during surveillance testing between 3000 and 3300 KW which provides assurance that the qualified load of 3300 kW

, will not be exceeded.

D.i_;itys s i_ce t This change incorporatos recommendations from Generic Letter 84-15 and IE Information Notice 84-6c?, Supplement,

1. These include the reduction of fast starts and test

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.. frequency based on failures._ The-change more clearly

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identifies thel' requirements for demonstrating the-operability of the dieseligenerators.

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17. -Existing Snecificationi

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N/A New Spegifigatigni.

E4.6.3.B Fuel Oil Storage =. _

'1; By removing--accumulated water:

a) From the day; tank at least_ monthly after-each occasion when~the diesol isl operated for. greater than 1. hour, and b)- .From'the: storage ~ tank.at-least' monthly.

2. By sampling-new fuel oil in accordance-with ASTM.D4057-81 prior ~to addition to ~

the storage tanks _.and:

a) By verifying in accordance with'the tests specified in ASTM:D270-65 (1975) prior,to addition to the storage tanksthat.the sample has:-

i) An absolute specific' gravity'at

'60/60 F of greater than or equal.to O.83 but.less than or equal to O.o0 or an API gravity at 60 F.of greater than or equal to 26 degrees but loss than or equal to 38 degrees in accordance with ASTM D1290-77.

t .

. 11) A kinematic viscosity at 40 C l

of greater than or. equal to'1.9 centistaken,.but less than.or-equal to.4.1 centistokes, or.

3 Sayholt,' SUS'at 100 F greater than or equal.to 32.6, butiless than or equal to ' 40.1'.

iii) A flash point equal to or ,

greater than 125 F,-and iv) Water and sedimentiof less than or equal to.O.05 percent by volume per ASTM- 1796-68.

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b) By verifying within 31 days of obtaining the sample that the other properties specified in Table 1 of ASTM D975-81 are met when tested in accordance with ASTM D975-81 except that the-analysis for sulfur may be performed in accordance with ASTM' D1552-79 or ASTM D2622-82 (Note 2).

3. At least monthly by obtaining a sample of fuel oil from the storage tanks in accordance with ASTM D2276-73 (1978), and verifying that total particulate contamination is less than 10mg/ liter when checked in accordance with ASTM D2276-73 (1978), Method A.

Note 2: If one or more property is out of spec, verify within an additional 31 days that a sample of f uel oil from the fuel oil storage is within specification or replace the fuel oil within additional 15 days.

Digcyggiggi Most of these requirements are presently being performed by plant surveillance procedures even though the items were not in the specifications. The additional requirements are based on latest NRC guidance. It ensures that new fuel is not contaminated prior to dumping into the fuel oil storage tank. Also the removal of accumulated water will ensure the fuel oil does not become contaminated during the storage period.

18. Ol i gting Specificatigni 4.6.2 During each refueling interval, a test of the diesel generators and emergency start circuits l shall be performed to verify that these emergency power sources and associated equipment are operable by:

A. Simulating a loss of offuito power in conjunction with a safety features actuation signal, and

1) Verifying de-energi:ation of the

, nuclear services buses and operati on of the load shedding circuitry.

2) Verifytnq the diesel starts fecm ambient condition on the auto-start signal and energizes the nuclear services buseu, and by verifying proper operation of the automatic

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-load sequencing; circuitry,' including-jmanual-closing of(the A Train

.intertie' breakers from the' Control-

/ Room and manual energization of(the:

' A Train; essential:HVAC from the-

' Control? Room.- LThe B.Traintintertie' -

gbreakers'are automatically closed, and the:B Train Contro1~ Room-essenti'al HVAC System ' i si automatically . energized. - (The _ diesel generators will beooperated'for at'

_least 5 minutes in.this condition.

B. Simulating a loss o'f offsite-power.and

, ' verifying lthat.on interruption of.the .

emergency power sources?the loadsLare-shed from the-nuclear. services buses-in1 accordance.withydesign-requirements and

.that subsequent' loading 1of the: emergency: ,

power: sources-is through.the automatic-load sequencing. circuitry. The' diesel.

generator will;be operated for'at least 5; minutes in this condition. -

j C.

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Load testing .ttue diesel generators -f or SFAS. capacity-.

4.6.3 Each diesel generator.shall be given a.

4 thorough-inspection at least biannually

, following the manufacturer'ssrecommendations for this class of standby service.

Bases:

! They assure the 3B, 3D2 intertie breakers are' automatically closed and'the B Train Control Room -

essential HVAC System is - automatically energized. . The 4

3A-3A2 and 3B-3B2 interties are not required i f the j event is only a safety features actuation.

UUU S 9eS iligg_tiggi 4.6.3.C. At each refueling interval, by,

1. Diesel Generator Inspections

a. Subjecting the. diesel generators.A

, and B to an inspection in accordance L with procedures prepared in

' conjunction with the maintenance recommendations provided by its manufacturur for this class of i

standby service.

l b. Subj ecting the diesel generators A2 i

__ __.__m _. ____ _ _ _ _ . . _ _ . . - _ _ _ _ _ _ _ . _ m __ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _______.________m_______m._.--_. _._____

and'B2 to an inspection in accordance with procedures prepared in conjunction with the maintenance and surveillance program recommended by the TDI Owners Group in " Design Review and Quality Revalidation Report for Rancho Seco," Appendix II.

2. Simulating a loss of off-site power in conjunction with a safety features actuation signal (Note 4, Note 6), and l a) Verifying de-energi ation of the nuclear service buses and operation of the load shedding circuitry.

b) Verifying the diesel starts on the auto-start signal (Note 2),

energizes the nuclear service buses, verifying proper operation of the automatic load sequencing circuitry, and operates for greater than or equal to 5 minutes in this condition. After energizatior., the steady state voltage and frequency of the emergency buses shall be maintained at 4160 (+420) volts and 60 (11.2) Hz during this test.

3. Simulating a loss of off-site power and verifying that on interruption of the emergency power sources the 1.oads are shed from the nuclear services buses in accordance with design requirements and that subsequent loading of the emergency power sources is through the automatic load sequencing circuitry. The diesel generator will be operated for at least 5' minutes in this condition (Note 1). l

4. Verifying the diesel generator operates for aF least 24 hours2.777778e-4 days 0.00667 hours 3.968254e-5 weeks 9.132e-6 months (Note 1). During the first 2 hours2.314815e-5 days 5.555556e-4 hours 3.306878e-6 weeks 7.61e-7 months of this test, the diesel generator shall be loaded between 2650 and 2850 kw for A and B and 3000 and 3300 kw for A2 and B2 and for the remaining 22 hours2.546296e-4 days 0.00611 hours 3.637566e-5 weeks 8.371e-6 months of this test, the l

, diesel generator shall be loaded between 2550 and 2750 kw for A and D and 3000 and ,

3300 kw for A2 and D2.

Note 1 All planned engine starts may be preceded by an engine prelube period. With the exception of once per 184 days, all planned engine

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- starts)may be? preceded-by'warmupfprocedures; recommended by'the! manufacturer;andimay:also-

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' include 'slowistarting. and gradual 2-loading so

.that mechanical; stress 'and: wear' ~on'_the diesel '

engine is' minimized.' ?The testing. performed-

+

ence every-184 days shall' include: fast -

~

, starting' (less than 'or equal - to 10 seconds).

-Note 3) 1A111 planned engine starts)for.'the purpose of g .

,this surveillance testing,mayLbe;pr'eceded by.- '

!an; engine:prelube. period. '

TheJtosting'shallf r - include; fast-_ starting;(less than:or equalito '

10 seconds)~.

Note 4' : Prior'to the~~per'formance.of-this test-the diesel. generators shall,be. operated between 0 L2550 andl2750 kw for/A-and'B and 3000 and-3300 kw for=A2'and.B2'for at least'1 hour1.157407e-5 days 2.777778e-4 hours 1.653439e-6 weeks 3.805e-7 months and;until

' engine operating temperatures'have stabilized.-

[ --

Note 6 When"the test required;by specification 4.6.3.E.is performed, thenfthe~ test required.

by specification 4.6.3.C.2 is notlrequired-to 37 i be performed. - ,.;;

! Discussion: y N t

l This change expands and clearlyLidentifies1the l l requirements foriload testing the dieseligenerators.

p This change incorporates the recommendations in Generic-l Letter 84-15. The Cycle 7 testing requirements,for-the.

Control Room HVAC are also deleted. With:the.: addition . '

of the TDI diesel generators'the' Control' Room-HVAC'will be automatically loaded in accordance with the' District's commitment to, meet'NUREG 0737, item III.D.3.4, Control Room Habitability.

j 19. Egisting Spegifisailggi N/A ,

4 New gggcL{iqat[gni ,

4.6.3.D. At leastonce.per10yeart,--bystpetingall i

four diesel generators simultaneously (Note 3) l_

i and verifying that they accelerate to a -

']

L nominal 900 rpm-for A and-B and 450Lrpm.for A2- -

~

! and B2 within 10 seconds after'the start' a-j uignal. The generator voltage'a'nd_ frequency chall be 4160 (1420) volts and 60 (11.2)'Hz within 10.0 seconds after-the' start sigpal.

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4 X / ..I4.h.3.E. Atileasti o'nce ' per > 1O years . simul ating ' a I1'oss p '. . of of f-site ' power (in 'conjuriction !with a -

.f /' simulated SFAS. (note 5),: and -

4{'

1 $ 1. Verifying de-energizationcof'the-nuclear

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j jP ' . service. buses:and-load' shedding from:the,

~ nuclear? service buses.-

, ;2. Verifying'the=dieselfstarts on the: auto-n

-start-signal, e'ergizes nthe' nuclear

-service.busesiwith' permanently connected loads,-loadsithrough the: load sequencer, (and. operates for greater than.or equalLto.

s 5 minutes;while...its generator is loaded with:the-emergency loads..;After i energization, the. steady state voltage and.frequencyjof=the emergency buses 4 shall be' maintained at- 4160'(1420), volts -

and 60 (11.2) .Hz 'during this-test.

-3. . Verifying for the A anci (B diesels generators'that a11Jautomatic' diesel

( generator trips, except engine overspeed, ,

ground. fault and generator. differential, and verifying for the' diesel generators A2 and B2-that all automatic diesel generator trips,-except engine overspeed, low lube ail pressure and generator-differential, are automatically bypassed-with an SFAS.

Note 3 All planned engine; starts for the purpose of this surveillance l testing may be preceded by an engine prelube period. The^ testing shall include fast starting (less . than or equal to 10 seconds).

Note 5 All planned engine starts for the purpose.of this surveillance testing may be preceded by an engine pr'elube period. The testing shall include fast starting (less. than or equal to r 10 seconds) and fast loading through the I sequencer.

E25991 At least once per 10 years a diesel generator test will

, be performed simulating a loss of offsite power in t conjunction with a simulated SFAS and loading of actual-3 loads to the ma>!in.um extent possible without damaging

), plant systems (i . e. use of recirculation flow or manual-J { valving out of a system to protect plant components).

p 1 .

j ; Diggggsiget .

These specifications are added.to demonstrate that all four diesel generator systems will start simultaneously and that they will accept actual emergency loads. This N

incorporates the recommendations of Generic Letter 84-15.

20. Egist109 89 eSificat190 , " , ,)

N/A Nsu enectiteetten i 4.32 IDI DIEEEL @ENE8 dig 8 GQUIBQ( BQQB ESSENILG(

VENIl(GIlQN @y@IEd 69e11cebility

< Applies to the TDI Diesel Generator Building Control Room Ventilation System components.

,, Qbigqti_yg To verify that this system and components will be able to perform their design functions.

@gecification /

i 's

- 4.32.1 The Diesc'. ' Generator Condr ol Room Essential Ventilatidr' System sha'il 'be:

1

. Demonstrated operable at least once per l 31 days by initiating flow through the essential air handling unit by verifying that,the air handling unit maintains a flou rate of greater than the low flow alarm setpoint.

629?5 <

The purpose of the TDI Diesel Generator Control Room Essential Ventilation System is_to limit high temperatures which the local controlt room would be subjected to upon 10as of normal cocling. The high temperatures will affect the envirohmental qualification of safety related electronic equipment housed within the Diesel Generator Co,ntrol ' hoom. This Control Room is designed with an air handling unit which is activated upon a high temperature signal. l Since this system is not normally operated, a periodic tent is required to ensure its operability when needed.

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Monthly testing.of.this system'wil'1~sh'ow;thatithe. system is f availablefor :its safety action. During this--test,

'the system-will1be observed'for unusualloriexcessive noise,or. vibration when'the-fan _ motors.are running. The

-aircflow alarm of.~10;OOO cfm was selected to ensure that

~

.3 the temperatures in the.Diese1~ Generator Control Room < j' wilicstey(below the' maximum _of 122 degrees-F maximum; c

J The dystlym is' automatically started by a ~ thermostat: when

~ l-the temperature in,the Diesel ~GeneratorfControl Room Lequals or exceeds 110-degrees F.

' Discygsi gg - _ .. . ~

' ~

This: specification'is added to demonstrate'the

~_ operability of the_TDI Diese1LGenerator'ControliRoom.

Essential Ventilation ~ System. ,

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.gafgly Ey31ggliggLfgc-Jigms'10'gget190'Vi-These are changes to the< operability land surveillance'-

-requirements. rIn most cases .the new requirements are

more restrictive. 'In:some cases the. requirements-are L < l ess ! restri cti ve. - These are cases where the. existing surveillance may actually~ degrade the operability of.the system.: The.requirementsgfor cold =. fast starts.of diesel.

fgenerators , are ,an . example .of cthis.. The-changes incorporate-recommendationsLfrom-. Generic-Letter 84-15

" Proposed Staff Actions to Improvefand Maintain. Diesel.

.- Generator Reliability",?IE.Information. Notice 84-69,

'" - - 'Supplementyi, " Operation.of Emergency Diesel-Generators,"

and: Regulatory _ Guide 1.137,:" Fuel-Oil Systems for Standby Diesel. Generators."

gasis fotj No Significant ljazatd s Detetminatigni The proposed changes do not involveia1significant hazards ~ consideration because operation of-Rancho.Seco in 'accordance ' with this : change would not: -

1) involve a significant l increaseLin the probabilityi or' consequences of an: accident-previouslyj_ . -

esaluated. The~cha'nges-are_to'the operability and?

surveillance. requirements. They. add requirements ifor new systems, improve requirements-for existing systems, and incorporate NRC recommendations.- The

~

changes demonstrate the operability of required systems to ensure safe operation-of:the plant.

?Therefore, these changes do not1increaseithe probability or consequences of an~ accident.

2) create'the~ possibility of-a-new or different kind of accident 1from any previously; analyzed. The

-changes demonstrate thefoperability and- 3 surveillance of critical plant systems. The changes to the operability and survei'11ance requirements do not' create the possibility ofla new-

,or different kind of accident.

3) involve _ a significant reducti on -~in a margin .of-safety.. The changes improve operability and-surveillance requirement 3.and therefore preserve

the margin of safety. They will not reduce the margin of safety.-

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t S-l t-ENCIDSURE 2 e

I 4

v t e Letter Sequence Request
TAC:63030, (Approved, Closed)
Initiation Request, Request, Request, Request, Request, Request, Request, Request, Request, Request Acceptance... Supplement, Supplement, Supplement, Supplement Administration Meeting Questions Answers Results Approval, Approval, Approval, Approval, Approval, Approval Other: A11745, Evaluation of DSR-48 Emergency Diesel Generator Crankshafts at Rancho Seco Nuclear Generating Station, ML20126J866, ML20126J973, ML20135E867, ML20149D631, ML20149F003, ML20196E677, ML20196E697, ML20206H162, ML20212B420, ML20214K863, ML20215G661, ML20234C529, ML20234C558, ML20234D524, ML20234D615, ML20234D649, ML20235M565, ML20235Q511, ML20236L543, ML20236N639, ML20236N713, ML20236S088, ML20237B265, ML20237B279
MONTHYEAR1987-12-29 [Table View]

ML20206H128

Text

Dear Mr. Miraglia:

3.7. Bases

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