ML20205N295

Special Rept:On 990314,fire Detection Sys Was Removed from Svc to Support Mod to Replace SRW Heat Exchangers in Unit 2 SRW Room During Unit 2 Refueling Outage.Contingency Measure 15.3.5.A.1 Will Continue Until Fire Detection Sys Restored

ML20205N295
Person / Time
Site:	Calvert Cliffs
Issue date:	04/13/1999
From:	Katz P BALTIMORE GAS & ELECTRIC CO.
To:	NRC OFFICE OF INFORMATION RESOURCES MANAGEMENT (IRM)
References
NUDOCS 9904160222
Download: ML20205N295 (10)

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PEnn E. Krrz Baltimore Gas and Eleuric Company Plant General Manager Calvert Cliffs Nuclear Power Plant

. . Calvert Cliffs Nuclear Powe: Plant 1650 Cabert Cliffs Parkway Lusby, Maryland 20657 410 495 4101 April 13,1999 U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, DC 20555 ATTENTION: Document Control Desk

SUBJECT:

Calvert Cliffs Nuclear Power Plant Unit No. 2; Docket No. 50-318 Fire Protection System Soecial Reports

REFERENCE:

(a) Updated Final Safety Analysis Report, Chapter 15, Technical Requirements Manual The attached special reports are submitted pursuant to 10 CFR 50.4 and in accordance with Reference (a). Technical Normal Condition, Contingency Measures require the licensee to submit a special report to the Nuclear Regulatory Commission when the specified restoration time is exceeded.

Each special report describes a condition where fire protection equipment remained inoperable for a period in excess of the specified restoration time. In each case, the equipment was removed from service (rendered inoperable) to suppod maintenance or modification activities associated with the planned Unit 2 refueling outage. As per Reference (a), Contingency Measures were established in each case.

This ensures that the conditions described do not represent any compromise to safety and there is no safety consequence to exceeding these restoration times. '

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Should you have questions regarding this matter, we will be pleased to discuss them with you.

Very truly yours, 2-

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9904160222 990413 -

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PEK/ALS/bjd Attachments: (1)

Fire Detection Instrumentation Special Report Contingency Measure 15.3.5.A.2 (2) Fire Detection Instrumentation Special Report Contingency Measure 15.3.5.B.3 (3) Spray and Sprinkler System Special Report Contingency Measure 15.7.6.A.2 (4) Fire Barrier Penetration Special Report Contingency Measure 15.7.10.A.2

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Document Control Desk April 13,1999 Page 2 cc: R. S. Fleishman, Esquire 11. J. Miller, NRC J. E. Silberg, Esquire Resident inspector NRC S. S. Bajwa, NRC R.1. McLean, DNR A. W. Dromerick, NRC J.11. Walter, PSC l

ATTACIIMENT (1) a FIRE DETECTION INSTRUMENTATION SPECIAL REPORT CONTINGENCY MEASURE 15.3.5.A.2 Haltimore Gas and Electric Company Calvert Cliffs Nuclear Power Plant April 13,1999

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ATTACHMENT (1)

FIRE DETECTION INSTRUMENTATION SPECIAL REPORT CONTINGENCY MEASURE 15.3.5.A.2 Submittal of this Special Report is required by Updated Final Safety Analysis Report, Chapter 15, Technical Requirements Manual, Technical Normal Condition 15.3.5, Contingency Measure D.I.

Specifically, fire detection instrumentation for the Unit 2 Service Water (SRW) Room was inoperable for greater than the 14-day restoration time stated in Contingency Measure 15.3.5.A.2.

ACTION TAKEN Contingency Measure 15.3.5.A.1 for the fire detection instrumentation was implemented because the Unit 2 SRW Room fire detection instrumentation was removed from service. The fire detection instrumentation was removed from service to support modification of the SRW heat exchangers during the Unit 2 refueling outage. Contingency Measure 15.3.5.A.1 requires, in part, that within one hour, an hourly fire watch patrol be established in the affected fire zone.

CAUSE OF INOPERABILITY On March 14,1999, the Fire Detection System was removed from service to support a modification to replace the SRW heat exchangers in the Unit 2 SRW Room during the Unit 2 refueling outage. The modification included welding activities. The smoke from welding activitics can actuate the Fire Detection System causing a hanging fire Farm in the Control Room. To prevent this alarm, a temporary alteration was installed that removed the Fire Detection System from service.

PLANS AND SCHEDULES FOR RESTORING THE SYSTEM TO OPERABLE STATUS The Fire Detection System will be restored when the welding work is completed. This is expected to be prior to the Unit 2 start-up. Contingency Measure 15.3.5.A.1 will continue until the Fire Detection System is restored to operable status. i 1

ATTACHMENT (2) l l

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FIRE DETECTION INSTRUMENTATION SPECIAL REPORT CONTINGENCY MEASURE 15.3.5.B.3 l

l Haltimore Gas and Electric Company Calvert Cliffs Nuclear Power Plant April 13,1999

ATTACllMENT (2)

FIRE DETECTION INSTRUMENTATION SPECIAL REPORT CONTINGENCY MEASURE 15.3.5.B.3 Submittal of this Special Report is required by Updated Final Safety Analysis Report, Chapter 15, Technical Requirements Manual, Technical Normal Condition 15.3.5, Contingency Measure D.l.

Specifically, the fire detection instrumentation for the Unit 2 Containment Reactor Coolant Pump Motor Bays 21B and 228 was inoperable for greater than the 14 hy restoratiori time stated in Contingency Measure 15.3.5.B.3.

1 ACTION TAKEN During the Unit 2 refueling outage, the Unit 2 Containment Reactor Coolant Pump Motor Bays 21B and 22B Dre detection instruments were removed from service because they obstructed removal of the reactor coolant pumps. As a result, Contingency Measure 15.3.5.B.I.2 for nre detection instrumentation was implemented. Contingency Measure 15.3.5.B.I.2 requires, in part, that containment air temperature be monitored once per hour at the containment dome and containment reactor cavity. j CAUSE OF INOPERABILITY Because of obstructions, on March 14,1999 during the Unit 2 refueling outage, the Unit 2 Containment Reactor Coolant Pump Motor Bays 21B and 22B heat detection instruments were removed from service to support the removal of Nos. 21B and 22B Reactor Coolant Pump Motors.

PLANS AND SCHEDULES FOR RESTORING TIIE SYSTEM TO OPERABLE STATUS The Unit 2 Containment Reactor Coolant Pump Motor Bays 21B and 22B Gre detection instruments will  !

remain inoperable until the motors are reinstalled. Contingency Measure 15.3.5.B.I.2 will remain in ]

place until the Dre detection instruments are restored to operable status prior to the Unit 2 start-up.

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ATTACHMENT (3)

SPRAY AND SPRINKLER SYSTEM SPECIAL REPORT CONTINGENCY MEASURE 15.7.6.A.2 Balth . ore Gas ord Electric Company Calvert Cliffs Nuclear Power Plant April 13,1999

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ATTACilMENT (3)

SPRAY AND SPRINKLER SYSTEM SPECIAL REPORT CONTINGENCY MEASURE 15.7.6.A.2 Submittal of this Special Report is required by Updated Final Safety Analysis Report. Chapter 15, Technical Requirements Manual, Technical Normal Condition 15.7.6, Contingency Measure C.I.

Specifically, the Unit 2 Service Water (SRW) Room Sprinkler System was inoperable for greater than the 14 day restoration time stated in Contingency Measure 15.7.6.A.2.

ACTION TAKEN During the Unit 2 refueling outage, Contingency Measure 15.7.6.A.1 for the sprinkler system was implemented because the Unit 2 SRW Room Sprinkler System was removed fiom service. Contirip.,ey Measure 15.7.6.A.1 requires, in part, that a continuous fire watch with back-up fire suppression equipment be established within one hour.

CAUSE OF INOPERABILITY On March 13,1999 during the Unit 2 refueling outage, the Unit 2 SRW Room Sprinkler System was removed from service to support the modification to the SRW heat exchangers.

PLANS AND SCIIEDULES FOR RESTORING THE SYSTEM TO OPERABLE STATUS The Unit 2 SRW Room Sprinkler System will remain inoperable until the SRW heat exchanger modification work in the room affecting the sprinkler system is completed. Centingency Measure 1.3.7.6.A.1 will remain in place until the sprinkler systerr. is restored to operable status prior to the Unit 2 start-up.

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AITACHMENT (4)

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FIRE BARRIER PENE1 RATION SPECIAL REPORT CONTINGENCY MEASURE 15.7.10.A.2 ,

Baltimore Gas and Electric Company Calvert Cliffs Nuclear Power Plant April 13,1999 t

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ATTACHMENT (4)

FIRE BARRIER PENETRATION SPECIAL REPORT .

CONTINGENCY MEASURE 15.7.10.A.2

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Submittal of this Special Report i; required by Updated Final Safety Analysis Report, Chapter 15, j Technical Requirements Manual, Technical Normal Condition 15.7.10, Contingency Measure B.I. {

Specifically, fire barr:er penetrations (Door Nos. 203 and 204) from the Turbine Building to the Unit 2 j Service Water (SRW) Room were inoperable for greater than the seven-day restoration time stated in i Contingency Measure 15.7.10.A.2.

ACTION TAKEN Contingency Measure 15.7.10.A.1 for the fire barrier penetrations was implemented because Unit 2 SRW Room Door Nos. 203 and 204 were placed in the open position to support movement of personnel and material into and out of the SRW Room during the Unit 2 refueling outage. Contingency Measure 15.7.10.A.1 reluires, in part, that, within one hour, a continuous Fire Watch be established on at I least one side of the inoperable fire barrier. The contingency measures for Door Nos. 203 and 204 remained in effect in excess of seven days, thereby requiring submittal of this special report. '

CAUSE OF INOPERABILITY On March 13,1999, Unit 2 SRW Poom Door Nos. 203 and 204 were placed in the open position to allow movement of material and persa i into and out of the Unit 2 SRW Room. The doors were placed in the open position to support L ,

tentation of the Unit 2 SRW heat exchanger modification during the Unit 2 rerueling outage.

PLANS AND SCHEDULES FOR RESTORING THE SYSTEM TO OPERABLE STATUS The Unit 2 SRW Room Doois will remain open u'itil no longer required to support the SRW heat exchanger modification. The doors will be restored to operable status prior to the Unit 2 start-up.

Contingency Measure 15.7.10.A.1 will remain in effect until Unit 2 SRW Room Door Nos. 203 and 204 are restored to operable status.

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