ML20138E821
| ML20138E821 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Calvert Cliffs  |
| Issue date: | 04/23/1997 |
| From: | Katz P BALTIMORE GAS & ELECTRIC CO. |
| To: | Miller H NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION I) |
| References | |
| NUDOCS 9705050165 | |
| Download: ML20138E821 (2) | |
Text
_._ _ _. _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ - - - - - - _ _ _ -.. _...
._.r j
f
~
PETER E. KATZ Baltimore Gas and Electric Company Plant General Manager Calvert Cliffs Nuclear Power Plant Calven Cliffs Nuclear Power Plant 1650 Calven Cliffs Parkway Lusby, Maryland 20657 l
410 495 4101 J
1 April 23,1997 d
U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Region 1 475 Allendale Road 3
King of Prussia, PA 19406 3
l
]
ATTENTION:
Mr. H. J. Miller, Regional Administrator i
j
SUBJECT:
Calvert Cliffs Nuclear Power Plant i
Unit No. 2; Docket No. 50 318 j
Penetration Fire Barriers - Special Report i
Technical Soecification 3.7.12. Action Statement a i
i i
Per the requirements of Technical Specification 3.7.12, Action Statement a, we hereby submit the j
attached Special Report concerning inoperable fire barrier penetrations. Specifically, the personnel air lock to the Unit 2 Containment has been inoperable for greater than seven days.
3 i
Should you have questions regarding this matter, we will be pleased to discuss them with you.
j Very truly yours, i
f
?
1 PEK/CDS/bjd l
Attachment I
i ec:
Document Control Desk, NRC Director, Project Directorate I-1, NRC R. S. Fleishman, Esquire Resident Inspector, NRC J. E. Silberg, Esquire R,1. McLean, DNR A. W. Dromerick, NRC J. H. Walter, PSC j
['
[j 9705050165 970423
/
PDR ADOCK 05000318 S
PDR u o u v v 1.
l.l!l.if1.1l.il.I!
lI.l ll i
I ATTACIIMENT (1)
UNIT 2 I
PENETRATION FIRE BARRIERS SPECIAL REPORT This Special Report is being submitted as required by Technical Specification 3.7.12, Action Statement a, due to a fire barrier penetration being inoperable in excess of seven days.
ACTION TAKEN On March 16,1997, the personnel air lock (PAL) to the Unit 2 Containment was placed in the open i
position to support movement of personnel and material into and out of Containment during the Unit 2 l
Refueling Outage. At this time, Technical Specification 3.7.12, Action Statement a was entered, since the PAL is part of the fire barrier that separates the Unit 2 Containment from the Auxiliary Building. In accordance with Technical Specification 3.7.12, Action Statement a, within one hour the operability of the fire detectors on at least one side of the inoperable fire barrier was verified, and an hourly fire watch-patrol was established.
The PAL has remained open in excess of seven days, thereby requiring a Special Report to be submitted.
The fire detection system on one side of the fire barrier has remained operable and the hourly fire watch patrol has remained in effect for this entire period.
CAUSE OF INOPERABILITY The interlocks on the PAL door are disconnected during certain periods of refueling to permit both doors of the PAL to remain open. There are a number of benefits associated with maintaining the PAL in the open position. The advantages of having the PAL remain in the open position during a refueling outage are contained in correspondence to the Nuclear Regulatory Commission, dated November 5,1993, i
" License Amendment Request; Personnel Air Lock Open During Core Alterations." (This amendment was approved by letter dated August 31,1994.) Among the benefits listed in the correspondence was i
less fatigue to the PAL due to over use and the benefit of a quick evacuation of Containment in the event of an emergency.
The PAL consists of two doors, normally connected via interlocks to form an air lock. He interlocks have been defeated, and both doors are open. However, either door, or both doors can be closed independently at any time. Material such as hoses and cables are not routed through the PAL.
Therefore, should a fire be discovered on either side of the PAL, the doors can be quickly closed.
The potential for fire spread between Containment and the Auxiliary Building via the open PAL doors is considered small. The PAL is a steel tube, approximately 10 feet long. There are no combustibles within the PAL to permit fire propagation through the open PAL. There is detection in the Auxiliary Building which will identify a fire in an incipient stage.
PLANS AND SCHEDULES FOR RESTORING THE SYSTEhi.JD OPERABLE STATUS The PAL will be closed and the interlocks re-enabled prior to the Unit 2 startup at the completion of the refueling outage. Until such time as the PAL doors are closed, and the penetration fire barrier is restored to an operable status, the compensatory actions, as required by the Technical Specification Action Statement will remain in effect.
I 1
..