ML20207L045

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Cost-Benefit Risk Analyses:Radwaste Sys for Light Water Reactors
ML20207L045
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Site: Calvert Cliffs  Constellation icon.png
Issue date: 01/08/1999
From: Margulies T
ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY
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Cost-Benefit Risk Analyses -

Radioactive Waste Systems for Light Water Reactors i

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T. Margulies, Ph.D.

U.S. Environmental Protection Agency Washington, D.C. 20460 i

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ABSTRACT i

i The reliability and radiological consequences of nuclear power and the benefits (averted doses from accidents) by several key alternatives to existing designs are l

addressed. Probabilistic risk calculations with annual levelized cost estimates were made to evaluate cost-beneficial justifications for potential safety 1

improvements to engineering design and mitigation such as supplemental filtering and scrubbing to the present containments, and for instrumentation and -

l monitoring to minimize a bypass scenario. Alternative allocations of recources to i

emergency preparedness measures such as stockpiling potassium iodide for the l

population would not have the additional protection benefits of substantially reducing non-inhalation pathway contributions of severe accident radioactive releases to offsite health effects, as well as, protecting land from contamination.

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BACKGROUND INFORMATION

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i in 1957 Brookhaven National Laboratory investigated the probabilistic reliability, consequences, and uncertainty ranges for severe light water reactor accidents (of approximately 200 Mwe power level), USNRC;1982. Estimates

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comprised essentially three scenarios: in-vessel failure or ex-vessel failure with the containment integrity maintained; and thirdly, a containment failure case with release of 100 % of the noble gases and 50% of the radioactive particulates to the i

atmosphere. The subjective probabilities assigned to these scenarios range between one cha..ce in 100,000 to one in a billion. Calculated consequences i

ranged from none to 3400 fatalities,43,000 injuries, and 2.3 billion dollars in property damage.

4 An assessment of the impacts of commercial nuclear electricity generation on the public in the United States was further investigated and reported in the Reactor Safety Study (USNRC; 1975) where a hybrid of analytical fault-tree and event-tree methods were employed to evaluate the reliability of a representative pressurized water reactor Surry, and a boiling water reactor Peach Bottom. Yo assess the consequences categories of weather conditions and averaged site population data were used. For 100 nuclear plants in operation the Reactor Safety Study estimated the likelihood of approximately 3400 fatalities (or greater) to be less than one chance in 10,000,000 per year. Wash-1400 used point 3

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estimates for the accident faultslevents and calculated a complementary cumulative distribution function (CCDF) by sampling the annual hourly weather I

time series to estimate consequences.

Later studies by the U.S. Nuclear regulatory Commission (USNRC) reported in NUREG-1150 (USNRC; 1990) addressed specific reactor designs and containments for five sites while incorporating uncerta!nties in source terms to develop a more complete technical evaluation of the risks of nuclear power.

NUREG-1150 performed uncertainty estimates on the faultslevents, accident progression uncertainty; however consequences were generated (as in Wash-1400) conditional on model parameters. The MACCS (MELCOR Accident Consequence Code System) (Chanin ; 1990) code incorporates upgrades to the offsite crosswind transport, weather sampling, and dose factors. Separate-studies have conducted parameter uncertainty analyses using MACCS. The reactor plants assessed in NUREG-1150 include Surry (with Subatmospheric Containment) and Peach Bottom (with BWR Mark i Containment), the plants named Sequoyah (with ice Condenser Containment), Grand Gulf (with BWR Mark lli Containment), and Zion (with Large Dry Containment). The Mark ll containment has been examined, in addition to the benefits of filtering to reduce offsite doses.

(IEEE; 1995) Containment failure probabilities were assessed by formal expert elicitation to develop a subjective probability distribution for massive leak or rupture. The systematic formal process emphasizes expert selection, problem characterization, probabilistic quantification such as with a bi-section method, 4

. ~.. _.. _. - _ _ _ _ _. _. _ - - - _ _ _ -. -. _.. _. _ _ _ _. -

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and documentation for traceability of results. For example, the Surry reactor contain nt (large 'd

) has a probability distribution of static failure pressures

/ gifig b ran proximately 65 and 170 psig. Uncertainties in the severe accident risk assessment reside, for example, in estimating system success states, human performance throughout the plant, common-cause faults, and W] cumulative effects of aging on systems, structures, and compone 2

to, severe accident progression events and transport phenomenology.

Several Severe Accident Categories and Descriptions (USNRC; 1982)

Accident Type Description SST-1 Severe core damage that develops from failure or loss of multiple engineered safety features including emergency core cooling and containment.

O Containment bypass through interfacing systems, such i

as a failure of check valves which isolate the low pressure injection system from the reactor coolant system at a high pressure can result in a core melt and a discharge of radioactivity that will bypass containment are included in this group.

9 Station Blackout where AC power transmission from offsite sources fails, by transmission line transients, 5

weather, or by external events such as an earthquake.

Furthermore, failure to recover or maintain either onsite power (e.g., diesels and batterys) or offsite AC power will interupt operations of core cooling systems.

e Transients without reactor protection systems to control the fission chain reaction and associated heating procest.as.

S Loss of Coolant Accidents (large and small pipe i

breaks) and adequate pumpinglwater supply failures.

O Vessel Failure / Rupture from material (radiation damage and ductility) degradation and pressurised thermal shock conditions from coolant injection.

SST-2 Severe core damage due to loss of core cooling and where the containment fails beyond design basis leakage to the atmosphere. Containment mitigating systems (e.g., sprays and suppression pools to wash out radioactive particulates, or fan coolers) operate to reduce the radioactive release. Alternatively, radioactivity and coolant is released through the steam generator tubes that have ruptured to the secondary side and then to the atmosphere through the condenser and steam-jet air ejector, or through relief valves.

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(Overlaps SST-3 ).

SST-3 Severe core damage occurs as in the previous categories due to failure of core cooling systems after, a transient or loss of coolant accident initiating event; however, all engineered i

release mitigation systems perform as designed. Fission product release is by containment leakage beyond design (assumed to be 1 % / day) or by basemat melt-through.

Alternatively, radioactivity and coolant is released through the steam generator tubes that have ruptured to the secondary side and then to the atmosphere through the condenser and steam-jet air ejector, or through relief valves.

i RADIOLOGICAL DOSE ASSESSMENT I

Radiological consequences for pathways of radioactivity to humans were assessed including impacts from cloud immersion, inhalation, and external exposure to radioactivity deposited on the ground. For each scenario, the transport and health impacts from releases of fractions of the reactor core inventory of radio-nuclides were simulated. The atmospheric dispersion assumes Gaussian-plumes with both wet and dry deposition components, as 7

well as radioactive decay. The CRAC (Calculations of Reactor Accident l

Consequences) and CRAC2 (CRAC Version 2) computer codes were developed during the conduct of the Reactor Safety Siudy (USNRC; 1975). The CRAC, y

CRAC2, and MACCS (MELCOR Accident Consequence Code System) (Chanin et.

al.; 1990) radiological assessment of doses and health effects incorporates weather time series sampling and multiple pathway analyses for atmospheric releases of radioactivity. The inventory of radionuclides assumes equilibrium in a large light water reactor unit. A comparison of scurce terms from several studies and the Chernobyl accident are shown in Table 1. In terms of the types and amounts of radioactivity released to the environment these estimates appear casentially compareable given the uncertainties for extremely severe accidents eventhough some prefer to focus on the differences in designs, scenarios, and containments.

Calculations using the CRAC2 code and site population data at representative low, medium, and high density sites are shown in Table 2 using SST-1. The SST-1 source terms contributes a substantially larger proportion of the expected off-site person-rem and correspondingly latent cancer fatalities than SST-2 and SST-3.

These accident source terms formed the basis for the safety goal studies at the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission. Also, they were extensively used to assess siting criteria keeping design differences fixed. The expected person rem (on an annual basis) are given in column 2 of that table. For comparison, MACCS results 8

with newer source terms generated as part of the NUREG-1150 effort are displayed in Table 3. Both expectation (mean) and 95-th percentile values obtained from the uncertainty propagation in NUREG-1150 are given in columns 2 and 3, respectively of Table 3. For a particular site, uncertainties in person-rem estimates are dominated by dry deposition velocity, ground shine shielding -

factors, and inhalation protection factors for nonevacuees (Helton; 1995,.McKay; 1995). Population distributions and correspondingly accident consequences varies significantly among sites from a societal perspective (Margulies; 1964).

For illustration, at the Calvert Cliffs site, the MACCS code was used to develop person-rem per year using a one chance in 100,000 per year accident release rate. This rate is characteristic of earlier government analyses during the safety goal evaluation. Here, source terms for severe accidents h, n NUREG-1150 were used, for example, for the Loss of Offsite Power (Station Blackout) and for Event V (valve failures that cause releases to bypass containment) scenarios. An equilibrium inventory of radio-nuclides for a 1030 MW(e) reactor pcwer was used and scaled to the Calvert Cliffs plant 845 MW (e). The analysis estimates whole body and thyroid doses and uses population data for the existing Calvert Cliffs a

site for a 50 mile radiai distance with average data at greater radial distances; it assumes 19 years of remaining plant operation.

BENEFIT-RISK COST ANALYSES This section provides several types of benefit-risk examples using 1) the 9

historical SST releases and deterministic annuity factors at representative sites

2) later nuclear plant analyses and the deterministic approach; and finally 3) a i

recent set of probability and accident consequence estimates with a perceptual stochastic approach.

l Benefits in terms of potential averted expected person-rem generated from the radiological dose codes were used to estimate dollar benefits using an approach the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission applies to evaluate whether to augment existing designs for light water reactors to reduce population dose (Title 10, Code of Federal Regulations, Part 50: Appendix 1, FR Vol. 40, No. 87,19439, May 1975).

The Nuclear Regulatory Commission's value for an ALARA (As Low As Reasonably Achievable) cost-benefit analysis initially set radiation costs as $

1000 per person-rem (USNRC: 1983). Recent proposals have been made to increase this by a factor of two to five. Therefore, a $ 2000 per person-rem averted was assumed in these calculations. Furthermore, this envelopes the indirect costs estimates. It is noted that $ 2000 per person-rem averted is equivalent to a $4 Million per cancer fatality valuation (with 510" latent cancer fatalities per person-rem [or 500 fatalities per million person-rem) conversion).

Furthermore, levelized cost (i.e., capital recovery or annuity ) factors (ICRP; 1983) were used to account for depreciation of assets and interest on money loaned for any equipment modifications as shown by calculations given in Table

4. This annual levelized costing approach has been given in the Regulatory Guide i

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i 1.110 for nuclear power plants (" Cost-Benefit Analysis for RadWaste Systems For i

Light Water Cooled Nuclear Power Reactors, USNRC"). Calculations could alternatively be performed for risk where the maximum consequence captures the public perception which is inversely related to te expected value (Niehaus et.

)

al.;1984). Surveys also support the perspective that woman voters and the general public rank the perceived risk from nuclear power as reverse that of the experts (Slovic et. al.,1980; Slovic,1987). For a continuous process with an expectation that depends on the random variable time of the accident requires stochastic distribution w discount factor assumptions. The Poisson model for e

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i rare, memoryless events was assumed. For a Poisson probability this expectation is given by special functions as shown above Table 5. For severe i

j accidents considered only n = 1, P ( 1 ) would be of interest.

lllustrative calculations with the Reactor Safety Study CRAC2 code are shown in Table 2 which indicate the results for three representative sites using annual 4

1 levelized cost factors (deterministic), calculated based on remaining plant service life. For clarification consider the following example. The Palisades site obtains an estimated $ 600,00010.0802 x 20 years equaling $ 150,000,000 assuming 5

% interest and 20 years remaining life. A proportionate amount of funds could potentially be justified for fixes which proportionally reduce the expected offsite perso;wom and latent cancer consequences. Available design mitigation I

alternatives include, for example, supplemental filtered vented containment i

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systems and instrumentation and monitoring for the Event V bypass scenario.

Cost estimates of approximately $ 20 Million and $ 2.3 Million, respectively for these engineering features (USNRC; 1983,1994) are exceeded by the valuation of offsite health effects as captured by the benefits of averting the expected person-rem. This argument is amplified if several units could share the same venting system.

Uncertainties in core melt damage and containment response probabilities, V

due to human error, aging; as well as, uncertainties in atmospherie dispersion at large distances from the site, in estimating radiation dose, and in the population distribution motivate the use of results from an uncertainty analysis. Table 3 presents use of these annuity factors applied to the five power plants assessed in NUREG-1150 with uncertainty. Both estimates of mean values and 95-th percentile values for the total person-rem (valued at $2000/ person-rem averted) are summarized. Additionally, calculations were made for the Calvert Cliffs site using the MACCS code with the NUREG-1150 source terms for Surry. This was accomplished by scaling the inventory of radionuclides for a unit at that site. As shown in Chart 1, $ 62.5 mh. ion would potentially be used to reduce the severe accident releases from the bypass scenario and Station Blackout ( at 5% interest rate for the remaining plant lifetime ) for Unit 2. Previous analyses sometimes substituted frequency for gaobability and valtfod latent cancer fatalities as

$ 100,000. Representative site specific calculations for pressurized water 12

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j reactors are shown in Table 6 using the continuous discounting approach with i

probability estimates provided by industry to USNRC as part of the independent f

plant examination program using probabilistic risk methods (USNRC; 1997). A i

value of 0.1 was used for large early release from containment if estimates were j

not readily available as was typically used for safety goal evaluation. These calculations are based on curve fits to MAACS individual dose versus distance i

calculations for the indicated scenarios and assumes uniform wind direction frequency. In both TMI and Chernobyl accidents the wind direction changed 1

throughout the events substantially. These calculations are primarily for illustrating the stochastic cost-benefit approach and are for giving robust insights on application of this economic risk analysis approach (USNRC; S.

Cohen; 1992). Radiological analyses of containment venting for mitigating severe accidents at boiling water reactors have been investigated for the Filtra Swedish system for Mark it's indicating the relatively substantial reduction in consequences as shown by individual dose versus distance calculations (IEEE; 1992).

An alternative to implementing engineering enhancements in design is to provic e better emergency preparedness. This would not affect land conta"nination but could reduce health risks. For example, potassium iodide (Kl) blocking of the thyroid has been considered for people at distances greater than those who would be evacuated (UhAEC; 1972, USNRC; 1997). Potassium lodide 13

I was assumed to be readily available and 96.6 % (nominal value) effective in reducing the thyroid dose from inhalation of radioactive iodines only if administered before plume passage. Thyroid nodule incidence is assumed as k

447 per million thyroid-rom. The cost of providing K1 to the populatien (say within a 500 mile radius of a site) with a relatively short shelf life can be substantial ($ 1.3710 for Calvert Cliffs); furthermore, its benefit ($ 1.1310' at $

7 50,000 per nodule averted)is restricted mostly to the thyroid organ. If weather direction frequency were neglected in the calculation then the consequences (

and benefit ) would be approximately 16 times higher. The extent of distribution l

would benefit evacuating plume and sheltering populations.

DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION The risks from accidental releases of radioactivity is characterized probabilistically. The juxtaposition of very large consequences and small probabilities for severe accidents can be difficult to perceive in absolute

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magnitude by both the expert and the public audiences; advisory groups usually i

recommend relative risk comparisons for decision-making since full validation of j

risk models and absolute risk magnitude results are usually precluded for such rare events. Furthermore, predictive risk calculations may be good enough for their intended purpose and may help make a better informed decision rather than an uninformed totally subjective judgement.

The analysis shows that there exist sites where expenditures for safety 14

imprcycmints cuch to filttred vanted centainm2nts end in:trum ntatien far monitoring M mitigate Event V appears cost-beneficial to protect public health i

and safety, as well as land offsite. This is based on annual levelized cost approaches such as recommended by ICRP, in Regulatory Guide 1.110, or the stochastic approach. Even though U.S. light water reactor systems are different than the Chernobyl unit (a negative rather than a positive void reactivity system) with a containment; technically, and perceptually, the source terms ch as the types and amounts of radioactivity released to the environ ont during severe accidents are comparably large. The protective meas re f KI distribution is equal to the cost of many design fixes and could have p lbAserious a erse reactions upon use, if medical attention is not readily available. It is recommended that industry and government continue the dialogue to resolve f

ways and means to develop a containment policy for nuclear power plants and to Improve nuclear reactor power safety by engineered design enhancements such as those proposed to filter and scrub radioactive particulates which include the lodides. The probabilistic risk economic approach for continuous discounting which differs somewhat from previous investigators may also be useful in other areas of hazard and economic risk assessment.

I REFERENCES 4

1. U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission,"The Development of Severe Reactor Accident Source Terms: 1957 - 1981,"NUREG- 0773, November 1982.
2. U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission," Calculation of Reactor Accident Consequences, Appendix VI to Reactor Safety Study, " NUREG 75/014, October 1975.

3.

U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission," Severe Accident Risks: An

]

Assessment for Five U.S. Nuclear Plants," NUREG-1150, December 1990.

15

a 4.

Chrnin,D., Srung, J., Ritchim L. & Jcw, H.-N., MELCOR accident i.

consequence code system (MACCS): user's guide, NUREG-4691, i

1990.

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5.

IEEE Trans. Nuclear Sci., v. 37, no. 2.,1992.

i 6.

Dept. of Energy, " Health and Environmental Consequences of the l

Chernobyl Nuclear Plant Accident," DOE /ER-0332, June 1987.

1 l

7.

J.C. Helton, J.D. Johnson, A.W. Shriver, and J.L. Sprung," Uncertainty l

and Sensitivity Analysis of early exposure results with the MACCS i

reactor accident consequence model," Reliability Enaineerina and l

System Safety,48, 91,1995.

8.

U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, McKay, " Evaluating Prediction l

Uncertainty," Report NUREG/CR4311,1995.

4 9.

Marglies,T. And R. Blond," Variability of Site Reactor Risk,",in Risk Analysis:An International Journal, Vol. 4, No. 2, p. 89,1984.

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10. U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, "A Handbook for Value-impact Assessment," NUREGICR-3568,1983.
11. ICRP," Cost-Benefit Analysis in the Optimization of Radiation Protection," Annals of the ICRP, No. 37, Vol.10, No. 2/3,1983, Pergamon Press.
12. Niehaus, F, G. de Leon, and M. Cullingford, "The Trade-Off Between Expected Value and the Potential for Large Accidents,"

in Low Probabilitv/Hiah Consecuence Risk Analysis, edited by Ray Waller and Vincent Covello, Plenum,1984.

13. Slovic, P.,8 Fischhoff, and S: Lichtenstein, in Societal Risk Assessment. Plenum, New York,1980; Slovic, P., " Perception of Risk," Science, p. 236,17 April 1987.
14. U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, " Final Environmental Statement related to the operation of Watts Bar Nuclear Plant, Units and 2, NUREG-0498, Supplement 1, NUREG- 0498, November 1994.
15. U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission,"An Analysis of Potassium j

lodide Prophylaxis For the General Public in the F. vent of a Nuclear Accident," S. Cohen and Associates (NRC-04-90-170), April 1992.

16. Atomic Energy Coms.iission, " Radioactive lodine in the Problem of Radiation Safety," U.S. AEC Translation Series AEC-tr-7536,1972.
17. " Potassium iodide," Federal Registrar,55(189): 39668, September 28, i
1990, 16

18.

U.S. Nucl:ar Regul: tory Cammirian" Twenty-Fourth Water Rtsctar j

Safety information Meeting," NUREG/CP-0157.

Table 1:

Severe Reactor Accident Radioactive Releases (Percentages Of Core Inventory)

Table I: Radioactive Releases ( % Core Inventory )

PWRI V (Surry SST-1 BWR Nureg.

Cherno-l RSS 1150) byl Xe, Kr 901100 80 - 100 100 100-I, Br

.70 / 40 25-70 20 45 Cs,Rb 67 40 / 40 20 -70 13 Te 64 40 /70 12-45 15 Ba, Sr 7

5/5 3 - 20 4 - 5.6 Ru 5

40150

.5-3 3.9 La

.9

.31.5

.15-1 SST - 1: Siting Source Term 1 (NUREG-0773); RSS: Reactor Safety Study (Wash-1400);

V (Event V Containment bypass); N-1150: NUREG-1150 Mean - 95 percentile Range ;

Chernobyl: Accident Release Estimates (DOE;1987)

Table 2: Expected Averted Person-Rem (CRAC2) Valuations and Annual Levelized Dollar Estimates ~

i Representa-annual 3%

4%

5%

6%

tive Site person-rem Populations x $ 2000lrem 20 Year 20 Year 20 Year 20 Year Palo Verde 1.6 10' 4.76 10' 4.35 10 3.99 10' 3.67 10 7

7 Palisades

6. 10' 1.79 10' 1.63 10' 1.5 10' 1.38 10' indian
2. 10' 5.95 10' 5.43 10' 4.98 10' 4.59 10' Point Representa-3%

4%

5%

6%

tive Site annual Populations person-rem 40 Year 40 Year 40 Year 40 Year

$2000lrom*

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. Palo Verde 1.6 10 1.48 10' 1.27 10 1.1 10' 9.63 10 Palisades

6. 10' 5.55 10' 4.75 10' 4.12 10' 3.61 10' Indian Point
2. 10' 1.85 10' 1.58 10' 1.37 10' 1.2 10' SST 1: 1 /100,000 per year; SST 2: 2/100,000 per year; SST 3: 7/100,000 per year 17 1

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Table 3: Estimates of Person-Rem (MACCS Expected Values [ top]; 95th l

percentiles [ bottom]) and Averted Costs For NUREG 1150 Plants t

l Expected 95th perc.

l Site annual Annual 3%

4%

5%

6%

person-person-l rem rem Peach 200 710 8 10' 7.46 10' 6.94 10' 6.47 10' Bottom 2.85 10' 2.65 10' 2.46 10' 2.3 10' Sequoyah 80 250 6.05 10 5.47 10' 4.96 10 4.53 10 7

7 7

1.69 10' 1.71 10' 1.55 10' 1.41 10' Grand 6

15 5.94 10' 5.29 10' 4.74 10' 4.28 10' Gulf 1.48 10' 1.32 10' 1.19 10 1.07,10 l

7 7

Zion 110 400 4.42 10 4.1 10' 3.81 10' 3.56 10 7

7 1.61 10' 1.49 10' 1.39 10' 1.29 10' i

7 Surry 30 150 1.07 10 1.06 10' 9.34 10' 8.74 10' 5.37 10' 5.00 10' 4.67 10' 4.37 10' Table 4: Annual Levelized Cost Factors Versus interest Rate and Time 3%

4%

5%

6%

5 Years 0.218355 0.224627 0.230975 0.237396 10 Years 0.117231 0.123291 0.129505 0.135868 15 Years 0.0837666 0.0899411 0.0963423 0.102963 20 Years 0.0672157 0.0735818 0.0802426 0.0871846 25 Years 0.0574279 0.064012 0.0709525 0.0782267 30 Years 0.0510193 0.0578301 0.0650514 0.0726489 l

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Chart 1: Potential Averted Costs For Severe Accident

( $ Milhons based on annualleveltzed costs)

I 70 -

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$ 50 F$$h y

e )!

mm

=

411111 4

30 g33333 j

411111 20l 411111

'o mm j

0 interest Rate B3%

$4%

95%

$] 6 %

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Table 5: Probabilistic Risk (Continuous Discounting)

Special Function Cost Factors Versus Interest Rate and Time Continuous Discounting C, P(n) Exp[ - rt} dl A ( r[1 + n,0,( A + r)t ] - r[1 + n,0,( A + r)t,1)

=

f A"

3,

( A + r)'*" n !

r[a,z,,z, ]

r[a,z,] - r[a,z,]

=

Time 3%

4%

5%

6%

5 Years 0.000113172 0.000109516 0.000105993 0.000102598 l

10 Years 0.000410377 0.000384675 0.000360793 0.000338594 r

15 Years 0.000838133 0.000761811 0.000693369 0.000631935 20 Years 0.00135429 0.0011949 0.00105684 0.000937035 25 Years 0.00192591 0.00165126 0.00142125 0.0122809 l

30 Years 0.00252751 0.0021082 0.00176839 0.00149187 1

Poisson Model; n = 1; rate = 1/100,000 per year; c, = 1 1

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d 20

4 1

.=

Table 6: Potential Expenditures ( $ Millions) For Safety improvernents To Address Extremely Severe Nuclear Accidents':

Plant 3%

5%

LERF2 Beaver Valley I 36.69 101.94 1.06 (-5)

Beaver Valley 11 16.98 50.76

)

Braidwood I 8.15 22.64 2.62 (-6)

Braidwood 11 8.15 22.64 Byron 1 6.70 18.62 2.73 (-6) i Byron 11 6.70 18.61 Calloway 113.22 314.05 5.S5(-5)

Catawba I 8.11 22.55 2.6 (-6)

Commanche P.eak i 1.42 3.96 7 (-7)

Commanchc Peak ll 1.42 3.96 Diablo Canyon i 16.49 45.81 8.8 (-5) 0.1 Diablo Canyon 11 16.99 47.16 D.C. Cook i 15.43 42.92 6.29 (-5)0.1 D.C. Cook 11 16.50 45.81 Haddem Neck 24.90 69.39 1.8 (-4) 0.1 Indian Point ll 21.11 58.62 1.9 (-6)

Indian Point 111 9.02 25.06 7.5 (-7)

J.M. Farley 1 0.62 1.74 4.5 (-7)

J.M. Farley ll 0.62 1.74 Kewaunee 3.67 10.20 3.61 (-6)

McGuire 1 7.03 19.55 1.9 (-6)

McGuire ll 7.43 20.66

1. Westinghouse Owner's Group Probabilities Summarized From Independent Plant Examinations Workshop in Austin, Texas
2. LERF = Large Early Release Frequency

s Table 6 (Cont.) : Potential Expenditures ( $ Millions) For Safety Plant 3%

5%

LERF North Anna i 11.53 32.02 6.8 (-5) 0.1 North Anna 11 11.54 32.01 Point Beach 1 22.49 62.24 2.43 (-5)

Point Beach ll 22.50 62.49 Prairie Island i 6.65 18.46 5 (-5) 0.1 Prairie Island 11 6.63 18.46 Robinson 14.96 41.58 1.11 (-5)

Salem I 9.6 26.67 2.36 (4) 2 Salem ll 9.6 26.67 Seabrook 0.54 1.50 1.35 (-7)

SequoyahI 7.55 20.95 2.7 (4)

Sequoyah ll 7.54 20.96 S. Harris 14.26 39.62 7 (-5) 0.1 So. Texas 1 2.12 5.89 1(4)

So. Texas 11 2.01 5.59 Summer 7.15 19.87 4.1(-6)

Surry i 12.50 34.76 7.4 (-5) 0.1 j

Surry 11 9.59 34.68 Turkey Point lll 2.33 6.48 9 (-7)

Turkey Point IV 2.33 6.48 Vogtle 1 3.42 9.51 1.61 (4)

Vogtle il 3.60 10.02 1.61 (-7)

Watts Bar i 33.61 93.33 1.5 (-5)

Watts Bar ll 33.61 93.33 Wolf Creek 7.81 21.69 4.19(-5)0.1 Zion 1 0.285 0.79 7.7 (-8)

Zion ll 0.285 0.79

3 Timothy Scott MargulieS 1213 River Bay Road, Annapolis, MD 21401 202-564-9774 i

Education i

I The Johns Hopkins University, Baltimore, Maryland Dept.'Of Mechanics and Materials Sciences 1

Masters of Engineering Science,1976

)

The Johns Hopkins University, Baltimore, Maryland j

Advisorsi L.S.G Kovasnay, S. Corrsin, W.H. Schwarz, Jared Cohon, and Thomas Mitchell i

Dissertation

Title:

" Physical Acoustics: An Investigation of Chemical Kinetic and Thermodynamic Properties of Fluids" i

1979 - 1981 School of Hygiene and Public Health Environmental. Health Sciences Studies 1965 - 1969 St Andrew's School, Middletown, Delaware Work Experience 7/93 - Present Environmental / Nuclear Engineer U.S. Environinental Protection Agency Washington, D.C. 20460 S Risk and Exposure Assessment G Risk and Transport Modelling 9 Risk Communication

(

O Cost Benefit risk assessment 5/92 - 5/93 Study Director National Research Council Washington, D.C. 20418 Write proposals, prepare membership, edit reports, arrange workshops, meetings, and symposiums P-m r4-r-

_ - ~ _ _

1

- Speech performerce M:tries Symposium

- Otologic Blast Injuries Workshop

- Report on " Hazardous Exposure to Impulse Noise" 6/82 - 5/92 Risk Engineer Office of Research U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, D.C. 20555 9 Severe Accident Consequence Modelling 9 Uncertainty, Sensitivity Analysis S Safety Goal Studies j

9 Probability and Statistics G Reliability Analysis 6/72 - 5/82 Senior Staff i

Applied Physics Laboratory The Johns Hopkins University Laurel, Maryland 21707 e Nuclear Safety Team Leader STMI Radiological Dose Assessment S Liquefied Natural Gas Risk Assessment S Liquid Oxygen Hazard Assessment Honors and Awards Dean's List American Petroleum Institute Fellowship Civil Service Special Achievement Award Civil Service Peer Award Civil Service Bronze Medal Teaching Fsxperience 1985 - Present Lecturer: System Safety and Risk Management Part-Time Programs Johns Hopkins University Hobbies:

Art, poetry, acoustics

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Technical Reports i

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1.

" Sonar Demonstration and Shakedown Operation (SODASO) Evaluation Report for USS JOHN MARSHALL (SSBN-611) Gold Crew, co-author, POR-i 1907, Johns Hopkins University Applied Physics Laboratory.

2.

" Sonar Demonstration and Shakedown Operation (SODASO) Evaluation Report for USS WOODROW WILSON (SSBN-624) Blue Crew, co-author, i

POR-1905, Johns Hopkins University Applied Physics Laboratory.

3.

" SSBN Sonar Systems Perfom1ance and Reliability Analysis," Thirty-Eighth Patrol, SSBN-631, POR-1923, Johns Hopkins University Applied Physics Laboratory.

i 4.

" SSBN Sonar Systems Performance and Reliability Analysis," Thiriy-Eighth l

Patrol, SSBN-624, POR-1941, Johns Hopkins University Applied Physics i

Laboratory.

i 5.

"Perryman Site Population Distribution," Johns Hopkins University Applied Physics Laboratory Report PPSE 2-3, November 1977.

l 6.

" Calculation of Potential Radiological Effects From An Accidental Release At The Three Mile Island Nuclear Generating Station," with L.C. Kohlenstein, Johns Hopkins University Applied Physics Laboratory Report CPE 7902, April 3,1979.

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7.

"Modeling Future Nuclear Power Plant Location Patterns," Contributor, Electric Power Research Institue Final Report EA-1063, April 1979.

8.

" Evaluation and Comparison of High Density Sites," Johns Hopkins University Applied Physics Laboratory Report PPSEE T-12, October,1979.

9.

" Accident Consequence Calculations for Calvert Cliffs Nuclear Power Plant; Volume 1: Projected Whole Body Doses;"" Volume ll: Projected Thyroid Doses," Johns Hopkins University Applied Physics Laboratory Report PPSEE T-12, October,1979.

10.

" Projected Dose Probabliity Distributions From Hypothetical Accidental Releases At the Calvert Cliffs Nuclear Power Plant," with T. Eagles, Johns Hopkins University Applied Physics Laboratory Report PPSEE T-15, October,1979.

11.

" Cove Point Liquefied Natural Gas Operations, A Preliminary Evaluation of the Risk," Johns Hopkins University Applied Physics Laboratory Report PPSEE T-13, October,1979.

12.

"Loccti n Syctems An: lysis cf Aw2y-Frem-R cctor Spent Fusi Stortga Facilties in the United States: Site Selection Model and Updates," with J.

Cohon. C. ReVelle, T. Eagles, and L. Hereford, DOE ET/47924 4, June,1980.

13.

" Population / Cost Trade-offs for Nuclear Reactor Siting Policies," with J.

Cohon, T. Eagles, and C. ReVelle, Johns Hopkins University Operations Research Series, #8104,1981.

14.

" Final Technical Report: Location Systems Analysis of Away-From-Reactor Spent Fuel Facilities in the United States," with J. Cohon, C. ReVelle, T.

Eagles, and L. Hereford, DOE ET/47924-5, July,1981.

15.

" Submarine Liquid Oxygen Breathing System, Preliminary Safety Evaluation, Volume I," with D.A. Silver, N. DeHaus, and L. Hereford, Johns Hopkins University Applied Physics Laboratory Report, October,1979.

16.

"The Development of Severe Reactor Accident Source Terms: 1957 -1981,"

l with R.M. Blond, M. Taylor,, M. Cunningham, P. Baronowski, Cybulskis, i

and R. Denning, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission report, NUREG-0773, November,1992.

17.

"A Systems Study of Regional Air Transport Mdeling for Emergency Response Applications," with E.A. Davis and G.A. Yoshioka, Johns Hopkins University Applied Physics Laboratory Report JHU-PPSE-T-22, January,1983.

18.

" Dose Calculations For Severe LWR Accident Scenarios," J. Martin i

Jr., Nuclear Regulatory Commission report, NUREG-1062, May,1984.

19.

" Acoustic Wave Propagation in Fluids with Coupled Chemical Reactions,"

Nuclear Regulatory Commission report, NUREG0935, August,1984.

i 20.

"A Report To Congress on Nuclear Regulatory," co-author, Nuclear Regulatory Commission report, NUREG-1062, February,1987.

21.

" Hazardous Exposure To impulse Noise," Study Director, Committee on j

Hearing, Acoustics, and Biomechanics, National Research Council, j

National Research Council, 1992.

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s PRESENTATIONS 1.

"Viscothermal Theory of Sound Wave Propagation in Chemically Reacting Mixtures of Nondiffusive Fluids," With W.H.Schwarz, J. Acoust. Soc. Am.,

Vol. 55, p. S75, April 23-6,1974.

2.

" Evaluation and Comparison of High Population Density Sites," paper presented at the 25th American Nuclear Society Meeting, Trans.

Arn, Ngg Ag_q., Vol. 33, p. 613, Nov 11 - 15,1979.

3.

" Multi-Objective Regional Energy Location: Cost Versus People Proximity Trade-offs" with J.L. Cohen, C.S. ReVelle, paper presented at the 25-th American Nuclear Society Meeting, Trans. Am. Nuc. Soc., Vol. 33, p. 613, Nov 11 - 15,1979.

4.

" Projected Dose Probability Distributions From Accidental Releases At A Nuclear Plant," T. Eagles, L. Kohlenstein, and T.G. Mitchell, Trans. Am. Nuc.

Eng., Vol. 38, p.117, June 7 - 11,1981.

5.

"The Use of Ultrasonic Measurements To Determine the Kinetics and Thermodynamics of Fast Reactions in Biological Systems, with W. H.

Schwarz, Foundations of Biochemical Engineering Winter Symposium, American Chemical Society, January 17 - 19,1982, Boulder, Colorado.

l 6.

" Location Systems Analysis of Away-rom-Reactor Spent Fuel Facilities,"

with J. Cohon, C. ReVelle, T. Eagles, Proceedings of the International a

Meeting on Nuclear Fuel Cycles and Waste Disposal, Brussels, Belgium, Trans. Am Num Agg., Vol. 40, p.152, April 26 - 30,1982.

7.

" Fission Product Behavior Modelling in Risk Analysis," with A.R. Taig, C.D.

Leigh, D.A. Powers, J.L. Sprung, J.C. Cunnane, H.I. Avci, P. Baybutt, and J.

Gieseke, " Proceedings of International Meeting On Light Water Reactors:

Severe Accident Evaluation, Volume I," Cambridge, Massachusetts, August 28 - September 1,1983.

8.

" Precalculated Doses for Emergency Response," with J.A. Martin, Jr., R.M.

Blond, and T.W. Eagles, Proceedings of Fifth International Meeting On Thermal Nuclear Reactor Safety," Karlsrhue, Germany, September,1984.

i 9.

" Uncertainty and Sensitivity Analysis of Environmental Transport Models,"

l with L.E. Lancaster, " Proceedings of the 1984 Statistical Symposium on National Energy issues," Seattle, Washington, NUREGICP-0063, October, 1984.

10.

" Safety Goal Evaluation: Sensitivity Studies," with R.M. Blond and R.P.

Burke, " International Meeting of Probabilistic Safety Assessment," San Francisco, California, February 24 - March 1,1985.

I 11.

"Hydroacoustic Analysis of Multiple Relaxation Kinetics," with W.H.

Schwarz, J. Acoust Soc. Am., Supplement I, Vol. 77, p. 520, April 1985.

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12.

"Ssund W va Prap gitian in Fluid 3 With Ccupl:d Ch:mic 1 Rs:ctigna," 4.

4 Acoust. Soc. Am., Supplement 1, Vol. 77, p. 520, April 1985.

13.

" Sound Wave Propagation in Anisotropic Materials," with W.H. Schwarz, 4 Acoust. Soc. Am., Supplement I, Vol. 77, p. 520, April 1985.

14.

" Acoustic Wave Propagation Through A Dilute Suspension of Rigid Spheres in a Viscoelastic Fluid, with W.H. Schwarz, presented at the American Institute of Chemical Engineer Meeting, Chicago, Illinois,1986.

15.

" Continuum Theory of Liquid Crystals," with H.S. Sellers and W.H.

Schwarz, presented at the American Institute of Chemical Engineers Meeting in Miami Beach, FL,1986.

16.

" Acoustic Wave Propagation Through A Dispersion of Rigid Spherical Particles, with W.H. Schwarz, presented at the American Association of Aerosol Science, Chapel Hill, N.C.,1988.

17.

" Sound Wave Propagation Through Multiphase Materials," with W.H.

Schwarz, A_ Acoust. Soc. Am., Supplement I, p. S80, May 1990.

18.

" Emergency Siren System Performance," with S. Long, J. Acoust. Soc.

J Am., Vol. 87, Supplement I, p. S80,, 21 - 25 May 1990.

1 19.

" Finite Amplitude Wave Propagation Through A Two-Phase System Using Coupled Generalized Burger's Equations," with A. Bonharbit, and W.H.

Schwarz, J. Acoust. Soc. Am., Vol. 89, No. 4, p.1928, April - 3 May,1974.

20.

" Nonlinear Wave Propagation in Reacting, Viscoelastic Fluids," with J.

Randall and W.H. Schwarz, J. Acoust. Soc. Am., Vol. 89, No. 4, p.1928, April - 3 May,1974.

21.

" Development and Evaluation of A Performance Assessment Methodology for Analyzing the Safety of a Geologic Repository for High Level Radioactive Waste," with T. McCartin and J. Randall, ASME, Dallas, Texas,25 - 30 November,1990 (Reprint # 90-WAIRA-2).

22.

" Uncertainty and Sensitivity Analysis of Environmental Transport Models,"

with L.E. Lancaster and R. Kornasiewez, ASME," Engineering Applications of Risk Analysis lil," p.11 - 19, Edited by F.Ella, Dec.1 - 6, 1991, Atlanta, GA.

23.

"Probabilistic Analysis of Magma Scenarios For Assessing Geologic Waste Repository Performance," with L. Lancaster, N. Eisenburg, and L.

Abramson, ASME, November 1992.

24.

" Nonlinear Wave Propagation in Reacting Fluids", " 1993 International Symposium on Nonlinear Theory and its Applications '93," p.1109 - 1112, Dec. 5 - 10,1993, Hawaii.

k s.

25.

"Nanlinacr W::vc3 Thraugh Multiccmpon:nt Fluid Media With Ch:mical i?

Reactions,"

J. Ap_qpst. Soc. Am., Vol. 97 (5), p. 3339,1995.

26.

" Acoustical EcologicalRisk," J. Acoust. Soc. Am., Vol. 97 (5), p. 3408, 1995.

27.

" Risk and Performance Assessment with Statistical Decisionmaking Applications," Environmental Protection Agency Conference on Statistics, March 1,1995, Williamsburg, VA 28.

"Probabilistic Human Intrusion Analysis," with B. Sinha, Proceedings of the " International Conference on Mathematics, and Computations, Reactor Physics, and Environmental Analyses, Portland, Oregon,30 April

- 4 May,1995.

29.

" Multiphase Helical Flow of Aerosol," with B.Benharbit, and A. Siddiqui, American Association for Aerosol Research, Pittsburgh, PA,9 - 13 October 1995.

30.

" Acoustic Wave Process in Viscoolastic Porous Media," 130th Meeting of the Acoustical Society of America, St. Louis, Missouri,1 December 1995.

31.

" Acoustic Wave Propagation Through Actin / Alpha-actin Gels," 130th Meeting of the Acoustical Society of America, St. Louis, Missouri,1 December 1995.

32.

" Nuclear Power Safety improvements: Mitigation Versus Emergency Preparedness," ASME,17 - 22 November 1996, Atlanta, GA.

33. " Acoustic Waves Through Viscoelastic Fluids With Suspended Particles Of Disparate Masses and Multiple Chemical Reactions,"in " Workshop on Ultrasonic and Dielectric Characterization of Suspended Particles, "

August 1997, National Institute of Standards and Technology, Maryland.

34. " Nuclear Power Hazard and Economic Risk Analysis," Safety and Engineering Risk Analysis, American Society of Mechanical Engineers, Winter Meeting, November 1997, H01101, Dallas, Texas.

35.

" Radiological Dose Estimates of the Cassini Mission Launch Accidents," Safety and Engineering Risk Analysis, American Society of Mechanical Engineers, Winter Meeting, H01101, November 1997, Dallas, Texas.

36.

Radioactivity Risk and Explosive Noise: French Nuclear Tests, Safety and Engineering Risk Analysis, American Society of Mechanical Engineers, Winter Meeting, November 1997, H01101, Dallas, Texas.

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37.

" Engineered Alternatives: Probabilistic Hazard and Economic Risk Assessment," American Nuclear Society Transactions, April,1998, Pasco, WA.

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38.

"RI k Acc ptanco cnd De l'innm king: Ccccini Mirlan S fety cnd Danger," American Nuclear Society Transactions, Knoxville, TN,1998.

39.

" Basaltic Magmatic Intrusion at Yucca Mountain," American Society of l

Mechanical Engineers, Winter Annual Meeting 1998.

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t ACOUSTICS PUBLICATIONS 1.

" Sonar Demonstration and Shakedown Operation (SODASO) Evaluation Report for USS JOHN MARSHALL (SSBN-611) Gold Crew, co-author, POR-1907, Johns Hopkins University Applied Physics Laboratory.

2.

" Sonar Demonstration and Shakedown Operation (SODASO) Evaluation Report for USS WOODROW WILSON (SSBN-624) Blue Crew, co-author, POR-1905, Johns Hopkins University Applied Physics Laboratory.

3.

" SSBN Sonar Systems Performance and Reliability Analysis," Thirty-Eighth Patrol, SSBN-631, POR-1923, Johns Hopkins University Applied Physics Laboratory.

1 4.

" SSBN Sonar Systems Performance and Reliability Analysis," Thirty-Eighth Patrol, SSBN-624, POR-1941, Johns Hopkins University Applied Physics Laboratory.

5.

"Viscothermal Theory of Sound Wave Propagation in Chemically Reacting Mixtures of Nondiffusive Fluids," With W.H.Schwarz, J. Chem. Physics.

Vol. 77, No. 2, July 15,1982.

6.

" Acoustic Wave Propagation in Fluids with Coupled Chemical Reactions,"

Nuclear Regulatory Commission report, NUREG0935, August,1984.

7.

" Acoustic Wave Propagation in Fluids," with W.H. Schwarz, in Frontiers in Fluid Mechanics, Edited by Stephan H. Davis and John Lumley, Springer-Verlag, 1985, p. 219 - 280.

8.

" Sound Wave Propagation in Fluids with Coupled Chemical Reactions,"

with W.H. Schwarz, d. Acoust. Soc. Am..,78, (2), p. 605, August J

1987.

9.

" Sound Wave Propagation in Viscoolastic Fluids With Simultaneous Chemical Reactions," with W.H. Schwarz, J. Acoust. Soc. Am.,82, (2), p.

j 522, August 1987.

10.

" Attenuation and Dispersion of Acoustic Waves in Nematic Liquid Crystals,"

with H.S. Sellers and W.H. Schwarz, Mol. Crvst. Lia. Cr.ytt., Vol.162 B, p.

185 -223, 1988.

11.

" Attenuation and Dispersion of Acoustic Waves in Reacting Nematic Liquid Crystal Mixtures, H. S. Sellers and W.H. Schwarz, Mol. Cryst. Lia.

Cryst, Vol.166, p.1 - 20, 1988.

12.

" Finite Amplitude Waves Through Colloids and Particulate Suspensions Using a Coupled Burgers' Equation Approach," with A. Benharbit, and W.H. Schwarz, J. Acoust. Soc. Am.,91 (5), p. 2556 - 2568, Dec.1991.

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"A Multiphcas Csntinuum Thr:ry Fcr Stund Wavo Pr:pignti:n Thrsugh Emulsions and Colloids Using A Generalized Fick's Law of Diffusion,"

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with W.H. Schwarz, J. Acoust. Soc. Am., 90 (6), p. 3209 - 3217.

14.

" Hazardous Exposure To impulse Noise," Study Director, Committee on Hearing, Acoustics, and Biomechanics, National Research Council, National Research Council, 1992.

15.

" Finite Amplitude Wave Propagating in Chemically Reacting Viscoelastic Materials," Advances in Nonlinear Acoustics,13-th international Symposium on Nonlinear Acoustics, Bergen, Norway, p.101 - 6,1993.

16.

" Sound Wave Propagation Through Visco-Elastic Fluids With Suspended Particles Of Disparate Masses and Multiple Chemical Reactions,"

(Submitted).

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