ML20063K459

Special Rept:On 940110,fire Suppression Halon Sys Disabled Due to Work Activity in Area Involving Removal of Marinite Cable Tray Covers.Halon Sys Inoperable for More than 14 Days.Subj Sys Scheduled to Be Inoperable Until 940412

ML20063K459
Person / Time
Site:	Calvert Cliffs
Issue date:	02/11/1994
From:	Cruse W BALTIMORE GAS & ELECTRIC CO.
To:	NRC OFFICE OF INFORMATION RESOURCES MANAGEMENT (IRM)
References
NUDOCS 9403010168
Download: ML20063K459 (2)

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,, b B A LTIMORE GAS AND i ELECTRIC CALVERT CLIFFS NUCLEAR POWER PLANT 1650 CALVERT CLIFFS PARKWAY

• LUSBY, MARYLAND 20657-4702 CHARLES H CRUSE February 11,1994 PtANT GLfJE RAL MANAGE R CALVERT CLIFFS U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, DC 20555 ATTENTION: Document Control Desk

SUBJECT:

Calvert Cliffs Nuclear Power Plant Unit No.1; Docket No. 50-317 Fire Suppression Halon System Special Report Technical Specification 3.7.11.3. Action Statement a Per the requirements of Technical Specification 3.7.11.3, Action Statement a, we hereby submit the attached Special Report concerning inoperable Halon Syuem. Specifically the Halon System in the Unit 1 Cable Spreading Room was it. operable for greater than 14 days.  ;

Should you have any further questions regarding this matter, we will i>e pleased to discuss them with you.

Very truly yours,

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,i i CHC/WDM/bjd -

j Attachment I cc: D. A. Brune, Esquire )

J. E. Silberg, Esquire 'l R. A. Capra, NRC l D. G. Mcdonald, Jr., NRC  !

T. T. Martin, NRC l P. R. Wilson, NRC  !

R. I. McLean, DNR J. H. Walter, PSC OQne.

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9403010168 940211 PDR ADOCK 05000317 I \\

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'- A'ITACIIMENT (1)

FIRE SUPPRESSION (HALON) SYSTEM SPECIAL REPORT 4

HACKGROUND On January 10,1994, the Halon 1301 total flooding fire suppression system in the Unit 1 Cable Spreading Room (CSR) was disabled. The Halon system was disabled due to a work activity in the area involving the removal of the marinite cable tray covers. This work activity has resulted in the room being subdivided with plastic shecting material (only fire retardant plastic is used). This subdivision could affect the effectiveness of the Halon system. In addition, the work activity requires personnel to be working in the overhead near the Halon nozzles. A Halon discharge could result in personal injury to the workers. Therefore, a decision was made to declare the Halon system inoperable and disable it. The Unit 1 CSR Halon system will remain inoperable until the work is r complete. .

The Unit 1 CSR total Hooding Halon system is addressed by Technical Specification 3.7.11.3.a. The Action Statement for this Technical SpeciUcation was entered when the Halon system was disabled.

Backup fire suppression capability in the form of manual hose stations are available near the ,

entrance to the room.

As specified by Technical Specification 3.7.11.3, Action Statement a, a Special Report must be issued to the Commission pursuant to Technical Specification 6.9.2 if the Halon system is not restored to operability within 14 days. The Halon system was inoperable for 14 days as of January 24,1994. As required, this Special Report will address actions taken, the cause of the inoperability, and the plans and schedule for restoring the system to operability.

EFFECT ON UNIT OPERATION i On January 10,1994, the Halon system in the Unit 1 CSR was disabled via a Temporary Modification Evaluation. Unit 1 was at 100% power at the time. The Halon system was disabled due to the work activitics associated with the marinite board removal project and the related asbestos abatement requirements. Technical Specification 3.7.113, Action Statement a, was entered when the system was disabled. Backup suppression capability is provided by the manual hose stations located near the entrance to the room. Continuous fire watch is being performed.

In addition to the Action Statement mandated activities, there are several other features which mitigate the potential for a fire in the CSR while the Halon system is disabled. The smoke detection system in the Unit 1 CSR is still operable. This system will provide an early warning of a fire ,

condition in the room which will permit the fire brigade to attack the Ere while it is still in an incipient stage. The Halon system was disabled in such a way that, if necessary, it can be manually discharged (if the system trip logic is satisfied). In addition, welding activities have been prohibited in the CSR without prior review by the Plant Operations Safety Review Committee. These measures minimize the potential for a fire and would also minimize the effects of a fire.

PIANS AND SCllEDULES The Halon system in the Unit 1 CSR is scheduled to remain inoperable until approximately April 12, l 1994 during the planned Unit 1 Refueling Outage. This is the anticipated completion date of the l Unit 1 CSR marinite board removal activity.

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