ML20148A809
| ML20148A809 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Calvert Cliffs  |
| Issue date: | 05/01/1997 |
| From: | Katz P BALTIMORE GAS & ELECTRIC CO. |
| To: | Miller H NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION I) |
| References | |
| NUDOCS 9705090149 | |
| Download: ML20148A809 (3) | |
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'*t, PETER E. KATz Baltimore Gas and Electric Company Plant General Manager Calvert Cliffs Nuclear Power Plant Calvert Cliffs Nuclear Power Plant 1650 Calvert Cliffs Parkway Lusby Maryland 20657
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410 495-4101 May 1,1997 1
U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Region 1 475 Allendale Road King of Prussia, PA 19406 ATTENTION:
Mr. II. J. Miller, Regional Administrator SUILIECT:
Calvert Cliffs Nuclear Power Plant Unit No. 2; Docket Nos. 50-318 Fire Protection -- Special Renort Per the requirements of Technical Specification 3.7.11.1, Action Statement b, we hereby submit the attached Special Report concerning an isolated section of the Calvert Cliffs Unit 2 fire suppression water system.
Should you have questions regarding this matter, we will be pleased to discuss them with you.
Very truly yours,
/.
PEK/RCG/bjd Attachment ec:
Document Control Desk, NRC Director, Project Directorate I-1, NRC R. S. Fleishman, Esquire Resident Inspector, NRC 3
J. E. Silberg, Esquire R. I. McLean, DNR i
l l A. W. Dromerick, NRC J.11. Walter, PSC g {',). g
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9705090149 970501 PDR ADOCK 05000318
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ATTACHMENT (1) a CALVERT CLIFFS NUCLEAR POWER PLANT FIRE PROTECTION - SPECIAL REPORT PURPOSE The purpose of this Special Report is to provide information concerning an isolated section of the Calvert Cliffs Unit 2 fire suppression water system. This report is required in accordance with Calvert Cliffs Technical Specification 3.7.11.1, Action Statement b.
DESCRIPTION OF EVENT On April 21,1997, at approximately 10:30 am, a portion of the fire suppression water system (fire main) was isolated. This isolation was necessary to make repairs to a section of fire main piping that is supplied from the Calvert Cliffs Unit 2 cross-connect from the Turbine Building to the Auxiliary Building fire main. It was necessary to isolate this section of the fire main to allow the system to drain so that repairs could be made during the current Unit 2 Refueling Outage.
The isolation of this portion of the fire main resulted in the temporary loss of water to several sprinkler / spray systems and hose stations. These sprinkler / spray systems and hose stations are addressed by the Calvert Cliffs Technical Specifications (3.7.11.2 and 3.7.11.4, respectively). The specific Technical Specification sprinkler spray systems that were affected by the isolation of this section of the fire main are: (see Table 3.7 5 " Fire Protection Sprinklers," Calvert Cliffs Unit 2 Technical Specification)
=> East Piping Area 203
=> East Piping Penetration Room 206/310
=> Radiation Exhaust Vent Equipment Room 204
=> Service Water Pump Room 205
=> Auxiliary Feedwater Pump Room 605
=> Cable Chase 2A
=> Cable Chase 2B The specific Technical Specification fire hose stations that were affected by the isolation of this section of the fire main are:
(see Table 3.7-6 " Fire llose Stations," Calvert Cliffs Unit 2 Technical Specification)
=> Auxiliary Building,5 foot, Fire Ilose Station Nos. IIS-5-17 and IIS-5-21
=> Unit 2 Containment, Fire Ilose Stations (all six)
The tire main was restored to its normal line-up with no sections isolated at approximately 8:10 pm on April 21,1997.
REGULATORY REOUIREMENTE Calvert Cliffs Technical Specifications for Unit 2 states, in part, in the Limiting Conditions for Operation 3.7.11.1.c, "an OPERABLE flow path capable of taking suction from the Pretreated Water Storage Tanks Numbers 11 and 12 and transferring the water through distribution piping with 1
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ATTACHMENT (1) l CALVERT CLIFFS NUCLEAR POWER PLANT FIRE PROTECTION - SPECIAL REPORT OPERABLE sectionalizing control or isolation valves to the yard hydrant curb valves and the first valve ahead of the water flow alarm device on each sprinkler, hose standpipe or spray system riser required to be OPERABLE per Specifications 3.7.11.2 and 3.7.11.4." Contrary to this requirement, a portion of the fire main that creates a cross-connect, flow path between the Unit 2 Turbine Building and Unit 2 Auxiliary Building and the first valve ahead of the water flow alarm device on each sprinkler system and hose standpipe was isolated.
Technical Specification 3.7.11.1, Action Statement b was determined to be applicable when this section of the fire main was isolated. 'Ihis Action Statement provides the following requirements, (the corresponding Baltimore Gas and Electric Company actions are provided):
b.1 Establish a backup fire suppression water system within 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br />, A backupfire suppression water system was establishedprior to isolating the section of affected fire mainpiping.
b.2 Submit a Special Report in accordance with 10 CFR 50.4:
By telephone within 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br />, a.
A telephone report to the Nuclear Regidatory Commission Operations Center was made by Calvert Chffs Operations personnel at approximately 11:14 am on April 21,1997.
1 b.
Confirm by telegraph, mailgram, or facsimile transmission, no later than the first working day following the event, This confirmation was sent viafacsimile transmission at approximately 10:21 am on April 22,1997.
c.
In writing within 14 days following the event, outlining the action taken, the cause of the inoperability, and the plans and schedule for restoring the system to OPERABLE status.
This will be accomplished by this Special Report.
i The Action Statement requirements for the sprinkler / spray systems and fire hose stations were being met during the period of the system inoperability. For the sprinkler / spray systems, a continuous fire watch was established. Backup fire suppression was available through existing hose stations which were unaffected by this event. For the fire hose stations in Unit 2 Containment, an equivalent capacity fire hose was routed from Fire llydrant No. 5 to the Unit 2 Containment.
ECllEllULE The Unit 2 fire suppression water system was restored to OPERABLE status at 8:10 pm on April 21, 1997. Compensatory measures were discontinued at that time. The Nuclear Regulatory Commission Operations Center was notified by telephone and the facsimile transmission sent on April 22,1997, that the Unit 2 fire suppression water system was restored to normal operation.
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