ML20206R991

Rept of Changes,Tests & Experiments (10CFR50.59(b)(2)). with

ML20206R991
Person / Time
Site:	Calvert Cliffs
Issue date:	12/08/1998
From:	Cruse C BALTIMORE GAS & ELECTRIC CO.
To:	NRC OFFICE OF INFORMATION RESOURCES MANAGEMENT (IRM)
References
NUDOCS 9901270046
Download: ML20206R991 (50)

Text

Cxtts H. CCUSE Bdtimore Gas and Electric Company Vice President Calven Cliffs Nuclear Power Plant Nuclear Energy 1650 Calven Cliffs Parkway Lusby, Maryland 20657 410 495-4455 January 22,1999 U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, DC 20555 ATTENTION: Document Control Desk

SUBJECT:

Calvert Cliffs Nuclear Power Plant Unit Nos.1 & 2; Docket Nos. 50-317 & 50-318 Renort of Changes. Tests. and Exneriments - 10 CFR 50.59 In accordance with 10 CFR 50.59(b)(2), Baltimore Gas and Electric Company hereby submits a report containing brief descriptions of changes, tests, and experiments approved under the provisions of l 10 CFR. 50.59. l l

Attachment (1) of this report includes 50.59 evaluations recorded approved between December 16,1997 and December 8,1998. Items in the report are sorted by 50.59 identification number.

Should you have questions regarding this matter, we will be pleased to discuss them with you.

Very truly yours, f /

jgj CW CHC/EMT/bjd

Attachment:

(1) Calvert Cliffs Nuclear Power Plant Report of Changes, Tests, and Experiments j l

[10 CFR 50.59(b)(2)] I L

cc: R. S. Fleishman, Esquire H. J. Miller, NRC

!- J. E. Silberg, Esquire 2100ocJ Resident inspector, NRC S. S. Bajwa, NRC A. W. Dromerick, NRC R.1. McLean, DNR J. H. Walter, PSC hq'l

/

~

9901*J70046 981208 PDR ADOCK 0S000317 R PDR _

4 ATTACHMENT (1) 1 l

s i

i CALVERT CLIFFS NUCLEAR POWER PLANT l l

l REPORT OF CHANGES, TESTS, AND EXPERIMENTS i

[10 CFR 50.59(b)(2)]

1 r

Baltimore Gas and Electric Company Calvert Cliffs Nuclear Power Plant January 22,1999

t I

. SAFETY EVALUATIONS (50.59) APPROVED BY POSRC 12/16/97-12/8/98 -

DOC ID

SUMMARY

SE00079 ESP ES 1996 00 287 INSTALLS CLAMPS TO RESTRAIN THE RCP SHAFT IN ORDER TO ,

FACILITATE REMOVAL OF THE RCP MOTOR IN MODES 5 & 6. THE ACTIVITY IS  !

NECESSARY IN ORDER TO RESTRA!N THE SHAFT AGAINST AXIAL MOTION THAT WILL OTHERWISE OCCUR ON REMOVAL OF THE MOTOR WITH THE RCS PRESSURIZED. AXlAL MOTION WILL RESULT IN SEAL DAMAGE AND COULD RESULT IN A BREACH OF THE RCS PRESSURE EOUNDARY. .

THE CLAMPS HAVE BEEN ANALYZED FOR A THRUST LOAD CORRESPONDING TO AN RCS PRESSURE OF 500 PSI CONCURRENT WITH THE DESIGN BASIS SEISMIC EVENT. THE ANALYSIS PROVIDES QUALIFICATION OF THE CLAMP COMPONENTS AS WELL AS THE PUMP COMPONENTS TO WHICH THE CLAMPS ARE ATTACHED. CLAMP MATERIALS ARE IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE CODE OF RECORD, ASME B & PV SECTION lli SUBSECTION NF, AND STRESS INTENSITIES ARE IN ACCORDANCE WITH DIVISION 1 OF THE SAME CODE.

STRESSES ARE CONSERVATIVELY LIMITED TO S (M) VALUES RATHER THAN AISC BASED ALLOWABLES TO RECOGNIZE THAT FAILURE OF THE CLAMPS REPRESENTS A DIRECT BREACH OF THE RCS PRESSURE BOUNDARY RATHER THAN AN INDIRECT BREACH IN THE CASE OF  ;

NORMAL SUPPORTS FOR CLASS 1 SYSTEMS.

l SAFETY EVALUATION SE 000 79 CONCLUDES THAT THE ACTIVITY IS NOT AN UNREVIEWED SAFETY QUESTION (USQ). EXISTING ACCIDENTS ANALYZED IN THE SAR ARE NOT AFFECTED, AND NO NEW ACCIDENT CONDITIONS ARE INTRODUCED. THE ACTIVITY DOES

• NOT VIOLATE TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION REQUIREMENTS.

SE00095 THE REMOVAL OF THE COUNTERWEIGHT ARM AND AIR ASSIST CYLINDER ON 2-BTV-1436

ALTERS THE DESIGN OF THE BTV AS DESCRIBED IN THE UFSAR FIGURE 1010. THE OPERATION OF THE BTV IS NOT CREDITED AS AN ACCIDENT MITIGATOR AND ITS FAILURE TO CLOSE DOES NOT INITIATE ANY ACCIDENTS NOT PREVIOUSLY ANALYZED ,

IN THE CHAPTER 14 ANALYSIS THEREFORE, THIS ACTIVITY DOES NOT AFFECT ANY  ;

EQUIPMENT IMPORTANT TO SAFETY.

THIS ACTIVITY DOES NOT CREATE AN UNREVIEWED SAFETY QUESTION AS DEFINED BY 10CFR50.59.

Page 1

?

DOCID SUIMIARY SE00099 THIS ACTIVITY INCREASES THE UPDATED FINAL SAFETY ANALYSIS REPORT (UFSAR)

LIMIT ON THE NUMBER OF PLUGGED U-TUBES PER STEAM GENERATOR (SG) FROM

, 500 TO 800. THIS ACTIVITY ALSO REVISES SAFETY ANALYSES AND ASSOCIATED '

i- EVENT DESCRIPTIONS IN UFSAR CHAPTER 14 AS A RESULT OF A CHANGE IN THE NUMBER OF ASSUMED PLUGGED SG U-TUBES. IN ADDITION, A CHANGE TO THE TECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS IS BEING SUBMITTED TO THE NRC CONCURRENT WITH -

THIS ACTIVITY TO LOWER THE MAXIMUM ALLOWED FULL POWER MTC, CONSISTENT l WITH THE SAFETY ANALYSES SUPPORTING THIS ACTIVITY.  :

AN INCREASE IN THE NUMBER OF PLUGGED STEAM GENERATOR U-TUBES WILL SLIGHTLY  !

DECREASE REACTOR COOLANT FLOW AND SECONDARY STEAM PRESSURE, AND SLlGHTLY r INCREASE AVERAGE COOLANT TEMPERATURE. HOWEVER, THE PLANT WILL CONTINUE TO OPERATE WITHIN THE SAFETY ANALYSIS ENVELOPE AND THERE IS NO ADVERSE EcFECT  :

ON PLANT CONTROL  ;

i A REVIEW OF THE CHAPTER 14 SAFETY ANALYSIS IN THE UFSAR REVEALED THAT THE  !

FOLLOWING EVENTS REQUIRED CONSIDERATION: 1) CONTROL ELEMENT ASSEMBLY

! WITHDRAWAL; 2) LOSS OF LOAD; 3) LOSS OF FEEDWATER; 4) FEEDLINE LINE BREAK;

5) LOCA; 6) LOSS OF FLOW; AND 7) ASYMMETRIC SG. SUBSEQUENT ANALYSIS AND .  ;

4 EVALUATIONS DEMONSTRATED THAT THE NRC ACCEPTANCE LIMITS FOR THESE i EVENTS ARE MET.

BASED UPON THE ABOVE, IT IS CONCLUDED THAT AN INCREASE IN THE LIMIT ON THE NUMBER OF PLUGGED U-TUBES TO 800 PER STEAM GENERATOR, AND REVISING THE UFSAR CHAPTER 14 SAFETY ANALYSES IN SUPPORT OF THIS ACTIVITY DO NOT INVOLVE AN UNREVIEWED SAFETY QUESTION.

SE00108 ONE OF THE TWO FISSION CHAMBERS THAT MAKE UP U-1 WIDE RANGE NI FOR CHANNEL B IS DEFECTIVE. THIS TEMP ALT INVOLVES DISCONNECTING THE DEFECTIVE FISSION CHAMBER INPUT AT THE PREAMP A3 INSIDE THE AMPLIFIER BOX. THIS A3 INPUT IS ONE OF TWO SIGNALS (A4 IS THE OTHER) THAT FEED THE INDICATION IN THE l CONTROL ROOM FOR SOURCE RANGE COUNTS PER SECOND (CPS). ALTHOUGH THE CPS SENSITIVITY WILL BE SLIGHTLY REDUCED (APPROXIMATELY 50%), THIS TEMP ALT WILL HAVE A NEGLIGIBLE EFFECT ON THE COUNT RATE SIGNAL, WHICH IS USED TO MONITOR AN INCREASE IN CPS.

IN THE WIDE RANGE, INDICATION, ALARMS AND TRIPS IN THE CONTROL ROOM ARE ,

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DOCID

SUMMARY

NOT AFFECTED BY THIS TEMP ALT SINCE THE WIDE RANGE IS FED DIRECTLY FROM PREAMP A4 WHICH WILL BE UNAFFECTED. RATE OF CHANGE OF POWER LEVEL (IN DECADES PER MINUTE) IS ALSO UNAFFECTED BY THIS TEMP ALT.

SINCE THE ABILITY FOR CHANNEL B TO CONTINUE TO ASSESS NEUTRON CHANGES IN THE CORE (THROUGH VISUAL INDICATION, AUDIBLE INDICATION, AND ANNUNCIATION FUNCTIONS) ARE UNAFFECTED, THIS TEMP ALT DOES NOT INVOLVE AN UNREVIEWED SAFETY QUESTION.

SE00140 THIS ACTIVITY PROPOSES A TEMPORARY ALTERATION OF THE PLANT'S ELECTRICAL ,

DISTRIBUTION SYSTEM. THE TWO SETS OF POWER CABLES, WHICH CURRENTLY

- CONNECT DIESEL GENERATOR (DC) 1B TO 4.16KV BUS 21 AT BREAKER 152-2106, t

' WILL BE REMOVED. IN THEIR PLACE. THIS ACTIVITY WILL INSTALL ONE SET OF POWER CABLES BETWEEN BREAKER 152-2106 AND SPLICE BOX 2J658, BYPASSING i DISCONNECT SWITCH 189-2106 AND REMOVING IT FROM SERVICE. TO LIMIT THE .

IMPACT ON THE PLANT, THESE ACTIVITIES WILL BE PERFORMED WITHIN AN r UPCOMING QSS WINDOW. I IN ORDER TO PREVENT CONNECTING TWO DGS TO ONE 4.16KV BUS OR ONE DG TO TWO 4.16KV BUSSES, ADMINISTRATIVE CONTROLS REQUIR2 THE DIESEL OUTPUT BREAKER TO BE IN THE OPEN AND RACKED OUT POSITION AND DISCONNECT SWITCH IN THE l LOCKED OPEN POSITION UNLESS DG1B IS REQUIRED TO POWER BUS 21 FOR AN  !

t APPENDIX R EVENT.

THE EXISTING PROTECTIVE RELAYS WILL BE EMPLOYED UNDER THE TEMPORARY f

ALTERATION TO PROVIDE PROTECTION OF THE CABLES AND DIESEL GENERATOR. THE I VOLTAGE ASSOCIATED WITH THIS TEMPORARY ALTERATION HAS BEEN EVALUATED AND FOUND TO BE ACCEPTABLE. SEPARATION WILL BE MAINTAINED IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE SEPARATION CRITERIA OF 61-406-A. ,

l AN ENGINEERING EVALUATION WAS PERFORMED TO ADDRESS THE ADDITIONAL WElGHT l

ADDED ON EXISTING SUPPORTS FROM THE TEMPORARY CABLES. THIS EVALUATION i SHOWS THAT THE TOTAL ADDITIONAL LOADING ON THE EXISTING RACEWAY SUPPORTS  :

IS WITHIN THE RESERVE CAPACITY, AND THUS THE ROUTING OF THE TEMPORARY CABLE ON EXISTING SUPPORTS IS ACCEPTABLE.

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.I DOCID

SUMMARY

.l 1 AN EVALUATION HAS BEEN PERFORMED TO DETERMINE THE SAFETY SHUTDOWN LOADS  ;

REQUIRED TO BE POWERED FROM BUS 21 FOR THE APPENDIX R EVENTS FOR WHICH DG1B WILL BE USED. THE CABLES INSTALLED TO SUPPORT THIS CONNECTION HAVE SUFFICIENT AMPACITY TO SUPPORT THE POWER REQUIREMENTS OF THE SAFE SHUTDOWN  ;

LOADS ON BUS 21.

i BECAUSE THIS ACTIVITY DOES NOT INCREASE THE PROBABILITY OR CONSEQUENCES OF ,

~ PREVIOUSLY EVALUATED MALFUNCTIONS AND ACCIDENTS, DOES NOT CREATE THE  !

POSSIBILITY FOR NEW ACCIDENTS AND MALFUNCTIONS, AND DO NOT REDUCE THE I

' MARGIN OF SAFETY AS DEFINED IN THE TECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS, THIS ACTIVITY DOES NOT INVOLVE AN UNREVIEWED SAFETY QUESTION.  ;

SE00148 THE DESIGN PROVIDED UNDER SUPP 1 IS LIMITED TO THE REPLACEMENT OF THE UNIT 1 l

' SRW HEAT EXCHANGERS. DETAILED ENGINEERING FOR UNIT 2 WILL BE PROVIDED UNDER A FUTURE ENGINEERING PACKAGE. HOWEVER, CONCEPTUALLY THE MODIFICATION TO BOTH UNITS WILL BE .DENTICAL i i

ES199501141 PRCVIDES THE DESIGN TO REPLACE THE SRW HEAT EXCHANGERS WITH NEW i PLATE AND FRAME EXCHANGERS HAVING INCREASED THERMAL PERFORMANCE C ' PABILITY.

THE SW AND SRW PIPING CONFIGURATION WILL BE MODIFIED AS NECESSARY TO ALLOW PROPER FIT UP TO THE NEW COMPONENTS. A FLOW CONTROL SCHEME TO THROTTLE SW FLOW TO THE HEAT EXCHANGERS AND IN THE ASSOCIATED BYPASS LINES WILL BE ADDED.

SW STRAINERS WITH AN AUTOMATIC FLUSHING ARRANGEMENT WILL BE ADDED UPSTREAM OF EACH HEAT EXCHANGER. THE MAJORITY OF THE PHYSICAL WORK ASSOCIATED WITH THIS MODIFICATION IS RESTRICTED TO THE SRW PUMP ROOM.

THERE ARE A NUMBER OF ACTIVE COMPONENTS ADDED BY THIS ACTIVITY AND DUE TO THE l INCREASED COMPLEXITY AND ADDITIONAL CONTROL FEATURES INCORPORATED BY THIS MODIFICATION, THE NUMBER OF COMPONENTS POTENTIALLY SUBJECT TO MALFUNCTION IS f INCREASED. INTRINSIC BENEFIT ASSOCIATED WITH THE NEW DESIGN HOWEVER,IS AN OVERALL IMPROVEMENT IN THE METHOD OF PERFORMING THE FUNCTION OF THE SW AND SRW SYSTEMS. THE BENEFITS IN THE NEW DESIGN ARE SUMMARIZED AS FOLLOWS:

INCREASE IN HEAT DUTY AVAILABLE WITH THE PLATE EXCHANGERS, THERMAL MARGIN IS INCREASED.

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DOC 10

SUMMARY

SYSTEM OPERATION AND TESTING IS SIMPLIFIED.

FLEXIBILITY PROVIDED TO THE OPERATOR TO SECURE ONE EXCHANGER AT A TIME FOR MAINTENANCE OR TO COMPENSATE FOR A COMPONENT FAILURE THE AVAILABILITY OF ITS EQUIPMENT IS INCREASED THE ADDITION OF SW STRAINERS REDUCES MACROFOULING ALTHOUGH THERE ARE INTRINSIC BENEFITS GAINED BY THIS DESIGN, AS DISCUSSED ABOVE, THE BENEFITS IN THEMSELVES CANNOT OFFSET THE POSSIBILITY OF A NEW MALFUNCTION OF ANY ONE OF THE NUMEROUS ACTIVE COMPONENTS CREATED BY THIS ACTIVITY. THEREFORE, THE POSSIBILITY OF FAILURE OF ANY ONE OF THE NEW COMPONENTS LEADS TO THE CONCLUSION THAT THE ACTIVITY MAY CREATE THE POSSIBILITY OF A MALFUNCTION OF A TYPE DIFFERENT THAN THAT PREVIOUSLY EVALUATED IN THE SAR.

i FOR THE ABOVE REASONS, THE POSSIBILITY OF A MALFUNCTION OF A D'FFERENT TYPE THAN PREVIOUSLY EVALUATED IN THE SAR IS CREATED.

NOTE THAT THIS ACTIVITY WILL NOT REDUCE THE MARGIN OF SAFETY DEFINED IN THE TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION BASES. IN FACT THE MARGIN WILL BE INCREASED BY THIS ACTIVITY DUE TO THE INCREASE IN THERMAL CAPACITY OF THE DUAL EXCHANGER TRAIN DESIGN AND THE INCREASED AVAILABILITY OF SR COMPONENTS (HX, DG, CAC, ECCS COOLERS).

SE00183 THE ROBERT SHAW VIBRATION MONITORING SYSTEM MONITORS VARIOUS SSCS; PUMPS, FANS AND COMPRESSORS FOR VIBRATION OF THE SSCS. THIS ACTIVITY WILL NOT AFFECT ANY OF THE TEXT IN THE FSAR. THIS ACTIVITY WILL MODIFY FSAR FIGURES TO REMOVE THE CONNECTION TO VIBRATION INDICATION PANELS 1Vl11,12,13,14 AND 2V121,22,23,24. THE DRAWINGS THAT WILL BE AFFECTED ARE 9-6 UNIT 1 ,

COMPONENT COOLING WATER,9-8 UNIT 1 CIRCULATING & SALTWATER COOLING SYSTEM, t 9-9 UNIT 1 SERVICE WATER,9-20A UNIT 1&2 CONTAINMENT AND PENETRATION ROOM VENTILATION,9-23 UNIT 1 COMPRESSED AIR,9-25 UNIT 2 COMPONENT COOLING WATER, ,

9 -26 UNIT 2 CIRCULATING & SALTWATER COOLING SYSTEM,9-27 UNIT 2 SERVICE WATER,9-28 UNIT 2 COMPRESSED AIR,10-4 UNIT 1 FEEDWATER AND CONDENSATE AND 10-11 UNIT 2 FEEDWATER AND CONDENSATE. THIS SYSTEM HAS BECOME A SOURCE OF NUISANCE ALARMS IN THE CONTROL ROOM. THE ALARMS REQUIRE OPERATOR ATTENTION  !'

THOUGH A MALFUNCTION MAY NOT ACTUALLY EXIST.

Page5

DOC ID

SUMMARY

THe ESP IS NOT REPLACING THIS VIBRATION MONITORING SYSTEM FOR THE FOLLOWING REASONS THE VIBRATION MONITORING SYSTEM PERFORMS NO AUTOMATIC CONTROL UNCTION. IT IS NOT REQUIRED BY ANY SYSTEM AS DESCRIBED IN THE FSAR TEXT.

OPERATIONS, SYSTEM ENGINEERING AND PREDICTIVE MAINTENANCE DO NOT HAVE ANY REQUIREMENT OR NEED FOR THIS SYSTEM. WITH THE EXCEPTION OF THE CEDM COOLING FANS AND THE AIR COMPRESSORS, ALL THE EQUIPMENT IS INCLUDED IN THE CONDITION MONITORING PROGRAM. THE CEDM COOLING FANS HAVE MAINTENANCE PERFORMED EVERY REFUELING OFF-LINE PERIOD AND HAVE RELIABLE HISTORY OF OPERATION.

THE AIR COMPRESSORS ARE ON A REGULAR SCHEDULED PM PROGRAM. BASED ON THE ABOVE EVALUATION, THIS ACTIVITY DOES NOT INCREASE THE PROBABlUTY OR CONSEQUENCES OF AN ACCIDENT OR MALFUNCTION PREVIOUSLY EVALUATED IN THE SAR, NOR DOES IT CREATE A NEW TYPE OF ACCIDENT OR MALFUNCTION NOT PREVIOUSLY EVALUATED IN THE SAR. THIS ACT!VITY DOES NOT RESULT IN A REDUCTION OF THE MARGIN OF SAFETY IN THE TECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS.

THERE ARE NO UNREVIEWED SAFETY QUESTIONS DUE TO THIS ACTIVITY.

SE00193 THE PURPOSE OF THIS ACTIVITY IS TO REVISE SECTION 7.3.1.3 OF THE UFSAR SO THAT IT CGRRECTLY DESCRIBES THE SEISMIC REQUIREMENTS AND METHODOLOGY THAT WERE EMPLOYED FOR THE ENGINEERED SAFETY FEATURES ACTUATION SYSTEM (ESFAS).

- THE ORIGINAL VITRO LABORATORIES' GEISMIC QUAL!FICATION REPORT FOR ESFAS DID NOT INVOKE lEEE 3441971 (IEEE GUIDE FOR SEISMIC QUALIFICATION OF CLASS I ELECTRIC EQUIPMENT FOR NUCLEAR POWER GENERATING STATIONS). HOWEVER, THE METHODOLOGY EMPLOYED BY VITRO LABORATORIES WAS EQUIVALENT TO OR EXCEEDED THAT OUTLINED IN lEEE 3441971 AND CERTAINLY MET THE INTENT OF i IEEE 3441971.

THEREFORE. IT IS CONCLUDED THAT THE ESFAS* DESIGN FEATURES AND DESIGN CRITERIA ARE MAINTAINED AND THAT NO IMPACT TO PREVIOUS ANALYSES IN THE SAR  !

IS CREATED. THIS ACTIVITY DOES NOT CONSTITUTE AN UNREVIEWED SAFETY QUESTION.

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DOCID

SUMMARY

SE00201 THE PROPOSED ACTIVITY IS THE TEMPORARY REMOVAL OF INSULATION PANELS IN CONTAINMENT TO SUPPORT OUTAGE MAINTENANCE WITH UNIT-2 IN MODES 1,2,3,4, 5,6 AND DEFUELED. THE INSULATION REMOVAL ENCOMPASSES THE PRESSURIZER MANWAY COVER,21 AND 22 STEAM GENERATOR SECONDARY MANWAY COVERS, VALVE 2-FW-130, AND REACTOR COOLANT PUMP 21 A.

THIS EVALUATION DEMONSTRATES THAT THE ABILITY OF THE AFFECTED EQUIPMENT TO PERFORM ITS DESIGN FUNCTION IS NOT COMPROMISED BY THE INSULATION REMOVAL THE PROBABILITY OF THERMAL SHOCK TO THE AFFECTED EQUIPMENT (DUE TO INADVERTENT CONTAINMENT SPRAY ACTUATION) HAS BEEN EVALUATED AND HAS BEEN DETERMINED TO NOT INTRODUCE ANY SIGNIFICANT ADVERSE EFFECTS. IN ADDITION, THERE IS SUFFICIENT CONTAINMENT COOLING AVAILABLE TO SUPPORT THIS PLANNED ACTIVITY SUCH THAT THE ADDITIONAL HEAT LOAD CREATED BY THE REMOVAL OF THE SPECIFIED INSULATION WILL NOT IMPACT THE FUNCTION OF OTHER SAFETY RELATED EQUIPMENT.

BASED ON THIS EVALUATION, THIS ACTIVITY DOES NOT CONSTITUTE AN UNREVIEWED SAFETY QUESTION AND THE MARGIN OF SAFETY AS DEFINED IN THE TECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS IS NOT REDUCED.

SE00224 IN AN EFFORT TO MINIMlZE THE IMPACT OF A DUAL HEADER SALTWATER SYSTEM OUTAGE DURING THE UPCOMING UNIT 1 REFUELING AND MAINTENANCE OUTAGE IN THE SPRING OF 1998. THE PROPOSED IMPLEMENTATION OF THE ABOVE TAS WILL PROVIDE A SOURCE OF COOLING WATER TO THE 11 SFP COOLER. THE OBJECTIVE OF THE TAS ASSOCIATED WITH THIS EVALUATION IS TO ENSURE THAT AT LEAST TWO RELIABLE AND INDEPENDENT SYSTEMS WILL BE AVAILABLE TO COOL THE SPENT FUEL POOL THESE TAS HAVE BEEN SUCCESSFULLY INSTALLED IN PREVIOUS OUTAGES.

TO OBTAIN THIS GOAL, SPOOL PIECES WILL BE INSTALLED WHICH ALIGN THE 21 SRW HEADER WHICH SUPPLIES COOLING TO THE 11 SFP COOLER AND JUMPERS WILL BE INSTALLED TO AUTOMATICALLY ISOLATE SRW TO THE 11 SFP COOLER IN THE UNLIKELY EVENT OF A UNIT 2 CSAS. THIS ENSURES THAT SRW WILL BE CAPABLE OF COOLING Page 7

i

'DOCID

SUMMARY

THE UNIT 2 CONTAINMENT WITHIN THE ORIGINAL DESIGN BASES. ALSO, TEMPORARY i ALTERATIONS ARE PROVIDED WHICH ALLOW THE REMOVAL OF THE CSAS SIGNALS FROM i THE VALVES TO PERMIT RESTORATION OF SFP COOLING.  !

i UPON IMPLEMENTATION OF THE TAS, THE 11 SFP COOLING SYSTEM WILL BE AVAILABLE i 1

AS AN INDEPENDENT COOLING LOOP. THIS IS ACCOMPLISHED WITH NO IMPACT ON THE f

, UNIT 2 ESFAS CSAS REQUIREMENTS. IT SHOULD BE NOTED THAT DURING THE  ;

i INSTALLATION AND REMOVAL OF THE TAS, THE 12 SFP COOLER, AS WELL AS THE  !

SDC SYSTEM, WILL BE AVAILABLE TO REMOVE DECAY HEAT FROM THE SFP.

, i l ALL OF THE EQUIPMENT INSTALLED TO SUPPORT THE TAS IS DESIGNED TO BE [

EQUIVALENT TO THE PERMANENT EQUIPMENT PROVIDING SIMILAR FUNCTIONS. SFP  !

HEAT LOAD AND TEMPERATURE LIMITS ARE ESTABLISHED TO SUPPORT THIS EVALUATION.  !

, BASED ON THESE LIMITS, THE RESTORATION OF SFP COOLING CAN BE EASILY ACCOMPLISHED PRIOR TO THE SFP REACHING ITS DESIGN TEMPERATURE OF 155 DEGREES

• F WITHOUT JEOPARDlZING THE ABILITY OF SRW TO COOL THE CONTAINMENT AS ORIGINALLY REQUIRED IN THE CONTAINMENT ANALYSES. [

THEREFORE, THIS EVALUATION CONCLUDES THAT THIS ACTIVITY CAN BE PERFORMED j SAFELY AND DOES NOT AFFECT ANY OF THE CCNPP TECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS NOR  !

DOES IT CONSTITUTE AN UNREVIEWED SAFETY QUESTION. ,

SE00224 IN AN EFFORT TO MINIMlZE THE IMPACT OF A DUAL HEADER SALT WATER SYSTEM i Revision 2 OUTAGE DURING THE UPCOMING UNIT 1 REFUELING AND MAINTENANCE OUTAGE IN THE l SPRING OF 1998. THE PROPOSED IMPLEMENTATION OF THE ABOVE TA*S WILL  :

PROVIDE A SOURCE OF COOLING WATER TO THE 11 SFP COOLER. THE OBJECTIVE OF  ;

.THE TA*S ASSOCIATED WITH THIS EVALUATION IS TO ENSURE THAT AT LEAST TWO .

RELIABLE AND INDEPENDENT SYSTEMS WILL BE AVAILABLE TO COOL THE SPENT FUEL i POOL THESE TA*S HAVE BEEN SUCCESSFULLY INSTALLED IN PREVIOUS OUTAGES. l i

TO OBTAIN THIS GOAL, SPOOL PIECES WILL BE INSTALLED WHICH ALIGN THE 21 SRW  !

HEADER WITH THE 12 SRW HEADER WHICH SUPPLIES COOLING TO THE 11 SFP COOLER, [

AND JUMPERS WILL BE INSTALLED TO AUTOMATICALLY ISOLATE SRW TO THE 11 SFP .[

COOLER IN THE UNLIKELY EVENT OF A UNIT 2 CSAS OR SIAS. THIS ENSURES THAT l SRW WILL BE CAPABLE OF COOLING THE UNIT 2 CONTAINMENT WITHIN THE ORIGINAL DESIGN BASIS. ALSO, TEMPORARY ALTERATIONS ARE PROVIDED WHICH ALLOW THE  !

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, Page 8  !

DOCID

SUMMARY

REMOVAL OF THE CSAS SIGNALS FROM THE VALVES TO PERMIT RESTORATION OF SFP COOLING.

UPON IMPLEMENTATION OF THE TA*S, THE 11 SFP COOLING SYSTEM WILL BE AVAILABLE AS AN INDEPENDENT COOLING LOOP. THIS IS ACCOMPLISHED WITH NO IMPACT ON THE UNIT 2 ESFAS CSAS AND SIAS REQUIREMENTS. IT SHOULD BE NOTED THAT DURING THE INSTALLATION AND REMOVAL OF THE TA*S, THE 12 SFP COOLER, AS WELL AS THE SDC SYSTEM, WILL BE AVAILABLE TO REMOVE DECAY HEAT FROM THE SFP.

ALL OF THE EQUIPMENT INSTALLED TO SUPPORT THE TA*S IS DESIGNED TO BE EQUIVALENT TO THE PERMANENT EQUIPMENT PROVIDING SIMILAR FUNCTIONS. SFP HEAD LOAD AND TEMPERATURE LIMITS ARE ESTABLISHED TO SUPPORT THIS EVALUATION, BASED ON THESE LIMITS, THE RESTORATION OF SFP COOLING CAN BE EASILY ACCOMPLISHED PRIOR TO THE SFP REACHING ITS DESIGN TEMPERATURE OF 155 DEGREES FAHRENHEIT WITHOUT JEOPARDIZING THE ABILITY OF SRW TO COOL THE CONTAINMENT AS ORIGINALLY REQUIRED IN THE CONTAINMENT ANALYSES.

THEREFORE, THIS EVALUATION CONCLUDES THAT TH!S ACTIVITY CAN BE PERFORMED SAFELY AND DOES NOT AFFECT ANY OF THE CCNPP TECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS NOR DOES IT CONSTITUTE AN UNREVIEWED SAFETY QUESTION.

SE00233 THIS ACTIVITY ADDS ALTERNATE COOLING EQUIPMENT TO PRECLUDE THE CONTROL ROOM /

CABLE SPREADING ROOM TEMPERATURES FROM EXCEEDING THE LIMITING OPERABILITY TEMPERATURE OF SAFE SHUTDOWN EQUIPMENT LOCATED IN THESE ROOMS. THE ALTERNATE COOLING EQUIPMENT INCLUDES TWO NEW FAN COIL UNITS (FCU), ONE EACH FOR THE CONTROL ROOM AND THE CABLE SPREADING ROOMS. THE EXISTING CHILLED WATER PUMPS AND A COMBINATION OF NEW AND EXISTING CHILLED WATER PIPING WILL BE USED TO TRANSPORT CHILLED WATER FROM THE CHILLER TO THE FCU DURING THESE EVENTS. SINCE AN APPENDIX R EVENT CAN POTENTIALLY OCCUR WITH A CONCURRENT LOSS OF OFF-SITE POWER, BACKUP POWER TO THE FCU, CHILLED WATER PUMPS AND CHILLER WILL BE PROVIDED BY ONE OF THE EXISTING DIESEL GENERATORS.

THIS ACTIVITY ALSO REPLACES THE EXISTING CONTROL ROOM HVAC NSR CHILLER WITH A NEW CHILLER. THE REPLACEMENT OF 'NE EXISTING CHILLER IS REQUIRED Page 9

DOCID

SUMMARY

AS PART OF OVERALL CR/CSR HVAC UPGRADES AND IS NOT PART OF THE APPENDIX R UPGRADES. THE EXISTING CHILLER COULD NOT OPERATE DURING LOW AMBIENT TEMPERATURES, AND ACCORDINGLY THE HVAC SYSTEM REQUIRED DIFFERENT SUMMER AND WINTER (ECONOMlZER CYCLE) OPERATING MODES. THE NEW CHILLER CAN OPERATE DURING LOW AMBIENT TEMPERATURES, AND THUS THE ECONOMlZER CYCLE IS NOT LONGER NEEDED AND WILL BE ELIMINATED. ELIMINATION OF THE ECONOMlZER CYCLE IS ACCOMPLISHED BY MODIFYING THE CONTROLS FOR THE OUTSIDE AIR DAMPERS AND RECIRCULATION DAMPERS. HOWEVER, A HIGH RADIATION SIGNAL OR SIAS WILL CONTINUE TO CLOSE THE OUTSIDE AIR DAMPERS AND FULLY OPEN THE RECIRCULATION DAMPER. AS PRESENTLY DESIGNED. THE DAMPER CLOSURE TIME ASSUMED IN THE CONTROL ROOM DOSE CALCULATIONS BOUNDS THti CLOSURE Tl?/.E OF THE DAMPERS (POST-MOD), AND THUS, THE CURRENT CONTROL ROOM DOSE ANALYSIS REMAINS BOUNDING.

NEW CONTROLS ARE PROVIDED TO FULLY OPEN THE OUTSIDE AIR DAMPERS AND FULLY CLOSE THE RECIRCULATION DAMPERS VIA A LOCKING HANDSWITCH. THIS FEATURE WILL PROVIDE FLEXIBILITY TO COOL THE CONTROL AND CABLE SPREADING ROOMS USING OUTSIDE AIR FOR ONLY POST TORNADO CONDITIONS, IF DESIRED. ALSO, A HANOSWITCH IS ADDED TO CONTROL THE COMMON EXHAUST DAMPER. THIS ENHANCEMENT PROVIDES THE OPERATORS WITH THE FLEXIBILITY TO TAKE A PRE TORNADO PROTECTIVE ACTION TO ISOLATE THE CONTROL ROOM HVAC DUCTS FROM THE OUTSIDE ATMOSPHERE.

A HIGH RADIATION SIGNAL OR SIAS WILL OVERRIDE THE HANDSWITCH AND WILL CLOSE THE OUTSIDE AIR DAMPER AND OPEN THE RECIRCULATION DAMPER AND WILL CLOSE THE COMMON EXHAUST DAMPER, AS IN THE CURRENT DESIGN.

SINCE THE PROBABILITY AND CONSEQUENCES OF PREVIOUSLY EVALUATED MALFUNCTIONS AND ACCIDENTS ARE NOT INCREASED BY THIS ACTIVITY, THE PROBABILITY OF NEW MALFUNCTIONS AND ACCIDENTS ARE NOT CREATED BY THIS ACTIVITY, AND THE MARGINS OF SAFETY EXPRESSED IN THE TECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS ARE NOT REDUCED BY THIS ACTIVITY, THERE IS NO UNREVIEWED SAFETY QUESTION ASSOCIATED WITH THIS ACTIVITY.

SE00235 THIS ACTIVITY AFFECTS THE TURBINE BEARING SPRAY SYSTEM, WHICH IS A NON-TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION FIRE SUPPRESSION SYSTEM. THIS ACTIVITY WILL MAKE THE SPRAY SYSTEM AUTOMATICALLY ACTUATE UPON A HEAT DETECTION ALARM, WHICH IS DiFFERENT FROM THE CURRENT CONFIGURATION WHERE THE HEAT DETECTION IS Page 10

l DocID

SUMMARY

ALARM ONLY, WITH THE SPRAY SYSTEM MANUALLY ACTUATED. THIS ACTIVITY IMPROVES THE CAPABILITIES OF THE SPRAY SYSTEM, BY ENSURING THAT ACTUATION OF THE -  ;

SPRAY SYSTEM WILL BE MUCH FASTER THAN WITH A MANUALLY ACTUATED SYSTEM (NOTE ,

t THAT TWO SIMULTANEOUS FAILURES OF THE SYSTEM WOULD BE REQUIRED TO RESULT IN ADVERTENT APPLICATION OF WATER ON A BEARING). THIS ACTIVITY DOES NOT INCREASE THE PROBABILITY OR CONSEQUENCES OF A MALFUNCTION OR ACCIDENT ,

PREVIOUSLY EVALUATED IN THE SAR, NOR DOES IT CREATE THE POSSIBlUTY FOR 'I

- A NEW MALFUNCTION OR ACCIDENT DIFFERENT FROM WHAT HAS BEEN PREVIOUSLY  ;

EVALUATED IN THE SAR. SINCE THE TURBINE BEARING SPRAY SYSTEM IS NOT REQUIRED BY TECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS, THIS CHANGE DOES NOT AFFECT THE t MARGIN OF SAFETY OF THE TECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS. THIS ACTIVITY DOES NOT  !

REPRESENT A USQ.

SE00240 THIS 50.59 SAFETY EVALUATION SUPPORTS THE USE OF A NEW BIOCIDE, TOWERBROM i 960, TO CONTROL FOULING WITHIN THE SALTWATER (SW) SYSTEM. THE SALTWATER  !

CHEMICAL ADDITION (SWCA) SYSTEM WILL REPLACE THE RETIRED IN PLACE SODIUM i HYPOCHLORITE (SH) SYSTEM AS THE VEHICLE FOR DELIVERING THIS NEW BIOCIDE.

IN ORDER TO CONSTRUCT THE SWCA SYSTEM, EXISTING SAFETY RELATED INTAKE  ;

STRUCTURE PENETRATIONS WILL BE MODIFIED TO ACCOMMODATE SMALL BORE NSR i PIPING AND CONDUlT.

THIS 50.59 SAFETY EVALUATION IS REQUIRED SINCE THE ADDITION OF THE NEW SWCA SYSTEM WILL BE DOCUMENTED IN SECTIONS 1.2.9.6 AND 9.5.2.3 OF THE UFSAR. [

SINCE THE NEW DESIGN ALLOWS FLEXIBILITY FOR THE POSSIBLE FUTURE USE OF DIFFERENT BIOCIDES, THESE SECTIONS OF THE UFSAR WILL BE UPDATED TO ALLOW THE i USE OF ANY FUTURE APPROVED CHEMICAL FOR THE CONTROL OF SW SYSTEM MARING [

FOULING. ADDITIONALLY, THIS 50.59 SAFETY EVALUATION WILL SUPPORT AND -l DOCUMENT THE USE OF SAFETY RELATED INTAKE STRUCTURE PENETRATIONS FOR THE  ;

ROUTING OF NSR COMMODITIES. l THE ACCEPTABILITY OF TOWERBROM 960 IN ITS ABILITY AS A CHEMICAL BIOCIDE TO CONTROL MARINE FOULING HAS BEEN ADDRESSED BY TESTING PERFORMED VIA  ;

TEMPORARY ALTERATION 196 0194.' TOWERBROM HAS BEEN FOUND TO BE COMPATIBLE WITH THE VARIOUS MATERIALS FOUND IN THE SW SYSTEM AND ITS USE WILL NOT CONTRIBUTE TO ANY ADVERSE AFFECTS ON ANY SW COMPONENT. A " CONTROL ROOM l CHEMICAL HABITABILITY" EVALUATION OF TOWERBROM 960 IN ACCORDANCE WITH  !

Page 11 j

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10CFR50 APPENDIX A GDC 19 CONCLUDED THAT TOWERBROM 960 WILL NOT CONSTITUTE A TOXICOLOGICAL OR FIRE HAZARD TO THE CONTROL ROOM FOLLOWING A WORST CASE ACCIDENT (REF. MEMO NEU 97 347). FURTHERMORE, THE ENVIRONMENTAL AFFECTS OF THE INJECTION HAVE BEEN SATISFACTORILY EVALUATED. TOWERBROM CONCENTRATIONS WITHIN THE SW SYSTEM WILL BE LOW AND THE CIRCULATION WATER SYSTEM WILL BE CREDITED FOR ADDITIONAL DILUTION FLOW TO LIMIT DISCHARGE CONCENTRATION OF TOTAL RESIDUAL CHLORIDE TO LESS THAN GUIDELINES PROVIDED BY THE DISCHARGE PERMIT ISSUED BY THE STATE OF MARYLAND DEPARTMENT OF THE ENVIRONMENT.

• CHANGED MADE TO THE INTAKE STRUCTURE VIA EXISTING PENETRATIONS MEET THE EXISTING SAFETY REQUIREMENTS. ANY POSSIBLE INTERNAL FLOODING DUE TO COMMODITY OR PENETRATION FAILURE IS BOUNDED BY THE EXISTING FLOODING ANALYSIS. EXTERNAL FLOODING WAS REVIEWED AND WAS DETERMINED TO HAVE NO ADVERSE AFFECT ON SAFETY RELATED EQUIPMENT IN THE INTAKE STRUCTURE.

THEREFORE, THIS IS NOT A USQ, NOR DOES IT REDUCE THE MARGIN OF SAFETY AS DEFINED IN THE TECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS BASES.

UFSAR SECTIONS 1.2.9.6 AND 9.52.3 WILL BE REVISED APPROPRIATELY.

SE00241 THIS ACTIVITY ADDRESSES THE TEMPORARY DEFEATING OF FIRE PROTECTION ZONES DESCRIBED IN THE SAR. THE DEFEATING AND RESTORATION WILL BE CONTROLLED BY A CONTROLLED PROCEDURE, TA-14. THE COMPENSATORY MEASURES ASSOCIATED WITH DEFEATING THE ZONE IS DEFINED BY EXISTING SITE PROCEDURES AND TECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS. THE DESIGN OF THE FIRE PROTECTION SYSTEM IS NOT AFFECTED BY THIS ACTIVITY. THE ONLY TEMPORARY CHANGE TO THE SAR IS THE DESCRIPTION OF THE ZONE AFFECTED IS TEMPORARILY REMOVED WHILE THE ZONE IS DEFEATED IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE PROCEDURE, TA-14. UPON RESTORATION OF THE FIRE PROTECTION ZONE, THE SAR DESCRIPTION IS RESTORED. THIS ACTIVITY IS NOT l AN UNREVIEWED SAFETY QUESTION.

SE00242 ESP ES 19 9 5 01 141 - 0 0 5 IS LIMITED TO THE REPLACEMENT OF THE UNIT 2 SRW HEAT EXCHANGERS. A SIMILAR CHANGE WAS PERFORMED ON UNIT 1 AND SUBMITTED TO THE NRC FOR ITS REVIEW.

Page 12

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SUMMARY

ES 19 9 5 01 141 PROVIDES THE DESIGN TO REPLACE THE SRW HEAT EXCHANGERS WITH NEW PLATE AND FRAME HEAT EXCHANGERS HAVING INCREASED THERMAL PERFORMANCE -

CAPABILITY. THE SW AND SRW PIPING CONFIGURATION WILL BE MODIFIED AS NECESSARY TO ALLOW PROPER FIT-UP TO THE NEW COMPONENTS. A FLOW CONTROL SCHEME TO THROTTLE SW FLOW TO THE HEAT EXCHANGERS AND IN THE ASSOCIATED BYPASS LINES WILL BE ADDED. SW STRAINERS WITH AN AUTOMATIC FLUSHING ARRANGEMENT WILL BE ADDED UPSTREAM OF EACH HEAT EXCHANGER. THE MAJORITY OF THE PHYSICAL WORK ASSOCIATED WITH THIS MODIFICATION IS RESTRICTED TO THE SRW PUMP ROOM.

A NUMBER OF ACTIVE COMPONENTS ARE ADDED BY THIS ACTIVITY. DUE TO THE ADDITIONAL COL'ROL FEATURES INCORPORATED BY THIS MODIFICATION, A MALFUNCTION OF EQUIPMENT "/?ORTANT TO SAFETY, DIFFERENT THAN THAT EVALUATED PREVIOUSLY, MAY BE CREATED. THE BENEFIT ASSOCIATED WITH THE NEW DESIGN, HOWEVER, IS AN OVERALL IMPROVEMENT IN THE METHOD OF PERFORMING THE FUNCTION OF THE SW AND SRW SYSTEMS. THE BENEFITS IN THE NEW DESIGN ARE SUMMARIZED AS FOLLOWS:

> INCREASE IN THE HEAT DUTY AVAILABLE WITH THE P H E S THERMAL MARGIN IS INCREASED.

> SYSTEM OPERATION AND TESTING IS SIMPLIFIED; i.E.,

= THERE IS NO ESFAS INTERFACE FOR THE SRW P H E OR ITS CONTROL VALVES (FICS PROVIDE CONTROL OF SYSTEM FLOW RATE REGARDLESS OF PLANT CONDITION);

= ADDED INSTRUMENTATION BENEFITS SYSTEM OPERATION AND TESTING; AND

= SYSTEM OPERATIONAL FLEXIBILITY IS INCREASED DURING TESTING, SUCH THAT ONE P H E COULD BE ISOLATED WHILE CONTINUING TO OPERATE SUBSYSTEM.

> FLEXIBILITY PROVIDED TO THE OPERATOR TO SECURE ONE P H E AT A TIME FOR MAINTENANCE OR TO COMPENSATE FOR A COMPONENT FAILURE.

> THE AVAILABILITY OF ITS EQUIPMENT IS INCREASED.

> THE ADDITION OF SW STRAINERS REDUCES HX MACROFOULING.

ALTHOUGH THERE ARE INHERENT BENEFITS GAINED BY THIS DESIGN, AS DISCUSSED ABOVE, THE BENEFITS IN THEMSELVES CANNOT OFFSET THE POSSIBILITY OF A NEW Page 13 i

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SUMMARY

MALFUNCTION OF ANY ONE OF THE NUMEROUS ACTIVE COMPONENTS CREATED BY THIS ACTIVITY. THEREFORE, THE POSSIBILITY OF FAILURE OF ANY ONE OF THE NEW COMPONENTS LEADS TO THE CONCLUSION THAT THE ACTIVITY MAY CREATE THE POSSIBILITY OF A MALFUNCTION OF A DIFFERENT TYPE THAN PREVIOUSLY EVALUATED IN THE SAR IS CREATED.

NOTE THAT THIS ACTIVITY WILL NOT REDUCE THE MARGIN OF SAFETY DEFINED IN THE TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION BASES.

SE00243 WATER BOX PRIMING SYSTEM CHECK VALVE 2 WBP 107 WAS OPENED FOR INSPECTION.

THE DISC FOUND TO BE STUCK OPEN. THE DISC COULD NOT BE RESTORED TO AN OPERATING CONDITION AND THERE ARE NO SPARE PARTS AVAILABLE. TO ALLOW THE PRIMING SYSTEM TO BE USED AND THE AFFECTED WATER BOX RETURNED TO SERVICE, THE CHECK VALVE WILL BE RETURNED TO SERVICE WITHOUT A DISC INSTALLED. IN THIS CONDITION THE WATER BOX MAY BE RETURNED TO SERVICE AND THE PRIMING SYSTEM CAN BE USED TO REMOVE ACCUMULATED AIR FROM THE ALL OF THE WATER BOXES. THIS ACTIVITY HAS NO AFFECT WHATSOEVER TO ANY EQUIPMENT IMPORTANT TO SAFETY. THERE ARE NO TECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS FOR ANY EQUIPMENT AFFECTED BY THIS ACTIVIT(. THIS ACTIVITY DOES NDT AFFECT THE MARGIN OF SAFETY AS DEFINED IN THE TECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS. THIS ACTIVITY DOES NOT CONSTITUTE AN UNRESOLVED SAFETY QUESTION.

SE00245 THIS ACTIVITY WILL INSTALL PLANT AIR AND PLANT WATER OUTLETS IN EACH OF THE SERVICE WATER PUMP ROOMS. THIS WILL ELIMINATE THE NEED TO BLOCK THE WATER TIGHT DOOPS OPEN TO RUN HOSES FOR THESE SERVICES TO SUPPORT MAINTENANCE ACTIVITIES IN THE ROOMS. THIS ACTIVITY DOES NOT AFFECT NUCLEAR SAFETY, AND DOES NOT CONSTITUTE AN UNREVIEWED SAFETY QUESTION.

SE00246 REVISED THE PLANT ENGINEERING ORGANIZATION TO DELETE PLANT TESTING UNIT AND DIVIDE THE FUNCTIONS BETWEEN M / CEU, PES SECTION OFFICE AND E&CSE.

SPECIFICALLY, THE STP FUNCTION WAS TRANSFERRED TO THE SECTION OFFICE, CONDITION MONITORING AND THERMAL PERFORMANCE WERE TRANSFERRED TO M / CEU, AND ETP DEVELOPMENT TO E&CSE. THIS CHANGE DOES NOT CONSTITUTE AN UNREVIEWED SAFETY QUESTION BECAUSE NO FUNCTIONS WERE DELETED AND THE LINES OF AUTHORITY REMAIN CLEAR.

Page 14

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SUMMARY

SE00247 THIS ACTIVITY RETIRES IN PLACE WATT-HOUR METERING WHICH DISPLAYS THE INTEGRATED ELECTRICAL OUTPUT OF THE FAIRBANKS MORSE EMERGENCY DIESEL GENERATOR (EDG),1B,1 A AND 28 DIESELS. THE METERING IS OBSOLETE AND DIFFICULT TO CALIBRATE. THE METERING IS NOT USED BY THE BILLING DEPARTMENT; CONSEQUENTLY, IT WILL BE RETIRED IN PLACE. THE METERING IS NOT USED TO -

CONTROL OR OPERATE THE EDG. THE DESIGN OF THE EDG IS NOT AFFECTED. THE EDG WILL START AND ACCEPT LOAD AS DESIGNED UPON COMPLETION OF THIS ACTIVITY.

THIS ACTIVITY IS NOT AN UNREVIEWED SAFETY QUESTION.

SE00248 THIS ESP SUPPORTS THE PERFORMANCE OF THE SAFETY INJECTION HEADER CHECK VALVES CLOSURE VERIFICATION TEST (PER STP O 65 J 1 & STP O 65 J 2).

THE PROPOSED ACTIVITY RESULTS IN CONDUCTING A TEST OR EXPERIMENT CAUSING THE SI SYSTEM TO BE OPERATED IN A MANNER THAT IS NOT CONSISTENT WITH THE DESIGN, '

FUNCTION OR METHOD OF PERFORMING THE FUNCTION, AS DESCRIBED IN THE SAR.  ;

SPECIFICALLY, THIS TEST ALTERS THE UFSAR'S DESCRIPTION (FIGURE 5-10 SHEET  !

SA) OF THE SI SYSTEM. t t

THE SAFETY INJECTION (SI) SYSTEM IS DESIGNED TO SUPPLY EMERGENCY CORE COOLING IN THE UNLIKELY EVENT OF A LOCA. THE SI SYSTEM CONSISTS OF HIGH PRESSURE AND LOW PRESSURE SUBSYSTEMS (LPSI). THIS ACTIVITY UTILIZES A HPSI FLOW TRANSMITTER AND ITS ASSOCIATED DRAIN VALVES TO CONDUCT A SAFETY  !

INJECTION CHECK VALVE QUARTERLY OPERABILITY TEST.

i THE QUARTERLY OPERABILITY TEST OF THE INBOARD CONTAINMENT CHECK VALVE REQUIRES MOMENTARILY DISABLING THE HPSI FLOW TRANSMITTER. ALSO, TO SUPPORT THE LEAK CHECK, THE PROCEDURE REQUIRES CYCLING EXISTING NORMALLY CLOSED l INSTRUMENT TUB'NG DRAIN VALVES. THIS SAFETY EVALUATION CONCLUDED THAT ,

THE SI SYSTEM FUNCTIONS AS DESIGNED TO MITIGATE THE CONSEQUENCES OF ANY ACCIDENT OR MALFUNCTION. THIS ACTIVITY DOES NOT DEGRADE THE RELIABILITY OF, OR INCREASE THE CHALLENGES TO, ANY ITS SSCS. THE PROPOSED ACTIVITY MEETS

' THE REQUIREMENTS OF THE DESIGN CODES, STANDARDS AND REGULATIONS.

i BASED ON THIS EVALUATION, THIS ACTIVITY DOES NOT CONSTITUTE AN UNREVIEWED SAFETY QUESTION AND THE MARGIN OF SAFETY AS DEFINED IN THE TECHNICAL l' SPECIFICATIONS IS NOT REDUCED.

Page 15  ;

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SUMMARY

.SE00249 THIS SAFETY EVALUATION MODIFIES THE OPERABILITY REQUIREMENTS FOR USING THE INCORE INSTRUMENTATION (ICl) SYSTEM AND ALLOWS A HIGHER NL%IBER OF INCORE INSTRUMENTATION (UP TO 80% STRINGS) TO BE INOPERABLE / FAILED WHILE STILL PROVIDING THE ABILITY TO ADEQUATELY MONITOR THE POWER DISTRIBUTION LIMITS CONSISTENT WITH THE CURRENT SAFETY ANALYSIS FOR UNIT 1 CYCLE 13. AN EVALUATION WAS PERFORMED AND COMPENSATING ACTIONS TAKEN TO ENSURE THE

. VALIDITY OF THE SURVEILLANCES PERFORMED USING THE INCORE DETECTOR SYSTEM.

THE COMPENSATING ACTIONS INCLUDE APPLYING A 3% PENALTY TO THE MEASURED PLHR AND POWER PEAKING FACTORS IN ORDER TO ACCOUNT FOR ANY POTENTIAL INCREASE

IN MEASUREMENT UNCERTAINTY. THE REVIEW CONCLUDED THAT THE PROPOSED CHANGE WILL NOT REQUIRE CHANGES TO THE TECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS. THE PROPOSED CHANGE DOES NOT INCREASE THE PROBABILITY OF OCCURRENCE OR CONSEQUENCES OF AN ACCIDENT OR MALFUNCTION, NOR DOES IT CREATE THE POSSIBILITY OF A NEW

! ACCIDENT OR MALFUNCTION, NOR DOES IT REDUCE THE DEFINED MARGIN OF SAFETY.

THEREFORE, THE PROPOSED ACTIVITY IS NOT AN UNREVIEWED SAFETY QUESTION (USQ).

SE00250 HVAC DAMPERS 0-PO-5344,5348 AND 5349 ARE IN NEED OF REPAIR. THEY MUST BE REMOVED FROM THE DUCT SYSTEM TO BE REPAIRED. IT IS PART OF THE CONTROL ROOM AND CABLE SPREADING ROOM COOLING AND VENTILATION SYSTEM AND SUPPORTS THE FIRE PROTECTION SYSTEM. FIRE WATCHES IN THE CONTROL ROOM WILL BE ESTABLISHED IN ACCORDANCE WITH TECH SPEC ACTION STATEMENTS FOR EQUIPMENT OUT OF SERVICE. TO MAINTAIN THE INTEGRITY OF THE CONTROL ROOM VENTILATION SYSTEM, THE EQUIPMENT ROOM THAT HOUSES THE DAMPERS WILL BE SEALED TO ALLOW THE DUCT WORK TO BE OPENED TO REMOVE THE DAMPERS AND AGAIN TO REINSTALL THEM.

WHILE MAINTENANCE IS PERFORMED ON THE DAMPER, A *1WIAKE-UP" PIECE WILL BE INSTALLED IN THE DUCT TO ESTABLISH THE INTEGRITY OF THE CONTROL ROOM VENTILATION SYSTEM. WITH THE SYSTEM INTEGRITY ASSURED, THE REQUIRED COOLING FOR THE ROOMS WILL BE AVAILABLE. THIS ACTIVITY DOES NOT CONSTITUTE AN UNREVIEWED SAFETY QUESTION.

4 SE00250 HVAC DAMPERS 0-PO-5344,5348 AND 5349 ARE IN NEED OF REPAIR. THEY MUST BE Revision 1 REMOVED FROM THE DUCT SYSTEM TO BE REPAIRED. IT IS PART OF THE CONTROL ROOM / CABLE SPREADING ROOM COOLING AND VENTILATION SYSTEM AND SUPPORTS THE '

FIRE PROTECTION SYSTEM. FIRE WATCHES IN THE CABLE SPREADING ROOM WILL BE .

ESTABLISHED IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE TECHNICAL REQUIREMENTS ACTION STATEMENTS FOR EQUIPMENT OUT-OF-SERVICE. TO MAINTAIN THE INTEGRITY OF THE CONTROL j

Page 16

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SUMMARY

ROOM / CABLE SPREADING ROOM VENTILATION SYSTEM, THE EQUIPMENT ROOM THAT .l HOUSES THE DAMPERS WILL BE SEALED TO ALLOW THE DUCT WORK TO BE OPENED TO ]

REMOVE THE DAMPERS AND AGAIN TO REINSTALLTHEM. WHILE MAINTENANCE IS PERFORMED ON THE DAMPER A "MAKE-UP" PIECE WILL BE INSTALLED IN THE DUCT ,

TO ESTABLISH THE INTEGRITY OF THE CONTROL ROOM / CABLE SPREADING ROOM ,

VENTILATION SYSTEM. WITH THE SYSTEM INTEGRITY ASSURED, THE REQUIRED COOLING FOR THE ROOMS WILL BE AVAILABLE. THIS ACTIVITY DOES NOT CONSTITUTE AN UNREVIEWED SAFETY QUESTION. l SE00251 THE SMOKE REMOVAL DAMPERS IN THE CONTROL ROOM HVAC SYSTEM ARE IN NEED OF INSPECTION AND POSSIBLY REPAIR. THEY MUST BE REMOVED FROM THE DUCT j SYSTEM TO BE ACCESSED. THEY ARE PART OF THE CONTROL ROOM AND CABLE I

SPREADING ROOM COOLING AND VENTli.ATION SYSTEM. TO MAINTAIN THE INTEGRITY OF THE CONTROL ROOM VENTILATION SYSTEM, THE EQUIPMENT ROOM THAT HOUSES THE DAMPERS WILL BE SEALED TO ALLOW THE DUCT WORK TO BE OPENED TO REMOVE  ;

THE DAMPERS AND AGAIN TO REINSTALL THEM. WHILE MAINTENANCE IS PERFORMED  !

ON THE DAMPERS, A "MAKE-UP" PIECE WILL BE INSTALLED IN THE DUCT TO ESTABLISH THE INTEGRITY OF THE CONTROL ROOM VENTILATION SYSTEM. WITH THE SYSTEM INTEGRITY ASSURED, THE REQUIRED COOLING FOR THE ROOMS WILL BE ,

AVAILABLE. THIS ACTIVITY DOES NOT CONSTITUTE AN UNREVIEWED SAFETY QUESTION.

SE00252 THE CONTROL HVAC SYSTEM AND ROOMS SERVED BY THE SYSTEM ARE ALLOWING LEAKS AND INFILTRATION. THE DAMPERS AND DUCTWORK NEED TO BE INSPECTED ['

AND RESTORED. THIS ACTIVITY WILL ALLOW THE OPENINGS TO THE OUTSIDE AIR TO BE COVERED. THIS WILL AlD IN THE EFFORT TO DETECT LEAKS AND INFILTRATION l AND DETERMINE WHERE CORRECTIVE ACTIONS ARE NEEDED TO RESTORE SYSTEM l i INTEGRITY TO SUPPORT THE ASSUMPTIONS IN THE CONTROL ROOM HABITABILITY ANALYSIS. THIS ACTIVITY DOES NOT DEGRADE THE PRESSURE BOUNDARY OF THE HVAC SYSTEM. WITH THE SYSTEM INTEGRITY ASSURED. THE REQUIRED COOLING FOR THE ROOMS WILL BE AVAILABLE. THIS ACTIVITY DOES NOT CONSTITUTE AN ,

I UNREVIEWED SAFETY QUESTION.

SE00253 THIS TEMPORARY ALTERATION PROVIDES THE PIPING FOR AN ADDITIONAL FLOW PATH l (MINIMUM' FLOW PATH) FOR THE SALTWATER SYSTEM (SW) PUMPS TO FACILITATE THE i REPLACEMENT OF THE UNIT 1 SERVICE WATER (SRW) HEAT EXCHANGERS. THIS WILL i i

Page 17 [

t

_ _ . _ _ .._.____________-__.___m_.___..___-_-___-u_ _m-t.__ _ _ . _ _ _ - _ - _ _ . _ _ . _ _____-_ . _ . _ _ .. _ __ _ . _ --___.u.__

DOCID

SUMMARY

ENSURE THAT THE SW PUMPS OPERATE AT A MINIMUM FLOW RATE AND WILL ENSURE ADEQUATE FLOW THROUGH THE CCW HEAT EXCHANGERS.

THIS ADDITIONAL FLOW PATH WILL BE USED ONLY DURING MODES $,6, AND DEFUELED.

THE PIPING, WITH AN ISOLATION VALVE, FOR EACH NEW FLOW PATH CAN BE INSTALLED DURING A TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION LCO FOR ONE TRAIN OF SW WHILE IN MODES 1-4.

IN MODES 1-4, THE ISOLATION VALVE MUST BE LOCKED CLOSED TO MAINTAIN THE FUNCTION OF THE SW SYSTEM.

SINCE THE PROBABILITY AND CONSEQUENCES OF A PREVIOUSLY EVALUATED ACCIDENT OR MALFUNCTION HAVE NOT BEEN INCREASED BY THIS ACTIVITY, NO NEW MALFUNCTIONS OR ACCIDENTS HAVE BEEN CREATED BY THIS ACTIVITY, AND SINCE THIS ACTIVITY WILL NOT REDUCE THE MARGIN OF SAFETY DEFINED IN THE TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION BASES, THERE ARE NO UNREVIEWED SAFETY QUESTIONS ASSOCIATED WITH THIS ACTIVITY.

SE00256 THIS ACTIVITY ALLOWS THE CREDITING OF THE NEGATIVE REACTIVITY WORTH OF A CERTAIN NUMBER AND PATTERN OF CEAS WHEN DETERMINING THE MODE 6 REFUELING BORON CONCENTRATION (RBC). THE EFFECT OF CREDITING THE NEGATIVE REACTIVITY WORTH OF CERTAIN CEAS IS TO REDUCE THE AMOUNT OF SOLUBLE BORON REQUIRED IN THE REACTOR CORE DURING REFUELING OPERATIONS TO MAINTAIN THE REACTOR SUBCRITICAL WITH A K EFFECTIVE OF < 0.95. THIS ACTIVITY ONLY ADDRESSES CREDITING CEAS DURING A FULL CORE ONLOAD / OFFLOAD, NOT DURING AN INCORE SHUFFLE. TO CREDIT THE NEGATIVE WORTH OF CEAS, ONLY A SELECT NUMBER AND PATTERN OF CEAS WILL BE CREDITED (THE NUMBER AND PATTERN CREDITED IS DETERMINED IN THE CYCLE SPECIFIC REFUELING BORON CONCENTRAT!ON ANALYSIS).

THE CREDITED CEAS WILL BE INSERTED INTO THEIR FINAL FUEL ASSEMBLIES WHILE THEY STILL RESIDE IN THE SPENT FUEL POOL DURING THE FULL CORE ONLOAD /

OFFLOAD. ADMINISTRATIVE CONTROLS WILL BE ADDED TO REFUELING PROCEDURES TO ENSURE THAT THE CREDITED CEAS ARE INSERTED INTO THE CORRECT FUEL ASSEMBLIES WHILE IN THE SPENT FUEL POOL THIS WILL BE VERIFIED BY VISUAL INSPECTIONS OF THE CEA IDENTIFICATION NUMBER AND FUEL ASSEMBLY IDENTIFICATION NUMBER PRIOR TO INSERTION INTO THE REACTOR CORE. ANALYSIS OF THE REFUELING BORON CONCENTRATION WILL BE PERFORMED WITH UP TO THREE CREDITED CEAS STUCK FULLY OUT OF THE CORE TO COMPENSATE FOR CEAS BEING INADVERTENTLY REMOVED OR LIFTED FROM THE CORE. ADMINISTRATIVE CONTROLS ARE ALSO IN PLACE TO VISUALLY VERIFY THAT NO CEAS ARE TO BE LIFTED WHEN RAISING THE Page 18

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SUMMARY

REFUELING MACHINE GRAPPLE OR RE TRACTING THE SPREADER. THIS ACTIVITY DOES NOT RESULT IN AN UNREVIEWED SAFETY QUESTION.  ;

j SE00258 . THE ACTIVITIES OF THE PROPOSED ESP RELOCATES THE SAMPLE CONNECTION POINT .I FOR THE CONDENSATE HEADER UPSTREAM OF THE DEMINERALIZERS. THAT SAMPLE .i POINT WILL NOW TERMINATE IN THE CDSS VICE THE TPSS FURTHER THE DISSOLVED  ;

OXYGEN ANALYZERS 1 & 2-AE-6440-1 IN THE TURBINE PLANT SAMPLE SYSTEM (TPSS) j 1 (2) T21 WILL BE MOVED TO PANELS 1 & 2-C 57A IN THE CONDENSATE -

i DEMINERALIZER SAMPLING SYSTEM (CDSS). THE NEW SAMPLE LINE ROUTING WILL BE SIGNIFICANTLY SHORTER THAN THE EXISTING SAMPLE LINE RESULTING IN A REDUCED l SAMPLE TRANSIT TIME.

THIS ESP ALSO INSTALLS NEW HYDRAZINE ANALYZERS 1 & 2-AE-6417 IN PANELS '

1 & 2 T21. THE HYDRAZINE ANALYZERS WILL BE ADDED TO THE EXISTING STEAM I

GENERATOR FEED PUMP DISCHARGE HEADER SAMPLE LINES INSIDE PANEL 1 & 2 T21 i AND WILL BE USED TO MONITOR HYDRAZINE IN THE FEEDWATER.  ;

ANOTHER ACTIVITY OF THE PROPOSED ESP WILL INSTALL A NEW MANIFOLD TO ALLOW

. HOTWELL SAMPLES TO BE ANALYZED FOR SODIUM BY CONNECT!NG THE CONDENSATE -

HOTWELL SAMPLE LINES (6 LINES PER UNIT) TO THE EXISTING SODIUM ANALYZERS l IN PANELS 1 & 2 T21 A. THESE MONITORS WILL BE USED TO CHECK FOR SODIUM i i

CONTENT IN THE CONDENSATE SYSTEM WHICH IS INDICATIVE OF CONDENSER TUBE  :

FAILURE.

THE PROPOSED ESP ALSO CONNECTS THE HOTWELL SAMPLE LINES IN 1(2) T21 TO THE .

SODIUM ANALYZER SAMPLE LINE WHICH GOES TO 1(2) T21 A. THE SAMPLE ISOLATION i

STOP VALVES IN 1(2) T21 AE CLOSED AND THE CONDENSATE PUMP DISCHARGE HEADER '

PH ANALYZERS IN PANELS 1 & 2T21 ARE ABANDONED TO SUPPORT SODIUM SAMPLING OF THE HOTWELL SAMPLES. ,

NONE OF THE SSC'S AFFECTED BY THE PROPOSED ESP PERFORM ANY SAFETY RELATED FUNCTIONS. ALL AFFECTED SSC'S ARE CLASSIFIED AS NON-SAFETY RELATED BY THE l CCNPP Q-LIST.  ;

AS DISCUSSED ABOVE, THE PROBABILITY OF OCCURRENCE OF AN ACCIDENT OR .;

MALFUNCTION OF EQUIPMENT IMPORTANT TO SAFETY PREVIOUSLY EVALUATED IN THE  ;

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SAR IS NOT INCREASED. THE CONSEQUENCES OF AN ACCIDENT OR MALFUNCTION OF EQUIPMENT IMPORTANT TO SAFETY EVALUATED PREVIOUSLY IN THE SAR ARE ALSO NOT i INCREASED. THIS ACTIVITY DOES NOT INCREASE THE POSSIBILITY OF A MALFUNCTION  !

OR AN ACCIDENT OF A DIFFERENT TYPE THAN PREVIOUSLY IN THE SAR. THERE ARE NO OFFSITE DOSE CONSEQUENCES. THE MARGIN OF SAFETY. AS DEFINED IN THE TECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS, IS NOT AFFECTED. THEREFORE, THERE ARE NO UNREVIEWED SAFETY QUESTIONS ASSOCIATED WITH THE ACTIVITIES DEFINED IN THIS SAFETY EVALUATION.

SE00259 THIS ACTIVITY INVOLVES A REANALYSIS OF THE EXCESS CHARGING EVENT TO CONSIDER '

AN INCREASED CHARGING PUMP CAPACITY AND ALSO TO CONSIDER THE IMPLEMENTATION OF A COMPUTER GENERATED ALARM FOR THE CASE WHEN THERE ARE THREE CHARGING PUMPS RUNNING AND THE LETDOWN IS ISOLATED. THE CHANGE HAS BEEN EVALUATED IN THE ACCIDENT ANALYSIS.

THE CHANGES DO NOT INVOLVE AN UNREVIEWED SAFETY QUESTION SINCE THERE ARE NO CHANGES TO ANY OF THE PROBABILITIES, CONSEQUENCES FOR THE ANALYZED ACCIDENTS OR THE MARGIN OF SAFETY.

SE00266 UNIT 2 CYCLE 12 IS APPROACHING THE UFSAR OPERABILITY LIMIT REQUIREMENT OF AT LEAST 75% OPERABLE ICI DETECTORS AND STRINGS. THIS SAFETY EVALUATION CHANGES THE 75% OPERABLE REQUIREMENT TO AT LEAST 40% OPERABLE DETECTORS [

AND STRINGS FOR THE REMAINDER OF U2 C12. THE COMPENSATORY ACTIONS INCLUDE IMPOSING A 3% PENALTY ON THE MEASURED PEAKING FACTORS AND SURVEILLANCES WILL NOW BE PERFORMED MORE OFTEN. SUFFICIENT ICI DETECTORS REMAIN OPERABLE TO ENSURE THE CONTINUED ABILITY TO ADEQUATELY MONITOR THE POWER DISTRIBUTION LIMITS CONSISTENT WITH THE CURRENT SAFETY ANALYSIS FOR UNIT 2 CYCLE 12. THE PROPOSED ACTIVITY WILL NOT REQUIRE CHANGES TO THE TECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS. THE PROPOEED CHANGE DOES NOT INCREASE THE PROBABILITY OF OCCURRENCE OR CONSEQUENCES OF AN ACCIDENT OR MALFUNCTION, NOR DOES IT CREATE THE POSSIBILITY OF A NEW ACCIDENT OR MALFUNCTION, NOR DOES IT REDUCE THE DEFINED MARGIN OF SAFETY. THEREFORE, THE PROPOSED ACTIVITY IS NOT AN UNREVIEWED SAFETY QUESTION (USQ).

SE00267 THE PURPOSE OF THIS ACTIVITY IS TO REMOVE THE AIR COMPRESSOR DISCHARGE CHECK VALVES FOR THE EMERGENCY DIESEL AIR START SYSTEM AND INSTALL MANUAL Page 20

DOCID 50MMARY ISOLATION VALVES. THIS WILL ALLOW ANY OF THE THREE AIR START SUBSYSTEMS TO BE TAGGED OUT OF SERVICE WITHOUT TAKING THE ENTIRE EDG OUT OF SERVICE.

REMOVING THE CHECK VALVES IS ACCEPTABLE SINCE EACH AIR COMPRESSOR DISCHARGE CURRENTLY HAS TWO CHECK VALVES: ONE AT THE DISCHARGE AND ONE AT THE AIR RECEIVER. THE CHECK VALVES AT THE RECEIVER ARE CONSIDERED THE SR PRESSURE BOUNDARY FOR AIR START SYSTEM. THIS ACTIVITY IS LIMITED TO THE NSR PORTION OF THE SYSTEM, WHICH IS UPSTREAM OF THE SR BOUNDARY. SINCE THE SUBJECT PIPING AND THE AIR START COMPRESSORS ARE ISOLATED FROM THE SR PRESSURE BOUNDARY BY SAFETY RELATED CHECK VALVES PRESSURE BOUNDARY FAILURE OR INADVERTENT VALVE CLOSURE WILL NOT AFFECT EQUIPMENT IMPORTANT TO SAFETY.

THERE ARE NO CHANGES TO ANALYZED MALFUNCTIONS OR ACCIDENTS, AND NO NEW MALFUNCTIONS OR ACCIDENTS ARE CREATED. THEREFORE THIS ACTIVITY DOES NOT CONSTITUTE A USQ.

SE00268 THIS ACTIVITY REVISES THE DESCRIPTION OF ACCESSIBILITY AND INSPECTION

• LOGISTICS UTILIZED AT CCNPP TO COMPLETE THE INSPECTIONS REQUIRED BY ASME SECTION XI,10CFR50.55A AND DRAFT GDC 36. THERE IS NO IMPACT ON ABILITY TO PERFORM THESE REQUIRED INSPECTIONS, NOR IS THE QUALITY OF THE INSPECTIONS AFFECTED. BASED ON THIS. THERE IS NO IMPACT ON THE STRUCTURAL INTEGRITY OF THE PRESSURE BOUNDARY. BGE HAS CONCLUDED THAT THIS ACTIVITY DOES NOT REPRESENT A USQ.

SE00270 UNIT 1 CYCLE 13 CONTINUES TO HAVE A HIGHER THAN EXPECTED ICI DETECTOR FAILURE RATE. EARLIER IN THE CYCLE, SAFETY EVALUATIONS (SE00208 AND SE O O 2 4 9)

WERE PERFORMED TO JUSTIFY CONTINUED USE OF THE ICI SYSTEM WITH UP TO 60%

FAILED ICI DETECTORS AND 80% FAILED ICI STRINGS. THIS SAFETY EVALUATION (SE O O 2 7 0) JUSTIFIES A FURTHER RELAXATION OF THE ICI OPERABILITY REQUIREMENTS. WE ARE NOW TEMPORARILY ELIMINATING (FOR APPROXIMATELY THE LAST MONTH OF UIC13), THE UFSAR REQUIREMENT FOR TWO (2) OF THE NINE (9)

OPERABLE DETECTORS AT LEVEL 4 TO BE t.OCATED IN THE INNER 109 FUEL ASSEMBLIES. NINE (9) OPERABLE DETECTORS WILL STILL BE REQUIRED AT LEVEL

4. FOR THE REMAINDER OF UIC13,3% PENALTIES WILL BE APPLIED TO THE MEASURED PEAKING FACTORS, SURVEILLANCES WILL BE PERFORMED MORE OFTEN, AND THE MINIMUM REQUIRED NUMBER OF INNER CORE OPERABLE DETECTORS AT LEVEL 3 WILL BE INCREASED. A CYCLE SPECIFIC CECOR UNCERTAINTY ANALYSIS WAS PERFORMED TO VERIFY THE CONTINUED VALIDITY OF THE UNCERTAINTIES REPORTED IN THE NRC Page 21

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SUMMARY

-I i

7 APPROVED TOFh REPORT. BGE HAS PERFORMED SENSITIVITY STUDIES USING CECOR -

OFF-LINE TO V9W THAT CECOR CAN ACCURATELY MEASURE THE CORE POWER PEAKS.  ;

SUFFICIENT ICI Ll;..ECTORS REMAIN OPERABLE TO ENSURE THE CONTINUED ABILITY TO ADEQUATELY MONITOR THE POWER DISTRIBUTION LIMITS CONSISTENT WITH THE l CURRENT SAFETY ANALYSIS FOR UNIT 1 CYCLE 13. THE PROPOSED ACTIVITY WILL NOT REQUIRE CHANGES TO THE TECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS.' THE PROPOSED CHANGE DOES NOT INCREASE THE PROBABILITY OF OCCURRENCE OR CONSEQUENCES OF AN +

ACCIDENT OR MALFUNCTION, NOT DOES IT CREATE THE POSSIBILITY OF A NEW i ACCIDENT OR MALFUNCTION, NOR DOES IT REDUCE THE DEFINED MARGIN OF SAFETY. [

THEREFORE, THE PROPOSED ACTIVITY IS NOT AN UNREVIEWED SAFETY QUESTION (USQ). s SE00271 THIS ACTIVITY PROVIDES REPLACEMENT OF THE UNIT 2 FEEDWATER REGULATING VALVE PNEUMATIC VALVE POSITIONERS AND CURRENT TO PNEUMATIC (l/P) ['

TRANSDUCERS WITH DIGITAL VALVE CONTROLLERS. SUCH REPLACEMENT IS CONSIDERED NECESSARY TO ADDRESS AGE INDUCED INSTRUMENT DRIFT AND  ;

CALIBRATION ISSUES. {

THIS ACTIVITY HAS BEEN EVALUATED AND SHOWN TO HAVE NO ADVERSE IMPACT ON ,

' NORMAL AND POST-TRIP FRV OPERATION, WHICH IN EFFECT MAKES NO CHANGES TO THE OVERALL FUNCTIONALITY OF THE FEEDWATER CONTROL SYSTEM. THIS MODIFICATION j j

WILL BE ACCOMPLISHED IN SUCH A MANNER WHICH ENSURES NO IMPACT ON COMPONENTS OTHER THAN THOSE DIRECTLY AFFECTED. AND THE NEW CONFIGURATION POSES NO (

NEW FAILURE MODES. ]

BASED UPON THIS EVALUATION, THIS ACTIVITY DOES NOT CONSTITUTE AN  !

UNREVIEWED SAFETY QUESTION, AND THE MARGIN OF SAFETY AS DEFINED WITHIN  :

THE TECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS REMAINS UNAFFECTED. THIS EVALUATION HAS BEEN ,

PREPARED BECAUSE SAR FIGURE 7148 DEPICTS THE FRV I/P WITH TWO PNEUMATIC  !

OUTPUTS, ONE OUTPUT DIRECTED TO EACH SIDE OF THE CONTROL VALVE ACTUATOR  :

PISTON. THIS FIGURE WILL BE REVISED TO REFLECT A SINGLE PNEUMATIC OUTPUT  !

PROVIDED BY THE DIGITAL VALVE POSITIONER.

SE00273 PISTON-OPERATED DAMPERS 0 DAMP 5371 AND 0 DAMP 5372 ARE BEING REPLACED WITH NEW DAMPERS. IN ORDER TO REPLACE DAMPERS 0 DAMP 5371 AND 0 DAMP 5372, THE

CR BOUNDARY PROVIDED BY THE CR HVAC SYSTEM DUCTWORK WITHIN THE HVAC I

EQUIPMENT ROOM MUST B E TEMPORARILY OPENED. IN ORDER TO ASSURE THAT THE i

Page 22

. , - -- , . - ...m , . -- ,- . , - -,,, . - . . -, ,y, -. - -. - . ---- . ,.. . , ,, . m ~,-y--.--........--v - , , - , , . -~ , -- .-

DOCID

SUMMARY

v COOLING AND HABITABILITY FUNCTIONS OF THE CR HVAC SYSTEM AE MAINTAINED, THE HVAC EQUIPMENT ROOM (ROOM 512), IN WHICH THE DAMPERS ARE LOCATED, WILL BE SEALED AGAINST INLEAKAGE. DURING THE PERIOD OF TIME IN WHICH THE DAMPERS ARE REMOVED, THE CR HVAC EQUIPMENT ROOM WILL BECOME AN EXTENSION OF THE CR BOUNDARY.

TO ADDRESS THE ISSUE OF UNFILTERED LEAKAGE INTO THE CONTROL ROOM HVAC SYSTEM, DURING THE TIME OF DAMPER REPLACEMENT, THE HVAC EQUIPMENT ROOM l WILL BE SEALED. THIS WILL BE ACCOMPLISHED BY SECURING NORMAL ROOM VENTILATION AND COVERING OR CLOSING THE ASSOCIATED DAMPERS AND DUCTS.

OTHER PENETRATIONS IN THE ROOM WILL ALSO BE SEALED. WITH THE ROOM SEALED AND THE DUCTWORK OPENED TO REPLACE THE DAMPERS, THE HVAC EQUIPMENT ROOM WILL ACT LIKE A LARGE PLENUM AND BECOMES AN EXTENSION OF THE SYSTEM DUCTWORK. BY SEALING THE HVAC EQUIPMENT ROOM WHILE DAMPER REPLACEMENT IS TAKING PLACE, THE INTEGRITY OF THE HVAC SYSTEM IS MAINTAINED SO THAT THE COOLING AND HABITABILITY FUNCTIONS ARE MET. ONCE THE DAMPER / ACTUATOR REPLACEMENTS ARE COMPLETE, THERE WILL BE NO EFFECT ON OPERATION OF THE CONTROL ROOM HVAC SYSTEM. .

THE SUPPORT SYSTEM FOR THE AFFECTED DUCT WAS REVIEWED, AND THE SEISMIC i INTEGRITY OF THE SYSTEM WILL NOT BE ADVERSELY AFFECTED DURING THE PERIOD IN WHICH THE DAMPER IS REMOVED.

THERE ARE NO INCREASES IN THE PROBABILITIES OR CONSEQUENCES OF PREVIOUSLY EVALUATED MALFUNCTIONS AND ACCIDENTS, AND NO NEW MALFUNCTIONS OR ACCIDENTS HAVE BEEN CREATED BY THIS ACTIVITY. THE MARGINS OF SAFETY AS DEFINED IN THE BASES OF TECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS HAVE NOT BEEN REDUCED. THUS, IT IS CONCLUDED THAT THIS ACTIVITY DOES NOT INVOLVE AN UNREVIEWED SAFETY QUESTION.

SE00274 PRESSURE SWITCHES 2-PS-8272,8273 AND 8274 ARE FOR THE UNIT 2 TURBINE AUTO STOP HEADER. THIS ACTIVITY EVALUATES THE ADDITION OF NINE ADDITIONAL PRESSURE SWITCHES IN ORDER TO CHANGE THE CIRCUlTS ACTUATED FROM 2-PS-8272, 8273 AND 8274 FROM A 1 OUT OF 1 TO A 2 OUT OF 3 TRIP LOGIC.

BASED ON THE ABOVE EVALUATION, THIS ACTIVITY DOES NOT INCREASE THE PROBABILITY OR CONSEQUENCES OF AN ACCIDENT OR MALFUNCTION PREVIOUSLY Page 23

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SUMMARY

r EVALUATED IN THE SAR, NOR DOES IT CREATE A NEW TYPE OF ACCIDENT OR MALFUNCTION NOT PREVIOUSLY EVALUATED IN THE SAR. THIS ACTIVITY DOES NOT  !

RESULT IN A REDUCTION OF THE MARGIN OF SAFETY IN THE TECHNICAL SPECIFl- i CATIONS. THIS ACTIVITY IS NOT AN UNREVIEWED SAFETY QUESTION.

SE00275 TEMPORARY ALTERATION 198 0002 REMOVES A SECTION OF CONTAINMENT COOLING DUCT WORK TO ALLOW 11A REACTOR COOLANT PUMP MAINTENANCE. THIS REMOVES  !

MOST OF THE COOLING AIR SUPPLY TO THE PRESSURIZER COMPARTMENT. THE . i OPERABILITY OF THE CONTAINMENT COOLING SYSTEM IS REQUIRED BY TECHNICAL i SPECIFICATIONS DURING PLANT MODES 1,2 AND 3. 'i THIS TA IS INSTALLED DURING PLANT SHUTDOWN IN MODES 5 THROUGH DEFUELED.

THE REMAINING COOLING AIR SUPPLY HAS MORE THAN SUFFICIENT CAPACITY TO  ;

COOL THE COMPARTMENT WITH THE PRIMARY SYSTEM IN THIS LOW ENERGY CONDITION.

ALSO, THE OPENINGS LEFT BY REMOVING THE SECTIONS WILL BE COVERED TO PREVENT FOREIGN MATERIAL INTRUSION. .l THEREFORE, THIS ACTIVITY IS NOT AN UNREVIEWED SAFETY QUESTION, NOR DOES l IT REDUCE THE MARGIN OF SAFETY AS DESCRIBE DIN THE TECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS 3 BASES.

I SE00276 THE UFSAR IS BEING REVISED TO REFLECT THE USE OF REDUNDANT PORTABLE EMERGENCY LIGHTING, PRIMARILY ASSOCIATED WITH OPERATOR ACTIONS TO ACHIEVE j SHUTDOWN FOLLOWING A SEVERE FIRE. THE EXISTING FIXED 8-HOUR DURATION 7 SELF-CONTAINED EMERGENCY LIGHTS ARE UNAFFECTED BY THIS CHANGE. THE PORTABLE LIGHTS ARE INDEPENDENT OF ANY PLANT SYSTEMS AND ARE STORED IN A LOCATION THAT WILL NOT IMPACT OTHER PLANT SYSTEMS. THE PROBABILITY OF OCCURRENCE OR THE CONSEQUENCES OF AN ACCIDENT OR MALFUNCTION OF EQUIPMENT

, IMPORTANT TO SAFETY PREVIOUSLY EVALUATED IN THE SAR ARE NOT INCREASED. ,

THERE IS NO POSSIBILITY OF A NEW MALFUNCTION OR ACCIDENT, AND THE ,

TECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS ARE NOT AFFECTED.

SE00277 THE PROPOSED ACTIVITY ALLOWS AN INCREASE IN THE NUMBER OF PLUGGED TUBES .

IN ANY ONE STEAM GENERATOR (SG) ABOVE 800 BY ESTABLISHING A NEW TUBE i PLUGGING LIMIT OF 1600 TUBES IN BOTH SG'S COMBINED. THIS ACTIVITY  !

ESTABLISHES AN INTERIM LIMIT UNTIL THE NRC APPROVES THE LOW FLOW LICENSE  ;

Page 24

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SUMMARY

AMENDMENT REQUEST (LAR) ASSOCtATED WITH INCREASING THE TUBE PLUGGING LIMIT TO 2500 PER SG. - IN ADDITION TO THE LIMIT OF 1600 ON THE TOTAL NUMBER OF PLUGGED TUBES, THE MAXIMUM DIFFERENCE BETWEEN THE NUMBER OF PLUGGED IN EACH ~!

SG WILL BE LIMITED TO 750. IN EFFECT, THESE COMBINED LIMITS ESTABLISH THE MAXIMUM NUMBER OF PLUGGED TUBES IN ANY ONE SG AT 1175. [

AN INCREASE IN THE NUMBER OF PLUGGED TUBES IN ANY ONE SG WILL SLIGHTLY .

DECREASE REACTOR COOLANT FLOW AND SECONDARY STEAM PRESSURE IN THAT SG. ,

HOWEVER, THE PLANT WILL CONTINUE TO OPERATE WITHIN THE SAFETY ANALYSIS ENVELOPE AND MEET ALL TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION REQUIREMENTS, AND THERE IS '

NO ADVERSE EFFECT ON PLANT CONTROL. ANALYSIS AND EVALUATIONS DEMONSTRATE THAT THE NRC ACCEPTANCE LIMITS FOR ALL DESIGN BASIS EVENTS ARE MET. ,

BASED UPON THE ABOVE, IT IS CONCLUDED THAT REVISING THE TUBE PLUGGING LIMIT i TO 1600 IN BOTH SG'S COMBINED DOES NOT INVOLVE AN UNREVIEWED SAFETY  !

QUESTION. '

SE00278 THIS SAFETY EVALUATION CONSIDERED THE OPERATION OF UNIT 1 CYCLE 14 IN MODES 6 AND 5. MODIFICATIONS TO THE FUEL ASSEMBLY, THE RELOAD CORE l DESIGN, AND THE PRESENCE OF OTHER CORE COMPONENTS (UP TO TWO TEST CAPSULES)  ;

WERE CONSIDERED. THE USE OF A THIRD FULL BATCH OF ERBlUM FOR UNIT 1 AS A  !

BURNABLE ABSORBER WAS CONSIDERED. THE SAFETY EVALUATION FOR THE USE OF FOUR LEAD FUEL ASSEMBLIES IN UNIT 1 CYCLE 14, WAS APPROVED IN SE O O O 9 7.

A UNIT 1 CYCLE 14 REFUELING BORON CONCENTRATION OF 2308 PPM (OR GREATER),  !

COUPLED WITH THE CREDITED CEA PATTERN SHOWN IN FIGURE 2 HAS BEEN DETERMINED .

TO BE VAllD FOR UNIT 1 CYCLE 14. THE UNIT 1 CYCLE 14 COLR WILL CONSIST OF l THE INTRODUCTION, CYCLE SPECIFIC LIMITS, AND REFERENCES; BUT THE ACTUAL VALUES NOT APPLICABLE TO MODES 5 AND 6 WILL BE BLANKED OUT UNTIL THE l UPPER MODES OF OPERATION ARE APPROVED FOR UNIT 1 CYCLE 14 (MODES 4,3,2,  !

AND 1). THE UNIT 1 CYCLE 14 SAFETY ANALYSES FOR MODES 6 AND 5 ACCOUNTED -

FOR ALL RELOAD CORE DIFFERENCES, AND ALSO EVALUATED THE INCLUSION OF UP TO TWO TEST CAPSULES IN THE UNIT 1 CYCLE 14 CORE. REANALYSIS OF THE BORON i DILUTION EVENT (MODE 6) INDICATED THAT PREVIOUSLY REPORTED RESULTS ARE  ;

MORE LIMITING. THE RESULTS OF ALL ANALYSES OF RECORD CONSERVATIVELY APPLY ,l TO UNIT 1 CYCLE 14 IN MODES 6 AND 5. IT IS CONCLUDED THAT OPERATION OF ,

UNIT 1 CYCLE 14 IN MODES 6 AND 5 DOES NOT INVOLVE AN UNREVIEWED SAFETY Page 25

_ - _ - _ - _ _ _ _ - -_- . ____-- L

' i; DOCID SUIMIARY I QUESTION.

SE00279 THIS ACTIVITY SHOWS THAT A SINGLE ENCAPSULATION TUBE, WHICH STORES AN  ;

INDIVIDUAL IRRADIATED FAILED FUEL ROD, CAN BE SAFELY STORED IN THE SFP IN ,

AN ICI RASH CAN OR TEMPORARILY ATOP THE SFP STORAGE RACKS. ENCAPSULATION TUBES ARE A STANDARD ABB-CE DEVICE FOR STORING FAILED FUEL RODS AND FOR

' CONTAINING SOLID FISSION PRODUCTS. THIS CAN BE ACCOMPLISHED BY MODIFYING  ;

FH-340 (COMPONENT MOVEMENT IN THE AUXILIARY BUILDING) TO INCORPORATE THE  !

FOLLOWING ADMINISTRATIVE CONTROLS: (1) BY ADMINISTRATIVELY REQUIRING THAT ,

ONLY A FUEL ROD WITH SUFFICIENT CLAD DAMAGE TO ENSURE NO RESIDUAL GAS GAP ACTIVITY BE STORED IN AN ENCAPSULATION TUBE IN AN ICI TRASH CAN OR '

TEMPORARILY ATOP THE SFP STORAGE RACKS; (2) BY ADMINISTRATIVELY PROHIBITING THE SPENT FUEL HANDLING MACHINE FROM ENTERING ANY AREA WHERE AN ENCAPSULATION TUBE HAS BEEN LAID TEMPORARILY ACROSS THE TOP OF THE SFP STORAGE RACKS; AND  !

(3) BY ADMINISTRATIVELY REQUIRING THAT AN ENCAPSULATION TUBE STORED IN AN  ;

ICI RASH CAN CANNOT PROTRUDE ABOVE THE SFP STORAGE RACKS TO PRECLUDE INTERFERENCE WITH THE SPENT FUEL HANDLING MACHINE. UFSAR SECTION 9.7 ,

(STORAGE OF FAILED FUEL RODS IN ENCAPSULATION TUBES) AND UFSAR SECTION 14.18 (FUEL HANDLING INCIDENT) WILL BE MODIFIED TO REFLECT A SINGLE '

ENCAPSULATION TUBE CONTAINING A DAMAGED FUEL ROD CAN BE SAFELY STORED IN THE SPENT FUEL POOL IN AN ICI TRASH CAN OR TEMPORARILY ATOP THE SPENT FUEL STORAGE RACKS. THE PROPOSED ACTIVITY IS NOT AN UNREVIEWED SAFETY QUESTION.

i SE00280 UPDATED EMERGENCY DIESEL LOADING CALCULATION E 88 015 AND AFFECTED DOCUMENTS. i THIS CALCULATION PREDICTS THE MAXIMUM LOAD SEEN BY EACH DIESEL UNDER VARIOUS ACCIDENT CONDITIONS AND OVER A WIDE RANGE OF TIME PERIODS. PREVIOUS RESULTS  :

SUPPORTED THE STATEMENT IN UFSAR SECTION 8.4,"THE PREDICTED ACCIDENT LOADS FOR LARGE BREAK LOCA, SMALL BREAK LOCA, AND MAIN STEAM LINE BREAK ARE LESS THAN 3000 KW." RESULTS NOW SHOW SLIGHTLY HIGHER LOAD TOTALS WHICH l' NECESSITATE A REVISION OF THIS STATEMENT. ALSO, SINCE THE TECH SPEC BASES REFERENCE THE 3000 KW VALUE CONTAINED IN THE UFSAR STATEMENT, A LICENSE AMENDMENT IS REQUIRED. THIS 50.59 EVALUATION CONCLUDES THAT THERE ARE NO UNREVIEWED SAFETY QUESTIONS. i i

SE00282 THIS ACTIVITY SHOWS THAT A SINGLE ENCAPSULATION TUBE, WHICH STORES AN INDIVIDUAL IRRADIATED FAILED FUEL ROD, CAN BE SAFELY STORED IN THE SFP AT  ;

Page 26 i

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SUMMARY

THE BOTTOM OF AN UPENDER TRENCH. ENCAPSULATION TUBES ARE A STANDARD ABB-CE DEVICE FOR STORING FAILED FUEL RODS AND FOR CONTAINING SOLID FISSION

, PRODUCTS. THIS CAN BE ACCOMPLISHED BY MODIFYING FH-340 (COMPONENT MOVEMENT .,

- IN THE AUXILIARY BUILDING) TO INCORPORATE THE FOLLOWING ADMINISTRATIVE CONTROLS: (1) BY ADMINISTRATIVELY REQUIRING THAT ONLY A FUEL ROD WITH -

SUFFICIENT CALD DAMAGE TO ENSURE NO RESIDUAL GAS GAP ACTIVITY BE STORED IN 3

AN ENCAPSULATION TUBE AT THE BOTTOM OF AN UPENDER TRENCH; AND (2) BY ADMINISTRATIVELY TAGGING OUT OF SERVICE THE UPENDER WHILE AN ENCAPSULATION TUBE IS BEING STORED IN THE ASSOCIATED UPENDER TRENCH. UFSAR SECTION 9.7

- (STORAGE OF FAILED FUEL RODS IN ENCAPSULATION TUBES) AND UFSAR SECTION 14.18 (FUEL HANDLING INCIDENT) WILL BE MODIFIED TO REFLECT THAT A SINGLE ENCAPSULATION TUBE CONTAINING A DAMAGED FUEL ROD CAN BE SAFELY STORED IN .;

SFP AT THE BOTTOM OF AN UPENDER TRENCH. THE PROPOSED ACTIVITY IS NOT AN -

UNREVIEWED SAFETY QUESTION.

t SE00283 THE PURPOSE OF THIS SAFETY EVALUATION IS TO DOCUMENT OUR CONCLUSION THAT RELOCATING THE LIFE CYCLE MANAGEMENT UNIT FROM THE NUCLEAR ENGINEERING DEPARTMENT TO THE NUCLEAR PROJECT MANAGEMENT DEPARTMENT WILL NOT REQUIRE 1 THE TECH SPECS TO BE CHANGED NOR WILL IT INTRODUCE A USQ. THIS SAFETY EVALUATION IS WRITTEN TO RECOGNIZE THAT THE ABOVE DESCRIBED ORGANIZATIONAL CHANGE IS DIFFERENT THAN THE CURRENT UFSAR DESCRIPTION OF OUR ORGANIZATION (SEE CHAPTER 12.1. 5.).

SE00284 THE PROPOSED ACTIVITY IS THE TEMPORARY REMOVAL OF INSULATION IN CONTAINMENT TO SUPPORT OUTAGE MAINTENANCE WITH UNIT-1 IN MODES 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6 AND DEFUELED. THE INSULATION REMOVAL ENCOMPASSES BOTH PRIMARY AND BOTH ,

SECONDARY MANWAY COVERS FOR 11 AND 12 STEAM GENERATORS,1-SI-148,1-St-217 AND 1-FW-133.

THIS EVALUATION DEMONSTRATES THAT THE ABILITY OF EACH AFFECTED ITEM TO .:

PERFORM ITS DESIGN FUNCTION IS NOT COMPROMISED BY THE INSULATION REMOVAL THE PROBABILITY OF THERMAL SHOCK TO THE AFFECTED EQUIPMENT (DUE TO .{

. INADVERTENT CONTAINMENT SPRAY ACTUATION) HAS BEEN EVALUATED AND HAS BEEN DETERMINED TO NOT INTRODUCE ANY SIGNIFICANT ADVERSE EFFECTS. IN ADDITION, 4 THERE IS SUFFICIENT CONTAINMENT COOLING AVAILABLE TO SUPPORT THIS PLANNED ACTIVITY SUCH THAT THE ADDITIONAL HEAT LOAD CREATED BY THE REMOVAL OF THE Page 27

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SUMMARY

SPECIFIED INSULATION WILL NOT IMPACT THE FUNCTION OF OTHER SAFETY RELATED EQUIPMENT.

BASED ON THIS EVALUATION, THIS ACTIVITY DOES NOT CONSTITUTE AN UNREVIEWED SAFETY QUESTION AND THE MARGIN OF SAFETY AS DEFINED IN THE TECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS IS NOT REDUCED.

SE00285 UNIT 1 PRESSURIZER HEATER B-1 WAS FOUND TO BE LEAKING. THE REPAlR OF THIS LEAKING HEATER SLEEVE WILL REQUIRE REMOVAL OF THE HEATER AND PARTIAL REMOVAL OF THE SLEEVE. THEN A WELDED PLUG ASSEMBLY WILL BE INSTALLED TO RESTORE THE RCPB. THE HEATER WILL NOT BE REPLACED. THIS RESULTS IN A CHANGE TO -

THE DESCRIPTION OF THE PRESSURIZER AND INSTALLED HEATER CAPACITY AS DESCRIBED IN CHAPTER 4 OF THE UFSAR.

THE PRESSURIZER COMPRISES A PORTION OF THE REACTOR COOLANT PRESSURE BOUNDARY (RCPB), MAINTAINS REACTOR COOLANT SYSTEM OPERATING PRESSURE AND COMPENSATES FOR CHANGES IN COOLANT VOLUME DURING LOAD CHANGES. THIS IS DONE BY MAINTAINING A STEAM SPACE THROUGH THE USE OF HEATERS. THE HEATERS ARE MOUNTED INTO THE PRESSURIZER USING SLEEVES WHICH ACT AS NOZZLES ON THE BOTTOM HEAD OF THE PRESSURIZER. THESE SLEEVES COMPRISE A PORTION OF THE RCPB. THE SLEEVES ARE MADE FROM ALLOY 600 MATERIAL WHICH IS SUSCEPTIBLE TO PWSCC.

IN LOCATION B-1 OF THE UNIT 1 PRESSURIZER, A THROUGH WALL LEAK HAS BEEN IDENTIFIED WHICH IS ATTRIBUTABLE TO PWSCC. THE REPAIR FOR THIS CRACK IS THE INSTALLATION OF AN ALLOY 690 PLUG, WHICH IS WELDED ON THE OUTSIDE OF THE PRESSURIZER. THE INSTALLATION OF THIS PLUG IS COMPLETED IN SEVERAL STEPS:

1. THE EXISTING HEATER SLEEVE IS PARTIALLY REMOVED AT A POINT INSIDE THE PRESSURIZER, NEAR THE PARTIAL PENETRATION WELD.

2. THE PLUG IS INSERTED INTO THE PENETRATION AND STAKED. THE EXCESS PLUG LENGTH IS REMOVED AT THE OUTER SURFACE OF THE PRESSURIZER SHELL.

3. THE WELD DAM IS THEN INSERTED AND STAKED. THE EXCESS WELD DAM LENGTH IS REMOVED AT THE OUTER SURFACE OF THE PRESSURIZER SHELL THE WELD DAM IS PROVIDED TO LIMIT DISTORTION OF THE PLUG BORE HOLE.

4. THE BOTTOM HEAD IS SUBJECTED TO PRE-HEAT.

P Page 28

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5. A 3-1/2" DIAMETER WELD PAD IS INSTAL, LED WHICH INCORPORATES THE PLUG.

6.' THE WELD DAM IS THEN REMOVED.

WITH THE HEATER REMOVED AND THE SLIEEVE PARTIALLY REMOVED, THE PRESSURIZER SHELL WILL NOW SE EXPOSED TO REACTOR COOLANT. THE SHELL MATERIAL IS i SA 533 GR. B, CL 1 MATERIAL, WHICH IS A P3 CARBON STEEL ALLOY. THE BORIC  ;

ACID IN THE REACTOR COOLANT WILL ATTACK THIS MATERIAL AN ASSESSMENT OF THE WORST CORROSION THAT COULD BE SEEN UNTIL THE END OF THE CURRENT LICENSE.

PLUS AN ADDITIONAL 20 YEARS TO BE 0. 0882 INCHES. IN REALITY, THE SMALL CREVICE OF EXPOSED LOW ALLOY STEEL WILL FILL COMPLETELY WITH CORROSION PRODUCTS, AND GREATLY REDUCE THE RATE OF CORROSlON. THIS WAS FOUND TO BE INSIGNIFICANT WITH REGARD TO THE PRESSURE BOUNDARY FUNCTION OF THE PRESSURIZER. ,

s THERE WERE ORIGINALLY 120 HEATERS INSTALLED IN THE PRESSURIZER. THESE HEATERS WERE SEPARATED INTO 6 BANKS (BANK 1,2,3, AND 4 AND 2 PROPORTIONAL). t THE HEATERS WERE ALSO SEPARATED INTO TWO GROUPS, EACH OF WHICH WAS i OPERATED BY SEPARATE CONTROLLERS (1.E.,2 PROPORTIONAL AND 4 BACK-UP CONTROLLERS). THE PROPORTIONAL HEATERS ARE THE PRIMARY HEATERS TO BE USED FOR NORMAL ANTICIPATED TRANSIENTS AND MANEUVERS. IN THE EVENT THAT THE PROPORTIONAL HEATERS ARE INSUFFICIENTLY FOR THE DEMAND, THE BACK-UP HEATER CAN BE OPERATED TO PROVIDE MORE CAPACITY. THE ORIGINAL INSTALLED l CAPACITY IS 1500 KW (EACH HEATER REPRESENTS ~12.5 KW, WITH 150 KW BEING REQUIRED BY TECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS. THERE HAVE BEEN 3 HEATERS REMOVED PRIOR TO THIS MODIFICATION, ONE FROM EACH BACK-UP BANK 1,2, AND 3. THE  :

EFFECT OF THESE REMOVED HEATERS IS A NEW INSTALLED CAPACITY OF 1462.5 KW.  !

THE HEATER BEING REMOVED BY THIS ACTIVITY IS LABELED B1, AND IS A BACK-UP HEATER IN GROUP 4. WITH THIS HEATER REMOVED, THE NEW INSTALLED CAPACITY i WILL BE 1450 KW. IN ORDER TO ENSURE THAT THE LOSS OF HEATERS IN UNIT 1 WILL NOT IMPACT THE OPERATION OF THE UNIT. AN EVALUATION WAS COMPLETED BY ABB-CE, WHICH ADDRESSEG THE LOSS OF UP TO 30 HEATERS. NO IMPACT WILL BE SEEN.

i THERE ARE NO CHANGES TO ANALYZED MALFUNCTIONS OR ACCIDENTS, AND NO NEW  !

MALFUNCTIONS OR ACCIDENTS ARE CREATED. THEREFORE, THIS ACTIVITY DOES NOT I CONSTITUTE A USQ.

Page 29 I

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. _ _ _ _ _ _ . . . - . . . . _ _ _ _ _ _ . _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ . . _ . . _ . _ _ . _.__________.___.-__..______._._._______m____ _______.__ __ - ____m _ mm_m-__. m ___ ., .

2 DOCID. .

SUMMARY

.SE00286 THE TELEPHONE SYSTEM IS TEMPORARILY POWERED FROM MCC-101BT VICE MCC-101 AT WHILE THIS POWER SOURCE IS DEENERGlZED FOR MAINTENANCE. AN UNREVIEWED SAFETY QUESTION IS NOT CREATED BECAUSE POWER FOR THE SYSTEM WILL STILL BE AVAILABLE FROM EITHER THE MAIN GENERATOR OR THE EMERGENCY DIESEL GENERATOR.

SE00287- THE PURPOSE OF THIS ACTIVITY IS TO ADD A STEAM TRAP IN THE UNIT 2 MOISTURE

, SEPARATOR REHEAT (MSR) SUPPLY LINE TO THE AUXILIARY STEAM SYSTEM. THE STEAM TRAP WILL PROVIDE CONDENSATE DRAINAGE TO CONDENSATE COLLECTION TANK

1. 21. THIS WILL ALLEVIATE A WATER HAMMER CONDITION THAT EXISTS WHEN THE ISOLATION VALVE IS OPENED. A 50.59 IS REQUIRED SINCE THIS DRAIN LINE WILL NOW BE SHOWN ON UFSAR FIGURE 10-6. THIS ACTIVITY DOES NOT INVOLVE OR AFFECT EQUIPMENT IMPORTANT TO SAFETY. THEREFORE, THIS ACTIVITY DOES NOT CONSTITUTE A USQ.

SE00288 THE PURPOSE OF THIS ACTIVITY IS TO LOWER THE OVERSPEED TRIP VALUE FOR THE UNIT 1 AND UNIT 2 AUXILIARY FEEDWATER PUMP TURBlNES FROM 5100 RPM +/- 2%

(4998 TO 5202 RPM) TO 4600 RPM +/- 2% (4508 TO 4692 RPM). BEARING FAILURES ON 11 AFWPT HAVE BEEN ATTRIBUTED TO PERFORMANCE OF THE UNCOUPLED TURBINE OVERSPEED TRIP TEST WITH THE CURRENT 5100 RPM OVERSPEED TRIP VALUE. THE OIL WEDGE BETWEEN THE TURBINE SHAFT AND BEARING IS CHALLENGED AT SPEEDS ABOVE 4600 RPM. THE REDUCTION OF THE TURBINE OVERSPEED TRIP VALUE WILL RESULT IN A DECREASE OF BEARING FAILURES. THE 5100 RPM VALUE, WHICH IS APPROXIMATELY 122% OF THE MAXIMUM OPERATING SPEED OF 4190 RPM, WAS SELECTED BECAUSE ORIGINALLY THIS EQUIPMENT HAD PROBLEMS WITH OVERSHOOT DURING COLD STARTUP. HOWEVER THE AFW PUMP TURBINE GOVERNORS HAVE SINCE BEEN EQUIPPED WITH LOWER ACCELERATION BUSHINGS, WHICH HAVE BEEN PROVEN TO ALLEVIATE HE OVERSHOOT CONDITION. THE REDUCTION IN TRIP VALUE DOES NOT -

AFFECT TURBINE OR PUMP OPERATION. THE MAXIMUM OPERATING SPEED THAT THE AFW PUMP AND TURBINE WILL CONTROL TO UNDER DESIGN BASES CONDITIONS 4190 RPM IS UNAFFECTED BY THIS ACTIVITY. THEREFORE, THE FLOW RATES AND RESPONSE TIMES OF THE AFW SYSTEM ASSUMED IN THE SAR ARE UNAFFECTED. THE PROBABluTY AND CONSEQUENCES OF A PREVIOUSLY EVALUATED ACCIDENT OR MALFUNCTION HAVE NOT BEEN INCREASED BY THIS ACTIVITY. NO NEW MALFUNCTIONS OR ACCIDENTS HAVE BEEN CREATED AND THE MARGIN OF SAFETY AS DEFINED BY THE TECHNICAL a SPECIFICATIONS IS NOT REDUCED. THERE ARE NO UNREVIEWED SAFETY QUESTIONS l ASSOCIATED WITH THIS ACTIVITY.

Page 30

. _ _ _ _ _ . . . _ _ . _ _ - - ________..__.___.__.___-__-._m._________._m___-___._m_ _ . _ _ - _ _ _ _ . _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ . _ ____m___..._ _______--_m___. __ _ _ _ _ _ _ . - _ _ . _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ . _____.__.______m

DOCID

SUMMARY

SE00289 WE ARE MAKING MANY IMPROVEMENTS TO OUR RADIATION SAFETY PROGRAM. TO INCREASE MANAGEMENT OVERSIGHT AND FOCUS IN THIS AREA, WE ARE CREATING THE POSITION OF SUPERINTENDENT-TECHNICAL SUPPORT. THE FOLLOWING THREE FUNCTIONAL AREAS WILL REPORT TO THE SUPERINTENDENT - TECHNICAL SUPPORT THROUGH THEIR RESPECTIVE GENERAL SUPERVISORS:

. PLANT ENGINEERING

. RADIATION SAFETY

. CHEMISTRY SE00291 DURING THE 1998 OUTAGE, THE SRW SYSTEM WILL BE REMOVED FROM SERVICE IN ORDER Revision 1 TO REPLACE THE EXISTING SHELL AND TUBE HEAT EXCHANGERS WITH NEW PLATE AND FRAME HEAT EXCHANGERS. IN ORDER TO MINIMlZE THE IMPACT ON OPERABLE /

OPERATING PLANT EQUIPMENT FROM SRW EQUIPMENT REMOVAL AND REPLACEMENT ACTIVITIES, AS WELL AS TO MINIMlZE TESTING, CONFIGURATION EVOLUTIONS, AND UNIT DOWN TIME, BOTH SUBSYSTEMS OF SRW WILL BE REMOVED FORM SERVICE AT ONCE. THE REMOVAllREPLACEMENT WORK IS SCHEDULED TO BEGIN DURING PLANT MODE 5 OR 6. BECAUSE BOTH EMERGENCY DIESEL GENERATORS (EDGS) ON UNIT 2 ARE SRW COOLED,

• THE SRW OUTAGE WILL IMPACT THEIR OPERABILITY. ALTHOUGH THE TECHN! CAL SPECIFICATIONS ,

REQUIRE ONLY ONE EDG TO BE OPERABLE IN MODES 5 AND 6 FOR RISK REDUCTION, IT ID DESIRABLE TO HAVE BOTH UNIT 2 EDGS OPERABLE WHILE IN MODES 5,6 OR DEFUELED.

THIS ACTIVITY PROVIDES THE ENGINEERING TO P.' OVIDE THE CAPABILITY FOR UNIT 2 ,

DG2A TO BE COOLED BY UNIT 1 SERVICE WATER (SRW) SUBSYSTEM 12 AND FOR UNIT 2 DG2B TO BE COOLED BY AN INDEPENDENT TEMPORARY COOLING SYSTEM. THE ELECTRICAL LINE-UPS OF THE UNIT 2 EDGS WILL N OT BE CHANGED BY THIS ACTIVITY (1.E., DG2A FEEDS 4.16 KV BUS 21 AND DG2B FEEDS 4.16 KV BUS 24).

IN ADDITION, SRW SUBSYSTEM 11 WILL BE ALIGNED TO PROVIDE COOLING WATER TO SPENT FUEL COOLER 12.

PROVISIONS ARE INCLUDED SUCH THAT SRW FLOW TO SFP COOLER 12 IS ISOLATED ON A UNIT 1 CONTAINMENT '

DURING THE 1998 OUTAGE, THE SRW SYSTEM WILL BE REMOVED FROM SERVICE IN ORDER TO REPLACE THE EXISTING SHELL AND TUBE HEAT EXCHANGERS WITH NEW PLATE AND FRAME HEAT EXCHANGERS. IN ORDER TO MINIMlZE THE IMPACT ON OPERABLE /

OPERATING PLANT EQUIPMENT FROM SRW EQUIPMENT REMOVAL AND REPLACEMENT ACTIVITIES, AS WELL AS TO MINIMlZE TESTING, CONFIGURATION EVOLUTIONS, AND UNIT DOWN TIME, BOTH SUBSYSTEMS OF SRW WILL BE REMOVED FORM SERVICE AT Page 31

My i

DOC ID

SUMMARY

ONCE. THE REMOVAUREPLACEMENT WORK IS SCHEDULED TO BEGIN DURING PLANT MODE

~ 6 OR 6. BECAUSE BOTH EMERGENCY DIESEL GENERATORS (EDGS) ON UNIT 2 ARE SRW COOLED, '

THE SRW OUTAGE WiLL IMPACT THElR OPERABluTY. ALTHOUGH THE TECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS -

j REQUIRE ONLY ONE EDG TO BE OPERABLE IN MODES 5 AND 6 FOR RISK REDUCTION, IT ID DESIRABLE TO HAVE BO1H UNIT 2 EDGS OPERABLE WHILE IN MODES 5,6 OR DEFUELED.

IN THE TEMPORARY CONFIGURATION, SFPC SUBSYSTEM 12 WILL RELY ON TWO BUSES AND EDGS - ONE FOR THE SUBSYSTEM 11 SRW PUMP (BUSS 1 AND DG1 A) TO MAINTAIN j SRW COOLING FOR THE SFPC SUBSYSTEM AND ONE FOR THE SUPPLY OF POWER TO THE j SUBSYSTEM 12 SFPC PUMP (BUS 24 AND DG28)- TO MAINTAIN ITS FUNCTION, AFTER . 1 A LOSS OF OFFSITE POWER. HOWEVER, THE PROBABILITY OF MALFUNCTION OF THE SFPC SUBSYSTEM 12 IN THIS CONFIGURATION IS BOUNDED BY THE CONFIGURATION IN WHICH j TWO SRW SUBSYSTEMS FOR ONE UNIT ARE CROSS CONNECTED FOR SRW HEAT EXCHANGER i MAINTENANCE AS DESCRIBED IN UFSAR TABLE 9-17A. i f

EXCEPT AS NOTED ABOVE, THIS ACTIVITY DOES NOT AFFECT THE ABILITY OF THE UNIT 1 SRW SYSTEM, EDGS, SFPC SYSTEM, OR ESFAS TO PERFORM THEIR INTENDED 7 FUNCTIONS AND DOES NOT INTRODUCE A SINGLE FAILURE VULNERABILITY INTO THESE  !

MITIGATION SYSTEMS. THUS. THIS ACTIVITY DOES NOT INCREASE THE PROBABILITY '

OF AN ACCIDENT OR INCREASE THE CONSEQUENCES OF PREVIOUSLY EVALUATED

'I MALFUNCTIONS AND ACCIDENTS AND DOES NOT REDUCE THE MARGIN OF SAFETY AS EXPRESSED IN THE TECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS. SINCE THIS ACTIVITY MAY INCREASE '

THE PROBABluTY OF PREVIOUSLY EVALUATED MALFUNCTIONS, THIS ACTIVITY DOES [

REPRESENT A USQ AND PRIOR NRC APPROVAL MUST BE SOUGHT.

~

SE00291 DURING THE 1998 OUTAGE, THE SRW SYSTEM WILL BE REMOVED FROM SERVICE IN ORDER i Revision 2 TO REPLACE THE EXISTING SHELL AND TUBE HEAT EXCHANGERS WITH NEW PLATE AND +

FRAME HEAT EXCHANGERS. IN ORDER TO MINIMlZE THE IMPACT ON OPERABLE / l OPERATING PLANT EQUIPMENT FROM SRW EQUIPMENT REMOVAL AND REPLACEMENT t

ACTIVITIES, AS WELL AS TO MINIMlZE TESTING, CONFIGURATION EVOLUTIONS, AND  !

UNIT DOWN TIME, BOTH SUBSYSTEMS OF SRW WILL BE REMOVED FORM SERVICE AT -

ONCE. THE REMOVAL 3 REPLACEMENT WORK IS GCHEDULED TO BEGIN DURING PLANT MODE 5 OR 6. BECAUSE BOTH EMERGENCY DIESEL GENERATORS (EDGS) ON UNIT 2 ARE SRW COOLED, l THE SRW OUTAGE WILL IMPACT THEIR OPERAB!LITY. ALTHOUGH THE TECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS  !

REQUIRE ONLY ONE EDG TO BE OPERABLE IN MODES 5 AND 6 FOR RISK REDUCT!ON, IT ID DESIRABLE TO  !

] HAVE BOTH UNIT 2 EDGS OPERABLE WHILE IN MODES 5,6 OR DEFUELED.  !

Page 32  ;

i

DOCID

SUMMARY

THIS ACTIVITY PROVIDES THE ENGINEERING TO PROVIDE THE CAPABILITY FOR UNIT 2 DG2A TO BE COOLED BY UNIT 1 SERVICE WATER (SRW) SUBSYSTEM 12 AND FOR UNIT 2 DG2B TO BE COOLED BY AN INDEPENDENT TEMPORARY COOLING SYSTEM. THE ELECTRICAL LINE-UPS OF THE UNIT 2 EDGS WILL N OT BE CHANGED BY THIS ACTIVITY (1.E., DG2A FEEDS 4.16 KV BUS 21 AND DG2B FEEDS 4.16 KV BUS 24).

IN ADDITION, SRW SUBSYSTEM 11 WILL BE ALIGNED TO PROVIDE COOLING WATER TO SPENT FUEL COOLER 12.

PROVISIONS ARE INCLUDED SUCH THAT SRW FLOW TO SFP COOLER 12 IS ISOLATED ON A UNIT 1 CONTAINMENT DURING THE 1998 OUTAGE, THE SRW SYSTEM WILL BE REMOVED FROM SERVICE IN ORDER TO REPLACE THE EXISTING SHELL AND TUBE HEAT EXCHANGERS WITH NEW PLATE AND FRAME HEAT EXCHANGERS. IN ORDER TO MINIMlZE THE IMPACT ON OPERABLE /

OPERATING PLANT EQUIPMENT FROM SRW EQUlPMENT REMOVAL AND REPLACEMENT ACTIVITIES, AS WELL AS TO MINIMIZE TESTING, CONFIGURATION EVOLUTIONS, AND UNIT DOWN TIME, BOTH SUBSYSTEMS OF SRW WILL BE REMOVED FORM SERVICE AT ONCE. THE REMOVAUREPLACEMENT WORK IS SCHEDULED TO BEGIN DURING PLANT MODE 6 OR 6. BECAUSE BOTH EMERGENCY DIESEL GENERATORS (EDGS) ON UNIT 2 ARE SRW COOLED, THE SRW OUTAGE WILL IMPACT THEIR OPERABILITY. ALTHOUGH THE TECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS REQUIRE ONLY ONE EDG TO BE OPERABLE IN MODES 5 AND 6 FOR RISK REDUCTION, IT ID DESIRABLE TO HAVE BOTH UNIT 2 EDGS OPERABLE WHILE IN MODES 5,6 OR DEFUELED.

IN THE TEMPORARY CONFIGURATION, SFPC SUBSYSTEM 12 WILL RELY ON TWO BUSES AND EDGS - ONE FOR THE SUBSYSTEM 11 SRW PUMP (BUSS 1 AND DG1 A) TO MAINTAIN SRW COOLING FOR THE SFPC SUBSYSTEM AND ONE FOR THE SUPPLY OF POWER TO THE SUBSYSTEM 12 SFPC PUMP (BUS 24 /.ND DG2B)- TO MAINTAIN ITS FUNCTION, AFTER A LOSS Oi OFFSITE POWER. HOWEVER, THE PROBABILITY OF MALFUNCTION OF THE SFPC SUBSYSTEM 12 IN THIS CONFIGURATION IS BOUNDED BY THE CONFIGURATION IN WHICH TWO SRW SUBSYSTEMS FOR ONE UNIT ARE CROSS CONNECTED FOR SRW HEAT EXCHANGER MAINTENANCE AS DESCRIBED IN UFSAR TABLE 9-17A.

EXCEPT AS NOTED ABOVE, THIS ACTIVITY DOES NOT AFFECT THE ABILITY OF THE UNIT 1 SRW SYSTEM, EDGS, SFPC SYSTEM, OR ESFAS TO PERFORM THEIR INTENDED FUNCTIONS AND DOES NOT INTRODUCE A SINGLE FAILURE VULNERABILITY INTO THESE MITIGATION SYSTEMS. THUS, THIS ACTIVITY DOES NOT INCREASE THE PROBABILITY OF AN ACCIDENT OR INCREASE THE CONSEQUENCES OF PREVIOUSLY EVALUATED MALFUNCTIONS AND ACCIDENTS AND DOES NOT REDUCE THE MARGIN OF SAFETY AS Page 33

DOCID

SUMMARY

EXPRESSED IN THE TECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS. SINCE THIS ACTIVITY MAY INCREASE -

THE PROBABILITY OF PREVIOUSLY EVALUATED MALFUNCTIONS, THIS ACTIVITY DOES REPRESENT A USQ AND PRIOR NRC APPROVAL MUST BE SOUGHT.

SE00292 THIS ACTIVITY INVOLVES A CHANGE TO THE MSSV TEST PROCEDURE IN ORDER TO PROVIDE FOR PERFORMING THE TESTING OF THE VALVE LIFT SETTING WHILE IN MODE 1 RATHER THAN ONLY MODE 3.

THE CHANGE DOES NOT INVOLVE A USQ SINCE AN MSSV WILL NOT INADVERTENTLY OPEN WHILE IT IS BEING TESTED. ALSO, THE T / S ACTION STATEMENT WILL SE MET WHEN ANY VALVG BECOMES INOPERABLE BY LOWERING THE POWER AND THE VHPT UPPER LIMIT PRIOR TO THE TEST.

SE00294 THIS SAFETY EVALUATION CONSIDERED THE OPERATION OF UNIT 1 CYCLE 14 IN MODES 4,3,2, AND 1. MODIFICATIONS TO THE FUEL ASSEMBLY, THE RELOAD CORE DESIGN AND THE PRESENCE OF OTHER CORE COMPONENTS (UP TO TWO TEST CAPSULES) WERE CONSIDERED. THE USE OF A THIRD FULL BATCH OF ERBlUM FOR UNIT 1 AS A BURNABLE ABSORBER WAS CONSIDERED. THE SAFETY EVALUATION FOR THE USE OF FOUR LEAD FUEL ASSEMBLIES IN UNIT 1 CYCLE 14 WAS APPROVED IN SE O O O 9 7. THE UNIT 1 CYCLE 14 SAFETY ANALYSES WHICH INCLUDED THE LOW FLOW CONTINGENCY ANALYSES, MINIMUM TEMPERATURE FOR CRITICALITY ANALYSES, RETURN-TO-POWER ANALYSIS FOR EXCESS LOAD EVENT, AND THE CYCLE SPECIFIC ANALYSES ARE ALL BOUNDED BY THE ANALYSES OF RECORD. IT IS CONCLUDED THAT OPERATION OF UNIT 1 CYCLE 14 IN MODES 4,3,2, AND 1 DOES NOT INVOLVE AN UNREVIEWED SAFETY QUESTION.

SE00295 THIS SAFETY EVALUATION CONSIDERS AN INCREASE IN COLR LIMITS FOR FXY T AND FR T FOR (UP TO) THE FIRST 1000 MWD /MTU OF UNIT 1 CYCLE 14. ALL CHAPTER 14 EVENTS SUPPORT FXY T AND FR T LIMITS OF 1.70 EXCEPT THE PRE-TRIP STEAM LINE BREAK EVENT WHICH APPLIED A LIMIT OF 1. 67; THEREFORE, THE ONLY EVENT REQUIRING REANALYSIS TO SUPPORT THE INCREASED FXY T AND FR T LIMITS IF THE PRE-TRIP STEAM LINE BREAK EVENT. RESULTS OF THE REANALYSIS OF THE PRE-TRIP STEAM LINE BREAK EVENT WITH FXY T AND FR T COLR LIMITS OF 1.70 FOR (UP TO) THE FIRST 100 MWD /MTU OF UNIT 1 CYCLE 14 WERE LESS LIMITING THAN THOSE PREVIOUSLY REPORTED. THE PROPOSED ACTIVITY DOES NOT CONSTITUTE AN UNREVIEWED SAFETY QUESTION (USQ). I Page 34

-- - - - - -- - - - - - - - ~~ - . - , . - - - - - - - . - - -

DOCID

SUMMARY

SE00297 THE PROPOSED ACTIVITY REPLACES THE NEUTRON DETECTORS OF TWO OF THE FORTY FIVE UNIT 2 INCORE INSTRUMENTATION (ICI) ASSEMBLIES WITH PLATINUM DETECTORS AND MODIFIES THE ASSOCIATED INSTRUMENT LOOP INPUT RESISTORS TO THE DATA ACQUISITION SYSTEM (DAS). INCORE INSTRUMENTATION CONSISTS OF INCORE NEUTRON DETECTORS AND CORE EXIT THERMOCOUPLES (CET).

THIS ACTIVITY DOES NOT AFFECT THE ICI SYSTEM OPERABILITY REQUIREMENTS SPECIFIED IN THE UFSA

R. PROCEDURE

S ARE IN PLACE WHICH ACCOUNT FOR THE PLATINUM MATERIAL DURING THE CORE RELOAD DESIGN AND TO ENSURE UFSAR REQUIREMENTS ARE MET DURING THE FUEL CYCLE. THUS, ASSUMPTIONS USED IN THE SAFETY ANALYSIS REMAIN VALID. THE PROPOSED ACTIVITY DOES NOT AFFECT THE '

DESIGN, FUNCTION, OR OPERABILITY OF THE CETS OR THE DAS.

THE PROPOSED ACTIVITY WILL NOT REQUIRE A CHANGE TO THE TECHNICAL SPECIFICA-TIONS. THE PROPOSED ACTIVITY DOES NOT INCREASE THE PROBABILITY OF OCCURRENCE OR CONSEQUENCES OF AN ACCIDENT OR MALFUNCTION, NOR DOES IT CREATE THE POSSIBILITY OF A NEW ACCIDENT OR MALFUNCTION, NOR DOES IT REDUCE THE DEFINED MARGIN OF SAFETY. THEREFORE, THE PROPOSED ACTIVITY IS NOT AN UNREVIEWED SAFETY QUESTION (USQ). ,

SE00299 THIS ACTIVITY SUPPORTS THE UCR CHANGE TO CORRECT ONE OF TWO DEFICIENCIES IDENTIFIED BY IR 1998 0 0 6 21. THIS ACTIVITY ALSO SUPPORTS A CLARIFICATION TO IMPROVED TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION (ITS) BASIS IDENTIFIED DURING THE REVIEW OF CORRECTIVE ACTIONS FOR THE IR. SPECIFICALLY, THIS ACTIVITY CHANGES:

(1) THE DESCRIPTION OF 1 (2)- HS - 3 6 5 9 A AND 3 6 6 0 A.

(2) THE DESCRIPTION OF THE SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENT IN THE BASES FOR 3.5.2.1 OF THE ITS.

SE00300 THIS TEMPORARY ALTERATION ALLOWS THE REMOVAL OF COVERPLATE CP-7 WHILE MAINTAINING 1 A DIESEL OPERABLE.

REASON FOR ACTIVITY: THIS TEMPORARY ALTERATION ALLOWS THE REMOVAL OF j COVERPLATE CP-7 WHILE MAINTAIN!NG 1A DIESEL OPERABLE. THE REMOVAL OF THE COVERPLATE WILL ALLOW ACCESS TO THE EXPANSION JOINT THAT IS LEAKING, SO THAT EFFECTIVE REPAIRS CAN BE MADE. IN DOING SO, THE SR ELECTRIC SUPPLY Page 35 ,

DOCID

SUMMARY

LINES WILL BE EXPOSED TO THE ATMOSPHERE AND WILL NOT BE PROTECTED FROM TORNADO AND HURRICANE LOADS. SYSTEM ENGINEERING IS REQUESTING DESIGN ENGINEERING TO EVALUATE TH!S SITUATION FOR DESIGN REQUIREMENTS.

THE SAR CHAPTER SA DISCUSSES THE ABILITY OF CAT I STRUCTURES AND SUPPORTING COMPONENTS TO RESIST IMPACT FROM MISSILES.

THEREFORE, THERE IS NO UNREVIEWED SAFETY QUESTION.

SE00301 PAST FAILURES OF SEQUENCER RELATED COMPONENTS HAVE LED TO MANY LICENSING AND SYSTEM ENGINEERING EVALUATIONS. THIS MODIFICATION WILL MAINTAIN THE ABILITY TO ANALYZE FOR HYDROGEN WITH THE SYSTEM IN THE MANUAL MODE. THIS ACTIVITY WILL REMOVE THE AUTO SEQUENCING FUNCTION OF THE HYDROGEN ANALYZER SEQUENCER. THE AUTOMATIC SEQUENCING FUNCTION IS NOT REQUIRED DURING NORMAL OR ACCIDENT CONDITIONS AND WE DO NOT NEED THIS PORTION OF THE ANALYZING SYSTEM TO MAINTAIN THE SYSTEM IN THE OPERABLE STATUS. AS SEEN FROM THE ABOVE DISCUSSION, THERE ARE NO CHANGES TO ANALYZED MALFUNCTIONS OR ACCIDENTS, AND NO NEW MALFUNCTIONS OR ACCIDENTS ARE CREATED. THEREFORE, THIS ACTIVITY DOES NOT CONSTITUTE A USQ.

SE00302 THIS ACTIVITY INSTALLS SURGE ARRESTERS AT THE PRIMARY WINDINGS OF THE U-440 TRANSFORMERS ASSOCIATED WITH 4KV AND 480V BUSSES 11,14,21 AND 24. THESE TRANSFORMERS ARE THE SOURCE OF POVER TO THE 1E 480 V BUSSES 11 A,118,14A, 148,21A,21B,24A AND 248. THE ASSOCIATED GE 4KV MAGNA-BLAST FEEDER BREAKER WILL BE REPLACED WITH AN ABB VACUUM RETROACTIVE FIT CIRCUIT BREAKER AFTER INSTALLATION OF SURGE ARRESTERS TO ANY OF THESE TRANSFORMERS.

REPLACEMENT OF ALL OTHER 1E CIRCUIT BREAKERS ON 4KV BUSSES 11,14,21 AND 24 WAS PREVIOUSLY EVALUATED. A STUDY SHOWED THAT USE OF THE VACUUM CIRCUIT BREAKERS ON THESE LOCATIONS WITHOUT SURGE PROTECTION COULD SUBJECT THESE TRANSFORMERS TO DAMAGING VOLTAGE SURGES WHEN TAKEN OUT OF SERVICE UNLOADED.

TO PREVENT SUCH DAMAGE, SURGE PROTECTION, lN THE FORM OF METAL OXIDE ARRESTERS, WILL BE USED TO SHUNT VOLTAGE SURGES GREATER THAN 12 KV TO GROUND.

I Page 36 l

.. ._m.. _ . . ._ _ . - _ _. _- - _ - __. . - _ - - . . _ _

DOC 10

SUMMARY

I SE00303 THIS TEMPORARY ALTERATION WILL ALLOW, IF NECESSARY, A BLIND FLANGE TO BE ,

INSTALLED IN PLACE OF THE BONNET OF CONTROL VALVE 1-CV-210Y. THIS WILL  !

ALLOW THE PARTIAL LIFTING OF TAGS TO RESTORE THE FLOW PATH FROM THE REACTOR l COOLANT MAKE-UP PUMPS TO THE VOLUME CONTROL TANK. THIS WILL ALLOW i ADDITIONS TO THE TANK TO MAINTAIN THE DESIRED TANK LEVEL' THIS CONTROL l VALVE IS NOT PART OF THIS FLOW PATH, BUT IS SEPARATED FROM THIS PATH BY-  !

A CHECK VALVE. THE TEMPORARY CLOSURE ON THE CV WILL PREVENT THE LOSS OF l ANY MAKE-UP WATER THAT COULD LEAK PAST THE CHECK VALVE (1 CVC 242).

OPERATIONS HAS PROCEDURES IN PLACE FOR THE CONTROL OF BORON CONCENTRATION

' AND SHUTDOWN MARGIN WITHOUT THE USE OF THIS VALVE. THIS ACTIVITY DOES NOT .

CONSTITUTE AN UNREVIEWED SAFETY QUESTION.

SE00304 FUEL RECONSTITUTION OR INSPECTION ACTIVITIES WOULD REQUIRE PLACING A SINGLE ASSEMBLY OR MULTIPLE ASSEMBLIES ON RACK SPACERS IN THE RECONSTITUTION AREA i OF THE SPENT FUEL POOL AND REMOVING THEIR UPPER END FITTINGS, WHILE ALLOWING FUEL MOVEMENT TO CONTINUE IN THE SPENT FUEL POOL PLACING FUEL ASSEMBLIES [

ON RACK SPACERS CAUSES THEM TO PROTRUDE ABOVE THE TOPS OF THE SPENT FUEL  ;

RACKS IN THE SPENT FUEL POOL THIS IS INCONSISTENT WITH THE CURRENT  ;

DESCRIPTION OF A FUEL HANDLING INCIDENT IN THE UFSAR. ADDITIONALLY, THE  !

TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION 3. 7.13 (PERTAINING TO MINIMUM WATER LEVEL IN THE SPENT FUEL POOL) WOULD BE VIOLATED BY THIS ACTIVITY. THUS THE MARGIN OF SAFETY AS DEFINED IN THE BASIS FOR ANY TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION IS REDUCED FOR ASSEMBLIES SEATED ON SPACERS WITH THEIR UPPER END FITTINGS REMOVED; HOWEVER, THERE ARE NO SIGNIFICANT HAZARDS ASSOCIATED WITH THIS REDUCED MARGIN OF SAFETY BASED ON THE ADMINISTRATIVE CONTROLS PLACED ON THE i RECONSTITUTION AND INSPECTION ACTIVITIES. THE ADMINISTRATIVE CONTROLS {

INCLUDE RESTRICTIONS ON PLACEMENT OF THE AFFECTED ASSEMBLIES, RESTRICTIONS 1 ON MOVEMENT OF LOADS OR OTHER ASSEMBLIES IN THE VICINITY OF AFFECTED I ASSEMBLIES, RESTRICTIONS ON DECAY TIME BEFORE UPPER END FITTING REMOVAL, AND RESTRICTIONS ON PERMANENT STORAGE OF ALUMINUM SPACERS IN THE SPENT FUEL POOL. THIS ACTIVITY SUPPORTS REVISIONS TO THE UFSAR, THE TECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS, THE TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION BASE % AND THE FUEL HANDLING  ;

PROCEDURES TO ALLOW PLACEMENT OF ONE OR MORE FUEL ASSEMBLIES ON SFP RACK  !

SPACERS AND REMOVAL OF THElR UPPER END FITTINGS. THE PROPOSED ACTIVITY,  !

THEREFORE, MAKES THE REQUISITE MODIFICATIONS TO CHAPTER 14.18 OF THE UFSAR, l TO TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION 3. 7.13, AND TO THE BASIS FOR TECHNICAL 4  ?

Page 37

?

DOCID

SUMMARY

SPECIFICATION 3. 7.13 SUCH THAT THE DESCRIPTIONS THEREIN ARECONSISTENT WITH RECONSTITUTION OR INSPECTION OF MULTIPLE FUEL ASSEMBLIES. THESE  ;

CHANGES ARE SHOWN TO BE TECHNICALLY JUSTIFIABLE BY ANALYSIS. THE ANALYSIS PERFORMED EVALUATED THE RESULTS OF AN FHI IN THE SPENT FUEL POOL AREA WITH ONE OR MORE ASSEMBLIES PLACED ON RACK SPACERS. THE CALCULATION WAS PERFORMED IN ACCORDANCE WITH NRC REVIEWED AND APPROVED METHODOLOGY. THIS SAFETY EVALUATION DOCUMENTS THAT THE RESULTS OF THIS CALCULATION SHOW THAT AN FHI IN THE SPENT FUEL POOL AREA WITH MULTIPLE ASSEMBLIES ON RACK SPACERS i ARE BOUNDED BY PREVIOUSLY ACCEPTED RESULTS FOR A DESIGN BASIS FHI IN THE  ;

CONTAINMENT AND IN THE SPENT FUEL POOLS. .

I THIS WORK ALSO CLARIFIES THE SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENT OF TECHNICAL SPECIFl- l CATION BASES 3. 7.13 ON SPENT FUEL POOL LEVEL BEING AT EQUILIBRIUM WITH -[

THAT OF THE REFUELING CANAL DURING REFUELING OPERATIONS. THE REVISED i SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENT READS: "DURING REFUELING OPERATIONS, THE LEVEL IN i THE SPENT FUEL POOL IS NORMALLY AT EQUILIBRIUM WITH THAT OF THE REFUELING POOL".

SE00305 THE PROPOSED ACTIVITY IS AN ORGANIZATIONAL CHANGE THAT WILL RESULT IN THE i HEALTH PHYSICS CONSULTANT REPORTING DIRECTLY TO THE SUPERINTENDENT, i TECHNICAL SUPPORT. CURRENTLY, THE HEALTH PHYSICS CONSULTANT REPORTS TO  :

THE GENERAL SUPERVISOR, RADIATION SAFETY. l SE00306 i THE NRC GENERIC LETTER (GL) 96-06 IDENTIFIES AN OVERPRESSURE CONCERN IN THE CAC'S AND ASSOCIATED PIPING DUE TO POTENTIAL HEAT TRANSFER TO THE STAGNANT l SERVICE WATER IN THE CACS FOLLOWING A POSTULATED ACCIDENT. THE CONCERN IS THAT IF A LOSS OF OFFSITE POWER (LOOP) OCCURS DURING A LOSS OF COOLANT .

ACCIDENT (LOCA), POWER WOULD BE LOST TO BOTH THE CAC FAN COOLERS AND THE f SERVICE WATER (SRW) PUMPS, WHICH SUPPLY WATER TO THE FAN COOLERS. THE VOIDS WOULD FORM, AS DESCRIBED IN GL 96-06, WHEN THE SYSTEM DEPRESSURIZES  ;

BELOW THE LOCAL SATURATION PRESSURE AS A RESULT OF STOPPING OF THE SRW  ;

PUMPS DURING THE ABOVE POSTULATED SCENARIO. UPON RESTART OF THE SRW PUMPS i '

WHEN LOADED ON THE EMERGENCY DIESEL GENERATORS (EDG'S) THE VOIDS WOULD COLLAPSE THEREBY CAUSING WATERHAMMER. ,

i IN ORDER TO ADDRESS THE CONCERNS IDENTIFIED BY THE NRC GENERIC LETTER (GL) t i

Page 38  ;

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l DOC ID

SUMMARY

96-06, THE ORIGINAL DESIGN CONFIGURATION FOR THE SRW HEAD TANKS AND THE SRW SYSTEM WERE MODIFIED. THE MODIFICATION INSTALLED THE NECESSARY -

EQUIPMENT AND COMPONENTS TO SUPPLY NITROGEN PRESSURE TO THE SRW HEAD TANKS. THIS MODIFICATION INVOLVED AN USQ. WHILE WAITING ON THE USQ TO BE RESOLVED AND THE MODIFICATION TO BE APPROVED BY THE NRC, AN INTERIM CONFIGURATION WAS ADOPTED TO BRING THE PLANT INTO SERVICE IMMEDIATELY FOLLOWING THE RFO. THE INTERIM CONFIGURATION MAINTAINS THE SRW HEAD TANKS IN A DEPRESSURIZED STATE BY ISOLATING THE TANKS FROM THE NITROGEN SUPPLY AND VENTING THE TANKS TO ATMOSPHERE.

UPON FURTHER ANALYSIS, IT HAS BEEN DETERMINED THAT THE POSTULATED LOADS COULD BE HANDLED BY THE SRW SYSTEM WITH MINOR ADJUSTMENTS. AS A RESULT, THE NITROGEN PRESSURIZATION SYSTEM WILL BE REMOVED AND IN DOING SO WILL PHYSICALLY RETURN THE SRW SYSTEM AND THE SRW HEAD TANKS TO THEIR ORIGINAL CONFIGURATIONS. THERE ARE NO USQ S ASSOCIATED WITH THIS CONFIGURATION. ,

SE00307 THIS ACTIVITY WILL ALLOW THE SHUTTING OF 1 N2 407 AND 1 N2 408 (ISOLATION VALVES FOR 1-PS-4048B,1-PT-40488, AND 1-PI-4048C) OFF THE NITROGEN ,

ACCUMULATOR FOR THE #12 MAIN STEAM ISOLATION VALVE (MSIV) WHILE THE VALVE REMAINS OPERABLE. FURTHERMORE, WHILE THE ABOVE MENTIONED VALVES ARE SHUT, 1-PI-4048C WILL BE REPLACED WITH A STANDARD PIPE PLUG. ONCE THE PLUG IS INSTALLED,407 AND 408 WILL BE UNISOLATED AND 1-PS-4048B /1-PT-4048B WILL BE RESTORED TO NORMAL OPERATION. ADDITIONALLY,20 OF 24 BOLTS ON THE HYDRAULIC ACCUMULATOR TANK COVER WILL BE REMOVED DURING MODE 1 OPERATION OF THE VALVE AND ACTUATOR. THE REMOVAL OF THESE BOLTS HAS BEEN ANALYZED IN THE ENGINEERING EVALUATION SECTION OF TA 198 0092 AND FOUND TO NOT AFFECT THE SEISMIC QUALIFICATION OF THE ACTUATOR. SINCE THE PIPE PLUG INSTALLED IN PLACE OF 1-Pi-4048C IS QUALIFIED AS A SAFETY RELATED PRESSURE ,

BOUNDARY THE SAME REQUIREMENTS AS THE BALANCE OF THE TUBING AND COMPONENTS IN THE N2 ACCUMULATOR SUBSYSTEM, ITS INSTALLATION WILL NOT INCREASE THE PROBABILITY OF AN ACCIDENT OR MALFUNCTION OR THE CONSEQUENCES OR A MALFUNCTION OR ACCIDENT PREVIOUSLY ANALYZED IN THE SAR. THE ACCUMUI.ATOR ANNUNCIATION FUNCTION WILL BE PROVIDED BY A DEDICATED WATCH STATIONED AT THE 1C161 PANEL Page 39

4 DOCID .

SUMMARY

THIS ACTIVITY DOES NOT CREATE AN UNREVIEWED SAFETY QUESTION AS DEFINED BY 10CFR50.59.

SE00308 THIS ACTIVITY DOCUMENTS THE USE OF A CONSERVATIVELY HIGH X/Q IN THE LOAC AND FLB ANALYSES IN ORDER TO COMPENSATE FOR THE USE OF A NON-CONSERVATIVE LOW ESTIMATE OF THE DECAY HEAT IN THE CESEC PROGRAM. THIS COMPENSATORY -

MEASURE WILL BE USED UNTIL THE ANALYSES ARE REANALYZED.

THE CHANGES DO NOT INVOLVE AN UNREVIEWED SAFETY QUESTION SINCE THERE ARE NO CHANGES TO ANY OF THE PROBABILITIES OR CONSEQUENCES FOR THE ANALYZED ACCIDENTS, OR THE MARGIN OF SAFETY. i SE00309 THIS ACTIVITY CORRECTS ONE OF TWO DEFICIENCIES IDENTIFIED BY IR 1R 1998 0 0 6 21. SPECIFICALLY, THIS ACTIVITY:

DELETES REFERENCE TO LIGHTS INDICATING MODULE WITHDRAWAL FOR RPS IN SECTION 7.2 (7.2 - 3).

SE00310 THIS TEMPORARY ALTERATION PROVIDES THE PIPING FOR AN ADDITIONAL FLOW PATH (MINIMUM FLOW PATH) FOR THE SALTWATER (SW) PUMPS TO FACILITATE THE REPLACEMENT OF THE UNIT 2 SERVICE WATER HEAT EXCHANGERS. THIS WILL ENSURE THAT THE SW PUMPS OPERATE AT OR ABOVE THEIR REQUIRED MINIMUM FLOW RATE AND WILL ENSURE ADEQUATE FLOW THROUGH THE CCW HEAT EXCHANGERS.

THIS ADDITIONAL FLOW PATH WILL BE USED ONLY DURING MODE 5. MODE 6, AND DEFUELED. THE PIPING, WITH ISOLATION VALVE, FOR EACH NEW FLOW PATH CAN BE INSTALLED DURING A TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION LCO FOR ONE TRAIN OF SW WILE IN MODES 1-4. IN MODES 1-4, THE ISOLATION VALVE MUST BE LOCKED CLOSED TO MAINTAIN THE FUNCTION OF THE SALTWATER SYSTEM. ,

SINCE THE PROBABILITY AND CONSEQUENCES OF A PREVIOUSLY EVALUATED ACCIDENT OR MALFUNCTION HAVE NOT BEEN INCREASED BY THIS ACTIVITY, NO NEW MALFUNCTIONS HAVE BEEN CREATED BY THIS ACTIVITY, AND SINCE THIS ACTIVITY DOES NOT REDUCE THE MARGIN IN SAFETY DEFINED IN THE TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION BASES, THERE ARE ,

NO UNREVIEWED SAFETY QUESTIONS ASSOCIATED WITH THIS ACTIVITY.

SE00311 THE CONTROL ROOM HVAC SYSTEM AND ROOMS SERVED BY THE SYSTEM ALLOW INFILTRATION. THIS ACTIVITY WILL ALLOW THE OPENINGS TO THE OUTSIDE AIR TO BE COVERED. THIS WILL AfD IN THE EFFORT TO MONITOR INFILTRATION AND Page 40

---,-,,---,----_---------_--_w- - - , - - - - - - _ - - - _ _ _ - - - - ,_.,, --.-a,e . , - - - - --,,-- - +w__ m__ _ _ --- -_'- -v'-m - w w -_ 'v

DOCID

SUMMARY

DETERMINE WHAT CORRECTIVE ACTIONS MAY BE NEEDED TO IMPROVE SYSTEM INTEGRITY TO SUPPORT THE ASSUMPTIONS IN THE CONTROL ROM HABITABillTY ANALYSIS. THIS ACTIVITY DOES NOT DEGRADE THE PRESSURE BOUNDARY OF THE HVAC SYSTEM. WITH THE SYSTEM INTEGRITY ASSUREO, THE REQUIRED COOLING FOR THE ROOMS WILL BE AVAILABLE. THIS ACTIVITY DOES NOT CONSTITUTE AN UNREVIEWED SAFETY QUESTION.

SE00314 THIS ACTIVITY INVOLVES A CHANGE TO THE UFSAR SECTION 14.3, BORON DILUTION EVENT. THE CHANGE INVOLVES A CHANGE IN THE MANNER OF DEFINING THE LIMITING REFUELING BORON FOR THE BORON DILUTION EVENT AND A REVISION OF SECTION 14.3, INCORPORATE THE CHANGE. THE REANALYSIS RESULTS SHOW THAT THERE IS SUFFICIENT TIME TO ALLOW OPERATOR ACTION TO MITIGATE THE CONSEQUENCES BEFORE SHUTDOWN MARGIN IS LOST. THE CHANGES DO NOT INVOLVE AN UNREVIEWED SAFETY QUESTION SINCE THE RESULTING TIME TO LOSE SHUTDOWN MARGIN IS WITHIN THE ACCEPTANCE LIMITS.

SE00315 THIS ACTIVITY PROVIDES SHUTTING AND OVERRIDING THE ACCIDENT SIGNAL TO OPEN FOR ONE OF THE FOUR LOW PRESSURE SAFETY INJECTION HEADER MOTOR OPERATED VALVES. THIS ACTIVITY IS BEING IMPLEMENTED AS A COMPENSATORY MEASURE FOR A DEGRADED SAFETY INJECTION CHECK VALVE. THIS ACTIVITY WILL REQUIRE THAT TWO OF THE THREE REMAINING LOW PRESSURE SAFETY INJECTION HEADER MOTOR OPERATED VALVES BE PRE-POSITIONED TO THEIR ACCIDENT POSITION. THIS ACTIVITY DOES NOT INVOLVE AN UNREVIEWED SAFETY QUESTION SINCE THE ABOVE CONFIGURATION ENSURES AT LEAST TWO LOW PRESSURE SAFETY INJECTION LEGS ARE AVAILABLE TO THE REACTOR COOLANT SYSTEM GIVEN THE WORST SINGLE FAILURE. EVEN WITH THE FLOW FROM ONE OF THE INJECTION LEGS ASSUMED LOST OUT THE BREAK DURING A LOSS OF COOLANT ACCIDENT, THE ONE REMAINING INJECTION LEG WILL PROVIDE ADEQUATE FLOW TO MAINTAIN CORE COOLING.

THEREFORE, THIS ACTIVITY DOES NOT INVOLVE AN UNREVIEWED SAFETY QUESTION. 4 SE00316 THIS TEMPORARY ALTERATION REMOVES FLANGED PORTIONS OF PIPING IN THE UNIT 2 MOTOR-DRIVEN AFW PUMP RECIRCULATION LINE TO THE CONDENSATE STORAGE TANK AND IN THE NORMALLY CLOSED CHEMICAL ADDITION LINE CONNECTED TO THE DISCHARGE OF THE PUMP. BLIND FLANGES ARE INSTALLED WHERE THE PIPING HAS BEEN REMOVED.

THE REMOVAL OF THESE PORTIONS OF PIPING IS REQUIRED TO FACILITATE MOVEMENT OF MATERIALS ASSOCIATED WITH THE REPLACEMENT OF THE UNIT 2 SERVICE WATER Page 41 l

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DOCID

SUMMARY

i

. (SRW) HEAT EXCHANGERS. THIS TEMPORARY ALTERATION ONLY APPLIES IN MODES I 4,5,6 AND DEFUELED.  !

I THE RECIRCULATION FLOW PATH IS NEEDED WHEN THE AFW SYSTEM IS ALIGNED FOR ' j AUTOMATIC FLOW INITIATION AND THEREFORE IT IS REQUIRED IN MODES 1-3. THE  :}'

MOTOR-DRIVEN PUMP WILL REMAIN AVAILABLE FOR MANUAL FLOW INITIATION FOR CROSS-i CONNECTION TO UNIT 1 IN ALL MODES.

SINCE THE PROBABILITY AND CONSEQUENCES OF A PREVIOUSLY EVALUATED ACCIDENT OR  !

MALFUNCTION HAVE NOT BEEN INCREASED BY THIS ACTIVITY, NO NEW MALFUNCTION OR ACCIDENTS HAVE BEEN CREATED BY THIS ACTIVITY, AND SINCE THIS ACTIVITY WILL NOT REDUCE THE MARGIN OF SAFETY DEFINED IN THE TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION BASES, THERE ARE NO UNREVIEWED SAFETY QUESTIONS ASSOCIATED WITH THIS l ACTIVITY.  !

L SE00318 THIS SAFETY EVALUATION CONCERNS A CHANGE TO THE UFSAR SECTION ON TURBINE MISSILES ONLY. NO PHYSICAL CHANGES WERE MADE TO THE PLANT. PREVIOUSLY, THE AFW PUMP ROOM LOCATED IN THE TURBlNE BUILDING WAS NOT ADDRESSED AS A  ;

i POTENTIAL MISSILE TARGET. ALSO, THE CONCRETE WALL BETWEEN THE AUXILIARY l BUILDING AND THE TURBINE BUILDING IS CREDITED FOR MISSILE PROTECTION.

HOWEVER, THE WALL CONTAINS NON MISSILE PROOF DOORS TO THE SWITCHGEAR ROOMS AND THE HVAC EQUIPMENT ROOM THIS ISSUE WAS NOT PREVIOUSLY ADDRESSED.

THREE METHODS ARE USED TO ADDRESS THESE CONCERNS. A REVISED BECHTEL i CALCULATION SHOWS THAT THE U-1 AFW PUMP ROOM,2T SWITCHGEAR ROOM AND  !

SEVERAL OTHER STRUCTURES AND COMPONENTS ARE ADEQUATELY PROTECTED. A i PROBABILISTIC CALCULATION IS USED TO SHOW THAT THE NON MISSILE PROOF  ;

DOORS TO THE 45' SWITCHGEAR ROOM AND THE CONTROL ROOM HVAC EQUIPMENT ROOM  !

ON THE 69' LEVEL ARE SUFFICIENTLY SMALL THAT THE TOTAL MISSILE HAZARD RATE (P4) FOR LOW TRAJECTORY MISSILES IS LESS THAN THE REG GUIDE 1.115 CRITERIA  ;

OF 10 -7 PER YEAR. THE RISK FROM UNIT 2 TURBINE MISSILES IS ADDRESSED BY  !

SHOWING THAT THE TURBINE MISSILE GENERATION PROBABILITY (P1) IS LESS THAN THE NRC CRITERIA OF 10 -5 PER YEAR.

I IN

SUMMARY

, THE TURBINE MISSILE RISK TO UNIT 1 AND UNIT 2 IS ACCEPTABLY LOW. THIS UFSAR CHANGE IS CONSIDERED A USQ BECAUSE SEVERAL UNPROTECTED *

. i Page 42 l

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SUMMARY

[

COMPONENTS, WHICH WERE NOT PREVIOUSLY DISCUSSED, ARE INCLUDED IN THE  :

PROPOSED UFSAR CHANGE. THESE COMPONENTS INCLUDE EQUIPMENT IN THE 45' SWITCHGEAR ROOM AND THE CONTROL ROOM HVAC EQUIPMENT ROOM (BECAUSE OF NON MISSILE PROOF DOORS), THE REFUELING WATER TANKS, AND THE SALT WATER PUMPS ALTHOUGH THE RISK IS QUITE SMALL,' THESE COMPONENTS REPRESENT AN INCREASE ,

IN THE PROBABILITY OF A MALFUNCTION OF EQUIPMENT IMPORTANT TO SAFETY AS DISCUSSED IN THIS SAFETY EVALUATION.

SE00319 _ PER I.E. BULLETIN 80-10 REQUIREMENTS, A 10CFR50.59 EVALUATION MUST BE PERFORMED TO ALLOW THE CONTINUED OPERATION OF THE TENDON ACCESS GALLERY .

SUMPS AS A RADIOLOGICALLY CONTAMINATED SYSTEM DUE TO THE PRESENCE OF l RADIOLOGICALLY CONTAMINATED WATER. THIS ACTIVITY DOES NOT AFFECT NUCLEAR SAFETY, AND DOES NOT CONSTITUTE AN UNREVIEWED SAFETY QUESTION.

i SE00321 THIS ACTIVITY WILL RETIRE THE MAKEUP DEMINERAllZER REGENERATION SYSTEM.

FACILITY CHANGE REQUEST (FCR) 86-0051 RETIRED THE MAJORITY OF THIS SYSTEM  :

AND RENAMED THE REMAINING PORTION MAKEUP DEMINERALIZER SYSTEM. HOWEVER, THE FCR WAS INCOMPLETE IN ISOLATING THE SYSTEM AND UPDATING DESIGN DOCUMENTS. THE FUNCTION OF MAKEUP DEMINERALIZER REGENERATION SYSTEM WAS >

TO PURIFY WELL WATER AND MAKE IT AVAILABLE TO THE PLANT AS DEMINERALIZED WATER. THE MAKEUP DEMINERALIZER REGENERATION SYSTEM WAS REPLACED WITH A ['

MOBILE UNIT. THE MAKEUP DEMINERALIZER REGENERATION SYSTEM AND THE MAKEUP DEMINERALIZER SYSTEM ARE NONSAFETY-RELATED AND ARE NOT IMPORTANT TO SAFETY.  :

THIS SAFETY EVALUATION WILL EVALUATE:

1. THE REMOVAL OF THE MAKEUP DEMINERALIZER REGENERATION SYSTEM DEGASIFIER VACUUM PUMPS FROM THE LIST OF TURBINE PLANT COMPONENTS ,5 I COOLED BY THE SERVICE WATER SYSTEM (SRW), PAGE 9.5 -5 REVISION 22 OF THE UFSAR.

2. THE REMOVAL OF THE SRW SUPPLY AND RETURN BRANCHES FOR DEMIN '

(DEMINERALIZED) WATER, FROM UFSAR FIGURE 9-9.

THE SAFETY-RELATED PORTION OF THE SRW SYSTEM IS ISOLATED FROM THE NONSAFETY TURBINE BUILDING SECTION BY SAFETY RELATED ISOLATION VALVES 1-CV-1600, 1-CV-1638,1-CV-1637 AND 1-CV-1639. THE NONSAFETY-RELATED / NOT IMPORTANT  ;

Page 43 i

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DOCID

SUMMARY

TO SAFETY SRW SUPPLY AND RETURN TO THE MAKEUP DEMINERALIZED REGENERATION .

SYSTEM DEGASIFIER VACUUM PUMPS WILL BE REMOVED BY CUTTING AND CAPPING THE PIPE IN ACCORDANCE WITH APPROVED DESIGN DOCUMENTS (M-600).

THIS ACTIVITY HAS NO AFFECT TO ANY EQUIPMENT IMPORTANT.TO SAFETY.

THERE IS NO TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION FOR THE MAKEUP DEMINERAllZED REGENERATION SYSTEM.

THIS ACTIVITY DOES NOT AFFECT THE MARGIN OF SAFETY AS DEFINED IN THE TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION FOR THE SERVICE WATER SYSTEM.

THIS ACTIVITY DOES NOT CONSTITUTE AN UNREVIEWED SAFETY QUESTION.

SE00323 THE PROPOSED ACTIVITY WILL ABANDON THE OUTAGE AIR ORYER / FILTER IN PLACE.

THE OUTAGE AIR DRYER / FILTER SYSTEM WAS ONLY DESIGNED TO FACILITATE OUTAGE RELATED WORK. THE SYSTEM WAS NEVER COMPLETED PER ITS ORIGINAL DESIGN AND IS NOT USED DURING OUTAGES, TO NO SIGNIFICANT ADVERSE AFFECT. THIS ACTIVITY DOES NOT INCREASE THE PROBABILITY OF OCCURRENCE OR THE CONSEQUENCES OF ANY ACCIDENT OR MALFUNCTION OF EQUIPMENT IMPORTANT TO SAFETY. THE -

UFSAR WILL BE REVISED TO DELETE REFERENCE TO THE OUTAGE AIR DRYER AND ASSOCIATED PIPING.

SE00324 1) A NEW POSITION (ASSISTANT GENERAL SUPERVISOR - RADIATION SAFETY) HAS BEEN CREATED. THIS NEW POSITION WILL OVERSEE THE RADIATION CONTROL UNIT AND THE ALARA UNIT. THIS LEVEL OF OVERSIGHT IS CURRENTLY NEEDED TO HELP ENSURE CONSISTENT APPLICATION OF RADIATION PROTECTION REQUIREMENTS.

2) RADIATION TECHNICAL SERVICES UNIT AND CHEMISTRY TECHNICAL SERVICES UNIT ARE BEING MERGED INTO A NEWLY CREATED UNIT ENTITLED RADIATION /

CHEMISTRY TECHNICAL SERVICES UNIT. THE NEW UNIT WILL REPORT TO THE GENERAL SUPERVISOR - CHEMISTRY.

SE00326 THE DESCRIPTION OF TESTS AND INSPECTIONS OF CHARCOAUHEPA FILTER UNITS FOR THE CONTAINMENT PENETRATION ROOM VENTILATION SYSTEM AND THE CONTAINMENT IODINE REMOVAL SYSTEM LISTS THE TESTING THAT WAS DONE FOR HISTORICAL REFERENCE. THE REVISION TO THE SAR IS TO CLARIFY THIS INFORMATION Page 44

DOC ID .

SUMMARY

BY DELETING THE HISTORICAL DATA AND ADDING REFERENCE TO CURRENT TESTING GUIDELINES. THE UNIT 1 AND UNIT 2 TECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS AND INDUSTRY AND NRC ACCEPTED STANDARDS (REGULATORY GUIDE 1.52, ASTM D3803-1989, AND ANSI N510-1975) ENSURE THE LATEST TESTING METHODS ARE UTILIZED ELIMINATING THE NEED TO MAINTAIN HISTORICAL TEST DATA IN THE SAR. SAR SECTIONS 6.6.7,6.7.2,6.7.7 AND 9.8.

WILL BE REVISED ACCORDINGLY TO DELETE HISTORICAL TEST DATA AND REFERENCE THE TECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS AND THE AFOREMENTIONED STANDARDS TO ENSURE CURRENT TESTING REQUIREMENTS ARE ME SINCE THE PROBABILITY AND CONSEQUENCES OF PREVIOUSLY EVALUATED MALFUNCTIONS AND ACCIDENTS ARE NOT INCREASED BY THIS ACTIVITY, THE PROBABILITY OF NEW MALFUNCTIONS AND ACCIDENTS ARE NOT CREATED BY THIS ACTIVITY, AND THE MARGINS OF SAFETY EXPRESSED IN THE TECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS ARE NOT REDUC BY THIS ACTIVITY, THERE IS NO UNREVIEWED SAFETY QUESTION ASSOCIATED WITH THIS ACTIVITY.

SE00327 THIS ACTIVITY WILL ALLOW THE EXISTING SOCKET WELDED, LIFT TYPE CHECK VALVE ON THE NITROGEN INLET TO THE SAFETY INJECTION TANKS TO BE REPLACED WITH AN ALTERNATE TYPE OF CHECK VALVE. THE NEW CHECK VALVES WILL BE FLANGED TO FACILITATE MAIRi'ENANCE AND WILL INCORPORATE AN 0-RING TO IMPROVE THE SEALING CHARACTERISTICS. THIS ACTIVITY DOES NOT CHANGE THE MARGIN OF SAFETY AS DESCRIBED IN THE TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION. NOR DOES IT AFFECT THE ACCIDENT ANALYSIS DISCUSSED IN THE SAR. THIS ACTIVITY DOES NOT CONSTITUTE AN UNREVIEWED SAFETY QUESTION.

SE00328 THE PRESSURIZER LEVEL CONTROL PROGRAM ON UFSAR FIGURE 4-11 WILL BE CHANGED TO REFLECT THE ACTUAL RESET VALUE FOR THE LOW LEVEL ALARM AND BACKUP SIGNAL TO START BACKUP CHARGING PUMPS, AND THE RESET VALUE FOR THE SIGNAL THAT ENERGlZES PRESSURIZER HEATERS AND STOPS BACKUP CHARGING PUMPS. ADDITIONALLY, THE SIGNAL FOR MINIMUM AND MAXIMUM LETDOWN WILL BE CHANGED TO REFLECT THE ACTUAL SETTINGS, AND THE PRESENTATION OF INFORMATION ON FIGURE 4-11 WILL BE CHANGED TO MAKE IT MORE READABLE. REFERENCE TO THE OUTPUT SIGNAL FROM THE PROPORTIONAL CONTROLLER WILL BE REMOVED FROM FIGURE 4-11. THIS INFORMATION -

IS CONSIDERED EXTRANEOUS DETAll WHICH MAKES THE FIGURE HARDER TO READ. THE CONTROL SYSTEM COMPARES THE PROGRAMMED LEVEL SETPOINT WITH THE MEASURED PRESSURIZER WATER LEVEL THE RESULTING ERROR SIGNAL IS USED TO CONTROL THE OPERATION OF THE CHARGING PUMPS, THE LETDOWN VALVES, AND THE PRESSURIZER HEATERS. THE FUNCTION AND METHOD OF PERFORMING THE FUNCTION OF THE PRESSURIZER LEVEL CONTROL SYSTEM REMAINS UNCHANGED.

Page 45 j

DOCID

SUMMARY

THIS ACTIVITY DOES NOT INCREASE THE PROBABILITY OR CONSEQUENCES OF AN ACCIDENT OR MALFUNCTION PREVIOUSLY EVALUATED IN THE SAR, NOR DOES IT CREATE A -NEW TYPE OF ACCIDENT OR MALFUNCTION NOT PREVIOUSLY EVALUATED IN THE SAR.

THIS ACTIVITY DOES NOT RESULT IN A REDUCTION OF THE MARGIN OF SAFETY IN THE TECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS. THEREFORE THIS ACTIVITY DOES NOT RESULT IN AN UNREVIEWED SAFETY QUESTION.

SE00329 THE PROPOSED ACTIVITY IS TO CHANGE OPERATING PROCEDURES TO ALLOW CONTINUED OPERABILITY OF THE SRW SUBSYSTEM AND THE ASSOCIATED DG AND ONE CONTAINMENT AIR COOLER WHEN ONE OF THE SRW PLATE HEAT EXCHANGERS IS SECURED FOR MAINTENANCE. THIS CHANGE REQUIRES A REVISION TO TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION 3.7.6 TO DEFINE REQUIRED ACTIONS FOR THIS CONDITION.

ASSOCIATED CHANGES WILL BE MADE TO THE TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION BASES.

NOTE: THE PROPOSED ACTIVITY APPLIES TO THE EXISTING UNIT 1 SW AND SRW SYSTEM CONFIGURATIONS AND TO THE UNIT 2 SW AND SRW SYSTEM '

CONFIGURATIONS AFTER IMPLEMENTATION OF ES199501141 IN THE 1999 RFO.

ES199501141 REPLACED EACH SRW HEAT EXCHANGER WITH A PAIR OF NEW PLATE AND FRAME HEAT EXCHANGERS HAVING INCREASED THERMAL PERFORMANCE CAPABILITY.

EACH NEW PL. ATE HEAT EXCHANGER IS CAPABLE OF REMOVING APPROXIMATELY 50% OF THE DESIGN ACCIDENT HEAT LOAD AT A BAY TEMPERATURE OF 90F. THE SYSTEM IS DESIGNED TO ALLOW INDEPENDENT ISOLATION OF EACH HX. THIS PERMITS ONE HX TO REMAIN IN SERVICE WHILE THE OTHER HX ON THE SUBSYSTEM IS ISOLATED.

HOWEVER, A SINGLE HX CANNOT REMOVE THE FULL ACCIDENT HEAT LOAD ASSOCIATED WITH THE SRW SUBSYSTEM. THE CURRENT LICENSING BASIS REQUIRES THE AFFECTED SRW SUBSYSTEM TO BE DECLARED INOPERABLE WHILE A SINGLE HX IS ISOLATED.

CONSEQUENTLY, ALL ASSOCIATED SAFETY RELATED EQUIPMENT IS CONSIDERED TO BE INOPERABLE.

ISOLATING ONE OF THE CONTAINMENT AIR COOLERS ASSOCIATED WITH THE ISOLATED HX WOULD REDUCE THE MAXIMUM ACCIDENT HEAT LOAD ON THE SYSTEM SUFFICIENTLY TO ENSURE THAT SRW SUPPLY TEMPERATURE WOULD BE MAINTAINED WITHIN DESIGN LIMITS. THIS WOULD ALLOW CONTINUED OPERATION OF THE AFFECT 3D SW, SRW AND CC SUBSYSTEMS AND ALL LOADS COOLED BY THESE SUBSYSTEMS. SPECIFICALLY, THE DG AND ONE CONTAINMENT AIR COOLER ON THE AFFECTED SRW SUBSYSTEM AND ALL OF THE CC COOLED LOADS COULD REMAIN OPERABLE WHILE THE HX IS BEING CLEANED OR IS Page 46 l

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SUMMARY

t

- SECURED FOR OTHER REASONS. THIS OPERATING CONFIGURATION WOULD REDUCE THE

OVERALL IMPACT OF HEAT EXCHANGER MAINTENANCE ON THE AVAILABILITY OF OTHER SAFETY RELATED EQUIPMENT.

THIS ACTIVITY DOES NOT INVOLVE ANY PHYSICAL MODIFICATION TO THE PLANT OR  ;

CHANGE IN SYSTEM OPERATING LIMITS. ALL SAFETY RELATED SYSTEMS WILL -  !

CONTINUE TO PERFORM THEIR FUNCTIONS AS DESCRIBED IN THE SAR. THE PROPOSED TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION CHANGE WILL ALLOW ADDITIONAL EQUIPMENT I IMPORTANT TO SAFETY, INCLUDING THE DG, TO REMAIN OPERABLE DURING HX  !

MAINTENANCE. -

THUS THIS ACTIVITY DOES NOT INCREASE THE PROBABILITY OF AN ACCIDENT OR _

MALFUNCTION, OR INCREASE THE CONSEQUENCES OF PREVIOUSLY EVALUATED MALFUNCTIONS AND ACCIDENTS, AND DOES NOT REDUCE THE MARGIN OF SAFETY AS EXPRESSED IN THE TECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS OR TECHNICAL REQUIREMENTS MANUAL. THIS ACTIVITY DOES NOT INVOLVE AN UNREVIEWED SAFETY QUESTION. -

HOWEVER, SINCE THE PROPOSED ACTIVITY IS A CHANGE TO THE TECHNICAL  !

SPECIFICATIONS, PRIOR NRC APPROVAL IS REQUIRED PRIOR TO IMPLEMENTATION.

SE00331 THE EXISTING NSR EFFLUENT SAMPLERS FOR COLLECTION OF MAIN PLANT VENT  ;

PARTICULATE, IODINE, AND TRITIUM SAMPLES ARE TO BE REPLACED WITH REDUNDANT TRAINS OF SAMPLERS THAT ALLOW FOR BETTER FLOW CONTROL, FLOW ALARMS, AND l AUTOMATIC TRANSFER OF FUNCTION TO A REDUNDANT TRAIN UPON LOSS OF THE  !

SELECTED TRAIN. CONTINUOUS SAMPLING OF MAIN PLANT VENT EFFLUENT IS ACCOMPLISHED TO COMPLY WITH THE ODCM REVISION 3 SECTIONS 3.3.3.9 AND 4.11. 2.1. THERE ARE NO REQUIREMENTS FOR THIS MONITORING FUNCTION IN THE .

TECH SPECS, NOR DOES THIS EQUIPMENT SATISFY ANY RG 1.97 OR SOER 93-01  ;

REQUIREMENTS. THE REPLACEMENT OF THIS EQUIPMENT WILL HAVE NO EFFECT UPON THE TECH SPECS, AND THE SAR WILL BE CHANGED VIA UCR TO REFLECT THE NEW .;

UNIT ID NUMBERS AND THE PRESENCE OF REDUNDANT TRAINS. IN CONCLUSION, THIS ACTIVITY IS NOT A USQ. t 3 SE00332 THE FORMATION OF NEW UNITS WITHIN RADIATION SAFETY SECTION PROVIDES FOR A MORE EFFECTIVE ORGANIZATION TO MANAGE THE RADIATION PROTECTION l PROGRAM AND ENSURE WORKER SAFETY. THE RADIATION SAFETY SHIFT OPERATIONS  !

, UNIT WILL ESTABLISH THE NECESSARY BARRICADES, POSTINGS AND CONTROLS AS A t I I

Page 47  ;

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SUMMARY

RESULT OF ALARA PLANNING. THE RADIATION SAFETY SPONSORSHIP UNIT DUTIES INCLUDE ACTIVE INVOLVEMENT IN WORK THAT HAS BEEN CLASSIFIED AS RADIOLOGICAL HIGH RISK (RHR) TO HELP ENSURE WORKER SAFETY.

SE00335 TEMPORARY ALTERATION 2 98 0043 REMOVES A SECTION OF CONTAINMENT COOLING SYSTEM DUCTWORK TO ALLOW 21B REACTOR COOLANT PUMP MAINTENANCE. THIS REMOVES MOST OF THE COOLING AIR SUPPLY TO THE PRESSURIZER COMPARTMF_NT.

THE OPERABILITY OF THE CONTAINMENT COOLING SYSTEM IS REQUIRED BY TECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS DURING PLANT MODES 1,2 AND 3.

THIS TA IS INSTALLED DURING PLANT SHUTDOWN IN MODES 5 THROUGH DEFUELED. THE REMAINING COOLING AIR SUPPLY HAS MORE THAN SUFFICIENT CAPACITY TO COOL THE COMPARTMENT WITH THE PRIMARY SYSTEM IN THIS LOW ENERGY CONDITION. ALSO, THE OPENINGS LEFT BY REMOVING THE SECTIONS WILL BE COVERED TO PREVENT FOREIGN MATERIAL INTRUSION.

THEREFORE, THIS ACTIVITY IS NOT AN UNREV:EWED SAFETY QUESTION, NOR DOES IT REDUCE THE MARGIN OF SAFETY AS DESCRIBED IN THE TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION BASES.

SE00338 THIS ACTIVITY ALLOWS THE CONDENSATE PRECOAT FILTER BYPASS VALVE 1CV5818 TO BE GAGGED OPEN. THE CONNECTING LINKAGE BETWEEN THE VALVE VANE ARM AND THE ACTUATOR IS BROKEN AND GAGGING THE VALVE OPEN WILL ALLOW IT TO BE REPAIRED WHILE IT REMAINS IN SERVICE. GAGGING THE VALVE OPEN WILL ENSURE CONDENSATE FLOW IS UNINTERRUPTED BUT WILL BYPASS THE PRECOAT FILTERS. THE PRECOAT FILTERS ARE ONLY USED FOR LONG TERM PURITY OF THE CONDENSATE; THEREFORE, TEMPORARILY BYPASSING THEM WILL NOT INCREASE THE PROBABILITY OR CONSEQUENCES OF A MALFUNCTION OR ACCIDENT. SINCE THE GAG IS DESIGNED TO BE STRONGER THAN THE ACTUATOR FORCE, THERE WILL BE NO INCREASE IN THE PROBABILITY OF IT FAILING. THERE ARE NO SURVEILLANCE TEST PROCEDURES OR TECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS TO EITHER THE CONDENSATE DEMINERAllZER OR PRECOAT FILTER SYSTEM.

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