ML20117F639
| ML20117F639 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Calvert Cliffs  |
| Issue date: | 05/14/1996 |
| From: | Katz P BALTIMORE GAS & ELECTRIC CO. |
| To: | NRC OFFICE OF INFORMATION RESOURCES MANAGEMENT (IRM) |
| References | |
| NUDOCS 9605170536 | |
| Download: ML20117F639 (2) | |
Text
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o PETr.: E.KATZ Baltimore Gas and Electric Company Plant General Manager Calven Cliffs Nuclear Power Plant Calvert Cliffs Nuclear Power Plant 1650 Calvert Cliffs Parkway Lusby, Maryland 20657 410 495-4101 May 14,1996 U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, DC 20555 ATTENTION:
Document Control Desk
SUBJECT:
Calvert Cliffs Nuclear Power Plant Unit Nos.1 & 2; Docket Nos. 50-317 & 50-318 Special Report Concerning Fire liose Stations Technical Specification 3.7.11.4. Action Statement a in accordance with our Technical Specification 3.7.11.4, Action Statement a, please find attached a Special Report concerning inoperable fire hose stations. Specifically, the fire hose stations in the Unit 1 Containment were inoperable during the Unit I refueling outage for greater than 14 days to support work activities associated with local leak rate testing of the Fire Main Containment Penetration and fire main check valve repairs. The Technical Specification required compensatory actions were in place until the affected fire ht:se stations were restored to an operable status on May 7,1996.
Should you have questions regarding this matter, we will be pleased to discuss them with you.
Very truly yours, 7
PEK/CDS/bjd Attachment cc:
D. A. Brune, Esquire J. E. Silberg, Esquire Director, Project Directorate 1-1, NRC A. W. Dromerick, NRC T. T. Martin, NRC Resident inspector, NRC R. I. McLean, DNR J.11. Walter, PSC 170074
//h; I 9605170536 960514 PDR ADOCK 05000317 S
ATTACifMENT (1)
FIRE IlOSE STATIONS SPECIAL REPORT CAUSE OF INOPERABIlITY On April 4,1996, the Fire llose Stations inside the Calvert Cliffs Unit 1 Containment were disabled to permit work activities. Rese activities included conduct of local leak rate tests of the containment isolation valves for the Fire Main Containment Penetration and repairs to one of these isolation valves (a fire system check valve during the Unit 1 Refueling Outage). The Unit 1 Containment contains a total of six hose stations with two each on the 10 foot,45 foot, and 69 foot elevations. The hose stations inside Containment are supplied from a common system header that penetrates the Containment Structure.
The fire hose stations in this area are listed in Technical Specification Table 3.7-6 and the compensatory measures required when they become inoperable are addressed by Technical Specification 3.7.11.4,
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Action Statement a. As specified by Technical Specification 3.7.11.4, Action Statement a, if the fire hose station is not restored to an operable status within 14 days, a Special Report must be submitted within 30 days detailing the cause of the inoperability, the action taken and the plans and schedule for restoring it to an operable status. The affected Fire liose Stations were inoperable for more than 14 days as of April 18,1996.
ACTION TAKEN As specified by Technical Specification 3.7.11.4, Action Statement a, an additional equivalent capacity fire hose was routed to the unprotected areas (Containment) from an operable hose station. A temporary fire hose was routed from an outside fire hydrant to inside containment and connected to the containment header while the portion of the Fire Main at the containment penetration was isolated and inoperable.
This temporary fire hose was in place until the Fire Main was restored to an operable status on May 7,1996.
PLANS AND SCHEDUI FS Werk on the fire system check valve and its containment penetration has been completed and the hose stations inside containment were restored to an operable status on May 7,1996, i