ML20203H868

Forwards FEMA Exercise Rept & 860508 Cover Memo Re 851022 Offsite Emergency Preparedness Exercise.No Deficiencies Identified.Corrective Actions Recommended by State of Wi for Util Must Be Addressed

ML20203H868
Person / Time
Site:	Kewaunee
Issue date:	07/29/1986
From:	Shafer W NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION III)
To:	Hintz D WISCONSIN PUBLIC SERVICE CORP.
References
NUDOCS 8608050112
Download: ML20203H868 (2)

Text

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JUL 291986 Docket No. 50-305 Wisconsin Public Service Corporation ATTN: Mr. D. C. Hintz Manager Nuclear Power Post Office Box 19002 Green Bay, WI 54307-9002 Gentlemen:

We have received the enclosed Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) letter dated May 8, 1986, and associated exercise evaluation on the offsite emergency preparedness exercise conducted on October 22, 1985. This was a partial participation exercise for the State of Wisconsin and a full participation exercise for Kewaunee and Manitowac Counties.

Based on the performance of the offsite agencies during the exercise, FEMA did not identify any deficiencies, but there were areas requiring corrective action, and the State has prepared a schedule of adequate corrective actions.

The areas requiring correction did not detract from the overall demonstrated capability to protect the health and safety of the public. The FEMA approval under 44 CFR 350 will remain in effect.

We fully recognize that the recommendations to be implemented may involve actions by other parties and political institutions which are not under your direct control. Nonetheless, we would expect the subject of offsite preparedness for the area around the Kewaunee Nuclear Power Plant to be addressed by you as well as others.

In accordance with 10 CFR 2.790 of the Commission's regulations, a copy of this letter and the enclosure will be placed in the NRC's Public Document Room.

Sincerely,

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2 860729 K 05000305 woriainal sic"*d M PDR. W. D. Shafer, Chief Emergency Preparedness and Radiological Protection Branch

Enclosure:

As stated O

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o Wisconsin Public Service 2 JU L. 2 9 totW5  :

Corporation Distribution cc w/ enclosure:

C. R. Steinhardt, Plant Manager DCS/RSB(RIDS)

Licensing Fee Management Branch Resident Inspector, RIII John J. Duffy, Chief Boiler Section Ness Flores, Chairperson Wisconsin Public Service Commission I cc w/o enclosure:

4 D. Matthews, 01E, EPB i

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/ Washington, D.C. 20472 N,3$ b N *" $ $ jjcalM 0 ni d ic MEMORANDlM FOR: Edward L. Jordan M 1 Director ', ff>  ?

Division of Emergency Preparedness ibS U and Engineering Response j t Office of Inspection and Enforcenent U.S Nuclear Regulatory Conmission fId FROM: ca . Arimm Assistant Associate Director Office of Natural and Technological Hazards Programs

SUBJECT:

Exercise Report of the October 22, 1985, Exercise of the Offsite Radiological Emergency Preparedness Plans for the Kewaunee Nuclear Power Plant Attached are two copies of the Exercise Report of the October 22, 1985, joint exercise of the offsite radiological energency preparedness plans for t?.e Kewaunee Nuclear Power Plant. This was a partial participation exercise for the State of Wisconsin aM a full participation exercise for Kewaunee aM Manitowoc Counties. The report dated April 3,1986, was prepared by Region V of the Federal Dnergency Management Agency (FDtA).

There were no deficiencies observed at the exercise. There were inadequacies identified requiring corrective actions, however, they did not detract fran the overall denonstrated capatility to protect the health ard safety of the public. The State has preoared a schedule of corrective actions and a copy of the schedule is attached. FEMA Headquarters and Region V staff have reviewed the schedule of corrective actions submitted by the State and found it to be Mequate. Based on the exercise and the corrective actions schedule, we cannot identify any impediments to protectirg the public health aM safety in the event of an incident at the Kewaunee NPP. Therefore, the approval under FEMA rule 44 CFR 350 will renain in effect.

If you have any questions, please contact Mr. Robert S. Wilkerson, Chief, Technological Hazards Division, at 646-2861.

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f EXERCISE REPORT KEWAUNEE NUCLEAR POWER PLANT WISCONSIN PUBLIC SERVICE CORPORATION JOINT EXERCISE Location of the Plant: Located in the State of Wisconsin, Kewaunee County," -

near the town of Carlton, Wisconsin.

Exercise Date: - October 22, 1985 Date of Report: February 7,1986 [ DRAFT') APivt 3,19 8G Fiu At Participants Included: The State of Wisconsin (partial), Kewaunee County (full), Manitowoc County (full), and the Wisconsin Public Servi Corporation (full).

PREPARED BY THE FEDERAL DiERGENCY MANAGDiENT AGENCY, REGION V NATURAL AND TECHNOLOGICAL HAZARDS DIVISION .

TECHNOLOGICAL HAZARDS BRANCH

- 300 SOUTH WACKER DRIVE, 25TH FLOOR CHICAGO, ILLINOIS 60606 1605T4OO9F PDR 860538 ~

F ADOCK 05000305 PDR o

TABLE OF CONTENTS TABLE OF CONTENTS page 1 i 1

EXERCISE SUmARY page 2 State of Wisconsin page 2 Kewaunee County page 3 l Manitowoc County page 4 ,

EXERCISE REPORT page 6 Introduction page 6

1. Exercise Background page 6

2. Participating and Non-Participating State and Local Governments page 6

3. List of Evaluators page 6

4. Evaluation Criteria page 7

5. Sunmary of Exercise Objectives page 7

6. Sumary of the Scenario page 11

7. Description of State and Local Resources Planned To Be Used in the Exercise page 12

8. Findings Noted in Past Exercises page 13

9. Exercises Objectives Still To Be Effectively Achieved page 14 -

Narrative page 16

1. State of Wisconsin page 16

2. Kewaunee County page 21

3. Manitowoc County page 27

SUMMARY

LISTING OF EXERCISE FINDINGS page 32 State of Wisconsin

1. Deficiencies page 33

2. Areas Requiring Corrective Action page 34

3. Areas Reconmended for Inprovement page 36 Kewaunee County

1. Deficiencies page 37

2. Areas Requiring Corrective Action page 38

3. Areas Reconmended for Inprovement page 41 Manitowoc County ,

1. Deficiencies page 42

2. Areas Requiring Corrective Action page 43

3. Areas Reconmended for Improvement page 45 1

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EXERCISE

SUMMARY

State of Wisconsin We Wisconsin Division of Emergency Government (DEG) comunications center received notification of an " Unusual Event" at the Kewaunee Nuclear Power Plant via the National Warning System (NAWAS) . Subsequently, the comunications center received notification via NAWAS of an " Alert" status.

Wis call was verified. Actions were initiated to activate the Dnergency Operations Center (EOC). The State of Wisconsin had chosen partial participation for this exercise using only those members of the EOC staff necessary to provide support to the Counties and the utility in conducting '

the exercise. The EOC was staffed in 38 minutes.

Some EOC staff positions were double staffed or demonstrated a shift change. The State EOC staff demonstrated the ability to make decisions based on the information provided. On one occasion the Department of Agriculture, Trade and Consumer Protection (DAICP) made the decision to advise the Counties to implement agricult. ural protective actions. The decision was made without sufficient information being available to the State Radiological Coordinator (SRC) to confirm the utility's recomendation.

W e State EOC has adequate facilities to carry out operations. " Draft" copies of maps were used during the exercise. When refined, these will enhance the operation. It is recomended the SRC be represented within the EOC operations room.

The State EOC staff used a variety of means for comunications. The State EOC staff received notification via NWdAS of the changes in classification.

When the utility gave notice of the change to " Site Area Emergency" the utility comunications controller asked all locations, (State EOC, State Area EOC, Kewaunee County Sheriff's Dispatcher and Manitowoc County Sheriff's Dispatcher), to follow the procedures to verify the call from the utility. W e Area EOC complied, but the State EOC did not verify the NNdAS message. The utility comunications controller had to call the State comunications controller via comercial telephone and ask if the State had received the classification change and protective action recomendations.

The comunications controller had failed to follow the verification procedures established in the plan. The State had received the information but would not upgrade the classification until the SRC confirmed actions requiring the change.

When the utility gave notice of the change to " General Emergency" only the State failed to verify the NAWAS message. The utility comunications controller waited only ten minutes before calling the State comunications controller via comercial telephone to ask if the NAWAS message had been received. Once again the State cormunications controller had received the information and failed to follow procedures for verification.

The SRC was in telephone contact with the utility's Dnergency Operations Facility (EOF) . The utility advised the SRC of the classification change to

" General Emergency". The State accepted the utility's recomendation without being able to independently verify this classification change or ,the protective action recomendation due to the lack of sufficient information.

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The State staff mobilized the Manitowoc field monitoring team to determine ~

background radiation levels and demonstrate sampling equipment and procedures. These included sampling of air, soil, water and vegetation.

We field monitoring team experienced some difficulty in maintaining radio cortmunication with the team controller.

'Ehe SRC made the decision to make KI available to emergency workers. This information was comunicated to the Counties and to the field monitorirvJ team controller.

%e State EOC staff simulated a request for assistance from FEMA, requesting the activation of the federal response. The State staff advised all  ?

agencies when information was available indicating it was safe for persons ~

who were evacuated to return to their homes. The JPIC released information to the news media providing advice and procedures for reentry.

The Joint Public Information Center (JPIC) is in the Two Rivers Comunity Center and has adequate space and other amenities for the conduct of extended operations. Kewaunee County, Manitowoc County and the utility staffed the JPIC real time, while the State staff was prepositioned. The Counties demonstrated a shift change. Coordination of decisions and emergency activities were demonstrated between the JPIC and the State and County EOCs.

The State, Manitowoc County and Kewaunee County use telephone and other land line systems as their primary means of comunications between the JPIC and their respm tive EOCs. Both Counties had radio backup systems in place. -

W e State did not demonstrate a backup system. There was no exchange of hard copy material between the State EOC and the JPIC or either County EOC and the JPIC.

Kits containing background information were available for the media. At least seven formal briefings were held. State and County personnel exchanged information and State, County and utility spokespersons coordinated their activities prior to each briefing. It is recomended that the State, Kewaunee and Manitowoc Counties and the utility establish a joint operational procedure for the JPIC.

Kewaunee County The Kewaunee County Sheriff's dispatch office was advised of an " Unusual Event" at the Kewaunee Nuclear Power Plant. The situation escalated to an

" Alert" and the County pronptly mobilized their staf f and activated their EOC. The County experienced difficulty in reaching the utility to verify their emergency messages. A shift change was conducted to demonstrate around the clock manning capability. Both shifts demonstrated their ability .

to carry out emergency response activities.

We recently remodeled EOC with its multi-room layout and supporting materials enabled the staff to function effectively. The County demonstrated the ability to comunicate using primary and alternate means with all organizations intended to support the emergency response activities. The County should establish procedures for maintaining message logs and the preparation of hard copy of important messages. ,

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'1he cbility to ciert the public through the use of sirens, route alerting and Emergency Broadcast System (EBS) messages that are concise and easily urderstood was demonstrated. The County inplemented the initial protective actions recomended by the utility before the need for protective actions had been verified by the State. The County leadership should make a prudent attenpt to contact the State to coordinate the decision to inplement protective action reconrnendations. Subsequent changes to the protective actions were properly coordinated with the State EOC and Manitowoc County.

The procedures for controlling emergency worker exposure require additional enphasis by the County. This will necessitate more cocplete instructions being provided to the emergency workers as well as careful monitoring of e exposure rates they may experience. The EOC staff demonstrated the appropriate decision-mking procedures with respect to the use of KI.

The County's ability to direct an orderly evacuation process was demonstrated by controlling the traffic through the use of control points and the ability to deal with inpediments along the evacuation routes. It is recomended that officials manning these control points become knowledgeable of reception and congregate care center locations.

The County maintains a list of mobility inpaired residents which specifically identifies any special requirements they may have. The County activated a reception center at the Algoma High School. There they demonstrated an ability to care for evacuees through radiological monitoring and registration procedures prior to transfer to the congregate care

. facility where they could receive food and lodging. Some of the relocation-

- center stafE were unsure of operational procedures.

Post emergency activities, comonly referred to as recovery and reentry, nay present some unique situations. In view of this, the County should discuss different problems that may be associated with residents returning to their homes in order to be better prepared to deal with them. It is recomended that during the next exercise the County try to identify anticipated problems and discuss possible solutions to then.

Manitowoc County The Manitowoc County Sheriff's dispatch was notified over the NAWAS that an

" Unusual Event" had been declared at the Kewaunee Nuclear Power Plant. The dispatchers called back to the plant on the comercial telephone and, finally over NAWAS, for eight minutes before getting an answer to verify the call. Similiar delays in the verification of later calls were encountered.

Alerting of personnel and staffing of the EOC was initiated following receipt of the " Alert" classification. The EOC was functionally staffed in 40 minutes and conpletely staffed in less than one hour.

The County Board Chairmn was in charge of emergency operations until the Vice-Chairman replaced him on the second shift. A conplete shift change, including security personnel, dispatch operators, and message handling clerks, was demonstrated. During both shifts, EOC staff members were involved in decision making and in directing activities of their various.

agencies. There were frequent staff briefings that included discussion of actions listed in the current County plan to ensure all had been consider M or conpleted.

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The County EOC contains a relotively large amount of space, most of which is utilized for everyday purposes. Emergency operations have been relegated to -

a comunications room and a small operations room. At times the operations room became overcrowded to the point message handlers had difficulty moving about the room. All required maps and charts were available in the operations area. A status board was maintained.

Protective action recomendations were inplemented (or simulated) as required by the situation. This included dispatch of a team of sheriff's deputies to man traffic control points. These officers were knowledgeable of their duties, nuclear power plant considerations and some were equipped -

with high and medium range pocket dosimeters to measure possible radiation exposure. Dosimetry kits should be provided to each individual in the field-that may be exposed to radiation.

l A relocation center was activated and staffed at Roncalli High School according to established procedures. Evacuees are processel using Red Cross materials. Monitoring is done by personnel from the State Radiological Emergency Response Health Monitoring Team. Congregate care is the 1 responsibility of the Red Cross. All personnel at the shelter exhibited knowledge of their programs and training except for the protocol for decontamination.

The prompt alert and notification system was activated within the prescribed times as set forth in NUREG-0654. Each tim the sirens were activated a prescripted message containing instructions for the public was (simulated) broadcast over EBS. A test message was actually broadcast over EBS from the EOC comunications room. A live message also announced exercise termination.

The Sheriff's Department provided a demonstration of supplemental route alerting. Teams were dispatched and were coordinated from a mobile field van. Available equipment included a fixed wind aircraft and vehicles that had broadcasting as well as siren capabilities.

The EOC staff had a 1ist of mobility inpaired persons located within the emergency planning zone (EPZ) and an indication of each person's special needs.

The County Board Chairman explained the policy for use of potassium iodide (KI) and monitored its distribution to emergency workers, including those dispatched to a simulated fire in Mishicot. These actions exceeded the requirements of the objectives selected for demonstration during this exercise.

Recovery and reentry activities were closely monitored by the EOC staff and were discussed at briefings to ensure that all necessary actions were accompiished. Actions included an EBS message containing instractions for the public. 'Ihe EOC staff realized that the exercise could have been terminated, but elected to spend extra time devoted to recovery discussions.

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EXERCISE REPORT Introduction

1. Exercise Background This was the third full participation exercise for Kewaunee County and Manitowoc County resulting from a simlated accident at the Kewaunee Nuclear Power Plant. The first exercise was January 21, 1981. A cemntnications drill involving the Kewaunee Plant and the two Counties was. conducted February 23, 1982. The second exercise, November 1, 1983 was a full -

participation for the State, Kewaunee County and Manitowoc County. A comunications drill involving the Kewaunee Plant and the two Counties was conducted October 23, 1984. The State chose particial participation for this exercise.

On March 9, 1982, Kewaunee County and Manitowoc County participated in a full participation exercise with the Point Beach Nuclear Power Plant. On September 11, 1984, the State, Kewaunee County and Manitowoc County again participated in an exercise with the Point Beach Plant. This was the most recent exercise involving the State and two Counties. Comunications drills with the Point Beach Plant were conduct 91 August 10, 1983 and September 10, 1985, and involved both Counties.

2. Participating and Non-participating State and Local Governments The Emergency Planning Zone (EPZ) of the Kewaunee Nuclear Power Plant -

impacts on both Kewaunee and Manitowoc Counties in Wisconsin. In addition to the principal Counties, Kewaunee and Manitowoc, there are ten Counties, all in Wisconsin, that are in the ingestion EPZ. These Counties (Brown, Calumet, Door, Fond du Lac, Marinette, Oconto, Outagamie, Sheboygan, Shawano and Winnebago) did not participate in this exercise as the scenario developed did not re pire activities in the ingestion EPZ.

3. List of Evaluators For this exercise there was a total of fifteen evaluators observing offsite exercise activities. Onsite activities were evaluated by a separate team from the Nuclear Regulatory Comission (NRC) . Of the offsite evaluators, eight, including the offsite Exercise Director, were FEMA Region V staff.

'Ihe balance of the team was conposed of a representative from the Food and Drug Administration (FDA) and six contract evaluators from the Argonne National Laboratory (ANL) . The evaluator assignments were as follows:

Exercise Director Wallace Weaver, (FEMA)

Wisconsin EOC, Madison Wiley Howell, FEMA Bill Knoerzer, ANL ,

James Kraeger, FDA Dan Santini, ANL ,

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Joint Public Information Centtr, Two Rivers Ray Kellogg, FFM Kewaunee County Robert Shapiro, FEMA Bill Gasper, ANL Woodie Curtis, FEMA Don Jankowski, ANL Bob Morrison, ANL .

Manitowoc County Rick Anthony, FFM Ed Robinson, FEMA Sue Ann Curtis, ANL Walter O'Keefe, FEMA (Red Cross)

4. Evaluation Criteria

'1he State and County plans being evaluated during this exercise were developed using the " Criteria for Preparation and Evaluation of Radiological Dnergency Response Plans and Preparedness in Support of Nuclear Power Plants" (NUREG-0654, FEMA REP-1, Revision 1). Therefore, these criteria, and the exercrit based on these criteria, " Modular Format for Uniformity of Radiological Emergency Preparedness Exercise Observations and Evaluation" dated June 1983 were used for exercise evaluation.

5. Exercise Objectives Objectives for this exercise were selected from among the FEMA thirty-five (35) standard objectives listed in Tab "M" of the " Modular Format for Uniformity of Radiological Emergency Preparedness Exercise Observations and Evaluations," dated June 1983. The objective numbers listed below correlate to Tab "M".

The State of Wisconsin selected the following seventeen objectives, including those applicable to the JPIC, to be demonstrated during the exercise.

1. Demonstrate ability to mobilize staff and activate facilities prortptly.

2. Demonstrate ability to fully staff facilities and naintain staffing around the clock.

3. Demonstrate ability to make decisions and to coordinate emergency activities.

4. Demonstrate adequacy of facilities and displays to support emergency operations.

5. Demonstrate ability to cormunicate with all appropriate locations, organizations, and field personnel. .

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6. Demon:trate cbility to mobilize rnd deploy field monitoring teams in a timely fashion.

7. Demonstrate appropriate equipment and procedures for determining ambient radiation levels.

8. Demonstrate appropriate equipment and procedures for measurement oE airborne radiciodine concentrations as low as 10-7 uCi/OC in the presence of noble gases. {

9. Demonstrate appropriate equipment and procedures for collection, -

transport and analysis of sanples of soil, vegetation, snow, water and milk. l

10. Demonstrate the ability to project dosage to the public via plume l exposure, based on pland and field data, and to determine appropriate protective measures, based on PAGs available shelter, evacuation time estimates and all other appropriate factors.

13. Demonstrate ability to alert the public within the 10-mile EPZ, and disseminate an initial instructional message, within 15 minutes.

21. Demonstrate the ability to make the decision, based on predetermined criteria, whether to issue KI to emergency workers and/or the general population.

2 22. Demonstrate the ability to supply and administer KI, once the decision has been made to do so.

24. Demonstrate ability to brief the media in a clear, accurals and timely manner.

- 25. Demonstrate ability to provide advance coordination of information released.

32. Demonstrate ability to iden.ify need for, request and obtain Federal assistance.

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35. Demonstrate ability to determine and inplement appropriate measures for controlled recovery and reentry.

Kewaunee County selected the following eighteen objectives to be demonstrated during the exercise.

1. Demonstrate ability to mobilize staff and activate facilities promptly.

2. Demonstrate ability to fully staff facilities and maintain staffing around the clock.

3. Demonstrato ability to make decisions and to coordinate energency activities.

4. Demonstrate adequacy of facilities and displays to support emergency operations. .

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5. Demon:treta ebility to conmunicate with all cppropriato locations, organizations, and field personnel.

13. Demonstrate ability to alert the public within the 10-mile EPZ, and disseminate an initial instructional message, within 15 minutes.

14. Demonstrate ability to formulate and distribute appropriate instructions to the public, in a timely fashion.

15. Demonstrate the organizational ability and resources necessary to manage an orderly evacuation of all or part of the plume EPZ. _

16. Demonstrate the organizational ability and resources necessary to deal with impediments to evacuation, as inclement weather or traffic obstructions.

17. Demonstrate the organizational ability and resources necessary to control access to an evacuated area.

18. Demonstrate the organizational ability and resources necessary to effect an orderly evacuation of mobility-inpaired individuals within the plume EPZ.

20. Demonstrate ability to continuously monitor and control e rgency worker exposure.

21. Demonstrate the ability to make the decision, based on predetermined criteria, whether to issue KI to emergency workers and/or the general population.

24. Demonstrate ability to brief the media in a clear, accurate and timely manner.

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25. Demonstrate ability to provide advance coordination of information released.

27, Demonstrate adequacy of procedures for r.-gistration and radiological monitoring of evacuees.

28. Demonstrate adequacy of facilities for mass care of evacuees.

35. Demonstrate ability to determine and inplement appropriate neasures for controlled recovery and reentry.

Manitowoc County selected the following nineteen objectives to be demonstrated during the exercise. .

1. Demonstrate ability to mobilize staff and activate facilities pronptly.

2. Demonstrate ability to fully staff facilities and maintain staffing around the clock.

3. Demonstrate ability to make decisions and to coordinate emergency activities. ,

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4 Demonstrate adequacy of facilitics and displays to support emergency operations.

5. Demonstrate ability to comnunicate with all appropriate locations, organizations, and field personnel.

13. Demonstrate ability to alert the public within the 10-mile EPZ, and disseminate an initial instructional message, within 15 minutes.

14. Demonstrate ability to formulate and distribute appropriate instructions to the public, in a timely fashion. .-

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15. Demonstrate the organizational ability and resources necessary to manage an orderly evacuation of all or part of the plume EPZ.

16. Demonstrate the organizational ability and resources necessary to deal with inpediments to evacuation, as inclement weather or traffic obstructions.

17. Demonstrate the organizational ability and resources necessary to control access to an evacuated area.

18. Demonstrate the organizational ability and resources necessary to effece an orderly evacuation of mobility-inpaired individuals within the plume EPZ.

20. Demonstrate ability to continuously monitor and control emergency worker exposure.

21. Demonstrate the ability to make the decision, based on predetermined criteria, whether to issue KI to emergency workers and/or the general population.

22. Demonstrate the ability to supply and administer KI, once the decision has been mde to do so. (Although not specifically selected, credit is being given because of the County's demonstration during the exercise.)

24. Demonstrate ability to brief the media in a clear, accurate and timeJy manner.

25. Demonstrate ability to provide advance coordination of in ntmation released.

27. Demonstrate adequacy of procedures for registration and radiolooical monitoring of evacuees.

28. Demonstrate adequacy of facilities for mass care of evacuees.

35. Demonstrate ability to determine and inplement appropriate measures for controlled recovery and reentry.

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6. Sunrnary of Scenario The Kewaunee Nuclear Power Plant radiological emergency preparedness exercise objectives and scenario for the October 22, 1985 joint exercise were developed by exercise planners from the Kewaunee Nuclear Power Plant and the State of Wisconsin Division of Emergency Government. FEMA Region V participated in discussions with the State planners in August and September 1985 to select the objectives and determine the scope of the exercise.

A review of previous exercise weaknesses was conducted by FEMA Region V and the scenario writers in order to develop a scenario that would allow l

demonstration of past exercise weaknesses as well as allow demonstration of exercise objectives selected by the exercise participants.

Submission of the scenario was according to eleadlines outlined in NRC and FDiA guidelines. Westinghouse Idaho Nuclear Conpany, Incorporated reviewed the offsite portion of the scenario for FEMA and found it to be adequate to exercise the objectives selected by the State of Wisconsin as well as those selected by Kewaunee and Manitowoc Counties.

Abstract of the 1985 Fewaunee Exercise Scenario On October 22, 1985, following 192 days of operation, the Kewaunee Nuclear Plant is operating at 100% power. During the last ten days of operation, the reactor coolant system and the 1A steam generator activity has ircreased. The primary to secondary leakage is less than the technical specification limit. On October 21, 1985 it was reported that minor unexpected shocks were felt in the Rockford, Illinois, Beloit, Wisconsin and Chicago, Illinois areas.

At 0730 a tremor wa- felt at the plant with a seismic record equipment operating alarm actua w nd the horizontal event light in the relay room lit. Sequential event recorder (SER) points 330 and 331, 28074 instrument, low level vertical trigger occurs. The University of Wisconsin Milwaukee Seismic Center confirms a shock has occurred and was centered north of Rockford, Illinois. This is an " Unusual Event".

We alarm is reset. At 0930 physical shaking of the buildings is felt with a seismic record equipment operating alarm actuated. An inspection of the seismic panel in the relay room revealed a horizontal event and the lo light lit. SER points 332 and 333 medium level triggers are printed out.

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The University of Wisconsin Seismic Center in Milwaukee is called and they confirm an earthquake has occurred centered just north of Rockford, Illinois, almost to Beloit, Wisconsin, with a 6.0 Richter Scale reading.

Wis is an " Alert".

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' At 0945 the condensate storage tank lo-lo alarm occurs as the water in both tanks has dropped.

At 1930 the diesel generator 1A engine abnormal alarm and diesel generator 1B engine abnormal alarm oc mr. When the local panel is checked, tha -ngiis starting air is less than 200 psig and the air reservoirs are bleeding down because of ruptures at welded seams. The condensate storage tanks a,re dropping because of ruptured seams on the tanks. The roving security officer reports steam coming from two safety valves on N steam generator as if they were leaking.

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At 1100 an earthquake greater than safe shutdown earthquake (SSE) occurs, causing the alarm to actuate again and the horizontal event, lo and hi lights to occur. SER points 334 and 335, high level trigger occurs. All offsite power is lost when poles are uprooted on all four lines leaving the switchyard.

The University of Wisconsin, Milwaukee confirms that the earthquake has occurred and estimates its epicenter about 15 miles south and west of Kewaunee and about 8 miles due west from the plant. The Richter Scale measurement was 7.0. Wis is the first recorded earthquake in the area and is felt to have been triggered by the previous earthquake at Rockford. This is a " Site Area Emergency".

The earthquake caused the 1A main steam isolation valve to go shut and caused a safety valve on the lA steam generator to go fully open.

At 1200 a steam generat' cube rupture occurs on the 1A steam generator to cause a loss of coola a to the environent. All AC power is lost. This causes a loss of all emergency core cooling systems. B is is a " General Dnergency".

Because the seals on the reactor coolant puaps will fail and the steam generator tams are ruptured, the core should become uncovered as a result of the loss of RCS inventory and inability to charge water. Core damage should occur.

The plant is in a loss of all AC power condition using Procedure IIA-0.0.

The exercise can be terminated af ter return of off-site power and the plant is Ming cooled down on RHR and all objectives of the exercise are coapleted.

The actual events followed the pre-exercise senario. Notification of the "Unasual Event" was received at 7:39 a.m., the " Alert" at 9:33 a.m., the

" Site Area Energency" at 11:16 a.m. and the " General Emergency" at 11:52 a.m. At the notification of " Site Area Emtgency" the protective action recommndation was made to shelter all sectors out to two miles and shelter farm animals in the same area and place them on stored feed and water. At

" General Emergency" the recoamendation was made to evacuate all sectors out to two miles, sheltering in place from two to 10 miles in sectors J, K, L and M and shelter farm animals and place them on stored feed and water out to ten miles in all sectors. The " General Emrgency" was downgraded to

" Alert" at 3:13 p.m. with no change in protective action reconrnendations.

AT 3:44 p.m. reentry by evacuees was begun with the recomnendation to wash any produce taken from fields or orchards and milk to be monitored for the next several weeks.

7. Description of State and Local Resources Planned To Be Used In The Exercise

.During this exercise the State planned to staf f and demonstrate response activity at the State anergency operations Center in Madison; the East Central Area Emergency Operations Center at Fond du Lac and the Joint Public Information Center at Two Rivers. The Manitowoc field monitoring team was also mobilized. They also planned to use the necessary coanunications systems to alert and mobilize the staff, conduct emergency operations and disseminate emergency warning and information to the public. .

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Kew:unee and Manitowoc Countics planned to demonstrate their EOC facilities, EOC staffs and comnunications and warning systems. Kewaunee and Manitowoc Counties also chose to :lemonstrate their capabilities to alert, warn, evacuate, relocate and care for persons in portions of the EPZ.

Mewaunee County activated a relocation center at Algoma High School in Algoma and Manitom: County activated a relocation center at the Roncalli High School in Manitowoc. Both Counties also demonstrated their capability to activate the promt alert and notification system and th- .mtgency broadcast system and to staff traffic and access control points. Evacuat'2n of the plume EPZ was sinulated. _

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8. Findings Noted In Past Exercises There were eighteen areas requiring corrective action identified for the State of Wisconsin during the 1983 Kewaunee exercise. Of these, sixteen have been corrected by plan revisions and/or demonstrated during the June 19, 1984 LACBWR and M rch 6, 1985 Zion full participation exercises and/or the September 11, 1984 Point Beach and October 22, 1985 Kewaunee partial participation exercises. Two weaknesses, as noted below, have not hwn corrected and are continued as areas requiring corrective action in this report.

E.7 "Information concerning the evacuation cf school children was not included in EBS releases." This area requiring corrective action is now a County responsibility because of a change in the Radiological Emergency Plans for the State and Counties. The objective to show corrective action -

was not selected or d-unnstrated during this exercise and remins open.

('Ihis was incorrectly noted as E.6 in the 1983 report.)

I.10 "The SRC and the utility do not have mutually understood data necessary for the State to inlependently verify offsite (dose) projections."

While corrective action was taken in August 1984 to establish the data parameters, the effective coordination of emergency information from the utility's EOF with the SRC was not demonstrated. This area requiring corrective action remains open.

There were fourteen areas requiring corrective action identified for Kewaunee County during the 1983 Kewaunee exercise. Of these, twelve have been corrected by plan revisions and/or demonstrated during the September 11, 1984 Point Beach and October 22 1985 Kewaunee exercises. 'No weaknesses, as noted below, have not been corrected and are continued as areas requiring corrective action in this report.

K.3.a " Permanent record radiological exposure control devices are not available for emrgency workers." Acquisition of TLDs for use by local emergency workers is currently underway. This area requiring corrective action was not selected for demonstration in this exercise and ratins open.

K.3.b " Instructions for rm ding dosimeters should be included in the emergency workers dosimetry kits." During the exercise, oral instructions were provided to the emergency workers by the EOC staff. However, writton instructions are not included in the kits. This area requiring corrective action remains open. ,

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, .-p7-_., -- 3 - + ' - - -'

" Wera were two creas requiring corrective action identified for Manitowoc County druing the 1983 Kewaunee exsrcise. Of these, one was corrected by plan revision and demonstrated during this exercise. One weakness, as noted below, has not been corrected and is continued as an area requiring corrective action in this report.

K.3.a " Emergency workers were not provided with permanent record devices."

Acquisition of TLDs for use by local emergency workers is currently underway. This area re piring corrective action was not selected for demonstration in this exercise and remains open.

9. Exercise Objectives Still to be Effectively Achieved We following exercise objectives were not co m letely demonstrated.

Appropriate action will be required to correct the weaknesses noted and these objectives must be successfully demonstrated during the next radiological em rgency preparedness exercise for Kewaunee and Manitodoc Counties and the State of Wisconsin with the Kewaunee plant.

The State of Wisconsin did not completely demonstrate the following two objectives:

5. Demtrate ability to comunicate with all appropriate locations, organizations, and field personnel.

10. Demonstrate the ability to project dosage to the public via plume exposure, basel on pland and field data, and to determine appropriate protective measures, based on PAGs available shelter, evacuation time estimates and all other appropriate factors.

Kewaunee County did not completely demonstrate the following three objectives:

5. Demonstrate ability to communicate with all appropriate locations, organizations, and field personnel.

20. Demonstrate ability to continuously monitor and control em rgency worker exposure.

35. Demonstrate ability to determine and inplement appropriate measures for controlled recovery and reentry.

Manitowoc County did not completely demonstrate the following two objectives:

5. Demonstrate ability to communicate with all appropriate locations, organizations, and field personnel.

20. Demonstrate ability to continuously monitor and control emergency worker exposure.

The following six exercise objectives have not yet been demonstrated for evaluation during the current exercise cycle.

11. Demonstrate ability to project dosage to the public via ingestion pathway exposure, based on field data and to determine appropriate 1 protective measures, based on PACS and other relevant factors.

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12. Demonstrata cbility to inplement protective actions for ingestion ,

pathway hazards.

19. Demonstrate the organizational ability and resources necessary to effect an orderly evacuation of schools within the plume EPZ.

29. Demonstrate adequate equipment and procedures for decontamination of emergency workers, equipment and vehicles.

30. Demonstrate adequacy of ambulance facilities eni procedures for handling contaminated individuals. .

31. Demonstrate adequacy of hospital facilities and procedures for handling' contaminated individuals.

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1 -

Narrative

1. State of Wisconsin Activation and Staffing

%e State received notification of an " Unusual Event" at approximately 7:30 a.m. via the National Warning System (NAWAS). This was confirmed via a comercial telephone call to the utility. At approximately 9:30 am the comunication controller received notification via NAWAS that the Kewaunee Nuclear Power Plant had changel the Emergency Action Level (EAL) to " Alert" -

status. This information was verified at 9:42 a.m.

Se acting Officer-in-Charge (OIC) initiated the activation of the Emergency Operations Center (PK) using the current call list. The EOC was staffed by 10:06 a.m. with the exception of the State Radiological Coordinator (SRC),

who activated "real-time" and arrived at 10:20 a.m. This was a partial participation exercise for the State of Wisconsin with some positions filled by Division of Emergency Goverranent (DEG) personnel. Agencies represented were DEG, Department of Health and Social Services (DHSS), Department of Transportation, State Patrol and Department of Agriculture, Trade and Consumer Protection (DA'ICP) . Some agencies demonstrated shift change and capability for 24-hour manning although this was not an exercise objective for the State.

Emergency Operations Management Since this was a partial participation exercise, it was used as training for soma EOC mnagemnt positic,ns. The OICs for both shifts dertenstrated their capabilities to properly manage the EOC operations.

At 11:16 a.m. the comunications .:ontroller was notified via NAWAS that the utility had upgraded to " Site Area at.3rgency" and had made protective action recomendations. The comunications controller did not verify the information using comercial telephone and the number provided by the utility. At 11:52 a.m., the utility notified the State and the Counties of the classification change to " General Emergency" with additional protective action recomendations. The comunications controller again did not verify the NAWAS message. Subsequently, both messages were confirmed by a call back from the Kewaunee plant to the State EOC per utility procedure. The State of Wisconsin was not verifying the receipt of these messages because they had insufficient information to independently confirm the utility's classification. However, confirmation of receipt of information (not concurrence) shmirl in automatic and not subject to independent verification by the OIC or SRC.

Area Pequiring Corrective Action: E.1 'Ihe comunications controller failed to verify NAWAS messages from the utility in accordance with established procedure. The State must clarify with the utility the exact procedure anil phone nambers to be used to verify the receipt of information from the Kewaunee plant. This verification process should not be subject to the independent verification of utility information by the OIC or SRC.

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Several copies of tne plan were available in the EOC and were used for reference. Each agency independently executes its own responsibility making routine decisions. Major problems are discussed with the entire staff.

Most staff positions had written procedures in addition to the plan. On one occasion the DATCP made the decision to advise the Counties to irrplement agricultural protective actions even though there was insufficient informtion available to the SRC for an independent verification of the utility's recomendation. The Counties were taking the appropriate action to inplement the protective actions in accordance with their plans.

Messages are copied and provided to each member of the EOC staff. This applies to external messages as well as internal messages.

Area Recorrmended for Improvement: More attention should be given to filling out message forms, such as time the message is generated and by what agency, etc.

Area Recomended for Improvement: The SRC should be represented within the FDC operations room to facilitate the coordination of information and proposed actions.

The State EOC staff simulated a request for assistance from FEMA, requesting the activation of the federal response.

Facilities The EOC has a & plate space, light, furniture, and phonas for its operations.

The facility can support extended operations. Backup power is available and is checked on a routine basis. Dnergency classification levels were posted and separate status ixwrds maintained in both the operations comt and SRC's office. On the first shift there were times when an action was not posted on the EOC status board for as much as 30 minutes after the event. The second shif t in the operations room was very pronpt at posting. The SRC's status board was also updated promptly.

Area Recomended for Improvement: Status board plotters should keep the status boards current and consistent at all times.

Comunications Comercial telephone, NAWAS, CDNATS, CDNARS, TIME system, and State microcomputer wsre used during the exercise to comunicate with Kewaunee and Manitowoc Counties, the East Central Area EOC at Fond du Lac, field monitoring teams, the JPIC, the utility and FEMA.

Telephone comunication from State staff to County staff counterparts was good. There were sotte initial phone problems at the " Alert" emrwocy classification but these woro resolved. There was little hard copy information between State and County EOCs.

Once the State's representative was in the utility's ' EOF, telephone contact was .stablished and maintained. There was never any hard copy exchange of information between the State EOC and the utility. As discussed below, 17

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,Sttta procedure is to independently evaluate information from the utility in conjunction with declarations of the various emergency classifications and protective action ree n mndations. It is i @ ortant that accurate and precise information be exchanged between the utility and State.

Dose Assessment and Protective Action Recomendations Dose assessment was a partial exercise objective and was being conducted for training purposes. 0.e dose assessment / protective action activity being evaluated at the State EOC was the SRC's ability to recomend KI for emergency worker protection. Because of the sparse information available at -

the time, the SRC to0k a conservative approach and recomended KI to be

• issued at a dose well below the guideline of 25 REM. This int'ormation was comunicated to the Counties and to the field monitoring team controller.

As noted above, the State EOC was being requested by the Counties to confir.n the protective action recomendations b?ing made by the utility. Even though the SRC was in telephone contact with the EOF, there was insufficient information to independently verify the utility recommendations. The State EOC could not advise the Counties to implement the protective actions. The coordination of ermrc*acy information between the SRC and the EOF was an exercise weakness identified during the 1983 Kewaunee exercise. Corrective action was taken by d e State of Wisconsin to establish the appropriate parameters for emergency information to facilitate coordination. Additional action by the State is necessary to insure that sufficient emergency information is available to the SRC for the independent verific6 tion of the utility's protective actions in accordance with the plan.

Area Requiring Corre~tive Action: I.10 'Ihe State of Wisconsin and the utility do not have m:tually understood procedures for the coor.limtion of emergency information necessary for the SRC to independently verify offsite protective action reco:mendations.

The field monitoring team demonstrated a working knowledge and expertise of their resources and responsibilities. The half hour between arrival at the EOF and departure to sa @les stations was due in most part to getting the radio system operational. Radio comunications between the controller and field team continues to be a problem. There were times when the field team was not in contact with the controller and would have to move until clear transmissions were ;xssible.

Area Requiring Corrective Action: F. The State should insure field monitoring teams have adequate r+11o equipment for continuous contnet with the team controller.

The equipment list, field team check list and equipment available were consistent. Team nembers knew where particular items were located for required sampling (e.g. air, water, soil, etc.). Cases containing equipment were opened and checked prior to departure. The Rueter-Stokes was powered from the car battery. Battery checks on the open line ion chamber, d-M counter and flashlicht were demonstratel at the EOF. Instruments were used

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correctly. A check of the instruments, using a Cesium source, was demonstrated af ter t'.ie required sa:tples were taken.

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Public Alerting and Instruction The Public alerting and instruction are primarily County responsibilities.

State of Wisconsin is involved in the confirmation of protective actions prior to the activation of the pronpt alert and notification system by the Counties. As noted above, the State could not advise the Counties to inplement the protective actions being recommended by the utility because of insufficient information being available to the SRC.

Protective Action This is a responsibility of Kewaunee an3 Manitowoc Counties and not an ~

objective for the State of Wisconsin.

Radiolajical Exposure Control Team

'Ihe field monitoring teams had appropriate dosimetry equipment.

members were aware of KI, maximum dose requirements and decontamination procedures. The team leader demonstrated operational procedures for personal dosimeters. He is responsible for monitoring the radiological exposure of the field monitoring team.

Media Relations Staffing of tae JPIC was accomplished in real time by KewauneeState County, Manitowoc County and Wisconsin Public Services Corporation.

representatives from the Division of Emergency Government, Department of Natural Resources and Department of Health and Social Services, Radiation Kewaunee County Protection Section were pre-positioned for the exercise.

and Manitowoc County demonstrated a shift change. A shift change was not an objective for the State.

The State spokespersons demonstrated the training and knowledge expected of professional information officers. The County representatives generally performed liason duties with their County EOCs and participated only briefly as spokespersons.

The JPIC is in the Two Rivers Cormunity Center. Angle space and equipment was available onsite or brought in by the State, the Counties and the utilty. Maps and other displays were available to assist the media briefers in their presentations. Space, other than the main briefing room, is available for media representatives to conduct interviews. The media briefing rocxn could accomodate 50 to 80 media people. A gymnasium is available for use as a briefing area should there be a need for a larger briefing arem.

At the JPIC, the State utilized telephones as the principal man < of coninunications with the State EOC. The telephone system included a speaker phone and a microcomputer link. No backup contuunication system was demonstrated.

Area Requiring Corrective Action: F. No backup connunications system was available between the JPIC and State EOC.

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Manitowoc County personnel used the telephone as their principal comunications link with their EOC. They did demonstrate a radio backup system. Kewaunee County personnel used telephone as their principal comunication link with their EOC. They also demonstrated their radio backup system.

During the exercise there was no exchange of hard copy materials between the two Counties and the JPIC. As a result PIO's at the JPIC did not have copies of EBS messages. On one occasion this created a problem as to what areas of which County had been evacuated and how the areas had been -

described in the EBS messages. No hard copy transmissions were received at the JPIC from the State EOC during the exercise.

Area Recomended for Irtprovement: Hard copies of EBS releases should be transmitted to the County PIO representatives at the JPIC for distribution to the mdia. (Kewaunee and Manitowoc Counties)

There was good telephone contact between the State EOC and the JPIC. Items were coordinated prior to release. However, there were no hard copies of the press releases transmitted to the State EOC prior to the releases being given out. The capability existed but was not used throughout the day.

At least seven media briefings were held during the course of the exercise.

Various maps and displays were used during the briefings. Hard copy of the releases were available at the tim of the briefing or shortly thereafter.

~ Kits containing information about the utility, nuclear power plants, radiation and the local area were available.

At times, the State representatives had information from the Counties about protective actions being initiated there before they received the information from the State EOC. In these cases, the State staff at the JPIC was reluctant to u% the information until they could confirm it with the State EOC.

During recovery and reentry, a press release was prepared announcing the Governor's action to terminiate the declaration of emergency. The release also contained instructions for people in congregate care facilities about returning home, preventive actions to be taken when using fresh produce and continuing the protective actions for dairy farmers and other fool prMucers.

The State and Counties were ha:rpered in their efforts during this phase of the exercise by the actions of the utility staff. When the utility exercise ended the utility staff began, at once, to disassemble the JPIC even though all the objectives of the offsite exerciso had not been cortpleted.

Area Recomended for Improvement: 'Ihe State, Kewaunee and Manitowoc Counties aM the Wisconsin Public Service Corporation need to establish joint operating procedures for the JPIC. The roles of the utility and the State for activation, mnagement and security of the facility mst N t defined and comunicated to all persons who will be involved in the utilization of the JPIC. These proceedures should include both normal operations as well as exercise operations. ,

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Recovery Cnd Reentry The field monitoring team obtained deposition values for radiation contamination of food and animal feeds. A more careful analysis of these values cowared to the protective action guides could have been completed before transmission to the affected Counties. However, this activity was being sinulated and the SRC did provide appropriate instructions for recovery and r+ntty to be inplemented by the Counties.

2. Kewaunee County Activation and Staffing .

Initial notification to Kewaunee County of an incident at the Kewaune Nuclear Power Plant and subsequent emrgency classification changes are handled through the Kewaunee County Sheriff's Department dispatch center located in the County Safety Building in Kewaunee.

The dispatch center is manned 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> a day by County Sheriff's personnel.

The notification of the " Unusual Event" was received at 7:39 a.m. via the NAWAS in the dispatch center. Call verification was completed at 7:43 a.m.

with a phone call over conmercial lines to the conmunications area at the .

plant. A call-down list, with current information, and radio pagers were used to notify appropriate County personnel. This process was completed at 7:47 a.m..

Upgrade in emergency classification to the " Alert" was received at 9:33 a.m.

via the NAWAS. Message verification was completed by 9:43 a.m. and the call down by 9:59 a.m.. Pcoblems were experienced in verifying the " Alert" notification from the plant. It took ten minutes to get through on the convercial telephone number used for verification. Rather than wait for verification the dispatcher proceded with notification of County personnel.

Three dispatchers completed the required phone calls to County emergency personnel.

Area Requiring Corrective Action: E.1 The State of Wisconsin, Kewaunee and Manitowoc Counties, and Wisconsin Public Service Coorporation should establish appropriate verification procedures (including telephone numbers) for each emergency action classification level and other notifications.

Receipt of subsequent changes in euergency classifications was not observ.-I at the dispatch center as the federal obsecvers relocated to the EOC.

Messages from the County Sheriff's dispatch center continued to be forwarded to the Kewaunee EOC for each change in classification level.

The EOC was fully staffed by 10:42 a.m. Around the clock capability was demonstrated by an actual shift change of all functions except the Department of Information and the Department of Health who remained double staffed for training purposes. The first shift provided their respective replacements with appropriate status information prior to being relieved.

Emergency Operations Management of t'te In accordance with the plan, the County Board Chairman was in charge County emergency response.

Pariodic briefings were conducted with each ~

staff member discussing their activities.

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- -- _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ . _____________}

- Area Recomnended for Improvement: Significant events :ruch cs emergency action level changes, protective action recomnendations, etc. should be announced to the staff rather than waiting for scheduled briefings.

Hard copies of incoming and outgoing messages were minimal. It is imortant that appropriate actions be recorded on hard copy messages to ensure that precise information is received. Relying on telephone conversations for this information my be misinterpreted and lead to possible inappropriate response. Appropriate essage logs and hard copy of imortant mssages should be maintained by EOC staff.

Area Requi,rin,g_ Corr,ecti ive , Action: F. Message logs were not maintained by mC staff and hard copy of igortant messages (inco.ning and outgoing) were not prepared.

At 11:16 a.m. the County was notified that the situation had escalated to a

" Site Area Emergency", and the utility reco u nded sheltering all sectors out to two miles. The County accepted and ig lemented this protective action without attegting to obtain a reconmndation from the State.

Although the recoended actions were appropriate, the County should attegt to verify them with the State and inplement the protective actions independently if they are unable to make contact with the State.

We protective action recomnendations were later changed to evacuate all sectors out to two miles plus evacuate sectors I, K, L and M out to ten miles. The County did confer with the State prior to iglemntation of the adjusted protective action Area Reconnended for Inprovment: Because Kewaunee County subsequently corrected tYefr eirTi'Er tat 1ure to coordinate the utility's protective

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action reconnendation, no further action is required. However it is reconnended that future training of Kewaunee County staff eghasize the need for coordination of protective actions with the State of Wisconsin and Manitowoc County as appropriate.

Facilities The County EOC has been co gletely remodeled and its multi-room configuration has greatly enhanced the EOC staff's ability to carry out their emergency responsibilities. A chalkboard at the front of the operations room served as a status board for recording significant events.

Information that was removed to make room for new entries was recorded and distributed to the staf f. It was noted that entries were not always recorded in a timely manner. This was because the mC Director did the posting and was sometimes occupied with another aspect of the emergency response.

Area Reconnended for Improvement: We responsibility for maintaining the

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status board shoufd'be assigned to an administrative staff member rather than the EOC Director.

Appropriate " draft" maps depicting evacuation routes, relocation centers, access control points, population distribution as well as other infor,mation needed by the staff were available.

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I Area Recomnended for Improvement: It would be helpful if the maps could be -

utilized during staff briefings when the various emergency response activities are being discussed.

Comnunications

[

Systems and procedures used to establish and milntain Numerous comnunications with backup and i appropriate locations were demonstrated at the EOC. The NAWAS system redundant systems are available to aumnent prinary links. As is the primary systen used to received information from the . utility.

noted above, the NAWAS for Kewaunee County is located in the 24-hour -

dispatch center at the County Sheriff's Department in the Safety Building in 1 Kewaunee.

Upon activation of ths EOC in Algoma all nessages from the NAWAS are forwarded to the ECC. Backup to this system is the police radio, ccmnercial telephone or the newly installed hi-band radio system.

A dedicated telephone net is used by the two County EOC Directors, the State and the Kewaunee plant as the pritory system for discussions and coordination among the agencies. Radio backup and comnercial telephone lines are alse available.

Primary connunications with local governments is via the Emergency Government Radio. Problems were encountered in activating this syAton to Investigation into the cause of establish contact with the Two Rivers EOC.

the problem determined that the malfunction was somewhere in the Two Rivers radio equipment. Other locations using t'lis radio net experienced no difficulties. Gmnercial telephones were used as backup to comnunicate with Two Rivers.

Primary comnunications with the County PIO at the JPIC are via comnercial telephone with radio as a backup. An additional backup is the microconputer providel by the State which provides hardcopy capability between the EOC and JPIC.

An adequate number of telephones and lines were available at the EOC for use by the responding agencies. There were numerous radio systems available for backup (police, fire, health and civil defence) .

The system used to provide WAUN FM with EBS messages was the new hi-band radio. Two E3S massages were transmittal " live" from the EOC comnunication room. The reminder of the messages were simulsted.

Dose Assessment and Protective Action Reconnendations Dose Assessuunt anr1 protective action recomrendations isre mstly a responsibility of the State of Wisconsin. The Health Department was to demonstrate the ability to make the decision based on predetermined criteria In and the SRC's recomnendation, whether to issue KI to emergency workers.

this exercise, Health Department officials in the Kewaunee County EOC recomnended use of KI for emergency workers in the field in accordance with the State program on KI. KI was held in reserve for people whose evacuation was not feasible. KT was not recomnended for the general population in '

accordance with the plan.

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'Public Alerting and Instruction A public alerting message was aired by WAUN N 92.7 at 11:04 a.m. There were seven EBS messages draf ted, coordinated by the Counties and released for broadcast throughout the exercise. Of these seven messages, two were aired on WAUN m for actual broadcast. Incormation describing the affected sectors by familiar landerks and boundaries was included in appropriate EBS messages. The Pios at the EOC were respcasible for determining these landmarks and boundaries. This task proved to be time consuming and cumbersom.

Area Recomended For Inprovement: Prescripted text describing EPZ sectors by familiar landerks and boundaries would sinplify and expedite the preparation of EBS messages.

The County procedurally demonstrated the ability to conduct supplemental route alerting in the appropriate geographic locations.

Protective Action The Kewaunee County EOC staff demonstrated the organizational ability and resources necessary to maage an orderly evacuation of all or part of the plume EPZ. Traffic control points were activated by the Highway Department by 11:30 a.m., consistent with the protective action recomendation. The Kewaunee Shoriff's D3partment has designed road blocks so congestion problems near the plant should not occur. The police have a color cMed map at the FE that shows areas expected to be most congested and areas expected to be least congestel with evacuating traf fic.

IE bad weather should be present during an evacuation, the Kewaunee County Highway Department has a fleet of radio equipped snow plows that can be dispatched to problem areas. The Highway Department representative also indicated that raserve plowing equipment could be activated. In the event of stalled or wrecked vehicles blocking evacuation routes, the police have a contract and can utilize two tow trucks from a private firm to re.nove obstructions. The Sheriff also indicated three tow trucks in Luxemburg and one in Denmrk that could be called as backup.

To evacuate school children, the police call (by comercial telephone) three bus lines responsible for everyday transportation between school and hone.

The bus lines are responsible for contacting drivers by comercial telephone. Additional buses can be secure.1 by contacting the Dworak Bus Service.

To control access to evacuated areas, all roads were blocked by the Highway Department (sinulated, except for one roadblock) . Water traffic and rail traffic was stopped by order of the Sherif f's Department. The Sheriff's representative and the Highway Department's representative both indicated that there are more than adequate resources available to cover all traffic and access control functions simultaneously in the EPZ.

The traffic control point activated and manned by County Highway Department personnel was at the intersection of Route 42 and First Road. Activation was not syncronizel with the exercise scenario. For convencience, it was demonstrated at a predetermined time. 'Ihe County enurgency worker was aware of evacuation routes and the procedures needed to naintain traf fic flow.

24

A two-way radio was provided to the County worker at the traffic control point. With this system he was able to comunicate with the County Highway Department's garage. The worker was not familiar with the location of reception / congregate care centers or decontamination locations, but stated this information could be obtained via radio. Direct comunication to the EOC or other control points was not possible. All comunications would go '

through the garage and be handled from there.

Area Recomended for Improvme.it: County personnel responsible for the staCCing of traffic control points should be batter informed on the locations of reception / congregate care and decontamination facilities.

At' t Reception cent-rs wte activated by social' services in a timly fashion.

10:15 a.m., reception ivntec personnel were placed on stanlby. "' hey were directed to open the reception centers at 11:15 a.m., seven minutes after a

" Site Area Dnergency" was declared and one hour in advance of the evaeustion ocder broadcast on E3S.

The remption +v1 congregate care center activated unring the exercise was located at th- 7dgona High School. The school is approximtely 19 miles from the Kewaunee Nuclear Power Plant. Organizations represenbd at the center were the County Public Walth, the Algoma School District, t .h-iMversity of Wisconsin Safety Departmnt (Radiation Unit), the Wisconsin Department of Health and Social Services and the American Red Cross.

Wenty-four hour staffing capability was demonstrated by the agencies representsi 41. Ihe center by a shif t change of most personnel and double staffing of the State of Wisconsin monitoring team.

The County Health Department representative statol she was unaware of her responsibilities. The Wisconsin Department or Walth an:1 Social Services representative maid not satisfactorily explain to his radiological monitoring support team member (from the U of W Safety Departnent) the DHSS plan for staffing of the reception center for radiological monitoring; nor the support agency's role in the staffing.

Area Recomended for Improvement: The Kewaunee County Health Norse and the Wisconsin Departanent oE Health and Social Services personnel should read and acquaint themselves with their respective responsibilities.

Fourteen Algoma High School students were registered at the reception / congregate care center by two registrars utilizing a standard " Red Cross Shelter Rejistration" form. The students were monitored by the radiological monitoring team at the entrance way to the school prior to being registered. The team ussi geighar counters with probe attadwnt.s.

One instrume7t included a low energy gem probe for monitoring the thyroid. According to the spokesperson for the team any evacuee found to be contaminated would be provided disposable coveralls to contain the contamination. The contaminated individual would be transporb-.1 to the Algoma Memorial Hospital by Algoma City Rescue Squad for decontamination.

Area Recomended for Improvement: While the decontamination protocol outlined in the State plan could result in some individuals being transported to a hospital, many would be decontaninated at the relocation center by the radiological monitoring team. Pwrsonnel assigned to this task should be prepared to handle this responsibility. (State of Wisconsin) 25 .

'Ihe center can accomcdate 2,100 persons. If capacity is exceMed at the center, evacuees will be assigned and transported to other shelter locations in Algoma and points throughout Kewaunee County. The shelters are located in other schools as designated in the County Plan and will be activated as needed. Evacuees may be transported to other shelter locations by use of buses contracted through the regular school bus services. The Algoma High School reception and congregate care center has sufficient resources to support an extended operation. By local and County agreements the Red Cross will provide cots and blankets for the use of the evacums at the center and assist with the feeding. Food will be purchased locally for any feeding necessary. Handicapped and special needs individuals will be sent or -

transported to the Luxemberg Elementary school for sheltering. The Luxemberg School is equipped to accomodate individuals who are mobility irrpaired.

During the exercise commercial telephone was the primary means of comunications with the County EOC and other supporting organizations.

Backup comunications would be REACT, the Red Cross and/or citizen band radios. The Algoma reception center includes a nursing station aryl would be staffed by school personn I with Dfr training, the Red Cross and/or nurses from the County Health Department.

Radiological Exposure Control The County Plan states that for an " Alert", the County Radiological Officer will uplate the list of available radiological equipment. Upon being referred by the Radiological Officer to the EOC Deputy Director, it was determined that no such list was available. Based on this infocution, it was impossible to ascartain iE the supply of dosimeters for emerg-ncy workers was adequate.

There was an indication that low-range and mid-range dosimeters had been distributal to all emcgency personnel going into the 10-mile EPZ and that record keeping cards w-re issued, and instructions (oral) were given to read the dosimeters and record the data once every two hours. No written instructions were issued with the pocket dosimeters.

Exposure control was -valuated at the one traffic control point activated for the exercise. Proper equipment (excluding TLDs) was provided. Written instructions on dosimeter use and recomended reading frequency were not included. The worker was not inforrel about dosimeter theory or application. He was unaware of the maximum allowable dose or of the location of the decontamination centers.

Area Requiring Corrective Action: K.3.a Radiological equipment inventory records do not exist at the Kewaunee County EOC, as called for in the County Plan.

Area Requiring Corrective Action: K.3.b Appropriate written instructions were not issued with the dosimetry packets. This is a weakness which was also notal during the 1983 Kewaunee exercise. Inforrution was not provided j

i l

to emergency workers concerning maximum dosi. and stay times as called for in the County Plan. .

I 26 I

i

Media Relr.tions Media relations is a joint function with the State, Manitowoc County and Wisconsin Public Service Corporation. Media relations are conducted at the JPIC. Evaluation of the Kewaunee County JPIC activity is included with the State of Wisconsin media relations discussion.

Recovery and Reentry According to the exercise objectives, the County would conduct a discussion of the anticipated problems associated with rew overy and reentry procedures J

as directed by the State. There was no evidence of a State directed discussion of these activities nor did the County conduct one. Instead the County used the tine allotal for this purpose to finish up reports of the exercise proceedings. It is inportant that anticipated problems involving recovery and reentry be discussed so that the staff may be better prepared to deal with them. Topics that could have been discussed are those related to safety precautions during recovery, possible health effects from low level radiation, availability of compensation for Einancial losses sustained and so on.

Area Requiring Correct ve Action: M.1 Kewaunee County EOC staff did not fully demonstrate their knowledge of the procedures for recovery and reentry. More time and consideration should be given to discussions of the problems relatincj to cecovery and reentry during the n-xt execcise.

3. Manitowoc County Activation and Staffing At 7:35 a.m., the County Sheriff's dispatchers were notified by the Kewaunee ,

Nuclear Power Plant via the NAWAS of an " Unusual Event" at the plant.

Dispatchers used checklists to mke the required notifications following verification of the call. An eight minute delay was encountered while dispatchers were attenpting to verify the call. The telephone line to the utility went unanswered. The dispatchers used the NAWAS to get the verification from the utility. Similar and longer delays were encountered at the notification of " Site Area Dnergency" and " General Emrg-ncy".

l l

Area Requiring Corrective Action: E.1 The State of Wisconsin, *rWaunee and l

Manitowoc Counties, and Wisconsin Public Service Coorporation should establish appropriate verification procedures (including telephone numbers) l for each emergency action classification level and other notifications.

Fmrgency staffing was initiated at 9:35 a.m. when the Sheriff's dispatcher was notified over NAWAS of " Alert" status at the plant. The EOC was

! functionally staffed, with the County Board Chairma in charge at 10:15 a.m.

and fully staffel at 10:30 a.m. A Sheriff's officer was dispatched to the l

utility at 9:42 a.m. Emergency government conununications control was assumed by Sheriff's of ficers operating consoles recently insta1181 in coninanications rooin adjacent to the operations room. ' Itis allowed sheriff's dispatch officers to devote full attention to their normal duties and provided EOC staff with necessary comnunications capabilities. A conplete shift change, including dispatch operators, security personnel and message handling clerks, was demonstrated thru individual replacements arriving at different tim s and being briefed by their respective counterparts.

27

Emergency Operations Management On the first shif t, the County Board Chairman was in charge of emergency operations. On second shif t, the First Vice Chairnun of the County Board performed this duty. Both conducted periodic briefings approximately every 30 minutes or m re frequently if events warranted. Staff members were involved in the briefings to describe activities of their respective agencies. They also participated in decision making such as determining placement of traffic control points, evacuation routes and activation of shelters. At changes of emergency action levels, the County Board Chairnun referred to the County Plan and reviewed aloud the emergency actions specified for that level., Staff embers used individual checklists to ensure all actions were cowleted.

Sheriff's officers operated a message center desk in the operations room where messages were logged, reproduced and distributed. They were assisted by runners to take mssages to or fron the contunications room. Sheriff's officers also controlled access to the building and again at the EOC. In this manner, personnel within the building for other purposes were not permitted into the EOC operations or comiunications areas.

At 11:22 a.m. the County Board Chairnan announced to the staff that conditions at the plant had changed to " Site Area Emergency" as of 11:16 a.m. The simulated sounding of sirens was accoglished at 11:30 a.m. A prescripted message from the County Plan was read by the PIO into a " dead" microphone to siaulate an EBS broadcast. An actual EBS test message had been broadcast through the same, but then " live" microphone at 11:05 a.m.

The sounding of the sirens was linked to the inpleanntion of protective action recoamendations that accomanied the " Site Area Emergency" notification.

Facilities The Manitowoc County EOC provides a relatively large space. Other uses of the space, such as the dining room facility, have crowded the operations room into a very limited space. 'Ihe EOC staff members were seated at tables facing the walls around the periphery of the room in order to gain maxinum use of every square foot of space. To see the charts, mps or other staff members, it was necessary to turn around in straight backed chairs. The message control operation further limited space available for the staff. At times, particularly when agencies had more than one representative in the room, it was overcrowded and message handlers encountered difficulty in moving through the room. It is apparent tint every day space utilization has taken priority to the point of near disregard for extended energency operations. While all required maps and charts and other amnties were

.available and staff members were knoaledgeable, the lack of space at tians, hanpered operational capability.

Area Reconmended for Inprovement: Manitowoc County should consider a redesign o the EOd layout to allow for additional space in the operations area. .

L 28

Comunications

%ere are adequate comunications at all levels with a primary and backup system for each area. The dispatch center is located on the first floor of the Sheriff's Department, however, there is a comunication console in the EOC which is a duplicate of the one on the first floor. After the activation of the EOC has been conpleted, all comunications are handled from within the EOC. This is an improvement over the former system used.

There is microconputer hard copy capabiHty with the JPIC, East Central Area Office, Kewaunee County and State EOC in Madison.

Dose Assessment and Protective Action Recomendations Dose Assessment and protective action recommiviations are mostly a responsibility of the State of Wisconsin. The Health Department was to demonstrate the ability to make the decision based on predetermined criteria and the SRC's recomendation, whether to issue KI to emergency workers. In this exercise, Health Department officials in the Manitowoc County EOC recomended use of KI for emergency workers in the field and institutionalized Wrsons in accordance with the State program on KI. KI was not recomended for the general population in accordance with the plan.

Public Alerting and Instruction The prompt alert and notification system was activated within the prescribed times as set forth in NUREG-0654. The sirens were simulated to be activated at 11:30 a.m., 12:15 p.m. and 1:40 p.m. to alert the public to tune to the local radio station for information. Special facilities were alerted at the same times with the use of pagers. The EBS was activated a total of five times during the exercise. The first one was a general messa p , whic'1 was broadcast live at 11:05 a.m. The three messages that followed at 11:30 a.m., 12:15 p.m. and 1:40 p.m. were more specific and were simulated by the PIO reading the messages into a " dead" microphr>ne. At 3:35 p.m. another

" live" broadcast was initiated using parts from a prescripted message and the balance drafted by the PIO. Before reading the messages the PIO would confer with the County Roard Chairman and the State EOC. The County Board Chairman would coordinate the EBS message with Kewaunee County Board Chairman. Areas affected by the protectiva actions were discribed by using familiar landmarks and boundries.

The Manitowoc County Sheriff's Department provided an excellent demonstration of supplemental route alerting. Route alerting teams were pronptly dispatched and well coordinated from a mobile field van. Available equipment included a fixed wing aircraft (unavailable on the day of the exercise due to weather) and vehicles that have public address as well as siren capabilities.

Protective Action Protective action recomendations from the State or utility were inplemented or simulated by the County. Consistent with stated policy, when the use of potassium iodide (KI) was authorized by th- State D?partment of Health, the County E m staff arranged for it's simulated distribution to emergency workers, the Mishicot Fire Department and institutionalized persons., These actions exe m bi IM requirements of the objectives .+1ectnd for demonstration during this exercise.

29 .

l

Inplementation of the protective action to shelter all sectors to two miles began with the notification of " Site Area Emergency" received at 11:16 a.m.

At 11:35 a.m., the Sheriff's office had simulated dispatch of field units to traffic access control points. At 11:44 a.m., Sheriff's officers were simulating the manning of barricades, which the Highway Department was putting into place. Estinates of traf fic volumes were discussed among the law enforcement representatives in the EOC. According to EOC staff, sufficient resources are available to keep evacuation routes clear during inclement weather or in the event of stalled or wrecked vehicles. .

Sufficient personnel and vehicles to operate traffic control points would be available through nutual aid agreements with other local jurisdictions in the County.

The County Sheriff's Department coordinated the demonstration of traffic and access control within the 10-mile EPZ. Tocations were selected from a base map in response to the protective action reconinendations. 'Ihe Highway Department has responsibility for placing barricades and evacuation route signs. The Sheriff's officers are responsible for manning these points.

One team was activated to man a traffic control point (the others were simulated). A request was submitted to the autual aid network for the additional personnel to m n other traffic control points.

The EOC staff had a list of mobility impaired persons within the EP7 and an indication of each individuals special needs. The remption center at Roncali High School was activated with staff present for duty at 11:45 a.m.

Registration is conpleted using Red Cross Shelter forms. Any further transportation required or feeding needs are provided for in the written plans. Radiological monitoring is done at the reception center by personnel fro.n the State of Wisconson Radiological Division with assistance of personnel from the University of Wisconsin. If contamination is found, the persons are issued protective clothing and transported to a local hospital for decontamination. Contaminated vehicles are inpounded by the Police TMparte nt for further consideration. Congregate Care is handled by the Rei Cross and the shelter is operated in accordance with National Red Cross policies and procedures.

Area Reconinended for Improvement: While the decontamination protocol outlined TMe State plan couGf result in sone individuals being transported to a hospital, many would be decontaminated at the relocation center by the radiological monitoring team. Personnel assigned to this task should be prepared to handle this responsibility. (State of Wisconsin)

Radiological Exposure Control Sheriff's officers at the traffic control point demonstrated knowledge of their responsibilities. A dosimtry kit consisting of a low-range and edium-range dosimter was provided to each two or three team. Field terns were familiar with reporting procedures, mximacn dose and the location of a decontamination center.

Area Re girlni LCorrective Action: K.3.a A dosimtry kit should be pro /idei for each fndividual that may be exposed to conta nination.

W

Medin Relations Media relations is a joint function with the State, Kewaunee County and Wisconsin Public Service Corporation. Media relations are conducted at the JPIC. Evaluation of the Manitowoc County JPIC activity is included with the State of Wisconsin ella relations discussion.

Recovery and Reentry Recovery and reentry was conducted in an orderly manner, with the County Board Chairman asking each emergency worker what they were doing to help the -

public return to their homes. There was discussion about what routes were -

being used by people returning home, dairy animals and safety precautions for the general public. The last EBS message pertaining to recovery and reentry was drafted from a prescripted message and other information recieved by the PIO.

31

SUMMARY

LISTING OF EXERCISE FINDINGS 32 I

UTILITY: Kewaunee Nuclear Power Plant

'- Sumary Listing of Exercise Findings

1. Deficiencies October 22, 1985 Wisconsin (State) (Date)

Wisconsin (Comunity)

NUREG Narrative Statommt Corrective Action Scheduled Actual Item of Deficiency Proposed Date Date None 33

1 UTILITY: Kewaunee Nuclear Power Plant ,.

Suninary Listing of Exercise Findings

2. Areas Requiring Corrective Action October 22, 1985 Wisconsin (State)

,Date)

(

Wisconsin (Ccenunity)

Corrective Action Scheduled Actual NUREG Narrative Statement Date Date l

Item of Weakness Proposed E.1 'Ihe connunication controller failed to verify NAWAS messages from the utility in accordance with established procedure. The State must clarify with the utility the exact procedure and phone numbers to be used to verify the receipt of information form the Kewaunee l plant. This varification process should j not be subject to the independent i

verification of utility information by the OIC or SRC.

4 F. 'Ihe State shuld insure field monitoring teams have adequate radio equipamt for continous contact with the team controller F. No backup comnunications system was available between the JPIC and State EOC.

34 9

e

UTILITY: Kewaunee Nuclear Power Plant

'- Sununary Listing of Exercise Findings

2. Areas Requiring Corrective Action October 22, 1985 Wisconsin (State) ,Date)

(

Wisconsin (Comuunity)

NUREG Narrative Statement Corrective Action Scheduled Actual of Weakness Proposed Date Date Item I.10 'Ihe State of Wisconsin and the utility do not have mutually understood procedures for the coordination of emergency information necessary for the SRC to independently verify offsite protective action reconwr>1ations. This is a weakness which was also noted during the 1983 Kewaunee exercise. While corrective action was taken in August 1984 to establish the data paransiters, the effective coordination or m 3rgency information from the utility's EOF with the SRC was not demonstrated.

35 O

9

UTILITY: Kewaunee Nuclear Power Pirnt

Stenary Listing of Exercise Findings

3. Areas Recommended For Inproverrent October 22, 1985 Wisconsin . (Date)

(State)

Wisconsin (Ccmnunity}

]

1. More attention should be given to filling out message forms, such as time the message is generated and by what agency, etc.

2. The SRC should be represented within the EOC operations room to facilitate the coordination of information and proposed actions.

3. Status board plotters should keep the status boards current and consistent at all times.

4. The State, Kewaunee and Manitowoc Counties and the Wisconsin Public Service Corporation need to establish joint The roles of the utility and the State for activation, nunagement and operating procedures for the JPIC. security of the facility must be defined and connunicated to all persons who will b of the JPIC. 'Ihese procedures should include both normal operations as well as exercise operations. l S. While the decontamination protocol outlined in the State plan could result in some individuals being transported to a hospital, many would be decontaininatol at the relocation center by the radiological monitoring team.

Personnel assigned to this task should be prepared to handle this responsibility.

4 I

36

ITPILITY: Kewaunee Nuclear Power Plant

'- Sumary Listing of Exercise Findings

1. Deficiencies October 22, 1985 Wisconsin (Date)

(State)

Kewaunee County (Cmmunity)

Narrative Staterymt Corrective Action Scheduled Actual NUREG Date of Deficiency Proposed Date Item None 37 9

9

._ 3

)

UTILITY: Kewaunee Nuclear Power Plant '

Sunnary Listing of Exercise Firvlings

2. Areas Requiring Corrective Action October 22, 1985 Wisconsin (Date)

(State)

Kewaunee County (Comnunity)

Narrative Statement Corrective Action Scheduled Ac;. cal NUREG Date Proposed Date Item of Weakness E.1  % e State of Wisconsin, Kewaunee and Manitowoc Counties and Wisconsin Public Service Coorporation should establish appropriate verification procedures (including telephone numbers) for each emergency action classification level and other notifications.

E.7 Information concerning the evacuation of schcol children was not included in EBS releases. Wis area requiritFJ corrective action is now a County responsibility because of a change in the Radiological Dnergency Plans for the State and Counties. We objective to shcw corrective action was not-selectal or 1.wxistrated during this exercise arvi remains open. (This was incorrectly noted as E.6 in the 1983 report.) ,

38 G

+

ITTILITY: Kewaunee Nuclear Power Plant Sumnary Listing of Exercise Findings

2. Areas Roquiring Corrective Action October 22, 1985 Wisconsin .

,Date)

(

(State)

Kewaunee County (Comnunity)

Corrective Action Scheduled Actual NUREG Narrative Statement Date Date Item of Weakness Proposed F. Message logs were not maintained by EOC staff aM hard copy of inportant messages (incomi >J and outgoing) were not prepared.

K.3.a Radiological equipment inventory records do not exist at the Kewaunee County EOC, as called for in the County Plan.

K.3.a Permanent record radiological exposure

control devices are not available for emergency workers. Acquisition of TLDs l

for use by local emergency workers is l

currently underway. 'Ihis area requiring corrective action from the 1983 exercise was not selected for demonstration in i this exercise and remains open.

1

}

l 39 i

i i

)

UTILITY: Kewaunee Nuclear Power Plant .'

• ~

Stmmary Listing of Exercise Findings

2. Areas Requiring Corrective Action October 22, 1985 Wisconsin (State)

,(Date)

Kewaunee County (Comnunity)

NUREG Narrative Statement Corrective Action Scheduled Actual.

Item of Weakness Proposed Date Date K,3.b Appropriate written instructions were not issued with the dosimetry packets. This is a weakness which was also noted during the 1983 Kewaunee exercise.

Information was not provided to emergency workers concerning maximum dose and stay times as called for in the County Plan.

M.1 Kewaunee County EOC staff did not fully demonstrate their knowledge of the procedures for recovery and reentry.

More time and consideration should be given to discussions of the problems relating to recovery and reentry during the next exercise.

40 9

UTILITY: Kewaunee Nuclear Power Plant

'- Sunmary Listing of Exercise Findings Areas Recomended For Inprovement 3.

October.22, 1985 Wisconsin (Date)

(State)

Kewaunee county (Comunity)

1. Significant events such as emrgency action level changes, protective action recomendations, etc. should be announced to the staff rather than waiting for scheduled briefings.

2. Future training of Kewaunee County staf f should enphasis the need for coordination of protective actions with the i

State of Wisconsin and Manitowoc County as appropriate.

3. The responsibility for mictaining the status board could le assigned to an administrative staff number rather than the EOC Director.

4. It would be helpful if the maps could be utilized during staff briefings when various ee rgency response activities are being discussed.

5. Prescripted text describino EPZ sectors by familiar landmarks and boundaries would sinplify and expedite the preparation of EBS messages.

6. County personnel responsihie for the staffing of traffic control points should be better informed on the location of reception / congregate care and decontamination facilities.

7. The Kewaunee County 11ealth Nurse and the Wisconsin Department of Health and Social Services personnel should read and acquaint themselves with their respective responsibilities.

8. liard copies of EBS releases should be transmitted to the County PIO representatives at the JPIC for distribution to the media.

41 e

L_____ _

..1 UTILITY: Kewaunee Nuclear Power Plant .-

Sumnary Listing of Exercise Findings

1. Deficiencies October 22, 1985 Wisconsin (State)

(Date)

Manitowoc County (Comnunity)

NUREG Narrative Statement Corrmtive Action Scheduled Actual of Deficiency Proposed Date Date Item None e

42

UTILITY: Kewaunee Nuclear Power Plant Sumnary Listing of Exercise Findings

2. Areas Requiring Corrective Action October 22, 1985 Wisconsin (State)

,Date)

(

Manitowoc County (Comnunity)

Narrative Statement Corrective Action Scheduled Actual NUREG Date of Weakness Proposed Date Item E.1 'Ihe State of Wisconsin, Kewaunee and Manitowoc Counties, and Wisconsin Public Service Coorporation should establish appropriate verification procedures (including telephone numbers) for each energency action classification level and other notifications.

E.7 Information concerning the evacuation of school children was not included in EBS releases. This area requiring corrective action is now a Connty responsibility because of a clunge in the Radiological Emergency Plans for the State and Counties. The objective to show corrective action was not selected or demonstrated during this exercise .uy3 remains open. (This was incorrs:tly noted as E.6 in the 1983 report.) ,

43

[TTILITY: Kewaunee Nuclear Ibwer Plant Sunsnary Listing of Exercise Findings

2. Areas Requiring Corrective Action (cx>ntinued)

October 22, 1985 Wisconsin (Date) i (State)

Manitowoc (bunty (Consnanity)

Cbtrective Action Scheduled Actual NUREG Narrative Statement Date Date of Weakness Proposed Item Bnergency workers were not provided with  % e State of Wisconsin's DDG is presently 09/86 K.3.a permanent record devices. Acquisition gathering ordering information from the of 'ILD's for use by local emergency " risk" counties with nuclear power plants in workers is currently underway. %is order to purchase T w's for emergency workers. (

l area requiring corrective action from %ey will be available for issuance when l the 1983 exercise was not selected for we next exercise.

l demonstration in this exercise and remains open.

K.3.a A dosimetry kit should be provided for Individual sets of dosimeters will be 09/B6 each individual that may be exposed to issu~5 to each emergency worker when the i radiation. Manitowoc County REP Plan is next exercised. In the past, FTMA has accepted issuance by " team".

44

(' c m ee Q v IJW (pg,a sr- M (frILI'lY: Kewaunee Nuclear Power Plant '

Sumary Listing of Exercise Findings

l. Deficiencies s i

Wisconsin ,, 0:tober 22, log (State) (Date)

Wisconsin ., j (QMuunity) l' NLREG Narrative Statement Cbtrective Action Scheduled Actual I Item of Deficiency Proposed Date Date None 1

1 l

33 i l - _ _ . _ _ . _ _ _ _ _ _

! m_

. l UPILITY: Kewaunee Itaclear Power Plant '

Sunumry Listing of Scercise Findings

2. Areas Requiring (brrective Action October 22, l E5 Wisconsin (State) (Date)

Wisconsin (Cbnnunity)

NLREG Narrative Statement Cbtrective Action Scheduled Actual Item of Weakness Proposed Date Date E.1 %e consunication controller failed to %e State, the counties, and the utility 10/87 verify NANAS messages from the utility held meetings in Decenber, 1985 and in accx>rdance with established February,1986 to discuss the connuni-procedure. We State nust clarify with cations problems which arose during the the utility the exact procedure and the exercise. Notification and verifi-phone nunbers to be used to verify the cation procedures were reviewed. %e receipt of information from the Kewaunee utility will be installing a new verifi-Plant. %is verification process should cation nunter for use by the State. %e not be subject to the independent phone line will have forwarding capabili-verification of utility information by ties from the (bntrol Room to the TSC the OIC or SRC. and then the EDF as those facilities are activated. 1Yaining will be conducted for the State's (bnuunication (bntroller in the use of the new verification procedures.

F. %e State should insure field monitoring te process is underway to provide new 09/86 teams have adequate radio equipnent for radios for the field monitoring teams.

continuous contact with the team controller.

G. No back-up comnunications system was A radio back-up connunications system SPY 1987 available between the JPIC and State D0C. for the JPIC will be instituted as soon as funding becomes available.

34

UTILITY: Kewaunee Wclear Ibwer Plant Sumary Listing of Exercise Findings

2. Areas Requiring Cbtrective Action (continued)

Wisconsin October 22, 1485 (State) (Date)

Wisconsin (Comunity)

NUREG Narrative Statement (brrective Action Scheduled Actual Item of Weakness Proposed Date Date I.10 'Ihe State of Wisconsin and the utility do Meetings were held in Decenber,1985 and 10/87 not have mutually understood procedures February, 1986 hetween the State, the for the coordination of emergency counties, and the utility to clarify the information necessary for the SBC to procedures for the coordination of independently verify off-site protective emergency information necessary for the action recomendations. 'Ihis is a SRC to independently verify off-site pro-weakness which was also noted during the tective action recomendations. 'Ibe 1983 Kewaunee Exercise. While utility is establishing a telephone line corrective action was taken in August, for exclusive use by the SRC. 'Ihe phone line 1984 to establish the data parameters, will have a forwarding capability from the the effective coordination of emergency 'ISC to the BOP when it becomes operational.

information from the utility's BDP with An individual will be designated, by title, the SRC was not demonstrated. in the 'ISC and the IDP to comunicate with the SHC.

35

. .i l

EffILITY: Kewaunee Nuclear Ibwer Plant ,

Sunmary Listing cf "Bcercise Findings

3. Areas " e nded for Improvement Wisconsin October 22, Z'5_

(State) (Date)

Wisconsin (Omuunity)

1. Pt>re attention should be given to filling out message forms, such as time the message is generated and by what agency, etc.

'IYaining will be conducted with DOG personnel and State agency representatives in the proper methods of filling out message forms.

2. 'Ihe SBC should be represented within the IOC operations room to facilitate the coordination of information and proposed actions.

'Ibe SRC will have a representative located in' the EDC.

3. Status board plotters should keep the status boards current and consistent at all times.

Status board plotters will be instructed in the necessity of keeping status boards current and consistent at all times. .-

4. 'Ihe State, Kewaunee and Manitowoc counties and the Wisconsin Public Service Oorporation need to establish joint operating procedures for the JPIC. 'Ihe roles of the utility and the State for activation, management and security of the facility nust be defined and connunicated to all persons who will be involved in the utilization of the JPIC. 'Ihese procedures should include both normal operations as well as exercise operations.

A meeting of DBG personnel, the State's lead PIO, and utility representatives was held on February 25, 1986 to establish joint procedures for the activation, operation, management, and security of the JPIC.

'Ihese procedures will be connunicated to each agency represented at the JPIC.

5. While the decontamination protocol outlined in the State Plan could result in some individuals being transported to a hospital, many would be decontaminated at the relocation center by the radiological montoring team. Personnel assigned to this task should be prepared to handle this responsibility.

Decontamination protocol outlined in the State Plan will be reviewed with relocation center personnel.

36

o .

4

. .~

)l ifrILITY: Kewaunee Nuclear Power Plant

• 4 Sungnary Listing of Fxercise Findings

1. Deficiencies October 22, 1985 i Wisconsin (Date)

(State)

Newaunee Cbunty (Cbnumanity) i (brrective Action Scheduled Actual NLREG Narrative Statement Date Date i Iten of Deficiency Proposed Ncme i

l 37

. .- )

LFFILITY: Kewaunee bbelear Power Plant Sunmary Listino of Exercise Findings

2. Areas Requirico (brrective Action October 22,' '5 Wisconsin (Date)

(State)

Kewaunee Cbunty (Chmunity)

Corrective Action Scheduled Actual NLREG Narrative Statement Proposed Date Date Item of Weakness

%ese nunbers are in effect and do 1984 El te State of Wisconsin, Kewaunee, and Manitowoc counties and Wisconsin Public currently operate. Kewaunee Cbunty Service Corporation should establish had no trouble verifying with the appropriate verification procedures Kewaunee Riclear Ibwer Plant.

(including telephone nunbers) for each emergency action classification level and other notifications.

Information concerning the evacuation of tere were no evacuations of school 03/86 E.7 school children was not included in EBS children in the last scenario.

releases. mis area requiring corrective Messages for school children are to action is now a county responsibility be used with the EBS messages and because of a change in the Radiological have been written to that effect Bnergency Plans for the State and counties. when we have practiced our pre-

% e objective to show corrective action exercise drill. %ese messages will was not selected or demonstrated during be included in EBS messages in the this exercise and remains open. (W is was future.

incorrectly noted as E.6 in the 1983 report.)

38

1 UTILITY: Kewaunee teclear Power Plant S-ry Listing of Dcercise Findings

2. Areas Requiring (berective Action (continued)

October 22, 1985 Wisconsin (Date)

(State)

Kewaunee Cbunty

((bsmunity)

(brrective Action Scheduled Actual NLREG Narrative Statement Date Date Item of Weakness Proposed F. Message logs were not maintained by IDC RN and easier to use message forms 02/86 staff and hard copy of inportant have been developed.

messages (incoming and outgoing) were not prepared.

Radiological equipment inventory records Wese records are currently in the 1%2 K.3.a do not exist at the Kewaunee (bunty EOC, Kewaunee Cbunty Emergency Government as called fer, in the Obunty Plan. Office.

K.3.a Mrmanent record radiological exposure Ebrmal letter requesting the prepositioned 03/86 control devices are not available for TID's and anount needed after 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> has emergency workers. Acxjuisition of TfD's been submitted to DHSS as of March, 1986.

for use by local emergency workers is currently underway. %is area requiring corrective action from the 1983 exercise was not selected for demonstration in this exercise and remains open.

3S

. .s 1

. }

ifrILITY: Kewaunee Riclear Ibwer Plant Sunnaq Listing of Exercise Findings

2. Areas Requiring Q)rrective Action (continued)

Wisconsin October 22, 1985 (State) (Inte)

Kewaunee (bunty (Omunity)

NLREG Narrative Statement Q)rrective Action Scheduled Actual Item of Weakness Proposed Date Date K.3.b Appropriate written instructions were not Kewaunee (bunty RDO's are currently 04/86 issued with the dosimetry packets. %is preparing the dosimetry kits with is a weakness which was also noted during pertinent information for maxinum the 1983 Kewaunee Exercise. Information dose and stay times, w not provided to emergency workers concerning maxinum dose and stay times as called for in the (bunty Plan.

El Kewaunee Cbunty EDC staff did not fully %e pre-exercise training session 08/86 demonstrate their knowledge of the will enphasize the areas of concern procedures for recovery and re-entry. for re-entry and recovery. Wis will More time and consideration should be include the discussion of legal and given to discussions of the problems counseling problems.

relating to recovery and re-entry during the next exercise.

40

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IFPILITY: Kewaunee Wclear Ibwer Plant Samenary Listing of Exercise Findings

3. Areas M aded for Improvement Wisconsin October 22, 1985 (State) (Date)

Kewaunee Cbunty (Cbauunity)

1. Significant events such as emergency action level changes, protective action reconsnendations, etc. should be announced to the staff rather than waiting for scheduled briefinos.

2. Ebture training of Kewaunee (bunty staff should emphasize the need for coordination of protective actions with the State of Wisconsin and Manitowoc (bunty as appropriate.

3. 'Ihe responsibility for maintaining the status board could be assigned to an adninistrative staff meniber rather than the BOC Director.

4. It would be helpful if the maps could be utilized during staff briefings when various emergency response activities are being discussed.

5. Prescripted text describing EPZ sectors by familiar landmarks and boundaries would simplify and expedite the preparation of EBS messages.

6. (bunty personnel responsible for the staffing of traffic control points should be better informed on the location of reception / congregate care and decontaminatinn facilities.

7. 'Ihe Kewaunee County Health Wrse and the Wisconsin Department of Health and Social Services personnel should read and acquaint themselves with their respective responsibilities.

8. Hard copies of EBS releases should be transmitted to the (bunty PIO representatives at the JPIC for distribution to the media.

1-8. 'Ihese reconenendations will be considered and discussed during the Cbunty training prior to tlm next exercise.

41

, ., l (FTILITY: Kewaunee Nuclear Power Plant

• Sununary Listing of Exercise Findings

1. Deficiencies Wisconsin October 22, 1985 (State) (Date)

Manitowoc Qxinty Kbauunity)

NLREG Narrative Statement Cbtrective Action Scheduled Actual Itess of Deficiency Proposed Date Date None 42

., l tTTILITY: Kewaunee W elear Power Plant Sununary Listing of Dcercise Findings .

2. Areas Requiring Corrective Action Wisconsin October 22, :3 (State; (Date)

Manitowoc (bunty (Connunity)

NLREG Narrative Statement Grrective Action Scheduled Actual Item of Weakness Proposed Date Date Eol %e State of Wisconsin, Kewaunee, and Manitowoc Cbunty has appropriate verifi- 09/86 Manitowoc (bunties, and Wisconsin Public cation nunbers and procedures in place Service Grporation should establish with WPS. System failure occurred at the appropriate verification procedures Kewaunee Wclear Plant 10-22-85 beyond (including telephone nunbers) for each Manitowoc County's control. Proper back-emergcxy action classification level up procedures were implemented to verify and other notifications. EAL calls by county. WPS will be estab-lishing a new verification nunber with call transfer ring-over from their control room to 'ISC to EDF in the next few months.

%is nunber change will be shown as a revision in the next Manitowoc munty REP Plan update.

E.7 Information concerning the evacuation It would have been inpossible for Manitowoc IDENOWN of school children was not included @unty to have demonstrated dissemination of in EBS releases. S is area requiring information for PAR's affecting school corrective action is now a county children, since the scenario 10/22/85 did responsibility because of a change in not drive such action as evacuation of a the Radiological anergency Plans for school. %ere are no schools affected the State and counties. %e objective in the EPZ of the Kewaunee Wclear Power Plant to shoc corrective action was not other than in the Village of Mishicot and selected or denonstrated during this 'Ibwn of Gibson and PAR's did not affect exercise and remains open. (% is was them. Procedures for evacuation of schools incorrectly noted as E.6 in the 1983 appear clearly in the Cbunty REP Plan and report.) willAmuld be demonstrated if the scenario for the exercise warrants that action.

43 i

7 ITTILITY: Kewaunee Nuclear Power Plant Stagnary Listing of Exercise Findings

2. Areas Requiring Corrective Action j October 22, 1985 Wisconsin (State)

, (Date)

Manitowoc County (Community) l NUREG Narrative Statement Corrective Action Scheduled Actual Item of Weakness Proposed Date Date K.3.a Dnergency workers were not provided with permanent record devices. Acquisition of 'ILDs for use by local emergency workers is currently underway. 'Ihis area requiring corrective action from the 1983 exercise was not selected for demonstration in this exercise and l

remains open.

l l Kc3.a A dosimetry kit should be provided for each individual that may be exposed to radiation.

l l

l l

l l

44 l

1 1

o .

ITTILITY: Kewaunee Nuclear Power Plant Stamary Listing of Exercise Findings

3. Areas Reconnended For Inprovement Wisconsin October.22, 1985 (State) -

(Date)

Manitowoc County (Conmanity)

1. Manitowoc County should consider a redesign of the EOC layout to allow for additional space in the operations area.

2. Hard copies of IBS releases should be transmitted to the County PIO representatives at the JPIC for distribution to the media.

45 e

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• Q i.

LTTILITY: Kewaunee Nuclear Power Plant Sunmary Listing of Exercise Findings

3. Areas Recomended for Inprovement l (btober 22,1o85 l Wisconsin (State) (Date) i l

Punitowoc (bunty (Oxmunity)

1. Manitowoc (bunty should consider a redesign of the FDC layout to allow for additional space in Un r,perations area.

j Kinitowoc (bunty will be relocating their EOC into larger quarters during March-April of 1986. 'Ihis larger configuration will be demonstrated in the Septenber 9,1986 exercise with the Ibint Beach Plant.

2. Intd copies of FES releases should be transmitted to the (bunty PIO representatives at the JPIC for distribution to the media.

Intd copies of EBS messages should be available when the network of computer terminals are in place mid-sunmer 1986. (bm[mters will be located at the JPIC and county EOC's as well as the State EOC and both Kewaunee ami Ibint Beach thclear Ibwer Plants' ECF's. 'Ib date, the system available has not been effective, thus underutilized.

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