ML20211D750

Responds to NRC Re Violations Noted in OI Rept 3-98-043 & EA 99-183.Corrective Actions:Oversight of Training Program & Contractor Policies That Implement Parts of Security Program Have Been Increased by Addl Position

ML20211D750
Person / Time
Site:	Kewaunee
Issue date:	08/23/1999
From:	Marchi M WISCONSIN PUBLIC SERVICE CORP.
To:	NRC OFFICE OF INFORMATION RESOURCES MANAGEMENT (IRM)
References
CON-NRC-99-062 EA-99-183, NUDOCS 9908270126
Download: ML20211D750 (6)

Text

.r

• NRC-99-062 Wisconsin Public Service Corporation (a subsidiary of WPS Resources Corporation)

Kewaunee Nuclear Power Plant North 490, Highway 42 I Kewaunee. WI 54216-9511 920-388-2560 l

August 23,1999 10 CFR 2.202 U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Attention: Document Control Desk  ;

Washington, D.C. 20555 i

Ladies / Gentlemen:

l 1

Docket 50-305 Operating License DPR-43 Kewaunee Nuclear Power Plant Response to Apparent Violation. EA 99-183

Reference:

Letter from J. A. Grobe (NRC) to M. L. Marchi (WPSC) dated July 22,1999 (NRC Office ofinvestigations Report 3-98-043)

In the reference, the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) informed Wisconsin Public Service Corporation (WPSC) of the results of an investigation by NRC Office ofInvestigations (01). The NRC's preliminary conclusion is that there is an apparent violation of regulatory requirements regarding willful falsification of records by a member of management in the Kewaunee Plant's contracted security staff. Accordingly, NRC has asked WPSC to respond to the apparent violation.

In the reference the NRC informed WPSC of the option to have a predecisional enforcement conference to discuss the issues further. As WPSC indicated in a telephone conversation with Mr. James Creed, NRC Region 111, we have waived the enforcement conference option and are providing the information requested by the NRC in the attachment to this letter.

Should there be any questions regarding any of the information provided, please contact me or a member of my staff for clarification.

Sincerely, t I

- U N M

Mark L Marchi Subscribed and Sworr to Before Me.This <#7; Day k

Vice President-Nuclear 1999 of d m ~ us.i_/

s/ 4 0 m>c $

GlH Notary Public, State of Wisconsin Attach.

cc - US NRC, Region 111 My Commission Expires:

US NRC Senior Resident inspector A4agle /rdoo /

9908270126 990823 PDR ADOCK 05000305 G pog stinud+or i voup.cionwpwi,co y%,,n%,i u

E-1 l

l .

ATTACHMENT I i

Letter froin Mark L. Marchi (WPSC) i To {

1 1

Document Control Desk (NRC) l

! Dated  !

! l l August 23,1999 Re: Response to Apparent Violation, EA 99-183 nehuc Pvoll ymotovm6 lcarwfileclicwe gparentviol disc

Document Control Desk August 23,1999 Attachment 1. Page 1 Apparent Violation The Nuclear Regulatory Commission's (NRC's) letter communicating the apparent violation, was not specific in citing what particular portion of the Code is considered to have been violated.

Consequently, our response to the apparent violation will be centered around the nature of the event that occurred.

Contrary to the requirements of the Kewaunee Plant Security Program, security weapons tests were not performed as required on all security equipment on two occasions. Specifically, the annual tests of shotguns were not performed on i1 shotguns in 1997 and nine shotguns in 1998. It was also found that the management individual from the contracted security firm responsible for conducting the equipment tests, falsified the documentation that signified completion of the tests for the periods in question. It was also determined that the individual responsible for the tests provided false information to the Kewaunee Plant Security Director when questioned on the subject.

WPSC Resnonse Wisconsin Public Service Corporation (WPSC) concurs with the finding as described above. WPSC's internalinvestigation of the event concluded that the contracted security management representative deliberately falsified records that are used to document performance of the tests. When confronted with the evidence, the individual denied any wrongdoing. Although the incident and the act itselfis serious, it was determined to be an isolated incident conducted by a single person. The contracted security organization is The Wackenhut Corporation (TWC).

WPSC would like to clarify a point made in the Oflice ofInvestigation (01) report letter. The letter notes that subsequent confirmatory testing of the shotguns resulted in two that failed their test.

WPSC would like to make it clear that the failures in and of themselve, do not mean that failing to conduct the previous tests resulted in the shotguns having been in an inoperable or degraded state for any particular duration. Although we can not conclusiv"y state that they were fully functional either, it should be cicar that the failures could have occurred a. 2ny time.

WPSC is aware that NRC is particularly concerned with events and/or conditions involving willful violations and considers them of sufficient significance to warrant escaJated enforcement. WPSC is equally sensitive to the seriousness of this type of event which is, in part, what prompted the extent and timeliness of corrective actions that have been taken. I 1

Document Control Desk l August 23,1999 l Attachment 1, Page 2 l However, WPSC feels that enforcement discretion can and should be applied when considering any civil penalty and at what level the NRC assesses the apparent violation. As indicated in the letter notifying WPSC of the apparent violation, WPSC identified the condition and took prompt and effective corrective actions to address the issue. Additionally, WPSC promptly notified NRC Region III of the condition even though the condition in and of itself did not meet regulatory reporting criteria. NRC also indicated in the letter that NRC's final decision will be based on )

1 confirmation on the docket that the corrective actions previously described to the NRC have been l

or are being taken. This response will provide that confirmation.

Reason For Violation I l

The individual responsible for conducting shotgun functional tests did not perform the required tests j j

on all shotguns in the Security Group's inventory. Why the individual failed to conduct the tests could i l

not be determined. When confronted with the evidence that the tests were not conducted the I individual denied falsifyng records that indicated tlnt the tests were performed. A contributing factor to the event was that there was no second verification or review requirements included in the process l which could have prevented the event.

l 4

The condition was found when it was determined that statements made by the individual responsible for conducting the tests could not be substantiated by plant security computer access records and weapons location records. The access computer showed that the individual responsible for performing the test was not in the plant long encugh or in the area of the weapons in order to obtain all the weapons he had attested to testing. Also, when weapons are taken ofTsite for any reason, they are logged as out of service. There were no log entries which would indicate the weapons were taken off l site for testing during the time intervals the suspect individual indicated that he had conducted the weapons tests.

The individual was a member of management / supervisory staff and was solely responsible for conducting and recording the tests. This was not considered an unusual situation for an individual in this type of position. The position was felt to be at a sufliciently elevated level of responsibility that m =wn..m

l Document Control Desk

(

j August 23,1999 Attachment 1, Page 3 a review of the activities' performance and confirmation of records were not required. Nevertheless, j this did introduce the potential for a deliberate act of an individual to go unnoticed.

I I

The falsified records were working records kept on the status of tests performed on the weapons. l These records are used as the basis for documenting that the tests were completed in a formal record,

" Security implementing Procedure (SIP) 30.02-10." The original inquiries started when the formal record was questioned as being out of date. When the individual responsible for the records was questioned on the status of the weapons he indicated he had forgotten to complete the formal record and indicated he had performed the required tests. His suppon for his statement was that he used the l l

working record to track the status until he entered the information on the formal record.

i Corrective Actions

• Oversight of the Training Program and contractor policies that implement parts of the security program have been increased with the addition of another licensee position to the security organization. This oversigh: should reduce potential of reoccurrence.

• Security contractor policies were reviewed and those that implement parts of the security program have been verified to include proper licensee review and oversight.

• All shotguns that could not positively be verified as having had an annual test fire were removed from service and test fired on 10/16/98.

• The two weapons that failed to properly cycle duria testing have been repaired, re-tested, and placed back in service.

• All training records that the responsible individual was involved with were reviewed for the past three years and written tests for 1998 were re-scored to verify compliance with the training and qualificationu (T&Q) manual. No discrepancies that impacted the T&Q progiam were detected and minor discrepancies were corrected. The minor errors were reviewed for considerations of this investigation and determined not to be a case of fitisification or a deliberate act.

. Other processes within the security program were reviewed to determine a similar pattern of a single individual having sole responsibility for a process or lack of proper oversight. Other processes were determined to have proper dissemination of responsibilities and oversight.

. The policy and procedure for documenting test firing of firearms have been revised and updated.

Policy now provides additional oversight and verification of the program. These measures are designed to prevent reoccurrence.

~w 2-

f

t. . . .-

1 ,

Document Control Desk

~ August 23,1999 -

Attachment 1, Page 4 -

e' Reviews were conducted of other programs and actions that the position was responsible for to determine compliance with the security program. No other abnormalities or concerns were detected.

• ' The security contractor pohey was revised to include an annual review of the security contractor responsibilities. These measures are designed to ensure periodic verification and continued licensee oversight of contractor policies.

. All personnel involved in the event as well as the security force were advised of the situation and responsibilities in ensuring thorough review and reporting of concerns found within any program and the ramifications of falsification.

. Since the event the contracted employee had been terminated by TWC.

- Comoliance Schedule The corrective actions described above have been completed.

. . . 4, &, .,-