IR 05000305/1990017
| ML20197H453 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Kewaunee  |
| Issue date: | 11/05/1990 |
| From: | Knop R NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION III) |
| To: | Evers K WISCONSIN PUBLIC SERVICE CORP. |
| References | |
| NUDOCS 9011140271 | |
| Download: ML20197H453 (2) | |
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Dco/DuM Aros)
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Docket No. 50-305 Wisconsin Public Service
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Corporation
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ATTN: 'Mr. K..H. Evers Manager
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Nuclear Power
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700 North Adams
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Post Office Box 19002
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Green Bay, WI 54307-9002 Gentlemen:
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.This refers to the routine safety inspection conducted by Mr. P. I. Castleman
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and others of this office during the period from September 9 through October 20, 1990, of activities at Kewaunee Nuclear Power Plant authorized by NRC Operating
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License No. DPR-43 and to the discussion of our findings with Mr. M. L. Marchi
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at the conclusion'of the inspection.
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'The enclosed copy of our inspection report identifies areas examined during-the inspection. Within these areas, the inspection consisted of a selective
. examination'of procedures and representative records, observations, and interviews with personnel.
No violations of NRC requirements were identified during the course of this
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In accordance with 10 CFR 2.790 of the Commission's regulations, a copy of this letter and the enclosed inspection report will be placed in.the NRC
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Public Document Room.
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We will gladly discuss any questions you nave concerning this inspection.
Sincerely, E
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R. C. Knop, Chief Reactar Projects Branch 3 E
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Enclosure:
Inspection Report
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No. 50-305/90017(DRP)
See Attached Distribution
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REGION III==
Report No. 50-305/90017(DRP)
Docket No.'50-305
License No. DPR-43
Licensee:. Wisconsin Fablic Service Corporation
P. O. Box 19002
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Green Bay, WI - 54307-9002
Facility Name:.Kewaunee Nuclear Power Plant
Inspect' ion At:
Kewaunee Site, Kewaunee, Wisconsin
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Inspection Conducted:
September 9 through October 20, 1990
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Inspectors:
P. I. Castleman
M. J. Davis
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. Approved By:
J. McCormick-Barger, Chief
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' Reactor Projects Section-3C
Date
Inspection Summary
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-Inspection from Se)tember 9 through October 20, 1990 (Report
No. - 50-305/90017( D RP) )
. Areas-Inspected: Routine unannounced inspection by resident and headquarters
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based inspectors of:
previous inspection findings; operational safety and
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ESF walkdown; surveillance; maintenance; and followup of written reports of
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nonroutine events.
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Results: Li_censee performance, overall, has been good,
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Operations:
No significant issues.
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Maintenance /Surveillbnce:
A reportable event occurred 'during this inspection
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aeriod due to both emergency diesel generators being out of service for one -
lour and forty minutes. The.1B EDG was removed from service for surveillance
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. testing at the same time that the 1A EDG was inoperable. The cause of the
inoperability of the 1A EDG was improper installation of a retaining clip
in a. fuel. injector assembly during the.1990 refueling outage.
This event is
particularly significant because the licensee failed to vigorously pursue an
investigation into the cause of anomalous behavior of the 1A EDG when their
initial assumption of the cause was disproven.
Details contained in
paragraph 4.
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Engineering and Technical: Supporti. ; A-design: deficiency associated with
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- equipment upgradesi.totthe plant" security system manifested. itself during.
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the' inspection period. :This': deficiency wasjan. inadequate evaluation of the -
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'electrica1' characteristics of new equipment, which resulted in/an overcurrent
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- trip of a supply breaker, ands.in'a 20% reduction in line voltage to the -loads -
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-in question <-under full current conditions. Details. contained in paragraph 5.
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DETAILS
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Persons Contacted
- M. L. Marchi, Plant Manager-
.D. -J.LRopson, Assistant Manager, Plant Maintenance
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- C. A. Schrock, Assistant Manager, Plant Operations
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R. E. Draheim,: Assistant Manager, Plant Services
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'd. J. Wallace, Superintendent, Plant Instrument and Control
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C. S. Smoker, Supervisor, Plant Quality Programs
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D. R. Berg, Superintendent, Plant.Information Systems
Di T. Braun, Superintendent, Plant Operations-
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- M. T. Reinhart, Superintendent, Plant Radiation Protection
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'*D. S. Nalepka, Plant: Licensing Supervisor
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G. J. Youngwirth,, Plant Electrical Maintenance Supervisor
F..D; Evitch Plant l Security Supervisor
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T. J.-Webb,-Plant Nuclear Engineer
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- D. J. Will, Assistant Superintendent, Nuclear Design Change
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The inspectors' also talked with and interviewed members of the
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Operations, Maintenance, Health Physics, Instrument and Control, Quality.
Control, Chemistry, Design. Change, and Security groups.
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- Denotes personnel attending exit interview.;
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Followup on-Previous Inspection Findings (92702)
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.(CLOSED) Violation (305/89012-02):
Failure to Document Emergency
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Operating Frocedures -(E0P) Setpoint Calculations.
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'Thiscseverity level IV violation was issued as< a result of the E0P.
inspection performed in 1989 at Kewaunee, during which it was found
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'thatithe licensee's: lack:;of setpoint1 calculations would make it-
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impossible' for an independent verification that theLappropriate~ data =
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. base and calculational methodology had been used in the development.
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.of the setpoints.- In their response to the Notice of Violation (NOV)-,
.the' licensee committed to develop a detailed setpoint-documert which
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twould present:the data and calculations used to-determine the setpoints
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included in the EOPs.
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,The setpoint;; document was published in: September 1990. The inspectors
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determined-that the calculations presented in the _ document apoeared to be
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idotailed and properly based. The licensee' plans;to maintain.the setpoint
document in a controlled manner, updating-it as revisions are made to the
E0Ps. : The; document appeared to address the concerns' expressed.in the
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NOV. We-have;no further questions regarding this issue, and this
. violation is closed.
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Operational Safety Verification (71707), (71710)
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The inspectors. observed control room operations, reviewed applicable logs
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and conducted discussions with control room operators throughout the
inspection period.
The inspectors verified the operability of selected
safety-related systems, reviewed tagout records, and verified proper
return to service of affected components.
The inspectors observed a
number of control room shif t turnovers.
The turnovers were conducted in
a professional manner and included log reviews, panel walkdowns,
discussions of maintenance and surveillance activities in progress or
planned, and associated LC0 time restraints, as applicable.
Tne inspectors conducted tours of the auxiliary and turbine buildings.
During these tours, observations were made regarding plant equipment
conditions, fire hazards, fire protection, adherence to procedures,
radiological controls and conditions, housekeeping, tagging of equipment,
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ongoing maintenance and surveillance activities, containment integrity,
and availability of safety-related equipment.
The overall material
condition of plant systems and equipment was noted to be good, as were
the observed housekeeping and fire protection practices.
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On October 3, the licensee conducted their monthly containment
inspection.
During the inspection, it was noted that the insuletion
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around check valve SI-304B, on the train B safety injection line to the
reactor vessel, was wet.
A followup containment entry was performed to
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remove the insulation and inspect the valve for leakage and potential
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boric acid induced bolt corrosion.
This inspection showed that the
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wetted insulation was due to a body to connet leak at a rate of four
drops per minute.
No degradation of the valve bolts was noted.
The
resident inspector, who acc'mpanied licensee personnel into the
containment, noted the valve to be in good material conditior..
There
appeared to be uniform leakage from around the circumference of the valve
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body to bonnet joint.
The licensee installed a catch basin beneath the
valve to contain the flow of water.
A followup inspection was performed
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ten days later, with no increase in leek rate noted. The control room
operators have noted no detectable increase in reactor coolant system
leakage.
The licensee intends to continue monitoring the leakage for any
further degradation in the integrity of the body to bonnet joint.
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During the inspection period, the inspectors walked down the accessible
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portions of the Auxiliary Feedwater (AF( Rystem.
Items checked
included:
an operational valve lineup; proper housekeeping including
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control of flammable materials; normal pump seal and valve stem
leakages; proper electrical breaker and switch lineup; the required
instrumentation, including pressure monitors and valve position
indicators, were operable, and; proper lineup of the service water
and condensate storage support systems. Overall, the system, including
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both the motor driven and turbine driven pumps, appeared to be in a sound
state of operational readiness and no problems were identified.
During routine tours of the facility, the inspectors observed the
licensee's security activities including badging of personnel, access
control, escorting of visitors, security staff attentiveness and
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operation of security equipment.
All activities were conducted in a satisfactory manner and no violetions
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or deviations wern i M *ified.
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Monthly Surveillance Observation (61726)
The inspectors reviewed / observed the following Technical Specification
required surveillance testing:
Surveillance Procedure
Test
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SP 47-010A
Reactor Coolant Temperature and Pressurizer Pressure
Instrument Channel Test - Channel 1
SP 35-038A-
Boric Acid Tank 1A Level Instrument Calibration
SP 42-047
Diesel Generator Combined Monthly Test
SP 54-058
Turbine First Stage Pressure Instrument Channel Test
SP 24-107
Shield Building Vent Monthly Test
SP 42-109
Diesel Generatoi Manual Test
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The following items were considered during the inspection:
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testing was performed in accordance with approved procedures; that
test instrumentation was calibrated; that-test results conformed with
technical specifications and procedure requirements and were reviewed
by personnel other than the individual directing the test, and; that any
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deficiencies identified during the testing were reviewed and resolved by
appropriate management personnel.
At 1825 on Friday, September 14, 1990, while shutting down the 1A Emergency
Diesel Generator (EDG) at the. completion of SP 42-047, " Diesel Generator-
Combined Monthly -Test," the control room operators observed the-EDG resume
full speed operation.
To ensure shutdown of the EDG, the operators placed
-its control switch in the pullout position, and the unit successfully
coasted to a complete stop.
In evaluating this malfunction, on-shift
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personnel assumed that the EDG. shutdown timing solenoid had failed, and
that the operability of the EDG was not affected.
Based on this assumption,
the licensee elected to not pursue an investigation of the EDG shutdown
anomaly over the weekend of September 15-16.
On Monday, September 17, at 0935, the licensee removed the 1A EDG from-
service to' investigate the assumed solenoid-failure, and to conduct
a surveillance test on the carbon dioxide deluge system. Prior to
removing the 1A EDG from service, the licensee performed 'an operability
demonstration of'the IB EDG in accordance with their standard practice-
for doing so when taking the opposite train EDG out of service. This
operability demonstration, conducted under SP 42-109, " Diesel Generator
Manual Test," consisted of a local manual start of the EDG, with-
verification that the unit was able to reach a speed of 900-950 RPM,
frequency of 60-63 Hz, and voltage of 4200 V, in less than 10 seconds.
In 'accordance with the licensee's standard practice for EDG demonstration
- testing, this operability test did not include loading the EDG,
As a result of their investigation, licensee personnel determined
that the 1A EDG timing solenoid was performing satisfactorily.
The
licensee then investigated the engine's governor, but no indications
of malfunction were found. The licensee concluded that there must have
been a problem with the engine itself, and they contacted the EDG vendor,
who dispatched a technical representative.
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When t'he troubleshooting and surveillance testing performed on the.1A EDG
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were completed, the licensee conducted a demonstration test of the 1A EDG
- per SP 42-109 prior to removing the-1B EDG from service for the completion
of-the surveillance-testing on the carbon dioxide deluge system. The
1A EDG was started manually, and satisfactorily attained the required
. operating parameters of engine speed and generator frequency and voltage.
Thus, _the.1A EDG was declared operable, and the IB EDG was removed from
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service for'a total of one hour and forty minutes.
The EDG vendor technical representative arrived two days later, on
September 19. During his inspection of the 1AL EDG, he discovered that a
retaining spring was not installed on a clevis pin connecting the engine
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fuel rack to one of the fuel injectors. The clevis pin had vibrated out
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of its proper position, thereby allowing the injector linkage to jam the
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fuel rack and limit its range _ of motion to no more than 50% open from the
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"not-fully-closed" position. The malfunction observed in the diesel's
performance was, at that time, determined to be caused by the fuel rack-
not being able to close completely, which allowed continued injection
of, fuel to the engine during its coastdoun to a complete stop. The
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inoperability of the EDG, however, resulted from the fuel rack's
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, inability to open more than 50%, a condition which would have prevented
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the EDG from being able to attain its continuous full load rating of
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2600 KW, Hence, when.the 1B EDG was removed from service for one hour and
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forty minutes on September 17, both EDGs were inoperable for that time
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period,'a condition which was outside the plant's design basis.
The most probable root cause of this event was determined to be the
incorrect installation of the fuel injector linkage retaining clip while
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-overhauling the 1A EDG during the plant's 1990 refueling outage.
-This event could have been averted had the licensee removed the 1A EDG
from service on Monday, September 17, to vigorously pursue their
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investigation once the initial assumption of the cause of the anomalous
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EDG_ behavior was proven incorrect.
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As immediate corrective action, the licensee repaired the 1A EDG and
returned-it to service. Additionally, to address the generic concern
that other fuel injectors might be similarly affected, all injector
linkage retaining clips for both EDG's were verified to be properly
installed. Long term.::orrective actions will include training of plant
maintenance mechanics on the details of this event, and the licensee will
re-evaluate their practice of not loading an EDG during demonstration
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testing. The licensee also plans to conduct operations personnel
training regarding.this event, focusing on conservatism in operability
assessment.-
This issue vill be evaluated further upon the inspectors' review of the
licensee event report documenting the circumstances surrounding the
event.
All activities were conducted in a satisfactory manner and no violations
or deviations were identified.
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Monthly Maintenance Observation (62703)
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Station maintenance activities of-safety related systems and components-
listed below were observed / reviewed to ascertain if they were conducted
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in accordance with approved procedures, regulatory guides, industry codes
-or; standards, and in conformance with technical specifications.=
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The following items were considered during this review:
the limiting-
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conditions of operation were met while components or systems were _ removed
from service;. approvals were obtained prior to initiating the work;
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-activities were accomplished using approved procedures and were. inspected
- as' applicable; functional testing and/or calibrations were performed
prior to returning components or systems to service; parts and materials
used were properly certified; radiological controls were implemented; and
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fire prevention' controls were implemented.
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LThe following maintenance activities were observed / reviewed:
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DCR_2483
Design Change Request (DCR) to Upgrade Auxiliary Building
Special Ventilation Zone Fan Inlet and Outlet Damper
Limit' Switch Wires
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-PMP 8-1
Preventive Maintenance on IB Fire Pump
MWR 48333
Replace 1A Charging Pump Power _ Supply Breaker
MWR.49175
Changeout 1A2 Service Water Pump
LMWR 49410-
Repair IB Emergency Diesel. Generator Vibration Monitoring
-Unit
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MWR_49451
' Repair Security Multiplexer
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During-the inspection period, the circuit breaker supplying:a multiplexer
-in the plant security system tripped open, resulting in the loss of some-
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security monitoring capabili_ ties.- The plant security force implemented
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appropriate compensatory measures for the-lost capabilities. As a result
of the licensee's investigation into the tripping open of the multiplexer
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.sapply breaker, it was determined that the total loads supplied by the.
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breaker were.significantly_ greater than the breaker's current interrupt
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rating. -This condition resulted from the :recent installation of several
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upgrades to the plant's-security system.
In particular, the design of-
the upgrades failed ~to account for the doubling of load due to the
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addition ~~of heaters in newly installed outdoor. equipment, so that, when -
.the heaters' energized on the first. cold night following. installation of.
the upgrades, the breaker in question tripped open due to an ovarcurrent '
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condition.- The licensee also determined that,'uncer full load current,
the line, voltage to'the multiplexer would be reduced by about 20%. This
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voltage reduction would adversely impact the operation of the equipment
supplied by the multiplexer.
The root cause of the mismatch between the multiplexer loads and the
rating of the supply breaker was the licensee's failure to adequately
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evaluate the. changes in electrical loading resulting from the-
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modifications to the lecurity system. : Corrective actions by the licensee
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included development of a desinn change that would install;a'new-supply
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breaker with double tie _ interrupting capacity of the old breaker, and the
installation of a' constant output voltage transformer to correct the
voltage degradation problem.
All other activities were conducted in a satisfactory manner and no
' violations or deviations were identified,
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Followup of Written Reports of Nonroutine Events-(92700)
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-The inspectors, through observations, discussions with licensee
personnel, and review of records, reviewed the following event-reports
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to determine that reportability requirements were satisfied, that
corrective action was implemented, and that the response to the event
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was adequate and met regulatory requirements,-license conditions, and
commitments, as applicable.
-(CLOSED) LER 90004 - ' Temporary Change to a Procedure Causes the
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Generator Main Output Breaker to Open, Resulting in an ESF Actuation
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On March 18,c1990, during a refueling shutdown, a generator trip and
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lockout signal was : initiated, causing the main generator output breaker
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.(G-1) to open. The 4160V non-safeguards buses, l'-3 and 1-4, and-
safeguards bus 1-6 were being backfed through breaker G-1, and were-
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.d6 energized. The event occurred during performance of an instrumentation
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and controls: procedure (ICP) that calibrated a pressure. indicator with a
sensing 'line common to a pressure switch in the turbine / generator motoring
' protection circuitry.
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To provide grid electrical power to in-plant busses ~through G-1 during
- refueling outages, the licensee'sinormal practice was to lift several
electrical leads in. order to disable the generator's motoring protection
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circuitry. ' Prior to the'1990 refueling outage, however, the licensee's'
substation and transmission group requested a change to the' practice of-
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_ lifting the leads ~because of a concern with disabling generator
protection circuitry.
In response' to this request, a temporary change to
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the preventive maintenance procedure-(PMP) by which the leads were lifted
was approved to leave the leads terminated during the outage.
He'.;2 ve r,
the pressure indicator calibration ICP was based on the asssmption that
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the leads'were lifted. When the instrumentation and contrals group
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calibrated _the pressure indicator, the pressure switch actuated,
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initiating ~ a generator trip signal, which caused G-1 to open_. The loss
of voltage on safeguards bus 1-6 caused various ventilation dampers and
.two containe,an. ' solation valves to close, constituting a reportable ESF
actuation
The ruot cause'of the event was determined to be the failure
to recognize the impact of the temporary change to the PMP'on the
pressure indicator ICP.
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Corrective actions included completion of the calibration with the
appropriate leads lifted, discussions with the groups involved, and
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Lprocedure-changes ~to PMP 39.8 ICP--54.07 and--ICP.54.30
The effect of
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the procedure changes was to group the three pressure sensing and
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indication components that share the common sensing;1ine under:the same
calibration procedurc, and tc ensure lifting of leads when required.to
bypass protection circuitry. The i.7spectors found that the, licensee's
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corrective actions' for thislLER are complete. - This LER 1s closed.
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(CLOSED)' LER 90005 -- Eddy Current Results Cause Both Steam Generators
_(SGs) Being Categorized as C-3
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On April :4 1990, at the completion of eddy current testing during the
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1990 refueling outage, 97 tubes in SG A and 75 tubes in SG B were
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' declared defective.:'With the number of defective tubes. exceeding one
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. percent of Use total number of tubes, both SGs were categorized as C-3,
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and the licensee made the notifications required by the plant technical
specifications.
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All' defective tubes were plugged and, as a preventive measure,'59 other
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tubes exhibiting degradation were plugged.
Sludge lancing was conducted:
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during the outage to reduce the accumulated sludge inventory within'the:
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SGs. To minimize the rate _ of SG tube degradation, a secondary system
boric acid addition program has been implemented to reduce the caustic
environment :in the tube crevice area. Additionally, portions of two
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- defective tubes were removed for laboratory analysis.
The results of-
this analysis will be forwarded for informational purposes to che NRC'_s
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Office of Nuclear Reactor' Regulation. The inspectors hadino'further
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questions regarding this issue. This LER is closed.-
-(CLOSED) LER 90008 -- Quality Assurance Audit of the Siemens Energy and
- Automation-Facility in. Raleigh, NC Finds Inadequaw 10 CFR 50 Appendix B
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Pr ogram
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Or May 2,1990, the licensee received the resul ;s of an audit of.the
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- quality assurance program at the Siemens Energy and Automation-Facility.
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- ;The audit found that this -facility had been accapting purchase orders for
saf aty related equipment and services' while it' had failed to implement a
squality +;surance program meeting the requirements: of Appendix B to.10 CFR
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50. A similar audit conducted in March 1987, found that the Siemens
facility had an effective.' quality assurance program for safety related-
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equipment.in' place.
Licen'see corrective actions included removal of the facility from its
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list of-suppliers qualified to provide safety related equipment and
services. Also, the licensee identified all equipment procured from the
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facility since March, 1987, and reviewed the dispositions of those. items.
. All of the equipment procured from Siemens.had either been installed in
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non-safety related applications or was still in the warehouse. The.
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equipment in the warehouse was placed in a. hold status, and was tagged
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with quality. assurance non-conformance tags pending.either commercial
grade dedication or redesignation of the equipment for non-safety related
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application;only.
The licensee determined that the provisions of 10 CFR 21'did not apply to this event.
However, since the results of the
quality assurance audit could potentially affect other licensees, the
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L i,.l censee electedito~ promulgate:those results in the' form of a licensee '
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i. Jeventireport issued:for information.only. This LER.is considered closed.-
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7. -- iExitInterview(307031-
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- The inspectors met with-licenseecrepresentatives (denoted in Paragraph '1)
throughout;the period and on October 23, 1990, and summarized-the'scoper
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andl findings.,of:the inspection activities.-
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The-inspe'ctorsl also ' dis;ussed the likely informational content of "th'e
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Linspection: report with regard to. documents or processes reviewed by the-
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' inspectors during.the.inspectlon.
The licensee did~not identify any-such
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