IR 05000305/1990017

Forwards Safety Insp Rept 50-305/90-17 on 900909-1020.No Violations Noted.Record Copy

ML20197H453
Person / Time
Site:	Kewaunee
Issue date:	11/05/1990
From:	Knop R NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION III)
To:	Evers K WISCONSIN PUBLIC SERVICE CORP.
References
NUDOCS 9011140271
Download: ML20197H453 (2)

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Dco/DuM Aros)

WO 51990 Docket No. 50-305

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Wisconsin Public Service Corporation

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ATTN: 'Mr. K..H. Evers

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Manager

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Nuclear Power

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700 North Adams Post Office Box 19002 Green Bay, WI 54307-9002

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Gentlemen:

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.This refers to the routine safety inspection conducted by Mr. P. I. Castleman

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and others of this office during the period from September 9 through October 20, 1990, of activities at Kewaunee Nuclear Power Plant authorized by NRC Operating License No. DPR-43 and to the discussion of our findings with Mr. M. L. Marchi

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at the conclusion'of the inspectio .

'The enclosed copy of our inspection report identifies areas examined during-the inspection. Within these areas, the inspection consisted of a selective

. examination'of procedures and representative records, observations, and interviews with personne No violations of NRC requirements were identified during the course of this

inspectio In accordance with 10 CFR 2.790 of the Commission's regulations, a copy of

_ this letter and the enclosed inspection report will be placed in.the NRC

'- Public Document Roo _

We will gladly discuss any questions you nave concerning this inspectio

Sincerely, E & '

R. C. Knop, Chief Reactar Projects Branch 3 E

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Enclosure:

Inspection Report

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No. 50-305/90017(DRP)

See Attached Distribution k RIII RIII , RIII

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REGION III==

Report No. 50-305/90017(DRP)

Docket No.'50-305 License No. DPR-43 Licensee: . Wisconsin Fablic Service Corporation

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P. O. Box 19002 Green Bay, WI - 54307-9002 Facility Name: .Kewaunee Nuclear Power Plant

- Inspect' ion At: Kewaunee Site, Kewaunee, Wisconsin Inspection Conducted: September 9 through October 20, 1990 i Inspectors: P. I. Castleman M. J. Davis

. Approved By:

l[]f & . Bs-vi1 J. McCormick-Barger, Chief

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' Reactor Projects Section-3C

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Date Inspection Summary

) -Inspection from Se)tember 9 through October 20, 1990 (Report No. - 50-305/90017( D RP) )

. Areas-Inspected: Routine unannounced inspection by resident and headquarters based inspectors of: previous inspection findings; operational safety and ',

i ESF walkdown; surveillance; maintenance; and followup of written reports of ;

L nonroutine event Results: Li_censee performance, overall, has been good,

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! t Operations: No significant issues.

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Maintenance /Surveillbnce: A reportable event occurred 'during this inspection aeriod due to both emergency diesel generators being out of service for one -

lour and forty minutes. The .1B EDG was removed from service for surveillance l

. testing at the same time that the 1A EDG was inoperable. The cause of the :

inoperability of the 1A EDG was improper installation of a retaining clip in a . fuel . injector assembly during the .1990 refueling outage. This event is particularly significant because the licensee failed to vigorously pursue an investigation into the cause of anomalous behavior of the 1A EDG when their initial assumption of the cause was disproven. Details contained in paragraph >

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Engineering and Technical: Supporti. ; A-design: deficiency associated with ,

- equipment upgradesi.totthe plant" security system manifested. itself during . '

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the' inspection period. :This': deficiency wasjan . inadequate evaluation of the -

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'electrica1' characteristics of new equipment, which resulted in/an overcurrent U

%; s  ; trip of a supply breaker, ands.in'a 20% reductione in line voltage to the -loads - .l

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-in question <-under full current conditions. Details. contained in paragraph i q

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.. DETAILS p -

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T : 1.- Persons Contacted

• L. Marchi, Plant Manager-

.D. -J.LRopson, Assistant Manager, Plant Maintenance

C. A. Schrock, Assistant Manager, Plant Operations 4

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R. E. Draheim,: Assistant Manager, Plant Services H g

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'd. J. Wallace, Superintendent, Plant Instrument and Control .i e' ;

C. S. Smoker, Supervisor, Plant Quality Programs i

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D. R. Berg, Superintendent, Plant.Information Systems 3 Di T. Braun, Superintendent, Plant Operations-

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M. T. Reinhart, Superintendent, Plant Radiation Protection p C '*D. S. Nalepka, Plant: Licensing Supervisor y G. J. Youngwirth,, Plant Electrical Maintenance Supervisor 1 F. .D; Evitch Plant l Security Supervisor j T. J.-Webb,-Plant Nuclear Engineer -

• D. J. Will, Assistant Superintendent, Nuclear Design Change 0 i

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The inspectors' also talked with and interviewed members of the Operations, Maintenance, Health Physics, Instrument and Control, Qualit < Control, Chemistry, Design. Change, and Security group _

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• Denotes personnel attending exit interview.;

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l Followup on-Previous Inspection Findings (92702)

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.(CLOSED) Violation (305/89012-02): Failure to Document Emergency Operating Frocedures -(E0P) Setpoint Calculation j J l

m, 'Thiscseverity level IV violation was issued as< a result of the E0P . 1 inspection performed in 1989 at Kewaunee, during which it was found 3 i , ? 'thatithe licensee's: lack:;of setpoint1 calculations would make it-  !

impossible' for an independent verification that theLappropriate~ data =

, , . base and calculational methodology had been used in t the development . 4

.of the setpoints.- In their response to the Notice of Violation (NOV)- ,

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.the' licensee committed to develop a detailed setpoint-documert which 4, twould present:the data and calculations used to-determine the setpoints ,

included in the EOP !

, ,The setpoint;; document was published in: September 1990. The inspectors determined- that the calculations presented in the _ document apoeared to be

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J idotailed and properly based. The licensee' plans;to maintain.the setpoint document in a controlled manner, updating-it as revisions are made to the 1 E0Ps. : The; document appeared to address the concerns' expressed.in the '

l NOV. We-have;no further questions regarding this issue, and this

. violation is close . Operational Safety Verification (71707), (71710)

o The inspectors . observed control room operations, reviewed applicable logs

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and conducted discussions with control room operators throughout the inspection period. The inspectors verified the operability of selected safety-related systems, reviewed tagout records, and verified proper return to service of affected components. The inspectors observed a number of control room shif t turnovers. The turnovers were conducted in a professional manner and included log reviews, panel walkdowns, discussions of maintenance and surveillance activities in progress or planned, and associated LC0 time restraints, as applicabl Tne inspectors conducted tours of the auxiliary and turbine building During these tours, observations were made regarding plant equipment conditions, fire hazards, fire protection, adherence to procedures, radiological controls and conditions, housekeeping, tagging of equipment,

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ongoing maintenance and surveillance activities, containment integrity, and availability of safety-related equipment. The overall material condition of plant systems and equipment was noted to be good, as were the observed housekeeping and fire protection practice _ On October 3, the licensee conducted their monthly containment inspectio During the inspection, it was noted that the insuletion

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around check valve SI-304B, on the train B safety injection line to the

- reactor vessel, was we A followup containment entry was performed to

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remove the insulation and inspect the valve for leakage and potential

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boric acid induced bolt corrosion. This inspection showed that the l- wetted insulation was due to a body to connet leak at a rate of four drops per minute. No degradation of the valve bolts was note The resident inspector, who acc'mpanied licensee personnel into the containment, noted the valve to be in good material conditior.. There appeared to be uniform leakage from around the circumference of the valve

_ body to bonnet joint. The licensee installed a catch basin beneath the valve to contain the flow of water. A followup inspection was performed

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ten days later, with no increase in leek rate noted. The control room operators have noted no detectable increase in reactor coolant system leakage. The licensee intends to continue monitoring the leakage for any further degradation in the integrity of the body to bonnet join During the inspection period, the inspectors walked down the accessible

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portions of the Auxiliary Feedwater (AF( Rystem. Items checked

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included: an operational valve lineup; proper housekeeping including control of flammable materials; normal pump seal and valve stem leakages; proper electrical breaker and switch lineup; the required instrumentation, including pressure monitors and valve position indicators, were operable, and; proper lineup of the service water

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and condensate storage support systems. Overall, the system, including both the motor driven and turbine driven pumps, appeared to be in a sound state of operational readiness and no problems were identifie During routine tours of the facility, the inspectors observed the licensee's security activities including badging of personnel, access

, control, escorting of visitors, security staff attentiveness and

{ operation of security equipmen All activities were conducted in a satisfactory manner and no violetions

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l Monthly Surveillance Observation (61726)

The inspectors reviewed / observed the following Technical Specification required surveillance testing:

Surveillance Procedure Test s ,

SP 47-010A Reactor Coolant Temperature and Pressurizer Pressure Instrument Channel Test - Channel 1 SP 35-038A- Boric Acid Tank 1A Level Instrument Calibration SP 42-047 Diesel Generator Combined Monthly Test SP 54-058 Turbine First Stage Pressure Instrument Channel Test SP 24-107 Shield Building Vent Monthly Test

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SP 42-109 Diesel Generatoi Manual Test The following items were considered during the inspection: the-testing was performed in accordance with approved procedures; that test instrumentation was calibrated; that-test results conformed with technical specifications and procedure requirements and were reviewed i by personnel other than the individual directing the test, and; that any deficiencies identified during the testing were reviewed and resolved by appropriate management personne At 1825 on Friday, September 14, 1990, while shutting down the 1A Emergency Diesel Generator (EDG) at the. completion of SP 42-047, " Diesel Generator-Combined Monthly -Test," the control room operators observed the- EDG resume full speed operation. To ensure shutdown of the EDG, the operators placed-its control switch in the pullout position, and the unit successfully

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coasted to a complete stop. In evaluating this malfunction, on-shift personnel assumed that the EDG. shutdown timing solenoid had failed, and that the operability of the EDG was not affected. Based on this assumption, the licensee elected to not pursue an investigation of the EDG shutdown anomaly over the weekend of September 15-1 On Monday, September 17, at 0935, the licensee removed the 1A EDG from-service to' investigate the assumed solenoid-failure, and to conduct a surveillance test on the carbon dioxide deluge system. Prior to removing the 1A EDG from service, the licensee performed 'an operability demonstration of'the IB EDG in accordance with their standard practice-for doing so when taking the opposite train EDG out of service. This operability demonstration, conducted under SP 42-109, " Diesel Generator Manual Test," consisted of a local manual start of the EDG, with-verification that the unit was able to reach a speed of 900-950 RPM, frequency of 60-63 Hz, and voltage of 4200 V, in less than 10 second In 'accordance with the licensee's standard practice for EDG demonstration

- testing, this operability test did not include loading the EDG, As a result of their investigation, licensee personnel determined that the 1A EDG timing solenoid was performing satisfactorily. The licensee then investigated the engine's governor, but no indications of malfunction were found. The licensee concluded that there must have been a problem with the engine itself, and they contacted the EDG vendor, who dispatched a technical representativ ,

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When t'he troubleshooting and surveillance testing performed on the .1A EDG were completed, the licensee conducted a demonstration test of the 1A EDG

- per SP 42-109 prior to removing the- 1B EDG from service for the completion of-the surveillance-testing on the carbon dioxide deluge system. The 1A EDG was started manually, and satisfactorily attained the required

. operating parameters of engine speed and generator frequency and voltag Thus, _the .1A EDG was declared operable, and the IB EDG was removed from

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service for'a total of one hour and forty minute The EDG vendor technical representative arrived two days later, on September 19. During his inspection of the 1AL EDG, he discovered that a retaining spring was not installed on a clevis pin connecting the engine i fuel rack to one of the fuel injectors. The clevis pin had vibrated out L of its proper position, thereby allowing the injector linkage to jam the

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fuel rack and limit its range _ of motion to no more than 50% open from the f "not-fully-closed" position. The malfunction observed in the diesel's performance was, at that time, determined to be caused by the fuel rack-not being able to close completely, which allowed continued injection of, fuel to the engine during its coastdoun to a complete stop. The L

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inoperability of the EDG, however, resulted from the fuel rack's

, inability to open more than 50%, a condition which would have prevented I the EDG from being able to attain its continuous full load rating of l -

2600 KW, Hence, when .the 1B EDG was removed from service for one hour and

, forty minutes on September 17, both EDGs were inoperable for that time period,'a condition which was outside the plant's design basi The most probable root cause of this event was determined to be the incorrect installation of the fuel injector linkage retaining clip while-overhauling the 1A EDG during the plant's 1990 refueling outag This event could have been averted had the licensee removed the 1A EDG

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from service on Monday, September 17, to vigorously pursue their investigation once the initial assumption of the cause of the anomalous

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EDG_ behavior was proven incorrec '

As immediate corrective action, the licensee repaired the 1A EDG and returned-it to service. Additionally, to address the generic concern that other fuel injectors might be similarly affected, all injector linkage retaining clips for both EDG's were verified to be properly installed. Long term.::orrective actions will include training of plant maintenance mechanics on the details of this event, and the licensee will

, re-evaluate their practice of not loading an EDG during demonstration testing. The licensee also plans to conduct operations personnel training regarding .this event, focusing on conservatism in operability assessment.-

This issue vill be evaluated further upon the inspectors' review of the licensee event report documenting the circumstances surrounding the even All activities were conducted in a satisfactory manner and no violations

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or deviations were identifie .l

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[ 5.1 Monthly Maintenance Observation (62703)

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i Station maintenance activities of- safety related systems and components-listed below were observed / reviewed to ascertain if they were conducted

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in accordance with approved procedures, regulatory guides, industry codes-or; standards, and in conformance with technical specifications.=

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The following items were considered during this review: the limiting-conditions of operation were met while components or systems were _ removed from service;. approvals were obtained prior to initiating the work; _ ,

-activities were accomplished using approved procedures and were. inspected

- as' applicable; functional testing and/or calibrations were performed prior to returning components or systems to service; parts and materials used were properly certified; radiological controls were implemented; and '

fire prevention' controls were implemente '

LThe following maintenance activities were observed / reviewed:

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DCR_2483 Design Change Request (DCR) to Upgrade Auxiliary Building Special Ventilation Zone Fan Inlet and Outlet Damper ,

Limit' Switch Wires-PMP 8-1 Preventive Maintenance on IB Fire Pump MWR 48333 Replace 1A Charging Pump Power _ Supply Breaker MWR.49175 Changeout 1A2 Service Water Pump LMWR 49410- Repair IB Emergency Diesel . Generator Vibration Monitoring

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MWR_49451 ' Repair Security Multiplexer a During-the inspection period, the circuit breaker supplying:a multiplexer-in the plant security system tripped open, resulting in the loss of some-

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security monitoring capabili_ ties.- The plant security force implemented

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appropriate compensatory measures for the-lost capabilities. As a result ,.

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of the licensee's investigation into the tripping open of the multiplexer :

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.sapply breaker, it was determined that the total loads supplied by the . ",

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' breaker were.significantly_ greater than the breaker's current interrupt

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rating. -This condition resulted from the :recent installation of several ><

upgrades to the plant's- security system. In particular, the design of-the upgrades failed ~to account for the doubling of load due to the a addition ~~of heaters in newly installed outdoor. equipment, so that, when -

.the heaters' energized on the first. cold night following. installation o the upgrades, the breaker in question tripped open due to an ovarcurrent '

condition.- The licensee also determined that,'uncer full load current,

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the line, voltage to'the multiplexer would be reduced by about 20%. This !

voltage reduction would adversely impact the operation of the equipment supplied by the multiplexe The root cause of the mismatch between the multiplexer loads and the rating of the supply breaker was the licensee's failure to adequately H 7 o

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evaluate the. changes in electrical loading resulting from the-  !

modifications to the lecurity system. : Corrective actions by the licensee included development of a desinn change that would install;a'new-supply i breaker with double tie _ interrupting capacity of the old breaker, and the installation of a' constant output voltage transformer to correct the voltage degradation proble All other activities were conducted in a satisfactory manner and no

' violations or deviations were identified, i

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'6 . Followup of Written Reports of Nonroutine Events-(92700)

-The inspectors, through observations, discussions with licensee 1 personnel, and review of records, reviewed the following event-reports i to determine that reportability requirements were satisfied, that corrective action was implemented, and that the response to the event <

was adequate and met regulatory requirements,-license conditions, and commitments, as applicabl (CLOSED) LER 90004 - ' Temporary Change to a Procedure Causes the +

, , Generator Main Output Breaker to Open, Resulting in an ESF Actuation On March 18,c1990, during a refueling shutdown, a generator trip and _;

lockout signal was : initiated, causing the main generator output breaker j

.(G-1) to open. The 4160V non-safeguards buses, l'-3 and 1-4, and-

, safeguards bus 1-6 were being backfed through breaker G-1, and were- '

.d6 energized. The event occurred during performance of an instrumentation l

and controls: procedure (ICP) that calibrated a pressure . indicator with a sensing 'line common to a pressure switch in the turbine / generator motoring 7

' protection circuitr '

s To provide grid electrical power to in-plant busses ~through G-1 during

refueling outages, the licensee'sinormal practice was to lift several electrical leads in. order to disable the generator's motoring protection o circuitry. ' Prior to the'1990 refueling outage, however, the licensee's'

substation and transmission group requested a change to the' practice of-

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_ lifting the leads ~because of a concern with disabling generator protection circuitr In response' to this request, a temporary change to ;

the preventive maintenance procedure-(PMP) by which the leads were lifted '

was approved to leave the leads terminated during the outage. He'.;2 ve r ,

the pressure indicator calibration ICP was based on the asssmption that L

the leads'were lifted. When the instrumentation and contrals group calibrated _the pressure indicator, the pressure switch actuated,

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I initiating ~ a generator trip signal, which caused G-1 to open_. The loss of voltage on safeguards bus 1-6 caused various ventilation dampers and

.two containe,an. ' solation valves to close, constituting a reportable ESF actuation The ruot cause'of the event was determined to be the failure to recognize the impact of the temporary change to the PMP'on the pressure indicator ICP.

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Corrective actions included completion of the calibration with the appropriate leads lifted, discussions with the groups involved, and

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% Lprocedure-changes ~to PMP 39.8 ICP--54.07 and--ICP.54.30 The effect of e$,r '

the procedure changes was to group the three pressure sensing and indication components that share the common sensing;1ine under:the same

1. calibration procedurc, and tc ensure lifting of leads when required .to bypass protection circuitry. The i.7spectors found that the, licensee's J, corrective actions' for thislLER are complete. - This LER 1s close ,r

(CLOSED)' LER 90005 -- Eddy Current Results Cause Both Steam Generators

_(SGs) Being Categorized as C-3

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On April :4 1990, at the completion of eddy current testing during the

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.e 1990 refueling outage, 97 tubes in SG A and 75 tubes in SG B were

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' declared defective.:'With the number of defective tubes. exceeding one

.J . percent of Use total number of tubes, both SGs were categorized as C-3,

. ' ; @~ and the licensee made the notifications required by the plant technical 1 specification ,

W All' defective tubes were plugged and, as a preventive measure,'59 other CY tubes exhibiting degradation were plugged. Sludge lancing was conducted:

during the outage to reduce the accumulated sludge inventory within'the:

F SGs. To minimize the rate _ of SG tube degradation, a secondary system boric acid addition program has been implemented to reduce the caustic environment :in the tube crevice area. Additionally, portions of two

', - defective tubes were removed for laboratory analysis. The results of-this analysis will be forwarded for informational purposes to che NRC'_s ,

Office of Nuclear Reactor' Regulation. The inspectors hadino'further i questions regarding this issue. This LER is closed.- 1-(CLOSED) LER 90008 -- Quality Assurance Audit of the Siemens Energy and ,

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- Automation- Facility in. Raleigh, NC Finds Inadequaw 10 CFR 50 Appendix B i

Pr ogram

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Or May 2,1990, the licensee received the resul ;s of an audit of.the

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quality assurance program at the Siemens Energy and Automation- Facilit ;The audit found that this -facility had been accapting purchase orders for saf aty related equipment and services' while it' had failed to implement a squality +;surance program meeting the requirements: of Appendix B to.10 CFR e 50. A similar audit conducted in March 1987, found that the Siemens facility had an effective.' quality assurance program for safety related-m' equipment.in' plac Licen'see corrective actions included removal of the facility from its H list of-suppliers qualified to provide safety related equipment and services. Also, the licensee identified all equipment procured from the ,

facility since March, 1987, and reviewed the dispositions of those. item . All of the equipment procured from Siemens.had either been installed in

._ non-safety related applications or was still in the warehouse. The . '

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equipment in the warehouse was placed in a. hold status, and was tagged with quality. assurance non-conformance tags pending.either commercial grade dedication or redesignation of the equipment for non-safety related

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application;only. The licensee determined that the provisions of 10 CFR 21'did not apply to this event. However, since the results of the quality assurance audit could potentially affect other licensees, the

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i. Jeventireport issued:for information.only. This LER.is considered closed.- '

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- The inspectors met with-licenseecrepresentatives (denoted in Paragraph '1)

throughout;the period and on October 23, 1990, and summarized-the'scoper '

andl findings.,of:the inspection activities.-

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The-inspe'ctorsl also ' dis;ussed the likely informational content of "th'e

%. Linspection: report with regard to. documents or processes reviewed by the- .

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' inspectors during .the .inspectlon. The licensee did~not identify any-such '!-

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' documents -.or processes as proprietar ' ~

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