IR 05000412/1986011

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Insp Rept 50-412/86-11 on 860519-22.No Noncompliance Noted. Major Areas Inspected:Preoperational Test Program,Including Activities in Qa/Qc Interface & Unresolved Items Identified by Inspector in Previous Insp
ML20202F371
Person / Time
Site: Beaver Valley
Issue date: 07/03/1986
From: Eselgroth P, Van Kessel H
NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION I)
To:
Shared Package
ML20202F359 List:
References
50-412-86-11, IEIN-85-096, IEIN-85-96, NUDOCS 8607150151
Download: ML20202F371 (16)


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U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

REGION I

Report M /86-11 Docket N License N CPPR-105 Category B Licensee: Duquesne Light Company Facility Name: Beaver Valley Power Station, Unit N Inspection At: Shippingport, Pennsylvania Inspection Conducted: May 19-22, 1987 Inspector b F. van H'. sel, Reactor Engineer 7- 3 " N Date Approved by: / 7 .3 - 84 _

P.'W.Eselggh, Chief,TestPrograms Date Section, Uperations Branch, DRS Inspection Summary:

Inspection on May 19-22, 1986 (Inspection No. 50-412/86-11)

Areas Inspected: Routine unannounced inspection of the Preoperational Test Program, including the review of JTG approved preoperational test procedures and the approved test results for one fully completed test, review of the activities in the QA/QC interface, and the review of unresolved items identi-fled by the inspector in previous inspections. An independent review was made of design aspects of the Auxiliary Feedwater Pump turbine steam supply line in connection with its potential for water hammer during the cold start of the turbine. Also reviewed were the causes and corrective actions for the problems experienced with Reactor Coolant Pump (RCP) "C" during the initial run of this pum Results: No items of non-compliance were identifie NOTE: For acronyms not defined, refer to NUREG-0544, " Handbook of Acronyms and Initialisms."

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8607150151 860703 i PDR ADOCK0500g2 l G

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DETAILS 1.0 Persons Contacted Duquesne Light Company

  • L.E. Arch, Principal Engineer (DLC)

C. Callaway, Supervisor Startup Testing

  • A. W. Crevasse, QA Deputy Manager N. J. Daugherty, Director Systems Testing (DLC)
  • J. J. Dusenberry, QA Supervisor (DLC)

A. Fiorente, Lead Power Engineer (SWEC)

  • D. C. Hunkele, Director QA Operatioas (DLC)
  • J. D. Johns, Supervisor QA Surveillance (DLC)

E. Kubas, System Engineer - SVG (DLC)

  • D. Lessard, Assistant Supervisor Engineer (SEWC)
  • Lynch, Principal Power Engineer (SWEC)
  • T. P. Noonan, Superintendent Operations & Maintenance ;DLC)
  • Pavlick, Director Support Services (DLC)

E. Schobel, Licensing Engineer (DLC)

  • R. J. Swiderski, Startup Manager (DLC)
  • R. Wallaver, Compliance Engineer (DLC)
  • L. P. Williams, Director Startup (DLC)

R. G. Williams, Supervisor System Test Software Dev. (DLC)

US Nuclear Regulatory Commission

  • L. J. Prividy, Resident Inspector
  • Denotes those present at exit interview on May 22, 1986 2.0 Licensee Action on Previous Inspection Findings (0 pen) Unresolved Item 412/85-08-01, " Classification of tests for the Preoperational Test Program" Scope The concern with the classification of preoperational tests concerns the identification of these tests for performance in the correct time frame relative to the milestones of the startup program, i.e., Cold Hydro, Fuel Loading, Initial Criticality, Start of Low Power Testing, and start of Power Escalatio Discussion An up-to-date' listing of the preoperational test procedures was obtained from the licensee. This listing is being cross referenced with the FSAR listing,. the descriptions in Appendix A of Regulatory Guide 1.68, and the preoperational test schedule as defined recently by the licensee. The inspector will complete this review during the next inspection perio .

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i This unresolved item will remain open until it has been verified that all

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required test procedures are listed and scheduled for performance in the required time frame in accordance with FSAR commitments.

i 3.0 Preoperational Test (POT) Program

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. 3.1 Test Procedure Review i

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Scope The ' test procedures listed in Attachment A were reviewed for admini-strative and, selectively, for technical adequacy and to verify that test planning satisfies reguiatory guidance and licensee commitments.

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Discussion The procedures were examined for:

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l Management review and approval i

i Procedure format Clarity of stated objectives Prerequisites

, Environmental conditions

! Acceptance criteria and their sources i

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References

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] Initial conditions

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Attainment of test objectives

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Test performance documentation and verification i Degree of detail for test instructions

Restoration of system to normal after testing

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j Identification of test personnel Evaluation of test data

, Independent verification of critical steps or parameters

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Quality control and assurance involvement i

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I Some discrepancies were noted in some of the listed procedures (Attachment A), as follows:

(1) With reference to procedure P0-2.06.09, " System Vibration and

, Thermal Expansion Testing prior to HFT": The folder examined only contained the isometrics for the Service Water System and omitted the many other systems.

(2) With reference to procedure P0-2.07.02, " Boric Acid Transfer System Test", Attachment A does not show a legend for the let-ters used in the test pcsition columns, nor does it have a

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titl It is assumed that the attachment is for valve line-u l (3) With reference to procedure P0-2.20.02, " Spent Fuel Pool and

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Refueling Cavity Leak Test", the leak testing for the spent fuel

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pool is not mentioned under " test method".

Findings

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Apart from the discrepancies listed above, no unacceptable conditions were noted in the review of these procedures. The discrepancies,

collectively, will represent unresolved item 50-412/86-11-0 j 3.2 Test Result Evaluation l Scope The only test (procedure) report presently approved by JTG,

S0V2.318.01 (see reference 1) was reviewed to verify that adequate testing was accomplished in order to satisfy regulatory guidance and

licensee commitments and to ascertain whether uniform criteria were being applied for evaluating completed preoperational tests in order l to assure their technical and administrative adequacy.

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! Preoperational teet procedure SOV2.318.01, " Circulating Water

Vacuum Priming System Test", Rev. O, issue 2 dated October 17,

1985; test report approval date (JTG) on May 13, 198 Discussion
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The test results were reviewed for:

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Test changes i Test exceptions

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Test deficiencies I *

Acceptance criteria i

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Performance verification

Recording of conduct of test

QC inspection records System restoration to normal

Independent verification of critical steps or parameters Identification of test personnel

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Verification that the test results have been approved The inspector, independently, verified the calculations for the line Voltage Correction Factor (VCF). With the VCF calculated, the new acceptance criterion for the starting current of Vacuum Priming Pumps 2VPS-P-21A and B could be established at 1028 amperes. This cleared the test exception for these pumps which were found to have a higher starting current than the acceptance criterion called for (942 A verses 883 A).

Findings No discrepancies or unacceptable conditions were noted in tne review of this test repor .3 Reactor Ccclant Pump (RCP) "C" Problem Review RCP "C" exn rienced a problem apparently due to foreign material in the Reactor Coolant System (RCS) during the period of hydrostatic testing of the RCS and as part of the initial performance test of the RCP's under test procedure P0.2.06.02. It was not known at the time what caused the problem but the licensee d;,cided to stop the "C" pump after excessive shaft vibration (>40 mils) was observe (see inspection report 50-412/86-08)

The inspector followed up on this test excegtion to P0 2.06.02 by discussing this matter with the system engineer in charge of the post event inspection. The more significant findings are as follows:

Found one piece of sheet metal (stamped TR-2) in the crossover leg connected to RCP "C". This piece was bent and warped out of its normal flat shape. It was established to be the middle part of a 3 piece sheet metal protective cover (3/16" stainless steel, type 304) to prevent people from falling into the cross-over leg while doing work in the channel of the steam generato #

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The other two pieces were found in the pump. The second piece (the top part) was easily pried loose from between the pump-cas-

ing and the pump impeller. .The third piece, however, was not i

recovered during the first post event inspectio It was still l wrapped around the impeller of RCP "C". '

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The bolt holes of the 3 piece protection cover were found to be '

undamaged. The plate can normally be bolted into the ring which  ;

is welded into the throat of the nozzle for the crossover leg  ;

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Found mostly metal (debris) powder in the crossover leg (apart from middle piece of protection cover). It is assumed that this powder originated from the plates of the cover after rubbing

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There appeared to be no record for the inventory control of the tools and materials used in the cleaning operation of the steam generator channel and the crossover pipin The cleanup corrective action steps being taken by the licensee con-

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sist of extensive pipiag and steam generator tube flush and blow down procedures. The licensee was working on a 10 CFR 50.55(e)

report to relate the results of their investigation in this matter to the NRC. An Unresolved Item was opened by the Senior Resident

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Inspector to cover this ite ,

l 4.0 Independent Inspection Efforts

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4.1 Response to IE Information Notice 85-96 on Temporary Strainers j

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Scope

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Determine the status and extent of the response to IE Information Notice 85-96 j References

! IE Information Notice No. 85-96; " Temporary strainers left '

installed in pump suction piping", dated December 23, 198 . Duquesne Light Company, " Inspection and Enforcement Position" ,

on Information Notice 85-96, Rev. O, dated March 7, 1986.

' SWEC Doc. No. 2 BVM-81, " Tabulation of S&W Mark Numbers for Valves, Steam Traps, and Strainers", Rev. 7, dated August 19, 1982.

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i Discussion

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This matter was discussed with a Duquesne Licensing Enginee The j more important highlights of this discussion are shown below:

1 The ifcensee's position on this matter has been stated in refer-i ence The licensee's position is that their administrative i controls will document and track the presence and removal of the

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temporary strainers in piping systems released by the construc-l tion work forc *

All temporary strainers are designed and specified by the Archi-i tect Engineer, Stone and Webster (SWEC). Each of these strainers i

is given a mark number (SWEC). These mark numbers are tabulated

in SWEC Document No. 2 BVM-81 (ref .3)

Since the strainers are temporary, each of these strainers are entered into the Incomplete Items List (IIL) and are tracked like all of the other items on this list in accordance with its administrative procedure.

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A meeting is to be held prior to the removal of the strainer ; The strainers, which are to be removed, are to be identified by Startup (SUG) on a Startup Work Request (SWR).

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There are cases where the strainer has to stay in. A JTG Policy Statement was issued in JTG Meeting No. 113 on this matte *

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A noninstallation of a temporary strainer would be covered by i

a construction deficiency. Such deficiencies would be tracked on the construction deficiency listin The inspector agreed that the system in place should provide adequate control on the installation and removal of temporary strainer The inspector had no further questions on this ite .2 Review of AFW Pump Turbine Steam Supply System Design for 2 Consideration of Water Hammer During Cold Start of the Turbine.

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l Scope In view of the long steam supply line (in excess of 300 ft) to the 1' Auxiliary Feedwater Pump turbine, the system's design and the design of the associated condensate drain system were reviewed by the in-spector to provide confidence that the initial cold start of the AFW pump (during the preoperational test) will not result in water hammer (see ref. 14, Attachment C) and subsequent damage to the steam piping and/or the steam turbine. A list of the references and drawings

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reviewed by the inspector.are contained in the attachment to this repor l

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Discussion Water hammer events in the subject steam supply line have been re-ported previously in several reactor plants (see ref. 14, Attachment

, C). The occurrence of water hammer in this line during cold start of the AFW Pump Turbine can be caused by a combination of design in-i adequacies including:

Long horizontal sections in the steam supply lin Inadequate drainage of condensate which forms rapidly in cold piping. This inadequacy may be the result of inadequate slope in the steam piping, absence of drainpots in strategic locations (at low points, at corners)

Drainpots too small or not enough of the *

Piping configurations that would be conducive to counter flows of steam and condensat *

Inadeuqate warmup and condensate drainage time of the steam i

line.

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The design of the Beaver Valley-2 steam supply line and the associated condensate drainage system were reviewed with the above design factors

in mind. The basic design documents consulted in the review are list-

ed under " References" in Attachment C.

The general system design was discussed with the SWEC system designers

who happened to be at the site and were available for the discussion After these discussions, the steam line was walked down to obtai first hand information on the routing of the steam line, the number, location, size, and configuration of the drainpots, the venting ar-rangements, the steam admission / isolation valves, and the steam line configuration at the turbine inle After the walkdown the referenced design documents were reviewed again to verify the statements made by the SWEC system engineers in the meeting. The main observations made by the inspector during these discussions are as follows:

(1) The slope of the steam line sections checked was in excess of 1

inch per 10 ft (ref.13) and should provide adequate drainag (2) The flow transient analysis (ref. 7) indicated that the drainpots provided will adequately handle the condensate formed during cold start of the turbine.

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j (3) The two drainpot designs used in the condensate removal system

appear to be used effectivel The first type was designed to act as a water slug absorber. Its volume was gradually increased from the nominal pipe diameter (3") to as much as 10 inches pipe

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diameter. These were placed at the end of horizontal sections i

where the piping would turn 90 horizontall The second type of drainpot was designed as a collection tank which is the con-ventional type of drainpot. The second type of drainpot was '

used effectively at locations where the steam line would turn

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from horizontal to vertica L (4) The first type of drainpot (see 3 above) was used at the turbine i inlet.

J q (5) While the steam line is long (relative to other PWRs), the drain-

pot provisions should be adequate to handle the condensate re-
moval during cold star j (6) The inspector did not observe any piping configurations that

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would appear to be conducive to steam / water counter flow t i

Findings Considerable attention appears to have beer paid by the architect engineer to the water hammer issu All indications are that the steam supply line and the associated condensate removal system will perform adequately during the initial cold start test of AFW Pump

Turbine (P02.24B.02).

5.0 QA/QC Interface Scope i The participation of the Duquesne Light QA Surveillance Group in the pre-operational test program was evaluated by the inspector. Of particular interest were the surveillances performed by this group during the recently performed Cold Hydrostatic test of the RC Discussion In continuation of the assessment of QA/QC involvement in the preopera-tional test program, the inspector reviewed the surveillance reports as-listed in Attachment ~B. All of these surveillances (7) were done during the Cold Hydro but involve a number of preoperational test procedures-other than the Cold Hydro procedure (P0-2.06.01).

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Some of the administrative problems observed by QA/QC indicate a need for the licensee to strengthen the implementation of administrative control is e

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Findings The inspector will follow up on the corrective actions taken by the licen-see under Unresolved item 50-412/86-11-0 .0 Exit Intervi_ew At the conclusion of the site inspection, on May 22, 1986, an exit inter-view was conducted with the licensee's senior site representatives (denoted in Section 1). The findings were identified and previous inspection items were discusse At no time during this inspection was written material provided to the licensee by the inspector. Based on the NRC Region I review of this re-port and discussions held with licensee representatives during this inspec-tion, it was determined that this report does not contain information sub-ject to 10 CFR 2.790 restriction I

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ATTACHMENT A to 50-412/86-11 Procedure Reviews Proc. N Procedure Title Rev. No. Approved JTG PO-2.01A.11 Engineered Safety Features Response 0 Apr 30, 1986 Summary P0-2.02.01 Nuclear Instr. System Test 0 May 21, 1985 P0-2.03.01 Incore thermocouple and RTD Cross 0 Feb 27, 1986 Calibration

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PO-2.06.05 Reactor Coolant Loop Isolation Valve 0 Dec 3, 1985 Test PO-2.06.09 System Vibration and Thermal Expansion 0 Mar 31, 1986 Testing Prior to HFT P0-2.07.02 Boric Transfer System Test 0 Feb 27, 1986 PO-2.20.01 Fuel Pool Cooling System Test 0 Jtc 19, 1985

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Attachment A 2 Proc. N Procedure Title Rev. No. Approved JTG PO-2.20.02 Spent Fuel Pool and Refueling 0 May 8, 1986 Cavity Leak Test P0-2.21A.01 Atmospheric Steam Dump Valves and 0 Apr 17, 1985 RHR Valve Test P0-2.268.01 Turbine Runback Control System Test 0 Apr 17, 1985 I

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ATTACHMENT B to 50-412/86-11 Review of QA Surveillance Deficiency Reports (SDRs)

SDR N Description of Activity Test Proc. N Date Reviewed POT-01-86 Witnessing RCP Seal P0.2.06.03 May 7, 1986 Injection Test (Section B)

POT-02-86 Witnessing RCP Seal P0.2.06.03 May 8, 1986 Injection Test ,Section A)

P0T-03-86 Witnessing RCP P02.06.03 May 7, 1986 Seal Injection Test (Section C)

POT-04-86 Witnessing disassembly P02.06.01 Apr 23, 1986 of check valve 2 SIS-132 and filling and venting during Cold Hydro P0T-05-86 Witnessing RCP Initial P0.2.06.02 May 7, 1986 Performance tests i

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Attachment 8 2 SDR N Description of Activity Test Proc. No. Date Reviewed POT-06-86 Witnessing performance P0.2.07.01 May 7, 1986 of Charging Pumps / Controls test POT-07-86 Review of POT surveillances P0.2.06.01 May 20, 1986 conducted as part of Cold Hydro (see POT 01 through 06-86)

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i ATTACHMENT C TO 50-412/86-11 AFW PUMP TURBINE STEAM SUPPLY SYSTEM DOCUMENTATION REVIEW

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References i NRC Inspection Report 50-412/85-26 NRC Inspection Report 50-412/86-04

, E&DCR (Engineering and Design Coordination Report) No. 2P-3588,

" Additional Isolation Valves in Steam Supply Line to the Auxiliary Feedwater Pump Turbine", approved August 17, 1981 Calculation No. MT-203, " Determination of size adequacy of main steam

condensate removal system", dated June 26, 198 . DLC Drawing No. AA10080-RM-41A, " Flow Diagram Main Steam Pipino", Re , November 12, 1985 Schneider Drawing No. 100218-0G, isometric piping drawing, " Main Steam System (MSS) Main Steam & Cable Vault Area, Platform E1.788'-2", 5 sheets, sheet 1 of 5, Rev. G, dated February 8, 1986 SWEC Interoffice Memorandum from P. Obadiah to Distribution, " Flow transient calculations for BV-2 piping design", dated February 10, 1986, with attached listing of category I stress analysis data package fluid flow transients SI-RM-41A-2, " Stress Analysis Data Package, QA Category I, II, Nuclear

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Safety Related, Main Steam System (MSS)", dated November 5, 1984 with Change Notice (CN)-2, dated November 7, 1985 (SWEC) SWEC Pipe Stress Calculation X2R, Rev. 2, independently reviewed April 9, i

1985. " Main Steam Piping - Cable Vault (MSVH)

l 1 SWEC Calculation No. X16G, " Main Steam piping - Safeguards area to main

! steam valve area", Rev. 2 independently reviewed April 2, 1985

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1 SWEC Pipe Support Evaluation, for Review of Stress Calculation, N NP(N)-X16G-2, dated April 4, 1985, 2 pages

. 12. SWEC Sub Calculation No.Z28-152, Rev. 1, independently reviewed on l September 5, 1985 for support mark number 2 MSS-PSR 493 i

1 Power Piping (PP) and Schneider (S) piping isometrics:

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Attachment C 2 Dwg. N Title Re C Rev. Date i

100214-1F Main Steam System (MSS) Main i Steam & Cable Vault Area, El. 773'-6"

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t Sheet 1 of 3 F PP 5-14-85 100215-0G Main Steam System, Mai3 Steam & Cable

Vault Area, El. 773'-6" l'

Sheet 1 of 5 G PP 12-03-85 Sheet 2 of 5 G PP 12-03-85 100219-0F MSS, Main Steam and Cable Vault Area, El. 778'-0" & El. 788'-2" l Sheet 1 of 7 F PP 2-20-86 i Sheet 2 of 7 F S 2-20-86

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Sheet 3 of 7 F S 2-20-86 100219-0G Sheet 1 of 7, not signed G PP 100219-0G Sheet 2 of 7, not signed G S 100219-0G Sheet 3 of 7, not sigr.ed G S 101614-4F MSS - Safeguards Area E1.718'-6" 'F PP I Sheet 1 of 5 F S 4-08-86 Sheet 2 of 5 F S 4-24-86 109952-3F MSS-Main Steam Valve Area, El. 718'-6" i

i Sheet 1 of 2 F PP 8-26-85 i 109952-3G MSS-Main Steam Valve Area, El. 718'-6" Sheet 1 of 2 (unsigned) G PP N/A 111001-1E Hydrogenated Gaseous Vent E PP 4-28-86 System (VRS), Aux. Building, E1.755'-6" 1 IE Information Notice 85-76. "Recent Water Hammer Events, dated

September 19, 1985 i

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