Text

Further Response to FOIA Request for Three Categories of Records Re NRC Proposed Rule on Earthquakes & Emergency Planning.App E Documents Forwarded & Available in Pdr.Apps F & G Documents Withheld (Ref FOIA Exemption 5)
	ML20198H489
Person / Time
Site:	Diablo Canyon, San Onofre, 05000000
Issue date:	12/23/1985
From:	Grimsley D; NRC OFFICE OF ADMINISTRATION (ADM)
To:	Bell N; NUCLEAR INFORMATION & RESOURCE SERVICE
Shared Package
ML20197J537	List: IA-85-653, Forwards Replies to Commission Questions Re SECY-85-283, Severe Low Frequency Natural Phenomena Considerations in Emergency Planning; ML20197J532; ML20197J694; ML20198H489; ML20198H572; ML20198H585; ML20198H600; ML20198H619;
References
	FOIA-85-653 ACRS-GENERAL, NUDOCS 8601310043
	Download: ML20198H489 (5)
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R UNITED STATES NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION WASmNGTON, D. C. 20555 hf!!

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Ms. Nina Bell, Assistant Director Nuclear Information and Resource Service 1616 P Street, NW, Suite 160 IN RESPONSE REFER Washington, DC 20036 TO FOIA-85-653

Dear Ms. Bell:

This is in further response to your letter dated September 20, 1985, in which you requested, pursuant to the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA), three categories of records regarding NRC's proposed rule on earthquakes and emergency planning.

The documents identified on enclosed Appendix E are being placed in the NRC Public Document Room (PDR) located at 1717 H Street, NW, Washington, DC 20555, in file folder F01A-85-653 in your name.

The documents identified on enclosed Appendix F contain the predecisional legal analyses, opinions, and recomendations of the Office of the General Counsel (0GC) for consideration by the Comissioners and the Office of Congressional Affairs (0CA) of the proposed testimony regarding the Diablo Canyon plant before the House Subcomittee on Energy Conservation and Power. Because the documents reflect the predecisional process between 0GC, OCA and the Comissioners, the documents are exempt from mandatory disclosere pursuant to Exemption 5 of the F0IA, 5 U.S.C. 552(b)(5), and the Comission's regulations, 10 CFR 9.5(a)(5). Release of the documents would tend to inhibit the open and frank exchange of ideas essential to the deliberative process. The documents do not contain any reasonably segregable factual portions and are being withheld in their entirety.

The document identified on enclosed Appendix G consists of a draft response to questions containing the preliminary advice, opinions, and recommendations of members of the staff. Release of the document would tend to inhibit the open and frank exchange of ideas essential to the deliberative process. The document is exempt from mandatory disclosure pursuant to Exemption 5 of the F0IA, 5 U.S.C.(b)(5), and the Comission's regulations,10 CFR 9.5(a)(5). The document does not contain any reasonably segregable factual portions and is being withheld in its entirety.

Pursuant to 10 CFR 9.15 of the Commission's regulations, it has been determined that the information withheld is exempt from production or disclosure and that its production or disclosure is contrary to the public interest. The person responsible for the denial of the documents on Appendix F is Mr. James A. Fitzgerald, Assistant General Counsel. The person responsible for the denial of the document on Appendix G is Mr. Carlton Kammerer, Director, Office of Congressional Affairs.

g 13 g 3 051223 DELL 85-653 PDR

o. 1 Ms. Nina Bell 1 This denial may be appealed to the Secretary of the Commission within 30 days from the receipt of this letter. Any such appeal must be in writing, addressed to the Secretary of the Commission, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Washington, DC 20555, and should clearly state on the envelope and in the letter that it is an " Appeal from an Initial FOIA Decision."

The. search for and review of documents that are subject to your request are continuing. We will notify you upon completion of the search and review.

Sincerely,

//wh Y '

Donnie H. Grimsley, Director Division of Rules and Records Office of Administration

Enclosures:

As stated 9

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Re: F01A-85-653 APPENDIX E Documents Being Placed in the Public Document Room

1. 04/16/85 Memo for T. A. Rehm from Jesse L. Funches re: Comment -

Pre-Hearing Question for 2/28/85 Udall Authorization Hearings w/ enclosure. (6 pages) - [ Category 3]

2. 05/02/85 Memo for R. F. Fraley from W. J. Dircks re: Response to 298th ACRS Meeting Follow-Up Items. (2 pages) - [ Category 3]

3. 06/13/85 Memo for Distribution from Frank P. Gillespie re: Office Review of Staff Pesition Relating to Complicating Effects of Earthquakes on Emergency Planning (annotated copy).

(35 pages) - [ Category 3]

4. 06/13/85 Memo fer Distribution from Frank P. Gillespie re: Office Review of Staff Position Relating to Complicating Effects of Earthquakes on Emergency Planning (annotated copy).

(35 pages) - [ Category 3]

5. 06/25/85 Comments on the Draft Final Rule Package: Complicating Effects of Earthquakes on Emeroency Planning dated June 20, 1985. (3pages)-[ Category 31

6. 07/05/85 Memo for Chairman Palladino et. al. from William J. Dircks re:

Consideration Earthquakes of Potential on Emergency Planning.Complicating)

(3 pages - [ Effects Categoryof 3]

7. 07/19/85 Memo for Distribution from Frank P. Gillespie re: Office Concurrence in Staff Position Relating to Complicating Effects of Severe Natural Phenomena on Emergency Planning.

(50 pages) - [ Category 3]

8. 09/06/85 Memo for Chairman Palladino et. al. from John E. Zerbe re: OPE Comments cn SECY-85-283 -- Final Amendments to 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix E; Consideration of Earthquakes in Emergency Planning.

(6 pages) - [ Category 3]

9. 09/06/85 Note to Mike Jamgochian from Lawrence J. Chandler re: Draft Answers to Chairman Palladino's Questions on SECY-85-283.

(2 pages) - [ Category 3]

10. 09/06/85 Mumo for Nunzio J. Palladino from William J. Dircks re:

Severe Low Frequency Natural Phenomena Considerations in Emergency Planning: SECY-85-283 w/ attachments. (23 pages)

[ Category 3]

'- Re: F01A-85-653 APPENDIX F Documents Being Withheld DATE DESCRIPTION

1. June 19, 1985- Memorandum from H. Plaine, General Counsel, to C. Kammerer, OCA,-

Subject:

House Subcommittee Hearings on Diablo Canyon.

(4 pages)

2. Undated Draft Paper entitled " Testimony Summary of the Commission's Decision,"

by M. Malsch, OGC, re: Diablo Canyon.(4 pages)

3. Undated Draft Paper entitled " Chronology Attachment to NRC Testimony on Diablo Canyon Licensing Process" by an 0GC attorney. (2 pages)

4. Undate'd Untitled Draft testimony by an OGC attorney, re: Diablo Canyort (6 pages)

5. Undated Draft Paper entitled " Questions and Answers for Hearing Wamups," by S. Trubatch, OGC, re: Diablo Canyort (6 pages)

6. Undated Draft Paper entitled " Draft Q&As on Diablo Canyon for Markey Hearings,"

by M. Malsch, 0GC, (2 pages)

7. Undated Untitled Draft answer to a Congressional Subcommittee Question by an 0GC attorney, re: Diablo Canyort (1page)

8. Undated Untitled Draft answer to a Congressional Question by an 0GC attorney, re: Diablo Canyort (3 pages)

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Re: F01A-85-653 APPENDIX G DOCUMENTNEINGWITHHELD

1. 06/18/85 Memo from Denton to Dircks, subject: -Diablo Canyon.--

sResponse to Questions by Congressman Markey. (36 pages) 4 t 4 i

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Nuclear Information and Resource Service 1616 P Street, N.W., Suite 160, Washington, D.C. 20036 (202) 328-0002 Septebmer 20, 1985 James M. Felton, Director FRET O IN h AWN .

Division of Rules and Records O office of Adminstration U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, D.C. 20555 i

ff453 FREEDOM OF INFORMATION ACT REOUEST ac 'c' 6 15 D" ear Mr. Felton:

Pursuant to the Freedom of Information Act, 5 U.S.C. 522, as amended, and 10 CFR 9.8 of the Commission's regulations, the Nuclear Information and Resource Service requests the following documents regarding NRC's proposed rule on earthquakes and emergency planning.

Please consider " documents" to include reports, studies, test results, correspondence, memoranda, meeting notes, meeting minutes, working papers, graphs, charts, diagrams, notes and summaries of conversations and interviews, computer records,NRC including internal andStaff any other forms of written communication, memoranda. In your response, please identify which documents correspond to which requests below.

Pursuant to this request, please provide all documents prepared or utilized by, in the possession of, or routed through the NRC related to:

1. Briefings and briefing materials used to prepare Commissioners for a July 10, 1985 hearing before Congressman Markey, including, but not limited to, items from the Office of General Counsel, General Solicitors Office, and the Office of Policy Evaluation; 2.

Transcripts or other documents prepared for or after meetings July 10, 1985 with the Office of Policy Evaluation prior to the hearing, mock hearings held with Chairman Palladino, and other meetings between Commissioners, between Commissioners and and their assistants, or between NRC Staff; 3.

NRC Staff memoranda and correspondence on the proposed rule to eliminate consideration of earthquakes in emergency preparedness.

Please forwarded.

provide a list of offices to which this request was (g5G pp

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2-In our opinion, it is appropriate in this case for you to waive search charges, pursuant to 5 U.S.C. 552(a) (4) (A) " because furnishing the information can be considered as primarily benefiting the general public." The Nuclear Information and Resource Service is a non-profit organization serving local organizations concerned about nuclear power and providing infor-mation to the general public. Information required by 10 CFR 9.14a was provided by letter dated August 3, 1984.

Sincerel 7 Nina Bell xdD Assistant Director cc: File 1

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..Y.. JUN 131985 bO MEMORANDUM T0: Distribution e% V n 'g~ql m FROM: Frank P. Gillespie, Director Division of Risk Analysis and Operations Office of Nuclear Regulatory Research

SUBJECT:

OFFICE REVIEW 0F STAFF POSITION RELATING TO COMPLICATING EFFECTS OF EARTHQUAKES ON EMERGENCY PLANNING On June 27, 1985, the Subcommittee on Energy Conservation and Power (E. J.

Markey) will hold an oversight hearing relating to the NRC's handling of the possible complicating effects of earthquakes on emergency planning for Diablo Canyon.

Based on ED0 directions received at a June 11, 1985 meeting, the staff work on the subject Commission paper has been accelerated. We have been directed to send the paper to the ED0 by June 24. The enclosed paper is the staff's best effort to date and describes three alternatives (1) adopt the proposed rule as a final rule (2) withdraw the proposed rule and leave the issue open for ajudication on a case-by-case basis or (3) issue a final rule which clarifies the original intent of the Comission which might state that emergency response plans shall include an assessment of the complicating n

effects during the of severe lifetimelow frequency of the plant (e.atural phenomena g., an earthquake upthat could to the SSE).be expected The staff and the ACRS are presently favoring the last alternative.

It is therefore requested that, by COB Monday, June 17, 1985, you provide input to the paper, as well as your agreement or disagreement with the position presented. Office coments will then be consolidated, retyped and resubmitted to you by June 21 and then submitted to EDO on June 24, 1985.

Mike Jamgochian, 443-7615 will be coordinating all office coments.

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Trank P. Gillespi , Director Division of Risk Analysis and Operations Office of Nuclear Regulatory Research l 0 9

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s-Distribution H. Denton D. Eisenhut F. Rowsome ,

V. Stello W. Schwink J. Taylor E. Jordan F. Pagano S. Schwartz D. Matthews D. Rohrer L. Chandler W. Olmstead W. Shields G. Cunningham R. Minogue .

D. Ross F. Gillespie J. Malaro M. Jamgochian L. Beratan A. Murphy

! J. Richardson

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For: The Commissioners From: William J. Dircks Executive Director for Operations

Subject:

FINAL AMENDMENTS TO 10 CFR PART 50, APPENDIX E; CONSIDERATION OF EARTHQUAKES IN THE CONTEXT OF EMERGENCY PREPAREDNESS

Purpose:

To obtain Commission approval for publication in the Federal Register of a final amendment to the regulations that would require limited consideration of the complicating effects of earthquakes in emergency planning.

Category: This paper covers a major policy matter.

Backaround: On December 8, 1981, the Commission ruled in a then pending adjudication that its energency planning regulations do not require consideration of potential earthquake' effects on emer- \

gency plans for nuclear power reactors. /fMAAfEstheref4 k\

Southern California Edisen Company, et aT. (San Onofre Nuclear Generating Station, Units 2 and 3), CLI-81-33, 14 NRC 1091 (1981).

In so ruling the Commission stated:

The Commission will consider on a generic oasis whether regulations should be changed to address the potential impacts of a severe earthquake on emergency planning. For the interim, the proximate occurrence of an accidental radiological release and an earthquake that could disrupt normal emergency planning appears sufficiently unlikely that consideration in individual licensing proceedings pending generic consideration of the matter is not warranted. 14 NRC at 1092.

l The Commission affirmed this position in the Diablo Canyon proceeding. l## #_Ma y & Pacific Gas and Electric Company (Diablo Qany&n~ Nuclear Power Plant, Units 1 and 2), CLI-84-12, 20 NRC J VY (August 10, 1984). In this decision the Commission th(

stated that it would initiate rulemaking "to address whether the potential for seismic impacts on emergency planning is a significant enough concern for large portions of the nation to

Contact:

Mike Jamgochian, RES 443-7615

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The Commissioners 2

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warrant the amendment of the r gulations to specifically !

consider those impacts." " ';, ,.~... :t O. The focus of this l rulemaking is to "obtain additional information to determine '

whether, in spite of current indications to the contrary, cost-effective reductions in overall risk may be obtained by the explicit consideration of severe earthquakes in emergency \

Id. af ,Wi- jff response planning." '

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Discussion: On December 21, 1984, the Commission published a proposed rule change to 10 CFR Part 50 that relates to Emergency Planning and Preparedness at Production and Utilization Facilities (49 FR 49640). The proposed rule stated that neither emergency response plans nor evacuation time analyses need consider the impa ,of earthquakes which cause or occur proximate in time wit /4n accidental release of radioactive material from a nuc ear power reactor. These amendments to 10 CFR 50.47 and 10 CFR Part 50 Appendix E proposed to explicitly incorporate in them the interpretation in the Commission San Onofre and Diablo Canyon rulings.

When the proposed rule was published in the Federal Register (49 FR 49640, dated December 21, 1984), it permitted a 30-day comment period. This was then extended until February 27, 1985 (see 50 FR 3797, dated January 28, 1985).

In the proposed rule, the Commission requested that commentors address the merits of three possible alternative:

1. Adoption of the proposed rule change which would explicitly incorporate the Commission interpretation in San Onofre and D_iablo Canyon (not to consider the impacts of earthquakes h\

in emergency planning).

2. Leaving the issue open for adjudication on a caso-by-case basis; or

3. Requiring by rule that emergency plans specifically address the impacts of earthquakes.

The Commission was also considering whether to include in this rulemaking tornadoes and other low-frequency natural events.

To date, 61 comment letters have been received. Twenty five (25) letters favored the promulgation of the proposed rule. The majority of these letters were from utilities, consulting firms representing utilities, 2 private citizens and the Department of Energy.

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l The Commissioners 3 Thirty-four (34) letters were received which we gainst proitulgation of the proposed rule, many of whic strong displeasure, shock or disbelief as to th voicing frection that k

the Commission was leaning in the proposed rule change. The majority of these letters were from private citizens, interven-tion groups and environrental groups. Approximately of these letters were 1:n the signed petition form with approximately signatures per letter.

Additional input was also received from the following foreign countries, all of which stated that the potential complicating effects of earthquakes was not specifically considered in their nuclear power reac emergency planning: Japan, France, Sweden, Germany and Taiwa one of the commentors specifically took a position with the second alternative which would leave the issue N

open for adjudication on a case-by-case basis.

All of the commentors that favored promulgation of the proposed rule into a final rule essentially agreed with the rational that the Commission used in the Federal Register Notice and provided little amplification or additional conceptual logic which would further support the proposed rule change. Nonetheless, those commentors that were against the proposed rule change provided the Commission with argument that questioned the validity of the iational in the Federal Register Notice and focused on addi-tional issues that are addressed in the proposed Federal Register Notice (Enclosure 1) of this rulemaking package.

Alternatives: After careful review of both the San Onofre_and Diablo Canyon _

decisions involving the complicating effects of earthquakes on k

emergency planning, as well as all public comment letters resulting from the proposed rule change that was published in the Federal Register on December 21, 1984, the staff perceives that there exists 5 fundamental alternative approaches which the Commission may wish to consider:

Alternative 1. Adoption of the proposed rule into a final rule- "neither emergency response plans nor evacuation time analysis need consider the impacts of earthquakes."

E #c_lotet Pro: 1. Pr;vid:: 'er .c litigation.

2. Is consistent with what other countries are doing.

3. Is consistent with the Commission's San Onofre and v Diable canyon decision.

Con. 1. Provokes outrage by the public because it is perceived that the Commission is attempting to " void" or

" write-off" earthquakes.

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The Commissioners 4 I

2. PRA analyses have indicated that earthquakes are among ,

dominate causes of core melt accidents, it has been I considered by some commentors irrational to not '

consider the effects of these same earthquakes on emergency response.

Alternative 2. Adoption of the proposed rule into a final rule

'with minor but important word changes, for example, "no additional emergency preparedness measures need be established to account for severe, low frequency natural phenomena than is already required in 10 CFR 50.47 and Appendix E."

FovudoSO Pro: 1. Peevidae +cr r.c litigation. /\

2. The modified wording does not arbitrarily focus on earthquakes.

3. The modified wording gives the perception that reasonable plans for coping with severe natural phenomena are already in place.

p (c.c N e Con: 1. The public may ... -:;. that we are doing nothing as ig, a result of their input, other than modifying words.

Alternative 3. Leaving the issue open for adjudication on a case-by-case basis; accomplished by withdrawing the proposed rule or by requiring consideration of earthquakes.

Pr .

Con: 1. Unnecessarily prolongs the ..nsing process.

2.

SA- strength of The litigation has no bounds 36-ee, bridges and roads may be litigated. \(

Alternative 4. Promulgate a final rule which might state that

" State earthquake preparedness planning shall take into account all nuclear power plants within its boundaries. In so doing, the Commission finds that this would provide reasonable assurance that adequate protective measures can and will be taken."

Pro: 1. Blends the nuclear power plant in with other industries.

2. Provides comparable protection to the public relative to other industries throughout the State.

3. May not require the State to establish additional preparedness around a nuclear power reactor.

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Th1 Commissioners 5 Cm: 1. Because each State's ability to deal with earthquakes is different, the generic finding of reasonable assurance may be inappropriate to make.

2. The State's earthquake preparedness program would be open to litigation and possibly would be open to litiga-O .

tion and may cause more delay in the licensing process.

Promulgate a final rule which clarified the h Alternative 5: original intent of the Commission and might state that eme IV ,

I response plans shall assure that the following decisionmaking gU - Q reolannin) capabilities exist relative to the complicating mpacts of severe, low frequency natural phenomena that could be

[ b expected during the life of the plant. The intensity of the event shall be no greater than the design basis for that event.

1. Ability to transport necessary personnel to the plant to cope with degraded modes of plant operation.

O t 2. Ability to communicate to the offsite autnorities any plant damage.

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3. Ability to obtain damage estimates to the plant. This information should be available to factor into the decision-making process, including recommendations to offsite authorities for protective actions after severe, low l

frequency natural phenomena.

Offsite. authorities should consider decisionmaking eplannin that takes into account various degrees and o s of damage to the plant environs.

1 Pro: 1. Limits litigation.

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2. This would be a clarification rule change, thus the Commission would not be seen as changing its decisions.

3. This is a compromise position between not requiring consideration of earthquakes and requiring consideration.

4. This includes all natural phenomena.

5. This consideration has already been cjone at San Onofre and Diablo Canyongi/Apu caC fi4 M

6. Thir(ass s not,that difficult or eg ensive to j accomplish gg4 g My Yt' -

Con: 1.

~ May permit some litigation of the adequacy of assessment performed.

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2.

Mayopenlitigationatoperatingreactors]a a#yl',,h.p A $f ,qa' Having considered all of the above, as well as all comments received, past operating reactor and emergency preparedness experiences and the ACRS comments, the staff recommends that g,A g f a final rule be promulgated that would embrace the concepts P *gMj of Alternative 5. This final rule would: /

1.

Clarify and articulate the Commission original concept of specifying what flexibility is required in emergency plans ,

in order to assure that there exists ..." reasonable assurance i thatappropriateprotectiveactionscanandwillbetaken..."['

to mitigate (not eliminate) the consequences of a radio-logical accident.

2. Assure the capability to transport necessary personnel to the plant to cope with the degraded modes of plant operation.

3. Assure the capability to communicate to the offsite authorities any plant damage.

4. Assure the capability to obtain plant damage estimates.

- - 5. Assure that offsite authorities consider decisionmaking

' - 6 planninh that takes into account various degrees and N( g locations of offsite damage resulting from severe, low

/ g/# , frequency natural phenomena.

hf / This staff recommendation would specifically not require:

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1. Evacuation time estimates that consider the complicating effects of severe, low frequency natural phenomena.

gf 2. That roads, bridges, buildi.,gs and other structures y A fgy.f [N be reinforced to withstand the effects of severe, low gfr gli frequency natural phenomena.

FEMA Coordination: Because FEMA is directly involved in the evaluation of offsite emergency preparedness and would be affected by the promulgation of these amendments, the NRC staff has kept the FEMA staff advised on the development of this paper. Based on this inter-action, FEMA has concurred in staff recommended source of action.

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1 The Commissioners 7 l Cost Estimate: The staff anticipates no significant cost impact on licensees, or State and local governments as a result of promulgation of this final rule change.

Recommendations: 1. Approve for publication in the Federal Register a notice

' of final rulemaking (Enclosure 1) to 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix E to be effective 30 days after publication.

2. Note:

(a) That appropriate Congressional committees will be notified of the rule change (Enclosure 2).

(b) That the ACRS is being informed of the rule change.

(c) That, pursuant to 10 CFR S 51.5(d)(3) of the Commission's regulations, an environmental impact statement, negative declaration, or environmental impact appraisal need not be prepared in connection ,

with the subject final rule change because there is no substantive or significant environmental impact.

(d) That pursuant to the Regulatory Flexibility Act of 1980, the Federal Register Notice contains a statement that the Commission certifies that this final rule will not have a significant economic impact on a substantial number of small entities, and a copy of this certification will be forwarded to the Chief Counsel for Advocacy, SBA, by the Division of Rules and Records, ADB.

(e) That the Federal Register Notice contains a statement that, pursuant to the Paperwork Reduction Act of 1980, the NRC has made a determination that the rule change does not impose new recordkeeping, information collec-tion, or reporting requirements. ~

(f) That the Federal Register Notice'will be sent by TIOC, ADM, to affected applicants, licensees, and persons that commented on the proposed rule.

(g) That a public announcement of the final rule change

will be made.

(h) That the staff recommends this Commission paper be placed in the POR.

(1) That a Regulatory Analysis is attached as Enclosure 3.

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The Commissioners 8 Sunshine Act: Recommend consideration at an open meeting.

Schedulina: For early considerations.

William J. Dircks Executive Director for Operations

Enclosures:

Federal Register Notice of Final Rule Change to 10 CFR, Part 50, Appendix E Regulatory Analysis Draft Congressional Letter ACRS Letter dated August 11, 1983 FEMA Final Regulation; 44 CFR 350 Federal Register Notice of Final Rule Change to 10 CFR, Part 50, Appendix E which is identical to the published proposed rule change.

Federal Register Notice of a Proposed Rule Change to 10 CFR, Part 50, Appendix E which is totally consis- .

tent with FEMA regulation 44 CFR 350.

[7590-01]

NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION 10 CFR Part 50 Emergency Planning and Preparedness AGENCY: Nuclear Regulatory Comission.

ACTION: Final rule. ,[ #

SUMMARY

The Commission is amending its regulations in 10 CFR Part 50 in order to assure that decisionmaking annin# capabilities exist

' ::1 ;; r n nt: t: 2::::: th: relative to the complicating impacts of severej low frequency natural j phenomena on emergency preparedness. The Commission anticipates that this final regulation will not have significant impactonemergencypreparednessrequirements-th;.O.e.I = established by the August 1980 emergency planning requirements ( FR ) but willprovideclarificationastotheCommission'soriginalintentknthe San Onofre and Diablo Canyon full power licensing decision.

EFFECTIVE DATE: [ Insert 30 days after publication in the Federal Register.]

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: Michael J. Jangochian, Division of Risk Analysis and Operations, Office of Nuclear Regulatory Research, U.S.

Nuclear Regulatory Comission, Washington, DC 20555, Telephone (301)443-7615.

1 Enclosure 1 1

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[7590-01]

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION: On December 21, 1984, the Commission published a proposed rule change to 10 CFR Part 50 that relates to Emergency Plann- l ing and Preparedness at Production and Utilities Facilities (49 FR 49640).

The proposed rule states that neither emergency response plans nor evacuation time analyses need consider the impact of earthquakes which cause an o. cur proximate in time with, an accidental release of radioac-tive material from a nuclea power reactor. These amendments to 10 CFR SG.47 and 10 CFR Part 50 Appendix E proposed,to explicitly incorporate in them the interpretation in the Commissi n$5an Onofre and Diablo Canven rulings.

On December 8, 1981, the Commission ruled in a then pending adjudica-tion that its emergency planning regulations do not require consideration of potential earthquake effects on emergency plans for nuclear power reactors. [MbeJ4Lttec/sf Southern California Edison Company, et al.

San Onofre Nuclear Generating Station, Units 2 and 3), CLI-81-33, 14 NRC 1091 (1981). In so ruling the Commission stated-The Commission will consider a generic basis whether regulations should be changed to address the potential impacts of a severe earthquake on emergency planning. For the interim, the proximate occurrence of an accidental radiological release and an earth-quake that could disrupt normal emergency planning appears sufficiently unlikely that consideration in individual licensing proceedings pending generic consideration of the matter is not warranted. 14 NRC at 1092.

2 Enclosure 1

[7590-01]

The Commission recently affirmed this position in the Diablo Canyon proceeding. [nphe/Mattsr/p/ Pacific Gas and Electric Comoany (Diablo Canyon Nuclear Power Pla 1 and 2), CLI-84-12, 20 NRC alN (August 10, 1984), San Luis Obispo Mothers for '

951P. WIV) (b C.( & tffY); ue & N /^ M w t d

, r Peace v. NRC (0.C. 0i . L,. 01-1i10). In - decisfon jthe Commission stated that it would initiate rulemaking "to address whether the potential for seismic impacts on emergency planning is a significant enough concern for large portions of the nation to warrant the amendment of the regulations to specifically consider those impacts. The chief focus of the rulemaking was to obtain additional information to determine whether, in spite of current indications to the contrary, cost-effective reductions in overall risk may be obtained by the explicit consideration of severe earthquakes in cmergency response planning."

5'V- 2T When the proposed rule was published in the Federal Register (49 FR 49640, dated December 21, 1984), it permitted a 30-day comment period, this was then extended until February 27, 1985 (see 50 FR 3797, dated January 28, 1985).

In the proposed rule, the Commission requested that commentors address the merits of three possible alternative:

1. Adoption of the proposed rule change which would explicitly incorporate the Commission interpretation in San Onofre and Diablo Canyon (not to consider the impacts of earthquakes in emergency planning).

2. Leaving the issue open for adjudication on a case-by-case basis; or 3 Enclosure 1

o

[7590-01]

3. Requiring by rule that emergency plans specifically address the impacts of earthquakes.

The Commission was also considering whether to include in this rule-making tornadoes and other low-frequency natural events.

To date, 61 comment letters have been received. Twenty five (25) letters favored the promulgation of the proposed rule. The majority of these letters were from utilities, consulting firms representing utilities, 2 private citizens and the Department of Energy.

Thirty-four (34) letters were received which were against promulgation of the proposed rule, many of which, voicing strong displeasure, shock or disbelief as to the direction that the Commission was leaning in the proposed rule change. The majority of these letters were from private citizens, intervention groups and environmental groups. Approximately of these letters were in the signed petition form with approximately signatures per letter.

Additional input was also received from the following foreign countries, all of which stated that the potential complicating effects of earthquakes was not specifically considered in their nuclear power

[ reactor emergency planning: Japan, France, Sweden, Germany and Taiwan.

g honeofthecommentorsspecificallytookapositionwiththealternative ,

[ ,

to leave the issue open for adjudication on a case-by-case basis.

,e j All of the commentors that favored promulgation of the proposed huleintoafinalruleessentiallyagreedwiththerationalthatthe Commission used in the Federal Register Notice and provided little h amplification or additional conceptual logic which would further support k the proposed rule change. Nonetheless, those commentors that were p1 4 Enclosure 1

[7590-01]

against the proposed rule change provided the Commission with arguments that questioned the validity of the rational in the Federal Register Notice and focused on additional issues that will be addressed in this Federal P.egister Notice.

A compilation o'f these issues with an accompanying Commission response follows:

Issue 1. There exists limited or no record (or Data) concerning the flexibility of emergency plans to support the proposed rule, therefore, the Commission cannot make a gener.ic finding that effects of be16.v-SSE' earthquakes on emergency planning are always resolved by the general flexibility of emergency plans.

Commission Response .' To 3c. f/t.m Issue 2. The proposed fuls violates the NRC's eergency planning principle of planning for accider.ts ranging from design basis accidents to core-melt accidents, with the capacity to reduce the consequences of even the most severe accidents.

Commission Response / To b f,g 4 g Issue 3. Emergency planning should focus on accident consequences and accident initiators not just the consequences of potential accidents.

5 Enclosure 1

[7590-01]

Comcission Response .' Io b h:W.b d Issue 4. Like all other safety systems, seismically qualified equip-ment must also be assumed to fail for purposes of emergency plar,aing.

, Commission Respcase ? To h h,W ( g Issue S. Emergency Planning must include the complicating effects of earthquakes up to and beyond SSE levels.

Commissic, Response The magnitude of the SSE and the adequacy of a plant's design to meet W d in adjudicatory pro-the SSE are reviewed by NRC and may be ::r.trc....

caedings, but, once settled, should not be reconsidered in reyiewing or.

/Au.1ihby4 4tK 4f~ to*~~<aco,'

adjudicating emergency planning issues. fff a larger earthquake were con f sidered feasible, then a larger SSE would have been established. If an earthquake smaller than an SSE were considered to be capable of damaging a plant's safety systems, then the plant's design would have been corrected.

Thus, emergency plans need not take into account earthquakes larger or smaller than an SSE. Nevertheless, the basis for emergency planning is not constrained by the design basis for a plantj!and emergency planning effort) recognize the possibility that events considered beyond the design basis can occur. A spectrum of potential consequences independent of the particular causes are analyzed in reaching decisions on emergency plann- ;

l I

6 Enclosure 1

[7590-01]

ing provisions, and the planning basis does not depend upon the particular scenario which may lead to significant offsite releases of radioactivity. '

Issue 6. The Commission's fundamental obligation, is to determine whether " adequate protective measures can and will be taken in the event of a radiological emergency." 10 CFR S 50.47(a). If circumstances pre-vent the NRC from finding that emergency plans can provide that assurance, t

it must deny the license. -

Commission Response The Commission agrees that if the NRC cannot make the ding that v

"...there is reasonable assurance that adequate protective measures can and will be taken in the event of a radiological emergency" to mitigate 4

(not eliminate) the consequences of an accident, the operating license must be denied. Various governmental authorities, consu nd members ;

of the public have argued that an emergency plan cannot be developed 3

that would eliminate public health risk from all of the possible reactor i accidents even in conjunction with severe, low frequency natural phenomena. I l

However, sinc omplete elimination of pil risk is not even theoretically l

possible, it

__ tt ,at.at .f gq f e NRC's emergency preparedness regula-

$Y,f g

tion ensurey d that no one in the public would receive a dose in excess l

of the EPA protective action guidelines (PAGs) for any accidental release, regardless of timing or severity. Based on experience, the NRC has noted that there are many uncertainties associated with potential accidents and that emergency preparedness is not a panacea for eliminating all risk to the public.

I 7 Enclosure 1 l

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- ~ - - - - - . . _ _

gp b, s,f 7

, The objective of the NRC emergency preparedness regulations is to N Y reduce the risk to the public health and safety by planning in advance how to respond to nuclear oower plant accidents-The NRC would not license a plant if the radiological risk posed by possible accidents were not very small - even in the absence of emergency preparedness. Nevertheless, the NRC has chosen to require emergency pre-paredness as another level of " defense-in-depth," the principal that a variety of independent and diverse level of protection should be afforded the public from the hazard of radiation exposure. The NRC believes that reasonable efforts to anticipate and plan for public protective actions in the vicinity of a commercial nuclear plant can substantially reduce, though not eliminate, the already small offsite radiological risk, and

~~

r is, therefore, a prudent is not essent[al'riquirement.

N-. _

7

~

p .

CobissToh RsensmM Issue 7. Inasmuch as seismic PRA analysis has indicated that earth-quakes are among dominant causes of core melt accidents, it is irrational to ignore the effects that these same earthquakes can have on emergency response., s ,, ,

Ww IL w) fu. m o rast seismic rrm on.iyXs have indicated that earthquakes are a major contributor to core melt accidents. However, recent evidence suggests that these PRA investigations embodied pessimistic estimates of structural and component failure levels, and that when more realistic failure levels are used, the significance of the earthquake threat diminishes. This appears to be true even when aging and degradation effects are considered. Moreover, the above cited studies found that

, 8 Enclosure 1

\

[7590-01]

l only very improbable earthquakes with motions several times the very severe design basi ns could cause serious accidents. Major earthquakes have to date not caused distress to nuclear power plants either in the United States r elsewhere. NRC efforts are currently l underway to better define needed inputs to seismic PRA studies which f the past were based on conservatif ubjective judgments. It is noted '

N 1

that even the M seismic PRAs, with their suspected conservative bias, has not yielded unacceptably. high core melt probabilities.

) It is the staff's position that early seismic Pfwere not d'fficiently validated for licensing decisionmaking, and that such validation must be expedited. Preliminary findi rom ongoing work point toward excessive conservatisms being introduced in the estimated failure levels used in the early work.

With th(scstudies in mind, the Commission nonetheless never intended M

to give the preception that _ d .. " ignoring" the complicating effects of earthquakes on emergency respan . Therefore, the enclosed final (i1#

rule is to clarify and partic age e Commission's original intend of specifying what flexibility is required in emergency plans in order to assure that there exists reasonable assurance that appropriate protec-tive actions can and will be taken to mitigate (not eliminate) the consequences of a radiological accident.

Issue 8. Defects in seismic design and quality assurance in construc-tion have consistently undermined the seismic strength of plant systems and structures.

9 Enclosure 1 1

'l

[7590-01]

It is thus irrational for the NRC to write off earthquakes as an emergency planning issue at the same time it is exhibiting growing concern regarding the effects of earthquakes on nuclear power plant site.

Commission Response M N The assertion in SesEmmsettr) that there is a growing concern about the abil.ity of nuclear power plants to withstand the effects of large earthquakes is, simply, incorrect. If anything, recent work, based on actual behavior of industrial facilities and their equipment in large earthquakes, leads to the conclusion that more margin against earthquakes larger than included in the design basis than was previously thought.

Earthquakes simultaneously affect all plant safety systems and do tend to " search out" design, construction and maintenance errors which could degrade plant safety. In a general way, only very gross errors are of concern since NRC standards and industry codes provide margins against minor to moderate errors. Unfortunate gross errors do occur and are more prevalent than previously believed. Examples are the failure to tie reinforcing steel together in the Trojan control room and

,F using mirror image design drawings at Diablo Canyon.{Also, the comments d N#

tend to confuse the regulatory issue of a plant not being built in of

[

accordance with the commitments in its license application with the safety issue of earthquake resistance of the plant as built. A discrepancybetweenas-builtandahsigneddoesnot,ofitself, imply significant degradation as seismic resistance. In fact, some of the changes might well enhance seismic resistance. However, the burden of justifying that the as-built plant is adequate res ts with the 10 Enclosure 1

)

. . \

C7590-01]

licensee.

One cannot assume, - a p +ri that resistance is either better or worse. ,

Issue 9. The use of unreliable seismic design bases is flawed and therefore its use as a basis for rulemaking is inappropriate.

OW . _ _ _

" While uncertainties do exist in estimating the behavior of structures, systems and components subjected to seismic effects, these uncertainties are explicitly treated in the design process through the introduction of .

conservatisms in the procedures. The end product tends to reflect an over design against earthquakes, sometimes to the extent that inservice l g inspection is degraded as is normal plant operation. Current research activities in seismic design of nuclear power plants is directed towards achieving greater realism thnough the removal of unneeded and undesirable seismic conservatism when it reduces overall plant reliability. Thus, present seismic bases may only be flawed in that they afford an overprotec-tion against infrequently occurring earthquakes, while introducing regative performance aspects for routine operation.

Issue 10. Even if a reactor is designed to withstand earthquakes of a certain magnitude, an earthquake can indirectly lead to an accident by causing operator error. Thus, operators may react to the trauma of anearthquakeandthedistractionoffluctuatinginstrumentsbyappa mistakes that lead to serious accidents.

r I

11 Enclosure 1

[7590-01]

Commission Response The NRC has conducted extensive research relative to this issue, the purpost of which was to determine if conditions of psychological stress induced by emergency conditions in a nuclear power plant have a signift-cant adverse effect on operator performance of typical tasks required during plent energencies. To this end, two tecnnical tasks were under-taken: (1) the technical findings from prior research studies of human performance under stress were reviewed and evaluatea, and (2) an experiment was performed with 24 trained reactor operators under varying conditions of psychological stress to measure the effectiveness of their decisionmaking a_nd responses for different reactor operational requirements.

Findings from existing technical literature indicate specific factors important to operator performance under stress. These factors are:

Perceptual narrowing, which can restrict the operator's under-standing of stressful conditions and the subsequent ability to respond appropriately to them; t Cognitive rigidity, which can restrict the cognitive capacities of operators to analyze, evaluate, and plan alternative courses of action in response to the stressfu? conditions; i Changes in the nominal degree of correctness of decisions arrived at by the individual or by the group; Reliance on prior training and the mental set such training provides; Enhanced role and importance of centralized authority to the operator in responding to the stressful conditions; 12 Enclosure 1 I

i

' ~ ,

[7590-013 I Some distortion of information provided about the stressful I

conditions and their effects by individuals and by the group; '

't'

,L.

Response (ke_rseveration.. or the tendency to repeat actions which are ineffectual or to make responses which are not appropriate to the stressful conditions.

The experiment involved three stress related variables to assess ;

their effects on operator decisionmakina under stress. W o rkload (i.e. ,

i amount of time to perform), conflicting information (i.e. , background noise and voices), and the level of detail in available written proca-dures were manipulated as three stressors. Decisionmaking performance was evaluated by the correct selection of actions to mitigate twelve emergency scenarios which could result from a seismic event at a pres-surized water reactor. Operators responded to each scenario by select-ing from a response list of specific actions to be taken immediately, or subsequently, or nonapplicable. Also, certain personality variables of the operators, related to decisionmakinc performance under stress were assessed and correlated.

Results from the experiment with reactor operators revealed:

Operators under stress perform better under lower levels of workload; 13 Enclosure 1

[7590-013 Availability of detailed procedures may supplement operator performance and decisionmaking such that negative effects cf psychological stress are reduced; Operators selected significantly more actions correctly in the presence of high conflictina information, relative to low conflicting information; The interactions of conflicting information with procedures, and conflicting information with workload, suggest a complex relationship between stress variables and decisionmaking performance; Specific operator ersonality characteristics were found to be related to enha e decisionmaking under stress; v

Operators having an internal locus of control (i.e., those who perceived reward as contingent on their behavior) perform better under stress than those having an external locus of control (i.e., those who perceive reward as independent of their behavior);

Operators who have coped successfully with many past stressful experiences perform better under stress than those who have copad with fewer past stressful situations; l

14 Enclosure 1 I

l

. [7590-01]

Operator response to stress may be affected by their general level of anxiety, their degree of emotional exhaustion, feelir.gs of depersonalization, and feelings about personal accomplishments.

Analysis of these findings from the literature and from the* operator experiments identified general measures for decreasing the effects of stress. These are: (1) training programs geared to develop operator knowledge, characteristics, and coping mechanisms which will enhance operator performance under stressful conditions; (2) training programs ,

and procedures which are compatible with the response characteristics of operators experiencing stress; and (3) awareness by supervisors, manage-ment and operating personnel of operator characteristics which are related to decisionmaking performance under stress. Specific measures that are now being used as a result of this research are:

Training and drills which establish mental set (i.e., an i expectant attitude within the operator) toward the , mitigation of an emeraency and the reduction of high stress; Establishing procedures which optimize individual workload dur-ing emergencies while maintaining individual responsibility; Effective display presentations of critical information in the control room, with displays designed for a narrowed range of cue utilization by operators during emergencies; 15 Enclosure 1

[7590-013 Ensuring that procedures are compatible with operator reliance on established authority and centralization of authority during emergencies; Providing procedures compatible with restrictive cognitive and problem solving processes; Providing formal training of operator stratecies in broadened problem solving techniques, novel problem solving, and decision reassessment; Training in information management, and procedures geared to reduce information distortion and to improve the flow and communication of critical information; Frequent drills that will help operators over-learn effective procedures and will allow practice in novel problem solving and decision reassessment. This includes opportunities to exhibit effective coping with such problems as part of the drills (especially if the drills are somewhat stressful) in order to help operators cope with future stressful events; Train personnel to view plant conditions and problem solving from a standpoint of internal locus of control (i.e., such that the operator performs because his/her performance is perceived 16 Enclosure 1

[7590-01]

as effectual and rewarding) in conjunction with the plant management's administrative policies; Train shift supervisors and plant managers to be aware of personality factors in their crews which could negatively affect decisionmaking and performance under high stress.

Supervisors could use this information to structure the control room personnel into the most effective decision unit possible by deployment of individual responsibility, work ,

assignment, and tailor-made training programs and drills; Incorporation of findings relating operator personality characteristics to performance under stress in a career selection cuide for prospective operators.

Issue 11. Emergency Plans are unique, for example, a rural and sparsely populated area may pose fewer evacuation problems, and thus require less flexibility, than an urban and densely populated plant site.

Thus, emergency plans cannot be found to possess the same degree of

" flexibility" in every casa.

Commission Response .' 3 k [% Md Issue 12. Earthquakes are distinct phenomena the following distinct features of earthquakes are:

1

--Sirens and broadcasting systems could be knocked down and roads j could be severely obstructed in an earthquake.

17 Enclosure 1

[7590-01]

--Although sheltering may be presumed to be available in almost any, other type of natural event, it could be rendered useless by an earthquake.

--An earthquake is likely to disrupt the distribution of water, natural gas, and gasoline, thus causing fires and impeding the efforts of firefighters.

--An earthquake is likely to impair or destroy the ability to monitor potential radiation releases and meteorological conditions.

--An earthquake can damage transportation routes by collapse of bridges and overpasses, liquefaction of roads, and landslides.

--An earthquake can cause the collapse of structures (including those housing personnel directing the emergency planning effort, relocation and decontamination facilities, and local agency services) or render sheltering useless due to damage.

--An earthquake is likely to cause a loss of offsite power, with its attendant effect on communications, as well as to potentially render useless other (backup) methods of communication such as radio transmissions.

--An earthquake is likely to cause physical and fright-induced (e.g. , heart attack) injuries, thereby overloading medical facilities and ambulance and rescue services.

Commission Response i To [La [h 1 Issue 13. FEMA's emerge.1cy plans do not adequately provide for earthquake response in a radiological emergency.

18 Enclosure 1

[7590-01]

Commission Resoonse

'TL<- M Av.s y ,

4 FEMA has an active program of earthquake preparedness which includes hazards and vulnerability analysis, estimates of damage and casualties, planning for Federal response to a major earthquake, and assistance to State and local governments in their earthquake planning and preparedness activities. The Commission and FEMA believe that all of these activities are sufficiently flexible to complement each other in preparing for an event that may require a concurrent response to a major earthquake and a serious accident at a nuclear power plant.

'yn

---- :V Having considered all of the above, as well as all comments received, Of'"

past operating reactor and emergency preparedness experiences, and the ACRS comments, the Commission has determined that a final fuel be promul-gated that would:

1. Clarify and articulate the Commission's original concept of specifying what flexibility is required in emergency plans in order to assure that there exists "... reasonable assurance that appropriate protec-tive actions can and will be taken..." to mitigate (not eliminate) the consequences of a radiological accident.

2. Assure the capability to transport necessary personnel to the plant to cope with the degraded modes of plant operation.

3. Assure the capability to communicate to the offsite authorities any plant damage,

d. Assure the capability to obtain plant damage estimates.

19 Enclosure 1 1 I

B o

- [7590-01]

y ,

f ad "o

(

5. Assure that offsite authorities consider decisionmaking preplan ing that takes into account various degrees and locations of offsite damage resulting from severe, low frequency natural phenomena.

This staff recommendation would specifica1.ly not require:

Evacuation time estimates that consider the complicating y\A 'Ieffects of severe, low frequency natural phenomena.

LMyllNSy/

g-

2. That roads, bridges, buildings and other structures be reinforced to withstand the effects of severe, low frequency natural phenomena.

Because FEMA is directly involved in the evaluation of offsite emer-gency preparedness exercises and is affected by the promulgation of these amendments,theNRCconsultedextensive)ywithFEMAduringthedevelopment ug/M41 Gald's (4tskl458M of this rule and as a result has seneeweed in the rule change.

FINDING OF NO SIGNIFICANT ENVIRONMENT IMPACT The Commission has determined under the National Environmental Policy Act of 1969, as amended, and the Commission's regulations in Subpart A of 10 CFR Part 51, that this rule, is not a major Federal action significantly affecting the quality of the human environment and therefore an environ-mental impact statement is not required. See 10 CFR 50.22(a)(1). More-over, the Commission has determined, pursuant to 10 CFR 51.32, that the final rule has no significantly environmental impact. This determination has been made because the Commission cannot identify any impact on the 20 Enclosure 1

[7590-01]

human environment associated with limited decisionmaking preplanning relating to the complicating effects of severe, low frequencies natural phenomena on emergency preparedness.

The alternative approaches that were considered in this rulemaking proceedings were:

1. Not to consider the complicating effects of earthquakes on emergency plans or evacuation tide estimates.

2. To not require additional emergency preparedness measures to cope with the complicating effects of earthquakes.

3. Leave the complicating affects of earthquakes on emergency planning open to consideration on a case-by-case basis.

4. Requiring that State Earthquake Preparedness take into account all nuclear power plants within their boundaries.

5. Promulgate a clarification rule change which would limit the assessment of the complicating effects of severe, low frequency natural

~

phenomena to certain decisionmakin prepla capabilities a pv M, PAPERWORK REDUCTION ACT STATEMENT The final rule contains no information collection requirements and therefore is not subject to the requirements of the Paperwork Reduction Act of 1980 (44 U.S.C. 3501 et seq.).

REGULATORY ANALYSIS The Commission has prepared a regulatory analysis of this regulation.

The analysis examines the costs and benefits of the rule as considered by 21 Enclosure 1

~

, . [7590-01]

l l

the Commission. A copy of the regulatory analysis is available for inspec- 1 I

tion and copying, for a fee, at the NRC Public Document Room, 1717 H Street NW., Washington, DC. Single copies of the analysis may be obtained from Michael T. Jamgochian, Office of Nuclear Regulatory Research, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Washington, DC 20555, Telephone (301)443-7615.

REGULATORY FLEXIBILITY CERTIFICATION In accordance with the Regulatory Flexibility Act of 1980, 5 U.S.C.

5 605(b), the Commission hereby certifies that this final rule will not, if promulgated, have a significant economic impact on a substantial number of small entities. The final rule clarifies certain elements and findings necessary for the issuance of an operating license for a nuclear power plant licensed pursuant to Section 103 and 104b of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended, 42 U.S.C. 2133, 2134b. The electric utility companies which own and operate nuclear power plants are dominart in their service areas and do not fall within the definition of a small business found in Section 3 of the Small Business Act, 15 U.S.C. 632, or within the Small Business Size Standards set forth in 13 CFR Part 121. Accordingly, there is no significant economic impact on a substantial number of small entities under the Regulatory Flexibility Act of 1980.

LIST OF SUBJECTS IN 10 CFR PART 50 Part 50 - Antitrust, Classified information, Fire prevention, Incorporation by reference, Intergovernmental relations, Nuclear power 22 Enclosure 1

[7590-01]

plants and reactors, Penalty, Radiation protection, Reactor siting criteria, Reporting and recordkeeping requirements.

Pursuant to the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended, the Energy Reorganization Act of 1974, as amended, and Section 552 and 553 of Title 5 of the United States Code, notice is hereby given that the following amendments to Title 10, Chapter I, Code of Federal Regulations, Part 50 is published as a document subject to codification.

PART 50 - DOMESTIC LICENSING OF PRODUCTION AND UTILIZATION FACILITIES

1. The authority citation for Part 50 continues to read as follows:

AUTHORITY: Sections 103, 104, 161, 182, 183, 186, 189, 68 Stat. 936, 937, 948, 953, 954, 955, 956, as amended, sec. 234, 83 Stat. 1244, as amended (42 U.S.C. 2133, 2134, 2201, 2232, 2233, 2236, 2239, 2282); secs. 201, 202, 206, 88 Stat. 1242, 1244, 1246, as amended (42 U.S.C. 5841. 5842, 5846), unless otherwise noted.

Section 50.7 also issued under Pub. L 95-601, sec. 10, 92 Stat. 2951 (42 U.S.C. 5851). Sections 50.57(d), 50.58, 50.91, and 50.92 also issued under Pub. L.97-415, 96 Stat. 2071, 2073 (42 U.S.C. 2133, 2239).

Section 50.78 also issued under sec. 122, 68 Stat. 939 (42 U.S.C. 2152).

Sections 50.80-50.81 also issued under sec. 184, 68 Stat. 954, as amended (42 U.S.C. 2234). Sections 50.100-50.102 also issued under sec. 186, 68 Stat. 955 (42 U.S.C. 2236).

For the purposes of Sec. 223, 68 Stat. 958, as amended (42 U.S.C.

2273), SS 50.10(a), (b), and (c), 50.44, 50.46, 50.48, and 50.80(a) are issued under 161b, 68 Stat. 948, as amended (42 U.S.C. 2201(b));

23 Enclosure 1

o

s f -

[7590-01]

$$ 50.10(b) and (c) and 50.54 are issued under sec. 1611, 68 Stat. 949, as amended (42 U.S.C. 2201(1)); and SS 50.55(e), 50.59(b), 50.70, 50.71, 50.72, 50.73, and 50.78 are issued under sec.161o, 68 Stat. 950, as amended (42 U.S.C. 2201(o)).

In Appendix E,Section IV " Content of Emergency Plans" is revised to read as follows:

IV. Content of Emergency Plans The -applicant's emergency plans shall contain, but not necessarily be limited to, information needed to demonstrate compliance with the elements set forth below, i.e., organization for coping with radiation emergencies, assessment action, activction of emergency organization, notification procedures, eme'rgency facilities and equipment, training, maintaining emergency preparedness, and recovery. In addition, the emergency response plans submitted by an applicant for a nuclear power reactor operating license shall contain information needed to demonstrate compliance with the standards described in S 50.47(b), and they will be evaluated against those standards. The nuclear power reactor operating license applicant shall also provide an analysis of the time required to evacuate and for taking other protective actions for various sectors and distances within the plume exposure pathway EPZ for transient and permanent populations.

Likewise, the nuclear power reactor operatina licensee and applicant

! emergency response plans shall assure that the following decisionmaking "This rule change it typed in comparative text in order to assist review.

l 24 Enclosure 1

,e -

[7590-01]

N Ef d(7"l 9 *'/ :

fepianninocapabilitiesexistrelativetothecomplicatingimoactsof s

severe, low frequency natural phenomena that could be expected during i

the life of the plant. The intensity of the event shall be no creater than the design basis for that event.

1. Ability to transport necessary personnel to the plant to cope with degraded modes of plant operation.

2. Ability to communicate to the offsite authorities any plant damage.

3. Ability to obtain damage estimates to the olant. This informa-tion should be available to factor into the decisionmaking process, including recommendations to offsite authorities for protective actions after an earthquake.

, ' , 40J2

4. Offsite authorities shall consider decisionmaking-preplanning 'c/

~-"ss , -

that takes into account various decrees and locations of damage to the '

plant environs.

= * *

Dated at this ___ day of , 1985.

I For the Nuclear Regulatory Commission.

Samuel J. Chilk Secretary of the Commission I

l l

25 Enclosure 1 i

t L* rw a

./ *% UNITED STATES

, *. , "- NUCLEAR. REGULATORY COMMisslON ,,

j 1 j YV ASHINGTON, D. C. 20555 .V K/

..... JUN 131985 W~ h .

MEMORANDUM T0: Distribution FROM: Frank P. Gillespie, Director Division of Risk Analysis and Operations Office of Nuclear Regulatory Research

SUBJECT:

0FFICE REVIEW OF STAFF POSITION RELATING TO COMPLICATING EFFECTS OF EARTHQUAKES ON EMERGENCY PLANNING Cn June 27, 1985, the Subcommittee on Energy Conservation and Power (E. J.

Markey) will hold an oversight hearing relating to the NRC's handling of the possible complicating effects of earthquakes on e:nergency planning for Diablo Canyon.

Based on ED0 directions received at a June 11, 1985 meeting, the staff work on the subject Commission paper has been accelerated. We have been directed to send the paper to the ED0 by June 24. The enclosed saper is the staff's best effort to date and describes three alternatives (1? adopt the proposed rule as a final rule (2) withdraw the proposed rule and leave the issue open for ajudication on a case-by-case basis or (3) issue a final rule which clarifies the original intent of the Comission which might state that emergency response plans shall include an assessment of the complicating n

effects of severe during the lifetimelow of frequency the plant (e.atural g., an phenomena earthquake upthat could to the be expected SSE).

The staff and the ACRS are presently favoring the last alternative.

It is therefore requested that, by COB Monday, June 17, 1985, you provide ]

input to the paper, as well as your agreement er disagreement with the position presented. Office coments will then be consolidated, retyped and resubmitted to you by June 21 and then submitted to EDO on June 24, 1985. J Mike Jamgochian, 443-7615 will be coordinating all office cont,ents.

1 7 s Q

-/ , ,

Trank P. Gillespi , Director Division of Risk Analysis and Operations Office of Nuclear Regulatory Research b g. 7 w a4 4~:r k f9 d F IL cc 6: 1 "YH N-

~m f6cc C+ b pr l,w y &

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4 Distribution H. Denton D. Eiser. hut F. Rowsome V. Stello W. Schwink J. Taylor E. Jordan F. Pagano S. Schwartz D. Matthews D. Rchrer L. Chandler W. Olmstead W. Shields G. Cunningham R. Minogue -

D. P.oss F. Gillespie J. Malaro M. Jamgochian L. Beratan A. Murphy J. itichardson

9 For: The Commissioners From: William J. Dircks Executive Director for Operations

Subject:

FINAL AMENDMENTS TO 10 CFR PART 50, APPENDIX E; CONSIDERATION OF EARTHQUAKES IN THE CONTEXT OF EMERGENCY PREPAREDNESS

Purpose:

To obtain Commission approval for publication in the Federal Register of a final amendment to the regulations that would require limited consideration of the complicating effects of earthquakes in emergency planning.

Category: This paper covers a major policy matter.

Background:

On December 8, 1981, the Commission ruled in a then pending

. adjudication that its emergency planning regulations do not -

require consideration of potential earthquake effects on emer-gency plans for nuclear power reactors. In the Matter of Southern California Edison Comoany, et al. (San Onofre Nuclear Generating' Station, Units 2 and 3), CLI-81-33, 14 NRC 1091 (1981).

In so ruling the Commission stated:

The Commission will consider on a generic basis whether regulations should be changed to address the potential impacts of a severe earthquake on emergency planning. For the interim, the proximate occurrence of an accidental radiological release and an earthquake that could disrupt normal emergency planning appears sufficiently unlikely that consideration in individual licensing proceedings pending generic consideration of the matter is not warranted. 14 NRC at 1092.

The Commission affirmed this position in the Diablo Canyon proceeding. In the Matter of Pacific Gas and Electric Company (Diablo Canyon Nuclear Power Plant, Units 1 and 2), CLI-84-12, 20 NRC (August 10, 1984). In this decision the Commission stated that it would initiate rulem& king "to address whether the potential for seismic impacts on emergency planning is a significant enough concern for large portions of the nation to

Contact:

Mike Jamgochian, RES 443-7615

P r- .

The Commissioners 2 wi.trant the amendment of the regulations to specifically consider those impacts." Slip Opinion at 9. The focus of this rulemaking is to "obtain additional information to determine whether, in spite of current indications to the contrary, cost-effective reductions in overall risk may be obtained by the explicit consideration of severe earthquakes in emergency response planning." Id.

pet %I W <~4f Discussion: On secemb r 21, 1984, ebeng'e to O CFR Partthe 50Commission that relathe %o published a proposed 1trle ergencyglanning anafreparedness a' %,6cti:n end tilp; tion #acilities -/<rpMNM

)

F g]g (49 FR 49640). Thbroposedruledatedthatfeitheremergency response plans nor evacuation time analyses need consider the l impact of earthquakes which cause or occur proximate in time P

h [sh with, an accidental release of radioactive material from a de/ p (,[

nuclear power reactor. These amendments to 10 CFR 50.47 and (N 10CFRPart50AppendixEproposedtoexplicitlyinceg:r:t:['r- )

if /tisia the> interpretation in the C:-- f::' i San Onofre and Diablo V ,-/ # Canyon rulings. 3 2Ws , yf.g ute f WhestIe proposed rule esse published in the Federal Register (49 FR 49640, dated December 21,1984)yM permitted a 30-day comment period. This was then extended until February 27, 1935

, (see 50 FR 3797, dated January 28, 1985).

In the proposed rule, the Commission requested that commentors address the merits of three possible alternative:

1. Adoption of the proposed rule change which would explicitly incorporate the Commission interpretation in San Onofre and V 1 Ojablo Canyon (not to consider the impacts of earthquakes ;

in emergency planning). '

2. Leaving the issue open for adjudication on a case-by-case basis; or

3. Requiring by rule that emergency plans specifically address l the impacts of earthquakes.

l The Commission was also considering whether to include in this l rulemaking tornadoes and other low-frequency natural events.

To date, 61 comment lecters have been received. Twenty five (25) I letters favored the promulgation of the proposed rule. The i majority of these letters were from utilities, consulting firms !

representing utilities, 2 private citizens and the Department of i Energy.

i l

s- . ,

The Commissioners 3 f heJ'-

Thirty-four (34) letters were received which I were against e/

promulgation of the proposed many of dichfvoicieg-- eM strong displeasure, shock or disbelrule, ief as to the direction that the Commission was leaning in the proposed rule.ohenge. The majority of these letters were from private citizens, interven-tion groups and environmental groups. Approximately of these letters were in the signed petition fon; with approximately signatures per letter.

Additional input was also geceived fromg" '^ ' -" ' - ' - . -'--

1 countrie:, all of which stated that the potential complicating :

effects of earthquakes Qa not specifically considered in their )

nuclear oowe reactor eMrcency planninor 11apan, France, sweden) l

@ any and Taiwan, None of the commentors specifically took a position wir.n une second alternative which would leave the issue open for adjudication on a case-by-case basis.

4 All of the commentors tAs1T favored' promulgatior, of the propeised 4

rule into a final rule essentially agreed with the rationa Ctnat y the Commission used in the Federal Register Notice and provided little splificatier er additional c;nceptsei legic which u;uld Wl r4e g#q --

_. .*urthetsupport the proposed rule change. M:n:thelere M ose commentors h e r: :g:in:t the proposed rule r" ;;; pr:vid:d th; C:x.i:: ice "4th ~;r e-t th:t questioned the validity of the rationa in the Federal Register Notice and focused on addi-tional issues that are addressed in the proposed Federal Register Notice (Enci sure 1),-# this -u'a=diruMackage-Alternatives: After careful review of both the 1AD.0 notre and Diablo Canyon e-decisions involving the complicating eTfeFts of' earthquakes on emergency planning, as well ar all public comment R ttm r (*ee N )

ram 1 ting he- the prepered re!e chtn; th:t :::: pdif:hed in the reder:? 9:;i;t:r :n 0; uier 21, 10S", the staff per;;iv:: eM th:t there ext:t: 5 fund:rra+el alternative approaches whicn the Commission may wish to consider: h

,. ~._,_, 4%

t Alternative h Adoption of the proposed rule into a final rule- "neither emergency response plans nor evacuation time nalysis'need consider the impacts of earthquakes."

Pro: 1. Provides for no litigation.

2. Is consistent with what other countries are doing.

3. Is consistent with the Commission's San Ono g and l Diablo Canyon decisiong i

s-Con: 1. Provokes outrage by the public because it is perceived

that the Commission is attempting to giffbap

" write-off" earthquakes g4( )jW N & h.T CM #

y a , a a w.zw . r -F~d - sm-

% ,Q p 4 nn-tweAunehM ^**9h. c

b .

b The Commissioners [t 4

(

d

2. PRA ana yses have indicated that earthquakes are among dominfkcausesofcoremeltaccidents,i as een considrred by some commentors irrational to not consider the effects of these same earthquakes on emergency response.

Alternative 2. Adoption of the proposed rule into a final rule with minor but important word changes, for example, "no additional emergency preparedness measures need be established to account for severe, low frequency natural phenomena than is already required in 10 CFR 50.47 and Appendix E."

Pro: 1. Provides for no litigation.

2. The modified wurding does not arbitrarily focus on earthquakes.

3. The modified wording gives the perception that reasonable plans for coping with severe natural phenomena are already in place. ,' C- 7 peste, -

Con: 1. The public may ealiz that we are doing nothing as a result of tne put, other than modifying words.

Alternative 3. Leaving the issue open for adjudication on a case-by-case basis; accomplished by withdrawing the proposed rule or by requiring consideration of earthquakes.

Pro: Ok~tt pulln c49~ O W-Con: 1. Unnecessarily prolongs the licensing process.

2. The litigation has no bounds--i.e., strength of bridges and roads may be litigated.

pM % Alternative 4. Promulgate a final rule which might state that

.g W M fgr " State earthquake preparedness planning shall take into account L all nuclear power plants within its boundaries. In so doing, t

p-5 the Commission finds that this would provide reasonable assurance that adequate protective measures can and will be l

w/ ^rg4 $ g3 6 taken."

f Pro: 1. Blends the nuclear power plant in with other 4 industries.

(V a Uk- 2. Provides comparable protection to the public relative to other industries throughout the State.

3. May not require the State to establish additional preparedness around a nuclear power reactor.

P s . .

The Commissioners 5 Con: 1. Because each State's ability to deal with earthquakes is different, the generic finding of reasonable assurance may be inappropriate to make.

&(r c

2. The State's earthquake preparedness program would be k open to litigation end possibly m,uld 6 esa t litiga-Meft and may cause pbte delay in the licensing process.

4 Alternative 5: Promulgate a final rule which clarifie$ the original intent of the Commission and might state that emergency response plans shall assure that the following decisionmaking preplanning capabilities exist relative to the complicating impacts of severe, low frequency natural phenomena that could be expected during the life of the plant.( The intensity of the 45/g-M event shall be no greater than the des 1gn basis for that event.')

1. Ability to transport necessary personnel to 5e plant to cope with degraded modes of plant operation.

2. Ability to communicate to the offsite authorities any plant damage.

3. Ability to obtain % to the plant. This information should be available to factor into the decision-making process, including recommendations to offsite authorities for protective actions after severe, low frequency natural phenomena, bg &

JM g Offsite authorities should consider decisionmaking. .g / cI*

fb f6 preplanning that takes into account various degrees and locations of damage to the plant environs.

Pro: 1. Limits litigation.

w: +6'f,

2. This would be a clarif..:t :a '"la % ;e, thus the Commission would not be seen as ch:.gfag its dectrien:.

a tter.% re f m t ." .

3. This is a compromise position between not requiring consideration of earthquakes and requiring consideration.

4. This includes all natural phenomena.

5. This consideration has already been done at San Onofre and Diablo Canyon.

6. This assessment is not that difficult or expensive to accomplish.

Con: 1. May permit some litigation of the adequacy of assessment performed.

s , ,

5 0 The Comissioners 6

2. May open litigati operatingreactorh.

v [ ev [ Having considered all of the above, as well a a

, received, past ooertting reactor and emergency preparedness experiences and the ACRS coments, the staff recommends that A ( N, a final rule be promulgated that would embrace the concepts of Alternative 5. This final rule would:

1. Clarify and articulate the Comission original concept of specifying what flexibility is required in emergency plans in order to assure that there exists ..." reasonable assurance that appropriate protective actions can and will be taken..."

to mitigate (not eliminate) the consequences of a radio-logical accident.

2. Assure the capability to transport necessary personnel to the plant to cope with the degraded modes of plant operation.

3. Assure the capability to comunicate to the offsite authorities any plant damage.

4. Assure the capability to obtain plant damage estimates.

5. Assure that offsite authorities consider decisionmaking preplanning that takes into account various degrees and locations of offsite damage resulting from severe, low frequency natural phenomena.

This staff recomendation would specifically not require:

1. Evacuation time estimates that consider the complicating effects of severe, low frequency natural phenomena.

2. That roads, bridges, buildings and other structures be reinforced to withstand the effects of severe, low frequency natural phenomena.

l-FEMA Coordination: Because FEMA is directly involved in the evaluation of offsite

! emergency preparedness and would be affected by the promulgation of these amendments, the NRC staff has kept the FEMA staff advised on the development of this per. Based on this inter-action, FEMA has concurred in sta commended source of action. '

1

- - , ._ ..n, . - - - ,,- .-.

r s

The Commissioners 7 Cost Estimate: The staff anticipates no significant cost impact on lice.nees, or State and local governments as a result of promulgation of this final rule,chegc.-

Recommendations: 1. Approve for publication in the Federal Register a notice .

of final rulemaking (Enclosure 1) to 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix E to be effective 30 days after publication.

2. Note:

(a) That appropriate Congressional committees will be notified of the rule change (Enclosure 2).

(b) That the ACRS is being informed of the rule change.

(c) That, pursuant to 10 CFR S 51.5(d)(3) of the Commission's regulations, an environmental impact statement, negative declaration, or environmental impact appraisal need not be prepared in connection with the subject final rule change because there is no substantive or significant environmental impact.

(d) That pursuant to the Regulatory Flexibility Act of

& g( 1980, the Federal Register Notice contains a statement L

$ig p 1

that the Commission certifies that this final rule will not have a significant economic impact on a ig 1)r 4 j

substantial number of small entities, and a copy of this certification will be forwarded to the Chief 5tz, g Counsel for Advocacy, SBA, by the Division of Rules and Records, ADB.

(e) That the Federal Register Notice contains a statement

' that, pursuant to the Papenvork Reduction Act of 1380, the NRC has made a determination that the rule change does not impose new recordkeeping, information collec-tion, or reporting requirements.

(f) That the Federal Register Notice will be sent by TIDC, ADM, to affected applicants, licensees, and persons that commented on the proposed rule.

(g) That a public announcement of the final rule change will be made.

(h) That the staff recommends this Commission paper be placed in the POR.

(i) That a Regulatory Analysis is attached as Enclosure 3.

J-O The Commissioners 8 Sunshine Act: Recommend consideration at an open meeting.

Scheduling: For early considerations.

William J. Dircks Executive Director for Operations

Enclosures:

Federal Register Notice of Final Rule Change to 10 CFR, Part 50, Appendix E Regulatory Analysis Draft Congressional Letter ACRS Letter dated August 11, 1983 FEMA Final Regulation; 44 CFR 350

. Federal Register Notice of Final l

Rule Change to 10 CFR, Part 50, Appendix E which is identical to the published proposed rule change.

Federal Register Notice of a Proposed Rule Change to 10 CFR, Part 50, Appendix E which is totally consis-tent with FEMA regulation 44 CFR 350.

1 l

w + - n - -

w

[7590-01]

a luq" uunt pr*f'AN W'"

y,~prefnm* +-FW%* W",-

NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION 10 CFR Part 50 Emergency Planning and Preparedness AGENCY: Nuclear Regulatory Commission.

M

@ g/c pc(W WM M ACTION: Final rule.

Uf

SUMMARY

The Commission is amending its regulation te 10 C."R rart 50 -

i n de. Loassurethat[decisionmaking preplanningcapabilitiefexist i

!:::! ;:;;r ::r.t: t :::::: th: relative to the complicating impacts of severej low frequency, natural phenomena on emergency preparedness. The A

g '

Commission anticipates that this final regulation will not have'significant impact on emergency preparedness requirements than those established by p/* the August 1980 emergency planning requirements ( FR ) but p willprovideclarificationastotheCommission'soriginalintentknthe San 2nofre and Diablo Canyon full power licensing decisiong s

EFFECTIVE DATE: [ Insert 30 days after publication in the Federal Register.]

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: Michael J. Jamgochian, Division 9f Risk )

l Analysis and Operations, Office of Nuclear Regulatory Research, U.S. !

1 Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Washington, OC 20555, Telephone (301)443-7615.

I l

1 Enclosure 1

.. 1

[7590-01] l SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION: On December 21, 1984, the Commission published a 9 aproposedrulecheng.to10CFRPart50th.rel:n.__tepergency/lann- t atmuld /2nW nWr .

ingandgreparednessatPreicticnendutil;Liesrecilit;n (49 FR 49640).

Theproposedrulestatefthatneitheremergencyresponseplansnor evacuation time analyses need consider the impact of earthquakes' which l

cause an occur proximate in time with, an accidental release of radioac-tive material from a nuclear power reactor. Theseansendmentsto10CFR9 / ,

50.47 and 10 CFR Part 50y AppendjxjE proposed to explicitly incorporate '

@ Co*75W g/

g' in them the interpretation jn the C-- '--#aa San Onofre and Diablo Canyon __

g

/ 'ffCMTYQ Alt ( ,W$

ca.re t'.

On December 8,1981, the Commission ruled in a then-pending adjudica- [

tion that its emergency planning regulations do not require consideration of potential earthquake effects on emergency plans for nuclear power reactors. In the Matter of Southern California Edison Comoany, et al.

San Onofre Nuclear Generating Station, Units 2 and 3), CLI-81-33,14 NRC 1091 (1981). In so ruling the Commission stated:

The Commission will consider a generic basis whether regulations should be changed to address the potential impacts of a severe

~

earthquake on emergency planning. For the interim, the proximate occurrence of an accidental radiological release and an earth-i quake that could disrupt normal emergency planning appears sufficiently unlikely that consideration in individual licensing proceedings pending generic co'isideration of the matter is not warrantert. (14 NRC at 1092.)

2 Enclosure 1

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[7590-01]

The Commission recently affirmed this position in the Diablo Canyon proceeding. In the Matter of Pacific Gas and Electric Cemoany (Diablo Canyon Nuclear Power Plant, Units 1 and 2), CLI-84-12, 20 NRC N Af' (August 10, 1984), petition for review ipi San Luf ts Obisoo Mot 5 prs fnr Peace v. NRC (D.C. Cir. No. 84-1410). In th'is decision the Commission stated that it would initiate rulemaking "to add:'ess whether tha potential for seismic impacts on emergency planning is a significant enough concern for large portions of the nation to warrant the amendment of the regulations to specifically consider those impacts. The chief focus of the rulemaking was to obtain additional information to determine whether, in spite of current indications to the contrary, cost-effective reductions in overall risk may be obtained by the explicit consideration of severe earthquakes in emergency response planning." ,

511; Opinie o b '2d A/M <f 2.5% 2 7.

./ / When the h posed rule was published.i t.a Federal Register '

N \

f (49 FR 49640, dated December 21, 1984), it permitted a 30-day comment f/ period, this was then e ended until February 27, 1985 (see 50 FR 3797,

.Ja gd January 28, 1985). _N In the proposed rule, the Commission requested that commentors a1 dress the merits of three possible alternative:

1. Adoption of the proposed rule change which would explicitly incorporate the Commission interpretation in San Onofre and Diablo Canyon (not to consider the impacts of earthquakes in ,

emergency planning).

2. Leaving the issue open for adjudication on a case-by-case basis; or 3 Enclosure 1

~

[7590-01]

3. Requiring by rule that emergency plans specifically address the impacts of earthquakes.

The Cammission was also considering whether to include in this rule-making tornadoes and other low-frequency natural events.

To date, 61 comment letters have been received. Twenty five (25) letters favored the promulgation of the proposed rule. The majority of these letters were from utilities, consulting firms representing utilities, 2 private citizens and the Department of Energy.

Thirty-four (34) letters were received which were against W

promulgaticn of the proposed rule, many of w M eh, voic SA wg strong displeasure, shock or disbelief as to the direction that the Commission was leaning in the proposed rule,ch= g: The majority of these letters were from private citizens, intervention groups and environmental groups. Approximately of these letters were in the signed petition form with approximately signatures per letter.

b Additional input was also received from the following foreign v y countries, all of which stated that the potential complicating effects of earthquakes was not specifically considered in their nuclear power

/ reactor emergency planning: Japan, France, Sweden, Germany and Taiwan.

None of the commentors specifically took a position with the alternative l to leave the issue open for adjudication on a case-by-case basis.

All of the commentors that favored promulgation of the proposed rule into a final rule essentially agreed with the rational that the Commission used in the Federal Register Notice and provided little amplification or additional conceptual logic which would further support the proposed rule change. Nonetheless, those commentors that were 1

l 4 Enclosure 1 t

l

. l

[7590-01]

. I i

against the proposed rule change provided the Commission with arguments

{

} that questioned the validity of the rational in the Federal Register l j Notice and focused on additional issues that will be addressed in this Federal Register Notice.

17 .

A compilation of these issues with an accompanying Commission J response follows: j gnM Issue 1. There ) concerning the flexibility of emergency plaas,4e-:r;;crt the prepered rule, 4herefore, the Commission cannot make a generic finding that effects of below-SSE-earthquakes on emergency planning are always resolved by the general flexibility of emergency plans.

~ _ _ _ _ _ _ _

N Commission Response . To 3 c_ f/%m Issue 2. The proposed rule violates the NRC's emergency planning principle of planning for accidents ranging from design basis accidents to core-melt accidents, with the capacity to reduce the consequences of even the most severe accidents.

Commission Response /,/ To h [N ,j 4 4 g2

. N

)

h Issue 3. Emergency planning should focus on accident consequences and accident initiators not just the consequences of potential accidents.

5 Enclosure 1 r

~

o .

~

[7590-01]

~ ^N . .

/ m Commissinn Response ,

Io eb h, W h <M. /

1

\

Issue 4. Like all other safety systems, seismically qualified equip-ment must also be assumed to fajl.for-purposes _ of emergency planning.

/

/ ' 8 s

D/

Commission Response .' To h h,m s '

Issue 5. Emergency /lanningmustincludethecomplicatingeffects of earthquakes up to and beyond SSE levels.

Commission Resoonse The magnitude of the SSE and the adequacy of a plant's design to meet the SSE are reviewed by NRC and ,treay be cr:I 4. Y. everted in adjudica ceedings, but, once settled, should not be reconsidered in reviewing or adjudicating emergency planning issue 5a1 Age 7e'a'rdq~uakewerec Qderedfeasib1_e,thenalargerSSEwouldhavebeenestablishedyIfan earthquake smaller than an SSE were considered to be capable of damaging i

a plant's safety systems, then the plant's design would have been corrected.

Thus, emergency plans need not take into account earthquakes larger or smaller than an SSE. Nevertheless, the basis for emergency planning is not constrained by the design basis for a plant, and emergency planning effort recognize the possibility that events considered beyond the design basis can occur. A spectrum of potential consequences independent of the particular causes are analyzed in reaching decisions on emergency plann-p\thtI f71 p p ff f( 417 aM g'gh t .

yc{L 6 Enclosure 1

7

[7590-01]

ing provisions, and the planning basis does not depend upon the particular scenario which may lead to significant offsite releases.of radioactivity.

Issue 6. The Commission's fundamental obligation is to determine whether " adequate protective measures can and will be taken in the event of a radiological emergency." 10 CFR S 50.47(a). If circumstances pre- :

vent the NRC from finding that emergency plans can provide that assurance, it must deny the license.

i l

Commission Response TheCommissionagreesthatiftheNRCcannotmakethehdingthat

"...there is reasonable assurance that adequate protective measures can and will be taken in the event of a radiological emergency" to mitigate (no,t, eliminate) the consequences of an accident, the operating license must be denied. Various governmental authorities, consu , and members of the public have argued that an emergency plan cannot be developed that would eliminate public health risk from all of the possible reactor accidents even in conjunction with severe, low frequency natural phenomena.

However, since complete elimination of all risk is not N taQy possible, it h et -the intent ei- the NRC's emergency preparedness regula-d** 4 /*

tions W ensure that no : : *- the ,.2"c would receive a dose in excess of the EPA protective action guidelines (PAGs) for any accidental release, regardless of timing or severity.

tfk there

e. are many uncertainties associated with potential accidentsyand that emergency preparedness is not a panacea for eliminating all risk,te-

-tt.: cubli e.

7 Enclosure 1

g *

[7590-01]

f 9

The objective of the NRC emergency preparedness regulations is to b pt reduce the risk to the public health and safety by planning in advance

[ , how to respond to nuclear power plant accidents.

The NRC would not license a plant if the radiological risk posed by ,

possible accidents were not ve y small - even in the absence of emergency preparedness. Nevertheless, the NRC has chosen to require emergency pre-paredness as another level of " defense-in-depth," the principal that a variety of independent and diverse ! eve! Of pret:: tier should be +4ck :fford:d-h prow nim ~>

the public from the hazard of radiation exposure. The NP.C believes that reasonable efforts' to anticipate and plan for public protective actions in the vicinity of a commercial nuclear plant can substantially reduce, though not eliminate, the already small offsite radiological risk, and is,therefore,aprudentisnotessentialrequirement.[

l--O j%:Ac ~(v%. h4 W l* M > D f

Co&& W M ypma 7 pw m a ~+ -

q A ny y Sg , We.as.~

a c_ Me. SAM'.

Issue 7. Inasmuch as seismic PRA analysis has indicated that earth-quakes are among dominant causes of core melt accidents, it is irrational to ignore the effects that these same earthouskes can have on emergency response., s

_d,W _

N f* ,' do prut alsmic ran on iy Ws g indicatsj that earthquakes are a major contributor to core melt accidents. However recent evid "N suggests that these PRA investigations embodied pessimistic estimates of structural and component failure levels, and that when more realistic failure levels are used, the significance of the earthquake threat diminishes. This appears to be trae even when aging and degradation effects are considered. Moreover, t above cited studies found that

/ _

=

Q k >-Jc 1% Enclosure 1 1f '

fds.

.% ues~y. W w sa.u

.- [7590-01]

only very improbable earthquakes with motions several times the-weep 1 e O pr design basis motions could cause serious accidents. Major earthquakes have to date not caused distress to nuclear power plants either in the United States or elsewhere. NRC efforts are currently underwaytobetterdefinefneededinputstoseismicPRAstudieswhichis the past were based on conservative subjective judgments. It is noted thateventhe[earthseismicPRAs,\withtheirsuspectedconservativebias, filas not yielded hnacceptably high core melt probabilities.

It is the staff's position that early seismic PRA were not sufficiently validated for licensing decisionmaking, and that such validation must be expedited. Preliminary finding from ongoing work point toward excessive conservatisms being introduced in the estimated l

failure levels used in the early work.

With thfsc. studies in mind, the Commission nonetheless never intended to give the preception that we were " ignoring" the complicating effects -

of earthquakes on emergency response. Therefore, the enclosed final rule is to clarify and particulate the Commission's original intend of specifying what flexibility is required in emergency plans in order to assure that there exists reasonable assurance that appropriate protec-tive actions can and will be taken to mitigate (not eliminate) the consequences of a radiological accident.

Issue 8. Defects in seismic design and quality assurance in construc- I tion have consistently undermined the soismic strength of plant systems and structures.

9 Enclosure 1

[7590-01]

It is thus irrational for the NRC to write off earthquakes as an emergency planning issue at the same time it is exhibiting growing concern regarding the effects of earthquakes an nuclear power plant site.

Commission Response

$.4 A vLe.s.

The assertion in _

~2'b) that there is a growing concern about the ability of nuclear power plants to withstand the effects of large earthquakes is, simply, incorrect. If anything, recent work, based on actual behavior of industrial facilities and their equipment in large 1

earthquakes, leads to the conclusion that more margin against earthquakes !

larger than included in the design basis than was previously thought.

Earthquakes simultaneously affect all plant safety systems and do tend to " search out" design, construction and maintenance errors which could degrade plant safety. In a general way, only very gross errors are of concern since NRC standards and industry codes provide margins against minor to moderate errors. Unfortunately gross errors do occur and are more prevalent than previously believed. Examples are the failure to tie reinforcing steel together in the Trojan control room and using mirror image design drawings a Jiablo Canyon. Also, the comments tend to confuse the regulatory issue of a plant not being built in accordance with the commitments in its license application with the safety issue of earthquake resistance of the plant as built. A discrepancy between as-built and as designed does not, of itself, imply significant degradation as seismic resistance. In fact, some of the changes might well enhance seismic resistance. However, the burden of justifying that the as-built plant is adequate resets with the 10 Enclosure 1

[7590-01]

licensee. One cannot assume, a prior, that resistance is either better or worse.

Issue 9. The use of anteliable seismic design bases is flawed and therefore its use as a basis for rulemaking is inappropriate.

While uncertainties do exist in estimating the behavior of structures, systems and components subjected to seismic effects, these uncertainties are explicitly treated in the design process through the introduction of conservatisms in the procedures. The end product tends to reflect an over design against earthquakes, sometimes to the extent that inservice inspection is degraded as is normal plant operation. Current research activities in seismic design of nuclear power plants is directed toward:

achieving greater realism through the removal of unneeded and undesirable seismic conservatism when it reduces overall plant reliability. Thus, present seismic bases may only be flawed in that they afford an overprotec- i tion against infrequently occurring earthquakes, while introducing negative performance aspects for routine operation.

Issue 10. Even if a reactor is designed to withstand tarthquakes of a certain magnitude, an earthquake can indirectly lead to an accident by causing operator error. Thus, operators may react to the trauma of l l

an earthquake and the distraction of fluctuating instruments by making mistakes that lead to serious accidents 11 Enclosure 1

I

[7590-01] 1

. i Commission Resoonse l l

1 The NRC has conducted extensive research relative to this issue, the l l

purpose of which was to determine if conditions of psychological stress induced by emergency conditions in a nuclear power plant have a signifi-cant adverse effect on operator performance of typical tasks required during plant emergencies. To this end, two technical tasks were under-taken: (1) the technical findings from prior research studies of human .

performance under stress were reviewed and evaluated, and (2) an experiment I was performed with 24 trained reactor operators under varying conditions of psychological stress to measure the effectiveness of their decisionmaking and responses for different reac+.or operational requirements.

)

l Findings from existing technical literature indicate specific factors important to operator perfo mar.ce under stress. These factors are: i l

1 l

Perceptual narrowing, which can restrict the operator's under-standing of stressful conditions and the subsequent ability to !

respond appropriately to them; Cognitive rigidity, which can restrict the cognitive capacities of operators to analyze, evaluate, and plan alternative courses l of action in response to the stressful conditions; Changes in the nominal degree of correctness of decisions arrived at by the individual or by the group; )

1 Reliance on prior training and the mental set such training providas; Enhanced role and importance of centralized authority to the operator in responding to the stressful conditions; 12 Enclosure 1

[7590-01]

Some distortion of information provided about the stressful conditions and their effects by individuals and by the group; Response perseveration, or the tendency to repeat actions which are ineffectual or to make responses which are not appropriate to the stressful conditions.

The experiment involved three stress related variables to assess their effects on operator decisionmakina under stress. Workload (i.e.,

amount of time to perform), conflicting information (i.e. , background noise and voices), and the level of detail in available written proce-dures were manipulated as three stressors. Decisionmaking performance was evaluated by the correct selection of actions to mitigate twelve emergency scenarios which could result from a seismic event at a pres-surized water reactor. Operators responded to each scenario by select-ing from a response list of specific actions to be taken immediately, or subsequently, or nonapplicable. Also, certain personality variables of the operators, related to decisionmakina performance under stress I were assessed and correlated.

I Results from the experiment with reactor operators revealed:

I l

Operators under stress perform better under lower levels of workload; T

13 Enclosure 1

\ c

. [7590-01]

Availability of detailed procedures may supplement operator performance and decisionmaking such that negative effects of psychological stress are reduced; Operators selected significantly more actions correctly in the presence of high conflicting information, relative to low conflicting information; Theinteracticasofconflictinginformationwithprocedures, and conflicting information with workload, suggest a complex relationship between utress variables and decisionmaking performance; Specific operator personality characteristics were found to be related to enhance decisionmakina under stress; Operators having an internal locus of control (i.e., those who perceived reward as contingent on their behavior) perform better under stress than those having an external locus of control (i.e., those who perceive reward as independent of their behavior);

Operators who have coped successfully with many past stressful experiences perform better under stress than those who have coped with fewer past stressful situations; 14 Enclosure 1

[7590-01]

. 1 Operator response to stress may be affected by their general level of anxiety, their degree of emotional exhaustion, feelings of depersonalization, and feelings about personal accomplishments.

Analysisofthesefindingsfromtheliterature$ndfromtheoperator experiments identified general measures for decreasina the effects of stress. These are: (1) training programs geared to develop operator knowledge,, characteristics, and coping mechanisms which will enhance operator performance under stressful conditions; (2) training programs and procedures which are compatible with the response characteristics of operators experiencing stress; and (3) awareness by supervisors, manage-ment and operating personnel of operator characteristics which are .

related to decisionmaking performance under stress. Specific measures that are now being used as a result of this research are:

Training and drills which establish mental set (i.e., an expectant attitude within the operator) toward the mitigation of an emeroency and the reduction of high stress; t

Establishing procedures which optimize individual workload dur-ing emergencies while maintaining individual responsibility; I

l Effective display presentations of critical information in the control room, with displays designed for a narrowed range of cue utilization by operators during emergencies; r

15 Enclosure 1

[7590-01] }

l Ensuring that procedures are compatible with operator reliance on established authority and centralization of authority during .

emergencies; Providing procedures compatible with restrictive cognitive and problem solving processes; Providing formal training of operator strategies in broadened proble'm solving techniques, novel problem solving, and decision reassessment; Training in information management, and procedures geared to reduce information distortion and to improve the flow and communication of critical information; .

Frequent drills that will help operators over-learn effective procedures and will allow practice in novel problem solving and decision reassessment. This includes opportunities to exhibit effective coping with such problems as part of the l drills (especially if the drills are somewhat stressful) in order to help operators cope with future stressful events; 1

Train personnel to view plant conditions and problem solving from a standpoint of internal locus of control (i.e. , such that the operator performs because his/her performance is perceived 16 Enclosure 1

[7590-01]

e as effectual and rewarding) in conjunction with the plant management's administrative policies; Train shift supervisors and plant managers to be aware of personality factors in their crews which could negatively affect decisionmaking and performance under high stress.

Supervisors could use this information to structure the control room personnel into the most effective decision unit possible by deployment of individual responsibility, work assignment, and tailor-made training programs and drills; Incorporation of findings relating operator personality characteristics to performance under stress ir. a career selection cuide for prospective operators.

Issue 11. Emergency Plans are unique, for example, a rural ai-sparsely populated area may pose fewer evacuation problems, and thus require less flexibility, than an urban and densely populated plant site.

Thus, emergancy plans cannot be found to possess the same degree of -

" flexibility" in every case, Commission Response .' T() be [vmMd Issue';. Earthquakes are distinct phenomena the following distinct featuras of earthquakes are:

--Sirens and broadcasting systems could be knocked down and roads could be severely obstructed in an earthquake.

17 Enclosure 1

\ .

. [7590-01]

--Although sheltering may be presumed to be available in almost any other type of natural event, it could be rendered useless by an earthquake.

--An earthquake is likely to disrupt the distribution of water, natural gas, and gasoline, thus causing fires and impeding the efforts of firefighters.

--An earthquake is likely to impair or destroy the ability to monitor potential radiation releases and meteorological conditions.

--An earthquake can damage transportation routes by collapse of bridges and overpasses, liquefaction of roads, and landslides.

--An earthquake can cause the collapse of structures (including those housing personnel directing the emergency planning effort, relocation and decontamination facilities, and local agency services) or render sheltering useless due to damage.

--An earthquake is likely to cause a loss of offsite power, with its attendant effect on communications, as well as to potentially render useless other (backup) methods of communication such as radio transmissions.

--An earthquake is likely *.o cause physical and fright-induced (e.g. , heart attack) injuries, thereby overloading medical facilities and ambulance and rescue services.

Commission Response '

To $5 fw 1 Issue 13. FEMA's emergency plans do not adequately provide for earthquake response in a radiological emergency.

18 Enclosure 1

, [7590-01]

Commission Response Ik .b .s y ,

4 FEMA has an active program of earthquake preparedness which includes hazards and vulnerability analysis, estimates of damage and casualties, planning for Federal response to a major earthquake, and assistance to State and local. governments in their earthquake planning and preparedness activities. The Commission and FEMA believe that all of these activities are sufficiently flexible to complement each other in preparing for an event that may require a concurrent response to a major earthquake and a serious accident at a nuclear power plant.

9~~,,w m #

Having considered all of the above, as well as all comments received, (9f u cuo past operating reactor and emergency preparedness experiences, and the ACRS comments, the Commission has determined that a final fuel be promul-gated that would.

1. Clarify and articulate the Commission's original concept of specifying what flexibility is required in emergency plans in order to assure that there exists "... reasonable assurance that appropriate protec-tive actions can and will be taken..." to mitigate (not eliminate) the consequences of a radiological accident.

2. Assure the capability to transport necessary personnel to the plant to cope with the degraded modes of plant operation.

3. Assure the capability to communicate to the offsite authorities any plant damage.

4. Assure the capability to obtain plant damage estimates. l l

1 l

. 19 Enclosure 1 I

, [7590-01]

5. Assure that offsite authorities consider decisionmaking preplanning that takes into account various degrees and locations of offsite damage resielting from severe, low frequency natural phenomena.

This staff recommendation would specifically not require:

1. Evacuation time estimates that consider the complicating effects of severe, low frequency natural phenomena.

2. That roads, bridges, buildings and other structures be reinforced to withstand the effects of severe, low frequency natural phenomena.

Because FEMA is directly involved in the evaluation of offsite emer-gency preparedness exercises and is affected by the promulgation of these amendments, the NRC consulted extensively with FEMA during the development of this rule and as a result has concurred in the rule change.

FINDING OF NO SIGNIFICANT ENVIRONMENT IMPACT The Commission has determined under the National Environmental Policy Act of 1969, as amended, and the Commission's regulations in Subpart A of 10 CFR Part 51, that this rule, is not a major Federal action significantly affecting the quality of the human environment and therefore an environ-mental impact statement is not required. See 10 CFR 50.22(a)(1). More-over, the Commission has determined, pursuant to 10 CFR 51.32, that the final rule has no significantly environmental impact. This determination has been~made because the Commission cannot idertify any impact on the 20 Enclosure 1

, [7590-01]

human environment associated with limited decisionmaking preplanning relating to the complicating effects of severe, low frequencies natural phenomena on emergency preparedness.

The alternative approaches that were considered in this rulemaking proceedings were: ;

1. Not to consider the complicating effects of earthquakes on emergency plans or evacuation time estimates.

2. To not require additional emergency preparedness measures to cope with the complicating effects of earthquakes.

3. Leave the complicating effects of earthquakes on emergency planning open to consideration on a case-by-case basis.

4. Requiring that State Earthquake Preparedness take into account all nuclear power plants within their boundaries.

5. Promulgate a clarification rule change which would limit the assessment of the complicating effects of severe, low frequency natural phenomena to certain decisionmaking preplanning capabilities.

PADERWORK REDUCTION ACT STATEMENT The final rule contains no information collection requirements and therefore is not subject to the requirements of the Paperwork Reduction Act of 1980 (44 U.S.C. 3501 et seq.).

REGULATORY ANALYSIS The Commission has prepared a regulatory analysis of this regulation.

The analysis examines the costs and benefits of the rule as considered by 21 Enclosure 1

. ~ . - - - _ . . -- - - - - -- -- --

o. .

[7590-01]

the Commission. A copy of the regulatory analysis is available for inspec-4 tion and copying, for a fee, at the NRC Public Document Room, 1717 H Street NW., Washington, DC. Single copies of the analysis may be obtained from Michael T. Jamgochian, Office of Nur. lear Regulatory Research, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Washington, DC 20555, Telephone (301)443-7615.

REGULATORY FLEXIBILITY CERTIFICATION In accordance with the Regulatory Flexibility Act of 1980, 5 U.S.C.

S 605(b), the Commission hereby certifies that this final rule will not, if promulgated, have a significant economic impact on a substantial number of small entities. The final rule clarifies certain elements and findings necessary for the issuance of an operating license for a nuclear power plant licensed pursuant to Section 103 and 104b of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended, 42 U.S.C. 2133, 2134b. The electric utility companies which own and operate nuclear power plants are dominant in their service areas and do not fall within the definition of a small business found in Section 3 of the Small Business Act, 15 U.S.C. 632, or within the Small Business Sizs Standards set forth in 13 CFR Part 121. Accordingly, there is no significant economic impact on a substantial number of small entities under the Regulatory Flexibility Act of 1980.

LIST OF SUBJECTS IN 10 CFR PART 50 i

Part 50 - Antitrust, Classified information, Fire prevention, Incorporation by reference, Intergovernmental relations, Nuclear power 22 Enclosure 1

, [7590-01]

plants and reactors, Penalty, Radiation protection, Reactor siting criteria, Reporting and recordkeeping requirements.

Pursuant to the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended, the Energy Reorganization Act of 1974, as amended, and Section 552 and 553 of Title 5 of the United States Code, notice is hereby given that the following amendments to Title 10, Chapter I, Code of Federal Regulations, Part 50 is published as a document subject to codification.

PART 50 - DOMESTIC LICENSING OF PRODUCTION AND UTILIZATION FACILITIES

1. The authority citation for Part 50 continues to read as follows:

AUTHORITY: Sections 103, 104, 161, 182, 183, 186, 189, 68 Stat. 936, 937, 948, 953, 954, 955, 956, as amended, sec. 234, 83 Stat. 1244, as amended (42 U.S.C. 2133, 2134, 2201, 2232, 2233, 2236, 2239, 2282); secs. 201, i

202, 206, 88 Stat. 1242, 1244, 1246, as amended (42 U.S.C. 5841, 5842, 5846), unless otherwise noted.

Section 50.7 also issued under Pub. L 95-601, sec.10, 92 Stat. 2951 (42 U.S.C. 5851). Sections 50.57(d), 50.58, 50.91, and 50.92 also issued under Pub. L.97-415, 96 Stat. 2071, 2073 (42 U.S.C. 2133, 2239).

Section 50.78 also issued under sec. 122, 68 Stat. 939 (42 U.S.C. 2152).

1 Sections E0.80-50.81 also issued under sec.184, 68 Stat. 954, as amended (42 U.S.C. 2234). Sections 50.100-50.102 also issued under sec.186, 68 Stat. 955 (42 U.S.C. 2236).

For the purposes of Sec. 223, 68 Stat. 958, as amended (42 U.S.C.

2273), SS 50.10(a), (b), and (c), 50.44, 50.46, 50.48, and 50.80(a) are issued under 161b, 68 Stat. 948, as amended (42 U.S.C. 2201(b)); l 23 Enclosure 1

i .

[7590-01]

55 50.10(b) and (c) and 50.54 are issued under sec. 1611, 68 Stat. 949, as amended (42 U.S.C. 2201(i)); and SS 50.55(e), 50.59(b), 50.70, 50.71, 50.72, 50.73, and 50.78 are issued under sec.161o, 68 Stat. 950, as 4

amended (42 U.S.C. 2201(o)).

i In Appendix E,Section IV " Content of Emergency Plans" is revised to read as follows:

IV. Content of Emergency Plans The applicant's emergency plans shall contain, but not necessarily be limited to, information needed to demonstrate compliance with the elements set forth below, i.e. , organization for coping with radiation emergencies, asses ?nt action, activation of emergency organization, notification procedures, emergency facilities and equipment, training, maintaining emergency preparedness, and recovery. In addition, the i

emergency response plans submitted by an applicant for a nuclear power reactor operating license shall contain information needed to demonstrate compliance with the standards describer; in S 50.47(b), and they will be evaluated against those standards. The nuclear power reactor operating license applicant shall also provide an analysis of the time required to evacuate and for taking other protective actions for various sectors and

{ distances within the plume exposure pathway EPZ for transient and permanent 4

populations.

Likewise, the nuclear cower reactor operating licensee and applicant emergency response plans shall assure that the following decisionmakino

This rule change it typed in comparative text in order to assist review.

24 Enclosure 1 p

e 8

[7590-01]

preplannina capabilities exist relative to the complicatina impacts of severe. low frequency natural phenomena that could be expected durina the life of the plant. The intensity of the event shall be no creater I

than the desian basis for that event. l

1. Ability to transport necessary personnel to the plant to cope with dearaded modes of plant operation.

2. Ability to communicate to the offsite authorities any plant danace.

3. Ability to obtain damaae estimates to the plant. This informa-tion should be available to factor into the decisionmaking process, includina recommendations to offsite authorities for protective actions after an earthquake.

4. Offsite authorities shall consider decisionmaking preplannina that takes into account various degrees and locations of damaae to the plant environs.

e e a a a l

Dated at this day of , 1985. '

For the Nuclear Regulatory Commission.

! l Samuel J. Chilk Secretary of the Commissior, i

i 25 Enclosure 1

.- i y .

I l

l' /

Coments on the Draft Final Rule Package: Complicating Effects of Earthquakes on Emergency Planning dated June 20, 1985.

I. General Coments The language in the rule might lead a court to conclude that offsite emergency response facilities and equipment should meet Seismic Category I design standards. This would be a masrive backfit. The Comission paper indirectly implies that this is not the intent. There is an explicit exclusion of roads, bridges, and buildings from seismic upgrades, but it is' not clear that the exclusion applies to, e.g., police or fire stations. Tighter language to avoid this expansive interpretation is

desirable.

The language of the new preplanning capabilities to bc required in the amendment to Part 50 Appendix E appears to be poorly edited and thought .

I through. The case for, or interpretation of, these preplanning features is not discussed in either the Comission paper or the Federal Register notice. This is necessary to establish a record of what they mean.

Particular problems with these new requirements are discussed below.

II.' Amendment to Part 50 Appendix E IV Among the new preplanning capabilities to be required under this amendment, item 2 now reads....

"2. Ability to comunicate to the offsite authorities any plant damage."

It is inappropriate to burden offsite authorities with translating estimates of health hazards from raw technical information on plant damage. This should, instead, obligate licensees to comunicate prognoses (before releases) and estimates (during and after releases) of the health hazards due to the accident at various locations offsite. We need planning standards for accident prognoses and evaluation.

Item 3 now begins....

"3. Ability to obtain damage estimates to the plant." ;

It is unclear who should have this ability--the licensee or the offsite

, authorities. Is it plant damage estimates or health hazard estimates that are really at issue? How does this relate to item 2 above?

$Jf

Item 3 continues....

"This information should be available to factor into the decision-making process, including recommendations to offsite authorities for protective actions after an earthquake."

Who is charged with making reconnendations or protective actions to offsite authorities, the licensee? If so, it should say so. It seems clear that licensees should advise offsite authorities of the health hazards offsite, but less clear that licensees should offer advice on emergency response tactics. Does this entail legal or liability problems? What planning standards constitute adequate preparation to give such advice? What resources will this preparation entail? Why limit the giving of such advice to earthquakes? Why not for reactor accidents of other origin?

Item 4 reads....

"4. Offsite authorities shall consider decision-making preplanning that takes into account...."

What constitutes adequate " consideration"? These prer,lanning capabilities seem vague and open to diverse interpretation, particularly as the package lacks any explanatory material on the interpretation or bases for the four particulars.

III. Comments on the Commission Paper and FRN Supplementary Information A. The Commission Paper, p. 2, promises a further assessment of the cost-effectiveness of the rule. None is given, and the regulatory analysis is absent from the package.

B. Commission Paper, p. 4, Alternative 2.

An additional " con" is the prospect of litigating what

" additional" means vs. what the existing regulations imply.

C. Commission Paper, p. 5. Alternative 4.

It may be beyond the NRC's legal authority to promulgate such a rule. In any case, the " cons" do not completely summarize the disadvantages of stretching our regulatory reach so far from licensees' responsibility or authority.

D. FRN, p. 10.

Tia logic for limiting the consideration of earthquakes to the SSE is flawed. The whole point of EP is for beyond-design-basis events.

It is not historically correct to say that if we found undue L. _ a

e -

.s 9

. 3~-

seismic risk, we would raise the SSE. This hapraened in the Indian Point hearing on risk, and, while we fixed the particular vulnerability found by the seismic PRA, we did not raise the SSE.

E. FRN, p. 10-11.

The logic on issue 7 is flawed. The best risk. assessment-based evidence suggests that EP fails as a level of defense-in-depth:

it accomplishes little or no risk reduction.

F. FRN, p. 12.

The sentence, "It should be noted that current seismic PRAs, ....

have not shown unacceptably high core-melt pr.'babilities," is contradicted by the record of the Indian Point hearing, where the staff is on record as saying that the vulnerability of Unit 2 to earthquake-indu4ed severe accidents was unacceptable prior to the licensee's voluntary, PRA-inspired backfits.

. G. FRN, p. 17.

The response to issue 12 is non-responsive in its dismissal of a legitimate concern. ,

' i l

H. FRN, p. 21.

I l

Co.ntrary to the text, not all PWRs can be cooled by " feed and bleed."

l Contrary to the text, not all plants are designed so that the >

batteries can last as long as 4 hours4.62963e-5 days <br />0.00111 hours <br />6.613757e-6 weeks <br />1.522e-6 months <br /> in blackout condition.

} Contrary to the text, the decay heat at one hour is closer to 2% )

than 1%. 1 I. FRN, p. 23.

Contrary to the text, recent PRAs have estimated core damage )

frequencies from 6E-3 to 1E-5/RY. Most are in the range of i 1E-3 to IE-4, as we have told the Congress and the public on many occasions. l a

l NRR ,

6/25/85

O - +' -+

/// i F1/l /

p a :eruq '

<T g jg UNITED STATES M

3 g NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION n j*

-rd wAsHsunton. o. c. 20sss y

~

July 5, 1985 ' g7 ;

+...* ,

l MEMORANDUM FOR: Chairman Palladino Comissioner Asselstine l Comissioner Bernthal !

Comissioner Zech FROM: William J. Dircks Executive Director for Operations

SUBJECT:

CONSIDERATION OF POTENTIAL COMPLICATING EFFECTS OF EARTHQUAKES ON EMERGENCY PLANNING l

The purpose of this mema is to inforu you of our progress and direction in preparation of the subject , final rulemaking package which I plan to submit to you by early August 1985.

On December 21, 1984, the Comission published a proposed rule change to 10 CFR Part 50 that nelates to Emergency Planning and Preparedness at Production and Utilization Facilities (49 FR 49640). The proposed rule stated that neither emergency response plans nor evacuation time analyses need consider the impact of earthquakes which cause or occur proximate in time with an :

accidental release of radioactive material from a nuclear power reactor. 1 To date, 61 coment letters have been received. Twenty five (25) letters

~

%n ra ri tha nrna:Inat4n of the proposed rule. The letters favoring the proposed rule were from utilities, consulting finns representing utilities, 2 private citizens and the Department of Energy.

_ Thirty-four (34) letters opposed promulgation of the proposed rule. Many l voiced strong displea:;ure, shock or disbelief at the position the Comission was taking in the proposed rule change. The majority of these letters were from private citizer.s, and environmental groups.

Additional input was also received from Japan, France, Sweden, Germany and Taiwan, all of which stated that the potential complicating effects of earthquakes were not specifically considered in their nuclear power reactor

, emergency planning.

Several issues raised in the public cements (and in particular in coments l from The Union of Concerned Scientists) will require substantial technical '

analysis prfor to going forward with promulgation of a final regulation. For i

4 &\ I

4 I .' l l

The Commissioners 2 l l

example the staff needs to: (1) assess whether there are sufficient facts to support the steff's belief that the complicating effects of earthquakes on ,

S emergency plans are adequately taken into account by the flexibility that '

exists in all emergency plans; (2) deal with the issue that defects in seismic design and quality assurance in construction can substantially undermine the seismic strength of plant systems and structures; (3) evaluate the limited existing information on the contribution of seismic events to :

overall core melt risks, recognizing that only a few PRAs sssess seismic

, risks and the treatment entails many uncertainties; (4) deal.with the question very severewhy emergencyi.e.,

earthquakes p(lans 2 to should 4 timesnot theconsider the complicating SSE) whose return frequency effects of is 10E(-4) to 10E(-5) while current emergency plans concern themselves with plant accidents whose estimated return frequency are also in this range.

These complex analyses, which are underway, are not expected to be completed before late July,1985.

After careful review of both the San Onofre and Diablo Canyon decisions regarding the complicating effects of earthquakes on emergency planning, as

. well as the issues identified above, the staff is considering 3 alternative approaches:

1 Alternative 1: Adoption of the proposed rule into a final rule with minor but important word changes, for example, "no additional emergency prepared-

, ness measures need be established to account for severe, low frequency natural phenomena than is already required in 10 CFR 50.47 and Appendix E."

Alternative 2: 1.eaving the issue open for adjudication on a case-by-case oasis; accompiished by withdrawing the proposed rule or by rsquiring consid-eration of earthquakes.

Alternative 3: Promulgation of a final rule which clarifies the original intent of the Commission to require that emergency response plar.s shall assure that the following capabilities exist relative to the complicating impacts of severe, low frequency natural phenomena.

1. Ability to transport necessary personnel to the plant after the event in order to augment the original staff to cope with degraded modes of plant operation.

~

2. Ability to obtain damage estimates to the plant and to be able to commu-nicate these estimates to offsite authorities. The information should be available to factor into the decisionmaking process, including recc-mmendations for protective actions after severe, low frequency natural phenomena.

3. Emergency plans for offsite authorities should take into account various degrees and locations of damage to the plant environs. This shall be k

t . l

^

l l

The Commissioners 3 l

limited to knowing alternate routes of travel as well as establishing l criteria for determining whether to shelter, relocate or to evacuate, j Having considered all of the above, as well as all comments received, past l operating reactor and emergency preparedness experience, I am leaning toward a recommendation that a final rule be promulgated which would embrace the ,

concepts of Alternative 3. This alternative would be a clarification and l articulation of the Commission's original intent as to what is specifically requircd to assure the necessary flexibility to cope with the complicating effects.of severe, low frequency natural phenomena on emergency planning.

\

/

Willi . Dircks Executive Director for Operations ;

cc: SECY OGC OPE M. Cutchin 1

mm O

9 e

-9 t

ML20198H489

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