ML20198H572
| ML20198H572 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Issue date: | 07/19/1985 |
| From: | Gillespie F NRC OFFICE OF NUCLEAR REGULATORY RESEARCH (RES) |
| To: | Harold Denton, Eisenhut D, Rowsome F NRC |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20197J537 | List: |
| References | |
| FOIA-85-653 NUDOCS 8601310055 | |
| Download: ML20198H572 (50) | |
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JyL lb bd5 MEMORANDUM T0:
Distribution FROM:
Frank P. Gillespie, Director Division of Risk Analysis and Operations Office of Nuclear Regulatory Research
SUBJECT:
OFFICE CONCURRENCE IN STAFF POSITION RELATING TO COMPLICATING EFFECTS OF SEVERE NATURAL PHENOMENA ON EMERGENCY PLANNING On June 11, 1985, the EDO directed the staff to accelerate development on the subject Comission Paper for promulgation of a Final rule. On June 13 and again on June 20, 1985, different versions of the subject paper were distributed to you for review and comment.
Likewise, on July 11 and 12 1985, the Comission met with the Subcomittee on Energy Conservation and Power and the full ACRS, both meetings were to discuss this very controversial issue.
In order to meet an EDO directive to have a final Comission paper to the ED0 by July 31, 1985, it is requested that you provide your input and concurrence with the enclosed paper by COB July 24, 1985.
Frank. Gillespie, Director Division of Risk Analysis and Operations Office of Nuclear Regulatory Research
Enclosure:
As stated 8601310055 051223 PDR FOIA DELLB5-653 PDR
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Distribution H. Denton D. Eisenhut F. Rowsome V. Stello W. Schwink J. Taylor E. Jordan F. Panano S. Schwartz D. Matthews D. Rohrer L. Chandler W. Olmstead W. Shields G. Cunningham R. Minogue D. Ross F. Gillespie J. Malaro M. Jamgochian L. Beratan A. Murphy J. Richardson h
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For:
The Commissioners From:
William J. Dircks i
Executive Director for Operations FINAL AMENDMENTS TO 10 CFR PART 50, APPENDIX E; CONSIDERATION Sub.iect:
OF EARTHQUAKES IN EMERGENCY PLANNING To obtain Commission approval for publication in the Federal I
Purpose:
Register of a final amendment to the regulations that would require limited consideration of the complicating effects of low frequency natural phenomena which would include earth-quakes in emergency planning.
Cateaory:
This paper covers a major policy matter.
On December 8, 1981, the Commission ruled in a then pending Backaround:
adjudication that its emergency planning regulations do not require consideration of potential earthquake effects on emer-gency plans for nuclear power reactors.
Southern California 2
Edison Company, et al.
(San Onofre Nuclear Generating Station, l
Units 2 and 3), CLI-81-33, 14 NRC 1091 (1981). In so ruling the Commission stated:
The Commission will consider on a generic basis whether regulations should be changed to address the potential impacts of a severe earthquake on emergency planning. For the interim, the proximate occurrence of an accidental radiological release and an earthquake that could disrupt normal emergency planning appears sufficiently unlikely that consideration in individual licensing proceedings pending generic consideration of the matter is not i
warranted. 14 NRC at 1092.
The Commission affirmed this position in the Diablo Canyon proceeding. Pacific Gas and Electric Company (Diablo Canyon Nuclear Power Plant, Units 1 and 2), CLI-84-12, 20 NRC 249 10, 1984).
In this decision the Commission stated that (August it would initista rulemaking "to address whether the potential for seismic impacts on emergency planning is a significant enough concern for large portions of the nation to warrant the amendment 3
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Contact:
Mike Jangochian, RES 443-7615 i
6 i
Tae Commissioners 2
of the regulations to specifically consider those impacts."
20 NRC at. 254. The focus of this rulemaking is to "obtain
.idditional information to determine whether, in spite of current indications to the contrary, cost-effective reductions in overall risk may be obtained by the explicit consideration of severe earthquakes in emergency response planning."
I_d. at 254-255.
Discussion:
On December 21, 1984, the Commission published a proposed amend-ment to portions of 10 CFR Part 50 relating to emergency planning and preparedness at production and utilization facilities for power reactors (49 FR 49640). The proposed rule stated that neither emergency response plans.nor evacuation time analyses need consider the impact of earthquakes which cause or occur proximate in time with an accidental release of radioactive material from a nuclear power reactor. These amendments to 10 CFR 50.47 and 10 CFR Part 50 Appendix E proposed to explicitly adopt by rule the Commission's interpretation of its existing rules in the Commission San Onofre and Diablo Canyon decisions.
4 The proposed rule permitted a 30-day comment period. This 1 geriod was extended until February _27, 1985.
In the proposed rule, the Commission requested that commentors address the merits of three possible alternative:
.l 1V 1.
Adoption of the proposed rule explicitly incorporating Q g \\,tb[.
the Commission interpretation in San Onofre and Diablo Canyon, not to consider the impacts of earthquakes in j
emergency planning.
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2.
Leaving the issue open for adjudication on a case-by-case basis; or
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3.
Requiring by rule that emergency plans specifically address
>y the impacts of earthquakes.
s The Commission was also considering whether to include in this rulemaking tornadoes and other low-frequency natural events.
MTo date, 61 comment letters have been received. Twenty-five letters favored the promulgation of the proposed rule. The majority of these letters were from utilities and consulting firms representing utilities. Two favorable comments were received from private citizens and one from the Department of Energy.
3 The Commissioners I
Thirty-four letters opposed promulgation of the proposed rule, many of which, voiced strong displeasure, shock or disbelief regarding the wording of the proposed rule. The majority of these letters were from private citizens, intervenor groups Nine of these letters were in the and public interest groups.
signed petition form with approximately 94 signatures in total.
Likewise, in a letter to the Chairman, dated June 20, 1985, the ACRS stated that "we...see no technical reason for the J
exclusion of earthquakes from the natural phenomena considered l
i in offsite emergency planning for nuclear power plants.
However, we believe that only limited consideration...is appropriate." Additional input was requested by the ACRS from Japan, France, Sweden, Germany and Taiwan, all of which stated that the potential complicating effects of earthquakes were not specifically considered in their nuclear power reactor emergency planning.
No commentor took a position on the second alternative, i.e.,
leaving the issue open for adjudication on a case-by-case basis.
All of the commentors favoring promulgation of the proposed rule agreed with the rationale offered by the Commission, and provided little additional support for the proposed rule. Commentors opposing the proposed rule questioned the validity of the Commission's rationale ar.d focused on additional issues addressed in the proposed final rule by the staff.
(Enclosure 1)
After review of the San Onofre and Diablo Canyon decisions and Alternatives:
all public comments the staff offers for Commission considera-tion three alternative approaches:
Alternative 1.
Adoption of the proposed rule into a final rule with minor but important word changes, for example, "no additional _ emergency preparedness measures need be established to account for severe, low frequency natural phenomena than is already required in 10 CFR 50.47 and Appendix E."
Narrows litigation of the issue in individual licensing i
6: 1.
cases.
2.
Does not arbitrarily focus on earthquakes.
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3.
es explicit the Commission's position 4 reasonable plans for coping with severe natural phenomena are already in place.
Con: 1.
Significant public concerns will appear to be dismissed without due consideration.
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The Commissioners I
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Inconsistent with the Commission's approach to severe accidents and the concept of defense in depth.
Alternative 2.
Leaving the issue open for adjudication on a
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case-by-case basis; accomplished by withdrawing the proposed rule or by requiring consideration of earthquakes.
Pro: No apparent advantages.
Con: 1.
The litigation itself would have no bounds--e.g.,
strength of bridges and roads may be litigated.
Prolong the licensing process through r x__c d 2.
adjudication.
iternative 3: Promulgate a final rule which incorporates
[ justification previously used by the Commission and states that emergency response plans shall assure that the following y
I capabilities exist relative to the complicating impacts of f
severe, low frequency natural phenomena.
O' 1.
Ability to transport necessary personnel to the plant after the event in order to augment the original staff as g [' I[
necessary to cope with degraded modes of plant operation.
2.
Ability to obtain damage estimates to the plant and to be k
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able to communicate these. estimates to offsi (p5' !
t authorities, so that this information avail-g{ q able to factor into the decisionmaking process, including pfg recommendations for protective actions after severe, low
([g,,lW(S.j, CHssrefrequency natural phenomena.
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- 3. 4 Emergency plans sk+m iw6use c+a,sioe a4T,,a ac 4 4.Teau45,ve u t,,,,
f w h ic a deu6e 94. TAweo sc rnaas was g/, i damage to the plant environs. This shall be ggf p
y limited to knowing alternate routes of travel as well as A
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relocate or to evacuate.
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Such a rule would le greater specificity to the
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sufficiently flexible to accommodate a spectrum of events, including the potential complicating impacts of severe low frequency nature phenomena.
j 2.
Defines scope of issues open to litigation.
Includes all natural phenomena rather than focusing 3.
arbitrarily on earthquakes.
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The Commissioners 5
4.
This is consistent with the Commission's action in other areas dealing with possible accidents with low predicted return frequencies.
M, Kwan, k p uy Edad+t-limited 1rtigation of the adequacy of assess-Pese Con: 1.
ment performed.
2.
May open litigation at operating reactors (through 10 CFR 2.206).
Having considered all of the above, as well as all comments received, past operating reactor and emergency preparedness experiences and the ACRS comments, the staff recommends that Alternative 3 be adopted.
In reaching this recommendation the staff has given special consideration to the following issues raised by the commentees :
o Limited or no record (data) exists concerning the flexibility of emergency plans to support the proposed rule; therefore, the Commission cannot make a generic finding that effects of below-SSE earthquakes on emergency planning are always resolved by the general flexibility of emergency plans (see Issue 1, Enclosure 1)g
.., 6 ~ U Current emergency plans take into consideration plant o
accidents whose probability are in the range of 10E(4) to 10E(-5). W t:1dn't these plans < consider the complicating effects of severe, natural phenomena (2 to 4 times the SSE) whose return frequency is in the same range (see issue 3, Enclosure 1)'
. Defects in seismic design and quality assurance in o
construction can undermine the seismic strength of plant systems and structures (see Issue 6 in Enclosure 1), and There is limited existing information on the contribution o
of seismic events to overall core melt frequency (see Issues 5 and 12. Enclosure 1) in that only a few PRAs assess seismic risks and the treatment entails many uncertainties.
fg A review of emergency exercises at nuclear power plants and V
licensee response to potential accident (see Issue 1 and Enclosure 2) demonstrate that emergency plans
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l The Commissioners 6
have sufficient flexibility to assure that protective actions can and will be taken to mitigate the consequences of a wide spectrum and combination of accidents. This information provides substantial support for the position that no additional emergency preparedness measures need be established to account for severe natural phenomena.
In addition, the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA))
which is responsible for reviewing and assuring effective offsite emergency preparedness and responsey as several programs h
in place or underway to assure that an integrated capability exists for protecting the public health and safety in the event of an emergency. These programs (see Issue 11) include: The Radiological Emergency Preparedness (REP) program and the Earthquake Hazard Reduction program. When completed, the Earthquake Hazard Radiation Program will provide the basis for adequate Federal, State and local government response to protect the public in the very unlikely event of a coincident major earthquake and radiological emergency._ The Radiolo i g
M Emergency Preparedness program 6resently assure ntegrated capability exists for State and T6 cal gbvernmWfits, together with p
utilities, to implement protective measures in the event of an
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emergency.
FrinA programs are carried out in a manner i
that addossees the integration of common functions such as
, communicatto alert and notification, protective actions and decisionmakin while recognizing unique management requirements d
such as radio ogical measurements.
On balance, it can be argued that the inherent flexibility in the plans outweighs uncertainties concerning the expected frequency of occurrence of severe reactor accidents resulting from or occurring proximate to severe low frequency natural phenomena (e.g., earthquakes, tornadoes) which have the potential for complicating the emergency response to these accidents. Therefore additional emergency preparedness measures for severe natural phenomena are probably not naa M
- However, th@f has decided to t31tv-a-mope-confirvative approa'cR)and WJ
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consideration of the complicating effects of severe, low j
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frequency natural phenomena on emergency planning. This will t
g g i provide added assurance that adequate protective actions can and v
will be taken in the event of a radiological emergency y
, gll if complicated by the effects of such natural phenomena.
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The Commissioners 7
This final rule would:
1.
Clarify and articulate the Commission's original premise that emergency plans have inherent flexibility to assure that there exists..." reasonable assurance that appropriate protective actions can and will be taken..." to mitigate (not eliminate) the consequences of a radiological accident.
1 2.
Require the ability to transport necessary personnel to the plant after the event in order to augment the original staff as necessary to cope with degraded modes of plant operation.
3.
Require the ability to obtain damage estimates the plant; and tehmeW+ to communicate these, timates to offsite To M N.
ausnorittes7 he information e available to factor into the decisionmaking process, tecluding recommenda44 ens Ser protective actions after severe, low frequency natural phenomena.
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Rv3uire thatAemergency plans SWd mbk w h b.
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-ende~ y 4+)u-damage to the plant environs. This slai.t e'
be limited to knowing alternate routes of travel as well as establishing criteria for determining whether to shelter,
[W relocate or to evacuate.
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This staff recommendation would specifically not require:
Evacuation time estimates that consider the complicating (h Y[
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effects of severe, low frequency natural phenomena.
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2.
reinforced to withstand the effects of severe, low frequency That roads, bridges, buildings and other structures be
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'E natural phenomena.
FEMA Coordination: Because FEM is directly involved in the evaluation of offsite emergency preparedness and would be affected by the promulgation of these amendments, the NRC staff has kept the FEM staff advised on the development of this paper. Based on this inter-action, FEM concurs in the staff recommended alternative.
Cost Estimate:
The staff anticipates that promulgation of this final rule change which limits consideration of the complicating effects of severe natural phenomena will have minimal cost impact on licensees, or State and local governments. This is because (1) the considera-tions are limited and (2) FEM has an extensive program for Radiological Emergency Preparedness as well as Earthquake Hazards Reduction.
o The Commissioners 8
Recommendations:
1.
Approve for publication in the Federal Register a notice of final rulemaking (Enclosure 1) to 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix E to be effective 30 days after publication.
2.
Note:
(a) That appropriate Congressional committees will be notified of the rule change,(E-......
2).
(b) That the ACRS is being informed of the rule change.
(c) That, pursuant to 10 CFR 5 51.5(d)(3) of the Commission's regulations, an environmental impact statement, negative declaration, or environmental impact appraisal need not be prepared in connection with the subject final rule change because there is no substantive or significant environmental impact.
(d) That pursuant to the Regulatory Flexibility Act of j
1980, the Federal Register Notice contains a statement that the Commission certifies that this final rule will not have a significant economic impact on a substantial number of small entities, and a copy of this certification will be forwarded to the Chief Counsel for Advocacy, SBA, by the Division of Rules and Records, ADB.
(e) That the Federal Register Notice contains a statement that, pursuant to the Paperwork Reduction Act of 1980, the NRC has made a determination that the rule change does not impose new recordkeeping, information collec-tion, or reporting requirements.
(f) That the Federal Register Notice will be sent by TIDC, ADM, to affected applicants, licensees, and persons that commented on the proposed rule.
(g) That a public announcement of the final rule change will be made.
(h) That the staff recommends this Commission paper be placed in the POR.
(1) That a Regulatory Analysis has been performed.
t The Commissioners 9
Sunshine Act:
Recommend consideration at an open meeting.
Schedulina:
For early consideratio William J. Dircks Executive Director for Operations
Enclosures:
1.
Federal Register Notice of Final Rule Change to 10 CFR, Part 50, Appendix E 2.
Listing of Public Evacuations i
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[7590-01]
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMISSION 10 CFR Part 50 Emergency Planning and Preparedness AGENCY: Nuclear Regulatory Commission.
ACTION: Final rule.
SUMARY: The Commission is amending its regulations in 10 CFR Part 50 in order to require limited consideration of the complicating impacts of severe, low frequency, natural phenomena on emergency preparedness. The Commission anticipates that this final regulation will not have significant impact on emergency preparedness requirements established by the August 1980 emergency planning requirements (45 FR 55402) but will provide clarification of the premise (that emergency plans have inherent flexibil-ity) which is an underlying factor in the Commission's San Onofre and Diablo Canyon decisions.
EFFECTIVE DATE:
(Insert 30 days after publication in the Federal Register.]
FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: Michael T. Jangochian, Division of Risk Analysis and Operations, Office of Nuclear Regulatory Research, U.S.
Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, DC 20555, Telephone (301)443-7615.
1
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SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION: On December 21, 1984, the Commission published a proposed amendment to portions of 10 CFR Part 50 relating to emergency planning and preparedness at production and utilities facilities for power reactors (49 FR 49640). The proposed rule states that neither emer-gency response plans nor evacuation time analyses need consider the impact of eartiquakes which cause an occur proximate in time with an accidental release of radioactive material from a nuclear power reactor. These amend-ments to 10 CFR 50.47 and 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix E proposed to explicitly adopt by rule the Commission's interpretation of its existing rules in the Commission's San Onofre and Diablo Canyon decisions.
On December 8, 1981, the Commission ruled in a then pending adjudica-tion that its emergency planning regulations do not require consideration of potential earthquake effects on emergency plans for nuclear power reactors.
Southern California Edison Company, et al.
San Onofre Nuclear Generating Station, Units 2 and 3), CLI-81-33,14 NRC 1091 (1981).
In so ruling the Commission stated:
i The Commission will consider on a generic basis whether regulations should be changed to address the potential impacts of a severe earthquake on emergency planning. For the interim, the proximate occurrence of an accidental radiological release and an earth-quake that could disrupt normal emergency planning appears sufficiently unlikely that consideration in individual licensing proceedings pending generic consideration of the matter is not warranted. 14 NRC at 1092.
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The Commission recently affirmed this position in the Diablo Canyon proceeding.
Pacific Gas and Electric Company (Diablo Canyon Nuclear Power Plant, Units 1 and 2), CLI-84-12, 20 NRC 249 (August 10, 1984),
San Luis Obispo Mothers for Peace v. NR' 51 F.2d 1287, (D.C. Cir. 1984);
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f cr M rehearina en maas drantog^ In glec's on the Commission stated that v
- ,s it would initiate rulemaking "to address whether the potential for seismic impacts on emergency planning is a significant enough concern for large portions of the nation to warrant the amendment of the regulations to specifically consider those impacts. The chief focus of the rule-making was to obtain additional information to determine whether, in spite of current indications to the contrary, cost-effective reductions in overall risk may be obtained by the explicit consideration of severe earthquakes in emergency response planning." Id. at 254-255.
The proposed rule permitted a 30-day comment period. This period was extended until February 27, 1985 (see 50 FR 3797, dated January 28, 1985).
In the proposed rule, the Commission requested that commentors address the merits of three possible alternative:
1.
Adoption of the proposed rule explicitly incorporating the Commission interpretation in San Onofre and Diablo Canyon, not to consider the impacts of earthquakes in emergency planning.
2.
Leaving the issue open for adjudication on a case-by-case basis; or 3
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3.
Requiring by rule that emergency plans specifically address the impacts of earthquakes.
The Commission was also considering whether to include in this rulemaking tornadoes and other low-frequency natural events.
To date, 61 comment letters have been received. Twenty-five letters favored the promulgation of the proposed rule. The majority of these letters were from utilities, and consulting firms representing utilities. Two favorable comments were received from private citizens and one from the Department of Energy.
Thirty-four letters opposed promulgation of the proposed rule, many of which, voiced strong displeasure, shock or disbelief regarding the Commission's favored alternative. The majority of these letters were from private citizens, intervenor groups and environmental groups.
Nine of these letters were in the signed petition form with approximately 94 signatures in total.
Additional input was requested by the ACRS from Japan, France, Sweden, Germany and Taiwan, all of which stated that the potential A
complicating effects of earthquakes was not specifically considered in g
their nuclear power reactor emergency planning.
M' No commentors or foreign countries took a position on the alter-g native to leave the issue open for adjuaication on a case-by-case basis.
All of the commentors favoring promulgation of the proposed rule agreed with the rationale offered by the commission, and provided p
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little additional support for the proposed rule change. Commentors g: /
opposing the proposed rule questioned the validity of the Commission's rationale and focused on the following additional issues.
4 Enclosura 1
[7590-01]
A compilation of these issues with an accompanying Commission response follows:
Issue 1.Thereexist[limitedorno:::::: (wpta)concerni$gthe flexibility of emergency plans to support the proposed rule, therefore,
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the Commission cannot make a generic finding that effects of below-SSE earthquakes on emergency planning are always resolved by the general flexibility of emergency plans.
Commission Response:
In June of 1979, the Commission began a formal reconsideration of the role of emergency planning in ensuring the continued protection of the public health and safety in areas around nuclear power facilities.
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The Commission determined that it must h that proper means and proce-dures will be in place to assess the course of an accident and.it:, poten-tial severity, that NRC and other appropriate authorities and the public will be notified promptly, and that adequate protective actions in response to actual or anticipated conditions can and will be taken. On August 19, 1980, the Commission published its final rule on emergency planning. In developing the final rule the Cosmission established 16 planning standards (See 10 CFR 50.47(b)) as the basic and fundamental standards which must be met by both onsite and offsite emergency response plans for nuclear power facilities. The planning standards are addressed by specific evaluationcriteriainNUREG-0654[ FEMA-REP-1,Rev.1.
To ensure that V
adequate plans exist and are maintained, the NRC reviews and evaluates the licensee's onsite emergency plans against the regulatory requirements 5
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[7590-01]
of 10 CFR 50.47 and 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix E; and the guidance criteria in NUREG-0654/ FEMA-REP-1, Rev. 1.
In a parallel manner, the Federal Emergency management Agency (FEMA) reviews and evaluates the state and local offsite plans against the criteria in NUREG-0654 and provides the NRC with its finding and determinations. Both agencies continue to review and evaluate changes to the respective plans and the results of drills l
and exercises, and ensure that necessary corrections are made based on those evaluations.
OneoftheskjoritemsthattheCommissionaddressedinthedevelop-ment of the final rule was that no single accident scenario should form I
the basis for emergency planning. The Commission noted that, instead, emergency planning should consider a wide spectrum of potential accidents.
Thus, while the NRC's requirements are intended to cover radiological accidents at the licensee's facility, the emergency plans developed to meet the requirements of the NRC's regulations can and have been used to respond to both radiological and non-radiological types of actual events.
The general flexibility of these emergency plans has been demonstrated by responte to a wide spectrum of simulated accident conditions during emergency exercises, and by the actual response by licensees and offsite authorities to actual and potential events.
1 k
yc The emergency planning and preparedness framework, which is v
in the emergency pla g reflects the integration of a number of key elements "
including: preestablished division of responsibilities and authorities; Opreestablished management controls; provisions for timely and informed 1
decisionmaking; coordination of response organizations; adequate primary D
and backup communications systems; written procedures to guide emergency yn
, response personnel; and training for emergency response personnel. These
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key elements are basic and essential to the response to any type of an emergency (i.e., radiological, non-radiological, onsite, offsite).
Emer-gency planning and preparedness also results in a heightened awareness by emergency workers to the complex nature of emergency response. It fosters expertise within emergency organizations due to their increased under-standing not only of individual response tasks, but also of how the separate tasks combine to form diverse response capabilities. Further, the emergency planning and preparedness process is a dynamic process incorporating improvements based on experibace gained through plan implementation and as a result of exercises, drills and actual events.
A measure of the flexibility of emergency plans is the range of diverse emergency conditions which are used to exercise the provisions of the plan and the capability of the response personnel and equipment. An integral part of the emergency planning and preparedness process is the use of exercises and drills to test equipment and procedures and to give emergency workers an opportunity to demonstrate their individual skills and to develop the team work necessary to respond to a wide variety of potential accident conditions. Since August 1980, more than 200 emer-gency exercises have been conducted in the U.S. related to nuclear power plants. A review of 135 of the more recent exercises shows that 36 exercises had natural disasters as events which either started the exercise; contributed directly to simulated damage to plant safety systems / equipment; or contributed directly to other events which complicated the simulated degradation of the plant. These natural disasters included: earthquakes (10); tornados (5); lightning strikes (6 with one offsite fire); bomb threats (4, one with two simulated explo-sicns); and plane crashes (5).
In the other 12 exercises, ammonia spills, 7
[7590-01]
ice storms, thunderstorms, truck crashes, hurricanes, high winds, hail, and fires were used as events which complicated the exercise scenario.
While the NRC has issued no specific guidance to licensees or applicants on the use of these and other non-mechanistic events in exercises or drills,thestaff,nonetheyss,encouragessuchinnovativeexercisestoV fulfill the regulatory requirements that full scale exercises test as such of the licensee, State, and local emergency plans as is reasonably achievable without mandatory public participation.
A further measure of the flexibility of existing emergency plans is demonstrated by the ability of emergency response organizations to use these emergency plans to accommodate a wide spectrum of events, including events not specifically within the planning basis. The Commission's regulations require, in part, that licensees develop emergency classifica-tion schemes, with associated initiating conditions, to enable operators to quickly and accurately assess the potential severity of, and the appro-priate response'to, a given emergency. These emergency classification schemes include consideration of natural phenomena (e.g., earthquakes, floods, tornados, and hurricanes) and other hazards (e.g., aircraft crashes, train derailments, explosions, and toxic fumes). The Commission's regula-tions also require that licensees notify the NRC when the emergency plan is activated. Actual events have occurred which have caused the activa-tion of emergency response plans around U.S. nuclear power plant sites.
BetweenAugust1982andMarch1985,the)(NRC'sIncidentResponseCenter recorded 29 notifications by licensees of activation of their emergency plans due to natural events including: seismic events (2), tornadoes (5),
hot weather (1), cold weather (3), hurricanes (2), lightening strikes 1
8
['7590-01]
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(4), offsite fires (2), flooding (2), high winds (1), and severe stores (2).
In most cases, the licensee's decision to activate b emergency plans due to these natural events was based on the potential for, and not actual damage at the site. However, there were cases where the natural events did result in minor. onsite impacts such as loss of offsite power for short periods of time, temporary loss of commercial telephone systems and loss of public alert siren systems.
In addition to natural events, mechanical problems at nuclear power plants have resulted in almost 600 activations of the licensee's emergency plans. Most of these activations were due to situations which resulted in emergency classifications of a
" Notification of Unusual Event," the lowest emergency classification., ',
y Additionally, 18 actual evacuations have been reviewed. This review focused on the number of persons being evacuated, the amount of time that
,f-t the evacuation took, the number of injuries resulting from the evacua-tion, the cause of the evacuation and the common emergency planning v
elements that existed which enabled the evacuation to be conducted successfully (see Enclosure 2). This analysis clearly showed that the
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conducted without emergency plans) were good communications and good
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emergency organizations. With these two elements many persons were '
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In Ifght of the overall adequacy determinations on the emergency 3
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.A plans with respect to regulatory requirements and guidance, the results
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conditions, the Commission concludes that there does exist an adequate
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record to demonstrate that an emergency planning and preparedness frame-
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work exists around nuclear power plants that reflects inherent flexibility for responding to a sufficiently wide range of plant and offsite conditions.
Issue 2.
The proposed rule violates the NRC's emergency planning principle of planning for accidents ranging from design basis accidents to core-melt accidents, with the capacity to reduce the consequences of even the most severe accidents.
Commission Response:
l In the joint FEMA /NRC document entitled " Criteria for Preparation and Evaluation of Radiological Emergency Response Plans and Preparedness inSupportofNuclearPowerPlants(NUREG-0654[ FEMA-REP-1,Rev.1),the Commission's philosophy of assuring both a broad and flexible preparedness in response to a wide spectrum of events is articulated.
In this Commission i
document it is stated at pp. 6, 7: "No single specific accident sequence should be isolated as the one for which to plan because each accident could have different consequences, both in nature and degree.
- Further, the range of possible selection for a planning basis is very large, starting with a zero point of requiring no planning at all because signif-icant offsite radiological accident consequences are unlikely to occur, to planning for the worst possible accident, regardless of its extremely low likelihood. The NRC/ EPA Task Force did not attempt to define a single accident sequence or even a limited number of sequences.
Rather, it identified the bounds of the parameters for which planning is recommended...."
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Issue 3.
Emergency P'1anning must include the complicating effects l
of earthquakes up to and beyond SSE levels.
i Commission Response:
1 The magnitude of the SSE and the adequacy of a plant's design to meet i
i l
the SSE are reviewed by NRC and may be challenged in adjudicatory pro-l ceedings, but, once settled, should not be reconsidered in reviewing or adjudicating emergency planning issues. Consistent with the Commission's regulations, if a larger earthquake were considered' appropriate to provide reasonable assurance that a nuclear power plant can be constructed and
,8 operated at a given site without undue risk to the health and safety of l
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the public, a larger SSE would be established. Nevertheless, the basis Y
for emergency planning is not constrained by the design basis for a plant and emergency planning efforts recognize the possibility that events considered beyond the design basis can occur. This rule change is designed to further assure that the complicating effects of low probability natural events) including earthquakes above the SSE,are adequately addressed in emergency planning.
Issue 4.
The Commission's fundamental obligation) istodetermine g
whether " adequate protective measures can and will be taken in the event of a radiological emergency." 10 CFR S 50.47(a). If circumstances pre-vent the NRC from finding that emergency plans can provide that assurance, it must deny the license.
'11
5 i
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[7590-01]
)
Commission Response:
The Commission agrees that if the NRC cannot make the finding that
"...there is reasonable assurance that adequate protective measures can j
and will be taken in the event of a radiological emergency" to mitigate the consequences of an accident, the operating license must be denied.
l It is the objective of the NRC emergency preparedness regulations is to reduce the risk to the public health and safety by planning in advance how to respond to nuclear power plant accidents.
l The NRC would not license a plant if the radiological risk posed by possible accidents were not very small - even in the absence of emergency preparedness..Nevertheless, the NRC has chosen to require emergency pre-paredness as another level of " defense-in-depth," the principle that a variety of independent and diverse level of protection should be afforded the public from the hazard of radiation exposure. The NRC believes that reasonable efforts to anticipate and plan for public protective actions in the vicinity of a commercial nuclear plant can substantially reduce, though not eliminate, the already small offsite radiological risk, and r-is, therefore, a prudent'if not essential requirement.
Issue 5.
Inasmuch as seismic PRA analysis has indicated that earth-quakes are among dominant causes of core melt accidents, it is irrational to ignore the effects that these same earthquakes can have on emergency response.
12
[7590-01]
Commission Responss:
Past seismic PRA analyses have indicated that very large earthquakes (2 to 4 times SSE) may be among the important or dominant contributors to the probability of core-melt accioents or public risk. However, these PRA studies (including the NRC sponsored Seismic Safety Margins Research Program (SSMRP) which calculated the seismic risk at the Zion Nuclear Power Plant) found that the risk of a core-melt accident is caused only by very improbable earthquakes with ground motions (in terms of peak ground acceleration) several times the already severe design basis ground motions.
In addition, the failure levels used in seismic PRA studies for structures, components and equipment are based, in general, on very con-servative assumptions.
For example, many equipment failure levels were based on qualification tests and do not reflect the true capacity to sustain vibratory motion beyond the design levels.
It would be expected that when more realistic failure levels are used the significance of the earthquake threat will diminish. NRC efforts are currently underway to better define the needed failure data to provide more realistic inputs to tVtM T d I' seismic PRA studies.
It should be noted that4the current seismic PRAs, with their generally conservative bias, have not shown unacceptably high core-melt probabilities. For example, the PRA for the Zion plant shows a core melt frequency of 5.6 x 10 s per year due to the seismic hazardy compared to a core melt frequency of about 4 x 10 s per year due to all 1
internally initiated accidents.
Issue 12 discusses this matter in further
- detail, j
With these studies in mind, the Commistien ghjetheles's never intended to give the perception that it was " ignoring" the complicating effects of earthquakes on emergency response. Thecefere, the ans4eeed final 13 l
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[7590-01]
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rule ja lto clarify'and articulate the Commission's original intent of I'
specifying what flexibility is required in emergency plans in order to assure that there exists reasonable assurance that appropriate protective actions can and will be taken to mitigate the consequences of a radio-logical accident.
Issue 6.
Defects in seismic design and quality assurance in construc-i tion have consistently undermined the seismic strength of plant systems and structures.
It is thus irrational for the NRC to write off earthquakes as an emergency planning issue at the same time it is exhibiting growing concern regarding the effects of earthquakes on nuclear power plant site, i
Commission Response The assertion that there is a growing concern within the NRC about the ability of nuclear power plants to withstand the effects of large earthquakes is incorrect. As a result of indications that earthquakes used for the design basis of eastern U.S. nuclear power plants may be understated, the NRC has underway an effort to define the seismic margins in operating plants. Preliminary results; based on evaluation of about 12 published and unpublished PRAs (including the NRC sponsored Seismic Safety Margins Research Program), demonstrate that eastern U.S.
I plants, in general, can sustain earthquake levels up to at least 0.3g peak ground acceleration compared to design basis earthquakes (SSE) ranging from 0.10 to 0.25g peak ground acceleration. These relatively high margins reflect an ability to accommodate moderate design and construction errors.
In addition, the NRC is sponsoring research to 14 i
9
[7590-01]
determine the capacity of concrete shear wall structures to sustain earthquake loads beyond their design basis. Results to date indicate that shear walls generally can sustain at least three to four times the design level earthquake (SSE). The NRC has also recently completed a research program showing that the probability of an earthquake causing a
- omplete rupture of the primary coolant piping offressurized, Water
~
Reactors (PWR) is extremely small (about 10.s per reactor year). The
- results of this research have led the Commission to issue for public comment a proposed change to 10 CFR 50 Appendix A, General Design Criterion 4 that will permit the removal of pipe whip restraints for the primary coolant piping in PWRs. Recent work by the Seismic Qualification c-
~
Utility Group (SQUG), based on actual behavior of industrial facilities
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and their equipment in large earthquakes, leads to the conclusion that s.~2
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more margin against earthquakes larger than included-in-the-design basis.
,4,. i exists than was previously thought.
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c Earthquakes simultaneously affect all plant safety systems and g
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tend to " search out" design, construction and maintenance errors which I
t, could degrade plant safety. However, since the PRAs and margins analyses performed to date indicate that nuclear power plants are capable of sustaining earthquakes much larger than their design basis, only very gross design and construction errors are of concern.
It is reasonable to assume that very gross design and construction errors would be detected and rectified as a result of normal inspections, preoperational tests and normal operational transients. For example.Vour research on the probabil-ity of a pipe ruptures in primary coolant loops, sensitivity studies have shown that only very unlikely design and construction errors of implausible magnitude may substantially change the seismic risk.
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Issue 7.
The use of unreliable seismic design bases is flawed.and
,,.t therefore its use as a basis for rulemaking is inappropriate.
Commission Response:
The safe shutdown earthquake, or SSE, for a nuclear plant is based upon an evaluation of the maximum earthquake potential for the specific site. The SSE is evaluated.as that earthquake which produces the maximum vibratory ground motion for which certain structures, systems, and components must be designed and constructed to remain functional.
( - All structures, systems and components necessary to achieve a safe shutdown are seismically qualified for the SSE and are expected, with high confidence, to function to bring the plant to a safe shutdown.
While uncertainties do exist in estimating the behavior of structures, systems and components subjected to seismic effects, these uncertainties are explicitly treated in the design process through the introduction-of conservatism).
In addition, as was pointed out in the response to issue 6, NRC research on seismic design margins has shown, based on published and unpublished PRAs, as well as other NRC research mentioned above, that nuclear plants in the eastern U.S. are, in general, capable of with-standing earthquakes much larger than their design bcsis. These conclu-sions are based on a very conservative approach that assigns failure levels for components, equipment and structures based on a high it confidence of low probability of failure. Thes+ conservatism 4 accounts for the uncertainties in response behavior and ability to perform the required safety function. Nonetheless, the final rule focuses on con-sideretion of severe, low frequency natural phenomena and is not limited s..
by the design bases for that phenomena.
16
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[7590-01]
Issue 8.
Even if a reactor is designed to withstand earthquakes of a certain magnitude, an earthquake can indirectly lead to an accident by causing operator error. Thus, operators may react to the trauma of an earthquake and the distraction of fluctuating instruments by making mistakes that lead to serious accidents.
Commission Response:
st k.
The NRC has conducted extensive research nefetive-te.this issue to determine if conditions of. psychological stress induced by mergency conditions in a nuclear power plant have a significant adverse effect on operator decisionmaking performance. A report; entitled, " Operational Decisionmaking and Action Selection Under Psychological Stress in Nuclear.
Power Plants," NUREG/CR-4040, documented these findings:
(1) decision-making performance is affected by stress such that fewer correct action selections were made in the affected condition as compared with the non-stress condition; (2) operators under stress perform better under lower levels of workload; (3) the interactions of conflicting information with operating procedures and level of workload suggest a complex relationship between stress variables and decisionmaking performance; (4) specific operator personality characteristics were found to be related to enhanced decisionmak'ng under stress. A number of measures for decreasing the i
I effects of stress on operators were identified in order to assist operators i
in making correct decisions during and after a severe natural phenomena.
q w. e.~
?
Although it is considered highly unlikely that operator' caused by an earthquake could lead to a reactor accident which would threaten public health and safety, emergency plans are designed to deal with such an accident if it should occur. This rulemaking is designed to provide 17
4
[7590-01]
added assurance that tha potential complicating effect of the earthquake associated with an accident of this type will be properly addressed in emergency planning.
Issue _9.
Emergency,P'lans are unique, for example, a rural and sparsely populated area may pose fewer evacuation problems, and thus require less flexibility, than an urban and densely populated plant site.
Thus, emergency plans cannot be found to possess the same degree of
" flexibility" in every case.
Commission Response:
The complexity of the emergency plan is normally tailored to the needs and characteristics of the site. However, the basic principles underlying the plan, including the inherent flexibility to accommodate the spectrum of accident conditions which might exist at that site, are common to all emergency plans.
For additional discussion on flexibility of emergency plans, please see the Commission response to Issue #1.
,,si Issue 10.
Earthquakes are distinct phenomena the following a
distinct features of earthquakes are:
--Sirens and broadcasting systems could be knocked down and roads could be severely obstructed in an earthquake.
--Although sheltering may be presumed to be available in almost any other type of natural event, it could be rendered useless by an earthquake.
--An earthquake is likely to disrupt the distribution of water, natural gas, and gasoline, thus causing fires and impeding the efforts of firefighters.
18
4
[7590-01]
--An earthquake is likely to impair or destroy the ability to monitor potential radiation releases and meteorological conditions.
--An earthquake can damage transportation routes by collapse of bridges and overpasses, liquefaction of roads, and landslides.
--An earthquake can cause the collapse of structures (including those housing personnel directing the emergency planning effort, relocation and decontamination facilities, and local agency services) or render sheltering useless due to damage.
--An earthquake is likely to cause a loss of offsite power, with its attendant effect on communications, as well as to potentially render i
useless other (backup) methods of communication such as radio transmissions.
--An earthquake is likely to cause physical and fright-induced (e.g., heart attack) injuries, thereby overloading medical facilities and ambulance and rescue services.
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Commission Response:
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The Commission disagreest All of the consequences listed above could also result from other severe, low frequency natural phenomena such as tornadoes, hurricanes, floods, etc. which are already addressed in emergency plans. All of these natural phenomena are similar in that (1)
.e they occur without very much warningJ2) they potentially devastate larger areas and (3) they are relatively of short duration. The principal difference between earthquakes and the other low frequency natural phenomena is that the other phenomena are easier to predict and there is (qL s
j gc6 gej normally more advance warning for these phenomena.
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Issue 11.
FEMA's emergency plans do not adequately provide for earthquake response in a radiological emergency.
Commission Response:
The Commission disagrees.
FEMA conducts two planning programs, the Radiological Emergency Preparedness (REP) program and the Earthquake Hazard Reduction program that, when completed, tested and exercised for the areas acound nuclear power plants, will provide the basis for adequate Federal, State and local governmental response to protect the public in the very unlikely event of a coincident major earthquake and radiological emergency.
The objective of FEMA's Radiological Emergency Preparedness (REP) program is to assure that an integrated capability exists for State and local governments, together with utilities, to implement protective measures to protect public health and safety in the avant of an emer-gency.
FEMA coordinates the activities of 10 Federal agencies in reviewing and evaluating State and local government planning and preparedness around nuclear power plants through its 10 Regional Assistance Committees (RAC's). These evaluations are effected through assessment of emergency plant, and observation and evaluations of exercises designed to test the capabilities of government entities.
Also, FEMA has developed and published the Federal Radiological Emergency Response Plan (49 FR 34896) for radiological emergencies including commercial nuclear power plant accidents on September 12, 1984.
FEMA has an active program of earthquake hazard reduction that coordinates Federal preparedness and mitigation activities and provides technical and financial assistance to States and local communities in all 20
[7590-01]
segments of emergency management. This includes hazard awareness, assessment, preparedness, mitigation, response, and recovery. The Federal response planning provides for the supplemental help and re J6ff.edbd.,"Md n;-W pb=a e W to State and local governments required to save lives and provide for basic human needs after a major earthquake. FEMA expects to publish the National Plan for Federal Response to a catastrophic earthquake in December 1985.
Drafts of the plan serve as an interim op vating guide for Federal agencies to use in the event of an earthquake prior to completion of the follow-on regional planning.
FEMA technical and financial assistance to State and local earth-quake hazard reduction programs focus upon preparedness snd response planning, and provides for implementation and training extrcises. The planning includes such activities as: hazards identification, vulnerabil-1 ity analysis, casualty and property loss estimates, and patential impacts resulting from damage to critical and special facilities (such as nuclear power plants) and lifelines. FEMA estimates that sufficient earthquake response planning (annexes to State and local emergency operation plans will be in place for the thirteen high-risk, high population areas currently being studied by the year 1996.
Both the earthquake and radiological preparedness programs are carried out in a manner that addresses the integration of common func-tions such as communication, alert and notification, protective actions and decisionmaking, while recognizing unique management requirements such as radiologic'al measurements. The ultimate goal in both program efforts is to facilitate the development of management and operational capabil-ities to analyze the need for protective action, make protective action 21
[7590-01]
decisions and implement appropriate operations. They are complimentary in that the capabilities developed under the radiological program provide the means for coping with the various hazards that might present themselves during a major earthquake.
I V Issue 12.
The Commission should evaluate the contribution of j f ,
seismic events to overall core melt frequencies.
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An examination of recent probabilistic risk analyses that-have M '. {
esti:neted the risk associated with4eismic avants indicates that seismic events have often been estimated to be one of the principal contributors to overall plant risk.
Further, these estimates indicate tnat the significant seismic contributors to core damage or risk have been from earthquakes considerably larger than the safe shutdoin earthquake (SSE).
Earthquakes which have accelerations less than the safe shutdown earthquake have not been found to be significant contributors to overall plant risk. The' susceptibility of a component or subsystem to seismic damage is measured in terms of its fragility. The weakest portion of a nuclear plant which influences seismic risk is the ceramic insulators in the switchyard.
Ithasbeenestimated(NUREG/CR-2405)thati.hereisa 50 percent likelihood that they would fail at an acceleration of 0.2 g, leading to a loss of offsite power. However, loss of offsite power alone will not lead to a severe accident. Cooling water can be provided to the g,
M core using steam-turbine-driven pumps or by electrical pumps powered by t
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onsite emergency diesel generators. An examination of the fragilities of gt j. the components of these emergency systems indicates that their failure t-
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[7590-01]
likelihood at earthquakes less than the SSE will be governed by random system failures, rather than seismically induced scenarios. Thus, the accident would progress in a manner similar to a transient associated with a loss of offsite power. Since the likelihood of a loss of offsite power at a U.S. plant from all causes is considerably higher than that associated with seismic events less than or equal to the SSE, the1'r contribution of below-SSE earthquakes to overall plant risk is minimal.
In contrast, as seismic intensity increases beyond the SSE, the estimated seismic contribution to risk increases.
Large earthquakes are almost always accompanied by a resultant loss of offsite power.
Seismically induced faults in electrical control systems become important as accelerations approach 0.7 g.
In addition, the estimated risk asso-ciated with severe earthquakes is usually associated with equipment failures resulting from structural collapse or interactions between structures which impose high stresses on piping systems. Absent structural interactions, most components (piping, cable trays, large pumps and compact valves) behave well even in earthquakes significantly above their design conditions. However, this is not universally true and improper location of motor drives or control devices can cause component failures in large, earthquakes.
Q.?
The analysis of seismic risk that have been performed have generally made several potentially conservative assumptions.
In most cases, structural degradation has been assumed to disable all components within the damaged structure in order to simplify the analysis. This assumption C
is clearly conservative, but current analytical techniques W permit c l
- but a wepy-subjective estimate of the degree of conservatism. Thus, a comprehensive estimate of the degree of conservatism introduced must await improvements in analytical techniques.
23
i j
[7590-01]
l Another area not usually considered is the ability of the operatot to mitigate seismically induced risk. Depending on the types of failures which have occurred, alternate systems may be employed by the operator to i
ensure core cooling is maintained, or damaged components may be repaired.
It is generally assumed that most seismic damage cannot be repaired in a short period of time. However, some credit has been allowed for restora-tion of relays which have moved to an unintended state, when they are easily accessible and the misposition can be detected easily from the control room.
Seismically induced accident sequences which take a long time (several hours) to develop provide time for the operator to provide alternate water sources. One hour after plant shutdown, the decay heat M
1 leal reduces to41.5 percent of full power.ghis can be adequately l
cooled if a little as 300 gpm of water is provided to the core and allowed to boi suming a 1000 MW(e) reac There are many potential sources of water which might be employed for core cooling but the avail-ability depends on the availability of support systems such as AC and DC i
power. Studies performed to date have not included a co@ rehensive evaluation of recovery actions following an accident and thus tend to be conservative.
Even in the fastest developing scenarios which have been found risk significant in previous PRAs, co"e melt does not occur simultaneously with the earthquake. Because of the normal heat capacity of material within the reactor vessel and the need to boil whatever water is initially present in the reactor vessel, and considering the additional heat sink available in the steam generators (PWR) or the suppression pool (BWR), at least 30 minutes will elapse between the initial shock and the release of 24
- s... ~. r f '
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[7590-01]
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7 fission products.
In most cases, several hours will be assilablz before large releases occur.
Because of the low demand for cooling water flow which the plant requires after shutdown, seismic aftershocks may be less significant than the original shock even if further damage results. Because of the low heat generation rates involved, a temporary interruption of coolant addi-tion can occur without core damage. However, a detailed examination of the effects of after shocks has not been performed, and a conclusive evaluation of their significance cannot be provided at present.
Issue 13. What is the probability that other natural events (e.g.,
hurricanes, tornadoes, heavy snow) which are now considered in emergency.
planning would initiate or occur proximate to an accident resulting in a radionuclide release from a nuclear power plant? How does this compare with earthquakes?
Commission Response:
Only a few probabilistic risk analyses have considered high winds i
(tornadoes or hurricanes) in the overall risk analysis and the current ability to conduct such analyses is modest. Thus, the results are highly uncertain. The likelihood of severe core damage from high wind speed initiators has been estimated between 4 x 10.s/ year to 1 x 10 s/ year in the studies which have occurred. Obviously, the occurrence of high winds is highly location dependent. Thus this range, which represents the variation in reported results, is not typical of tha range expected at any specific site. We are unaware of any study that specifically includes the effects of heavy snowfall. This would nomally be treated as one of the causes of a loss of offsite power and not treated separately.
25
[7590-01]
External flooding events have been examined in a few PRAs with a resultant estimate of flood-induced severe core damage frequency in the range between 10.s and 10.e per year. Again, these results are highly uncertain because of the modest state of development of the methodology and are highly site specific.
The results of recent PRAs indicate that the estimated contribution of seisciic events to plant risk is of the same order as that from flooding and high winds at certain sites. This is highly site specific, however, and is not applicable at all sites.
In areas where the frequency of high winds or flooding is relatively low, the seismic risk contribution will dominate.
,,.,[
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ec*~
Having considered all of the above, as well as all comments received, past operating reactor and emergency preparedness experiences, and the ACRS comments, the Commission has determined that a final rule be promul-gated that would:
1.
Clarify and articulate the Commission's original premise that emergency plans have inherent flexibility to assure that there exists l'
... reasonable assurance that appropriate protective actions can and will
'I.-
be takan..." to sitigate (not eliminate) the consequences of a radiological
.../1 \\<
',[( I accident.
t' 2.
Require the ability to transport necessary persor.nel to the plant after the event in order to augment the original staff as Q
necessary to cope with degraded modes of plant operation.
3.
Require the ability to obtain damage estimates to the plant and H M4 kl.b mli 4 to be able to communicate these estimates to offsite authorities
- A i
26
l i
[7590-01]
ta '-
.. 2 be available to factor into the decisionmaking process, including recommendations for protective actions after severe, low frequency natural phenomena.
offs.ve 4,
Require thataemergency plans 6 W /
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damage to the plant environs. This skau be limited to knowing alternate routes of travel as well as establishing criteria for deter-mining whether to shelter, relocate or to evacuate.
In reaching this decision the Commission has weighed the following issues w 'd h m b ;
I o
Limited or no record (data) exists concerning the flexibility l
of emergency plans to support the proposed rule; therefore, the Commission cannot make a generic finding that effects of below-SSE earthquakes on emergency planning are always resolved by the general flexibility of emergency plans (see Issue 1, ),
o Current emergency plans take into consideration plant accidents whose probability are in the range of 10Et4) to 10E(-5). Why shouldn't these plans consider the complicating effects of severe, natural phenomena (2 to 4 times the SSE) whose return frequency is in the same range (see issue 3, Enclosure 1),
o Defects in seismic design and quality assurance in construction can undermine the seismic strength of plant systems and struc-tures (see Issue 6 in Enclosure 1), and 27
[7590-01]
o There is limited existing information on the contribution of seismic events to overall core melt frequency (see Issues 5 and 12, Enclosure 1) in that only a few PRAs assess seismic risks and the treatment entails many uncertainties.
A review of emergency exercises at nuclear power plants and licensee response to potential accident"/(see Issue 1, Enclosure 1 and Enclosure 2)
U demonstrate that emergency plans have sufficient flexibility to assure j
that protective actions can and will be taken to mitigate the consequences of a wide spectrum and combination of accidents. This information provides substantial support for the position that no additional emer-gency preparedness measures need be established to account for severe natural phenomena.
In addition, the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) which is responsible for reviewing and assuring effective offsite emergency preparedness and response has several programs in place or underway to assure that an integrated capability exists for protecting the public health and safety in the event of an emergency. These programs (see Issue 11) include: The Radiological Emergency Preparedness (REP) program and the Earthquake Hazard Reduction program. When completed, the Earth-quake Hazard Radiation Program will provide the basis for adequate Federal, State and local government response to protect the public in the very unlikely even to a coincident major earthquake and radiological emergency.
The Radiological Emergency Preparedness program presently assures an integrated capability exists for State and local governments, together with utilities, to implement protective measures in the event of an emergency. Moreover, both programs are carried out in a manner that 28
[7590-01]
addresses the integration of co:nmon functions ~ such as communication, alert and notification, protective actions and decisionmaking, while recognizing unique management requirements such as radiological
~~
measurements.,.
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- f. <
, e. v.u.u w u-y "7 ton balance, 5tican be argued.that the inherent flexibility in 4he-plans outweighs uncertainties concerning the expected frequency of occurrence of severe reactor accidents resulting from or occurring proximate to severe low frequency natural phenomena (e.g., earthquakes, tornadoes) which have the potent!al for complicating the emergency response to these accidents. Therefore3 additional emergency preparedness U
ptlA )&, measures for severe natural phenomena ar r
- However,
~
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thQtaff has decided to take a more conservative approach and amend its
~
regulations to explicitly require some' limited consideration of the complicating effects of severe, low frequency natural phenomena on emergency planning. This will provide added assurance that adequate protective actions can and will be taken in the event of a radiological emergency complicated by the effects of such natural phenomena.
his final rule would specifically not require:
@d 4d'
, [1.) Evacuation time estimates that consider the complicating effects
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o p severe, low frequency natural phenomena.
s 2.
That roads, bridges, buildings and other structures be reinforced to withstand the effects of severe, low frequency natural l ' g M phenomena, ft.. 9 > b c
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9 t
Likewise, the Commission's intentions relative to each capability 9
i
)
is as follows:
29
[7590-01]
4.~ 4L ~4 nk %
Item 1.
" Ability to transport necessary personnel to the plantato u p4- +L m yJ n 4 *-H ** m "m h
,o scope with degraded modes of plant operation.
This item means that a licensee's emergency plan must contain adequate consideration of the necessity of having at the plant or getting y
to the plant, adequate personnel to cope with the plant operations under adverse conditions. Thus, the plans must consider alternate methods for getting selected personnel to the plant if a severe, low frequency i
natural, phenomenon, which bleforthespecificsite,occursand f
disrupts the normal transportation routes to the site.
g The licensee's onshift operating crew is adequate to safely operate k
the plant and.to initially respond to emergencies. However..nerating p
h crews and other plant personnel must ) iso be relieved after a reasonable I
) time. Thus, this item requires the licensee to perform adequate planning (transportation arrangements) to ensure that they can get relief
,p p personnel and' other necessa personnel to the plant in 12 to 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> LU,
E Y ': y}
after the start of the phenomenp. For those phenomena which are amenable to prediction (i.e., hurricanes, severe ice and snow storms, and floods)
M e
kN the licensee should consider contingency measures such as maintaining D
more than one operating shift on station.
ib, This item does not mean that the staffing goals of Table B-1 of d
\\ l NUREG-0654 must be met in the event of an emergency at the plant and the /f, J
simultaneous occurrence of unpredicted severe, low frequency natural I,/&.
phenomena which impede normal transportation routes.
Item 2.
"Abil,ity to obtain damage estimates to the plant and to be M lo M, e. 4 4 m 4se communicaterto the offsite authorities, This information should be available to factor into the decisionmaking 30
[7590-01]
process, including recommendations for protective actions after a severe, low frequency natural phenomenon.
This item relates to the information available for transmission by the licensee (i.e., estimates of onsite damage) to the offsite authorities and the inclusion of such information by the licensee into the decisionmaking process for (1) developing recommendations to offsite authorities of protective actions, and (2) determining appropriate actions by the licensee to res?ond to the event and its impacts on plant operations, if any.
The existing regulations require that the licensee's emergency plans contain provisions for the gathering of information concerning damage sustained by,the plant r.s a result of any accident, including the occur.
rence of severe, low frequency natural phenomena. This information would
,i :,
be used by the licensee in We+r decisionmaking process regarding plant operations and protective action recommendations for the public. The implementation of this item recognize ~s the existence of the current diverse communications means (i.e., radios, direct link dedicated telephones, microwave telephone links and standard commercial telephone links) already in a place at nuclear power plants to communicate that information offsite. These systems are expected to be adequate to fulfill the provisions of this requirement.
In" addition,,}hisitesdoesnotmeanthatequipmentusedtotransmit information within the plant or from the plant to offsite authorities must meet any special seismic or environmental qualifications above those for which the equipment is presently design <:d.
However, the licensee should assure that adequate communications are available to local offsite authorities (e.g., mobile radios) to ensure that the means are available i
31 1
o
[7590-01]
to transmit information between the license and local offsite authorities and to discuss public protective actions, after a severe low frequency natural phenomenon.
Item 3.
"Offsite 4. u.s p y jo &
ek M
-cf. 4 whC G a.f.A 6 4 A o.c.4 e el it M A.4A 4 W.-
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pre 4. w e,rL:. d.444. L &t Jo.A =- 3. e.4 4 %J 4 N +=. /J
.+ 4,,, t u du se e ?" + j CN + A
-4v 4 4 e _ _
5,.4A y, Ah, 4-u f., e This item means that State and local offsite emergency response (L 4e plans must contain adequate provision to assure that information me
/t, regarding the damage sustained to the areas surrounding a plant, and the adverse impact of that damage to offsite responses to a radiological emergency at the plant, are (1) transmitted by the offsite authorities to the licensee and (2) appropriately considered by the licensee and offsite authorities in their decisionmaking. Guidance for offsite authorities on the use of alternate evacuation routes and the balancing
[
of public protective actions (i.e., evacuation, sh*eltering, relocation)
Mk should be included in the offsite plans.
@ C
. s QpmA Because FEMA is directly involved in the evaluation of offsite emer bucr gency preparedness exercises and is affacted by the promulgation of these 7
t/g #
s
.,i amendments, the hRC consulted extensively with FEMA during the development i
Y ) ( >..
g of this rule,and as a ~ result FEMA has concurrbei in the rule change.,
,. wL-e-M.
FINDING OF NO SIGNIFICANT ENVIRONMENT IMPACT The Commission has determined under the National Environmental Policy Act of 1969, as amended, and the Commission's regulations in Subpart A of 10 CFR Part 51, that this rule, is not a major Federal action significantly 32
[7590-01]
affecting the quality of the human environment and therefore an environ-mental impact statement is not required. See 10 CFR 50.22(a)(1). More-over, the Commission has determined, pursuant to 10 CFR 51.32, that the final rule has no significantly environmental impact. This determination has been made because the Commission cannot identify any impact on the human environment associated with limited consideration of the complicating effects of severe, low frequencies natural phenomena on emergency preparedness.
The alternative approaches that were considered in this rulemaking proceedings were:
1.
Not to consider the complicating effects of earthquakes on emergency plans or evacuation time estimates.
2.
Not to require additional emergency preparedness measures to cope with the complicating effects of earthquakes.
3.
Leave the complicating effects of earthquakes on emergency planning open to consideration on a case-by-case basis.
4.
Requiring that State Earthquake Preparedness take into account all nuclear power plants within their boundaries.
5.
Promulgate a rule change which would require the full assess-ment of the complicating effects of severe, low frequency natural phenomena on emergency planning.
PAPERWORK REDUCTION ACT STATEMENT The final rule contains no information collection requirements and therefore is not subject to the requirements of the Paperwork Reduction Act of 1980 (44 U.S.C. 3501 et seq.).
33
9
[7590-01]
REGULATORY ANALYSIS 7".
TheCommissionhaspreparedakegulatoryanalysisofthisregulation.
The analysis examines the costs and benefits of the rule as considered by the Commission. A copy of the regulatory analysis is available for inspec-tion and copying, for a fee, at the NRC Public Document Room, 1717 H Street NW., Washington, DC.
Single copies of the analysis may be obtained from Michael T. Jamgochian, Office of Nuclear Regulatory Research, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Washington, DC 20555, Telephone (301)443-7615.
REGULATORY FLEXIBILITY CERTIFICATION In accordance with the Regulatory Flexibility Act of 1980, 5 U.S.C.
$ 605(b), the Commission hereby certifies that this final rule will not, if promulgated, have a significant economic impact on a substantial number of small entities. Tha final rule clarifies certain elements and findings necessary for the issuance of an operating license for a nuclear power plant licensed pursuant to Section 103 and 104b of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended, 42 U.S.C. 2133, 2134b. The electric utility companies which own and operate nuclear power plants are dominant in their service areas and do not fall within the definition of a small business found in Section 3 of the Small Business Act, 15 U.S.C. 632, or within the Small Business Size Standards set forth in 13 CFR Part 121. Accordingly, there is no significant economic impact on a substantial number of small entities under the Regulatory Flexibility Act of 1980.
34
[7590-01]
LIST OF SUBJECTS IN 10 CFR PART 50 Part 50 - Antitrust, Classified information, Fire prevention, Incorporation by reference, Intergovernmental relations, Nuclear power plants and reactors, Penalty, Radiation protection, Reactor siting criteria, Reporting and recordkeeping requirements.
Pursuant to the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended, the Energy Reorganization Act of 1974, as amended, and Section 552 and 553 of Title 5 of the United States Code, notice is hereby given that the following amendments to Title 10, Chapter I, Code of Federal Regulations, Part 50 is published as a document subject to codification.
PART 50 - DOMESTIC LICENSING OF PRODUCTION i
AND UTILIZATION FACILITIES 1.
The authority citation for Part 50 continues to read as follows:
AUTHORITY: Sections 103, 104, 161, 182, 183, 186, 189, 68 Stat. 936, 937, 948, 953, 954, 955, 956, as amended, sec. 234, 83 Stat. 1244, as amended (42 U.S.C. 2133, 2134, 2201, 2232, 2233, 2236, 2239, 2282); secs. 201, 202, 206, 88 Stat. 1242, 1244, 1246, as amended (42 U.S.C. 5841, 5842, 5846), unless otherwise noted.
Section 50.7 also issued under Pub. L 95-601, sec. 10, 92 Stat. 2951 (42 U.S.C. 5851). Sections 50.57(d), 50.58, 50.91, and 50.92 also issued
)
under Pub. L.97-415, 96 Stat. 2071, 2073 (42 U.S.C. 2133, 2239).
Section 50.78 also issued under sec. 122, 68 Stat. 939 (42 U.S.C. 2152).
Sections 50.80-50.81 also issued under sec. 184, 68 Stat. 954, as amended 35
\\
[7590-01]
(42 U.S.C. 2234). Sections 50.100-50.102 also issued under sec. 186, 68 Stat. 955 (42 U.S.C. 2236).
For the purposes of Sec. 223, 68 Stat. 958, as amended (42 U.S.C.
2273), $$ 50.10(a), (b), and (c), 50.44, 50.46, 50.48, and 50.80(a) are issued under 161b, 68 Stat. 948, as amended (42 U.S.C. 2201(b));
55 50.10(b) and (c) and 50.54 are issued under sec. 1611, 68 Stat. 949, as amended (42 U.S.C. 2201(1)); and $$ 50.55(e), 50.59(b), 50.70, 50.71, 50.72, 50.73, and 50.78 are issued under sec. 161o, 68 Stat. 950, as amended (42 U.S.C. 2201(o)).
In Appendix E,Section IV " Content of Emergency Plans" is revised to read as follows:
IV. Content of Emergency Plans The applicant's emergency plans shall contain, but not necessarily be limited to, information needed to demonstrate compliance with the elements set forth below, i.e., organization for coping with radiation emergencies, assessment action, activation of emergency organization, notification procedures, emergency facilities and equipment, training, maintaining emergency preparedness, and recovery. In addition, the emergency response plans subettted by an applicant for a nuclear power reactor operating license shall contain information needed to demonstrate compliance with the standards described in 5 50.47(b), and they will be evaluated against those standards. The nuclear power reactor operating license applicant shall also provide an analysis of the time required to evacuate and for taking other protective actions for various sectors and distances within the plume exposure pathway EPZ for transient and permanent populations.
36
[7590-01]
MLikewise,'the nuclear power reactor operatina licensee and applicant emergency response plans shall assure that the following capabilities exist relative to the complicating impacts of severe, low frequency natural phenomena l
/
1.
Ability to transport necessary personnel to the plant after the
,4 so m m
..7 ' ' '.,
event in order to augment the original staff 4to cope with degraded modes
..X i
"e" of plant operation.
/ <,
2.
Ability to obtain damage estimates to the plant and to be able ALo -++.4 M-,'
to communicate these estimates to offsite authorities Ebe.information J
<ha"Td-be available to factor into the decisionmaking process, including recommendations for protective actions after severe, low frequency natural phenomena.
o (4x4 4.
- 3. A Eneroency pians Md # cLJ.a. c -- e_'_m.J a /) s A J & u o.e4 ;,
h4 J
,L 4 A el h W damage to the plant environs. This shall be limited to knowina alternate routes of travel as well as establishina criteria for determining whether to shelter, relocate or to evacuate.
R A
a A
l 1
l Dated at this ___ day of
, 1985.
For the Nuclear Regulatory Commission.
Samuel J. Chilk Secretary of the Commission "This rule change it typed in comparative text in order to assist review.
37
1 Y
e EVACUAT 10115 Number Eme r-o r gency People i nj u-Distance l_ocation Date cause( s)
Plan Evac.
Time ries Deaths (up tol Comments Decatur, gli 7/19/74 Tank car explosion No 30,000 3 hrs None None 15 miles rapid communication and rIre Madison County, Idaho 6/6/76 Teton Das broke No 7,000 30 mins None Mone 30 miles well organized; good communications Freemont Co.,
Idaho 6/6/76 Teton Das broke No 2,800 1-1-1/2 None None 5 mile's 6 deaths - refused to hrs leave i
Jackson, Miss and Jackson County 4/15/79 Flood or Pearl Yes 6,500 12-18 hrs None 1
2.3 elles Well prepared but meet i
Rive r res i s tance f rom residents Witchita Falls, TX 5/5/79 Tornado Yes 100,000 N/A Mone None N/A Organized system or 4
she l te red communications i
Mobile, Als and 2 coasted counties 1979 Hurricane Yes 100,000 within None None 300 miles Prepared in advance; 17 hrs ability to communicate Ed Phoenix, AR 2/17/80 Flooding Yes 20,000 6 hrs None Mone 3 miles Advance preparation and ability to communicate Port Jarvis, NY 2/12/81 Flooding or the Yes 3,000 2 hrs None 1
1 mile Death involved a retarded Delswere River youth who became confused success due to organiza-tion and communication South San Fran., CA 8/22/81 Toxic gas cloud No 3,000- 30 mins None None 1/2 mile People were told to leave from chemical plant 5,000 a res Marysville, WA 10/6/81 Chlorine gas cloud Yes 2,000 2 hrs None None 4 alles Occurred af ter midnight; went door-to-door Cameron, LA 9/10/82 Nurricane Yes 3,000 3 hrs None None 50 miles communication between i
l Federal and State to local parrishes Tart, LA 12/11/82 Chemical plant Yes 17,000 2.5 hrs None None 10 miles Well prepared accident to 3.5 hrs 5
o Denver, CO 4/3/83 Rail sccident, Yes 9,000 3.5 hrs None None 10 alles lead prepared for y
nitric acid spill contingencies n
C Jackson, MISS 5/21/83 Pearl River Flood Yes 3,100 12-18 None None 2.3 miles Moved to higher ground-E hrs we I I prepa red fo r restart actions PJ Moncks Cornor, SC 7/7/83 Leak in Pinopolls Yes 3,000 2.5 to None None 10 miles Ability to communicato dem, Lake Moultrie 3 hrs
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