ML20195J700
| ML20195J700 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Rancho Seco |
| Issue date: | 01/25/1988 |
| From: | Crutchfield D Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation |
| To: | Andognini G SACRAMENTO MUNICIPAL UTILITY DISTRICT |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20195J705 | List: |
| References | |
| NUDOCS 8801280677 | |
| Download: ML20195J700 (6) | |
See also: IR 05000312/1987029
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UNITED STATES
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NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
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WASHINGTON, D. C. 20555
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January 25, 1988
Docket No. 50-312
Mr. G. Carl Andognini
Chief Executive Officer, Nuclear
Sacramento Municipal Utility District
Rancho Seco Nuclear Generating Station
14440 Twin Cities Road
Herald, California 95638-9799
Dear Mr. Andegnini:
SUBJECT: AUGMENTED SYSTEMS REVIEW AND TEST PROGRAM FOLLOWUP
INSPECTION (50-312/87-29)
This letter fonvards the report for the Augmented Systems Review and Test
Program (ASRTP) followup inspection performed by an NRC inspection team between
September 28 and October 9, 1987, involving activities authorized by NRC
Operating License No. DPR-54 for the Rancho Seco Nuclear Generating Station.
This inspection was conducted by members of the Office of Nuclear Reactor
Regulation, the Office for Analysis and Evaluation of Operational Data, and NRC
contractors. At the conclusion of the inspection, the findings were discussed
with you and the members of your staff identified in Appendix A of the enclosed
inspection report.
In a letter to you dated November 6, 1987, we provided a
preliminary sumary of the more significant inspection findings.
The NRC effort involved an assessment of the corrective actions taken since the
initial ASRTP inspection in February 1987.
The specific areas reviewed
included the open and unresolved items identified by the ASRTP inspection, an
evaluation of the expanded ASRTP (EASRTP) inspection process developed to
ensure quality in key selected systems, and a review of the Engineering Action
Plan developed to improve the quality of engineering and design control activi-
ties. Additionally, the team reviewed your program for procuring and control-
ling safety-related fasteners.
Two documents are enclosed in this letter:
the Executive Sumary of this
inspection is enclosed to provide an overview of the inspection team's findings
in each area reviewed; a more detailed explanation of the team's findings is
provided in the enclosed inspection report.
The report includes findings that
may result in enforcement action, which would be the subject of separate
correspondence from the NRC Region V Office.
The team was encouraged by the improvements you have made in the functional
areas of design change control, quality assurance, and management. Additionally,
it appeared that the Engineering Action Plan has improved the quality of
engineering activities and the EASRTP inspections have provided adequate
assurance that significant safety system design problems have been identified.
However, the team is concerned about your practices for purchasing and
controlling safety-related materials.
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Sacramento Municipal Utility District
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January 25, 1988
We recognize that you have either already taken or plan to take corrective
actions relating to the area of purchasing and controlling safety-related
materials.
At the management meeting held at our Region V office on November
24, 1987, you addressed your corrective action program for this area.
Your procurement program is being reviewed in a separate inspection and several
open items which must be closed before restart will be addressed in a separate
inspection.
Therefore, no written response is required to this inspection
report.
In accordance with 10 CFR 2.790(a) a copy of this letter and the enclosure will
be placed in the NRC Public Document Room.
Should you have any questions concerning this inspection, we would be pleased
to discuss them with you.
Sincerely,
W
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Dennis M. Crutchfield, Director
Division of Reactor Projects III/IV/V
and Special Projects
Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
Enclosures:
1.
Executive Summary
2.
Inspection Report 50-312/87-29
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Sacramento Municipal Utility District
-3-
January 25, 1988
cc: Mr. Robert Croley
Mr. Joseph 0. Ward, Chief
Sacramento Municipal Utility District
Radiological Health Branch
,
14440 Twin Cities Road
State Department of Health Services
Herald, California 95638-9799
714 P Street, Office Building #8
,
Sacramento, California 95814
Mr. Gordan K. Van Vleck
Secretary, Resources Agency
Sacramento County
1416 9th Street, Room 1311
Board of Supervisors
Sacramento, California 95814
827 7th Street, Room 424
Sacramento, California 95814
Mr. David S. Kaplan, Secretary
and General Counsel
Ms. Helen Hubbard
Sacramento Municipal Utility District
P.O. Box 63
6201 S Street
Sunol, California 94586
P.O. Box 15830
Sacramento, California 95813
Thomas A. Baxter, Esq.
Shaw, Pittman, Potts & Trowbridge
2300 N Street, N.W.
Washington, DC 20037
Mr. Jerry Delezinski
Sacramento Municipal Utility District
Rancho Seco Nuclear Generating Station
14440 Twin Cities Road
Herald, California 95638-9799
Mr. Robert B. Borsum
Babcock & Wilcox
Nuclear Power Generation Division
Suite 220, 7910 Woodmont Avenue
Bethesda, Maryland 20814
Resident Inspector / Rancho Seco
c/o U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Comission
14440 Twin Cities Road
Herald, California 95638-9799
Director Energy Facilities Siting Division
Energy Resources Conversation and
Development Comission
1516 - 9th Street
Sacramento, California 95814
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Sacramento Municipal Utility District
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January 25, 1988
Distribution
Docket Files - 50-312
DRIS R/F
RSIB R/F
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BGrimes
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CHaughney
LNorrholm
JKonklin
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JDyer
TMurley, NRR
JSniezek, NRR
FMiraglia, NRR
DCrutchfield, NRR
GHolohan, NRR
GKnighton, NRR
GKalman, NRR
JMartin, RV
DKirsch, RV
RZimmerman, RV
LMiller, RV
LSpessard, AE0D
JTaylor, OED0
MJohnson, OED0
LPDR
ACRS(10)
PBoehnent, ACRS
GPA (3)
Regional Administrators
Regional Division Directors
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ENCLOSURE 1
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
INSPECTION REPORT 50-312/87-29
RANCHO SECO NUCLEAR GENERATING STATION
A team of NRC inspectors and contractor personnel inspected the corrective
actions taken by the licensee as a result of NRC's Augmented Systems Review and
Test Program (ASRTP) inspection (50-312/86-41) perfortned at Rancho Seco in
February 1987. This effort included reviewing specific ASRTP inspection open
and unresolved items, assessing the licensee's expanded ASRTP (EASRTP) inspec-
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tion and evaluating the licensee's Engineering Action Plan (EAP). Additionally,
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the team reviewed the licensee's program for procuring and controlling
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safety-related fasteners. The inspection team did not inspect the licensee's
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programs for the maintenance, operations, and surveillance testing areas, as
these programs were not ready for review.
The findings for the various areas
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inspected are summarized below.
ASRTP Inspection Open and Unresolved Items
The inspection team closed 31 of the 44 open and unresolved items previously
identified during the ASRTP inspection. Those items closed were issues pre-
viously raised in the management, design control, and quality assurance areas.
The licensee had reorganized its management structure and had filled a number
of key positions with well-qualified new employees. This action appears to
have stabilized the organization, and working relationships should be ade-
quately established before restart. The engineering and design control pro-
grams appear to be improving as a result of the Engineering Action Plan.
The
quality assurance organization benefited from improvements the licensee had
made in the auditing and corrective actions area, as well as from an improving
surveillance area.
Evaluation of the Expanded ASRTP (EASRTP) Inspection Program
The EASRTP inspections, perfomed by the licensee and patterned after the NRC
ASRTP inspection, appear to contribute to the overall safety of the plant
systems.
The licensee had completed 24 of the 33 planned EASRTP inspections,
and reports had been issued for 18 of the completed inspections. The NRC team
found that the EASRTP inspections have identified several significant safety
issues which were correctly scheduled for resolution before restart. The team
did not review the adequacy of the corrective actions taken to resolve problems
because these actions were still being developed. Although the methodology
used for EASRTP was comparable to the NRC ASRTP inspection, the team identified
a few concerns that were offered as enhancements to the EASRTP inspection
effort.
These suggestions concerned the depth of reviews in certain aspects of
the engineering and surveillance testing areas.
The team also expressed its
concern that the EASRTP inspection was only able to review preliminary
procedures for the maintenance, operations, and surveillance testing areas, as
these programs were still being developed.
A more detailed review of the final
documents would have increased the value of the EASRTP inspections.
Despite
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these potential enhancements, the inspection team concluded that the EASRTP
inspection process provided adequate confidence that the significant problems
with the design of Rancho Seco Nuclear Generating Station were being identified
before restart.
Assessment of Engineering Action Plan
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The EAP appeared to have improved the quality of calculations and analyses
performed to support systems design.
The team reviewed mechanical and electri-
cal analyses developed since the ASRTP inspection and found that the overall
quality had been improved.
However, the team identified instances where good
engineering practices were not followed and deficient analyses resulted.
The
team concluded that these deficiencies existed because the Engineering Action
Plan had not yet been fully implemented and that engineering supervisory
reviews lacked consistent standards.
The team also concluded that the
inconsistencies would be resolved when new supervisors and engineering person-
nel were fully trained in the various aspects of the EAP.
Procurement and Control of Fasteners
The inspection team reviewed the licensee's program for purchasing and control-
ling fasteners as a followup to a previous industry survey.
In February 1987,
as part of an industry survey, the NRC obtained six fasteners from Rancho Seco
maintenance personnel that were supposedly safety-related, quality class I
materials.
The fasteners were then sent to Idaho National Engineering
Laboratory (INEL) for mechanical, chemical, and microstructural analyses.
Two
of the six fasteners failed to meet the ASTM A-193 Grade B7 standards that were
stamped on the bolts.
Mechanical testing revealed an ultimate tensile strength
that was below specification; chemical testing indicated out-of-specification
readings for carbon, chromium, manganese, and molybdenum, and microstructural
analysis revealed that the bolts had not received the proper heat treatment to
yield a quenched and tempered martensitic structure as required by ASTM A-193
Grade B7 material.
The results raised concerns about the presence of counter-
feit fasteners in the plant.
The licensee had identified 88 suspect fasteners in their procurement system
that were similar to these that failed the INEL testing.
The licensee found 64
of the fasteners in the warehouse and was searching for the remaining 24
fasteners.
During this investigation, the licensee discovered that suspect
fasteners were actually non-safety-related materials that had been erroneously
provided to the NRC for testing.
The NRC team reviewed the licensee's proce-
dures for purchasing and controlling safety-related fasteners to determine
whether poor administrative controls played a role in the issuance of incorrect
materials.
Several deficiencies were noted in the licensee's practices for
purchasing safety-related and non-safety-related fasteners and controlling
these fasteners in the warehouse.
The inspection team was concerned that the
deficiencies could also apply to other procurement areas and may have resulted
in incorrect material or equipment being installed in the station for safety-
related application.
This area will be reviewed by a future inspection prior
to restart.
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