ML20195J700

Forwards Augmented Sys Review Test Program Followup Insp Rept 50-312/87-29 on 870928-1009.Encl Executive Summary Includes Findings That May Result in Enforcement Action. Procurement Program Being Reviewed in Separate Insp

ML20195J700
Person / Time
Site:	Rancho Seco
Issue date:	01/25/1988
From:	Crutchfield D Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
To:	Andognini G SACRAMENTO MUNICIPAL UTILITY DISTRICT
Shared Package
ML20195J705	List: ML20195J700 ML20195J724
References
NUDOCS 8801280677
Download: ML20195J700 (6)

See also: IR 05000312/1987029

Text

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. / o,, UNITED STATES

8 o NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

74 ;j WASHINGTON, D. C. 20555

• %*****/ January 25, 1988

Docket No. 50-312

Mr. G. Carl Andognini

Chief Executive Officer, Nuclear

Sacramento Municipal Utility District

Rancho Seco Nuclear Generating Station

14440 Twin Cities Road

Herald, California 95638-9799

Dear Mr. Andegnini:

SUBJECT: AUGMENTED SYSTEMS REVIEW AND TEST PROGRAM FOLLOWUP

INSPECTION (50-312/87-29)

This letter fonvards the report for the Augmented Systems Review and Test

Program (ASRTP) followup inspection performed by an NRC inspection team between

September 28 and October 9, 1987, involving activities authorized by NRC

Operating License No. DPR-54 for the Rancho Seco Nuclear Generating Station.

This inspection was conducted by members of the Office of Nuclear Reactor

Regulation, the Office for Analysis and Evaluation of Operational Data, and NRC

contractors. At the conclusion of the inspection, the findings were discussed

with you and the members of your staff identified in Appendix A of the enclosed

inspection report. In a letter to you dated November 6, 1987, we provided a

preliminary sumary of the more significant inspection findings.

The NRC effort involved an assessment of the corrective actions taken since the

initial ASRTP inspection in February 1987. The specific areas reviewed

included the open and unresolved items identified by the ASRTP inspection, an

evaluation of the expanded ASRTP (EASRTP) inspection process developed to

ensure quality in key selected systems, and a review of the Engineering Action

Plan developed to improve the quality of engineering and design control activi-

ties. Additionally, the team reviewed your program for procuring and control-

ling safety-related fasteners.

Two documents are enclosed in this letter: the Executive Sumary of this

inspection is enclosed to provide an overview of the inspection team's findings

in each area reviewed; a more detailed explanation of the team's findings is

provided in the enclosed inspection report. The report includes findings that

may result in enforcement action, which would be the subject of separate

correspondence from the NRC Region V Office.

The team was encouraged by the improvements you have made in the functional

areas of design change control, quality assurance, and management. Additionally,

it appeared that the Engineering Action Plan has improved the quality of

engineering activities and the EASRTP inspections have provided adequate

assurance that significant safety system design problems have been identified.

However, the team is concerned about your practices for purchasing and

controlling safety-related materials.

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Sacramento Municipal Utility District -2- January 25, 1988

We recognize that you have either already taken or plan to take corrective

actions relating to the area of purchasing and controlling safety-related

materials. At the management meeting held at our Region V office on November

24, 1987, you addressed your corrective action program for this area.

Your procurement program is being reviewed in a separate inspection and several

open items which must be closed before restart will be addressed in a separate

inspection. Therefore, no written response is required to this inspection

report.

In accordance with 10 CFR 2.790(a) a copy of this letter and the enclosure will

be placed in the NRC Public Document Room.

Should you have any questions concerning this inspection, we would be pleased

to discuss them with you.

Sincerely,

.

W W

Dennis M. Crutchfield, Director

Division of Reactor Projects III/IV/V

and Special Projects

Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation

Enclosures:

1. Executive Summary

2. Inspection Report 50-312/87-29

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Sacramento Municipal Utility District -3- January 25, 1988 l

cc: Mr. Robert Croley Mr. Joseph 0. Ward, Chief

Sacramento Municipal Utility District Radiological Health Branch ,

14440 Twin Cities Road State Department of Health Services !

Herald, California 95638-9799 714 P Street, Office Building #8 ,

Sacramento, California 95814 l

Mr. Gordan K. Van Vleck 1

Secretary, Resources Agency Sacramento County l

1416 9th Street, Room 1311 Board of Supervisors

Sacramento, California 95814 827 7th Street, Room 424

Sacramento, California 95814 l

Mr. David S. Kaplan, Secretary

and General Counsel Ms. Helen Hubbard

Sacramento Municipal Utility District P.O. Box 63

6201 S Street Sunol, California 94586

P.O. Box 15830

Sacramento, California 95813

Thomas A. Baxter, Esq.

Shaw, Pittman, Potts & Trowbridge

2300 N Street, N.W.

Washington, DC 20037

Mr. Jerry Delezinski

Sacramento Municipal Utility District

Rancho Seco Nuclear Generating Station

14440 Twin Cities Road

Herald, California 95638-9799

Mr. Robert B. Borsum

Babcock & Wilcox

Nuclear Power Generation Division

Suite 220, 7910 Woodmont Avenue

Bethesda, Maryland 20814

Resident Inspector / Rancho Seco

c/o U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Comission

14440 Twin Cities Road

Herald, California 95638-9799

Director Energy Facilities Siting Division

Energy Resources Conversation and

Development Comission

1516 - 9th Street

Sacramento, California 95814

.

Sacramento Municipal Utility District -4- January 25, 1988

Distribution

Docket Files - 50-312

DRIS R/F

RSIB R/F

JPartlow

BGrimes .

CHaughney

LNorrholm

JKonklin

Elmbro

JDyer

TMurley, NRR

JSniezek, NRR

FMiraglia, NRR

DCrutchfield, NRR

GHolohan, NRR

GKnighton, NRR

GKalman, NRR

JMartin, RV

DKirsch, RV

RZimmerman, RV

LMiller, RV

LSpessard, AE0D

JTaylor, OED0

MJohnson, OED0

PDR

LPDR

ACRS(10)

PBoehnent, ACRS

GPA (3)

Regional Administrators

Regional Division Directors

NTIS

NSIC

SECY

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ENCLOSURE 1

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

INSPECTION REPORT 50-312/87-29

RANCHO SECO NUCLEAR GENERATING STATION

A team of NRC inspectors and contractor personnel inspected the corrective

actions taken by the licensee as a result of NRC's Augmented Systems Review and

Test Program (ASRTP) inspection (50-312/86-41) perfortned at Rancho Seco in l

February 1987. This effort included reviewing specific ASRTP inspection open

and unresolved items, assessing the licensee's expanded ASRTP (EASRTP) inspec- i

tion and evaluating the licensee's Engineering Action Plan (EAP). Additionally, i

the team reviewed the licensee's program for procuring and controlling i

safety-related fasteners. The inspection team did not inspect the licensee's j

programs for the maintenance, operations, and surveillance testing areas, as l

these programs were not ready for review. The findings for the various areas

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inspected are summarized below.

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ASRTP Inspection Open and Unresolved Items

The inspection team closed 31 of the 44 open and unresolved items previously

identified during the ASRTP inspection. Those items closed were issues pre-

viously raised in the management, design control, and quality assurance areas.

The licensee had reorganized its management structure and had filled a number  ;

of key positions with well-qualified new employees. This action appears to l

have stabilized the organization, and working relationships should be ade-

quately established before restart. The engineering and design control pro-

grams appear to be improving as a result of the Engineering Action Plan. The

quality assurance organization benefited from improvements the licensee had

made in the auditing and corrective actions area, as well as from an improving

surveillance area.

Evaluation of the Expanded ASRTP (EASRTP) Inspection Program

The EASRTP inspections, perfomed by the licensee and patterned after the NRC

ASRTP inspection, appear to contribute to the overall safety of the plant

systems. The licensee had completed 24 of the 33 planned EASRTP inspections,

and reports had been issued for 18 of the completed inspections. The NRC team

found that the EASRTP inspections have identified several significant safety

issues which were correctly scheduled for resolution before restart. The team

did not review the adequacy of the corrective actions taken to resolve problems

because these actions were still being developed. Although the methodology

used for EASRTP was comparable to the NRC ASRTP inspection, the team identified

a few concerns that were offered as enhancements to the EASRTP inspection

effort. These suggestions concerned the depth of reviews in certain aspects of

the engineering and surveillance testing areas. The team also expressed its

concern that the EASRTP inspection was only able to review preliminary

procedures for the maintenance, operations, and surveillance testing areas, as

these programs were still being developed. A more detailed review of the final

documents would have increased the value of the EASRTP inspections. Despite

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these potential enhancements, the inspection team concluded that the EASRTP

inspection process provided adequate confidence that the significant problems

with the design of Rancho Seco Nuclear Generating Station were being identified

before restart.

Assessment of Engineering Action Plan

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The EAP appeared to have improved the quality of calculations and analyses

performed to support systems design. The team reviewed mechanical and electri-

cal analyses developed since the ASRTP inspection and found that the overall

quality had been improved. However, the team identified instances where good

engineering practices were not followed and deficient analyses resulted. The

team concluded that these deficiencies existed because the Engineering Action

Plan had not yet been fully implemented and that engineering supervisory

reviews lacked consistent standards. The team also concluded that the

inconsistencies would be resolved when new supervisors and engineering person-

nel were fully trained in the various aspects of the EAP.

Procurement and Control of Fasteners

The inspection team reviewed the licensee's program for purchasing and control-

ling fasteners as a followup to a previous industry survey. In February 1987,

as part of an industry survey, the NRC obtained six fasteners from Rancho Seco

maintenance personnel that were supposedly safety-related, quality class I

materials. The fasteners were then sent to Idaho National Engineering

Laboratory (INEL) for mechanical, chemical, and microstructural analyses. Two

of the six fasteners failed to meet the ASTM A-193 Grade B7 standards that were

stamped on the bolts. Mechanical testing revealed an ultimate tensile strength

that was below specification; chemical testing indicated out-of-specification

readings for carbon, chromium, manganese, and molybdenum, and microstructural

analysis revealed that the bolts had not received the proper heat treatment to

yield a quenched and tempered martensitic structure as required by ASTM A-193

Grade B7 material. The results raised concerns about the presence of counter-

feit fasteners in the plant.

The licensee had identified 88 suspect fasteners in their procurement system

that were similar to these that failed the INEL testing. The licensee found 64

of the fasteners in the warehouse and was searching for the remaining 24

fasteners. During this investigation, the licensee discovered that suspect

fasteners were actually non-safety-related materials that had been erroneously

provided to the NRC for testing. The NRC team reviewed the licensee's proce-

dures for purchasing and controlling safety-related fasteners to determine

whether poor administrative controls played a role in the issuance of incorrect

materials. Several deficiencies were noted in the licensee's practices for

purchasing safety-related and non-safety-related fasteners and controlling

these fasteners in the warehouse. The inspection team was concerned that the

deficiencies could also apply to other procurement areas and may have resulted

in incorrect material or equipment being installed in the station for safety-

related application. This area will be reviewed by a future inspection prior

to restart.

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