ML20147C716
| ML20147C716 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Millstone  |
| Issue date: | 01/14/1988 |
| From: | Scace S NORTHEAST NUCLEAR ENERGY CO., NORTHEAST UTILITIES |
| To: | NRC OFFICE OF ADMINISTRATION & RESOURCES MANAGEMENT (ARM) |
| References | |
| MP-11374, NUDOCS 8801190328 | |
| Download: ML20147C716 (140) | |
Text
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General Offices
- Selden Street. Berhn, Connecticut 9 .YNN s$aN5=
- W****" P.O. BOX 270 HARTFORD, CONNECTICUT 06141-0270 L ' J 5%, %,TZ,"~- (203) 66m January 14, 1988 MP-ll374 Re: NUREG-1021/ES-201/ para H.1 U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Cmmission Ibctrnent Control Desk Washington, D.C. 20555
Reference:
Facility Operating License tb. DPR-65 Ibcket No. 50-336 January 11, 1988 NRC License Examination Ccmnents Gentlemen:
Attached is the ccupilation of eminents on the written exarninations administered to Millstone Unit tb. 2 license candidates on January 11, 1988.
These ccmnents were the result of a review of the examinations conducted by members of the Millstone Unit No. 2 training staff. Included are both the ccmnents discussed during the exam review meeting of January 11, 1988 plus additional ccmnents resulting frm reviews conducted subsequent to this meeting. Attendees at the January 11, 1988 meeting were:
M. Wilson tbrtheast Utilities R. Flanagan Northeast Utilities R. CinTnino Northeast Utilities R. Burnside Northeast Utilities T. Grilley tbrtheast Utilities D. Pantalone Northeast Utilities M. Ehredt Cmbustion Engineering (NU Training Staff)
D. Silk NRC P. Isaksen EG&G The exam reviews were conducted considering the following:
- 1. Does the question elicit the correct response?
- 2. Is the key answer correct?
- 3. Is there potential for additional correct responses?
- 4. Is the question appropriate?
References are provided, where Tcessary, to substantiate the ccmnents.
b 8801190320 880114 Q V
l
- Please contact Mr. Michael Wilson, Supervisor, Operator Training, Millstone Unit tb. 2, with any questions concerning our ccmmnts.
Yours truly, NORnlEAST NUCLEAR ENERGY CCMPANY bt ht%
' Ste hen E. Scace Station Superintendent Millstone Nuclear Pcwor Station SES/MJW/pab
Attachment:
Reactor Operator and Senior Reactor Operator Exan ecmnents and applicable references c: R. Gallo, Branch Chief, Region I B. W. Ruth, Manager, Operator Traini.g
)
4
[\ ,rT SECTION 1 OUESTION 1.05
- 1. We cannot currently read 10,000 cps on our Excore NIs. The circuitry is designed to shif t power indication to % power whenever countrate goes above 1000 cps. References are provided.
- 2. There are no PORVs on the S/G. There are Secondary Safety Valves, Atmospheric Dump Valves and Steam Dump and Bypass Valves.
~
- 3. If the student assumes a +MTC at BOC conditions, then the cooldown will add negative reactivity. The resulting condition when equilibrium is reached would bei Final Tavg less than Initial Tavg, Final Power below POAH. This means that no correct choice was given in the question.
Based on this above, credit should be given for any written
. answers which assume a +MTC, as well as for key answer "d" which presupposes a negative MTC. ,
QUESTION 1.09 b.
)
The candidates may assume based on part a, that 70% power is to be maintained or that power is being increased to 70%. As such, reducing power to control ASI within limits may not be recognized as an option by the candidates.
The answer key should accept for full credit two of the following three steps / methods for ASI control:
- 1. Rod Insertion
- 2. Rod Withdrawal
- 3. Power reduction
Reference:
OP 2393, Xenon Oscillation Band Control OUESTION 1.11
- 1. The students are only required to discuss the ef fect of source-detector geometry on the 1/m plot. They are not required to know how fuel loading, fuel enrichment or poison loading af fects the 1/m plot. (Theory objectives related to 1/m plots are attached).
- 2. There are two correct answers to this question. Both a. and p)
( c. can be correct.
i t
t F
("') ,
V 3. The key answer, "c", is technically a correct response.
i However this choice describes an evolution which is not done at MP2.
Based on these comments it is recommended that full credit be g iven f or either "a" or "c" .
QUESTION 1.14 (3.)
There are no S/G PORV's on Millstone Unit 2.
QUESTION 1.15 c.
i' The answer states that the core delta T during Natural Circulation approaches full load delta T. This is incorrect.
The Natural Circulation delta T will be approximately one-half of full. power delta T (this assumes maximum possible decay heat) .
(Reference attached).
Based on this, the phrase "Core delta T during natural circulation cooldown will approach full load delta T." should be
- removed from the answer key.
t i
s l
OP 2202 Page 5 Rev. 10 5.2 Withdraw the Shutdown groups as per OP 2302A (Control Element Drive System).
CAUTION: A stable reactor coolant temperature must be maintained during the critical approach, i
NOTE: At approximately 1000 CPS increasing, the wide range log channels extended range detectors high voltage h-f,08 will be de-energized and the "Extended" range light l will be extinguished on the Reactor Protection Panel.
The meter indication will go from approximately 1000 i CPS to approximately 10-7% power and the counts per second light will transfer to the % light on C04.
5.3 Prior to withdrawal of the Regulating CEA's, record the position of all CEA's on OPS Form 26190-1, or demand a computer i printout of all CEA positions and affix the printout to OPS Form 26190-1.
5.4 Withdraw the Regulating CEA's as per OP 2302A (Control Element Drive System).
5.5 Check the following during approach to criticality:
5.5.1 Power level on the operable wide range nuclear instruments indicates no significant deviation in readings.
5.5.2 Startup rate not to exceed one OPM.
5.5.3 40% group overlap (maximum).
5.5.4 Individual CEA alignment.
5.5.5 The boron concentration and CEA position for criticality are consistent with the ECP.
5.6 Within 15 minutes prior to making the reactor critical, complete OPS Form 26190-2.
5.7 When the indicated reactor power is increasing (slightly positive SUR) without CEA withdrawal, the reactor is critical.
O 5.8 Turn off audible count rate.
OP 2380 Page 6 Rev. 5 7.2.8 Logic Test Modules 7.2.8.1 Channel A - Module AB 7.2.8.2 Channel B - Moduel BC, Module BD 7.2.8.3 Channel C - Module AC, Module CD 7.2.8.4 Channel D - Module AD All module switches:
- a. Matrix Relay Trip Select in OFF position.
- b. Channel Trip Select in 0FF position.
7.3 Indication Prior to Startup 7.3.1 Wide Range Channels
- a. Before a startup commences check each channel wide range drawer and verify the extended range off pushbutton not lit,
- b. Also verify the CPS lamp is lighted on C04.
- c. Wide Range Channel Counts Per Second (CPS) range meter should indicate on 0.1 to 10 4CPS.
() d.
e.
Chamber Voltage lamp (amber) lighted, Chamber Voltage indicator (0-1000 volts) at 600-900 volts.
7.3.2 Power Range Safety Channel drawer
- a. Power On lamp (red) lighted
- b. Chamber Voltage indicators (0-1000 volts) at 750
+ 50 VDC.
- c. High Channel Deviation lamp (red) off.
7.3.3 RPSCIP drawer
- a. Delta T Power Blocked lamp (red) off (block
^4 removed automatically above 10 % power or when the Zero Power Mode key is in the OFF position).
- b. Delta T Test lamp (red) off.
- c. Delta T Power Not Selected lamp (red) off.
OFF if Delta T Power is selected.
7.4 Operation During Powe. Increase 7.4.1 g- l,05 SubP ower Ran9e 7.4.1.1 Observe the shift from CPS to Percent Power at 1000 CPS.
DE LESSCN: NUCLEAR INST 1DENmT'.CN SYSTEM ID i I12-OP -BO-I&C-2380-2 REV 1 DM1!: 12-1-87 IN5uuA;n>R AIDS COffENT , INSITUC'10R/SHRANT ACTIVITY c) The count rate circuit supplies a signal to:
o Meter display (C04 and RPS) o Audible c.ount rate o Count rate /rellirx3 suoner o Extended range bistable l
- 5) As counts increase (due to startup) the ao-l.1, purpose
/ h Extended Range bistable will be at 1000 BO-7b.2, conditions actuating cps: interlock !
a) Turn off the Extended Range light above the drawer power meter.
b) Shift the C04 meter CPS /% light to BO-7a'.2, casoonents affected
.g.
c) Deenergize the K2 relay in the pre amp assembly which removes the discrim-inators and one fission chamber from
- i. the circuit.
Page 22 of 50 4
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'v; RDCIOR OPERATICN LESSCN OBJECTIVES ID4 M2-OP-RO-FLND-2116G Rev 0 Date 9-23-86 Enabling Objectives: At the completion of this lesson, the RO will be able to:
- 1. Define the following terms:
- a. Point of Adding Heat (POAH)
- 2. Explain the purpose of a 1/M plot.
- f, f 2. Describe the relationship between source - detector geometry and 1/M plot results.
- 4. State the purpose of performing an ECP.
- 5. Sketch a typical reactor trip power level trace and explain its shape.
- 6. Explain the neutron flux traces made during a reactor startup.
- 7. State the source and magnitude of decay heat,
- 8. Describe reactor plant coastdown.
- 9. Draw and explain the axial power distribution which occurs during each of the following core conditions:
- a. BOL, HZP
- b. EOL, HZP
- c. BOL, HFP
- d. EOL, HFP
- 10. Use OP-2208 to:
- a. Calculate the amount of P!tt or boric acid necessary to change RCS boron concentration by a given amount.
- b. Calculate an ECP.
O 11
/"N Q -
(ssl INSTRUCk_fGUIDE s_/
LESSON: REACTOR OPERATION ID $ M2-OP-RO-FUND-2116G REV 0 DATE 8-13-86 INSTRUCTOR AIDS CONTENT - -
INSTRUCTOR / STUDENT ACTIVITY When we reach the POAH, we will see the
-2 negative feedback. (~10 % power).
Point out we will see:
, 1. decreasing SUR i
! 2. increasing mcderator temp-erator (steam dumps will compensate for this)
- 2) On the control room indication we will not see any effects of moderator and fuel reactivity feedback until power is between
.1% and 1%.
~
! 3. 1/M Plots -3
- a. We can see by our, formula for M that as K approaches one,,M approaches infinity, we use 1/M so that as we approach criticality, 1/M approaches zero.
! 1) M= 1/1-k 1.,
l 1/M = l-K ;
Page 15 of 44
INSTRUC GUIDE LESSON: REACTOR OPERATION ID # M2-OP-RO-FUND-2116G REV 0 DATE 8-13-86 INSTRUCTOR AIDS CONTENT INSTRUCTOR / STUDENT ACTIVITY __
- 2) M = CR F/CR 0 DE 2! 1 then l
1/M = CR7/CR 2
- b. Uses of 1/M Plotu. Obj-2
- 1) Reactor Startup t
The 1/P. plot can bc used to predict crit- Point out that we do not use icality as positive reactivity is added 1/M plots during norr71 start-to the core, ups.
l l
- 2) Fuel loading One of the reasons that 1/M j plots are not done during nor-a) As fuel is being loaded into the core, mal reactor startups is the l K,gg (and tJ}erefore countrate) is constantly changing effective increasing.. .Even though the boron core geometry that occurs l concentration.is more than adequate while control rods are being l to keep the reactor shut down during withdrawn.
l fuel load, 1/M plots are done. Data l
is taken af,ter each bundle is loaded.
Page 16 of 44
s INSTROC.\s,/ GUIDE ( ,
LESSON: REACTOR OPERATION ID # M2-OP-RO-FUND-2116G REV 0 DATE 8-13-86 INSTRUCTOR AIDS CONTENT INSTRUCTOR / STUDENT ACTIVITY i
b) Countrate response, and therefore the value of 1/M is strongly influenced by source-detector-fuel geometry. Ooj-3 c) Scurce-detector geometry is important based on which neutrons (source or fission) make up the majority of the neutrons that the detector is seeini.
o In the area very close to the source, there are a large number of source neutron 5present.
o These sagree neutrons are producing an equilibrium population of Mx3 neutrons in any fissionable material exposed to the flux from the source.
o Recall that for a k of .9, for example, m = 10, which means that for every.10 neutrons present in the core.,,:9 are fission neutrons and 1 is a source neutron.
i Page 17 of 44
i D (
INSTRUC'. \_4UIDE C ).
ss/
LESSON: REACTOR OPERATION ID # M2-OP-RO-FUND-2116G REV 0 DATE 8-13-86 NSTRUCTOR AIDS CONTENT - -
INSTRUCTOR / STUDENT ACTIVITY o Another factor to consider is the distance that the source neutrons travel before undergoing an inter-action.
o A source, neutron is not likely to cravel much further than about 30 cm (one foot).
o This means.that any neutrons present more thra a few feet from the source are likely to be fission neutrons rather than source neutrons.
!?-14 o If the detector is placed too near
' the source,,the detector s:ill see a large per,centage of source neutrons and a small percentage of fission -
neutrons.
o As Keff is increased, the number of fission neutrons will increase and the number of source neutrons will remain constant.
Page 18 of 44
INSTRUC bOIDE )
. LESSON: RgACTOROPERATION ID $ M2-OP-RO-FUND-2116G REV 0 DATE 8-13-86 CONTENT INSTRUCTOR / STUDENT ACTIVITY p
'IN.STRUCTOR AIDS __
o If the detector is seeing primarily i source neutrons, the increase in fission neutrons will only have a small' affect. on its response.
o This. detector response is non-conservative since it predicts core criticality at a much higher reac-tivity addition than it will act-ually occur at.
.i o If the detector is placed too far from;the source, it will see a large percentage of fission neutrons and I a small percentage of source neut-cons.
o If the detector is seeing primarily fission neutrens, an increase in fission neutrons will have a large pffect on detector response.
i l
Page 19 of 44
p p ( .
5 s INSTRUC.\ m NUIDE \bj LESSON: REACTOR OPERATION ID i M2 OP-RO-FUND-2116G REV 0 DATE 8-13-86
[5CTRUCTOR AIDS CONTEt. INSTRdCTOR/ STUDENT ACTIVITY o This detector response is conserv-ative since it predicts core crit-icality at a lower reactivity add-ition than it will actually occur at.
o The ideal detector l', cation would be far enough from tne source so that the source neutrons would have a minor effect on. response yet close enough so that the increase in fission neutron population is accurately seen during reactivity, changes.
CP-15 d) In addition ,to source detector geometry, the fuel loading pattern can play a role
- f. !! in detector response during fuel load.
I o S4 321d i
Page 20 of 44
O O INSTRUC. C CUIDE V 1-LESSON: REACTOR OPERATION ID # M2-OP-RO-FUNO-2116G REV 0 DATE 8-13-86 INSTRUCTOR AIDS _
CONTENT INSTRUL1GP/ STUDENT ACTIVITY l (Loading sequence) ,
, 1/M i
l 4 7f assem'alies l Very little multiplicat. ion r,ccurs l
! initially due to the distar.ce between the source an<t fuel b:no.11<e. If extra-
- /, / polation is performed af..er a few bundles are added, criticality will'be over estimated. This is iot conserv-ative.
o S 1 234D (Loading sequence) 1/M
!- 4 of assemblies
.t i
l 1
l l
Page 21 of 44
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kss INSTRUC.k.-GUIDE s LESSON: REACTOR OPERATION ID # M2-OP-RO-FUND-2116G REV 0 DATE 8-13-86 INSTRUCTOR AIDS CONTERT INSTRUCTOR / STUDENT ACTIVITY This loading sequence results in an imwediate increase in countrate due to the proximity between source and fuel. This sequence underestimates criticality and therefore is more concervative.
o S1234 D 1 M
- of assemblies The source and detector are so close together that multiplication is masked by the strength of the source. This geometry _results in a non-conservative 1/M plot. Notice also that the fuel is not loaded between the detector and the soutca.
Page 22 of 44
()
LESSON: REACTOR OPERATION INSTRUC'. ,IUIDE ID $ M2-OP-RO-FUND-2116G REV 0 DATE 8-13-86 INSTRUCTOR AIDS CONTENT INSTdUCTOR/ STUDENT ACTIVITY o 678 5S 1 D 432 1._
I M
i of assemblies i The fuel is loaded uniformly around the source giving the best detector response.
B. Reactor Shutdown
- 1. Reactor Trip
$P-16 a. The response of reactor power to a large Obj-5 l negative insertion of reactivity (trip) can l
be divided into five regions.
l l
prompt drop i -
short lived precurser decay l '
long lived precurser decay l
l Page 23 of 44
O '
Q-1,15a CEN-128 OPERATOR TRAINING PACKAGE FOR NATURAL CIRCULATION PRE, PARED FOR THE C-E OWNERS GROUP ,
O l
May,1980 1
Combustion Engineering, Inc.
l 1000 Prospect Hill Road
- i Windsor, Connecticut 06095 l
l 8
- 1. INTRODUCTION
- 2. DESIGN FEATURES HaTIIRat r,Inr,IllaTinN
- 3. T 2ERFOR!iANCE
1.0 INTRODUCTION
- 4. MITIGATION PROCESS 1.1 Objective 5. EMERGENCY PROCEDURE 1.2 Overview (GUIDELINES) 1.3 Reference Material -
1.1 Objective Slide 1 This training package provides the operator of a C-E designed Nuclear Power plant with an indepth knowledge of extended plant operations in a sub-cooled natural circulation mode. Specifically plant characteristics and their operational implications are presented in detail. At the conclusion of the lecture, the operator will have a thorough understanding of:
- 1. the plant design features that impact -
natural circulation heat removal,
- 2. the expected values of plant parameters l
during operation in a natural circula-l tion mode.
O 3. the results of testing that has been conducted for natural heat removal,
- circulation
- 4. the operational implications of opera-tion in a natural circulation mode.
The main intent of this package is to supple-ment the event specific training packages with I
detailed infonnation regarding natural circula-tion. Natural circulation provides the means of removing core heat and monitoring RCS heat removal when RCPs or Shutdown Cooling are un-available. Some of the emergency procedures that may involve natural circulation include:
- 1. Loss of RCS Flow.
l 2. Loss of AC Power.
- 3. LOCA.
4 Steam Generator Tube Rupture
- 5. Steam Line Break The Emergency Procedure Guidelines, transient analysis, and Sequence of Events Analysis in CEN-128, Response of Combustion Engineerino j
Nuclear Steam Supply System to Transients and Accidents were used to prepare this package.
The best-estimate plant response in CEN-128 is used throughout. Ncminal values and system 1-1
i
- 1. IRTRODUCTI0tt
. 2. DESIGN FEATURES flaTURal CIRCIILATinN 3. LAt 7 ,\
( 2ERFOR!iAtlCE
() response are assumed. This response is based on a C-E reference desior., used to represent 4. MITIGATION PROCESS the currently operating reactors designed by 5. EPERGENCY PROCEDURE C-E. Reference plant material should be supple-(GUIDELINE) mented by plant specific infonnation, where appropriate. Such information should be supplied by the user in the right hand margins.
1.2 Overview Slide 2 The objective of this, training package will be accomplished in three sections as outlined below:
The DESIGN FEATURES AND CHARACTERISTICS section which describes the natural circulation mode of operation has three subsections:
2.1 Typical Plant Parameters 2.2 Important Potential Impact 2.3 Determining Factors for Natural Circulation.
O The PLANT PERFORMANCE section which describes
( expected plant performance based on test results, analyses, and actual operating incidents has three subsections:
3.1 Test Results 3.2 Analyses Results 3.3 Operating Experience .
The MITIGATION PROCESS, which provides the operator with the necessary infonnation on how potentially adverse effects of operating in natural circulation are mitigated, has four subsections:
4.1 Operator Actions 4.2 Safety Function Orientation 4.3 Alternative Systems to Accomplish Safety Functions 4.4 Precautions 1.3 List of References
- 1. Response of Combustion Engineering Nuclear Steam Supply System to Transients and O)
C Accidents, CEN-128, April 1980.
1-2
~
- 1. If1TR000CTI0tf
- 2. DESIGN FEATURCS HATilDal CIRCttlaTIAN
- 3. L Input for Response to NRC Lessons Learned EERFORIMilCE
\., 2.
Requirements for Combustion Engineering 4. MITIGATl0fl Nuclear Steam Supply Systems CEN-125, PROCESS Decenter 1979. 5. EMERGENCY PROCEDURI (GUIDELINE)
- 3. Review of Small Break Transients in Combustion Engineering Nuclear Steam Supply Systems, CEN-114P July 1979.
v l
l O
v 1-3
- 1. 11TR000CT10fl
- 2. . DESIGN FEATURES CHARACTERISTICS flaTilRal CIRCIILATION 3. PLANT p EERFORfWlCE V 2.0 DESIGN FEATURES AND CHARACTERISTICS
- 4. MITIGATION 2.1 Typical Plant Parameters PROCESS 2.2 Important Potential Impacts 5. EMERGENCY PROCEDURE-2.3 Detennining Factors ,
(GUIDEllflE) 2.1 Typical Plant Parameters Slid 2 3 Central to the accomplishment of the basic safety function of Core Heat Removal is the ability to transport Reactor Coolant to a region where Reactor Coolant System Heat Removal can be accomplished. Three basic heat removal sch wes or modes are available for post reactor trip residual heat removal:
Forced Circulation
- a. Reactor Coolant Pumps
- b. SafetyInjectionPumps(HPSIorLPSI)
Natural Circulation
- a. Subcooled
- b. Two-phase Pool Boiling or Reflux Boiling Reactor coolant pump forced circulation and l heat transfer to the steam generators is the preferred mode of operation for residual heat removal whenever plant temperatures and pressures are above the Shutdown Cooling System entry con-ditions. The subcooled natural circulation capability of all C-E plants provides an j emergency means for con'erolled core cooling using
! the steam generators for extended. periods of time if the reactor coolant pumps (RCPs) are unavailable. Two-phase natural circulation and pool boiling are schemes that will occur to provide adequate core cooling during certain transients but are essentially beyond operator control and are not desirable as long tenn nethods.
Slide 4 It is the accomplishment of subcooled natural circulation resulting from the density gradient over the elevation difference between heat sink and heat source that will be addressed in the remainder of this lecture.
The natural circulation flow rate is detennined by point where the thermal driving head just offsets the system head loss (i.e. friction losses).
2-1
1
_1. INTRODUCTION
- 2. DESIGN FEATURES I & CHARACTERISTICS i - HaTUDal CIDCllLATinN 3, ptAn7 Since the natural circulation flow rate will vary EERFORlWICE l with decay heat level it becomes convenient to 4. MITIGATION use the reactor core ai (i.e. Th-Tc) as the 5. NCY PROCEDURE l primary measure of natural circulation. The aT (GUIDELINE) essentially provides a measur9 of flow relative l to power.
l Q=mcaT p AT=cf p where Q = decay heat rn = natural circulation mass flow rate cp= specific heat capacity of Reactor Coolant The aT can be further referenced to the nomal flow power aT (i.e. the aT for 100% power and 100% flow) to yield the power to flow ratio (i.e.
percent power-to-percent flow).
,.)
0/0 NFP AT Slide 5 g
=
'y 3 p blFP Hence in order to have heat transfer conditions at least as acceptable as those that exist at full power, it is desirable to have a power to flow ratio less than 1 or in other words a AT -
less than the normal full power aT.
A typical CE plant is designed with an effective natural circulation themal driving head of
! 25 ft.
Based on test results from the power ascension test program, which will be examined in more detail later, this results in typical actual power to flow ratios of 0.25 to 0.5 and hence natural circulation AT's of anywhere from 15 'F to 30'F.
Decay heat levels of interest range from approximately 3% at 200 sec following trip O (effect loss of forced circulation due to RCP coastdown) to approximately 0.8% 10 hours1.157407e-4 days <br />0.00278 hours <br />1.653439e-5 weeks <br />3.805e-6 months <br /> after trip.
Therefore actual core flow rates are on the 2-2
_ l
- 1. INTPnntIrTTnN
- 2. DESIGN FEATURES
& CHARACTERISTICS
, NAT!!RAL CInCillATinN 3. PLANT (V) order of 10,000 gpm to 46,000 gpm for a typical C-E operating plant.
4.
2ERFORlWlCE HITIGATION PROCESS Since flow is dependent on the decay heat level the power-to-flow ratio (and hence AT).will fr IE also vary with power.
As a gross approximation aT varies as [Q]% where .
Slide 6 Q is the decay heat power level.
The following simple derivation of the relation between AT and decay heat , Q,may be presented or used as a student exercise:
For NATURAL CIRCULATION:
Thermal driving head (H) + head loss (h)) = 0 where H = E (pc -/h)
E = elevation j4.=colddensity A = hot density 2
and, h) = K K = loop resistance
= volumetric flowrate
" ~ E' 1(fc ~[h E.(fn-fc)' KV assuming density linear with temperature and a small range of density,then (f-ge)M(Th-T)=aT g and xM l
2 now I aT % Kin
- 2 or simply AT E rn I
l substituting in primary calormetric Q = mc AT l Qu dr e q % AT*/t 6T
- 2-3 l
- 1. 11TRODUCTT0:1
- 2. DESIGti FEATURES
& CHARACTERISTICS PIATitRat CIRCHLATin'i 3. PLN4T O
D 2.2 Important Potential Impact 4.
2ERFOR!WlCE MITIGATION PROCESS Slide 7 With the loss of RCS forced circulation four 5. EMERGENCY PROCEDURE:
of the basic safety functions are impacted. (GUIDELINE)
Core heat removal is now relying on cooling flowing at much lower rates resulting in correspondingly higher temperatures. Addition-ally, the accomplishment of this safety function is much more susceptible to the effects of voiding resulting from loss of inventory or pressure control.
Reactivity control by boron is affected by slower loop transit time.
RCS heat removal is affected in that with slower loop transit times, monitoring of RCS heat removal is much less effective and manual control is necessary.
Finally, RCS oressure control is affected in that the main pressurizer sprays are now un-available requiring reliance on auxiliary spray.
2.3 Determinino Factors for Natural Circulation Slide 8 Natural Circulation flow rate is governed by:
Slide 9 1. Decay heat - typical values of decay Slide 10 heat may be as high as 3.0% of full 200 seconds after shutdown to one hour after shutdown.
- 2. Component elevations - satis factory Slide 11 natural circulation decay heat re-moval is obtained by elevation-difference between bottom of core and top of the S.G. tube sheet. Typical elevation differences are on the order of 25-35 feet. Additionally, a small contribution to natural circulation is achieved as coolant density changes I
while passing through the S.G. tubes.
l
- 3. Primary to Secondary heat transfer -
i water in S.G. provides t heat sink Slide 12 and returns primary coolant at a greater density. No degradation of heat transfer occurs as long as l secondary level covers at least 1/3 l of the tube height.
2-4
- 1. 11TR03U:TI0ft
- 2. DESIGi :EATURES
& CHARACTERISTICS -
NATlin AL CIDritLATInN 3. PLANT EERFORfWICE
- 4. Loop flow resistance - the major 4. MITIGAT10tl Slide 13 PROCESS Slide 14 resistive element is the locked rotor _
RCP therefore relative loop pressure 5. EMERGENCY PROCEDURE Slide 15 Slide 16 drops will not be analogous to forced (GUIDELINE) flow situations. Flow resistance will also be affected by any aas or vapor voiding.
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1 1
2-5
- 1. INTRODUCTION
- 2. DESIGN FEATURES NATitDal CInrllLATION 3. L T
[V l 3.0 PLNIT PERFORfiAflCE 4, PERFORfWICE QITIGATION ROCESS 3.1 Test Results
- E 3.2 Analyses Results [gUDLlE) 3.3 Operating Experience ,
3.1 Test Results Slide 17 All plants as part of the power assention test Slide 18 program conduct a reactor trip from caer by Slide 19 stopping all reactor coolant pumps and monitor Slide 20 pump coastdown and natural circulation. The basic elements of this test are as follows:
Initial Conditions 40% power NSSS controls in automatic mode Sequence of Events Trip R",Ps manually RPS trips reactor and turbine Operator slowly restores SG water levels (N using auxiliary feedwater I t/ Operator tenninates auxiliary feedwater and SGs "steam down" for 1-2 hours.
Evaluation Core decay heat is derived from measured I
steam generator water level changes and corresponding inventory depletion.
RCS flow is derived from measured T , T H C and derived core decay heat.
Evaluation of these tests shows the following results:
l Slide 21 1. That values of power to flow ratios and ATs are as predicted.
1 2. The transition from forced to natural circulation presents readily discernable characteristics that are of use to the operator in establishing natural circu-lation, specifically:
3-1
- 1. INTRODUCTION
, 2. DESIGN FEATURES
& CHARACTERISTICS NaTtlRal CinCilLATinN 3. PLANT 7' BERFORfWICE (N)'ide22 Th increases and then peaks or 4. MITIGATION stabilizes within 5 to 10 minutes. PROCESS
- 5. EMERGENCY PROCEDURE Core exit thermocouples tract T . (GUIDELINE) l g aT(i.e.T H - TC ) is less than the normal full power AT.
TC is controllable by the secondary i heat sink.
l 3.2 Analyses Results Slide 23 Within CEN-128 analyses natural circulation Slide 24 performance can be examined from the loss of
- SliJe 25 AC event. It should be noted that
l Slide 26
- 1. Characteristics are the same as test results.
i 2. AT power provides measure of natural I circulation perfonnance, (m) 3. Effects of pressurizer are small.
l %/
3.3 Operating Experience
- Several instances of natural circulation at hot I standby and at least one occurrence of natural I
circulation cooldown.
On April 15, 1977, St. Lucie Unit 1 was Slide 27 manually trioped due to the loss of Component l Slide 28 Cooling Water (CCW) to the Reactor Coolant l Slide 29 Pumps (RCP) which was initially caused by loss l
of instrument air compressors in the contain-ment (CCS valves are solenoid actuated, air operated). The plant tripped at 3:39 p.m. and
. the reactor coolant pumps tripped at 3:40 p.m.
I ara remained secured for the subsequent cooldown.
I Based on apparent damage to seals in both "B" reactor coolant pumps and concern of same for "B" reactor coolant pumps, a natural circulation cooldown was established via the Turbine Bypass System to condenser with vacuum being maintained with steam from NSSS. The 5% valve (60-50%
open) established a 75'F cooldown rate. At 410'F, the steam generator pressure was de-k creasing and vacuum was dropping so atmospheric dumps were used for additional steam load and both auxiliary sprays were initiated to decrease 3-2
4
- l. INTR 000CTI0ft
- 2. DESIGN FEATURES
& CHARACTERISTICS NATitD AL CIRCill ATinN 3. PLANT
(,D pressurizer temperature and pressure. Once on 4. MITIGATION atmospheric dumps, a 60*/hr cooldown rate was PROCESS establisned until the reactor coolant system 5. EMERGENCY PROCEDURE reached 320*F. At this point the system started (GUIDELINE) to level off. Two charging pumps were sufficient to keep up with shrink except when increasing one steam generator to a high level, when three were required. During reactor cooldown, the system was being purged of Hp by feeding and bleeding the Volume control Tank.
The cooldown rate at 320*F slowed down to 25'F/hr. At 11:20 p.m., the system was at 300*F with pressurizer pressure of 350 psia and water phase at 440*F. Line up for Shutdown Cooling (SDC) was in progress. Shutdown cooling was placed into service at 1:42 a.m., April 16, 1977 and the plant was cooled significantly at 9:15 a.m., April 16, 1977, thus concluding the incident.
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3-3 l
()LESSON: RCS HEAT REMOVAL INSTRUC ) GUIDE ID i M2-OP-RO-FUND-2121J REV 0 DATE 2-5-87 INSTRUCTOR AIDS CONTENT INSTRUCTOR / STUDENT ACTIVITY
- 8) Expected response to NC RO-4
- /./5c' a) Established in 5 - 15 min.
b) 20 - 25* F AT For maximum decay heat c) 3 - 3.5% Flow d) Stable / decreasing T, e) Stable T c f) Subcooled RCS (no voiding) No voiding has been observed during the MP2 NC events.
g) Adequate SG Heat Removal I
h) 5 min. Loop Transit Time
- c. Verification Criteria RO-5
- 1) T, constant or decreasing Page 18 of 45
[)
V SECTION'2 OUESTION 2.04 part c.
The reference given (M2-OP-ELECT-2342, p. 3& 4) does not state a specific reason for the 460 amp limit on bus 24E when it is being supplied from 24F. Procedure OP 2343 (reference book 4, section 14), step 7.22, caution #1 states, "Do not exceed load limits on RSST 15G-21S or its busing 3.0 MVA 460 amps." The identifier "15G-21S" is the designation for the Unit 1 RSST, not a breaker or disconnect. As the Unit 1 RSST is not limited to 460 amps and the Unit 2 operators have no real indication or control of the total load on the Unit 1 RSST, the 460 amp limit is understood to be based on the bus connecting the Unit 1 RSST to 24E.
(Reference excerpts are attached).
QUESTION 2.08 part b The question asks for three (3) sources of SFP makeup water but does not solicit a system flowpath.
Therefore an answer stating the RWST as a possible source should be fully accepted as one of tP.e three required answers.
O QUESTION 2.09 part d.
The AFW Flow Control Valves have three modes of operation as stated in both OP 2322 (ref. book 4) and AOP 2579B (ref. book 7).
These modes are Auto, Manual and Manual (Local). If an Automatic Feedwater Actuation Signal (AFAS) is present then tee "Reset-Normal-Override Switch" has three modes of selection which allow the operator additional modes of operation ( AFW SD & OP 2322). As the question did not mention the switch by any name, nor indicate that an AFAS had occurred, it is impossible for an examinee to determine which "modes of operation" the question is attempting to solicit. Therefore, discussion in either area of AFW Valve control should be accepted for full credit.
QUESTION 2.10 part a.
The CEA, upon loss of the lif t coil, will be held in place by the Upper gripper and/or the Lower gripper coils.
The key answer should be changed to allow f 11 credit for mentioning either the upper gripper or the lower gripper.
O 1
QUESTION 2.11 The following CVCS components also receive a signal on SIAE according to reference M2-OP-PRI-2304 Fig. 2a. (CVCS SD)- (# l-7 given in answer key) .
- 8. PMW to charg ing pump suct ion ( 2-CH-196 )
-9. Precise reactivity control isolates (2-CH-909, CH-910)
- 10. Boric acid pump recirc. isolations close (2-CH-510, CH-Sil)
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III. DESCRIPTION
['u]J A. 6900 Volt Load center 25A and load center 25B are both normally supplied by the NSST. On a loss of normal power to. these load centers, power will automatically transfer to the RSST.
This transfer will cause the buses to be deenergized for a very short period of time (less than 1 second). For the i
loads supplied from load centers 25A and 25B turn to Appendix A.
B. 4160 Volt Load centers 24A and 24B normally receive power from the' rr NSST through feeder breakers. They, in turn, provide power to load centers 24C and 240. On a turbine trip, these C feeder breakers'from the NSST open and the feeder breakers from 24G to load centers 24C 'and 24D will close. Load center 24G is powered from the RSST. Load center 24E is designated as the swing bus and can receive power from l
either 24C or 24D. There is a backup ; power.. supplyrto 24E from 24F which is powered from the Unit 1 RSST. .This-power ~r 0'04 6 sepply is restricted to? 460 amps and is sized to be capable of supplying one Emergency Core Cooling System train following an accident.
The 4.16 KV subsystem is divided into two specific "Facilities." Facility 1 begins with load center 24C which U2IED 10/84
o .. . . - . . = . . .
b powers one train of Emergency Saf eguards Equipment and is provided with an emergency power supply by the "A" Emergency Diesel Generator. Facility 2 begins with load center 24D and powers a radundant second train of Emergency Safeguards Equipment and is provided with an emergency power supply by the "B" Emergency Diesel Generator. These Emergency Diesel 2
Generators are designed to automatically start and load when a Loss of Normal Power (LNP) ' signal is received. For L further information refer to the Emergency Diesel Generatot System Description.
Load center 24E provides power to a third Ser ..ee Water Pump, High Pressure Safety Inj ection Pump and Reactor.
l .
Building Closed Cooling Water Pump. These pumps are installed spares and can provide support to either Facility 1 or Faci.'ir/ 2. When they are servicing a f acility, load center 24E is provided power from that facility.
{ C. 480 Volt 1
The 480 volt subsystem is supplied with power from the 4.16 KV System through a 4.16 KV to 480 volt step down transformer. The transformers are located directly adjacent
. he 480 volt load centers that they service.
I l
-4 U2IMD 10/84 1
OP 233 Paga 17 Rev. 7 Verify tie breakers 24C-2T-2 and 240-2T-2 are open.
[ 7.21.2 7.21.3 Obtain permission fNm Unit #1 control room.
7.21.4 Verify all feeder breakers on 24E are open.
7.21.5 Put synchroniz:ng switch for 2153-24E-2 on. Check incoming voltage.
7.21.6 Synchroscope will riot move due to dead bus.
7.21.7 Close 2153-24E-2.
7.21.8 Observe rutining voltage.
7.21.9 Turr synchroscope off.
7.21.10 Bus 24E is now energized.
7.21.11 Close feeder breakers as required.
7.22 Energizing Bus 240 from Bus 24E.
CAUTION: 1. Da:nottexceed loadlimits :on RS0Tr15G-215 'or.its-h.O d busing 3'.0 WA 460 amps.
- 2. Diesel Generator 120 must be shutdown and disabled.
7.22.1 Verify 15G-12U-2 is open.
7.22.2 Verify 2253-24C-2 is open.
7.22.3 Verify 24C-1T-2 is open.
7.22.4 Verify 24C-2T-2 is open.
l 7.22.5 Verify 240-2T-2 is open.
l 7.22.6 Verify all individual load breakers on Bus 24C are l open.
7.22.7 Verify Bus 24E is energized and notify Unit 1 Control J.04 c Room 0,,erator that they will be supplying Unit 2 Bus l 24C.
7.22.8 Dypess ESAS undervoltage chanr.els for 24C (A3) using the bypass keys from the Control Room Key' Locker at ESAS Cabinets.
l 7.22.9 Reset Facility 1 Sequence using sequencer reset key from the Control Room Key Locker at ESAS Cabinet.
O V
L i . - - _ . - . _ . .
to the first room which houses the two electric motor-driven i
auxiliary feedvater pumps.is by stairs leading down from the ground floor at elevstion 14'6". The enclosure over the pump room stairvell serves as a protective barrier against direct water streams into the pump room due to a possible overhead pipe failure.
The second room which houses the turbine-driven auxiliary feedvater pump is a water-tight vault physically separated from the motor-driven auxiliary feedvater pump ro.om by a reinforced concrete wall. The only access means to this room is through a water-tight fire door.
D. Controls and instrumentation Tha electric-driven auxiliary feed pu:aps are individually controlled, l
from control room panel C05, or from the hot shutdown panel C21 in the Turbine Building. The electric-driven pumps may be either l
automatically actuated or manually actuated.
For automatieasetuation.; each pump and its associated control flow 7 gc[
valve have two switches on each panel. The first switch, sometimes i
called the automatic permissive or the permissive block switch, either allows or blocks the automatic start of the respective pump.
l This auto permissive switch has three positions:
- I'ull to lock, which blocks the automatic signal.
- Reset, which resets the automatic ,' unction.
- Seart, which will start the elactric .exiliary feed pumps l
i and open the flow control valves, p
- d U2AfV 08/84
w eehu elects the s mode of operation of the flow control (m)
],QC{p)i valve associated with the pump. Thet%aedeeleteseleettoegare:
- 1) "NORMAL". which allows the valve to open fully for an automatic
' actuation; 2) "0VERRIDE", which allevs manual control of the valve position following an automatic actuation; and 3) "RESET."which resete the electrical legic for returning the mode of operation back to normal.
For manual actuation of the electric pumps, there are switches on both control panels which allow use of the pumps on an "as neede1" basis. One way to do this is to manually initiate the autoestic actuation seqtsence; thes is done by using the start position of the permissive-block switch, which starts the automatic initiation, (G regardless of S/G 1evels. A second way to manually initiate AFW is to use other switches which manually start the pump (s) and to
- manually control the feedvater regulating valve position (s) to t
provide the desired flow rate.
l The Terry Turbine, which is not automatically actuated, can also bs
~1he Tur'fne vill operate marually act. sated from panelo C05 or C21.
steam ' supply ptessures of 50 psig or higher - norms 1 reliehy at operation is at normal steam get.arator pre osures. The turbine can be supplied from either steam generat,e. Turbine speed is governor controlled betvec.a 1400 and 4200 rpm. wh.ch is controlled bv a l
haadsvitch on C05.
l
\ ,a f
L) l U2AFW 08/84 09 2322 Page 13 Rev. 9 f 7.7.5 2Ta everride:the7Aute-AFW: Initiation. Signal to an C gg individual FRV at C05 or C-21: ,
7.7.5.1 Momentarily place the:Seset-Woreal-0verride; 23 witch:.HS 5276A(B) or HS5279A(B) to override.
7.7.5.2 Observe C04 Alarms "AFW HV5276A (HV5279A)
Auto-Open-Override.
7.7.5.3 Shift FRV controller to Manual-HIC 5276A(B) <
or HIC 5279A(B) and adjust flow rate a desired.
'7.7.6 To bypass a S/G 1evel input, obtain the bypass key from the S.S. and bypass the desired channel at C100.
Annunciation of the bypassed channel is on C04.
APW.FRV-maybar.in either Manuahor2 Auta:. prior to Q Q.04 d NOTE:
transfer to C-21.
w l
l 7.8.1 At C-21, place the Normal / Remote Handswitches (HS j 5276C and HS 5279C) to Remote.
7.8.2 Place C-21 controller to Manual and adjust flow as required.
l 7.9 Transfer of AFW-FRV control from C-21 to COS.
7.9.1 If both C-21 & C05 FRV controller, are in Auto, Place HS 5279C and 5276C to Normal, and on C05 place FiM.i l seantrollet to. Manual and adjust flow as necessary.
7.3.2 .If the transfer is to be made with the FRV controllers in Manual, the C-21 cor, troller output must be matched to the C05 controller output prior to shifting HS 5276C and 5279C to Normal positian.
o{ }
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[e[, food' 7 A09 ?S79B Page 5 Rev. 1 V 4.8 De-energize B61 by tripping breaker 80610 at 22F to stop Charging Pumps B and C to prevent RCS overfill, and to allow manual valve operation.
4.9 Open or verify open Auxiliary Feed Header Cross-tie valve, 2-FW-44.
4.10 Use "A" Aux. Feedpump, P-9A, to provide Aux. feedwater due to the fact that the control for the remaining pumps may have been affected by the fire.
4.11 Maintain S/G 1evel 70-80% (C05) with AtismRNs
},()({g FW-43A, and FW-438 in manual-(teseD ,
4.12 Uhen accessible, verify or open 2-CH-429 with handwheel, b,' I 4.13 Verify and, if necessary, manut 'ly open valve 2-CH-131.
4.14 Maintain PZR levc1 40-604 (Loca'. by opening 2-CH-192 and borate (in gravity feed aiode) to the requireo shutdown margin using Ch in Pump A or 8 (CO2).
4.15 When level is less thar iti% initiate procedure OP-2322 to provide Fire Watsr tr Aux. Feedwatsr Suction.
U 4.16 Ensure makeup to Fire Water Supply Tanks from the City Water Main.
i 4.17 Perform applicable steps of Reactor Trip Recrue n (EOP 2526).
NOTE: This plant is in Hot Standby > 300'F. Maintaining RCS inventory via Charging and secondary heat removal via Aux. Feed.
t 4.18 Direct Chemistry to obtain a CTMT air sam?le for CTMT entry.
! 4.19 Proceed to procedure 257988 for Cold Shutdown.
l
- 5. O!SCUSSION 5.1 This procedure was developed in accordance with the Millstone l
Point Unit #2 Appendix "R" Compliance Review as issued March 1987. This report takes into acs Jnt compliance with the I rules of Apperdix R 10CFR50 as updated per NRC staff positions, letters, seminars, and regional workshops.
O.
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f W ii CHEMICAL AND VOLUME -CONTROL SYSTEMS CVCS etcuas 2.
IM2107-s29--87I86002304 2//
.g _,_. . . ._ ,
5 1
. m.
). SECTION 3
.NJ OUESTION 3.02 part a.
'< Examinees may assume a cause for the given plant conditions ( i .e .
Exc9ss Steam Demand Event in containment), in which case a SIAS, CIAS and EBFAS could clso occur on a high containment pressure.
Y^ As an E9FAS would override the AEAS signal, credit should be g iven it' these actuations are assumed to occur.
gpESTION 3.07 Tho question did not clearly solicit a reason for each of the automatic actions, but the answer key requires a reason for full credit. Therefore, the reason part of the key answer should not be required for full credit.
l' OUESTION 3.08 part_b; The phrase "increasing S/G pressure" in the key answer should not
- be required for full credit. Steam Generator pressure is not an
()
%J input used for TM/LP calculations.
OUESTION 3.10 p. art b.
An explaitation that deals with the actual system response that will close the other five steam dump valves, should also be i
accepted for full credit. This includes Tavg less than the setpoint for the B, C, and D steam dumps or steam pressure less l than 'the atmospheric dump setpoint.
l l
l l'
l f
U
/"N I_).
s QUESTION 3.11 a. and e.
3.11 a.
. The D/G 12. 0 Trouble Annunciator will result ' from any one of 30 dif ferent conditions (reference attached) . Depending on which condition caused the Annunciator to alarm, any one of the answers
' given in'_ Column -B could be correct.
Examples
, 1.. If the annunciator alarms due to a "Lube oil Level Low" condition, the D/G wil.1 not trip and answer number 1. is Correct.
- 2. -If the annunciator alarms due to an "Engine Overspeed" condition, the D/G will trip under any- condition and answer number 2. is correct.
- 3. If the annunciator alarms due to a "Lube oil Temp. High" condition, the.D/G will trip, unless it had received an Emergency Start signal, and answer number 3. is correct.
Based on this, it is recommended that part a. be deleted.
( 3.11 e.
l !
A DC Control Power Failure will either 1) Not Trip the D/G, 2)
Trip the D/G unless an Emergency Start Signal is present or 3)
Cause the D/G to come up to speed on the mechanical governor with no trip protection (except overspeed). What will happen ' depends
- upon what portion or portions of DC Control Power is lost.
To determine what will happen to the D/G, refer to the circuit diagrams supplied.
- 1. Figure 8.3-2 Sheet 12 chows that the "Loss of Control DC,"
i Annunciator is caused by one of four relays: CR1, CR2, CR3, and CF4.
- l
- 2. Identifying each one of these relays we find thatt l
- a. CR1 is the relay that indicates a loss of power to the starting portion of the D/G Control Circuitry. Ret'er to Figure 8.3-2 Sheet 3.
4
-- , - - - - - - - - - - , - - . . . , - , . - , - - - - _ _ . , m- - -,
' r%
k_s - b. CR2 is the relay that indicates a loss of power to the shutdown and local starting portion of the D/G Control Circuitry. Refer to Figure 8.3-2 Sheet 4.
- c. CR3 is.the relay that indicates a loss of power to the automatic tripping and e nergency. shutdown portion of the D/G Control Circuitry. 3efer .to Figure 8.3-2 Sheet 5.
de CF4 is the relay that indicates a loss of power to the Exciter Control Circuitry. Refer to Figure 8.3-2 Sheet 10.
- 3. A loss of power to CR1, CR2 or CF4 will produce a D/G Trip signal. Refer to Figure 8.3-2 Sheet 6. Note that a loss of power to CR3 will not produce a DG trip signal since the trip circuitry must be de-energized for this relay to lose power. A loss of CR3 will' produce a "Loss of DC Control Power" annunciator, however, as shown on Figure 8.3-2 Sheet
, 12.
- 4. A Loss of power to CR1, CR2 or CF4 will not produce a D/G trip if an Emergency Start Signal is present. This is shown on Figure 8.3-2 Sheet 7. On an Emergency Start, the indicated ESS contact opens which prevents the Loss of DC Power Trip Signal from energizing the Shutdown Relay (SDR).
S. In addition to the above, a loss of power to the circuitry monitorod by either CR1 or CR2 will f ail open the Air Start Valves >ad roll the D/G with air. If the Trip Circuitry (CR3) . iso loses power, tb ? D/G will come up to speed and run with no trip protection available (except the overspeed trip) and the "Loss of DC Control Power" Annunciator in alarm.
- 6. The difference in response of the D/G to partial loss of
( strol power vice total loss of control power is covered on p4ges 106 and 107 of the D/G Instructor Guide (lesson plan c:cerpts attached).
I Based on the above information it is recommended that part e. be deleted.
(~')
~,-
.M . OP 2346A Page 17 Rev. 9 U Initial . ,
Monitor 008 E.D.G. voltmeter and frequency meters for proper indication.
Take corrective action as necessary to maintain 4.16kV and 60 hz. If 0/G' output voltage decreases to 4025 volts the undervoltage contact in the D/G output breaker opens, not allowing the breaker to automatically close on an LNP signal.
Subsequent determine cause of alarm, i.e., low frequency, overload, voltage regulator maladjustment or failwe.
Notify Electrical Maintenance Department, i
8.4 0/G 120 Trouble C08 A-36 0/G 13U Trouble C08 B-36 NOTE: Alarms on local Panel C38/C39.
8.4.1 Lube Oil Level Low C38/039 1-1 Initiating Device Setpoint 1.5-8795 Dip stick "add oil" mark. '
LS-8796 -- Dip stick "add oil" mark.
l Action:
Auto None Initial Determine cause of low oil level.
Subsequent
- 1. Submit trouble report / notify maintenance to add oil.
- 2. St red codrel p, vwe t %A Reset alarm M6decressd.
reut e fe it 3 Set on ePe t
- 3. If unit is removed from service r(efe)r to Section (j 2, License Requirements.
O
OP 2346A Page 18 ,
Rev. 9 O .
V 8.4.2 Lube Oil Pressure Low C38/C39 1-1 .
Initiating Device Setpoint PS-8785 16 PSI Decreasing PS-8784 18 PSI Decreasing PS-8783 20 PSI Decreasing PS-8788 20 PSI Decreasing PS-8787 18 PSI Decreasing PS-8786 16 PSI Decreasing Action:
Auto If no emergency start signal' (ESS) is present, engine will trip when alarm comes in. If an ESS is present, 2/3 pressure switches must actuate to trip unit.
Initial
- 1. Check oil sump level.
- 2. Check for oil leak or broken oil lines.
Subsequent I
s 1. Notify Maintenance Department of malfunction.
- 2. If unit is removed from service, refer to Section 2, License Requirements.
8.4.3 Lube Oil Temp. Low C38/C39 3-1 Initiating Device Setpoint OTLA 105'F Decreasing Action:
Auto ,
None Initial Determine cause of alarm:
- 1. Check standby heater in service and standby L.O.
pump operating if engine is shutdown.
- 2. Check temperature control valve operation if engine is running.
- 3. Verify proper valve alignment.
l l .
.l
OP 2346A Page 19 Rev. 9
, Subsequent ,
- 1. Notify Maintenanc9 Department of malfunction.
- 2. If unit is removed from service for maintenance, refer to Section 2 License Requirements.
8.4.4 Lube Oil Temp. High C38/039 4-1 ,
Initiatina Device Setpoint TS-8799 230*F Increasing TS-8800 230'F Increasing Action:
Auto If no emergency start signal present, unit will trip.
Initial Determine cause of high temperature alare:
- 1. Engine overload - reduce load.
- 2. Check cooling water supply pressure.
- 3. Check temperature control valve operating.
g 4. Check oil sump level normal.
V 5. Check pump discharge pressure.
- 6. Check D/G service. water flow and strainer AP for indication of. plugging. .
- 7. Verify vent fan operating with 0/G running.
Subsequent
- 1. Notify Maintenance Department of malfunction.
! 2. If un'it is removed from service, refer to Section 2, License Requirements.
8.4.5 Crank Case Pressure High C38/C39 5-1 Initiatina Device Setpoint PS-8791 +0.5" H 2O PS-8792 +0.5" H 2O I Action:
Auto If no ESS is present, unit will t:ip.
Initial Determine cause of alarm.
'(
4 OP 2346A Page 20 Rev. 9 CAUTION: If cause of alarm is high crankcase pressure, ,
do not remove r:rankcase inspection plates for one hour.
Subsequent
- 1. Notify Maintenance Department of malfunction.
- 2. If engine is removed from service, refer to Section 2, License Requirements.
8.4.6 Jacket Coolant Temp. Low C38/C39 3-2 Initiatina Device Setpoint TS-8775 90'F Oecreasing TS-8776 90*F Decreasing Action:
Auto None Initial g Determine CJuse of alarm:
V 1. Check standby heater in service and pump operating.
- 2. Check temperature control valve. operating if -
engine is running. . __. . ..
- 3. Check O/G service water flow secured if 0/G not running.
- 4. Verify vent fan not operating with O/G secured.
Subsequent
- 1. Notify Maintenance Department of malfunction.
- 2. If engine is removed from service, refer to Section 2, License Requirements.
8.4.7 Jacket Coolant Pressure Low C38/C39 2-2 4
Initiating Device Setpoint PS-8771 15 PSI Decreasing I
PS-8772 15 PSI Decreasing Auto If no emergency start signal present, unit will trip.
OP 2346A Page 21 Rev. 9 O
O Initial. .
Determine cause of alarm:
- 1. Check water level normal.
- 2. Check for obvious leaks.
- 3. Check proper alignment of valves.
Subsequent
- 1. Notify Maintenance Department of malfunction.
- 2. If unit is removed from service, refer to Section 2, License Requiretants.
8.4.8 Jacket Coolant Level Low C38/C39 1-2 Initiatino Device Setpoint LS-8769 Expansion Tank 15" from bottom LS-8770 Expansion Tank 15" from bottom Action:
Auto None Initial
\ Determine cause of alare:
- 1. Check level in expansion tank.
- 2. Check for obvious leaks.
Subsequent
- 1. If no leaks are found, fill to normal level (23"). Notify Chemistry for chemical sample / addition.
- 2. Notify Maintenance Department of malfunction.
- 3. If unit is removed from service, refer to Section 2, License Requirements.
8.4.9 Jacket Coolant Temp. High C38/C39 4-2 Initiatino Device Setpoint TS-8773 200*F Increasing TS-8774 200*F Increasing Action:
Auto If no emergency start signal present, unit will trip.
O
OP 2346A Page 22 Rev. 9 Initial .
Determine cause of alarm:
- 1. Engine overload - reduce load and determine cause of overload.
- 2. Check water level normal.
- 3. Check temperature control valve for proper operation.
- 4. Check operation of standby heating system.
- 5. Check system for obvious leaks.
- 6. Check 0/G service water flow and strainer AP indication for plugging. ,
- 7. Verify proper operation of 0/G vent fan.
Subsequent
- 1. Notify Maintenance Department of malfunction.
- 2. If unit is removed from service, refer to Section 2, license Requirements. .
8.4.10 Fuel Oil Pressure Low C38/C39 2-7
\ Initiatino Device Setpoint PS-7026 10 PSI Decreasing PS-7020 10.P.SI Decreasirs x_
Action:
Auto If no emergency start signal is present, unit will trip when fuel pressure reaches 10 psi.
Initial Determine cause of alarm:
1,_ Check oil supply tank level normal.
- 2. Check for obvious leaks.
- 3. Verify fuel oil supply open/ latched.
Subsequent
- 1. Notify Maintenance Department of malfunction.
- 2. If unit is removed from service, refer to i
Section 2, License Requirements. ,
, O 4
-- - - - , --. e
OP 2346A Page 23 Rev. 9 8.4.11 Engine Overspeed C58/C39 5-4 . ,
Initiating Device Setpoint Over Speed Governor 1050 RPM Action:
Auto Engine trip.
Ir.; tial Determine cause of overspeed:
- 1. Governor malfunction.
- 2. Loss of electrical load.
- 3. Emergency stop pushbutton at control end of engine.
Subsequent
,e NOTE: If alarm resets, then a faulty speed switch is indicated.
- 2. If action'in Step'1 is not successful, then
~" ' ~
operate the overspeed trip reset lever it'the control end of engine and then reset the alarm.
- 3. If engine and alarm reset, attempt to restart the engine.
- 4. Notify Maintenance Department of malfunction.
- 5. If unit is removed from service, refer to Section 2, License Requirements.
8.4.12 Fuel Oil Supply Tany Level Lo T-48A C38 1-7 Fuel Oil Supply Tank Level Lo T-48B C39 1-7 Initiating Device Setpoint LS7002 Hi/Lo 138"/132" (97%/92%)
LS7011 Hi/Lo 138"/132" (97%/92%)
O
OP 2346A Page 24 Rev. 9 Action: ,
Auto None Initial Determine if alarm is Hi or Low:
- 1. Check diesel oil transfer pump P47A/P47B breaker not tripped. -
- 2. Visually check level glass on supply tank.
3.. Check for leaks.
- 4. Check valve line up normal.
Subsequent
- 1. Notify Maintenance Department of malfunction.
- 2. If unit is removed from service, refer to Section 2, License Requirements.
- 3. If low level is due to malfunction of transfer pump, the tank may be filled using other transfer pump and normally locked closed crosstie valve as per Operating Procedure No 2S468.
l 8.4.13 Engine Start Failure C38/C39 5-3 _ _
Initiatina Device ,,. Setpoint__
TD1 12 Sec. Engine Crank Time
! Action:
Auto Blocks engine start thru shutdown relay.
Initial l Determine cause of alarm:
- 1. Check other alarm drops and verify support components operable.
- 2. Check starting air pressure normal and no air leaks.
Subsequent
- 1. If any of the above were corrected, reset shutdown relay and attempt another start.
m U
t
OP 2346A Page 25 Rev. 9
- 2. If none of the'above: ,
- a. Notify Maintenance Department of malfunction,
- b. If unit is removed from service, refer to ,
Section 2, License Requirements.
8.4.14 Starting Air Pressure Low C38/C39 3-7 Initiatino Device Setpoint PS-8314 A (B) 150 PSI Decreasing PS-8818 A (B) 150 PSI Decreasing Action:
Auto None Initial Determine cause of slarm:
l
- 1. Check A.C. and 0.C. air compressor operation and ci.'cuit breaker closed. ;
- 2. Check air dryer valve lineup.
( 3. Check for air leaks or lifting relief valve.
- 4. Check air receiver air pressure local indication
! to verify possible faulty pressure switch.
- 5. Ensure air compressor returns pressure to normal.
Subsequent j 1. If any of above conditions were found and/or corrected, verify pressure returned to normal.
- 2. If condition not corrected, notify Maintenance Department.
- 3. If unit is removed from service, refer to Section 2, License Requirements.
8.4.15 D.C. Control Power Failure C38/C39 3-4 '
Initiating Device Setpoint CR1, CR2 or CR3 Relay Loss of 125 V.D.C.
V .
OP 2346A Page 26 Rev. 9 f ( Action:
. Auto Engine Air start valves fail open an loss of 125 VOC.
Engine will come up to speed on mechanical (governor with no protection).
Initial
- 1. Determine if alarm is valid.
- 2. Trip 0/G locally using mechanical overspeed trip and shut starting air isolation valves.
- 3. Determine cause of loss of 125 dc check circuit breaker No. 20 in 125 vdc distribution panel 201A-1V (15G-120) 2018-1V (15G-13V) closed.
Subse_quent
- 1. Notify Electrical Maintenance of malfunction. ,
- 2. If unit is removed from service, refer to Section 2, License Requirements.
8.4.16 480V t.uxilicry Power loss 2-4
{ %
Initiatinn Device C38/C39 Setpoint 74 Relay .
N/A Action: -
Auto None Initial Determine cause of alarm: ,
Subsequent
- 1. Notify Electrical Maintenance Department.
- 2. If unit is removed from service, refer to Section 2, license Requirements.
- 8.4.17 Generator Bearing Temp. High C38/C39 1-5 Initiatina Device Setpoint TE 9370B, TE 9371B, 85'C 185'F TE 93710, TE9370D
OP 2346A Page 27 Rev. 9
, D .
O, Action: .
Auto None Initial Determine cause of alare: -
- 1. Check bearing oil level. -
- 2. Check temperature with hand held pyrometer or similar device.
Subsequent 4
- 1. Notify Maintenance Department and Instrument Department of malfunction.
- 2. If unit is removed from service, refer to Section 2, License Requirements.
8.4.18 Generator Undervoltage C38/C39 1-6 Initiatina Device Setpoint 27/59-1 27/59-2 N/A Action:
Os Auto None Initial Determine cause of alare:
- 1. Take manual voltage control and return voltage to normal.
Subsequent
- 1. Notify Electrical Maintenance Department of malfunction.
- 2. If unit is removed from service, refer to Section 2, License Requirements.
8.4.19 Generator Underfrequency C38/C39 3-6 Initiating Device Setpoint 81/X N/A Action:
Auto ,
Generator breaker "15G-12U-2" or "15G-13U-2" trip.
i OP 2346A Page 28 Rev. 9 O Initial Determine cause of trip by relay operation, record and reset the relay.
Subsequent
- 1. Notify Electrical Maintenance Department of malfunction.
- 2. If unit is removed from service, refer to Section 2, License Requirements.
8.4.20 Generator Lockout Trip C38/C39 5-5 Initiatino Device Setpoint 86 Relay N/A Action:
Auto Generator breaker "15G-12U-2" or "15G-13U-2" trip.
Initial Determine cause of trip by relay operation, record l and reset the relay (s).
Subsequent
- 1. Notify Electrical Maintenance Department of malfunction. -
- 2. If unit is removed from service, refer to Section 2 License Requirements.
8.4.21 Generator Non-Lockout Trip C38/C39 5-6 Initiatino Device Setpoint Reverse Power Relay - 32 Relay N/A Voltage Restraint Overcurrent -
51V Relay Core Balance Ground Fault -
50 GS Relay Overcurrent (Instantaneous) 50 Relay Action:
Auto Generator breaker "15G-12U-2" or "15G-130-2" trip.
O
I OP 2346A Page 29 Rev. 9 Initial .
Determine cause of trip by relay operation, record and reset the relay (s).
Subsequent j
- 1. Notify Electrical Maintenance Department of i l
malfunction.
- 2. If unit is removed from service, refer to Section 2, License Requirements.
S.4.22 Generator Neutral Ground Fault C38/C39 4-5 Initiatina Device Setpoint 59/SI Relay N/A Action:
Auto None Initial Determine cause of alarm by relay operation, record and reset the relay (s).
I O Subsequent
- 1. Notify Electrical Maintenance Department of
~
malfunction. - -
- 2. If unit is removed from service, refer to Section 2, License Requirements.
8.4.23 Generator Excitati,r. i.oss C38/C39 3-5 Initiatina Device Setpoint 40/76 hlay N/A Action:
Auto None Initial Determine cause of alarm:
- 1. Reset exciter and verify alarm clears.
- 2. Check O.C. control power available.
OP 2346A Page 30 Rev. 9 Subsequent ,
- 1. Notify Electrical Maintenance Department.
- 2. If unit removed from service, refer to Section 2, License Requirements.
8.4.24 Service Water Flow Low C38/C39 5-7 Initiatina Device Setpoint FS 6389 500 GPM FS 6397 500 GPM Action:
Auto None Initial Determine cause of low flow condition:
- 1. Check service water pump in operation and system pressure normal.
- 2. Check differential pressure (local gages) on service water strainer to determine if strainer is plugging.
- 3. D/G heat exchanger (s) inlet flow control valve open and operating properly.
- 4. Check for obvious leaks.
- 5. Check possible faulty flow switch.
- 6. Check engine lube oil and jacket cooling water temperature normal.
- 7. If service water flow cannot be established, shutdown the diesel within 3 minutes.
Subsequent
- 1. Notify Maintenance Department and/or Instrument
> Department of malfunction.
- 2. If engine is removed from service, refer to Section 2, License Requirements.
OP 2346A Page 31 Rev. 9 O . .
8.4.25 Generator Stator Temp. High C38/C39 2-5 .
Initiatino Device Setpoint Thermal Relay 49 Il0*C Action:
Auto -
None Initial Reduce load on generator:
- 1. Verify D/G room ventilation fans operating.
- 2. Verify power factor (reactive load) normal.
- 3. Verify no obstruction in vent. intake or that ventilation system has malfunctioned.
Subsequent
- 1. Continue to minimize diesel load if possible.
If diesel is not vital to safe plant operation, unload diesel and run at "0" load to promote
! O cooling of stator.
- 2. If diesel is vital to safe plant operation, attempt to promote a second source of Cooling air: ._ .. . --
- a. Open doors of affected room.
l b. Set up portable booster fans,
l 8.4.26 4160V Auxiliary Power loss C38/C39 1-4 Initiatir.o Device Setpoint 27-X1/15G-22S3 N/A 27-X2/15G-2253 N/A Action:
NOTE: This alarm indicates an under voltage condition between bus 24G and buses 24C/24D.
1 . - -
OP 2346A Page 32 Rev. 9 t0 .
' ..Auto:
- 1. Actuation of either 0/G 4160V auxiliary power loss alarm relay initiates interlocking which prevents closing the RSST feeder breakers 2253-24C-2 and 2253-240-2.
NOTE: The above automatic action will inhibit any attempt to parallel the 0/G's with the 345 KV System in the event of an undervoltage condition on the 345 KV System RSST or the feeder breaker from 24G to 24C/240 is not closed.
Initial:
- voltage normal (GETAC and C08 indication).
l 2. Verify RSST feeder breaker 24C/240 is closed.
Subsequent
- 1. If above conditions are satisfied reset the
~ ~
alarm at the 0/G skid mou'nte'd panel (s).
~
- 2. If alarm resets 'a'n'd' LNP recoveiy"operation is in progress proceed with recovery operation.
- 3. If alarm cannot be reset notify maintenance to investigate and initiate repairs.
- 4. If alarm was actuated due to maintenance on bus 24G ensure alarm is reset following restoration of bus 24G to normal.
8.4.27 0.C. Air Compressor Started C38/039 4-7 l Initiating Device Setpoint l PS79850/B 42/a Relay 190 PSI Decreasing Action:
Auto D.C. compressor starts.
4
OP 2346A Page 33 Rev. 9 Initial Determine cause of alarm:
- 1. Check A.C. compressor hand switch in auto.
- 2. Check A.C. compressor circuit breaker closed.
- 3. Check air dryer valve lineup.
- 4. Check for air leaks or relief valve lifting. ,
- 5. Check air pressure recovery.
Subsequent Determine cause of low pressure condition:
- 1. Notify Maintenance Department of malfunction.
- 2. If unit is removed from service, refer to Section 2, License Requirements.
8.4.28 Generator Overvoltage C38/C37 2-6 Initiatina Device Setpoint 27/59.2 27/59.2 N/A Action:
Auto None.
Initial Determine cause' of alarm:
- 1. Take manual voltage control and return voltage to normal.
Subsequent
- 1. Notify Electrical Maintenance Department of malfunction.
- 2. If unit is removed from service, refer to Section 2, License Requirements.
8.4.29 Aux. Control Sw. Not in Auto Position C38/C39 4-4 Jniti,*'ig_ Device Setpoint RS1 u. $$3, RS4 N/A A .
A Actiori
! Auto None.
OP 2346A Page 34 Rev. 9 b) v Initial Oetermine cause of alarm:
- 1. Check auxiliary control switches in auto position.
- a. Coolant Pump
- b. Coolant Heater
- c. Lube Oil Pump
- d. Lube Oil Heater Subsequent
- 1. If alarm is due to switch malfunction, notify Electrical Maintenance Dept.
8.4.30 Fuel Oil Supply Valve Shut C38 A-10 C39 A-10 Initiatina Device Setpoint i PS 7026A 3 PSIG PS 7020A 3 PSIG Action This is an operator alert alarm to provide Note:
iridication to the operator tha't the fuel.
oil su;, ply valve to the diesel engine (s) is -
closed.
Auto Unit will not start or will trip if running. (See Section 8.4.10)
Initial
- 1. Dispatch operator to determine cause of alarm (i.e
- valve tripped due to fire, PM's, or break in fuel oil line.
CAUTION: VALVES 2-FO-79 (80)ARE THERMALLY TRIPPED AS WELL AS MANUALLY TRIPPE0. CHECK CAREFULLY TO ENSURE VALVE STEM IS ACTUALLY OPEN (UP)
FOLLOWING RESET ACTION OR WHEN CHECKING VALVE OPEN.
O
OP 2346A Page 35 Rev. 9 kjQ Subsequent: ,
- 1. If valve is tripped due to fire, initiate A0P 2559.
- 2. If valve is tripped due to performance of preventative maintenance, ensure valve is properly reset following the completion of
~
maintenance.
- 3. If low pressure is due to line break, Solate the fuel oil at the supply tank.
- 4. Refer to oicense Requirements, Section 2.
8.5 D/G 12U (13U) Greaker Closing'Ckt. Blocked C08 C-36 C08 0-36 Initiatina Device Setpoint 3 Relay / Operate N/A Action:
Auto None.
O Initial
- 1. Determine cause of alarm:
1.1 If breaker trips when removing D/G from service on reverse power or maintenance has been performed on breaker; reset alarm by leaving Syn. Switch in off and using breaker control switch on C08, go to close and then back to trip.
d
- 2. If alarm does not reset verify operability of the other 0/G and associated equipment.
Subsequent
- 1. Determine cause of trip by relay operation, record and reset the relay (s).
- 2. Notify Electrical Maintenance Department of malfunction.
- 3. If unit is in-operable, refer to Section 2, License Requirements.
O .
O INSTRUCTOR GHDE O e ID-M2-RO-ELECT-2346 IESSO4: EMERGENCY DIESEL GDERATOR ARO SLBSYST1!MS Rev 0 Date 12-16-85 INS 11tDCTOR AIDS C0KNNr INSTRUCTOR / STUDENT ACTIVITY
- 1) Electrical - energizes SDR.
,l
- 2) Setpoint is 225*F.
- h. Engine Start Failure
- 1) Electrical - energizes SDR.
- 2) If the engine cranks for Adequate lube oil pressure is 12 seconde and does not reach 13 psig.
a speed of 250 RPM or establish adequate lube oil pressure, the diesel will trip.
- i. DC Control Power Failure This trip actuates on partial A
M 2 //e_ , _ _ _
of DC control power to the ;
Diesel.
>c
. .: . Page 106 of 137
O INSTRUCTOR GUIDE O O ID-M2-RO-ELECT-2346 LESSON: DERGENCY DIESEL GDERATOR Af0 SWLSYSTEMS Rev 0 Date 12-16-85 INSTRUCTOR AIDS C0pmNr INSTEUCTOR/ STUDENT ACTIVITY On a total loss of DC the
'3' / /e_ Diesel will start and come up to speed but the breaker will not close becanism of the loss of control power.
- 1) Electrical - energizes SDR.
- 2) Loss of 125V DC control power.
- 3. Diesel Generator Breaker Trips
- a. Generator Underfrequency
- 1) 81/X relay.
- b. Generator Non-h>ckout.
- 1) Reverse Power.
Page 107 of 137
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(~N i SECTION 4
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\J QUESTION 4.03 a.
The question requires the candidate to state four of the steps which must be taken to place the Enclosure Building Filtration Systems (EBFS) in service during an Electrical Emergency. The guidance for performing this is contained in EOP 2528, Electrical Emergency, step 3.11, Contingency Actions. As such, it is not expected that licensees perform this step f rom memory. The answer key lists five steps; the procedure lists six steps.
Steps four and five of the key answer (EOP 2528 steps 3.11 e and 3.11 f) describe actions that remove the Condenser Air Removal System from Service.
Full credit should be given for describing actions taken which will start EBFS.
QUESTION 4.04 b.
The key answer contains four steps which are performed to initiate emergency boration. In addition to these steps, credit should be given for stating thats n
(,) o If the boric acid pumps fail to start, open the gravity feed valves.
o If the gravity feed valves are being used, close the volume control tank outlet valve.
These steps are performed if the boric acid pumps fail to start during emerger.cy boration.
Reference:
AOP 2558, Rev. O, steps 4.3 and 4.4.
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[ ! QUESTION 4.08 LJ The key answer states the guidance that is contained in AOP 2551 for closing the MSIV's f rom outside the control room. In that the candidato did not have this procedure available when answering the question, full credit should be given for describing alternatives which result in MSIV closure. Two alternatives includes o closing the MSIV's from the bottle up panels, C70A and B (The bottle up panels are located outside of the control room)
Reference:
AOP 2579A, Rev. 2, step 4.5 o locally isolating instrument air at the MSIV's and then bleed the air pressure from the operating cylinders and accumulators
Reference:
Drawing attached QUESTION 4.10 a.
The key answer lists five indications of a misaligned CEA which
(~~N are found in the Entry conditions to AOP 2556, Dropped CEA
\,s,) Recovery. Additional indications, not used as Entry Conditions, should also receive credit. These include:
- 1. Rod drop alarm on the RPS.
- 2. CEA Group Deviation annunciator.
- 3. CEA Group Gross Deviation annunciator.
- 4. CEA Group deviation backup annunciator.
- 5. CEA Motion Prohibit annunciator.
References:
M2-OP-RO-I&C-2380-2, pg 19 and 20 OP 2302A, Rev. 9, Sections 8.6, 8.7 8.8, 8.9, 8.15, 8.25 LJ
a QUESTION 4.11.b.
The question asks for "an" indication of RCS leakage . . . ,
implying that one answer is required.
l The key answer lists two indications, each worth one half of the total point value.
Full credit should be awarded for either of the key answers.
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l thermal power, with a simultaneous loss of the condenser l heat sink. No credit is taken for the Atmospheric Dumps in this analysis. Each code safety valve taps off the main steam line and exhausts to the roof of the Enclosure Building separately. The combined flow of all main steam line code safety valves is adequate to relieve 12,700,000 lbs/ hour which corresponds to 108% of the steam flow generated at 2700 MWt.
P. Main Steam Isolation Valves (MSIVs); 2-MS-64A/B The main steam isolation valves (see rigure 13), one per steam line, serve to limit an excessive Reactor Coolant System (RCS) cooldown rate and the resultant reactivity insertion following an excess steam demand event. The MSIVs are air operated, swing disc valves which vill autonictically close on a low pressure signal f rom either steam generator at a setpoint of not less than 500 psia.
Welded to the downstream portion of the MSIV is a non-Os return valve (2-MS-1A/B), so the assembly actually consists of two opposing disc check valves, one held open by an air operator and the other opened by the steam flowing through it. Technical Specifications require that the air operated valves close within six seconds.
The air operated MSIV contains a spring which assists it in closing by forcing the dise dow.. into the flow-path. The purpose of the spring is to overcome mechanical binding in the stem and to provide a positive The MSIVs fail closed on a loss of air. To closure.
07 prevent an inadvertent closure of the MSIvs on a 1oss of 4 O 8
instrument air, accumulators are placed at the valves p
and will, providing the system is intact, keep the MSIVs
- open for approximately 30 minutes. An alarm will annunciate in the Control Room (C05) whenever the air pressure downstream of the accumulator is less than 70 psig (see rigure 14). Located at the top of the C05 vertical section, on either side of the main steam isolation valve mimic, are the control switches for the air operated disc. Each MSIV utilizes a pair of thumbswitches to operate the two pairs of solenoid valves that control air supplying the MSIV operator.
The solenoid valves are controlled in parallel, such that triggering either circuit (by turning one thumb-switch or actuating one MSI channel) will isolate both air supplies to the MSIV operator and vent any entrapped air, ensuring the MSIV closes. This solenoid valve arrangement will also require that both solenoid operating circuits be ' reset" to allow the MSIV to open.
At a minimum steam generator pressure of 500 psia, as sensed by the Engineered Safeguards Actuation System the (ESAS), both MSIVs will automatically isolate. This is an attempt by ESAS to isolate a potential steam line break and limit the amount of RCS cooldown. When this occurs, an "MSI ACTUATION" alarm on Col will annunciLte.
In order to perform a plant cooldown (and consequently drop Main Steam pressure) in which the condenser is utilized, it is necessary to block the MSI signal. When pressure in each SG is less than 600 psia, a permissive signal ac'tuates to provide annunciation on the col alarm panel. The operator then initiates the MSI Block by depressing two pushbuttons on Col. When the MSI is blocked, an annunciator on Col provides confirmation of this, and the plant cooldown may now continue.
O 9
l!
() SECTION 5 :
OUESTION 5.08 a. ,
i The answer key gives core size as one of the 4 factors which af fect the convergence or divergence of a Xenon oscillation. +
While this is true, the design of the core gives a fixed size.
The "effective" size of the core can be changed, however, by the positioning of the Group 7 CEAs. Based on this, CEA position as well as core size should be accepted as an adequate answer.
QUESTION 5.10 This question gives reactivity in units of both delta k/k and
- pcm. At Millstone 2 the operators only use units of delta k/k (or 4 delta k/k) and are not required to use units of pcm. Based '
on this it is recommended that no credit is taken off for
- - incorrect conversions between pcm and delta k/k.
t i
OUESTION 5.11 a.
In this part of the question on ECP vs. Actual CEA position, it j
O is stated that one RCP trips two minutes prior to criticality.
If this did happen, a Reactor Trip due to RCS Low Flow would occur making the pull to criticality impossible. (Reference j attached). ;
Based on this information, it is recommended that Part a. be deleted.
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'V TEXT MATERIAL APPROVAL SHEET I. Text
Title:
Reactor Protection Systein Descriptic ID4: M2-OP-RO-I&C-2380-1 Rev 1 Date 6 87 II. In tiated:
ms 6-30-87 DEVELOPER' DATE III. REVIEWED:
f Ye TECHNICAL REVIEWER'
__ 9h/87 DATE U ~
mv W ~i ' d ~ $ Y DATE INSTRUCTIONAL REVIEWER G IV. APPROVED:
c' c- / '
CLEAR TRAINING SUPERVISOR / DATE V. RELEASED FOR USE:
l !?N(4LL&
NU7 LEA TRAINING SUPERVISOR
//f DA/E i
SYSDESC #6(5)
,3- The variable setpoint functions as shown on figure
(/ 20. As power is reduced from 100% the peak power detector (peak detector) will continually detect the maximum power and keep the trip setpoint within 9.6% of that power. The pretrip and reset alarm setpoints are reduced similarly. During a power increase, setpoints can only be reset manually. When power increases to within 4% of the existing trip setpoint the backlighted pushbuttons on the RPSCIP and C04 will illuminate to alert the operator to the ~ need to reset the trip setpoint. Depressing either of that channel's reset pushbuttons at any time will change the trip setpoint to 9.6% above the existing power level. If actual power approaches j to within 2% of the variable trip setpoint a l pretrip will occur. Setpoints remain constant at constant power level.
(V 8. Low Reactor Coolant System Flow Trip, (figure 22) q, d ik1 Four differential pressure transmitters per SG continuously monitor the delta P between the SG T cold plenum and its respective T hot leg. The channel A dp for SG 1 is summed with thf channel A dp for SG 2 after the square root of the signal is determined. The square root function provides a more linear flow signal to the trip unit. The flow trip setpoint and pretrip setpoint can reduced with the FDSSS if the license is amended to permit less than four pump operation.
The low flow trip can be bypassed with the four Zero Power Mode Bypass keys when power is less than 10-'% to permit low power physics testing.
O Rev 1 6/87 23
l The trip setpoint is 91.7% of actual flow. Since
\_/ actual flow is 121% of design flow, the reactor will trip before flow decreases to the design full flow value.
Indication of each safety channel's flow is displayed on CO-3. Measured flow is only used for control board display and the low flow trip, other trips requiring a flow input use the number of pumps running to generate an artificial flow value.
- 9. Local Power Density Trip (figure 23)
Local Power Density (LPD) trip is a complex trip requiring the use of a Core Protection Calculator (CPC) drawer for calculation of the setpoints, and l a location for the trip and pretrip contacts.
O- The uncalibrated lineer range nuclear instrumentation upper (U) and lower (L) subchannels are mathematically combined as illustrated on figure 23 to yeild YE which represents the axial distribution of power. YE i (external tilt) is modified' by two shape annealing factors A and B. "A" accodnts for f
l uneven neutron shielding of the detectors by structural materials. "B" compensates for the overlapping of the neuti:ons emanating from the lower and upper halves of the core. The resultant l
! value, YI, (internal tilt) is displayed on the control board, is compared with the LPD trip and pretrip setpoints, and is provided to the TM/LP calculator.
Rev 1 6/87 24
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t SECTION 6 j
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QUESTION 6.03'.b.
The question requires the candidate to use a HPSI pump curve provided to determine HPSI flow rate at a given pressure.
The key answer allows for + or - 50 gpm when making this de terminat ion . Based on the pump curve provided, which does not contain an accurate grid, this allowance should be increaseu.
Plus or minus 100 gpm is recommended.
QUESTION 6.04 b.
The key answer states that (the quick open permissive switch is used) "when there might be radioactivity in a SG." The reference sited (RRS pg 10, 11, 12) includes this information for historical design purposes. The reference uses the words "The switch was included to permit . . . " It is not currently used for this purpose. AOP 2569, Steam Generator Tube Leak, contains no guidance concerning its use.
The ensvar key should be changed to accept, for full credit, a
(~N response that indicates that this switch is used to protect
\ms) personnel when draining condensation from the valves and mufflers. -
Reference:
RRS System Description, page 11.
QUESTION 6.06 b.
The key answer indicates that the TMLP trip setpoint will "dearease" as ASI changes from 0.0 to -0.1. This is incorrect.
The TMLP trip setpoint will increase under this condition.
QUESTION 6.06 c.
If the candidate assumes that the plant trips due to the RCP trip (as it would), the key answer is correct, the TMLP trip setpoint will decrease to its floor value.
If the candidate considers RCS flow as the only variable of concern when answering the question, then "no effect" is correct.
Actual flow is not an input into the TMLP trip circuitry.
I U
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(U ) QUESTION 6.06 e.
The key answer indicates that the TMLP trip setpoint will decrease when a linear power range channel (safety) fails high.
This is incorrect. The TMLP trip setpoint will increase under this condition.
The key answers should be revised accordingly.
Reference:
T.S. 2.2 Figures 2.2-3, 2.2-4 OUESTION 6.07 g.
The key answer le "No Effect", describing the response of the MSIV's to a complete loss of instrument air.
The MSIV's are equipped with air accumulators which serve to hold the valves open for a period of time following a degradation in instrument air pressure. Without a time frame for consideration indicated in the exam question, the response could correctly be either "no ef fect" or "fails closed."
The key answer should be changed to accept for full credit either "no effect" or "Fail Closed."
(
Reference:
Main Steam System Description, pg 8-9 OUESTION 6.08 b.
The key answer requires specific pressure values for various seal conditions. No allowance is included in the key for variations f rom the specif ied values.
The key should be changed to allow for i 15 psi for vapor seal pressures and i 100 psi for all other pressure.
l QUESTION 6.11 c.
l The circuit that prevents the containment spray pump from responding under the conditions specified in the exam question is the "Main Generator Final Coastdown Circuit" (
Reference:
Containment Spray System Description, page 6). Detailed l
i knowledge of this circuit is not required by our learning objectives.
The exam should be changed to eliminate part C.
!O
SECTION 7
()t OUESTION 7.01 The question refers to a note contained within a-procedural step entitled "Boration without Boric Acid Pumps available" . The title of the step was not made available to the candidate.
Taking the note out of the context prevents the examinee from interpreting the meaning of "automatic boration unavailable".
Therefore, an answer giving the boric acid storage tanks as a source of makeup should be accepted for full credit.
Reference AOP 2551, pg. 6& 7, step 4.20 QUESTION 7.03 The question asks that three alternate methods of depressuring the RCS be given if auxiliary spray is inoperable.
The objectives listed in the TPG for AOP-2553 do not require the students to memorize alternate actions. In fact, the objectives specifically state that procedures must be used for two of the alternate methods mentioned in the procedure.
73 (Reference attached).
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'"' Based on this it is recc.nmended that any reasonable method of depressurizing the RCS should be accepted as an answer.
QUESTION 7.04
- 1. Theg answer go Part a. states that the cooldown limit below 300 F is 30 F/Hr.g This is incorrect. The cooldown limit
, below 300 F is 30 F/Hr. (Reference attached).
a l 2. Part b. of the question asks what combination of three RCPs
. will provide the highest spray flow. The objectives listed in the TPG for OP-2207 do not require the students to
^
, memorize these pump combinations. (Reference attached).
, Additionally, the key answer is incorrect (References attached).
Based on this it is recommended that part b. be deleted.
( 3. Part d. asks why the charging Header Valves must be closed l when securing auxiliary spray. As a matter of fact, these
! valves must be opened when securing auxiliary spray in order to ensure that the charging pumps have a discharge flowpath.
l _s (Reference attached).
- Based on this it is recommended that part d. be deleted.
l l
fm_ OUESTION 7.06 b.
"') The question asks for the restrictions on plant operation in Mode 1 based on the stated conditions. The question does not ask for Tech. Spec. references or time limits.
Based on the information given in the question, both D/G's are inoperable (T.S. 3.8.1.1). And both Service Water headers are inoperable based on the provisions of T.S. 3.0.5.
Both of the above technical specifications prevent continued operation in Mode 1.
Additionally, the time limits associated with the actions of these technical specifications do not require memorization.
Based on the above, the correct answer to the question should be that Continued Operation in Mode 1 is not Possible. No other information should be required.
QUESTION 7.10 a.
! The answer to this question fails to include the possibility of j opening the Gravity Feed Valves to perform a boration of the RCS.
l This method of boration can be used based on the Emergency D Boration Procedure: AOP 2558 and Emergency Operating Procedure 2540A (which is referenced in the boration step, 3.1, of EOP 2525).
Based on this information it is recommended that an additional correct answer would be: ,
Open Gravity Feed Valves (2-CH-508, 509)
Close VCT Outlet Valve (2-CH-501)
Start all available charging pumps 00ESTION 7.11
- 1. Part a. of this question asks when it is permissible to not l isolate a ruptured Steam Generator. The answer key only L gives one answer: If the ruptured SG is the only one 2vailable for heat removal. Based on the SGTR EOP, there are additional correct answers:
I b
If RCS T is not below 570 F, the faulted SG should'not be isola $ed.
- 'The faulted SG may be unisolated to prevent overfilling.
- The faulted SG may be unisolated to cooldown the SG.
Based on this information it is recommended that any of the above answers also be accepted for full credit. (Reference attached).
-2._ part c. The additional correct information that the bypass key is installed to allow for control of the PORV should be accepted.
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_ , _ . _ - _ . . _ - . _ - _ - . . - . . - _ .~ .. _ . ._ -..__ _ - -
AOP 2551 Page 6 Rev. 4 4.19.9 Operate the Boric Acid' pumps for the required time k determined above, then stop the Boric Acid pumps.
4.19.10 Manually close 2-CH-514, 4.19.11 Operate the pressurizer sprays and backup heaters from Panel C-21 to facilitate mixing.
4.19.12 After allowing. time for complete mixing, have the Chemistry Department determine the new boron concentration of the reactor coolant system.
4.19.13 Repeat Steps 1 through 12 if necessary, until the desire boron concentration is established.
),O, .4;20-Sorstion:without;3 erie: Acid paspsfavailabhase:,
CAUTION: When the VCT outlet, 2-CH-501, is shut and charging pump suction is frota the RWST, a high level in the VCT will divert letdown to the Clean Radwaste System continuously at the charging rate to the RCS.
4.20.1 Determine total addition time required per O 4.20.2 Steps 4.19.1 thru 4.19.5.
Open the power supply breakers to 2-CH-508 (BS151),
2-CH-509 (85149), and 2-CH-501 (85145)L_l1 4.20.3 Open the Boric Acid Gravity feed valfei,) 2-CH-508 and 2-CH-509, using the local handwheels.
NOTE: No boric acid flow will result if the outlet from the VCT is open, due to the differential in supply head.
~
O
A0P 2551 Page 7 Rev. 4 4.20.4 Close the outlet valve from the VCT, 2-Cri-510 (local manual) and commence timing. When the total addition time has lapsed, align charging pump suction to the RWST by opening 2-CH-504 (local manual) and 2-CH-19?
2-CH-192 must be opened by makegg to/from RWST.
installation an air jumper around the solenoid.
If not, Ensure 2-CH-196 VCT makeup bypass is closed.
fail the air to the air operator and the valve will go closed.
..w p . " - .
With automatic boration unavailable, makeup ch.
to the RCS must be from the RWST to ensure that the boron concentration is greater than or equal to that of the RCS.
_ # M
1 4.20.5 Close the boric acid gravity feed valves, 2-CH-508 and 2-CH-509.
) Carry out Steps 4.19.11 and 4.19.12.
4.20.6
- 5. FIGURES None l 6. DISCUSSION It is highly improbable that habitation of the control room could be lost since fire protection is afforded and Scott air packs, as well as air line breathing masks, are available. Comunications can be l
maintained throughout this procedure using in-plant telephones, f
maintenance jacks or walkie-talkies. All operations will be dir2cted by the Shift Supervisor. In the event that the control room is evacuated because of fire, the fire brigade duties should be performed by Unit 1 personnel, so that Unit 2 personnel can complete operations required for a safe shutdown.
BN: kdy O
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/drawJ. dnw,n - ialackey F6rm Ap t ved bglTo nlcol Systcms Monagor Effedtiv4 Dato
/i TRAINEE PERFORMANCE GUIDE (TPG)
'V training Programs geplacement operator Unit MP-2 TPG Number: 2553 (0) /All Task Areas Plant Cooldown using Natural Circulation Critical Task: x Yes No Operations Approval: M/h f/ '
TERf1INAL OBJECTIVE:
Wh i l e "a t the control board with the plant in a Hot Standby condition and Natural Circulation in progress conduct a plant cooldown using AOP 2553.
ENABLING OBJECTIVES:
- 1. From memory discuss with an instructor, the following as they apply to a Plant Cooldown using Natural Circulation.
() a. The indications that Natural Circulation is in progress.
- b. Conditions that contribute to the formation of vdids.' ~
- c. Indications that voiding-is present'.
- d. Criteria that indicates voiding is not interfering with heat removal.
I e. Uhy cold shutdown boron concentration is maintained 100 ppn greater than required by OP 2208.
(
).00>2nysinenthe-dbisancelprov,igins AOPJ553,, discuss with an t
instructor actions taken at specified temperatures and/or pressures during the cooldown to include:
- a. Blocking SIAS.
?> . Blocking f1SI.
- c. Closing SIT outlet isolation valves.
1 1
- d. Shutdown cooling valve lineup.
~T e. Shutdown cooling initiation.
[V f. Peducing RCS temperature below 230 P.
DIF-106 Page 1 of 4 p,y, i 1
() 2553(0)/All - Plant Cooldown using Natural Circulation - cont.
t .
- 3. Perform shutdown margin and boration calculations using 4.1 OP 2208.
- a. Calculate a cold shutdown boron concentration given present core burnup. (2208/5.2)
- b. Given plant conditions and a desired RCS boron concen-tration, calculate the required boric acid addition.
(2208/5.3)
- c. Given plant conditions calculate a blended makeup.
(2208/5.3)
- 4. Control pressurizer level while RCS heat removal is by 4.2 Natural Circulation.
- a. Use Figure 2304A-1 and LI-103 (cold calibrated) to determine actual pressurizer level.
- b. Operate the letdown flow controller in "manual" to
() c.
control letdown flow. (2304A/7.3)
Operate the letdown back pressure controller in "Auto"
(
to control letdown flow. (2304A/7.3) _ _ . _ . . _
l d. Manually operate charging pumps us.ing OP.2304E.
- g. .
(2304E/7.0)
- e. Use control room switches to manually initiate HPSI flow and verify flow using available indications.
(2306/ Generic, 01/ Generic)
- S. Control pressurizer pressure while RCS heat removal is by 4.3 Natural Circulation.
- a. Use control room switches and controllers to operate any CVCS component required to initiate auxiliary spray and verify its operation using available indicators. (2304/ Generic, 01/ Generic)
- b. Manually operate charging pumps using OP 2304E.
(2304E/7.0)
- c. Use control room switches to manually initiate HPSI flow and verify flow using available indicators.
(2306/ Generic, 01/ Generic) '
)
- d. Reduce pressurizer pressure by providing a flow path (d2, 7.0 3 from the pressurizer to the Quench Tank through a l
PORV using OP 23010. (2301D/7.1.23) l Page 2 of 4
() 2553(0)/A11 - Plant Cooldown using Natural Circulation - cont.
(
- 5, cont.-
~7 g3 e. Cool the pressurizer by filling and draining using the guidance provided in OP 2207.(2207/5.17)
- 6. Given plant conditions, use control room reference material 4.0
.to determine the method to use for Steam Generator heat removal and water level control.
- 7. Maintain Steam Generator water level when cooling down: 4.0
'a . Operate the "A" turbine bypass valve controller in manual to control cooldown. (2316A/ Generic)
- b. Operate the Atmospheric Dump valve (s) in manual to control the cooldown. (2316A/ Generic)
- c. Control Steam Gens;ator level with the Main Feedwater System using OP 2321.
Control Steam Generator level with the Auxiliary Feed O t d.
System using OP 2322.
- e. Operate the Steam Dump temperature c,ontroller in manual to control the cooldown using OP 2316A.
- .~ ~.
~
- 8. Given any one of the following the met'h'ods to use, coo 1down 4 . 0' l an isolated Steam Generator.
- a. Start RCP(s) using OP 2301C. (2301C/7.1)
- b. Initiate Steam Generator blowdown using OP 2316A.
(2316A/7.5, 7.6)
- c. Initiate Auxiliary Feedwater flow to the Steam Generator using OP 2322. (2322/7.1)
- d. Initiate steam flow with MSIV bypass valve using OP 2316A. (2316A/7.1) l e. Start up the Main Steam System using OP 2316A.
l (2316A/7.1)
Use control room indicators to monitor the parameters 4.12 i 9.
required to ensure Natural Circulation is in progress.
(2304/ Generic, 2316A/ Generic, 2387F, 2301/ Generic, 01/
O Generic) 4.13
- 10. Use control room switches to operate any CVCS or HPSI System component while monitoring control room indicators to determine if RCS voids exist. (2304/
Generic, 2306/ Generic)
Page 3 of 4
2553(0)/All - Plant Cooldown using Natural Circulation - cont.
l
- 11. Given voiding exists in the RCS, use control room 4.11 l indicators to determine if action is required to eliminate or reduce the voids. (2316A/ Generic, !
2387F, 01/ Generic)
- 12. .Make preparations for initiating shutdown cooling using 4.25 OP 2310. (2310/7.1, 7.2)
- 14. 'Use control room switches to shift RCP seal bleedoff 4.20 to the Equipment Drain sump tank using OP 2304.
(2304/ Generic)
- 15. Break condenser vacuum using OP 2329. (2329/7.3) 4.22
- 16. Initiate shutdown cooling and establish a cooldown 4.25 of less than 20 F/ hour using OP 2310. (2310/7.3)
- 17. Given shutdown cooling is in operation continue the 4.25 cooldown using OP 2207. (2207/A11)
(7--)
- 18. Direct a PEO to operate remote components. 4.0
- 19. Request chemistry sample for boron concentration. 4.1 4.19 l
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Decsmb2r 8. 1986 REACTOR COOLANT SYSTEM 3/4.4.9? PRESSURE /TEtiPERATURE LIMITS REACTOR COOLANT SYSTEM .
LlH1 TING CONDITION FOR OPERATION i
$- 3.4.9.1 The Reactor Coolant System (except the pressurizer) temperature and pressure shall be limited in accordance with the limit lines shown on
'f Figure 3.4-2 during heatup, cooldown, criticality, and inservice leak and hydrostatic testing with:
- a. A maximum heatup of 20*F in any one hour period with Tavg at or below 110*F 30'F in any one hour period with Tavg at or below 140'F and above 110'F, and 50*F in any one hour period with Tavg above 140*F.
- b. A maximum cooldown of 80'F in any one hour period with Tavg above 300'F and a maxirum cooldown of 30'F in any one hour A q nt. period with Tavg at or below 300*F and above 200*F, and G /.U 20*F in any one hour period with Tavg at or below 200'F.
6 c. A maximum temperature change of 5'T in any one hour period, during hydrostatic testing operations above system design pressure.
APPLICABILITY: PODES 1, 2*, 3, 4 and 5.
ACTION:
With any of the above limits exceeded, restore the temperature End/or pressure to within the limit within 30 minutes; perfom an engineering evaluation to determine the effects of the out-of-limit condition on , l the structural integrity of the Reactor Coolant System; determine that the Reactor Coolant System remains acceptable for continued operations or be in andat least HOT STAN>3Y within the next 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br /> and reduce the pressure to less than 200'F and 500 psia, respectively, RCS Tav within !he following 30 hours3.472222e-4 days <br />0.00833 hours <br />4.960317e-5 weeks <br />1.1415e-5 months <br />.
t
- See Special Test Exception 3.10.3.
I Anendment No. $5,7/,113 MILLSTONE - l#11T 2 3/4 4-17
/dnav G dnw,n Fo'rm Ap nical Systems Manager ialackv Effedtiv4 Date oved by} Te TRAINEE PERFORMANCE GUIDC (TPG)
Training Prog ram s'n,ni co.s.n r nearneer Unit Mp 2 TPG Number pn?(1M/5.0 Task Areat Plant Cooldown ,
Critical Task: x Yes No Operations Approval: y M,
Q7M TERMINAL OBJECTIVE:
With a normal complement of control room operators, function as a team to perform a plant cooldown, from 532 F and 2250 psia to Mode 6 with the pressurizer flooded and cooled, using OP 2207 and related plant procedures.
ENABLING OBJECTIVES:
- 1. From memory, discuss the following items concerning the 1.0 plant cooldown procedure, OP 2207:
- a.
- Major evolutions, (e.g.: reduce pressure, cooldown, block SIAS, prepere and initiate SDC, cool pressurizer).
- b. The general intent"of 'tihe procedure.
- c. Significanc precautionis intended to prevent eciuipnient ~
damage, (e.g.: NDT limits, spray delta T limits, PORV operability, LTOP concerns).
- d. The personnel safety hazard posed to people in the SG channel heads if the SIT outlets are not tagged closed.
2.0
- 2. Using the guidance provided in OP 2207, discuss with an instructor the prerequisites and initial conditions pertaining t'o a plant cooldown, to includes
- b. RCS degassification.
- c. SG level and pressure control with and without the l condenser available.
O l
DIF-106 Page 1 of 4 Rev. 1
2207(12)/5.0 - Plant Cooldown - cont.
- 3. Operate Auxiliary Feedwater, Condensate, Main Feedwater, 5.4 and CPF domins. to: ,
- a. Secure Main reedwater using OP 2321 (2321/7.6).
i
- b. Secure a SGFP using OP 2321 (2321/7.5). l l
- c. Operate the Condensate System for plant shutdown using !
l OP 2319A (2319A/7.3).
- d. Secure / shift CPF demins. using OP 2319C (2319C/7.3).
- e. Start Auxiliary Feedwater pumps using OP 2322 (2322/7.1, 7.2).
- f. Feed SG's with Auxiliary Feedwater using OP 2322 (2322/7.3).
Break condenser vacuum using OP 2329 (2329/7.3) 5.16.3 4.
5.16.4
- 5. Use control room switches to close the MSIV's and de-pressurize the Main Steam header. (2316/ Generic,
()
l j Ol/ Generic) t *6. Direct a PEO to operate and tag remote components. 5.7
- 7. Operate CVCS to:
--- - . . . . - ~~
Dilute / borate to the charging pump suction using~ OP _5 '. l a.
2304A (2304A/7.8, 7.13).
Provide Auto makeup to the VCT using OP 2304C 5.4 b.
(2304C/7.2).
Degas the VCT using OP 2304A (2304A/7.9). 5.10
- c. Note Align for RCS excess purification using OP 2304F 5.28 d.
(2304F/7.1).
Align for excess letdown on SDC using OP 2304F 5.23 e.
(2304F/7.3).
Equalize RCS/pzr boron concentration using OP 2654 5.1
- f. Note (2654/7.10).
- 8. Control pressurizer level during plant cooldown by:
Using Figure 2304A-1 and LI-103 to determine actual 5.2 a.
pressurizer level.
Page 2 of 4
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()
(
2207(12)'/5.0 - Plant Cooldown - cont.
- 8. - cont.
- b. Operating the letdown flow controller in "Manual" 5.2 to control letdown flow.
,c. Operating the letdown back pressure controller in 5.13 "Auto" to control letdown flow.
- d. Manually starting additional charging pumps using 5.2 OP 2304E (2304E/7.3).
- 9. Control pressurizer pressure during plant cooldown by:
- a. Securing all pressurizer heaters. 5.5
- b. Operating the Main Spray valve controllers in 5.5 "Manual".
- c. Aligning control board switches to initiate, 5.18.2 Fote increase, and secure Auxiliary Spray.
Stop a RCP using OP 2301C (2301C/7.2). 5.3 10.
Operate the atmospheric dump / steam bypass controller in 5.4 11.
"Manual" to establish and maintain any specified cooldown
- ;;;, ,. .r rate. ,
- p. er, , - , . . . i- ,.
- 12. Operate control board switches to (01/ Generic).- -
- a. Block SIAS. 5.6
- b. Disable a HPSI train. 5.7
- c. Block MSI.
5.9 Shift PORV setpoints to low. 5.17.5
- d.
Secure C CS. 5.27 e.
Operate control board switches to secure the stack 5.21.4 14.
Hi-Range Radmonitor.
() 15. Operate the SDCS tot Perform boron equilization using OP 2310 (2310/7.1). 5.8 a.
Page 3 of 4
e 2207(12)/5.0 - Plant Cooldown - cont.
)
- 15. - cont.
Warmup the SDCS using OP,2310 (2310/7.2). 5.8 b.
- c. Initiate SDC on the RCS, establish and maintain any 5.20 specified cooldown rate using OP 2310 (2310/7.3)
- 16. ' Operate ESAS bypass switches to inhibit all four 5.21.3 channels of SRAS using OP 2384 (2384/7.3).
Open the PORV's by pulling any two RPS.high pressurizer 5.25 17.
pressure modules.
Adjust the RCS QT level and pressure using OP 2301A 5.26 18.
(2301A/7.2).
~
Explain the method for cooling the SG's below 212 F. 5.03 19.
Verify cooldown rate and pressurizer spray delta T limits Caution 5.4
- 20.
' being met by performing SP 26028-1 and evaluating the data.
() *21. Perform boration/ dilution calculations using OP 2208 (2208/5.3).
5.1 Given the results of RCS boron samples, use OPS Form 5.11
- 22.
2208-12 to determine if the cold shutdown boron concentration requirements are being met for any existing RCS temperature and time in core life.
Use OP 2301B, Figure 10.1 to determine the minimum 5.15 :
l *23. '
' allowable RCS pressure for any given temperature and RCP configuration.
Locate and open any specified "fingers" in test 5.19
i State which' temperature indfcato.s are used to monitor 5.4 l 25.
! the RCS cooldown rate during:
l a. RCP operation.
l
{ b. SDCS operation.
- c. Natural circulation.
Page 4 of 4
OP 2207 Page 6 Rev. 14 O
V 4.24 Certain combinations of operating RCP's will result in ineffectiv,e,_ ,
pressurizer spray capability and potential "hardness" of pressure response. To ensure effective spray and minimize the need to use auxiliary spray one of the following pump combinations should be operating (whenever other pump constraints permit).
A,B,C,0
~ -
A,B,C A,B,0
.09h A.C,0 B,C,0 B,0 A,B If one of the above combinations cannot be maintained, miaimize RCS temperature changes and pressurizer level changes as pressure response on level increase will be similiar to operating with a "hard" bubble.
4.25 During plant cooldown monitor containment temperature and pressure. Adjust containment cooling as necessary to ensure d containment pressure is maintained between -12" water gauge and l
+2.1 PSIG.
4.26 Prior to entering mode 5 obtain the ESAS Bypass Keys for SRAS frcm the Unit Superintendent. Bypass all four (4) channels of SRAS after entering mode 5 to prevent tripping the LPSI pumps in the event of an inadvertent SRAS initiation. If the keys are unavailable bypassing the SRAS may be defered until the next working day (normal hours).
4.27 Maintain pressurizer level within the limits set forth in Tech. Specs 3.4.4.
4.28 If steam generators are to be drained down ensure auto aux.
Feedwater bypass keys are installed to prevent auto aux. feed initiation while draining the steam generator (s).
4.29 Prior to initiation of shutdown cooling ensure 94TG-1 test switch TS-8, fingers G, H and I and 94TG-2 test switch TS-7B, Fingers B, C and E are opened and caution tagged (C07R).
This will prevent inadvertent tripping of the LPSI pump (s) and O lossofshutdowncoolingfromturbinetestingor34hVbreaker operation during shutdown cooling operation.
OP 2207 . Page 15 Rev. 14
/m Q b.24 Cut,in excess letdown from 500 as follows:
5.24.1 Establish communications from 2-CH-603 to the control room.
5.24.2 Open 2-SI-040.
5.24.3 Open 2-CH-603 and maintain letdown flow and pressure using the back pressure regulators 2-CH-201P and -
2-CH-201Q' SMQ 5.25 If depressurization is required, adjust SDC flow to reduce RCS y'B temperature to approximately 130'F.
5.26 In order to cool and flood the pressurizer perform the following:
5.26.1 Open the manual isolation valves to the out of service back pressure control valve 2-CH-348 and 350 for PCV 2-CH-201P or 2-CH-347 and 349 for PCV 2-CH-201Q.
Set the back pressure controller PIC 201 to match 5.26.2 RCS pressure (this will close the PCV's interrupting CVCS flow).
5.26.3 Place the back pressure control valve selector O
Q 5.26.4 switch to "Both" (HS-201).
Place the letdown flow controller selector switch to "Both" (HS-110-1). Both letdown flow control valves will now respond to the output of HIC-110.
5.26.5 Open the letdown flow control valves fully (HIC-110).
Pressurizer level will now be controlled by the back pressure control valves.
5.26.6 Slowly adjust the back pressure controller setpoint to 100 PSIA. Both back pressure control valves will open in response to the pressure error, and flow through the CVCS is re-established.
CAUTION: Prior to securing anxiliary spray flow ensure 2-CH-518 or 2-CH-519 is opened to provide a flow path for the changing pumps 7' (6 to prevent damage to pumps.
O
o n ?"/*/>
Effective cate
' Fore re e vnd By 5tatf n superintencent O STAT 10m Pe0Ct0VRC OR FORM CHANCE t
- A. 10(NTIFICAT10N NUMBER # M J2534I REY. d CHANGE No. /
OR RN TITLC 85Gm henerr? & /Obe? kUD htrL INITIATED BY J E SN//W h
~
, 8. CHANGf M
flA UIY hl QN4Ckt ,
,/la C. REASON FOR CMANCE .
peyosed reacd ud, Avum &+mdQuaw de him Sah;7 L dik fc Aate 2 Q'<.< ad uny o~c m ..for Intent 10. Changes)
D, NON !NTENT CHANGE AUTHOR 12ATICN (N
- DATE SICNATURE TITLE Shif t Supervisor (on duty)
E. REv!fvt0 Department Head J /f Unreviewed Saf westion tvaluation Occumentation Recuired: /
(Significant change in procedure setnod or scope ( ) YE5 [ 6f M0 as described in FSAR)
(If yes, sociment in PORC/50RC meeting einutes)
ENv180*(NT AL 1MP ACT
( ) YES (Adverse environmental in :t)
(If yes, document in PORC. 'AC meeting einutes)
F. INffCRATto SAFETY REvilW REQUIRED (Affects response of Safety Systees, performance ( ) Yt5 ( No of Safety related control systeen or pertornance of control systees which say indirectly af f ect safety systes response.)
, (If yes. 60ciment in PORC/50RC meeting einwtes. )
G.
MHe ttComEN05 APPROVAL (or confirmation of interia change within 14 days)
@ wat meeting Numeer
- 2. U - 3 i H. APPe0V AL AND IMPL(M(NT ATION The change is hereby implemented and is effective this date, encept for interim nich were toplemented and ef fective per teie Avinor) ation of D above i chaWnges~ c %w .i,t 3 hole 02 ,
7 S u y on sepe o,,te ~ ee vo m werc.x ,..
if 307 Rev. 7 P.tge 1 of 1
I W. D. Romberg 3-11-86 86-9 Form Approved by Station Superintendent Effective Date 50RC Mtg. No. '
\
(V3 STATION PROCEDURE COVER SHEET A. IDENTIFICATION Number E0P 2534 Rev. 3 Title STEAM GENERATOR TUBE RUPTURE Prepared By J. Becker
- 0. REVIEW
~
I have reviewed the above procedure and have found it to be satisfactory.
TITLE SIGNATURE DATE J
DEPARTMENT HEAD $,L 7!/0 El}x:&aM Lc(N 3-1 s?
C. UNP.iVIEVE0 SAFETY QUESTION EVALUATION 00CUMENTATION REQUIRED: y (Significant change in procedure method or scope YES [ ] NO [ T as described in FSAR)
(If yes, document in PORC/50RC meeting minutes)
ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACT (Adverse environmental impact) YES [ ] NO g (If yes, document in PORC/SORC meeting minutes)
O. INTEGRATED SAFETY REVIEW REQUIRE 0 (Affects response of Safety Systems, performance YES [ ] NO [ [
of safety-related control systems or performance of control systems which may indirectly affect safety system response.)
(If yes, document in PORC/50RC meeting minutes.)
E. PROCEDURE REQUIRES PORC/SORC REVIEW YES [ [ NO [ ]
F. SAFETY EVALUATION REQUIRED YES [ ] NO((
G. PORC/SOPC APPROVAL PORC/50RC Meeting Number 4 -O - 3 M H. APPROVAL AND IMPLEMENTATION The attacned procedure is hereby approved, and effective on the date below:
I 3/4c t1 sO &C u ct.~ . M W1/Mi
(% Station / Service / Unit Superintendent Effective Date
~
L/
SF 301 l
Rev. 8 Page 1 of 1
UNIT 2 STEAM GENERATOR TUBE RUPTURE Page No. Eff. Rev.
1 - 23 3 O
l O Page 1 EOP 2534 Rev. 3
D (v .
STEAM GENERATOR TUBE RUPTURE
- 1. PURPOSE To provide the subsequent operator actions which must be accomplished in the event of a steam generator tube rupture. These actions are taken after completion of the Standard Post Trip Actions and a steam generator tube rupture has been diagnosed. The actions in this procedure are necessary to ensure that the plant results in a stable safe condition.
- 2. ENTRY CONDITIONS
! a. The Standard Post Trip Actions have been accomplished.
O m
- b. Plant conditions indicate that a steam gen 4rator tube rupture has occurred by one or more of the following
- i. Steam generator blowdown radiation high alat . if*Ci-ii. SJAE Radiation monitor high alarm (RC14) iii. Unbalanced charging and letdown flows (CO2, iv. Standby charging pumps start (CO2)
- v. Decreasing pressurizer level and pressure (CO3) vi. Main steam line radiation monitor (s) alarming (RC05E)
- 3. OPERATOR ACTIONS Instructions Contingency Actions 3.1 Verify Standard Post Trip Actions, 3.1 Perform Standard P:st Trip E0P 2525, have been performed Actions, E0P 2525 EOP 2534 Page 2 Rev. 3
O V -
Instructions Contingency Actions CAUTION SS/SCO must be notified immediately of any safety function criteria not satisfied.
3.2 Perform Safety Function Status 3.2 E safety function ctatus checks check criteria are not satisfied Then
- a. Complete OPS Form 2534-1 a. Diagnose problem and at approximately 10 minute go to appropriate E0P intervals until plant i. E any break is conditions stabilize suspected, Then and
~
refer to Break
- b. Direct STA qualified indi- Identification vidual to review report and Chart, Figure 4.1 verify acceptance cr,iteria to assist in are satisfied diagnosis l
and ii. Go to appropriate break E0P 9C
- b. J,_f, f diagnosis of one event is not apparent, Then go to Functional Recovery, E0P 2540 i
l l
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E0P 2534 Page 3 Rev. 3
1 l
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1
/
Instructions .
Continoency Actions CAUTION Pressurizer level may not provide an accurate indication of total RCS inventory due to voids. Voids may exist, especially if RCPs are not running. However, pressurizer level in conjunction with a subcooled RCS is an indication that the core is covered.
The reactor vessel leve'l monitor gives an indication of void ,
size above the core.
3.3 Confirm the diagnosis of a steam 3.3 generator tube rupture a. H a loss of primary coolant is indicated,
- a. Refer to Break Identi-fication Chart, Then go to E0P 2532 Figure 4.1 g and b. M excess steam demand Direct Chemistry to is indicated, Then go to b.
sample steam generators E0P 2536 for activity 3.4 Manually initiate SIAS, 3.4 H pressurizer pressure decreases to 1600 psia (CO3), Then do CIAS and EBFAS (C01) the following
- a. Verify SIAS, CIAS and EBFAS (C01X)
- b. Stop.all RCPs (CO3)
- c. Refer to Figure 4.3 for acceptable safety injection system delivery flow O
E0P 2534 Page 4 Rev. 3
() -Instructions - Contingency Actions 3.5 If EBFAS has irittiated, Then 3.5 Continue with this procedure align Condenser Air Removal System to Unit 2 Stack by the following
- a. Verify Condenser Air Removal Fan, F-55A or F-558, running (or manually start) (C06)
< and
- b. Open 2-EB-57 (C06) l I
1 I
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1 O Page 5 E0P 2534 Rev. 3 w.___ _
~
O Instructions .
Contincency Actions CAUTION RCS T should be reduced to less than 520*F in both loops h
2 //eq before isolating a steam generator to minimize the potential for subsequent lifting of steam generator safeties.
NOTE Narrow range T stops at 515'F. Wide range T h is availabic on C101.
h 3.6 Initiate a plant cooldown using both 3.6 steam generators to reduce hT to less a. Operate atmospheric dun,1 than 520'F in both Iriops (C04) valves (C05)
Operate steae dump and bypass and a.
valves to.reduca RCS hT at b. Loj opening and closing 50-75'F per hour (C05) times in SS Log and
- b. Refer to Plant Cooldown using Natural Circulation, AOP 2553 CAUTION
' Use of the steam driven auxiliary feedwater pump will result in an unmonitored radioactivity release.
l --
3.7 During the cooldown, maintain 3.7 Hanually control main or steam generator level auxiliary feedwater (C05) 50-70% (C05) l
_3. 8 During the cooldown, When 3.8 M MSI occurs, Then maintain steam in the l permitted, block MSI turbine building by (C01) opening the MSIV bypass l
valves 1 E0P 2534 Page 6 i
Rev. 3 l
D (G
Continocncy Actions Instructions CAUTIM If maximum spray water temperature differential exceeds 350*F an Engineering evaluation must be performed following the event.
Notify Engineering if spray we.ter temperature differential exceeds 200*F.
NOTE 1
- 1. Auxiliary spray depressurization rate may be as high as 50 I psi / min. PORV depressurization rate will be even faster.
Auxiliary spray should provide better control of the depressurization process.
- 2. Reducing pressure may require throttling HPSI flow. Step 3.16
! provides HPSI termination criteria.
3.9 Reduce and maintain RCS pressure 3.9 Depressurite using PORV(s),
Refer to Functional Recovery using main or auxiliary spray until one of the following conditions is of RCS Inventory and Pressure, E0P 2540C, Step 3.4 is reached.
t a. RCS pressure is approximately equal to steam generator pressure j (C05)
'E
- b. RCS T subcooling approaches 30*F h
(ICC display)
O E0P 2534 Page 7 Rev. 3
) 3.10 Determine which steam generator 3.10 Select steam generator with has the rupture. Symptoms are higher radiation readings
- a. High radiation on main to be isolated steam line rad monitors (RCOSE)
- b. Higher steam generator activity (sample results)
- c. Higher boron concentration ,
(sample results) ,
- d. Increasing steam generator level (C05)
- e. Lower feedwater flow rate as indicated by valve position ,
(C05)
- O i
l l l
l l
l t
I P
i l
E0P 2534 Page 8 Rev. 3 ,
1 l_ - . - . - . . - - _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ - _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ ____ __ _____ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ __ __ _
Instructions - Continaency Actions CAUTIONS
- 1. Steam generators are vital for RCS heat removal. One steam
],))g generator must be used for this purpose even if ruptures are detected in both steam generators.
- 2. Do not isolate atmospheric dump valves, unless they have failed open.
3.11 When RCS T is less than 520*F (C05), 3.11 Manually close valves h
Then isolate the affected steam generator. Do the following
- a. Raise the setpoint of the associated atmospheric dump to 975 psia (C05)
- d. Close the feed regulating valve (COS)
- e. Close the main feed block valve (C05)
- f. Close the auxiliary feed regulating valve (C05)
- g. Close the auxiliary feed air 'ssisted a check valve (C05)
- h. Verify blowdow?. is isolated Close steam supply to steam 1
1.
i driven auxiliary feed pump (C05)
- j. Close main steam low point O drains (C07)
Page 9 E0P 2534 Rev. 3
Instructions .
Contingency Actions 3.12 Ve-ify the correct steam 3.12 generator has been isolated 4. M the wrong steam by chemistry analysis generator has been iso-lated. Then unisolate that generator and isolate the affected steam generator (Step 3.11).
- b. H both steC generators are suspectw3, g only isolate the steam gener-ator with the highest radioactivity determined by chemistry sample or radiation readings on main steam line rad monitors (RC05E) 3.13 Determine if RCPs can be 3.13 Continue with this procedure restarted by the following
- a. Pressurizer level greater than 35% and constant or increasing (CO3)
Pressure temperature limits b.
I of Figure 4.2 satisfied for T in the operating h
loop'(CO3)
- c. One steam generator is removing heat (C05)
- d. RCPs starting prerequisites are met per OP 2301C l
i E0P 2534 Page 10 Rev. 3 l
Instructions Continoency Actions ,
i CAUTION Pressurizer level and pressure can be expected to decrease upon starting RCPs due to loop shrinkage and/or void collapse. The level decrease may be large enough to drain the press.urizer, RCP operation with a drained pressurizer may continue provided HPSI and charging pumps are operating and NPSH requirements are met.
3.14 If conditions exist for RCP 3.14 operation, Then a.. Verify Natural
- a. Start HPS! and charging pumps Circulation flow in (or verify operating) to make the operating loop up for RCS contraction (C01/2) 1. Pressurizer level
- b. Start one RCP in each loop greater than 20%
l (operating loop first) (C03) (CO3)
Verify heat removal
- c. Monitor RCS pressure and corres- 11.
ponding Tc for adequate pump from unaffected f NPSH '.;03) steam generator Operate HPSI and charging pumps 111. Pi-4sure/ Temperature d.
to restore pressurizer level limits of Figure 4.2 35-45% (CO3) satisfied for T h I"
^
the operating loop (C03).
iv. Loop delta T (Th -Tc ) between 10 and 45'F (CO3)
- v. T constant or c
decreasing (CO3) i
' vi. T constant or h
decreasing (CO3) '
or
~
4 E0P 2534 Page 11
! Rev. 3 i
1 5
4 9
D Instructions .
Contingency Actions
- b. Verify adequate core coo'ing by incore thermocouple less than 555'F and constant or ,
decreasing
- c. E adequate core cooling cannot be verified, Then go to Functional
- Recovery, E0P 2540 3.15 H Pressurizer pressure is 3.15 Continue with this procedure greater than 360 psia and stable, Then stop the LPSI pumps (C01) 3.16 When all the following conditions 3.16 If,the HPSI pump termi-exist, Then, one facility at a t.ime, nation conditions do g HPSI pumps may be throttled or exist, Then continue to stopped operate HPSI pumps (Col)
- a. Pressurfter level greater than 35% and constant or increasing (CO3)
- b. Pressure / Temperature limits of Figure 4.2 satisfied for T in the operating loop.
h ^
- c. Heat removal from the unaffected steam generator
- d. Rtactor vessel level above
- top of Hot Leg (> 43%) ,
4 (ICC display)
O E0P 2534 Page 12 i Rev. 3
L . _ = a - $- 4 s Instructions Contingency Actions t
3.17 Contrel'HPSI and/or Charging pumps 3.17 Cortinue with this procedure flow to restore and maintain
- a. Pressurizer level 20-80%
(CO3) a_nd
- b. RCS operating loop subcooling at least 30*F subcooled (ICC display) 3.18 I_f,EBFAS was initiated and 3.18 Unit 1 Stack recorder a. Continue running EBFS Fans indicates less than 10 cps and above pre-event value, b. Continue discharging Then return Condenser Air Air Removal to Unit 2 Removal Discharge to Unit 1 Stack.
Stack by the following
- a. Override and stop "A" and "B" EBFS Fans (C01)
- b. Close 2-EB-40, 2-EB-41, 2-EB-50, and 2-EB-51 (C01)
- c. Open Condenser Air Removal discharge dampers, 2-EB-55 and 2-EB-56 (C06)
- d. Close 2-EB-57 (C06)
O E0P 2534 Page 13 ,
Rev. 3
Instructions Contincency Actions 3.19 Continue RCS cooldown to 2.19 Refer to Plant Cooldown cold hutdown using Natural Circulation,
- 11. Open 2-CH-504, RWST to charging pump suction (CO2) iii. Stop the boric acid pumps (CO2) iv. Close 2-CH-514 O Emergency Borate Valve (CO2)
- v. Close 2-CH-508 and 509, gravity feed isolation valves (CO2) vi. Complete OPS Form 2208-13, shutdown margin
. ang
- b. Refer to Plant Cooldown.
OP 2207 O
E0P 2534 Page 14 Rev. 3
.d-Instructions - Contingency Actions 3.20 Throughout the cooldown, 3.20 Continue with this procedure monitor for RCS voiding.
Indications of voiding are
- a. Pressurizer level increases greater than expected while using auxiliary spray (CO3)
'E
- b. Pressurizer level increases slower thAn expected for existing HPSI and charging flow (CO3) f or
- c. Unhea d thermocouples in upper head indicated saturated conditions (ICC display) or
- d. Reactor vessel level less than 100% (ICC display) .
3.21 Througho:it the cooldown, 3.21 [f,RCS f voiding is inhibiting verify RCS voiding not inhioiting core cooling, Then go to adequate 'co's cooling by Functional Recovery, E0P'2540 l
- a. Presture/Temperr4Jre limits f of Figu e 4.2 are satisfied for incore thermocouple temperature (ICC display) and At least one steam generator $
b.
is removing heat E0P 2534 Page 15 Rev. 3
f O Instructions Contingency Actions 3.22 Control level in the isolated 3.22 steam generator less than 90% (C05) a. E condenser is by maintaining RCS pressure available, Then do the Nearly equal to the isolated following.
a.
steam generator pressure (C05) 1. H level increases above 90%, Then and Within the Pressure / Temp- open MSIV bypass b.
erature limits of Figure 4.2 valves (C05) for T in the operating loop 11. When level h
decreases below 50% Then close the MSIV bypass valves (C05)
- b. If the condenser is not available, Then operate atmospheric dump valves to reduce level, e
E0P 2534 Page 16 Rev. 3
O
.'V) Instructions . Contincency Actions CAUTION Use of the Blowdown Treatment System involves processing water that may be highly contaminated. Radiation and contamination levels will be much higher tha'n during normal operation.
3.23 H RCPs cannot be restarted, 3.23 Do the following Then cool the isolated steam generator by the following
- a. Lower steam generator a. Lower steam generator level by the following level by steaming to the condenser
- i. Obtain management 1. Open affected steam concurrence to override generator MSIV bypass O blowdown isolation valve (C05) and signal ii. Place steam generator ii. When steam generator blowdown treatment level decreased to system in operation 20%, Then close per Main Steam System, MSIV bypass valve OP 2316A (C05).
iii. Establish drain rate b. Raise steam generator of 75 gpm (local) level to 90% using iv. When steam generator auxiliary feedwater
! ' level reaches 20%, Then pumps at approximately stop drain'ing 150 gpm (C05)
- b. Raise steam generator level
! to 90% using auxiliary c. Repeat fill and drain feedwater pumps at approx- process until desired imately 150 gpm (C05) steam generator pressure O
E0P 2534 Page 17 Rev. 3
/O Contingency Actions V Instructions .
Repeat fill ano drain and temperature obtained c.
process until desired (local /COS) steam generator pressure and temperature obtained (local /CO5) 3.24 Alian turbine ouilding sumps 3.24 Align the turbine building to the CPF sumps (local). sumps to the Aerated Waste Refer to OP 2336A, Station System Sumps and Orains a. Close 2-AR-36 (14'6" TB)
- b. Open 2-AR-37 (14'6" TB)
- c. Open 2-SSP-76 (-45' 6" Aux Bldg) 3.25 Verif. '-CN-334, Atmospheric 3.25 Continue with this procedure O Orain .ollecting Tank drain to LIS, is closed (local) 3.26 Direct Chemistry to sample the 3.26 Continue with this procedure secondary systems for activity 3.27 Refer to AOP 2569, Steam 3.27 Continue with this procedure Generator Tube Leak, for guidance on operation with a contaminated secondary system 3.28 Not applicable 3.28 As time permits, Refer to
! Reactor Trip Recovery, l
E0P 2526, and perform additional l
steps as necessary l
- 4. FIGURES O 4,1 Break Identification Chart 4.2 RCS Pressure / Temperature Limits 4.3 Safety Injection System Delivery Flow Page 10
- Final - @,2g34
9 Figure 4.1 BREAK 10ENTIFICATION CHART INITIAL CON 0! TION: PRESSURIZER PRESSURE DECREASING EITHER
. ,YES S/G PRESSURE NO
( 800 psi?
CONTAINMENT NO YES ORESSURE INCREASING?
CONTAINMENT NO YES PRESSURE INCREASING?
JAE, MAIN STEA.-
SECONDARY SECONDARY LINE, OR BLOW-BREAK BREAK N' DOWN RAD MONITORS YES INSIDE OUTSIDE ALARMING?
CONTAINMENT CONTAINMENT PRIMARY PRIMARY BREAK BREAK INSIDE OUTSIDE CONTAINMENT CONTAINMENT b
' E0P 2534 E0P 2536 E0P 2532 LOSS OF STEAM GENERATOR EXCESS TUBE RUPTURE PRIMARY STEAM DEMAND COOLANT UNIQUE SYMPTOMS:
- HI RAD IN CONTAINMENT *HI RAD IN SECONDARY
.NO RAD INCREASE eNOR",AL CONTAINMENT CONDITIONS E0P 2534 Page 19 l .
Rey, 3 l
1
~ .
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i ,, , , , ,
2500- , ,, ,
i ) i !i
, 8 ,1
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il , ,
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- ACCEPTAGL.E !
t i Acct!PTA ALE l [ --
2000 , /
- 1 6 J .
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f -
,fV e r i_. _
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T i ii J} ,E /
' 'ilC y.
11 /
- '15 0^* ;
f i
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/i is w U t <>1 -'-'
g@ 8[ /-/
l,oo l Yd @ u -
/
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)
a 4 11 2 -.
g 1 *v - /6 /
O !/ #/ '
6 f'I / \
$1000 s C l
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f .. .. . . __ ..
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s.
,. [_J. . ,
. .a.. ..L.
' - ' ' d L L-. l 1- i A -
l 500
/ ,* i-) j NOT ACCErTABLE l-
~~ ~
[_
7 7~ ." ,
po5 . . .
,- ,o
- 4. t '
Cj#..~ t V:i' D , ,T ,
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.. u. i ..{jj.
' _L . . . . . .L . .
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.+_ _
g#g ;, ._ .. . . ..
600 400 500 200 300 RCS TEMPERATURE (F)
- This curve supercedes the 100F/HR cooldown curve any time the RCS has experiencea an uncontrolled cooldown to below 500F.
t
\
- This curve supercedes the 30f subcooling curve if, at any tire, the contain. ment pressure has exceeded Spsig.
FIGURE 4.2 RCS PRESSURE / TEMPERATURE Llh!TS /
Page 20 E0P 2534 Rev. 3
a RCS PRESSURE / TEMPERATURE LIMIT DATA PTS LIMIT 100*F/HR 200'F C00LOOWN 30'F DEORADED CTMT SU8C00LE0 CllRVE SU8C00LE0 MINIM 0M MAXIMUM MAXIMUM RCS SATURATION MINIMUM PRESSURE PRESSURE PRESSURE PRESSUR2 PRESSURE TEMP (psia) (psia) (psia) (psia)
(*F) (psia) 1919- 1919 Upper Limit of 600 1543 2350 595 1487 1852 1852 y 1787 590 1432 1787
. a, - 1723 585 1378 1723 3
1326 1662 1662 580 1276 1602 1602 595 570 1227 1543 1543 1180 1487 1487 565 1133 1432 1432 560 1089 1378 1376 555 1045 1326 1326 550 545 1003 1276 1276 963 1227 1227 540 535 924 1180 1180
(..
530 885 1133 1089 1133 1089 525 848 813 1045 1045 520 515 778 1003 1003 744 963 963 510 712 924 924 505 681 885 885 500 650 64 8 848 495 621 813 813 490 593 773 773 485 566 744 744 480 540 712 712 475 515 681 687 470 U 490 650 657 465 ~~
2350 467 621 633 460 2286 434 593 607 455 2208 423 566 582 450 2133 540 SG1 445 402 515 540 2060 440 382 490 522 1989 i 435 362 467 502 1919 I 430 344 1852 326 434 483 l 425 1787 509 423 467 420 1723 292 402 451 V 415 1662 277 392 436 f 410 1602 262 362 408 405 344 406 1543 400 247 E0P 2534 Page 21 l Rev. 3
O
(_,/ RCS PRESSURE / TEMPERATURE LIMIT DATA (Cont'd)
- PTS LIMIT 100'F/HR 30'F DEGRADED 200'F C00LOOWN SUBC00 LED CTMT SUBC00 LED CURVE MINIMOM MINIMUM MAXIMUM MAXIMUM ACS SATURATION PRESSURE PRESSURE PRESSURE PRESSURE TEMP PRESSURE (psia) (psia) (psia) (psia) (psia)
('F) 395 233 326 .392 1487 Upper Limit 390 220 309 378 1432 of 2350 385 208 292 366 1378 380 196 277 353 1326 375 184 262 340 1276 370 173 247 329 1227 365 163 233 319 1180 360 153 220 309 1133 355 144 208 299 1089 350 135 196 289 1045 345 126 184 281 1003 340 118 173 275 963 135 110 163 265 924 330 103 153 256 885 325 96 144 251 848 320 90 135 242 813 O% 315 84 126 118 236 230 778 744 310 78 305 72 110 224 712 300 67 103 219 681 214 650 4 395 62 96 58 90 210 621 2230 290 53 64 205 593 2100 285 49 78 202 566 1970 280 72 198 540 1850 275 45 67 196 515 1730 270 42 62 192 490 1620 265 39 58 190 467 1530 260 35 53 188 434 1453 255 32 49 184 423 1370 250 30 402 1300 245 27 382 1230 240 25 362 1170 235 23 344 1100 230 21 326 1040 225 19 309 980 220 17 292 930 215 16 277 880 210 14 262 840 205 13 247 800 200 12 O E0P 2534 Rev. 3 Page 22 l
1
l J
1300, iy 1200 (, l
-s ,
'3 1100-o 1000- . -
900 ', '
S .
1 y e00 - a ii f lI U 700 " l 'n . .. .. .
D '
g . y -
N 600 j'3 ACCEPTABLE MCION
- a. - -
n g 11 ' ' ' ' '
N** 500< 3 j ', - --
1 1 11 400< .-
., in. !
j3 300<
.-- qg --- -
,n
= 2 ---
200 - -
)jg '- ~~
~
3ij i ii.
T9%
~
,iii i iii~ ___ ___ = ' '
=
100 <---
WACCEPTABLE EGION
= - --- ---- %2
... 3
= 2 - ----
.-_ .- ;. -- -- --- - =
-; - yg q._. ..
1600 3400 3200 4000 ,
0 800 TOTAL OF FOUR HrOI AND LPSI HEADER FLOWS (GPit) l NOTES 1. This curve is based on one facility operating and at least one charging
}
pump in operation.
- 2. J_f, f containment pressure has exceeded 5 psig at any time during an event. $.,
then do not use this curve. Its accuracy is in doubt. When determining l' Safety Function status:
Consider the Safety Function satisfied if all other safety function l l
1 parameters meet criteria. '
MINIMUM REQUIRED SAFETY liiJECTION DELIVERY CURVE l O FIGURE 4,3 :
i I E0P 2534 Page 23 i
Rev. 2 i
i
O O INS 11EJC10R GUIDE O
LESSON: REACTOR PRCHECTICM SYSTEM ID 8 M2-OP-RO-I&C-2380-1 REV 1 DATE 11-30-87 INS 11tDCIOR AIDS COf11!NT 17canW ACTIVITY
- 3) A 15 volt dummuy si p i is applied to the trip unit relays to keep them from tripping.
.b. LPD trip is bypassed similarly because of R0-7, LPD bypass calculation inaccuracies at low power.
- 2. Individual trip unit inhibit keys (12) covered in section II.D.7.b.5.
TP-9 a. Each logic ladder has 20 key bypass contacts, not including spares.
Discuss PORV control by pulling
[f (~ b. Key number 6 operates the High Pressurizer Pressure trip inhibit relay and the PORV two TU-6s and using key 86.
bypass logic relay K 29 for that channel. .
PP-2380-L4 3. Zero Power Mode Bypass RO-7, ZPM bypass
- a. Permits low temperature, low pressure, and RO-1, purpose of bypass key low flow control rod operation.
- b. Provided for low power physics testing Page 44 of 78
O , ]/g TEXT MATERIAL APPROVAL SHEET I. Text
Title:
Reactor Protection System Description ID4: M2-OP-RO-I&C-2380-1 Rev 1 D'te a 6 87 II. In tiated:
wA 6-30-87 DEVELOPER' DATE III. REVIEWED:
W// bund TECHNICAL REVIEWER
,h /87 DATE .
nm Vl. ] *C ~$Y DATE INSTRUCTIONAL REVIEWER G IV. APPROVED:
, 5 c- 2 NUCLEAR TRAINING SUPERVISOR / DATE l
l V. RELEASED FOR USEt l h/Lv
_AyTRAININeSePERVISR 7 ,E SYSDESC #6(5)
O
rx trip and the low pressure trip receive their
(_-} process variable signal from the same transmitter.
If pressure increases from normal, a pre-trip alarm will occur at 2350 psia and at 2100 psia a reactor trip signal and a PORV open signal will be fed into their respective two out of four channel logics. The trip unit key bypass is provided to inhibit both the trip and PORV opening signal for its respective channel.
Physical removal of any trip unit from the RPS panels results in activation of all of that trip
-}(/ / unit's functions. Removal of two high pressurizer pressure trip units would cause a reactor trip and PORVs to open. Use of the trip unit bypass key to bypass one of the "pulled" trip units would permit open/close control of the PORVs. The trip inhibit l relay K 36 and the PORV bypass relay K 29 are located in the RPS auxiliary logic drawers (4) and are activated by key number 6.
- 4. Steam Generator Water Level Low Each steam generator has four differential pressure sensors (channel A, B, C, D) which measure the difference between downcomer level and a reference leg. The reference leg is maintained full by an air cooled steam condensing chamber at its top. Level sensing and indication is narrow ,
range only, covering a span of 184 inches as 0 to l
100% with zero being 294 inches above the tube i sheet. The 36% trip setpoint is 3% above the top i
l l
O Rev 1 6/87 20
h SECTION 8 OUESTION 8.01 The answer key should be changed to allow for dif ferent, correct responses which indicate relationships between LCO's, LSSS's, and Safety Limits. One such response would be If the safety limits are not exceeded, fuel and RCS integrity will be maintained. LSSS's serve to trip the reactor to ensure that safety limits will not be exceeded, assuming that LCO's are being met.
Reference:
10CFR 50.36, M2-OP-RO-ADMIN-2001, T.S. 2.1 and Bases.
QUESTION 8.02 Technical Specification 4.02 b. specifies "the combined time interval for any 3 consecutive surveillance intervals not to exceed 3.25 times the specified surveillance interval" . The period between 7/6/86 and 5/6/87 incorporates 3 consecutive surveillance intervals and exceeds 3.25 times the surveillance interval. The question asks "EXPLAIN WHETHER OR NOT a surveillance interval has been exceeded and if so WHIEH ONE.
Based on this an acceptable alternative answer should be "The interval from 7/6/86 to 5/6/87 (for 3 consecutive surveillance intervals) [0.5) exceeds the required 3.25 t imes the surveillance interval (0.5)"
OUESTION 8.03 This question asks "What action, if any, is required . . .
"and why?" It does not ask for the time in which this action must be completed nor the reference, by paragraph, for this action.
Therefore, the answer should read "A plant shutdown should be I started (within 1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br />) [1.0) as required by Technical Specifications (0.5) with subsequent action to bring the plant to cold shutdown in accordance with T.S. (0.5].
O
(~h OUESTION 8.04 V TPG ACP-0A-2.06A EO #9d requires the operator to: "Given ACP-OA-2.06A and a request for clearing tags explain the
. conditions required for clearing including documentation of restoration".
Question 8.04 c. specifically addresses the topic with regard to documentation of restoration but did not provide the candidate 4 the requisite procedure.
Additionally the reference sited in the answer key specifies that "Normally the "Restoration Performed" block should not be filled in when the tags are issued". The question addressed a specific exception from this normal practice as allowed by the cited reference.
It is recommended that 8.04 c. be deleted. >
OUESTION 8.05 The question does not ask for the time frame during which "Actions and notifications must be completed" but only for "WHAT" actions and notifications must be completed".
() Additionally MP2 learning objectives do not require memorization of one hour ( immed iate) reporting criteria.
The answar key should be changed to allow full credit if the candidate stated that RCS pressure must be restored to within its J
limits and that notifications are conducted in accordance with procedures.
O
8 OUESTION 8.07 This question specifies "B HPSI pump was taken out of- service for maintenance". No reference is made to either A or C HPSI pumps.
OP 2308 paragraph 7.5 provides operational guidance for removal
. of B HPSI pump f rom service that results in "Restoring HPSI pump" A to service as rac I pump or HPSI pump C as Fac II pump . . .
Therefore two HPSI pumps would be available on separate facilities. T.S. 3.5.2 requires "Two separate and independent ECCS subsystem shall be operable with each subsystem comprised of one operable HPSI pump . . ." Therefore operability of ECCS is not relying on the action statement.
The answer should read "The startup can be commenced [1.0) because the ECCS is operable provided both A & C HPSI pumps are properly aligned (1.0].
Additionally, full credit should be awarded it the candidato assumed that the A or C HPSI pump was inoperable and answered in accordance with key.
QUESTION 8.08 ACP-0A-3.02 provides guidance for non intent changes in Section
s 6.9.1. Since temporary changes to procedures meet the definition of non intent changes as specified in paragraph 4.7, they could be treated as a non intent change. Therefore an acceptable alternative answer is:
- 1. The change is a non intent change [.6]
- 2. The change is approved by two licensed SRO's from the unit involved, at least one of whom shall be the on duty SS [0.7]
- 3. The change shall be reviewed within 14 days of implementation (by PORC/bORC) (0.7)
Add it ionally , in that temporary changes are only allowed if the intent of the procedure is not altered, then credit should be awarded if the candidate describes those provisions which distinguish betwe'en intent and non intent changes.
O
OUESTION 8.10 The cited TPG states "Define non compliance per 3.02" . No TPG for Shutdown Cooling Refueling or Technical Specification requires the licensed operator to know from memory those times / conditions when both trains of SDC are not required, when in mode 6.
The operator is thus encouraged and trained to reference Tech Specs and Procedures prior to removing a SDC loop f rom Service.
Based on those points it is recommended that this question be deleted.
QUESTION 8.11 The point distribution of the key answer is unclear.
O 4
4