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Forwards Dcrdr Final Summary Rept.Vol 1 Summarizes How Each Phase of Review Performed & Identifies Personnel Involved. Vol 2 Includes Human Engineering Discrepancy Findings & Proposed Schedules for Corrective Actions
	ML20138N500
Person / Time
Site:	LaSalle
Issue date:	10/29/1985
From:	Massin H; COMMONWEALTH EDISON CO.
To:	Harold Denton; Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
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ML20138N503	List: ML20138N500; ML20138N511;
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\\ Commonwealth Edison

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) one First NationIl Pl72a. Chic"go. Illmois

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O 7 Address Reply to: Post Office Box 767

/ Chicago Illinois 60690 Detober 29, 1985 Mr. Harold R. Denton, Director Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Comission Washington, DC 20555

Subject:

LaSalle County Station Units 1 and 2 Detailed Control Room Design Review (DCRDR) Final Sumary Reports NRC Docket Nos. 50-373 and 50-374 References (a): License NPF-18, Attachment 2, Condition 2.

(b): Supplement 1 to NUREG-0737 dated December 17, 1982.

(c): Cordell Reed letter to H. R. Denton dated April 14, 1983.

(d): Cordell Reed letter to H. R. Denton dated August 25, 1983.

(e): Cordell Reed letter to H. R. Denton dated November 15, 1983.

l l

(f):

A. Schwencer letter to D. L. Farrar dated February 21, 1984.

(g):

J. G. Marshall letter to H. R. Denton dated April 23, 1984.

(h):

J. G. Marshall letter to H. R. Denton dated April 15, 1985.

Dear Mr. Denton:

Enclosed please find the Detailed Control Room Design Review (DCRDR)

Final Summary Report for comonwealth Edison Company's (CECO) LaSalle County Station (Reference (a)). This report meets the Section 9, Item 2 CECO commitment in Reference (c) ano the regulatory requirements of Item 2 in 1

Reference '( f).

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.P H. R. Denton October 29, 1985 Volume 1 of this report suanarizes how each phase of the review was performed, who was involved in the review and their respective qualifica-tions. Volume 2 of this report includes all Human Engineering Discrepancy (KD) findings, responses, and proposed schedules for implementation of the respective corrective actions. This proposed schedule, as noted in Section 3, Item 5.3 of Reference (c) is predicated upon NRC approval of CECO's disposition of each of the HEDs included in Volume 2..

Also, as noted in the same Reference (c), this schedule is subject to the availability of equip-ment, outage time availability at the applicable station, and engineering design lead time. As indicated in References (c) and (b), some problems affecting more than one emergency response activity will require an.

evaluation to assure that an integrated corrective action is taken. These activities will also affect the proposed schedule.

The schedule for completion of the corrective actions has been designated as the completion of the first refueling outage (1st R.F.) or the second refueling outage (2nd R.F.).

In accordance with this definition, the corresponding outage schedule for LaSalle is:

Unit I lst R.F.

June, 1987 2nd R.F.

December, 1988 Unit 2 1st R.F.

May, 1988 2nd R.F.

September, 1989 If you have any questions, please contact this office.

One signed original and five (5) copies of this transmittal and its attachments are included for your use. Please note that seven volumes of photographs have only been sent to Dr. A. Bournia.

Very truly yours, l

H. L. Massin Nuclear Licensing Administrator im Attachments t

cc: Dr. A. Bournia Resident Inspector - LSCS 0830K

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HISTORICAL REPORT REVIEW ERROR ANAYSIS PPOBLEM ANALYSIS REPORT Name(s) of Investigator (s)

Date Station Index Number Unit Report Type and Number Date of Incident Unit Operating Status Docum'ented Problem

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Control Room Human Engineering Discrepancy Index/ Log Number A. O A

1 CONTROL ROOM REVIEW TASK DEVELOPMENT Task Number Job Title Station Number Prepared By TASK DESCRIPTION ACTION ACTION STEPS (Sequence of what must be done to accomplish ACTIONS)

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J-i APPENDIX B s

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Frequency with Which Potential HEDs were Associated with Each Operator Survey Questionnaire Item 1

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Frequency with Which Potential HEDs were Associated with Each Operator Survey Questionnaire Item Question Frequency Questionnaire Item A.2 14 Identify any additional displays which would be helpful in the main control room. Explain why.

A.1 12 Identify any additional controls which would be helpful in the main control room. Explain why.

B.3 8

Identify the system (s) in which controls and/or displays are not grouped together but should be.

B.4 8

Describe how the layout of the control board equipment can be improved to allow operators to perform more effectively.

B.8 7

Describe any system (s) in the control room which you feel are difficult or confusing to operate.

Describe any incident (s) in which these have affected operator job performance.

C.3 7

Identify and describe those alarm tiles that have an inappropriate set point, that is those that give the operator either too much or too little time in which to respond to a plant problem.

C.2 5

Describe any incident (s) in which the annunciator warning systen was ineffective in helping operators respond to a problem.

A.3 4

Identify the area (s) in the main control room where direct voice communication is difficult.

C.4 4

For alarms with multiple inputs, is the conputer printout capability sufficient for you to determine the cause? If not, which alarms should be split into single inputs?

)

G.2 4

Identify tables / checklists / status boards etc.

which could be redesigned to improve their usefulness. Explain.

I.3 4

Describe any incident (s) involving control room personnel in which additional training would have been helpful.

A.5 3

Describe areas in the main control room where lighting causes glare, reflections, dark areas, or other problems.

C.5 3

Identify any alarm tile (s) in the main control room which are confusing or difficult to understand. Explain why.

B-1

Question Frequency Questionnaire Item E.1 3

Identify any information or calculations not presently provided by the process computer that would be useful.

E.4 3

Describe any incident (s) in which a delay in computer response to a request has detracted from or interfered with job performance.

E.5 3

Is there any information presented on the CRT's that would be more useful if it was presented differently? Explain.

F.4 3

Describe any situation (s) in which replacement equipment such as fuses, bulbs, ink, etc. were unavailable for corrective maintenance.

A.4 2

Identify any area (s) in the main control roam where the air quality (temperature, humidity, air flow) makes it uncomfortable or distracting to work.

B.1 2

Identify any control device (s) that should be operated manually instead of automatically or vice versa. Why?

E.3 Identify any words or symbols used on the computer that are difficult to understand or interpret.

Suggest improvements.

E.7 2

Identify any information presented on the computer printer that is not useful to control room operations and explain why.

Describe any situation (s) in which presentation of this information interfered with main control room personnel receiving information from the printer.

F.5 2

Describe the method used to determine lamp failure on the control panels. Describe a method that you feel would be more effective. Explain.

H.4 2

Describe how the shif t turnover process can be improved.

H.5 2

Describe any incident (s) in which the operating crew staffing structure affected control room operations. How can this be improved?

A.6 1

Identify any obstacle (s)-in the main control room that interfere with movement.

B.2 1

Identify any throttleable valve (s) that would potentially ' restrict your time to respond during emergency operations because of their throttleability.

B-2

Question Frequency

~ Questionnaire Item B.5 1

Identify areas on the main control boards where your use of a control is interfered with by other equipment surrounding it (eg. controls,' displays, telephones, radios, etc. ).

B.6 1

Identify equipment (controls, displays) in the main control room which are difficult to reach or monitor. Describe any incident (s) in which this difficulty has had an impact on operator job performance.

B.7' 1

Identify any-control (s) on back panels that should be on front panels or vice-versa. Please explain why and be specific.

B.9 1

Describe any incident (s) in which controls located in the control room were accidently activated.

Why?

C.1 1

Identify and describe those areas in the main control room where background noise levels interfere with annunciator alarms. Describe any incident (s) in which the background noise delayed an operator in detecting an annunciator alarm in a timely manner.

D.2 1

Identify any area (s) in the main control room where messages presented over the PA or radio systems can not be heard clearly.

D.3 1

Describe any instance (s) in which the use of the PA or radio systems by non-operating personnel interfered with control room use of the system.

D.5 Describe any incident (s) in which use of walkie-talkies have interfered with plant instrumentation.

E.6 1

Identify any CRT's located in the control room which are difficult to use from normal operating positions because of their placement in the control room.

F.1 1

Describe any incident (s) in which maintenance activities contributed to an operational problem.

G.1 1

Identify any procedure (s) which are unclear or difficult to use.

E:cplain. Describe any incident (s) in which this led to an operational problem?

'G.5 1

Identify the testing procedure (s) that should be performed more or less frequently (daily, weekly, monthly, quarterly, etc.) than they are now.

For each, state why.

B-3

Question Frequency Questionnaire Item H.2 1

Describe any individual responsibilities which are not clearly understood. How could they be improved?

I.1 1

Describe any inconsistencies between training and actual control room operations. What can be done to make the two more consistent?

I.2 1

Describe any emergency situation (s) for which you feel you have not received enough training.

D.1 0

Identify any auditory signal (s) presented in the control room which are confusing.

D.4 0

Describe any situation (s) in which problems with the PA or radio systems prevented or interfered with an operators ability to communicate with individuals in other areas.

E.2 0

Describe any feature (s) of the computer system that you feel are helpful.

E.8 0

Identify any computer system procedures which are difficult to understand.

Describe any incident (s) in which this had caused a problem.

E.9 0

Identify any key (s) on the keyboard for the computer which are not used by main control room personnel. Describe any incident (s) in which these keys have caused problems in using the computer.

F.2 0

Describe any incident (s) in which the station maintenance program was particularly helpful in preventing an operational problem.

F.3 0

Identify and describe any characteristic (s) of the main control room preventative maintenance program, or corrective maintenance procedures that are a) very effective b) not effective.

G.3 0

Identify the log (s) that you feel are difficult to update or maintain. Explain why.

G.4 0

Identify any mathematical calculation (s) that are time consuming and/or difficult to perform.

Explain.

H.1 0

Are there any job duties which are performed by others in which you feel main control room personnel should be more directly involved or vice versa? Explain.

B-4

Question Frequency Questionnaire Item H.3 0

Describe any instance (s) in which distractions, in the form of unnecessary personnel, traffic, etc.,

interfered with-your main control room duties.

B-5

APPENDIX C~

Management and Staffing:

Personnel O

1.0 INTRODUCTION

The management and administration of the LaSalle Station Detailed Control Room Design Review (DCRDR) was the responsibility of the Technical Services Nuclear Department.

Within this department, the DCRDR Program Administrator reports to.the Technical Services Nuclear Department Manager who reports directly to an Assistant Vice President and hence to a CECO Executive Vice President.

The DCRDR activities were implemented by experienced Operating,

' Engineering and ' Human Factors Engineering personnel.

These individuals performed the DCRDR with input from other CECO

' studies, analyses and concerns involving human factors engi-neering considerations.

The DCRDR review team consisted of a select group of profes-sionals with the wide range of skills necessary for the performance of the design review and included:

e An I&C-engineer e

An engineer / architect with control room design experience e

A senior reactor operator or operations technical advisor with operating experience e

A human factors specialist Subject Matter Experts (SMEs) participated in every phase of

~

the review.

They worked closely with all review team members to provide the appropriate level of plant design and opera-tional knowledge.

The following sections summarize the qualifications of each of the LaSalle Station DCRDR review team participants.

Two cate-gories of involvement are listed:

DCRDR review team partici-pants (Section 2.0), and SME Support Personnel (Section 3.0).

C-1

2.0 DCRDR REVIEW TEAM PARTICIPANTS The qualifications of the DCRDR review team members are summarized below.

The responsibilities and duties of each member is discussed in Section 3.0, of Volume 1 of the LaSalle Station DCRDR Final Summary Report.

The Program Administrator position was originally filled by Mr.

Gary Abrell.

During the second half of the LaSalle DCRDR, the Program Administrator position was filled by Mr. Larry Davis.

Both, men were CECO employees.

Mr. Abrell qualifications are as follows:

Education:

B.S.,

U.C.

Naval

Academy, Annapolis,

Maryland, 1961.

. Experience:

Mr.

Abrell has served as. the Supervisor of Station Support Services for the past 11 months.

Prior to.that he was the Director of Quality Assurance for Operations for 6-1/2 years.

He has 23 years of engineering experience which includes 20 in the nuclear field.

He has held positions in Nuclear Licensing and Nuclear Station opera-tions at Commonwealth Edison.

He has had 3-1/2 years - in the Navy Nuclear Power Program.

He has held an SRO license for Dresden Station since 1970 and has been a

Registered Professional Engineer.in Illinois since 1978.

In the Human Factors area, Mr. Abrell adopted the

" Green Board" for Dresden Station in 1973 and was responsible for its implementation.

This concept is in use at

LaSalle, Byron, and Braidwood stations.

C-2

y Mr. Davis' qualifications are as follows:

Education:

M.B.A.,

Illinois Institute of Technology, 1978.

B.S.,

Engineering, University of Illinois, 1970.

Experience:

For the past six months, Mr. Davis has served as the Supervisor of Station Support Services including the duty as the CECO Human Factors Program Administrator.

He has approximately 14 years of nuclear power plant experience, was SRO licensed at the Dresden Station (BWR) and was license certified at the Braidwood Station (PWR).

Prior to his present assignment, he held various positions at a

newly established Production Training Center including the Acting Training D. nager position.

Prior experience included duties at both an operational and pre-operational nuclear generating station.

C-3

The position of DCRDR Program Coordinator was filled by Mr.

Robert G.

Howard of CECO.

Mr. Howard's qualifications are as follows:

Education:

B.S.,

Electrical Engineering, University

~of Wisconsin, 1955.

Experience:

For the past four years, Mr. Howard has assisted in the Human Factors Reviews of CECO's

Zion, LaSalle, Byron, Braidwood, Dresden, and LaSalle nuclear stations.

For the past three years he was Coordinator of the Byron /Braidwood Prelimina'ry Design Assessment (PDA) and for the past two years assisted Mr. Squires and Mr. Lau in the development and implementation cf the DCRDR Generic Program Plan for CECO nuclear plants.

For the past seven years Mr. Howard was assigned as Staff Engineer in the Control and Instrument group of the Station Electrical Engineering Department and as of September 3,

1984, is a Staff Engineer in Technical Services Nuclear Department.

For eight years prior to that he was Operating-Engineer at the Zion Station (SRO license from 1973 to 1979).

Twenty-three of his 40 years experience with power plants have been in the nuclear power area,

' including assignments in operation, maintenance, construction and engineering.

C-4

.The position of Senior Subject Matter Expert was filled by Mr.

William R.

Huntington (Assistant Superintendent-Operations) of CECO.

Mr. Huntington's qualifications are as follows:

Education:

B.S.,

Electrical Engineering, M.I.T.,

1965.

Experience:

Mr.

Huntington is now Assistant Superintendent-Operations.

March 1984 to April 1985 Technical Staff Supervisor at LaSalle Station.

In this capacity, Mr. Huntington's responsibilities included Tech-nical Support of Operations, including Technical Specification

changes, procedure revisions and plant modifications.

Lead Engineer /

January 1976 to March 1984 Assistant Technical Supervisor /Preoperational Test Coordinator in the Technical Staff.

In this position, his primary function was to supervise the development, performance, and evaluation of the pre-operationa.

testing of both LaSalle County Station reactors.

July 1965 to July 1975 - Officer, United States Navy.

Served in various capacities in nuclear submarines during construction, operation and overhaul phases.

C-5

The position of Human Factors Management Assistant is being filled by Kathleen A.

Hesse of CECO.

Ms. Hesse's qualifica-tions are as follows:

Education:

B.S.,

Psychology, Minor in Engineering Manage-ment, University of Missouri-Rolla, 1984.

Associate of Science in General

Studies, Specialization in Pre-Engineering, Belleville Area College, 1980.

Diploma in Drafting, Specialization in Electrical Drafting, St. Louis Tech, 1976.

Experience:

Since joining Commonwealth Edison Company in January of 1985, Ms. Hesse has supported projects under Commonwealth Edison Company's human factors engineering program.

Her main task is working closely with the Detailed Control Room Design Review Coordinator, offering additional support.

Ms. Hesse also works on.the technical aspects of the project where and when help is needed.

Other power plant experience includes employment with another utility company.

Ms.

Hesse has been totally involved in all aspects of the Detailed Control Room Design Review for the Commonwealth Edison nuclear stations.

C-6

The individuals filling the Human Factors Engineering pcaitions were made up of individuals from outside contractors.

The position of Lead Human Factors Specialist (LHFS) was filled by Mr. Robert L.

Kershner from Advanced Resource Development (ARD)

Corporation.

Mr.

Kershner's qualifications are as follows:

Education:.

M.A.,

Human Factors Psychology, the Catholic University of America, Washington, D.C.,

1977.

B.A.,

Applied Psychology, cum laude, University of Baltimore, Baltimore, Maryland, 1975.

Experience:

For the past five years Mr.

Kershner, Vice President of Human Factors Technology Division for ARD Corporation, has worked in the nuclear utility industry providing support in a number of human factors areas including Lead Human Factors Engineer for over 8 DCRDRs, program plan develop-

ment, SPDS design and evaluation, control room design

reviews, and EOP validation.

Prior to that

time, he spent six years designing, conducting and evaluating human factors research in vibrotactile codes, traffic management, driver information

systems, low-fidelity simulation

aids, information presentation to time critical materials, visual searen patterns, and military systems

design, analysis and improvement.

In addition, Mr.-Kershner participated in underwater acoustical testing of nuclear submarines serving as assistant trial director.

C-7

~

Dr.

Eugene B.

Silverman, president of Advanced Resource Development (ARD) Corporation, acted in a quality assurance capacity.

Dr. Silverman's qualifications are as follows:

Education:

Ph.D.,

Applied Experimental Psychology, Computer Science and Electrical Engineering, The Catholic University of America, Washington, DC, 1976.

M.A.,

Human Factors, The Catholic University of America, Washington, DC, 1975.

B.S.,

Physiological Psychology, University of Maryland, College Park, Maryland, 1969.

Experience:

Dr. Silverman~has developed an organization which is highly responsive to the current needs of business and technology.

He has managed the comprehensive human factors engineering reviews of Pressurized Water Reactor and Boiling Water Reactor nuclear power plant control rooms.

The reviews were conducted within the operational, cost and schedule constraints of the plant and were implemented,

jointly, with utility engi-neering and operations personnel.

Design issues addreised included control board

layout, contr al/ display design and functional

grouping, environmental conditions, process computer performance, procedure (normal, emergency, and abnormal) effectiveness, maintainability and annunciator system design.

Supporting consulta-tion was provided in the areas of operator

training, task

analysis, human fatigue and stress, and personnel error analysis.

C-8

T The Human Factors. Specialist positions are being filled by ARD -

Corporation personnal, the names, affiliations, and educational and experimental qualifications for these individuals are as follows:

Individual:

Mr. Stephen H. Cooley

' Affiliation:

Advanced Resource Development (ARD) Corporation Education:

M.A.,

Industrial / Organizational Psychology, Uni-versity of Illinois at Chicago, Illinois, 1980.

B.A.,

Psychology with minors in Business Admini-stration and Statistics, George Washington University, Washington, D.C., 1976.

Experience:

For the past four years, Mr.

Cooley, a Senior Human Factors Specialist for ARD, has worked in the nuclear power industry.

Ha has provided support in a number of human factors areas that include:

program plan development, control room design reviews, procedure writing and evaluation, training, and human error as a result of inade-quate man-machine interfaces.

Prior to his work in the nuclear

industry, he worked for three years in designing, conducting and evaluating both applied and theoretical research in leader-ship emergence, personnel selection, personnel staffing

patterns, stress management, group dynamics, market research, management assessment, and the psychological factors associated with addiction.

C-9

Individual:

Mr. Joseph B. Winter Affiliation:

Advanced Resource Development (ARD) Corporation Education:

M.S.,

Psychology, Virginia Commonwealth University, Richmond, Virginia, 1979.

B.S.,

Psychology, Virginia Commonwealth s

University, Richmond, Virginia, 1974.

Experience:

Mr. Winter has over two years experience in the power industry conducting task analyses on nuclear jobs for training purposes.

In addition to utility employment, he has three additional years of human factors experience utilizing a

variety of analytic techniques in the areas of test validation, selection, classification, compensation, performance appraisal and multi-purpose job analysis.

He is an accomplished SAS programmer and has used task analysis approaches to create computerized classification

systems, tying them to human resource development projects which factor geographic differences in pay.

He has experience developing job evaluation systems and has worked extensively as a job analyst.

l l

1 l

C - 10

Individual:

Mr. Michael A. Boggi Affiliation:

Advanced Resource Development (ARD) Corporation Education:

M.S.,

Industrial Engineering, North Carolina State University,

Raleigh, North

Carolina, expected completion:

December 1985.

B.A.,

Psychology, LaSalle College, Philadelphia, Pennsylvania, 1981.

Experience:

In 1982 Mr.

Boggi supervised a

group of researchers conducting a noise control project for the regional headquarters of the Amoco Oil company of Raleigh, North Carolina.

In addition, Mr. Boggi worked on a team that evaluated aspects of

safety, biomechanics, and the man-machine interface at specific work locations at the ITT plant in Raleigh, North Carolina.

Besides his applied experience, Mr.

Boggi has conducted observational research in freight management and traffic control.

Presently he is applying his training and experience to complex man-machine interface issues in the nuclear industry.

C - 11

Individual:

Mr. Christopher C.

Plott Affiliation:

Advanced Resource Development (ARD) Corporation Education:

M.S.,

Industrial Engineering, Texas Tech University, Lubbock, Texas, 1983.

B.S.,

Kinesiological

Sciences, University of Maryland,' College Park, Maryland, 1981.

Experience:

Presently, and for the last year and one-half, Mr. Plott has been involved in the evaluation of the complex man-machine interface issues in the nuclcir industry as well as in the development of the computerized data base management system being used for a DCRDR.

For the previous two and one-half years, he was involved in various applied research projects conducted at Texas Tech.

These included work in the areas of work physiology, biomechanics, anthropometry, task analysis and work load measurement while under contract to the Bureau of

Mines, the State of

Texas, and the McDonnel Douglas Corp.

His responsibilities included the design, conduct and analysis of various aspects of these projects.

Mr. Plott has also worked in the areas of human-computer interface and sofware development.

C - 12

Individual:

Ms. Kimberly R.

Siler i

Affiliation:

Advanced Resource Development (ARD) Corporation Education:

B.S.,

Human Factors Psychology, Wright State University, Ohio, 1982.

Experience:

Since joining the ARD Corporation in October of 1984, Miss Siler-has been involved in the conduct of nuclear power plant CRDRs.

During the previous two years Ms.

Siler was a

research psychologist responsible for the

design, implementation and analysis of applied research in the areas of Behavioral Workload Assessment and Biomagnetism in the Visual Evoked Response Laboratory of the Air Force Aerospace Medical Research Laboratories / Human Engineering at Wright-Patterson Air Force

Base, Dayton, Ohio.

In addition to her research activities, Ms.

Siler was continuing her education in the' Graduate Program in Human Factors at the Psychology Department at Wright State University.

l C - 13 I

.m Individual:

Mrs. Cynthia F. Weiss /Parr Affiliation:

Advanced Resource Development (ARD) Corporation Education:

M. S.'E.,

Industrial Engineering.

(Occupational Safety and Health), NIOSH Graduate Traineeship, University of Michigan, Ann Arbor, Michigan, 1982.

B.S.E.,.

Industrial Engineering (Human Factors),

University ^of Michigan, Ann Arbor, Michigan, 1981.

?

Experience:

Mrs. Parr has over three years experience in the nuclear power industry and, as a project engineer in the Human Factors Technology Group, she has provided human factors engineering support to a variety of ARD programs.

Her expertise in the control room is in the design and retrofit of annunciator reviews for several nuclear stations a

and has published and presented a paper on this subject.

In addition, she has designed work-stations for control room operators to ensure that computers, hardcopy records, and spare parts were easily accessible, and performed environ-mental evaluations on light,. ventilation, and auditory design to numerous stations.

)

I C - 14

Individual:

Mr. Vincent J. Fortunato III

-Affiliation:

Advanced Resource Development (ARD) Corporation Education:

M.A.,

Experimental Psychology, State University of New York, Binghampton, New York, 1982.

B.S.,

Psychology, State University.

College, Oswego, New York, 1979.

Experience:

Mr.

Fortunato has provided both research and consulting support to a variety of-ARD programs.

His research activities have included NASA-funded projects involving psychophysiological measures of workload and computer graphic displays of system status.

His support of ARD's nuclear clients has included control room I&C inventories;

and, human factors reviews of computer graphic display

systems, emergency response computer

c. 'shics

systems, radiation monitor graphic

( fr* ys, and quadrex safety assessment syste.:c.

C - 15

Individual:

Mr. Robert Klein Affiliation:

Advanced Resource Development (ARD) Corporation Education:

M.S.,

Industrial Psychology, California State University at Long Beach, Long Beach, California, 1978.

B.S.,

Psychology, St.

Joseph's

College, Philadelphia, Pennsylvania, 1973.

Experience:

Mr.

Klein has been involved with human engineering in the design and evaluation of complex control and display systems for over four years.

He prepared an overall assessment of cruise missile weapon control system hardware and.

software components, reporting on human factors engineering, operability, maintainability, safety, and nuclear security.

He was the human factors member of a

multidiscipline maintainability demonstration team to verify system compliance with Navy maintenance standards.

He participated in experimental design execution, and analysis on Coast Guarc and DOD related projects.

Mr. Klein's experience in military applications of process control and integrated display systems is now utilized in support of nuclear power plant control room design reviews as a Staff-Engineer in ARD's Human Factors Technology Group.

1 C - 16

Individual:

Dr. Linda A. Cosgrove Affiliation:

Advanced Resource Development (ARD) Corporation

' Education:

Ph.D.,

Experimental Psychology, University of Virginia, Charlottesville, Virginia, 1979.

M.A.,

Experimental Psychology, University of Virginia, Charlottesville, Virginia, 1976.

B.A.,

George Mason University, Fairfax, Virginia, 1974, summa cum laude.

Experience:

As a Project Scientist, Dr.

Cosgrove has been responsible for several curriculum development, industrial and computer

training, and human factors engineering studies.

Her support of ARD clients has included the development of an industrial training program and a task analysis of emergency operating procedures.

s 1

C - 17

Individual:

Dr.

E. Ralph Dusek Affiliation:

Advanced Resource Development (ARD) Corporation Education:

Ph.D.,

Experimental Psychology, Statistics, State University of Iowa, Iowa City, Iowa, 1951.

M.A.,

Experimental Psychology, Statistics, State University of. Iowa, Iowa City, Iowa, 1949.

B.A.,

Psychology, Mathematics, University of Missouri, Columbia, Mis sou r'i, 1947.

Experience:

Dr. -Dusek has over 30 years of experience in applied experimental psychology and human-f actors engineering.

During that period he held a

succession of responsible positions all involving applied research in experimental psychology and human factors engineering.

In addition, he has extensive management experience in directing the activities of laboratories and contractors conducting work for which he was responsible.

.Dr.

Dusek has participated in human factors evaluations in nuclear plant control room design reviews at seven different stations.

He has also written human factors manuals for use in future modifications of specific control rooms.

1 C - 18 J

Individual:

Mr. Donald F. Taylor Affiliation:

Advanced Resource Devel.opment (ARD) Corporation Education:

M.S.,

Industrial Engineering and Operations Research (Human Factors),

Virginia Polytechnic Institute and

. State University, Blacksburg, Virginia, 1975.

B.S.,

Industrial Engineering and Operations

Research, Virginia Polytechnic Institute and

-State University,.Blacksburg, Virginia, 1972.

Experience:

Mr. Taylor has been active in human factors for a period of over ten years.

He has applied experience in mechanical and fluids engineering as well as in nuclear maintenance and operations.

As a

senior engineer in the Human -Factors Technology

Group, Mr.

Taylor provides human engineering support to the ARD nuclear programs.

Mr.

Taylor has extensive experience in the

design, evaluation, and enhancement of the man-machine interface in process control appli-cations.

He developed human factors guidelines for the design of nuclear power

plants, the preparation of emergency procedures, and the development of maintenance procedures and docu-mentation.

He has participated in all phases of Control Room Design Reviews (CRDRs),

including over 75 interviews with licensed nuclear operators and ' surveys of 15 control rooms.

Mr.

Taylor developed criteria, methods and procedures for the

analysis, verification, and validation of control room tasks, and surveys of control room equipment.

C - 19

Other Review Team Members The position of System Design Engineer was filled by Mr. Edward L.

Seckinger of CECO.

Mr. Seckinger's qualifications are as follows:

Education:

B.S.,

Engineering, Southern Illinois University at Carbondale, Illinois, June 1972.

M.S.,

Electrical Engineering, University of Illinois at Urbana, Illinois, December 1973.

Experience:

Mr. Seckinger has over 11 years of experience in the nuclear power area.

Between 1974 and 1977 he worked in the Tech Staff at Dresden Station performing modification and Tech Spec

tests, investigating deviations and incidents, etc.

From 1977 to 1980 he worked in the Dresden/ Quad Cities group of the Station Nuclear Engineering Department providing support in the

planning, design and installation of plant modifications.

From 1980 to 1983 he worked in the LaSalle Project Engineering Department providing support in the

design, construction and licensing of LaSalle Station and reviewing pre-operational test procedures and results.

From 1983 to the present he has worked in the LaSalle group of SNED.

Some of his current duties are the review of modifications, NRC notices and bulletins, etc.

C - 20

The Instrument.and Control Engineer position was filled by Mr.

James J.

Krass (assisted by Robert Howard) of CECO.

Mr. Krass' qualifications are as follows:

Education:

B.S.,

Electrical Engineering, Technology from Purdue University, 1968.

Experience:

Presently Mr. Krass is assigned to the Control and Instrument section in the Station Electrical Engineering Department of CECO.

From February 1979 to April of this year he was assigned to the Electrical Instrumentation and Control Branch of the Clinch River Breeder Reactor Project at Oak Ridge Tennessee.

And, for the ten years prior to

that, Mr.

Krass was in CECO's Operational Analysis Department working on Instrument and Control Systems in both fossil and nuclear plants.

C - 21

z 3.0 SUBJECT MATTER EXPERTS (SMEs)

Sixteen SMEs participated during various phases of the LaSalle Station DCRDR; they. include:

Don

Crowl, Andy

Ruger, Al Magnafici, Jay

Houston, Tom

Carr, Dennis

Cornish, Bob McConnaughay, Chuck

Maney, Mark

Dowd, Larry

Nickles, Paul

Nelson, Roger

Armitage, Bill Kirchikoff, Ken

Wolf, Joe

' Williams, and -Ken Rauch.

Qualifications of each of these individuals are summarized in Table C-1.

l 1

C - 22

Years of Years of Senior React'or Reactor Years of Years of Operator Operator Nuclear SME Education Experience Experience Experience R.

Armitage 12 3

1 12.5 T.

Carr 14 4

15 D. Cornish 12 3

13 D.-Crowl 12 3

1 9.5 M.

Dowd 16 2.5 8.5 J.

Houston 12 4

8 W.

Kirchikoff 18 2

9 Al Magnafici 12 4

12.5 C.

Maney 14 4

11 B.

McConnaughay 14 2

2 9.5

+

P.-Nelson 12 3

1 15 L.

Nickles 14 4

16 K..Rauch 12 2.5 6

A.

Ruger 12 3.5 7

J.

Williams 16 1.5 15 W.

Wolf 14 4

10 Total 216 28 27 177.5 Mean 13.5, 3.1 2.5 11.1 Mean for holding license (SRO/RO)

- 3.4 years i

Table C-1.

LaSalle DCRDR SME Participant Qualifications 4

e s

C - 23

1

(

l APPENDIX D Codes i

~-,, - - -......

r,.--

-,,.n.,

-..-..--,-,-~_,..,,_.....,,_,.,n---..

+

CONTROLLER TYPE 1 POT SETPOINT POTENTIOMETER 2 MAN MANUAL CONTROLLER 3 M/ATS MANUAL / AUTO TRANSFER' STATION 4 ANSP AUTOMATIC CONTROLLER W/O SETPOINT ADJUST 5 MASP' M/A TRANSFER STATION WITH SETPOINT ADJUST 6 ANM AUTOMATIC CONTROLLER W/O MANUAL FUNCTION 7 EGCC' EGC CONTROLLER LOCATION 1 OPM08J 24 1N62-P600 47 2H13-P610 2 OPM11J 25 1N62-P601 48 2H13-P611 3 OPM12J 26 1PM01J 49 2H13-P614 4 OPM14J 27 IPM02J 50 2H13-P624 5 OPM17J 28 1PM03J 51 2H13-P632 6 1D21-P600 29 IPM04J 52 2H13-P635 7 1H13-P600 30 1PM05J 53 2H13-P636 8 1H13-P601 31 1PM06J 54 2H13-P642 9 lH13-P602 32 IPM07J 55 2H22-P007 10 1H13-P603 33 IPM08J 56 2N62-P600 11 1H13-P604 34 1PM09J 57 2N62-P601 12 1H13-P607 35 1PM10J 58 2PM0lJ 13 1H13-P608 36 1PM13J 59 2PM02J 14 lH13-P609 37 IPM16J 60 2PM03J 15 IH13-P610 38 2D21-P600 61 2PM04J 16 1H13-P611 39 2H13-P600 62 2PM05J 17 lH13-P614 40 2H13-P601 63 2PM06J

-18 1H13-P624 41-2H13-P602 64 2PM07J 19 1H13-P632 42 2H13-P603 65 2PM08J 20 1H13-P635 43 2H13-P604 66 2PM09J 21 1H13-P636 44 2H13-P607 67 2PM10J 22 1H13-P642 45 2H13-P608 68 2PM13J 23 1H22-P007 46 2H13-P609 69 2PM16J CONTROL TRANSFER SWITCH TYPE - CONTROL TYPE 1 CTW CONTINUOUS THUMBWHEEL CONTROL 2 CRC CONTINUOUS ROTARY CONTROL 3 PBI PUSH BUTTON INCRESE 4 PBD PUSH BUTTON DECREASE 5 CTS CONTROL TRANSFER SELECTOR SW.

6 CTP CONTROL TRANSFER PUSHBUTTON MATCH CONDI? ION 1 YES 1 DEN DENERGIZED 2 NO 2 EN ENERGIZED 11 YES 12 NO D-1

COMMUNICATIONS 1 CDO CENTER DESK OPERATOR 2 EM ELECTRICAL MECHANIC 3 EMF ELECTRICAL MECHANIC FORMAN 4 EA EQUIPMENT ATTENDANT 5 EO EQUIPMENT OPERATOR 6 IM INSTRUMENT MECHANIC 7 IMF INSTRUMENT MECHANIC FORMAN 8 LD LOAD DISPATCHER 9 MM MAINTENANCE MECHANIC 10 MMF MAINTENANCE MECHANIC FORMAN 11 NSO NUCLEAR STATION OPERATORS 12 OE OPERATING ENGINEER 13 RWE RADWASTE EQUIPMENT.

14 SCRE SHIFT CONTROL ROOM ENGINEER 15 SE SHIFT ENGINEER 16 SF SHIFT FORMAN 17 GSEP STATION GSEP DIRECTOR 18 SST STATION SUPERINTENDANT

COLOR, 1A AMBER 2 BG BIEGE 3 BK BLACK 4B BLUE 5 BR BROWN 6C CLEAR 7 GY GRAY 8G GREEN 9O ORANGE 10 P PINK 11 R RED 12 RG RED / GREEN l

13 W WHITE 14 Y YELLOW WHAT MEASURED 1 Conc CONCENTRATION 16 Load LOAD 31 Temp TEMPERATURE 2 Cond CONDUCTIVITY 17 Per PERIOD 32 T TIME 3 cont CONTINUITY 18 PA PHASE ANGLE 33 Unit UNIT

'4 Cur CURRENT 19 Pos POSITION 34 Vac VACUUM 5 Dev DEVIATION 20 P PRESSURE 35 VARS VARS 6 DP DIFFERENTIAL Pressure 21 Pur PURITY 36 Vib VIBRATION l

7 Dis DISPLACEMENT 22 Rad RADIATION 37 V VOLTAGE l

8 DIR DIRECTION 23 Vars REACTIVE LOAD 38 Vol VOLUME 9 Ecc ECCENTRICITY 24 RxP REACTOR POWER 39 Wear WEAR l

10 ElP. ELECTRICAL POWER 25 RDGP ROD GROUP ID 40 INDV INPUT DEVIATION l

11 Exp EXPANSION 26 RDID ROD ID NUMBER 41 MADV M/A DEVIATION 12 Flow FLOW 27 RPos ROD POSITION 42 SRVO SERVO ERROR

(-

13 Freq 28 STPT SET POINT 43 OD OUTPUT DEMAND f

14 Hum HUMIDITY 29 Spd SPEED 98 TEST TEST 15 Lev LEVEL 30 SUR START UP RATE 99 CTRN CONTROL TRANSFER i

l D-2

DISPLAY TYPE 1 EM EDGEWISE METER 66 RRO RADIO-RECEIVER ONLY 2 RM ROTARY METER 70 GTC GRAPH / TABLE / CHART / INSTR.

10 SP SINGLE PEN RECORDER 71 PRC PROCEDURES 11 DP DUAL PEN RECORDER 72 PID P&ID/ DRAWINGS 12 MP MULTI PEN RECORDER 73 RB REFERENCE BOOK 13 MPT MULTI POINT RECORDER 74 LOG LOG 14 XYP X-Y PLOTTER 75 BRD BOARD 15 P PRINTER 76 PTM PORTABLE TIMER 16 TR TAPE RECORDER 77 CLK CLOCK 20 DC DRUM COUNTER (INTEGRATOR) 78 TBA THUMB BUSTER AID 21 EC ELECTRONIC COUNTER 79 DS DATE STAMP 22 LED LIGHT EMITTING DIODE 80 CHR CHAIR 23 LED LIGHT EMITTING DIODE 81 TBL TABLE 30 LLI LEGEND LIGHT INDICATOR 82 DSK DESK 31 IL NONLEGEND LIGHT INDICATOR 83 CAB CABINET 40 TAR TAPGET 84 BC BOOK CASE 41 REL RELAY 85 FC FILE CABINET 42 ANN ANNUNCIATOR 86 PT PAPER TRAY 43 TIM TIMER 87 LAD LADDER / STEP STOOL 50 REM PESPONSE EDGEWISE METER 88 TC TRASH CAN 51 DEM DEMAND EDGEWISE METER 89 CAR CART 52 DEV DEVI ATION EDGEWISE METER 90 FE FIRE EXTINGUISHER 53 T/I MOVING TAPE / FIXED INDEX 91 EA EMERGENCY AIR 54 KS KNOB SKIRT 92 EAH EMERGENCY AIR HOSE 55 T/S SETPOINT TAPE INDICATOR 93 SCB AIR MASK AND TANK (SCBA) 59 ELECTRIC METER 94 EL EMERGENCY LIGHTING 60 PHN PHONE 95 KB KEYBOARD 61 RBS RADIO BASE STATION 96 CRT CATHODE RAY TUBE 62 RP PORTABLE RADIO 98 DW DEC WRITER 63 RPC PORTABLE RADIO CHARGER 99 CAL CALCULATOR 64 SPP SOUND POWER PHONE 65 SPJ SOUND POWER PHONE JACK UNITS 1 Amps AMPERES 2 cmHg CENTIMETERS OF MERCURY 3 CPM COUNTS PER MINUTE 4 CPS COUNTS PER SECOND 5 CF CUBIC FEET 6 CFM CUBIC FEET PER MINUTE 7 DPM DECADES PER MINUTE 8 Deg DEGREES 9 DegC DEGREES CENTIGRADE 10 DegF DEGREES FARENHEIT 11 Ft FEET 12 Ftw FEET OF WATER 13 G GALLONS 14 GPH GALLONS PER HOUR 15 GPM GALLONS PER MINUTE D-3

r-UNITS. (cont.)

16 Hz HERTZ 17 Hr HOURS 18 In INCHES 19 InHg INCHES OF MERCURY-20 InW INCHES OF WATER 21 Ka KILOAMPERES 22 Kvar KILOVARS 23 KV KILOVOLTS

~24 KW KILOWATTS 25 Mvar MEGAVARS 26 MW MEGAWATTS 27 MWT MEGAWATTS THERMAL 28 umho MICRO MHOS 29 ua MICROAMPERES 30 uCI/cc MICROCURIES PER CUBIC CENTIMETER 31 uCI/S MICROCURIES PER SECOND 32 mph MILES PER HOUR 33 ma MILLIAMPERES 34 MPPH MILLION POUNDS PER.MOUR 35 mr/hr MILLIREMS PER HOUR 36 mv MILLIVOLTS 37 mils MILS 38 min MINUTES 39 Notch NOTCHES 40 PPB PARTS PER BILLION 41 PPM PARTS PER MILLION 42 %

PERCENT 43 %V PERCENT BY VOLUME 44 %W PERCENT BY WEIGHT 45 %Def PERCENT DEFLECTION 46 %P (T)

PERCENT THERMAL POWER 47 PTS POINTS 48'PPH POUNDS PER HOUR 49 PSI POUNDS PER SQUARE INCH 50 PSIA POUNDS PER SQUARE INCH ATMOSPHERIC 51 PSID POUNDS PER SQUARE INCH DIFFERENTI AL 52 PSIG POUNDS PER SQUARE INCH GAUGE 53 rpm REVOLUTIONS PER MINUTE 54 R/hr ROENTGENS PER HOUR 55 W/sqcm SCFH 56 sec SECONDS 57 SCFH STANDARD CUBIC FEET PER HOUR 58 SCFM STANDARD CUBIC FEET PER MINUTE 59 Steps STEPS 60 Units UNITS 61 VDC VOLTAGE-DC 62 V VOLTS 63 W WATTS 64 UCI/ML MICROCURIES PER MILLILITER 65 umo/cm MICRO MHOS/ CENTIMETER i

66 KVDC KILOVOLTS-DC D-4

_ _ - _ _ _ _ - __ _, _ _ ~ _ _..

- _ - _.. ~

1 s.

SWITCH TYPE 1 CARD CARD

)

2 CB CIRCUIT BREAKER 3 CRC CONTINOUS ROTARY CONTROL 4 DRC' DISCRETE ROTARY CONTROL 5 JH J-HANDLE CONTROL SWITCH 6 JACK JACK 7 JS JOY STICK 8 KLS KEY LOCK SWITCH 9 KP KEY PAD 10 KFS KINFE SWITCH 11 LLPB LEGEND LIGHT PUSH-BUTTON 12 NLPB NON-LEGEND LIGHT PUSH-BUTTON 13 NSND NON-SWITCH /NON-DISPLAY 14 PB PUSH-BUTTON 15 RMH REMOVABLE HANDLE 16 RKR ROCKER SWITCH 17 RCS ROUND CONTROL SWITCH 18 SS SLIDE SWITCH 19 TW THUMBWHEEL 20 TCS THUMB CONTROL SWITCH 21 TGS TOGGLE SWITCH 22 LTW LEGEND THUMBWHEEL 24 PBL LEGEND PUSH-BUTTON SWITCH ACTION 1 AI AS IS 2 SR SPRING RETURN VALVE CONTROL 1 SC SEAL CLOSED 2 SO SEAL OPEN 3 TC THROTTLE CLOSED 4 TO THROTTLE OPEN DIVISIONS

~

1.0001 15 10 29 30 2

.002 16 100 30 4 3

.005 17 1000 31 5 4

.01 18 12 32 50 5

.02 19 12.5 33 500 6

.05 20 18 34 6 7

.1 21 2 35 8 8

.2 22 2.5 36 EACH 9

.25 23 20 37 LOG 10

.4 24 200 38 PERIOD 11

.5 25 25 39 7.5 12 1 26 250 40

.00001 13 1.25 27 3 41

.6 14 1.5 28 3.33 42

.0833 D-5

SWITCH POSITIONS 1

+15 56 APRM 111 CH 21 2

-15 57 ARMED 112 CH 22 3 0 58 -AUTO 113 CH 23 4 0-10%

59 AUTO OPEN 114 CH 24 5 0-100 60 AVERAGE 115 CH 3 6 0-25%

61 AVG 116 CH 4

'7 0-54 62 B 117 CH 5 8 1 63 B BUS +

118 CH 6 9 10 64 B BUS -

119 CH 7 10 100 65 B LEVEL 120 CH 8 11 10E-1 C6 B OFF 121 CH 9 2 10E-2 67 B PRIM 122 CHECK 13 10E-3 68 B START 123 CHK 14 10E-4 69 B STBY 124 CLOSE 15 10E-5 70 B-C 125 CLOSED 16 10E-6 71 BALANCE 126 CONVERTER OUTPUT 17 10E-7 72 BC 127 COUNT 18 10E-8 73 BLOCK 128 CV TEST 19 10E-9 74 BOTTOM 129 D 20 10E5 75 BUS 21 B-C 130 DCR 21 11 76 BUS 22 B-C 131 DECR

2 12 77 BUS 23 B-C 132 DECREASE 2

23 125 78 BUS 23-1 B-C 133 DISARMED 24 13 79 BUS 24 B-C 134 DISCH 25 14 80 BUS 24-1 B-C 135 DOWN 26 15 81 BUS 25 B-C 136 DRAIN 27 16 83 BUS 26 B-C 137 DRYWELL 28 2 83 BUS 27 138 DW 29 2-3 84 BUS 28 AB 139 DW1 30 21 85 BUS 28 BC 140 DW2 31 22.

86 BUS 28 CA 141 DW3 32 23 87 BUS 29 AB 142 EMERG ROD IN 33 24 88 BUS 29 BC 143 ENGAGE 34

-3 89 BUS 29 CA 144 EXPAND X 10 35 3 E EM CONT 90 BY 145 F5 36 3-1 91 BYP 146 FAN 37 4 92 BYPASS 147. FAN A 38 40 93 C 148 FAN B 4

39 5 94 C-A 149 FAST 40 6-95 CA 150 FAST LOWER 41 7 96 CAL 151 FAST RAISE 42' 8 97 CALIB 152 FILTER IN 43 9 98 CH 1 153 FILTER OUT 44 A 99 CH 10 154 FIRE 45 A BUS +

100 CH 11 155 FIXED 46 A BUS -

101 CH 12 156 FLOW 47 A LEVEL 102 CH 13 157 FWD 48 A OFF 103 CH 14 158 GAIN

- 49 A PRIM 104 CH 15 159 50 A START 105 CH 16 160 GR 1 AND 4 51 A STBY 106 CH 17 101 GR 2 AND 3 52 A-B 107 CH 18 162 HAND 53 AB 108 CH 19 163 HI CAL 54 ADD 180-109 CH 2 164 HI CAL 10E5 55 ANALY2E 110 CH 20 165 HOLD D-6

SWITCH POSITIONS (cont.)

166 HOLD 221 PUMP 1 276 TOP 167 I 222 PUMP 2A 277 TORUS 168 IN 223 PUMP 2B 276 TREAT 169 INBD 224 PUMP 2C 279 TRIP 170 INCR 225 PUMP 2D 280 TRIP A 171 INCREASE 226 PUMP 5 281 TRIP ADJ 172 INHIBIT 227 PUMP ON 282 TRIP B 173 IRM-228 PURGE 283 TRIP TEST 174 ISOL 229 PWR 284 TURB TEST 175 ISOLATE 230 PWR & FLOW. TEST 285 UNLABLED MIDPOSITION 176 LO CAL 231 PWR FLOW 286 UNLABLED POSITION 1 177 LO CAL 10 232 PWR TEST 287 UNLABLED POSITION 2 178 LO CAL'10E5 233 RAISE 288 UP 179 LOCAL 234 RAMP 289 VALVE A 180 LOWER 235 RBM 290 VALVE B 181 MAN 236 READ 291 VAR 182 MAN OPEN 237 RECIRC 292 X1 183 MANUAL 238 REF 293 X3.16 184 MANUAL OVERRIDE 239 REFUEL 294 ZERO 185 MANUAL OVRD 240 RELEASE 295 ZERO 1 186 MON A 241 PESET 296 ZERO 2 187 MON B 242 REV 297 ZERO CHECK 188 MON C 243 REVERSE 298 ZERO NO 1 189 MON D 244 REVERSE 299 ZERO NO 2

'190 MONITOR 245 RFP 2A 300 ARM 191 NEU' 246 RFP 2B 301 27 192 NEUTRAL 247 RFP 2C21 302 28 193 NOR 248 RFP 2C22 303 29 194 NORM 249 ROD IN 304 SUPP POOL 195 NORMAL 250 ROD OUT NOTCH 305 D. GEN 196 NORTH 251.RUN 306 REMOTE / MANUAL 197 NOTCH OVERRIDE 252 SAMPLE 307 D. GEN / BUS 8 NUET 253 SET 308 BUS 9 OFF 254 SHUTDOWN 309 VLV 200 OFF OFF 255 SLOW 310 TURB B 201 ON 256 SLOW LOWER 311 TURB A 202 ON OFF 257 SLOW RAISE 312 DRYWELL L1 203 ON ON 258 SOU 313 DRYWELL L2 204 OP 259 SOUTH 314 E 205 OPEN 260 SPAN 315 P 206 OPER 261 SPAN 1 316 G 207 OPERATE 262 SPAN 2 317 H 208 OUT 263 STANDBY 318 TRIP RESET

'209 OUTBD 264 START 319 SYS A 210 OVER TEST 265 START HOT STBY 320 L S B 211 OVERRIDE 266 STOP 321 IV0053 212 PERIOD 267 SUPP 322 IVQ052 213 POWER OFF 268 SV TEST 323 NORMAL BUS 214 POWER ON 269 SYST 1 324 LOCAL MANUAL 215 PRIM 270 SYST 2 325 INOP 216 PPOGRAM 271 T 326 NORMAL (NO TRIP) 217 PSA 272 T1 327 TEST (WILL TRIP) 218 PSB 273 T2 328 TURBINE TRIP 219 PULL TO LOCK 274 T3 329 TEST PWR 220 PULL TO STOP 275 TEST 330 TEST FLOW D-7

f SWITCH POSITIONS (cont.)

331 PRINT 333 PRINT ON ALARM 334 MM/ MIN 332 SCAN

-e D-8 O

APPENDIX E.

Control Room Design Review Survey

4 CONTROL ROOM DESIGN REVIEW SURVEY The Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) is requiring that a detailed human factors review of every nuclear power plant control room be performed.

Part of the guidance document published to support these reviews, NUREG-0700, suggests the use of your operating experience to help the review team identify operator / control board interface problems.

The Commonwealth Edison Company and the management of this station support the spirit of the NRC's directives.

As a result, we are asking for your support and assistance in the program by completing the attached questionnaire.

For this progtem, the Company's goal is to improve the operating crew's capability to recognize, control and manage plant abnormal and emergency conditions.

A by-product, of course, is that some changes and corrections will be made which will make the operating crews' job easier to perform.

The que'stionnaire contains 52 questions that cover nine general topic areas dealing with different aspects of control room design and operating crew job duties and tasks. The questions deal with " problem

areas as well as good or beneficial features associated with the control room.

In completing the questionnaire, please read each question carefully and then answer it as fully as you can based upon your experience.

In preparing your answers, consider the questions from all the various modes of plant operation, e.g.,

startup, hot stand-by, full power, etc.

Give detailed answers so that someone not as familiar with the area as you are will be able to understand exactly what you mean.

Thcagh the questionnaire is long, please take the time you need and answer all thw questions you can.

Your viewpoints and experiences are important to this review.

Use additional paper if necessary and attach it to this question-naire.

If you do use additional paper, please be sure to match your answer to the appropriate question.

If you feel that we have left anything out or failed to cover an area in which you have a concern, please tell us by attaching comments to the questionnaire.

If you are unable to answer a particular question, please indicate this in the space provided for your response.

In asking for your support in this program, we feel it is important for you to know what we will do with your answers.

As the questionnaires are returned, a non-CECO contractor will summarize your answers on a question-by-question basis and compile results for each.

The team conducting the control room design review will then be informed of each problem area identified so that they can pay special attention to it during the review process.

Should the team verify the area as a problem, they will document it on a form made for that purpose.

Though the NRC may eventually be told of the problems you help identify, we want to assure you that your answers and comments on this questionnaire will be kept in strict confidence.

Your answers will be summarized so that your exact words do not appear.

Further, your answers will in no way ef fect your careers, standings or promotions in Commonwealth Edison.

Therefore, in answering the questionnaire, be as open, honest and straightforward as you can.

E-1

2 In addition to completing the questionnaire, we would like you to supply us with the additional information requested on the following page.

It will hcip

- us to integrate your responses with other.information we must collect as part of this project.

The contractor' who will be summarizing your answers may contact you privately for additional information or clarification, if neces-sary.

When you have completed the qitestionnaire, place it in the envelope provided, seal the envelope, and return it within four weeks to the individual indicated on - the next page.

Thank you very much for your cooperation and assistance.

9 s

s 9

9 m

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i-a

-NAME:

PRESENT POSITION:

NUCLEAR OPERATING EXPERIENCE:

YEARS

-CONTROL BOARD OPERATING EXPERIENCE YEARS HELD A REACTOR. OPERATOR'(RO) LICENSE YEARS HELD A SENIOR REACTOR OPERATOR (SRO) LICENSE YEARS AGE:

SEX:

l HEIGHT:

Return To:

E-3

= A.1 Identify any additional controls ' which would be helpful in the main control room. Explain why.

A.2 Identify any additional displays which would be helpful in the main control room. Explain why.-

A.3 Identify the arca(s) in the main control room where direct voice communication is difficult.

A.4 Identify any area (s) in the main control room where the air quality (temperature, humidity, air flow) makes it uncomfortable or distracting to wc;k.

A.5 Describe areas in the main control room where lighting causes glare, reflections, dark areas, or other problems.

A.6 Identify any obstacle (s) in the main control room that interfere with movement.

B.1 Identify any control device (s) that should be operated manually instead of automatically or vice versa. hty?

B.2 Identify any throttleable valve (s) that would potentially restrict your time to respond during emergency operations because of their throttle-ability.

B.3 Identify the system (s) in which controls and/or displays are not grouped together but should be.

l E-4

m

(

B.4 Describe how the layout of the control board equipment can be improved to allow operators to perform more effectively.

B.5 Identify areas on the main control boards where your use of a control is interfered with by other equipment surrounding it- (e.g.,

controls, displays,' telephones, radios, etc.).

B.6 Identify equipment (controls, displays) in the main control room which are difficult to reach or monitor.

Describe any incident (s) in which this difficulty has had an impact on operator job performance.

B.7 Identify any control (s) on back panels that should be on front panels or vice versa. Please explain why and be specific.

B.8 Describe any system (s) in the control room which you feel are difficult o-n'. fusing to operate.

Describe any incident (s) in which these have afte ted operator job performance.

B.9 Describe any incident (s) in which controls located in the control room were accidently activated. Why?

C.1 Identify and describe those areas in the main control room where back-ground noise levels interfere with annunciator alarms.

Describe any incident (s) in which the background noise delayed an operator in

. detecting an annunciator alarm in a timely ranner.

C.2 Describe any incident (s) in which the annunciator warning system was ineffective in helping operators respond to a problem.

E-5

i C.3 Identify and describe those alarm tiles that have an inappropriate set-point, that 'is, one that gives the operator either too much or too little time in which to respond to a plant problem.

C.4 For alarms with multiple inputs, is the computer printout capability sufficient for you to determine the cause?

If not, which alarms should be split into single inputs?

C.5 Identify any alarm tile (s) in the main control room which are confusing i

or difficult to understand. Explain why.

I.

D.1 Identify any auditory signal (s) presented in the control room which are confusing.

- D.2 Identify any area (s) in the main control room where messages presented over the PA or radio systems cannot be heard clearly.

D.3 Describe any instance (s) in which the use of the PA or radio systems by non-operating personnel interfered with control room use of the system.

f D.4 Describe any situation (s) in which problems with the PA or radio systems prevented or interfered with an operators ability to communicate with individuals in other areas.

I D.5 Describe any incident (s) in which use of walkie-talkies have interfered with plant instrumentation.

1 1

E.1 Identify any information or calculations not presently provided by the process computer that would be useful.

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l E.2 Describe any feature (s) of the computer system that you feel are helpful.

E.3 Identify any words or symbols used on the computer that are diffictilt to

. understand or interpret. 'Suggest improvements.

E.4 Describe any incident (s) in which a delay in computer response to a request has detracted from or interfered with job performance.

E.5 Is there any information presented on the CRT's that would be more useful if it was presented differently? Explain.

E.6 Identify any CRT's located in the control room which are difficult to use from normal operating positions because of their placement in the contrni room.

E.7 Identify any information presented on the computer printer that is not

-useful to control room operations and explain why.

Describe any situation (s) in which presentation of this information interfered with main control room personnel receiving information from the printer.

E.8 Identify any computer system procedures which are difficult to under-stand. Desctibe any incident (s) in which this has caused a problem.

E.9 Identify any key (s) on the keyboard for the computer which are not used by main control room personnel. ' Describe any incident (s) in which these keys have' caused problems in using the computer.

,F.1 Describe any incident (s) in which maintenance activities contributed to an operational problem.

E-7

F.2 Describe any incident (s) in 'which the station maintenance program was particularly helpful in preventing an operational problem.

-F.3-Identify and describe any characteristic (s) of the main l control room preventative maintenance program or corrective maintenance procedures that are a) very effective, b) not effective.

'F.4 Describe any' occasion (s) in which replacement equipment such as fuses, bulbs, or ink was unavailable for corrective maintenance.

F.5 Describe the method used to determine lamp failure on the control panels.

Describe a method that you feel would be more effective.

Explain.

G.1 Identify any procedure (s) which are unclear or difficult to use.

Explain.

Describe any incident (s) in which this led to an operational problem.

G.2 Identify tables / checklists / status boards, etc. which could be redesigned to improve their usefulness. Explain.

G.3 Identify the log (s) that you feel are dif ficult to update or maintain.

Explain why.

G.4 Identify any mathematical calculation (s) that are time consuming and/or difficult to perform. Explain.

.G.5 Identify the testing procedure (s) that should be performed more or less frequently (daily, weekly, monthly, quarterly, etc.) than they are now.

For each, state why.

E-8

H.1 Are there any job duties which are performed by others in which you feel main control room personnel should be more directly involved or vice versa? Explain.

H.2-Describe any-individual responsibilities.which are not clearly understood. How could they be improved?

H.3 Describe any instance (s) in which distractions, in the form of unnecessary personnel, traffic, etc., interfered with ' your main control room duties.

H.4 Describe how the shift turnover process can be improved.

H.S Describe'any incident (s) in which the operating crew staffing structure

.affected control room operations. How can this be improved?

I.1 Describe any inconsistencies between training and actual control room operations. What can be done to make the two more consistent?

I.2 Describe any emergency rituation(s) for which you feel you have - not received enough training.

I.3-Describe any incident (s) involving control room personnel in which additional training would have been helpful.

s E-9

E k

APPENDIX F Control Room Labeling Standard 1

f

CONTROL ROOM LABELING STANDARD The following information is'a summary guideline to be followed

-for labeling system / workstations, subsystem / functional

areas, components and control positions within the LaSalle control room.

The chcracteristics of labels must be such that they provide maximum information to the operator.

The various illumination levels of control areas, control locations, and restraints on operator position demand that all label characteristics (such as size, lettering and placement) serve as perceptual aids to information discrimination and processing.

The redundancy inherent in such characteristics can serve as a visual code to reduce response time and minimize probability of error.

Placement of labels should be uniform throughout the system to insure ease of element / control identification and should

. provide maximum visibility.

Labels should be oriented horizon-tally in order to be read easily, quickly and accurately and should not be subject to accidental removal.

The following guidelines adhere to those established by the Ceco checklist to aid the operator in the locating, identifying

and handling of controls, displays and equipment.

Labels should describe the function of 1.

Label Information equipment items, or if needed for clarity, describe engi-neering characteristics or nomenclature.

F-1

Labels should be placed below indi-2.

Placement of Labels cators except in cases-where there are space constraints.

If the labels are located above eye level, they should be positioned to ensure visibility.

All labels should be placed close to the corresponding panel element.

Placement should also provide sufficient space to allow adequate discrimination from adjacent' controls and minimum inter-ference with visibility during adjustment or manipulation of controls.

Placement should also be such that labels do l

1 not obscure or detract from other information sources (see Figures 1

and 2).

.Therefore, the following guidelines should be followed:

a.

Labels should not appear on the control itself when an I

adjustment or manipulation is required that causes the operator's hands to obscure the label for an extended time period.

b.

Adjacent labels should be separated by sufficient space so they are not read as one continuous label (see Figure 3).

c.

Eliminate, wherever

possible, vertically oriented labels and replace with horizontal labels.

d.

Curved patterns of labeling should be avoided.

e.

Labels should be mounted to minimize the possibility of accidental detachment.

f.

Labels should be mounted on a flat surface.

F-2

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LABEL

~

Q ct.o wrR INJ CNTR Vt.R 6 AUTO l

8 Figure 1.

Proximity of label to panel element.

F-3

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l HPCI TUR8INE BAROMETRIC O AUX OlL PUMP O O CONDENSER O I

CNDS PUMP

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I

.V I,t l

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I MPCI TURBINE G

AUX Olt PUMP G

LOCKED OFF t

opp RESET RUN NORMAL DEFEAT RESET RUN j

l OPEN OPEN AUTO-FEED l

ALTTO FEED I

i Figure 2.

Separation of adjacent labels.

F-4 j

i

h OHF RADIO POWER A

OC 4

NON-PREFERRED UHF R

POWER A

oc i

PREFERRED t

Figure 3.

Examples of preferred and non-preferred label placement.

4 F-5

3.

Character Style and Dimensions - Recommended styles are shown in Figure 4.

A condensed Helvetica type font is an acceptable style.

Capital letters that art simple in design (i.e.,

without flourishes or serifs) should be used in all labels.

Other character dimensions are given below:

a.

Letter width-to-height ratio - no less than 1:1; no greater than 3:5.

b.

Numeral width-to-height ratio - 3:5 (except for the numeral "4"

which should be one stroke width wider and the numeral "1" which is one stroke in width).

c.

Stroke width-to-character height ratio - no less than 1:6; no greater than 1:8.

d.

Minimum space between:

1)

Characters - one stroke width 2)

Words - one character width 3)

Lines - one-half character height In order to insure speed and 4.

Character Readability accuracy in the reading of labels, uniform size and style of the characters should be adopted.

5.

Character Height - Letter height should be identical for all labels within the same hierarchical level, based on the maximum viewing distance.

The heights displayed in Table 1 are the minimum and preferred values recommended for opera-tor viewing distances of three feet.

If the operator's normal viewing distance is not three feet, the alphanumeric character's height should subtend a visual angle on the retina of 15 minutes at a minimum (0.004 x viewing dis-tance).

A visual angle of 20 minutes (0.006 x viewing distance) upon the retina is preferred by the NRC i

(NUREG-0700).

1 F-6

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EMEEEE

~ M E IBEEEEEEEE a.

U.S.

Military Specification MIL-M-18012B AB C D EFG HIJ KLM NOPQRSTUVWXYZ 0123456789 b.

U.S.

Military Standard MS--33558 ( ASG)

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i Figure 4.

Recommended character styles.

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Table 1.

Preferred values for character height MINIMUM MAXIMUM Letter height

.150 Letter width

.100

.150 Stroke width

.019

.025 Space between characters

.019

.025 Space between words

.100

.150 Space between lines

.075 1

F-8

6.

Labeling Visibility - The -following guidelines should be adhered to:

a.

Labels should not cover,- detract from or obscure figures or scales which must be read by the operator.

b.

Labels should be visible to the operator during control activation.

7.

Label color codes - General control room should be white with black lettering.

Yellow, blue and green should be used to identify Division I,

II, and III equipment, respectively.

Orange should be used for reactor protection system equipment.

l F-9 J

APPENDIX G Control Room Annunciator Standard m

m

CONTROL ROOM ANNUNCIATOR STANDARD The guidelines governing the labeling of aanunciator warning systems-parallel the labeling guidelines for the control room.

1.

Location - The annunciator warning panel labels should be located above the panel and be consistent with a subtended visual angle of at least 15 minutes (.004 x viewing distance) when viewed from a central position within the primary operating area.

For LaSalle, this should be.625= inches.

Within each panel, alarm tiles shculd be grouped by function or

system, and each panel should be located above the related controls or displays necessary for diagnostic or corrective response.

2.

Legends Legends on individual annunciator til'es should be unambiguous and specific as to conditions that they address.

Information should be ' conveyed concisely using abbreviations and acronyms consistent with those used elesewhere in the control room.

The use of alarms which refer to other detailed annun-ciator panels located outside the primary operating area should be minimized.

3.

Character Height - For optimum legibility of the panel legends, letter height should subtend a minimum visual angle of 15 minutes and be identical for all tiles based on maximum viewing distance.

For LaSalle, the G-1

letter height should be.22 inches.

The alphanumeric labeling of the vertical and horizontal axes of the annunciator panels should be consistent with a sub-tended visual angle of at least 15 minutes viewed from a central. position within the primary operating area.

For LaSalle, this should be.5 inches.

4.

Character Style - Type style for legends should be simple, upper-case, and consistent for all tiles to insure maximum readability *.

Legends should be engraved on tiles using black lettering on white background to provide high contrast.

Character dimensions should be consistent with those recommended in the labeling standard.

5.

General Guidelines a.

An abbreviation standard should be developed and strictly observed, b.

Words in the label should express exactly what action is intended and at the same time be clearly understood, direct and correctly spelled.

The meanings of words should be commonly accepted by all intended users.

Unusual technical terms should be avoided.

c.

Symbols can be used only if they have a commonly accepted meaning, they are unique and distin-guishable from each other, they use a commonly accepted standard configuration, and they are used

' consistently within and across panels.

Roman numerals should be avoided.

McCormick, E.J.

Human Factors in Engineering and Design ~(Sth Edition).

New-York:

McGraw-Hill, 1976.

G-2

I

\\

d.

Words and abbreviations which are similar in appearance should be avoided where error in interpretation could result.

e.

Labels should identify functionally grouped controls or displays and be located above the groups they identify.

f.

All discrete functional control positions should be identified along with the direction of motion in continuous motion rotary controls.

g.

Labels should describe the function or equipment compon'ents.

h.

Words should be used which have a

commonly accepted meaning for all intended users; unusual terms should be consistent within and across pieces of' equipment.

i.

Words on labels should be concise yet convey the intended meaning.

j.

Abbreviations should be limited to five or less characters.

G-3

LaSalle County Station

' Final Summary Report PREFACE The following document was prepared jointly by the Commonwealth Edison Company (CECO) and Human Factors Technology Group of the Advanced Resource Development (ARD)

Corporation.

The ARD

. Corporation assisted CECO throughout all phases of the Control Room Design Review (CRDR).

This report contains the Commonwealth Edison Company's LaSalle

}

County -Station Detailed Control Room Design Review (DCRDR) final summary report, as per CECO's April 14, 1983, recponse to NUREG-0737 Supplement ~ 1, and to the NRC's subsequent February 27,

1984, confirmatory order (Docket Number 50-373)- to Mr.

Dennis L. Farrar from Mr. A. Schwenger.

s

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A

Final Summary Report LaSalle County Station TABLE OF CONTENTS PAGE SECTION VOL.'l DCRDR FINAL

SUMMARY

REPORT PROGRAM IMPLEMENTATION 1-1

1.0 INTRODUCTION

2-1 2.0 OVERVIEW 2-2 2.1 Review Phases 2-3 2.2 Foundation Processes 2-4 2.3 Investigative Processes 2-4 2.4 Assessment Phase 2-4 2.5 Reporting Phase 3-1 3.0 MANAGEMENT AND STAFFING 4-1 4.0 DOCUMENTATION AND DOCUMENT CONTROL 4.1 Output Documentation 4-2 4-2 4.2 Document Control 4-3 4.3 Data Base Management System 5.0 INTEGRATION WITH OTHER SUPPLEMENT 1 5-1 NUREG-0737 INITIATIVES 6-1 6.0 REVIEW PROCESS 6-1 6.1 Historical Event Review 6-7 6.2 Operating Experience Review 6-15 6.3 Task Analysis 6-24 6.4 Control Room Inventory 6.5 Verification of Equipment Availability and 6-31 suitability 6.6 Validation of Control Room Functions 6-37 6-43 6.7 Control Room Survey 7-1 7.0 HED ASSESSMENT 8-1 8.0 HED IMPLEMENTATION 8-1 8.1 General 8-3 8.2 Labeling 8-4 8.3 Annunciators 8-4 8.4 Enhancements 8-5 8.5 Verification of Corrective Actions

- iii

F~

]

LaSalle County Station Final Summary Report TABLE OF CONTENTS (continued)

PAGE SECTION APPENDICES A-1 A

FORMS NUMBER OF ASSOCIATIONS OF OPERATOR SURVEY B

SUMMARY

ITEMS TO HUMAN ENGINEERING B-1 DISCREPANCIES C-1 C

MANAGEMENT AND STAFFING:

PERSONNEL D-1 D

CODES E-1 CONTROL ROOM DESIGN REVIEW SURVEY E

F-1 F

CONTROL ROOM LABELING STANDARD G-1 G

CONTROL ROOM ANNUNCIATOR STANDARD s

e

- iv -

LaSalle County Station Final Summary Report I

1. 0' INTRODUCTION The Detailed Control Room Design Review (DCRDR) is part of a broad program designed by the nuclear industry and the federal government to ensure consideration of human factors in nuclear

' power plant design and operation.

The purpose of the LaSalle DCRDR was to review and evaluate the control room workspace, instrumentation,- controls and other equipment from a

human factors standpoint, taking into account both system demands and operator capabilities.

Secondly, the human factors review identified, assessed and will implement control room design modifications which correct inadequate or unsuitable items.

The following objectives were identified for the LaSalle County Nuclear Generating Station DCRDR:

1.

Determine whether the control room provides the system status information, control capabilities,

feedback, and analytic aids necessary for control room operators to accomplish their functions effectively.

2.

Identify characteristics of the existing control room instrumentation,

. controls, other equipment, and physical arrangements that may detract from operator performance.

1-1

LaSalle County Station Final Summary Report 3.

Analyze and evaluate the problems that could arise from the aforementioned human engineering discrepan-cies (HEDs),

and analyze means of correcting those

~

discrepancies which could lead to substantial problems.

4.

Define and put into effect a plan of action that applies human factors principles to improve control room design and enhance operator effectiveness; particular emphasis should be placed on improvements affecting control room design and operator performance under emergency conditions.

5.

Integrate the control room design review with other areas of human factors inquiry identified in the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) Task Action Plan.

6.

Verify Preliminary Design Assessment (PDA) results and integrate corrective actions resulting from PDA into DCRDR recommendations.

Final Summary. Report.

LaSalle County Station 2.0 OVERVIEW

'The Commonwealth Edison Company DCRDR evaluates the control room workspace, instrumentation, controls.and other equipment from the human factors ~ engineering perspective.

Both system

' demands and operator capabilities were taken into account.

The HEDs identified in the review phase were assessed ~by the Human Engineering Discrepancy Assessment Team (HEDAT).

For those HEDs significant enough to warrant a corrective action, this team identified and assessed control room improvements which would correct the problems described'in the HEDs.

A tentative corrective action schedule based upon the safety significance and = human' ' factors importance was also established.

As indicated in.the CECO response to the NUREG-0737 Supplement.1, this schedule is dependent upon the NRC's response to this repor t.' and the.results of the integration of all Supplement 1 initiative modifications.

Prior

.t o licensing, Commonwealth Edison conducted a

human factors ' Preliminary Design Assessment (PDA) of the LaSalle c3ntrol. room.

As a result, a large number of design improve-

.ments were. completed.

In addition, a

number of items..was deferred until1 the DCRDR.

Each of these deferred ' items was reviewed.and documentation. supporting the disposition of each is available on-site.

2-1

E LaSalle County Station Final' Summary Report 2.1 Review Phases The co.itrol. rooms were reviewed to determine if they provide the operator with the system status information, control capabilities,

feedback, and performance aids necessary to accomplish this function and task effectively.

Characteris-tics of the existing control room instrumentation,

controls, other equipment and physical arrangements that may detract from operator performance were also identified during this phase.

These review processes were used to collect pertinent information and/or to identify HEDs within the control rooms.

2.1.1 Operating Experience Review An operating personnel survey and a

review of historical reports was conducted to identify conditions which affect probability for those operator errors which could affect safe operation of the generating stations.

Industry-wide Licensee Event Reports _ (LERs) for similarly designed control rooms that have generic applicability, were included in this review.

Operating personnel were also interviewed to obtain feedback based on previous operating experience.

2.1.2 Review of System Functions and Analysis of Tasks Involved in Control Room Operator Functions l

The BWROG EPGs were used as the base document for establishing information requirements.and performance criteria for the tasks which operators must accomplish.

1 Inventory of Control Room Instrumentation and Equipment

'2.1.3 The inventory itemized and described the existing control room components for comparison with the information,

control, 2-2

LaSalle County Station Final Summary Report equipment and material requirements identified in the system functions review and task analysis.

2.1.4 Survey of the Human Engineering Acceptability of Control Rc om Components and Environmental Conditions This survey identified whether the control room components and environment (e.g., lighting, noise / sound control) were designed to accommodate basic human characteristics such as physical size and perceptual-motor capabilities.

Verification of Task Performance Capabilities 2.1.5 During this phase, the adequacy of workstations to support the execution of control room operator tasks was assessed.

The verification was made by comparing the information and control requirements derived from the task analysis to the existing instrumentations and controls available in the control rooms.3 2.1.6 Validation of Control Room Functions The validation was conducted to determine whether the functions allocated to the control room operating crew could be accomp-lished within the structure of the defined Emergency Operating Procedures (EOPs) and the design of the control room as it exists.

2.2 Foundation Processes The first three are foundation processes in which frames of reference and benchmarks for identification of discrepancies were established.

The last three are investigative processes with which the benchmarks were used to identify HEDs.

2-3

Final Summary Report LaSalle County Station-2.3 Investigative Processes The investigative processes used the data collected during the foundation processes to determine the adequacy of control room operators' tasks and functions from a

human engineering

_ perspective by comparing the data against the human factors benchmarks established during these processes.

Deficiencies were identified and documented during this part of the review.

It was during this part of the review that the control room survey of the control boards was conducted.

This' survey was followed by a verification of task - performance capabilities, including the verification of instrumentation and control availability and suitability.

Subsequent to the verification process, a validation of the control room. functions was conducted to determine whether the functions allocated to the control room operating crew could be accomplished within' the structure of the emergencyioperating procedures and the design of the existing control room.

2.4 Assessment Phase Upon completion' of the DCRDR investigations, a review of the HEDs was conducted by the HEDAT.

The review served to identify the significance of each HED, as well as to provide the review team with the opportunity to determine the appropriate actions necessary to correct the HEDs.

A schedule was then developed.

2.5 Reporting Phase The following report represents the methodology, findings and conclusions from the LaSalle County Generating Station DCRDR.

The review was conducted by Commonwealth Edison Company with 2-4

. - ~

~ -.._ -...

LaSalle County Station Final Summary Report extensive human factors engineering support from ARD

.Corporat on, columbia, Maryland.

Th'is report was prepeced to i

i show compliance with NUREG-0737 Supplement 1.

1 9

T l

i-t 1

e i

e, I

4

+

1

+

4 i

e 2-5

i 1

Final Summary Report LaSalle County Station 3.0 MANAGEMENT AND STAFFING

.The purpose of the DCRDR was to identify and correct those features in the control room environment which were not in concert with.the safe and efficient operation of the facility.

The

.DCRDR activities were implemented by experienced operations, nuclear systems and~ human factors ' engineering personnel.

?

The DCRDR Team The LaSalle DCRDR team consisted of a group of professionals from various disciplines with the wide range of skills necessary for the performance of the design review and included:

o I&C engineering e

Nuclear systems engineering e

Human factors engineering e

Operations This core group was' supplemented, as required.

During the course of the

review, any additional. specialists (e.g.,

lighting, acoustics) required for. specific tasks were made available as needed.

.3-1

Final Summary Report LaSalle County Station Before beginning the review, team members were selected and familiarized with the methods and content of relevant NRC documents, general human factors engineering _ principles and methodology.

Team members were also provided with the _ oppor-tunity to familiarize themselves with the general design and operation of the plants.

Any general or specific procedural

. issues were resolved at this point.

The review team members were encouraged to document dissenting

opinions, regarding ~HEDs, if. appropriate.

They were also provided access to plant facilities, personnel, necessary documents and information required to perform their assigned tasks.

A statement of responsibility and qualifications was provided for each team member under agreement with the NRC at the commencement of the station's DCRDR within the Commonwealth Edison system, and this statement is included in Appendix C.

B-- R

g, -

LaSalle County Station Final Summary Report 4.0 DOCUMENTATION-AND DOCUMENT CONTROL This section describes the documentation system (input / output documents) and documentation management / control procedures which CECO used to support the LaSalle'DCRDR.

From the beginning of the review, the team had at its disposal the following reference documents:

o System Lists System Descriptions e

Piping and Instrumentation Drawings e

e Control Room Floor Plan (Lighting, HVAC, Acoustics, etc.)

e Panel Layout Drawings e

-Panel Photographs List of Acronyms, Abbreviations e

Description of Control Room Coding Conventions e

Samples of Computer Printouts e

Procedures (Emergency, Abnormal and Operating) e Guidelines for Procedural Development e

Other Human Factors / Control Room Studies o

As additional documents were acquired or written, they were added'to the library.

4-1

LaSalle County Station Final Summary Report l

4. 11 Output Documentation In order to facilitate systematizing and recording Control Room Design Reviews, a series of standard forms was developed.

The forms used. are listed below and appear in their entirety in Appendix A.

L.

Control Room Human Engineering Discrepancy Record o

Questionnaire Item Summary Form e

Personnel Survey Summary Form

-o Index of Reviewed Reports o

e Historical Report Review Error Analysis Problem Analysi's Report Control Room Review Task Development e

Validation Review Worksheet o

Sound Survey Record e

Lighting Survey - Illuminance Record

_fi.

e Lighting Survey - Luminance and Reflectance Record e

Lighting Survey - CRT e

Air Velocity Survey Record e

Photographic Log e

Form Task Analysis Instrument / Control Requirement e

Task Analysis Controller Requirement Form j

e e

Inventory Form Controller Inventory Forn o

4.2 Document Control The Commonwealth Edison Company recognized that a data collec-tion / analysis effort, such as that inherent in a DCRDR, can

, generate volumes of ~ paperwork which, if managed improperly, 4-2

-LaSalle County Station Final Summary Report

-could result in a

great loss of time and money.

CECO, therefore, implemented a data base management system (DBMS) to collect, update, analyze and provide the information necessary to fulfill the requirements of DCRDRs on a dedicated computer.

An example of a method used for the DCRDR DBMS is illustrated in Figure 4.1.

Implementation of the DBMS minimized the number of_ manual transformation steps required in the data collection /

analysis effort.

Furthermore, it afforded the DCRDR team the capability of real-time data analysis.

Through the use of the DBMS parameters, any number or combination of data points was accessed and analyzed on an as-needed basis.

4.3 Data Base Management System The DBMS was implemented on CECO's Prime 750 computer using INFO /INFOTEXT.

It consists of a master program with memory exQ2ted from various source storage devices to hold the data documents.

Because manual handling of data is largely elimi-nated after data is entered into the system, the DBMS greatly reduced duplication of

efforts, document loss and errors resulting from unnecessary handling of data.

After the DBMS was implemented, the series of data files and

-records were created using information derived from the various source documents.

Each source document contained specific forms, charts, schedules, etc., required for the DCRDR and each constituted a single data file.

Data files, in turn, comprised.

individual records which represent the specitic parameters contained in the file forms, charts, etc.

The file then served as a model of the document from which it was created, as well as an area in which to store data records.

The source docu-ments included-those reports and forms listed previously in this chapter.

To avoid file damage or unauthorized data manipulation, access to. the DBMS was restricted by liriting user training and by issuing passwords to a limited number of users.

4-3

LaSalle County Station Final Summary Report DATA BASE USER (S)

SOFTWARE DATA BASE STORAGE CONFIGURATIOR user OPERATOR suB-tasks l81 117l13 l t, l, t,

11 p

sRATOR tasks 1Ii 1 '2 I T3II4 I,,,. T.

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OPERATOR FUNCTIONS l

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USER SYSTEM PROCEDURES lEl lP2lP3lP4l, P,

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system EVENTS lEl lE2lE3lE4 I,,,

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STANDARD STANDARD CUSTOM REPORT llEPORT REPORT

1 ft OUTPUT REPORTS & SCREENS Figure 4.1 Sample Human Factors Evaluation i

Data Base System I

i 4-4

.~

Final Summary Report LaSalle County Station 1

i T

I 5.0 INTEGRATION WITH OTHER SUPPLEMENT 1 NUREG-0737 INITIATIVES Commonwealth Edison Company has an integrated program to address each of the Supplement 1 to NUREG-0737 initiatives.

- This program extends throu_ghout its system of nuclear generating stations and-has specific provisions for each

- station.

This program is headed by the CECO Station Nuclear Engineering Department which provides the necessary integration and support to ensure that a systematic approach is adopted for.

the inclusion of each of the recommended design changes resulting from these initiatives.

Details of this

process, including schedules were provided in Commonwealth Edison's l:

April 14, 1983 submittal to the NRC.

- The design of the Safety Parameter Display System (SPDS), the R.G.

1.97 based instrument

displays, the development of function-oriente'd emergency operating procedures, the training

- of.the operating staff, and the DCRDR are being integrated in a manner which takes full advantage of the scheduling of each of l

- these initiatives, and is being integrated with respect to the overall improvement of the operator's ability to comprehend plant conditions and cope with emergencies.

I h

e 5-1

Final-Summary. Report LaSalle County' Station 1

. Design changes will be integrated with the ~ informational data base collected as a function of the DCRDR.

In addition, the' corrective action modifications resulting from the DCRDR will be evaluated for their effects on these programs.

The integration of the -DCRDR and these other programs include provisions for operator ~ retraining and upgrading of operating procedures when necessary, to reflect the physical changes made in the control room.

Functions and tasks have been analyzed to determine information and ' control needs and to identify operator tasks during emer-gency operations.

This analysis will be used to verify the completeness of the emergency operating procedure, and will serve as the basis for verifying the SPDS parameters.

t l

5-2

LaSalle County Station

-Final Summary Report 6.0 REVIEW PROCESS The DCRDR review process resulted in the identification of a number of HEDs that were eval'uated to determine the extent to which they could affect the potential of operating crew errors.

Also requiring consideration were the recommendations for.

improvement or correction that the Human Factors

' Specialists (HFSs) made for the discrepancies discovered in.the DCRnR investigative processes.

Once the ' HEDs were evaluated and r recommended improvement (if applicable) agreed upon, most improvements will be implemented according to a schedule based on the relative significance of the HED.

6.1 Historical Event Review 6.1.1 Introduction The objective of the Historical Event Review was to investigate archival documentation of control room problems to ensure that the man-machine interface was adequate to reduce the potential for human error.

Human error in performing complicated tasks is a

well documented fact and the potential for it is always present.

In

-the_ nuclear power industry, human error can combine with poor design features and contribute to serious operational 6-1

1 LaSalle County Station Final Summary Report problems.

Fortunately, in the

industry, instances of past human performance error and equipment / design arrangement problems are documented in plant and industry records and can be - used as a data base for recommending design improvements.

This section describes the process used to review several such documents to identify areas of potential human performance problems at Commonwealth Edison Company's LaSalle Units 1 and 2.

There were-five sources of historical reports available for this review at LaSalle station.

Three of the sources were in-house documentation and consisted of LaSalle Licensee Event Reports (LERs), LaSalle Deviation Reports (DVRs), and LaSalle Professional Committee Reports (PROS).

The other two sources of documentation were industry-wide sources and consisted of Significant Event Reports (SERs) and Significant Operating Event Reports (SOERs).

These latter two sources were NSAC/INPO reviewed reports available to the review team through Commonwealth Edison-Company.

All five sources were used at LaSalle station for the Historical Event Review.

6.1.2 Methodology The following paragraphs delineate the processes used to

collect, screen, prioritize and evaluate the documents identified above.

7 6.1.2.1 Collecting the Historical Reports In its archives, LaSalle station has a copy of every LER, DVR and PRO report generated at that station.

An HFS reviewed each of' the above reports for LaSalle Units 1 and.2 from 1979 to 1985.

In addition, every NSAC/INPO SER and SOER report from their _ beginning ~in 1979 following the accident at Three Mile Island Unit 2, until 1985, was reviewed by an HFS.

The purpose 6-2

LaSalle County Station Final Summary Report of the review was to identify those reports that involved control room

operator, procedural and/or control board equipment failure and/or design arrangement errors.

Copies of reports so identified were made for further screening.

Over 130 reports'were reviewed for LaSalle station.

4 6.1.2.2 Screening the Historical Reports After collecting all potentially relevant reports for LaSalle

station, the reports were screened by an HFS with the assistance of a Subject Matter Expert (SME) and the DCRDR Coordinator, to determine if the report described and documented a control room problem.

Because this was a DCRDR, only reports applicable to the control room were retained for further analysis.

Reports were considered to document a

control room problem if they met any one or more of the following criteria:

e Equipment referenced (valve / pump controls,

displays, indicators, etc.) must be in the physical confines of the control room.

o Procedure steps referenced must be accomplished within the physical confines of the control room.

o Personnel error referenced must have occurred in the control room on equipment contained in the control room, or entailed a deviation from procedures that were to be accomplished in the control room.

6.1.2.3 Prioritizing the Historical Reports A-detailed analysis of every report passing the collection and screening process would have been very time-consuming and of 6-3

T LaSalle County Station Final Summary Report dubious value.

Therefore, the reports were. evaluated and categorized in priority by an HFS and an SME to allow the review team to focus the historical review effort.

Reports meeting any one or more of the following criteria were considered to be high in priority:

A)

The consequences of the report had either-a significant effect on plant operation, or had the potential for having a significant effect on plant operation.

1 B)

The report documented personnel

injury, radiation exposure in excess of Ceco

limits, or had the potential for significant adverse effect on public health or safety.

C)

The report documented a trip / scram, derating, or unit outage.

D)

The report documented equipment damage in excess of

$100,000.00.

Reports not meeting any of these criteria were considered to be low in priority.

All high-priority reports were evaluated.

The evaluation of low-priority reports was left to> the discretion of the DCRDR Coordinator, pending time and manpower constraints.

At

LaSalle, no low-priority reports were evaluated.

A total of 83 in-house reports was selected and prioritized at LaSalle.

Of these, 27 were evaluated to be high in priority and 56 were evaluated to be low in pr.iority.

A total of 45 non-in-house reports was selected and prioritized.

All were evaluated as high in priority.

Of these 45 reports, 20 were 1

L A.

A

[

Final Summary Report LaSalle County Station p

determined to be of potential applicability to Boiling Water Reactors (BWRs) 'of LaSalle's vintage, and consequently, only these 20 non-in-house reports were evaluated at LaSalle.

i 6.1.2.4 Report Review and Evaluation I

A Problem Analysis Report (PAR) (Appendix A) was completed for each report investigated.

The folloaing information was

~

recorded for each report:

e Investigators.' names e

Station name.

e Unit (s) on which the problem occurred DCRDR index number of the report which was assigned by e

the HFS e

Type and number of the report involved Effect of the incident on the unit e

e Problem as documented in the report Any corrective action taken or proposed as documented e

in the report.

.A copy of each report and its PAR was put in a Historical j

~ Review project notebook, along with an index of all reports selected and prioritized.

Though the low-priority reports were put in the notebook, no PAR was completed for them unless they l

were investigated.

The project notebook was maintained by the HFS.

At the conclusion of the Historical Event Review phase of LaSalle's

DCRDR, the project notebook was delivered 'to the DCRDR Coordinator for inclusion.in LaSalle's DCRDR records, and is available for review.

i For each report investigated, the HFS obtained copies of appropriate documentation to allow the HFS to identify the i

individuals involved in the incident and the operating 6-5

4' LaSalle County Station Final Summary Report conditions of the unit / plant at the. time of the incident.

In most cases, the Shif t Engineer's log was sufficient for this additional documentation, purpose.

In some instances, however, such as the unit log, center desk log, and/or a SCRAM-report, was collected.

Any and all such documentation was placed in the project notebook with.the report and PAR to which it related.

A preliminary investigation was then conducted by the HFS for each high-priority report.

This investigation included the interviewing of individuals associated with or familiar with each problem, and the examination of equipment and procedures associated with the problem.

These investigations continued until the HFS had amassed enough data to determine whether the documented problem _ had been corrected from a human factors perspective or not.

If the problem had been corrected, the investigations "yes" line on-the PAR was checked and no further were'made.

If the HFS determined that the problem had not been adequately addressed from a human factors perspective, and hence was still uncorrected, the "no" line was checked and the investigation and analysis of that problem continued.

These additional investigations consisted of a more in-depth examina-tion of equipment and procedures and the interviewing of as many individuals associated with or familiar with the problem as possible.

Though interview notes were taken by the HFS, individuals were assured of complete confidentiality; consequently, these notes are not available for review.

When the HFS felt he had collected enough data to determine the fundamental causes of 4

the problem and ascertain its corrective status from a human factors perspective, the investigation of the problem ceased.

If, at this point, the HFS determined that the problem had not 6-6

+

7

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LaSalle County Station

Final Summary Report been adequately addressed and that additional human engineering corrective action could be taken to minimize the probability of the ' problem ' recurring, a

Control Room Human Enqineering Discrepancy _ form (CRHED) was completed and the HED number entered in the appropriate space on the PAR.

The above process for report review and investigation dif fered slightly for the non-in-house reports.

Because there were no individuals on-site who were involved in the incidents des-cribed in the reports, alternate individuals were interviewed.

-These alternates were people knowledgeable with the LaSalle in the incident and included systems and/or procedures involved experienced reactor operators, shift engineers, nuclear engineers, shift foremen and operating engineers.

This was the only investigative modification made.

6.1.3 Results

'A.

total of 33 reports and problems were investigated at LaSalle.

As a result of the investigative process described uncorrected. and had above, seven problems were evaluated as HEDs written.

These findings (HEDs) are contained in Volume 2.

6.2 Operatina Experience Review 6.2.1 Objectives The objective of the operator survey is to obtain special, pertinent knowledge that operating personnel at Commonwealth

. Edison Company's LaSalle plant possess regarding both positive and negativ_e control room system features which they have experienced and/or observed in the course of preparing for operations or during operations the'mselves.

As one of the foundation processes of the

DCRDR, the operator survey is 6-7

LaSalle County Station Final Summary Report intended to provide information th'at will guide the human factors specialists during subsequent investigative phases of.

the DCRDR; (i.e.,

the-checklist

survey, task

analysis, verification and validation processes).

Aside from this primary function, the survey also provides an avenue for plant management.

to gather general information about the plant operators' perceptions and opinions o f.

control room design and

- procedures.

6.2.2 Methods 6.2.2.1 Development of the Self-Administered Questionnaire The open-ended, self-administered questionnaire was structured to address the following nine content-topic areas as suggested in NUREG-0700:

Workspace Layout and Environment e

e Panel Design e

Annunciator Warning System o

Communications e

Process Computers Corrective and Preventive Maintenan'e c

]

e.

e procedures Staffing and Job Design e

e Training A-draft questionnaire was prepared from a

pool of survey questions asnembled for each topic area.

The question orienta-tion was predominantly like the critical Incident Technique to ensure that responses were as objective as possible.

A. team consisting of personnel with operating, psychometric and training expertise reviewed and evaluated the written questions.

1 1

a 4

6-8.

LaSalle County Station Final Summary Report Items retained in the final questionnaire met the following criteria:

Simplicity questions were

direct, employed common everyday language and were as brief as possible.

Clarity - questions were unamoiguous.

questions were free of emotionally charged Objectivity words such as good / bad, strong / weak, etc.

surveys are susceptible to social Error Free desirability,

leniency, central tendency and halo-type errors.

Retained items were those that had the minimum tendency toward these error types.

As an aid in the evaluation process, the team members used a rating scale to judge each item on each of the above criteria.

The question ratings were then averaged across the criteria to determine which would be included in the questionnaire.

Finally, the questions were sorted into topic areas to ensure that the area was sampled adequately as to item content.

ARD personnel, along with operations personnel, selected the final set of items for inclusion in the questionnaire.

The resulting questionnaire, with accompanying explanatory materials, was then distributed to the operators.

A copy of the distribution packet, including the questionnaire, is provided in Appendix E.

Each question in the nine topic areas was posed as an open-ended question.

Operators were encouraged to describe in based.

In detail the specifics upon which their responses were the cover letter, operators were reminded to consider all modes of plant operation, including start-up, hot standby, full power 6-9

r LaSalle County Station Final Summary Report and reduced

power, in addition to possible abnormal or emergency operating conditions.

Opinions regarding both

" problem" and beneficial design features of the control room were solicited.

Each respondent was also asked to complete a separate sheet detailing his background, level of experience and current status at LaSalle.

6.2.2.2 Distribution of the Self-Administered Questionnaire These questionnaires were distributed to eighty-seven person-

nel, based on a

list prepared by CFCo.

The participants included non-licensed operations personnel, licensed operations personnel and licensed non-operations personnel at.the LaSalle plant.

At the time of distribution, the questionnaire recipients received a briefing emphasizing major elements of the cover letter.

The briefing included an explanation of the purpose, description of and instructions for the questionnaire, assurance of confidentiality, explanation of what will be done with the results, and a request to fill out the background /

biographical information.

The operators were given several weeks to fill out the self-administered questionnaire and to return it by mail to the Assistant Superintendent for Operations in a self-addressed, stamped envelope that had been provided.

He gave the unopened envelopes to ARD.

Confiden-tiality was assured by assigning each questionnaire a number.

The list of potential respondents and corresponding numbers were kept in confidence by ARD personnel.

6.2.2.3 Analysis of Responses to the Self-Administered Questionnaire ARD personnel logged the thirty-four questionnaires (39%) that were re*.urned and tallied the demographic information.

Written 4-A@

LaSalle County Station Final Summary Report responses were reviewed for each question and then summarized on a Quest _ionnaire Item Summary Form (QISF).

A sample of this

-form can be found in Appendix A.

Responses which addressed the same-issue were collapsed into a summary statement of the concern, with an associated count of the frequency with which that concern had been mentioned.

An experienced Nuclear Station Operator ~ (NSO) worked with the HFS to clarify any ambiguities associated 'af'.h the responses and the summaries.

6.2.2.4 Follow-up Work with Experienced Nuclear Station Operator The objectives of the follow-up interviews were as follows:

To clarify ambiguities in any written responses to the e

self-administered questionnaire e

To gather additional details (e.g'.,

system or component information) pertaining to ambiguous or incomplete responses Working together, the HFS and the experienced NSO clarified the written responses on the self-administered questionnaire.

The resulting responses were recorded on the appropriate QISP.

6.2.2.5 Integration of Interview Data with Self-Administered Questionnaire Responses The information compiled previously from the self-administered questionnaires was enhanced based on the follow-up work.

Ambiguities noted previously were resolved

and, where appropriate, specifics such as system or component names were added.

The items were investigated further by the HFS to 6-11

4 a4 LaSalle County Station Final Summary Report determine whether responses were in accordance with sound human engineering conventions and practices.

Positive and negative responses which were in compliance were. designated as "Not an j

HED" in the appropriate space on the QISF.

Positive responses and negative responses deemed not in compliance were designated as

" potential HED" on the QISF.

Some negative responses I'

evaluated to be in compliance were designated as " Complaints" in the appropriate space on the QISF.

6.2.2.6 Documentation for Future Reference The data gathered during the Operator Personnel Survey are being maintained by ARD in a form that will provide the review The team with reference mate::ial for later phases of the CRDR.

stated HEDs were entered into a computerized DBMS and have been final determi-i presented to the Review Team which will make the nation of whether they are to be classified as HEDs.

6.2.2.7 Biographical information i

i The biographical data information collected with the question-This naires was summed and averaged by type of operator group.

provided the HFS and the review team with an indication of the demographics. of the population upon which the survey response data is based.

This information is provided on a Personnel Survey Summary Form (PSSF) (Figure 6.1).

i I-6.2.3 Findings The evaluation of operator comments resulted in 126 potential

.HEDs being designated as valid in the judgement of the HFS.

The 126 potential HEDs were written and are presented in Appendix B of this report.

The following analysis is based on these potential HEDs since those finally designated as HEDs by k

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LaSalle County Station Final Summary Report the assessment team include input from other phases of the control room rev iew as well.

Some of those identified as potential HEDs by the operator survey are redundant with those found in other phases, such as the checklist, and have been attributed to the checklist rather than the operator survey.

Thus, in discussing the operator survey's sensitivity to human factors

issues, it seemed more appropriate to analyze the initial set of potential HEDs.

An analysis of the items revealed that the largest number of potential HEDs was associated with problems of:

additional room; additional displays which would be helpful in the control controls which would be helpful in the control room; systems where controls and/or displays are not grouped together as they should be; and how the layout of the control board equipment can be improved for operators.

Also, a

large number of potential HEDs was found for systems in the control room which are difficult or confusing to operate, and for alarm tiles that have an inappropriate set point (i.e.,

those that give the operator either too much or too little time in which to respond to a plant problem).

A slightly smaller number of potential HEDs was associated with:

the annunciator warning system being ineffective in helping operators respond to a problem; areas in the main control room where direct voice cc.nmunica tion is difficult; alarms with multiple inputs where cc.nputer printout capability tables / checklists /

is not sufficient to determine the causer status boards, etc., which could be redesigned to improve their and incidents in the control room involving usefulness; personnel for whom additional training would have been helpful.

l An intermediate number of potential HEDs was found for the following:

areas in the main control room where lighting l

l 6-14

LaSalle County Station Final Summary Report' or other problems; alarm causes glare, reflections, dark areas, tile (s) in the main control room. which are confusing or difficult to understand; information or calculations not presently provided by the process computer that would be useful; incidents in which a delay in computer response to a request has detracted from or interfered with job performance; any information presented on the CRTs that would be more useful if it were presented differently; and any situations in which l

replacement equipment (e.g., fuses, bulbs, ink) was unavailable for corrective maintenance.

Decreasing numbers of potential HEDs were associated with other items as is shown in Appendix B.

6.3 Task Analysis 6.3.1 Method the LaSalle County DCRDR Task Analysis was to The objective of determine, to the extent practical, whether system performance requirements can be met by combinations of instrumentation, equipment, software and personnel to insure that operator performance requirements do not exceed operator performance capabilities under emergency operating conditions.

Specifically, the goal of the analysis was to identify and delineate the discrete tasks required to be performed by the control room staf f during emergency scenarios and to identify the instruments and controls required by the staff and document to accomplish the objectives of the tasks identified.

The foundation and basis of the analysis was the BWR Owners Group EPGs.

The BWR Owners Group EPGs Rev. 3 outlines the steps necessary to mitigate abnormal or transient symptoms associated with 6-15

Ef n

LaSalle County Station Final Summary Report reactor control, primary and secondary containment integrity control, as well as radioactivity release.

It is a generic document that directs the operator to follow various steps in sequence and/or concurrently in a success path toward symptom mitigation with contingencies for unsuccessful attempts at symptom alleviation.

Because of their comprehensiveness in outlining nymptoms -associated with such a

wide variety of events and exercising all af fected system modes, the EPGs were selected as the source document for task development.

Developing task statenents f rom the EPGs takes full advantage of the multidisciplinary efforts directed towards discerning system and subsystem functions and man-machine interactions.

In

addition, system enhancements made in later generation plants were taken into account during the development of the

EPGs, v n ic),

enabled the DCRDR review team to take full advantage of the opportunity to review functions possibly not considered when LaSalle was designed and constructed.

6.3.2 Site-Specific EPG Development At the outset of the LaSalle County DCRDR Task Analysis, SMEs and HFSs met to review the generic EPG document in order to make the document specific to LaSalle County station.

Each section of the generic EPGs was evaluated to identify the in systems that should be used to address the functions covered a given situation.

In addition, site-specific-parameter set values were inserted where required to ensure that the point EPG document being developed was specific to the LaSalle County operating specifications and limits, and to ensure that, in later stages of the task

analysis, the requir ed level of instrument and control precision for task accomplishment would be obtained.

Once the site-specific EPG document was developed, the process of site-specific task identification was begun.

Each section bl6

J Final Summary Report LaSalle County Station of the site-specific EPGs was reviewed in context by the SMEs and HFSs to identify the discrete operator actions both implied and explicitly stated for each step in the document.

Operator actions were operationally defined at a level at which the action possessed a definite beginning and end, was accomplished by an individual, and had a

single identifiable goal or objective.

Tasks defined at this level of specificity permitted the analysis to identify elemental or-basic operator activities, and subsequently their associated instrument and control requirements, that could. stand alone in terms of basic goal. orientation, or be combined with other elemental tasks in terms of~

more complex goal orientation.

The entire 7

site-specific EPG document was examined and all unique operator actions or tasks were identified, coded with a task number, and f

grouped into system task lists predicated upon a prevailing system being exercised or acted upon by the EPG.

The tasks

~

were also cross-referenced to the EPG by placing the task number next to the paragraph or EPG stateqent from which the task was derived.

This created a direct link between the DCRDR J

task listings and the EPG source document which could be utilized in the task development process.

6.3.3 Task Development i

Once identified, the tasks were documented on the Control Room Review Task Development Form (a blank copy is contained in SMEs and HFSs then met Appendix A) along with its task number.

to complete the form by developing each task.

The first item of information documented on the form was the job title of the I

individual who should perform the task together with the names of the individuals developing the task.

Next, the HFS questioned the SME concerning the conditions under which the i

task could be performed.

Both normal and abnormal or emergency situations were included and documented during this process i

--- m m

r i

LaSal'le County Station Final Summary Report

because, although' the tasks were generated from the site-specific EPGs, many were at such an elemental level that they are typically performed daily, e.g.,

" determine reactor water level".

These task conditions were important to the analysis because

they, in

part, determined the level of precision required in th'e task, as well as the general time criticality under which the task may be performed, especially during transient conditions.

Information was also obtained concerning the f requency with which the task is performed, the 1 cues that alert the task performer that the task is to be performed, and the performance criteria and/or goal that each task sought to accomplish.

This preliminary information about each task gave the HFS analysts and the SME a contextual base from which to discern the precise sequence of steps that must be performed in order to accomplish each task.

The final information collected during the task development the actual step-by-step listing of the action steps process was necessary to accomplish each task.

The questioning in this phase of the process by the HFS analysts to the SMEs was from the perspective of what should be done versus that of what is done.

This perspective was vital to the success of the DCRDR Task Analysis because it kept the focus off what currently exists and placed it on what should exist, thereby ensuring the objectivity of the analysis and preventing a "self-fulfilling prophecy" loop f rom being entered.

For example, in collecting that the sequential step-by-step data, care was taken to ensure action steps that needed to be performed outside the control in f act written as being performed f rom the control room, were if a valve should be operable f rom the control room.

That is, the action step room but currently is a locally operated valve, would have been written as; 'open the xxx valve", as opposed f

to; " dispatch an equipme it attendant to manually open the xxx valve".

In a parallel manner, non-existent annunciators were 6-18

r-r~

LaSalle County Station Final Summary Report created if the HFS and SME felt they should exist, as well as positive indication of critical plant functions required, such as ampere indication on important pumps.

Both the cask identification and task development processes room via a table-top review were performed outside the control to ensure a comprehensive review, copies of approach.

However, the station's Technical Specifications, normal, abnormal and procedures, up-to-date P& ids and electrical emergency schematics were made available to the HFS analysts and SMEs and were referenced on an as-needed basis.

The information obtained during the task development process was collected on task development forms.

After an independent review for completeness and accuracy by an SME who did not provide the original information, the information contained on entered into the DCRDR DBMS for LaSalle County the form station.

This data base was sorted by task number and proof was then output and a completed It read for data entry errors.

task development book resulted.

This book contains all task statements identified and analyzed at LaSalle County station,

~

initiating cues, frequency of to include their task conditions, and list of sequential steps performance, performance criteria, for task completion.

An excerpt from the book is presented in Figure 6.2.

6.3.4 Instrument and Control Requirements Following the completion of the Task Development process, the instrument and control data was collected for each task.

Unique codes were established for most of the variables pertinent to the DCRDR Task Analysis to facilitate data collection and subsequent computer analysis.

As

required, collected for each information for the following variables was 6-19

LaSalle County Station Final Summary Report LASALLE COUNTY STATION STA. NO.-

1 JOB TITLE: NSC TASK NO. CN-12 PREPARED BY: SNE - HFS ACTION:

CONFIRM AUTO INITIATICN OF THE POST LO A HYOR0 GEN /0XYG SYSTEM TASK CON 0!TICNS: (Givens. Denials, Environment)

GROUP 2 ISCLATICN HAD OCURRE0 FREQUENCY: Once a OTHER PER EVENT INITIATING CUES: (When does the task start)

LOW RX WATER LEVEL: -50 in.

HIGH DRYWELL PRESSURE 1.69 PSIG MANUAL INITIATION OF THE S ANC/OR D INITIATION PUSHBUTTCNS (What dces the job incutent have to accomolf sh)

PERFORMANCE CRITERIA:

TO OBTAIN AN ACEGUATE ASSESSMENT OF ORYWELL HYORCGEN A CONCENTRATI0hS.

(Steps of what must be done to accomplish ACTIONS)

ACTION STEPS:

I.00 CONFIRM THAT THE SUCTION VALVE FROM THE CRYWELL IS OPEN.

I 2.00 CONFIRM THAT THE RETURN VALVE TO THE SUPPRESSION CHAMB 2

3.00 CONFIRM THAT THE MONITCR ANALYIER LIGHT IS ILLUMINATED.

3 4.00 4

CSSERVE THE H2 AND 02 CONCENTRATICN TREN05.

5.00 5

RESPCND TO ANNUNCIATORS.

FLgure 6.2 6-20

F LaSalle County Station Final Summary Report action step of each task.

Where not

obvious, a

brief description of each variable is included.

Relational Number - this was a sequential whole number 1.

used to uniquely number each task's action steps.

2.

Sequential Number - any given action step could have several sub-steps.

This number was used to sequentially track those sub-steps.

3.

Label Name - what the label content should say was written here, as opposed to what the current content said.

Location - where the equipment should be located.

4.

Communication With others - if an action step entailed 5.

communication with others, a code was entered for the type of individual being communicated to, e.g.,

an in the plant.

equipment attendant out 6.

Display Requirements:

generally used for indicator lights a.

Condition to denote whether it should be energized or de-energized.

b.

Color Type of Display c.

d.

What Measured Units of Measurement e.

f.

Required Range of Measurement g.

Divisions Zone Banding Range and Color h.

6-21

7 LaSalle County Station Final Summary Report 7 ',

-Control Requirements:

Type of Switch a.

Type of Valve Control Eb.

Type of Switch Action c.

Names of Switch Positions d.

Controller Requirements:

'8.

Type of Controller a.

Control Transfer Switch Type b.

Control Transfer Switch Position c.

Type of controller Switch Control d.

Parameter Controlled e.

f.

What Measured Units of Measurement g.

Required' Range of Measurement h.

Zone Banding Range and Color i.

j.

Divisions Identification Number (EID) 9.

Equipment when a piece of equipment, e.g.,

hand 10.

Sub-Number had related components, e.g.,

position control switch, indicator

lights, the related components were given the same EID number as the piece of equipment they were related to and then uniquely identified via a sub-number.

related Sub-Name - the label content which a component 11.

to a piece of equipment should have, as opposed to what its current content was.

6-22

LaSalle County Station Final Summary Report a field used to " flag" a piece of equipment 12.

Match whose Instrument and Control requirements did NOT match those identified in the task analysis as being required.

I&C data was collected on an action step-by-action step basis for each task.

The HFS analysts would question the SMEs for each relevant variable about the characteristics which that variable should have.

As the SMEs identified the appropriate entered via specific codes equipment variable values, they were on the Task Analysis Instrument and control Requirements Form.

This process was accomplished in the control room,.but off to Data on out of the immediate primary operating area.

the side, variables numbered 1

tl'ough 8 were collected and recorded l

first.

These are the v riables that delineate the unique I&C requirements that a piece of equipment should possess for the particular task action step being analyzed.

Once collected, this data was compared to the characteristics of the piece of equipment that exists in the control room to accomplish the function under investigation, in order to ascertain the degree of compatibility between what should exist and what does exist.

At this

point, the EID number of the piece of and any sub-number and sub-name as appropriate, was equipment, If the current characteristics of the entered on the I&C form.

piece of equipment EXACTLY matched those identified in the analysis as being required, the code for "yes" was placed in the space for the variable ' match'.

If any current character-istic of the piece of equipment did not exactly match that identified in the task analysis, the code for "no" was placed in the spaca for the variable

' match'.

These compatibility in the comparisons were done within the primary operating area However, ef f orts were made to minimize the time control room.

spent in the primary operating area as well as to be as 6-23 L

\\

LaSalle County Station Final Summary Report non-distracting to the unit operator as possible.

This approach permitted a preliminary verification. of availability with the task analysis, and to be accomplished concurrently.

provided the DCRDR. review team with a means to independently verify the accuracy of the computer-generated results < of the comparison of the task analysis a,nd inventory data baser.

It should be emphasized that the data concerning the I&C characteristics required for each action step were collected in order to and recorded prior to any compatibility comparison ensure an independent and objective

analysis, unbiased by current characteristics.

Once th'e I&C requirements were identified and recorded for each task's action

steps, the data was entered onto the

DBMS, printed out and compared to tQe original hard copy to ensure data entry accuracy.

The original.bhrd copy was retained and filed for future reference.

A blank -copy of the Task Analysis Ins t r umen't and Control Requirements Form can be found in Appendix A.

6.4 control Room Inventory The objective of the control room inventory for the LaSalle station was to establish a

reference set of data which identified all instrumentation, controls and equipment within the control room.

All

displays, controls, controllers, annunciators and other equipment on the control boards, with which the operators interact, were included in this inventory.

Based on the guidance of NUREG-0700, HFSs from ARE Corporation and NSOs from Commonwealth Edison completed an inventory of the control room for Units J1 and 2 at the LaSalle station.

In

-order to ensure that an up-to-date inventory was generated, the approach taken was that of direct observation in the control room.

I?urRA.

LaSalle County Station Final-Summary Report Each piece of equipment on the control boards was identified by

~

the specific needs of a unique code which was developed to meet This code served to identify the section of the DCRDR project.

the specific control panel in which each piece of equipment was located, as well as equipment components that were functionally related.

The relevant physical characteristics of each piece of. equipment, a r, they appeared from the front of the control panels, were then coded.

The characteristics noted were those which would determine, from a human factors standpoint, the in monitoring and to the operators usefulness of the equipment controlling the plant.

The data was stored in the computerized DBMS developed by ARD for Commonwealth Edison's DCRDRs.

6.4.1 Methods All equipment on the front panels, back panels and common panels for LaSalle Unit 1

was inventoried.

The Unit 1

2 because there are only minor

-inventory can be applied to Unit These differences have been differences between the two units.

documented and are included with the inventory.

The following f

i g the inventory:

. steps summarize the approach taken in per orm n 1.

The most recent set of the simulator control panel elevation drawings was obtained.

An HFS compared these

prints, component by component, to their respective control panels in the control room and noted any discrepancies on the prints.

2.

The prints from the simulator were used because of their accurate reflection - of the actual panels and because there was already a numbering scheme imposed 6-25

LaSalle County Station Final Summary Report upon them which was tied to a data base containing station equipment piece nu'mbers and system informa-used by This data base was integrated into that tion.

the DCRDR team so that this information would not have The numbering scheme was to be collected redundantly.

that the prints and also adopted by the DCRDR team so the data base.could be used.

Any changes made due to the actual configuration of the boards were also made Any new identifi-on the prints and in the data base.

with those already cation numbers were made consistent in place.

sub-identification number (Sub-ID) scheme There was a used to designate components that were functionally related and did not have a number of their own.

A typical example of the use of this scheme concerns a control switch and its associated indicator lights.

The control switch was assigned an EID to show its relative location on the boards.

Its indicating lights were given the same EID to show functional assigned to relationship, but a sequential number was The control switch had a Sub-ID of each as a Sub-ID.

000.

Sub-numbers were also used to distinguish multiple-point recorders, different between points on control and display components on a controller, and different components on a vendor-supplied panel inset.

3.

The inventory was originally taken by video taping each c'omponent as an HFS and an NSO described items not functions and positions which were such as switch evident from simply looking at the component.

An HFS then entered the da'ta from the video tape directly inventoried directly into the DBMS.

Equipment was from the control boards when there was any question about the accuracy of the information on the video tape.

($-26

Final Summary Report LaSalle County Station 4.

The inventory was accomplished panel. by panel.

As each piece of equipment.was inventoried, it was checked off on the appropriate print.

5.

The Inventory form (shown in Appendix A) was used to inventory - equipment other than - controllers.

The data fields on this form were filled in with numerical codes as summarized in Appendix D.

By utilizing these

codes, data entry into the computerized DBMS was facilitated and consistency in terminology was achieved among the various HFSs and NSOs collecting the inventor 1 data.

The following summarizes the information recorded on the inventory forms:

e The EID and SUB-NUMBER were entered on the Inventory Form for each piece of equipment.

e The LABEL name was taken verbatim from the control panel, o

The SUB-NAME was used for legends on indicating

lights, names of points on multi-point recorders, names of pens for dual-pen or multi-pen recorders, or. labels for components that were sub-numbered.

Detailed information about each piece of equipment (i.e.,

that which had been assigned a

sequence or sub-number) was then entered with reference to the lists of codes in Appendix D.

Some fields were appropriate for displays and others were appropriate for controls.

Note (refer to the Inventory forms) that there could be multiple entries in some fields in the detailed record of information about a given piece of equipment, e

The COLOR field was used for several purposes

-- to identify the color of indicating lights, targets on breaker

controls, or pens on multi-pen recorders.

a 6-27

n LaSalle County Station Final Summary Report DISPLAY ' field referred to anything e

The TYPE OF that meters, gauges or presents information switch position.

other than a label name or a There could be only one type of display per detail record.

Instruments that had more than scale or point would have had these coded one in separate sub-numbered records.

e WHAT MEASURED referred to the parameter (s) being displayed on one physical scale or continuum.

In data collection, this was assumed or inferred from the display in question.

For

instance, if the units were

" gallons per minute," flow was postulated to be the WHAT MEASURED.

If more than one scale existed on an instrument (e.g.,

dual-pen inventoried on a recorder),

each scale was separate detail record (and appropriately subnumbered).

e The UNITS field related directly to WHAT MEASURED field, but was taken directly from the scale shown on the display.

e The RANGE of a meter or gauge was directly observable from the instrument.

Any one instrument could have more than one range.

Any change in the

" DIVISIONS" on the meter indicated a

new range.

Some scales had multipliers generally increasing the range by a

factor of 10 (e.g.,

x10; x100; x1000; x10E3).

Some meters conveyed this multiplier as part of the UNITS (e.g., gpm x 100).

This was one case in which the boards ~ were not verbatim.

The multiplier was always copied assumed to be associated with the RANGE.

e The DIVISIONS of the meter or gauge were directly observable from the instrument.

DIVISIONS were always derived; they were the smallest defined as the absolute valite of gradation on the scale to be read.

Any one instrument could have several different in the Whenever there was a change number of minor scale marks between the major divisions.

scale

marks, a

change in divisions was indicated.

For ease of coding, divisions were assumed to have no multiplier.

For scales with multipliers, it was only necessary to code the multipliers for the range fields.

w

LaSalle County Station Final Summary Report e

ZONE BANDING and the COLOR used for each zone were directly observed from the instrument.

The range marked with each color was recorded in the zone banding field and the code for. the respective color was recorded in the color field for zone banding.

~

e TYPE OF SWITCH referred to any control except controllers.

" Shape" was the most important characteristic, with "what was being con-trolled" ranked second.

Examples would be a J-handle valve control or a pushbutton test or a keylock selector control switch.

There was in the only one type of switch per detail line inventory.

e VALVE CONTROL referred to a specific type of those that control valves.

This switch field was used to delineate whether or not a valve was seal-in (valve travels full open or throttleable (valve is able to be closed) or mid-position of travel).

For stopped in a there were only four possible this. parameter,

throttle

close, throttle

open, variables seal-in closed.

If a switch is seal-in open, throttle open but has an as-is function (see SWITCH ACTION),

the valve will travel full open without any further operator

action, therefore having seal-in features.

On the inventory, it was documented as both throttle open and seal-in open, o

SWITCH ACTION referred to what a

control switch' will do after it has been reposi-tioned.

It either stays where it is put to its mid-positio'n (spring (as-is) or returns return).

It is possible that one switch is both as-is and spring return (e.g.,

a. pump control that is able to be locked "off" but normally is spring return).

e SWITCH POSITION was the verbatim position labels taken from the escutcheon plate of a control.

Switch functions and position names established by were for pushbuttons knowledgeable NSOs.

The inventory form was to handle more than one switch designed position on one detail record.

6-29

LaSalle County Statior.

Final Summary Report 6.

Controllers are pieces of equipment that typically contain both display and control functions.

The controller received the EID' number and ~ all.. components were sub-numbered.

A typical controller may take two different signals (e.g.,

flow and pressure) to the parameters and, therefore, directly control one ofThe display may show the actual the other indirectly.

it may meter the response demand to the parameter, or of the controlled parameter.

To inventory control-1ers, a Controller Inventory form was developed (see Appendix A for the form and Appendix D for codes).

The following summarizes the information collected on the Controller Inventory Form:

e TYPE OF CONTROLLER referred to the controller unit as a whole.

The code for the type of controller was entered on every detail record that was sub-numbered for the controller.

e CONTROLLER PARAMETER also referred to the controller unit as a whole.

The formats were chosen from the WHAT ME.\\SURED format list.

It was possible to have more than one parameter controlled.

The inventory form was designed to handle this contingency.

referred to a specific control e

TYPE OF CONTROL on the controller.

This variable was always sub-numbered so there was never more than one per detail line.

e For every ~ type of control there was a WHAT CONTROLLED entry.

'These were taken from the WHAT MEASURED list of codes and included level and position, parameters such as flow, o

SWITCH POSITIONS were taken from the switch positions list but generally were one of the following:

Manual, Balance,

Auto, or 0-100.

These entries referred specifically to the control listed in TYPE OF CONTROL.

e The display characteristics (COLOR, TYPE OF

DISPLAY, WHAT

MEASURED, UMITS, RANGE and with their DIVISIONS) were synonymous

~co'nterparts in the standard inventory form.

u 6

6-30

g' l

LaSalle County Station Final Summary Report Verification of Equipment Availability and Suitability 6.5 6.5.1 Objective _

The objective of the DCRDR verification process was to assure that.. operator tasks can be performed in the existing control room at the LaSalle station with minimum potential for human error.

The focus was on instruments and equipment, not on operator skills and knowledge.

The verification was

~

accomplished by comparing-the operators' perceived. requirements for information and control capabilities during emergency from the DCRDR task

analysis, with the operations derivedin the LaSalle control room identified by the '

equipment present control room inventory.

First it this verification process.

' There were two aspects.to was determined whether or not appropriate equipment was l

available in the control room to perform each functional task required by emergency operations.

Second, for equipment that available, it was determined whether or had bee'n identified as not the characteristics of each piece of equipment made it suitable for the task, i.e., whether it offered the operator sufficient control and display capab'ilities to efficiently accomplish the task.

The characteristics addressed were those physical aspects of the equipment that were apparent from the

-front of the control panels and which, from a human factors

. perspective, determined the equipment's usability by the plant l

operators.

As detailed in the summary of the LaSalle control room inventory, a

thorough compilation of relevant equipment characteristics was completed for all

displays, controls,

. controllers and annunciators-on the

front, back and common panels at LaSalle Units 1-and 2.

6-EL

LaSalle County Station Final Summary Report with a unique The ' inventory identified each piece of equipment

code, the Equipment Identification (EID)

number, so that could be referenced during the-task analysis specific equipmen,t and all pertinent characteristics of each piece of equipment could be retrieved from a computerized data base.

As detailed in the summary of the LaSalle task analysis of the operators' need for specific display emergency procedures, identified at each step information or control capabilities was The tasks to be throughout sequences 'of emergency operations.

performed during emergency operations were derived from the Procedure Guidelines.

General Electric Owner 's Group Emergency The equipment requirements implied by these tasks were categorized in terms of the characteristics described for the control room inventory.

The verification process involved the collaboration of HFSs from ARD Corporation and NSOs from the LaSalle station.

The

~

. availability and suitability of appropriate equipment in the control room to meet the needs of each emergency task was of the task analysis

-judged by.SMEs, and noted by HFSs, as part data collection effort.

To ensure that the

' equipment requirements determined from different tasks did not place of equipment, the HFS, conflicting demands on specific pieces using the computerized data base from the task

analysis, that had been grouped all references to each piece of equipment judged to be unsuitable and, in consultation with the SMEs, determined the oesirable equipment characteristics.

HEDs perceived to be documented the incidents where equipment was unavailable or unsuitable.

The HEDAT review required but was in requirements were finally determined whether these perceived fact required, 6-32 u

LaSalle County Station Final Summary Report 6.5.2 Method _

The'following approach was used for conducting the~ verification of equipment availability and suitability for emergency operations:

1.

After the equipment requirements for a given task were identified during the task analysis process, the SME made a judgement as to which, if any, control room instrumentation was presently used to perform that task, and whether or not t aat piece of equipment was suitable in each of its relevant characteristics.

The HFS noted on the Task Analysis Instrument / Control Requirement Form the EID number of the equipment that was available for the operator to perform each task.

If the equipment was not available, a distinctive EID number was created for it which identified it as an Also, if the piece of unavailable piece of equipment.

equipment was available, but a redundant piece was needed in another location, it was coded as unavail-able.

Whether or not this piece of equipment was suitable for the task (i.e., had characteristics that matched those specified on the task analysis form for that task), was also indicated on the form in the column labeled " Match".

If this needed equipment was unavailable or unsuitable, a "no-match" was designated on this form.

For

meters, recorders and digital

displays, determined on the basis of the suitability was following criteria:

Does the display provide the e

What measured operator with the needed information in the form of a

parameter that does not require mental m

LaSalle County Station Final Summary Report transformation?

(e.g.,

if the difference in is needed, a delta temperature between two points T display would be suitable; whereas, separate

. displays for the two absolute temperature readings would not be suitable.)

Do the units in which the display is e

Units scaled correspond to that expected by the (e.g., temperature in degrees F) operator?

e Range -- Does the range of the available display span the range required by the operator to perform the task?

Do the divisions in which the Divisions e

display is graded allow the operator to read the display with the level of precision required by the task?

Is tbe type of display e

Type of display appropriate for the task at hand (e.g.,

if trend information is needed, a chart recorder should be available)

For indicator lights (including those that provide feedback to the operator regarding control switch actuation) and annunciators, suitability was implied by availability.

There were no separate criteria for the suitability of these types of displays.

~

For controls, suitability was determined on the basis of the following criteria:

Does the type of switch used e

Type of switch allow the control task to be performed in an unanbiguous manner?

For example, a continuously adjustable rotary switch would be unsuitable for an on-off control function.

~'*r

'm n.

I LaSalle County Station Final Summary Report e

Name of switch positions Do the switch include positions labeled on the escutcheon plate the control function that is to be performed?

Is the type of valve e

Type of valve control consistent with the degree of control required by the operator?

For example, if graded control of valve position. is required, a throttleable valve would be suitable; whereas, a seal-in valve would not be suitable, e

Type of switch action -- Does the control switch allow the operator to perform the control function unambiguously and in a

reasonable duration of time?

For example, if the task calls for a switch to remain in the actuated position for a long. period of

time, an "as-is" switch would be more suitable than one that spring returns.

For controllers, suitability was determined on the basis of the following criteria, which were applied similarly to the corresponding criteria for displays and controls listed above:

Type of switch for the control function (s) e Range of setpoint (demand) display e

Divisions of setpoint (demand) display e

What measured by status (response) display e

Units of status (response) display e

Range of status (response) display e

Divisions of status (response) display e

If the record was flagged as a "no match",

a comment was included which briefly described the nature of the "no match" for ease of later reference.

6-35

LaSalle County Station Final Summary Report

" match" or "no The EIDs of available equipment and the 2.

match" designation for each' task was entered as part of the task analysis data into the computerized DBMS developed by' ARD, for Commonwealth Edison's DCRDRs.

The "no matches" were then selected out of the Task The nature of Analysis DBMS and sorted by EID number.

the numbers that were created for the unavailable equipment resulted in them being grouped together upon sorting.

The sorting also resulted in the grouping of all the discrepancies of a single piece of equipment.

Computer printouts of these selected data were then used by the HFS to further investigate apparent discrepancies between the equipment requirements from the task analysis and the actual equipment character-istics.

3.

Required but unavailable equipment, as identified from those records in the task analysis data base that had been given a created EID number, were evaluated first by having SMEs confirm the validity of these dis-crepancies.

The HFS then documented them as HEDs.

identified from those records 4.

Unsuitable equipment, as in the task analysis data base for which "no match" had been specified, but for which an actual EID number existed, were then evaluated.

"No match" records were sorted.by EID number, in order to group all of the tasks which had referenced a given piece of equipment as being unsuitable.

The equipment might have been judged unsuitable for different reasons in different tasks.

Moreover, conflicting requirements for a given piece of equi'pment might have been generated across

tasks, implying that in. addition to changes being required in some aspect of the available equipment, a new piece of equipment might be needed.

6-36

LaSalle County Sta' tion Final Summary Report 5.

The validity of the "no mat-ch" items was confirmed by an HFS by checking the requirements specified during the task analysis against the actual piece of equipment in the control room.

Any conflicting requirements for a

given piece of equipment were resolved with input from SMEs.

An HFS then documented the valid discrepancies as HEDs.

6.5.3 Findings Forty-eight HEDs resulted from the LaSalle verification process.

These HEDs were given to the HEDAT for resolution.

This team assessed whether missing equipment was in fact required

and, if so, what was required.

Similarly, they determined what was necessary to resolve

" unsuitable" equipment.

Validation of control Room Functions 6.6 6.6.1 Introduction The objective of the validation review was to determine whether the functions allocated to the control room operating crew the structure of be accomplished ef fectively within both could the established emergency procedures and the design of the control room as it exists.

6.6.2 Methodology LaSalle The following paragraphs describe the processes used at

used, County Station to determine the validation approach to be secure operating personnel to assist with the validation, implement the approach selected, record the data, and evaluate the data collected.

6-37

LaSalle County Station Final Summary Report 6.6.2.1 Determining the Validation Approach The_

three possible approaches to conducting a

validation presented in the Commonwealth Edison Generic DCRDR Program Plan were available to the review team to implement at LaSalle County Station.

These approaches were:

a)

A control room walk-through using the appropriate procedures; on a real-run-through of a simulation of the event b)

A time simulator; c)

A talk-through on a control room mockup using uniform

scale, architectural drawings of the control room panels.

Approach "b"

was considered to be the optimal approach to implement for the LaSalle County validation.

At the outset of the LaSalle County DCRDR, the DCRDR Coordinator approached the LaSalle County simulator manager at the Commonwealth Edison Production Trainino Center to determine the feasibility of using the LaSalle County simulator for the station's valida-tion.

The week of April 29, 1985 to May 3, 1985 was picked to conduct real-time run-through simulations.

6.6.2.2 Securing Operating Personnel After securing the simulator, the DCRDR Coordinator approached the Assistant Superintendent ~for Operations at LaSalle. County to request two reactor operators, a shift foreman and a shift I

6-38

)

LaSalle County Station Final Summary Report engineer to assist the review team with the validation.

This complement of personnel is considered to be the minimal staffing crew according to the station's Technical Specifica-tions for operations.

The Assistant Superintendent of Operations was also given an overview of what would be expected he agreed to the crews during the validation; and request'ed of provide the review team with the personnel requested.

Ilowever, in lieu of a shift engineer, he proposed providing an SRO licensed Shift Control Room Engineer (SCRE) because he was not certain that because of the limited number of shift engineers reserved one would be available the week we had at the station, the simulator.

6.6.2.3 Validation Events selected for simulation for The following emergency events were In the estimation of operating the LaSalle County validation.

SMEs, they provided f.or the exercise of all major unit systems and every control room workstation:

normal reactor startup e

normal reactor shutdown e

(LOCA) small break loss of coolant accident e

large LOCA inside the drywell e

medium LOCA inside the drywell e

LOCA outside the drywell e

inadequate core cooling:

e due to feedwater problems due to loss of shutdown cooling due to loss of recirculation flow anticipated transient without reactor scram (ATWS) e following the loss of offsite power reactor scram e

6-39

LaSalle County Station Final Summary Report Implementing the Real-Time Simulator Run-Through 6.6.2.4 Three video tape machines and color cameras were obtained for the LaSalle County validation.

In

addition, a

time-code two generator was used on the two main cameras that tracked the (Unit RO and Center Desk RO).

This equipment reactor. operators was brought to the LaSalle simulator in Braidwood, set up and tested prior to the conduct of the validation events.

Before the validation started, the DCRDR Coordinator selected the' order of the events to be simulated from the above list and insured that up-to-date copies of the applicable LaSalle County An HFS developed a floor diagram of procedures were available.

the unit workspace and numerically identified unit

. workstations.

These numbers were written on pieces of paper and placed on the vertical sections of the control panels in In addition, the upper left-hand portion of each workstation.

the DCRDR Coordinator conferred with the SROs ' assisting with to devise realistic the validation, and the simulator operator, scenarios to envelope the events to be validated, to make the simulation as realistic as possible.

For example',

sutveil-lances were being run when the official valid-tion event's symptoms were first introduced.

At the start of each day's validation, the DCRDR Coordinator them on the purpose and assembled all participants and briefed specific objectives of the event simulation, identified any assumptions about the operating situation, and gave the operating crew. time to review any procedures they felt a need to review.

In order to maximize realism, the crews were not informed of the specific event to be simulated; however, they were informed of the overall events to be validated.

Each member of the crew was provided with a

microphone with 6-40

LaSalle County Station Final Summary Report sufficient cable to allow him f reedom of movement around the entire primary operating area.

Finally, the operators were instructed to call

out, during the event simulation, the actions they were

taking, the direction of the action's

movement, the display / indicator to which they referred (to verify system response to the actions taken), and what that response indication is or must be before subsequent action can take place.

At a signal from the DCRDR Coordinator, all cameras, video recorders and the simulator were started.

One camera was devoted to the unit operator and followed his activities.

Another camera was devoted to the center desk operator and followed his activities.

Occasionally, camera assignment was When this was switched between the two to facilitate coverage.

.done, it was coordinated by the camera operators.

A third camera was positioned to encompass the entire primary operating area.

The cameras were operated by HFSs, technical assistants under the direction of

HFSs, or the DCRDR Coordinator's assistant under the direction of an HFS.

The role of the SME narratot was assumed by the SCRE, an SRO licenced individual provided by LaSalle County station.

This individual had nine years of nuclear experience, six of which were in operations.

He has held his license for one year.

During the validation event, he conveyed what was transpiring, what the operators should be attempting and why, and what the operators should be anticipating.

The members of the review team did not of f er ~any assistance during the event scenarios.

When, in the opinion of the DCRDR Coordinator, the crew had successfully mitigated the simulated

event, the event and recordings were terminated.

At the conclusion of each event, the equipment operators recorded the tape counter readings, the event recorded, the date and time, and any unusual circum-stances surrounding the event.

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LaSalle County Station Final Summary Repor.t i

The above process was followed for each of the events presented To the extent possible, the personnel earlier in this summary.

assigned to assist the review team with the validation were given. dif ferent roles to play for different events.

The two reactor operators who assisted the validation had seven and nine years of nuclear experience, six and nine of

which, respectively, were in nuclear operations.

They held their RO

' licenses for four and eight years.

The Shift Foreman who assisted the validation had fifteen years of nuclear exper-ience, ten of which had been in operations.

He held his SRO license for four years.

6.6.2.5' Data Recording and Analysis The video tapes generated in the LaSalle County validation this simulation serve as the primary means of documentation for phase of the LaSalle County

review, and are available for review..

Shortly after the even' simulation was coriple ted, an HFS and SME met to jointly-review and analyze the data collected on the tapes.

Copies of the applicable LaSalle County normal, abnormal and emergency procedures were available.

The review and analysis were and referenced during the review.basis, with the HFS attending to performed on an event-by-event the operators' performance as compared to the control criteria identified and board / control room design utilizing the specified in the Commonwealth Edison Generic DCRDR -Program Plan.

The tapes were reviewed on as close to a procedural the HFS stopping the tapes step-by-step basis as possible with

.as necessary to question the SME and obtain clarification on 1

I GM2

LaSalle County Station Final Summary Report E

the operator actions observed.

When, in the opinion of the observed in which equipment availability, HFS, an ' instance was or in which operator suitability or location could be enhanced, uncertainty due to procedural ambiguity could be minimized, a suitable

~ comment was documented on a

validation review worksheet (VRW).

The comment would contain the tape number, counter reading, event title, procedure number and step, and a

. description of the observed problem.

This process continued until each simulated event had been reviewed and analyzed.

Subsequent ~ to the validation data

analysic, the validation observation comments on the VRW were compared to existing control room HEDs.

If an HED concerning the observed problem had been previously written, its number was written in the space provided on the VRW for recording each comments' HED number.

If the observation represented a new discrepancy, an HED was ' generated and its number placed in the appropriate column on the VRW.

-6.6.3 Results

' Eleven events were simulated and evaluated.

From the analyses performed, twenty-four HEDs were generated that were found solely during the validation.

If an HED that was discovered and documented as a result of another review phase was also observed during the validation, a comment was added to the existing HED that it was also observed during the validation.

written.

Copies of the In these cases, a duplicate HED was not in Volume 2 and HEDs written from the validation are contained are kept on file at Commonwealth Edison.

6.7 Control Room Survey This survey considered the extent to which equipment and the environment in the control room are designed to accommodate 6-43

LaSalle County Station Final Summary Report basic human characteristics such as physical size and p'erceptual-motor capabi.tities.

Human Factors Specialists, in concert with experienced Common-wealth Edison personnel knowledgeable of plant systems and control room instruments and equipment, and operations personnel, observed and measured control room featurea.

Instrumentation, controls and other equipment items were examined for human engineering acceptability as components without reference to their specific uses in task performance.

Discrepancies were based on design incompatibility with human perceptual,

motor, psychological or size characteristics.

Examples included controls too closely spaced for easy manipu-lation, meters with markings too small to be distinguishable at a

practical

distance, and displays too high to be read.

Environmenta.1 conditions were surveyed independently.

The guidelines included principles or explanatory statements followed by specific categorical or numeric statements.

The procedure was to observe or measure, as required, and check statement.

compliance with each categorical or numerical The review team members conducting the checklist survey placed their initials and the date in the "Yes" box to indicate compliance, or placed their initials in the "No" box to indicate noncompliance.

"Yes" was checked only if there was of the item was total compliance (i.e.,

only if every instance fully consistent with the provisions of the checklist).

If there was any instance of noncompliance, the "No" box was checked and a

reference made as to where noncompliance occurred.

A CR HED form (Appendix A) was filled out for each non-compliant item and a photograph of at least one instance of each. type of discrepancy was taken.

6-44

LaSalle County Station Final Summary Report 6.7.1 Human Factors Engineering Checklist for the nine Engineering guidelines were applied Human Factors topic areas listed below:

1.

Control Room Workspace addressed the-general layout, availt' ility and accessibility of operating equipment the anthropometric suitability of work-and materials; stations; coordination and separation in multi-unit control rooms; availability and accessibility of emergency equipment; and enviro.nmental factors.

Compliance with most of the workspace guidelines was determined by inspection.

Certain sets of guidelines required simple measurements,. including measurements of

distance, heigh't and span; viewing angles; and reach radius.

In

addition, assessment of climate

control, lighting adequacy and the auditory environ-ment required more specialized measurements or tests of temperature, humidity and air flow; luminance and reflectance; noise and reverberation; and audibility of speech and signals.

These measures are explained in section 6.7.2.

2.

Panel - Design Section addressed allocation of controls and displays to preferred panel areas; grouping of cor.crols and displays; spacing, demarcation and color 1

shading to enhance recognizability of individual components and of groupings; ordering of components within groupings; layout consistency within and among panels; and strings, clusters, or matrices of similar components.

E 6-45

LaSalle County Station Final Summary Report 3.

Annunciator Warning System Section addressed overall concerns such as. alarm parameter selection and set

points, first-out alarms and prioritization; and design features of the auditory alert, visual alarm and operator response subsystem.

It was necessary to assess the annunciator system on both a general or panel-by-panel basis.

control room-wide basis and a Guidelines concerning such design features as auditory alert signal intensity, automatic reset after silence, labeling of visual alarm tiles, etc.,

were applied equally throughout the control room.

Compliance with many of the guidelines was determined review of annunciator system specifica-by inspection, The tions and questions asked of operating personnel.

annunciator system was tested so that its performance characteristics could be observed.

Assessment of auditory signal audibility, discriminability and localizability were based on perfcrmance tests with sound measurements where there was any uncertainty (Section 6.7.2).

4.

Communications Section addressed auditory communica-tions equipment used in the control room.

Communica-specialized topic which was treated tions is a

relatively independently, on-a control room-wide basis.

Individual workstations were considered only incidentally.

5.

Process Computer Section addressed software security and characteristics (dialogue / command

language, prompting, structuring); procedures and other aids to computer use; keyboard arrangement, function controls 1

6-46 j

J LaSalle County Station Final Summary Report and other controls: computer response time; and design characteristics of displays and printers / printer messages.

The guidelines addressed generic qualities in a manner that did not require knowledge of specific uses.

Compliance with most of the guidelines was determined by inspection in the control room and review of software and hardware specifications.

It was necessary to question control room operators or supervisors to make determinations about some of the criteria.

Measurements were necessary to assess response times, keyboard key dimensions and separation and certain readability factors including character size and separation viewing angle,-

luminance

contrast, geometric distortion and resolution of CRT displays.

6.

Controls Section addressed principles of selection, protection and designs and specifications for different types of controls.

The guidelines were applied on a control room-wide basis and called for measurements of control dimensions, spacing and resistance.

Measurement of displacement of key-operated controls was also included.

Dimensions and spacing were checked on the panels themselves.

Resistance measurements were made with different devices depending on the type of control.

7.

. Displays Section addressed principles of displays including information to be displayed, usability of displayed values, readability, printing, markings and coding.

Guidelines were also given as to design characteristics of particular types of displays including meters, light indicators, graphic recorders 6-47

l.-

LaSalle County Station

~ Final Summary Report and counters.

Each display was checked for confor-mance tc the applicable. guidelines.

After every displsy had been checked, they were considered from a system perspective to assure appropriate consistenvy in labels, markings and coding.

8 '.

Labels and Location Aids _ Section addressed labeling,

location, content and lettering; use of temporary labels; and use of location aids such as demarcation, Each label was checked for accuracy color and mimics.

and conformance to guidelines.

A system / panel-oriented check was used to examine the labeling hierarchy and consistency of terms and abbreviations used to refer to system components.

Labeling and color coding was considered from a total control room perspective to assure consistency.

9.

control-Display Integration Section addressed relative positioning of single control and display pairs and function and sequence-multiple controls and displays; of-use relationships; movement relationship and other aspects of compatibility of controls and displays which are used together.

The control-display integra-tion survey was conducted panel-by-panel.

Environmental Measurement Pro _cedures 6.7.2 6.7.2.1 Sound Survey Procedures Using a control room layout drawing, locations were selected Measure-

-and marked where sound measurements were to be taken.

ments were taken at each operator position that required verbal communication and/or auditory discrimination of a

signal.

6-48

LaSalle County Station Final Summary Report the center of the Measurements were made with the microphone at head location.

The microphone was located 5 ft.

above the the operator stands and 4 ft. above floor at positions _ where Measurement positions included:

the floor at seated positions.

Senior reactor operator's desk e

Reactor operator's desk the center of e

near Operator workstation or points e

each panel or console the requiring communication with e

Back panel areas primary operating area essentially flat response at grazing Microphones having an incidence (90")

were used.

The microphone was

-placed-vertically at the measurement location with the sensitive element up.

noise levels (where ambient These measurements were for ambient noise without the noise is defined as background control room communications equipment).

contribution of alarms, printers or Integrated "A" weighted db(A) measurements were taken for all of the above positions.

Octave measurements were also taken center frequencies from about 31.5 Hz to about and included Measure 3nents were recorded on the Sound Survey Record 8000 Hz.

that specifies both location and direction.

(Appendix A) of measurements was taken for the annunciators a A second set alarms using equipment and personnel from the CECO Operations and - Analysis. Department (OAD).

These were taken at the seated head level for the unit desk for each unit and at the cen desk.

A real-time integrating spectrum analyzer was useu co obtain the sound levels corresponding to one-third and full ith frequencies, octave bans e ao

c LaSalle County Station Final Summary Report A set of tests was performed at each location previously described.

First, the control room ambient sound levels were measured.

The measurements were taken while each annunciator, corresponding to the unit location, was activated.

Finally a measurement was taken while all annunciators were activated simultaneously.

items were analyzed using the The following Section 6 checklist sound level measurements:

Ambient Noise (6.1.5.5) e Communications (6.2.2.3, 6.2.2.5, 6.2.2.6) e e

Annunciator (6.3.2.1)

Computers (6.7.3.2) e 6.7.2.2 Lighting Survey Procedures Using a control room layout drawing, locations were selected to be taken and marked where the illumination measurements were for normal and emergency lighting.

Readings were taken:

in front of each front panel; at operator workstations in the control room; and in front of each back panel.

At each position, the following were measured:

Full AC ambient e

Full DC emergency e

For determining the variance in illumination levels across the boards under normal lighting, measures were taken at 1-foot intervals vertically, and 2-foot intervals horizontally, so

-that a matrix of the levels across the boards was developed.

Readings were recorded on the Lighting Survey - Illuminance Record Form (Appendix A).

Final Summary Report LaSalle County Station The determination of the luminance and reflectance

ratios, followed these procedures:

The object was covered with a " perfect reflector" e

pad, with care taken not to block light.

e The luminance reading on the pad was taken and recorded.-

e The reflector pad was removad.

e The' luminance reading of the object was then taken and recorded.

At each panel, measurements were taken of:

e Reflectance of pad on panel e

Panel background (where reflectance pad was placed)

Meter faces (with and without glare) e other display faces (with and without glare) e e

Lights Readings were recorded on the Lighting Survey Luminance and Reflectance Record (Appendix A).

6.7.2.3 Humidity / Temperature Procedures Humidity and temperature were measured by setting up meters in an area where they were not disturbed.

The locations of the meters were marked on a control room layout drawing.

Readings were taken at floor level and at 6 ft. above floor level for at least a 24-hour period.

The graph of the recording for the

+

period was kept.as a permanent record.

6-51 r -

y.

7_

w

,e LaSalle County Station Final Summary Report 6.7.2.4 Air Velocity Survey Procedures Using: a ' control ~

layout ! drawing, locations were selected room f

and' marked where air velocity readings were taken.

Measure-ments were taken at principal ~ operator workstations.

Measure-

.ments 'were taken at an elevation of 6

ft..for standing and at 4 ft.

for sitting positions.

Measurements positions, were recorded on the Air Velocity Survey Record (Appendix A).

1 g

E t

i.;.

O s

(

5 1

1

\\

i f.

6-52

V LaSalle County Station Final Summary Report 5

7.0 HED ASSESSMENT The assessment-of HEDs for, impact on plant safety and oper-ability was accomplished by the HED Assessment Team (HEDAT).

At-a minimum, the HEDAT consisted of the Lead Human Factors Specialist (LHFS),

the DCRDR Coordinator, the I&C Engineers, Engineeri[ig. Department (SNED)

Station

'the Station Nuclear Project Engineer or designate, and the Station Assistant their designate.

Each member Superintendent for Operaticns or meets or exceeds the minimum requirements committed _to in the CECO Program Plan.

( Appendix 'C provides a list of all DCRDR and their qualifications.)

The team met and participants The reviewed the HEDs generated in the DCRDR process.

in regards to the relative objective was to categorize each HED importance as it. pertbins to safe and productive operation of classified into HEDs were Based on team consensus, the ' level of the plant.

one of three categories (I, II or III) based on safety relatedness of the equipment in question.

Three categories were identified as follows:

. Category I:

Discrepancies associated' with engineered safe-guard systems or engineered safety features Category II:

Discrepancies associated with plant systems not included in Category I Discrepancies falling in neither Category I or II Category III:

7-1

LaSalle County Station Final Summary Report Second, the HEDAT reviewed each HED to determine at what level of severity.each HED should be assigned within the categories, based on the following criteria:

A). Includes HEDs with documented errors, documented control-based problems or, in the judgement of the HEDAT, may have a significant impact on plant safety and/or productivity.

B)

Includes HEDs which may have a moderate -influence on plant performance-and any "C"

category HEDs that have been documented in' more than one phase of the DCRDR (conse-quences may' delay or

impact, but not significantly, the efficient operation of the plant).

c)

Includes HEDs with a relatively minimal impact on plant performance (consequence of human error will not lead to degraded plant safety system).

Level assignment-was the determining factor in the recommenda-tion to correct HEDs.

The HEDs in level A should be corrected because they have been documented to have caused errors and/or The HEDs in level B or C may performance problems in the past.

or may not be corrected, depending on their relative opera-tional significance.

While it is desirable from sound human engineering practices to rectify every discrepancy discerned, it is recognized that the. potential

benefit to be gained may not offset the expected short-and long-term considerations entailed, particularly in light of the fact that these HEDs have merely a

moderate potential for impact on operating performance and/or plant safety.

The ultimate responsibility for addressing tne HEDs discovered in the DCRDR process rested with the Station Operations and Station Nuclear ' Engineering Departments.

The DCRDRs Review Team performed the

review, documented the results and made recommendations to the aforementioned responsible departments.

7-2

=-

~..

LaSalle County Station

. Final. Summary Report Responsible representatives from-the Station Operations and the LHFS, the Station Nuclear Engineering Departments met' with

I&C Engineer and - DCRDR Coordinator to review the assessed HEDs land : decide which to correct.

During these meetings, the LHFS and.the DCRDR Coor6inator worked to ensure.that the HED's potential-for negative impact was given proper weight in comparison to the overall benefit of the recommended differentiated correction.

Those HEDs to be corrected were from those :not to be corrected.

The LHFS and the DCRDR Coordinator, with the assistance of the Station Operations Department and/or the Station Nuclear Engineering Department, justification for those HEDs which warrant no have written a The justifications are recorded in Volume 2.

further action.

The HEDs from.all phases of the DCRDR were reviewed in sequence HEDs checklist guideline, organization.

according to the Ceco relating to the ' preliminary design assessment (PDA) were evaluated first.

Differences from Program Plan The assessment process exercised for the LaSalle DCRDR. differed

-from the methodology identified in the Commonwealth Edison These differences described herein were a direct Program Plan.

result of the experience gained in the conduct of several DCRDRs and were designed to facilitate the overall review The integrity of the assessment process was

+

process.

and each HED was _ evaluated to determine the extent maintained to which the HED af fects the potential for operating crew error and its potential impact on safety.

reviewed and evaluated each HEDAT member During theLAssessment, each

'HED on several

. factors influencing operational T ae swicch to a consensus format facilitated the performance.

practical understanding of the impact each HED may have on Each member contributed a

unique operator.

performance.

7-3

...~

_LaSalle County Station Final Summary Report perception to the HED which helped shape-the opinion of the group.

In this process, each member had equal opportunity to influence the final decision on every HED.

This switch also negated the need for the Pre-Assessment form originally discussed in the program plan in that the human factors component was well represented in the HEDAT.

A further change to the program plan involved a switch from a four-tier rating to a three-tier rating.

This was accomplished in the program plan to by collapsing Level A and B as described Level A, with the remaining levels moving up a notch.

1 7-4

ev LaSalle County Station Final Summa'ry: Report 4

.f 8.0 HED IMPLEMENTATION t

8.1 General _

r

-In. conjunction with the assessments, the HEDAT reviewed the suggested corrective actions and/or selected recommendations for the appropriate HEDs.

No accepted recommendation will be implemented until the Commonwealth Edison Company (CECd) has received the NRC's reactions and comments. concerning it, E

following the submittal of each station's DCRDR final report.

.Upon

. receiving confirmation from the NRC regarding HED l

l I

resolutions, CECO will resolve the-HED corrective actions accordingly.

the 1)

The HEDs to be corrected will be ordered according 'to priorities set forth in the-Implementation Schedule except

{

associated - with-enhance-where noted (Figure 8.1).

HEDs

'ments, labeling or procedures may be corrected by the completion of-'the first refueling outage regardless of category.

[

2 )-

Equipment necessary to correct HEDs for Prompt and - Near-an HFS has reviewed

. Term Correction will be ordered af ter to ensure that the equipment

. their design-specifications

. meets applicable ~ criteria 'and will in fact correct the (This assumes that the equipment is available discrepancy.

on an "off-the-shelf" basis.)

8-1

D LaSalle County Station Final' Summary Report LEVEL _

A B

C CATEGORY First*

First

.Second**

1 First Second Second 2

Second Second Second 3

Estimated refueling outage dates:

Unit One Unit Two June 1987 December 1988

First refueling outage September 1989 May 1988

- Second refueling outage Suggested Planned Plant Refueling Outages Figure 8.1.

HED Corrective Actions Impicmentation l-

o LaSalle County Station Final Summary Report For.one-of-a-kind, "special or' der" pieces of necessary equipment, CECO will select a vendor and supply them with the pertinent design. specification criteria.

3)

Station Operations and/or Station Nuclear Engineering Departments will review the station's upcoming outage work schedules and arrange manpower and time, as necessary, to implement the corrections according to plant schedules.

4)

The Station Operations and/or Station Nuclear Engineering Departments will deliver copies of each HED and supporting information to the DCRDR Coordinator for inclusion in the station's permanent DCRDR records file.

An HFS will review and/or assist in the resolution of HEDs, as required.

5)

Upon completion of each HED's recommended correction, the responsible department will notify the DCRDR Coordinator who, in turn, will arrange for the corrections reviewed by an HFS.

6)

An HFS will review the correction for compliance to sound human engineering principles and verify that additional discrepancies were not created.

Should the correction ' not form to be be satisfactory,_the HFS will complete a new HED assessed via the procedure set forth above.

The rating

scale, as identified in the program plan for supporting the assessment process, was not used.

It was not necessary to utilize this technique' in that a consensus was reached through discussion of each of the team members.

8.2 Labeling A detailed, coordinated labeling standard has been designed (Appendix F) and will be implemented for all future labels.

8-3

LaSalle County Station Final Summary Report This labeling package has been developed, based on an _ extensive review of labeling requirements in the control room.

Labeling requirements have been developed to be consistent in size and style throughout the control room.

The use of labeling, as

needed, will-reduce the wordiness of the

labeling, reduce reading

time, and enhance functional relationships between controls and displays, thereby reducing search time.

8.3-Annunciators An annunciator standard (Appendix G) has been developed and will be used for all future legends on annunciator tiles.

Appropriate plant personnel, operations experts and human factors specialists have closely reviewed the requirements placed on the plant annunciator system.

8.4 Enhancements Several enhancement techniques may be used for implementation of corrective action.

These enhancement techniques will be reviewed closely by plant personnel, operations experts, and human factors specialists.

Based on this

review, the the entire control enhancement package will be coordinated over room so as -to ensure that all enhancement techniques will be consistent, interactive, and mutually supportive of one another.

This coordination is important to ensure that an enhancement technique used in one area of the control room does not conflict with or degrade the effectiveness of enhancement techniques used in other areas of the control room.

Several methods of enhancement may.be used based on the enhancement requirements review.

These methods may include:

demarcation

lines, background color

shading, color codina shape coding, re-labeling (coordinated with labeling package),

re-sealing (of displays, mimics) and/or other location aids and enhancements.

%- f

=-

LaSalle County Station Final Summary-Report Any, or all, of these methods used will. be coordinated ~on a

~ control room-wide basis, and will be implemented to conform with good human engineering principles.

Verification of Corrective Actions 8.5 Corrective. Actions being implemented will be reviewed to verify This their ef fectiveness f rom a human ' engineering perspective.

verification will utilize sound human engineering methods.

Verification will be performed using panel mock-ups incorpora -

ting the corrective actions, consultation with operators and reviews, and possible systems experts, human factors specialist use-of the control room simulator.

If the result of the result in verification determines that a corrective action will a-negative effec +

on control room operations, then the suggested corrective action will be altered or cancelled as appropriate.

If a

corrective action is verified to be effective it may then be implemented in the control room.

8-5

APPENDIX A Forms Control Room Human Engineering Discrepancy Record A-la/b/c/d Questionnaire Item Summary Form A-2 Personnel Survey Summary Form A-3 Index of Reviewed Reports A-4 Historical Report Review Error Analysis Problem A-5.

Analysis Report Control Room Review Task Development A-6

-Validation Review Worksheet A-7 Sound Survey Record A-8 Lighting Survey - Illuminance Record A-9 Lighting Survey - Luminance and Reflectance Record

-A-10 Lighting Survey - CRT A-11 Air Velocity Survey Record A-12

-A-13 Photographic Log Task Analysis Instrument / Control Requirement Form A-14 Task Analysis Controller Requirement Form A-15 A-16 Inventory Form Controller Inventory Form A-37

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ML20138N500

Contents

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Subject:

Dear Mr. Denton:

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1.0 INTRODUCTION

SUMMARY

1.0 INTRODUCTION

SUMMARY

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ML20138N500

Text

Subject:

Dear Mr. Denton:

=

=

1.0 INTRODUCTION

SUMMARY

1.0 INTRODUCTION

SUMMARY

Navigation menu

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