ML20138N500
| ML20138N500 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | LaSalle  |
| Issue date: | 10/29/1985 |
| From: | Massin H COMMONWEALTH EDISON CO. |
| To: | Harold Denton Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20138N503 | List: |
| References | |
| 0830K, 830K, NUDOCS 8511050209 | |
| Download: ML20138N500 (637) | |
Text
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/* / \ Commonwealth Edison
,e ,
" ) one First NationIl Pl72a. Chic"go. Illmois
( O 7 Address Reply to: Post Office Box 767
/ Chicago Illinois 60690 Detober 29, 1985 !
Mr. Harold R. Denton, Director Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Comission Washington, DC 20555
Subject:
LaSalle County Station Units 1 and 2 Detailed Control Room Design Review (DCRDR) Final Sumary Reports NRC Docket Nos. 50-373 and 50-374 References (a): License NPF-18, Attachment 2, Condition 2.
(b): Supplement 1 to NUREG-0737 dated December 17, 1982.
(c): Cordell Reed letter to H. R. Denton dated April 14, 1983.
(d): Cordell Reed letter to H. R. Denton dated August 25, 1983.
(e): Cordell Reed letter to H. R. Denton dated November 15, 1983.
l l
(f): A. Schwencer letter to D. L. Farrar dated February 21, 1984.
(g): J. G. Marshall letter to H. R. Denton dated April 23, 1984.
(h): J. G. Marshall letter to H. R. Denton
> dated April 15, 1985.
Dear Mr. Denton:
Enclosed please find the Detailed Control Room Design Review (DCRDR)
Final Summary Report for comonwealth Edison Company's (CECO) LaSalle County Station (Reference (a)). This report meets the Section 9, Item 2 CECO 1
commitment in Reference (c) ano the regulatory requirements of Item 2 in Reference '( f) .
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.P H. R. Denton October 29, 1985 Volume 1 of this report suanarizes how each phase of the review was performed, who was involved in the review and their respective qualifica-tions. Volume 2 of this report includes all Human Engineering Discrepancy (KD) findings, responses, and proposed schedules for implementation of the respective corrective actions. This proposed schedule, as noted in Section 3, Item 5.3 of Reference (c) is predicated upon NRC approval of CECO's disposition of each of the HEDs included in Volume 2.. Also, as noted in the same Reference (c), this schedule is subject to the availability of equip-ment, outage time availability at the applicable station, and engineering design lead time. As indicated in References (c) and (b), some problems affecting more than one emergency response activity will require an .
evaluation to assure that an integrated corrective action is taken. These activities will also affect the proposed schedule. '
The schedule for completion of the corrective actions has been designated as the completion of the first refueling outage (1st R.F.) or the second refueling outage (2nd R.F.). In accordance with this definition, the corresponding outage schedule for LaSalle is:
Unit I lst R.F. June, 1987 2nd R.F. December, 1988 Unit 2 1st R.F. May, 1988 '
2nd R.F. September, 1989 If you have any questions, please contact this office.
One signed original and five (5) copies of this transmittal and its attachments are included for your use. Please note that seven volumes of photographs have only been sent to Dr. A. Bournia.
Very truly yours, l H. L. Massin Nuclear Licensing Administrator im Attachments t
cc: Dr. A. Bournia Resident Inspector - LSCS 0830K
. - . - - -. - . - - . . - - - . - . ~,. . - . - _ - - - - - . - - - . . _ . - . . - -
y-HUMAN ENGINEERING DISCREPANCY FORM f
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HISTORICAL REPORT REVIEW ERROR ANAYSIS PPOBLEM ANALYSIS REPORT Name(s) of Investigator (s)
Date Station Index Number Unit Report Type and Number . _ .
Date of Incident Unit Operating Status Docum'ented Problem
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1 Sequence of Events Unit Shutdown _
hrs Unit Dera'ed ,,_ hrs Effect on Unit Unit Trip (Scram) __ h r s Corrective Action Taken or Proposed Subsequent Action Taken of a " Corrective
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Problem Identified and Corrected: _
Control Room Human Engineering Discrepancy Index/ Log Number
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CONTROL ROOM REVIEW TASK DEVELOPMENT Task Number __
Job Title
- Prepared By Station Number TASK DESCRIPTION ACTION ACTION STEPS (Sequence of what must be done to accomplish ACTIONS)
TASK CONDITIONS (Givens, Denials, Environment)
FREQUENCY Shift Day Wk Mo Bi Quar 6 Mos Year Cycle Other Mo Once A INITIATING CUES (When does the task start)
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r VALIDATIOt1 REVIEW WORKSHEET Event Operator Human Factors Specialist Procedure (s)
Procedure Step Yes No Comment HED Index Number
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SOUND SURVEY RECORD PAGE O?
NAME UNIT DATE CONDITIONS PEOPLE FREQUENCIES PANEL LOCATION dB(A) 10 CONTROL ROOM 31.5 63 125 250 500 1k2k4k8k feet 9
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J-i APPENDIX B s
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- Frequency with Which Potential HEDs were Associated with
- Each Operator Survey Questionnaire Item 1
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Frequency with Which Potential HEDs were Associated with Each Operator Survey Questionnaire Item Question Frequency Questionnaire Item A.2 14 Identify any additional displays which would be helpful in the main control room. Explain why.
A.1 12 Identify any additional controls which would be helpful in the main control room. Explain why.
B.3 8 Identify the system (s) in which controls and/or displays are not grouped together but should be.
B.4 8 Describe how the layout of the control board equipment can be improved to allow operators to perform more effectively.
B.8 7 Describe any system (s) in the control room which you feel are difficult or confusing to operate.
Describe any incident (s) in which these have affected operator job performance.
C.3 7 Identify and describe those alarm tiles that have an inappropriate set point, that is those that give the operator either too much or too little time in which to respond to a plant problem.
C.2 5 Describe any incident (s) in which the annunciator warning systen was ineffective in helping operators respond to a problem.
A.3 4 Identify the area (s) in the main control room where direct voice communication is difficult.
C.4 4 For alarms with multiple inputs, is the conputer printout capability sufficient for you to determine the cause? If not, which alarms should be split into single inputs?
)
G.2 4 Identify tables / checklists / status boards etc.
which could be redesigned to improve their usefulness. Explain.
I.3 4 Describe any incident (s) involving control room personnel in which additional training would have been helpful.
A.5 3 Describe areas in the main control room where lighting causes glare, reflections, dark areas, or other problems.
C.5 3 Identify any alarm tile (s) in the main control room which are confusing or difficult to understand. Explain why.
B-1
Question Frequency Questionnaire Item E.1 3 Identify any information or calculations not presently provided by the process computer that would be useful.
E.4 3 Describe any incident (s) in which a delay in computer response to a request has detracted from or interfered with job performance.
E.5 3 Is there any information presented on the CRT's that would be more useful if it was presented differently? Explain.
F.4 3 Describe any situation (s) in which replacement equipment such as fuses, bulbs, ink, etc. were unavailable for corrective maintenance.
A.4 2 Identify any area (s) in the main control roam where the air quality (temperature, humidity, air flow) makes it uncomfortable or distracting to work.
B.1 2 Identify any control device (s) that should be operated manually instead of automatically or vice versa. Why?
E.3 Identify any words or symbols used on the computer that are difficult to understand or interpret.
Suggest improvements.
E.7 2 Identify any information presented on the computer printer that is not useful to control room operations and explain why. Describe any situation (s) in which presentation of this information interfered with main control room ,
personnel receiving information from the printer.
F.5 2 Describe the method used to determine lamp failure on the control panels. Describe a method that you feel would be more effective. Explain.
H.4 2 Describe how the shif t turnover process can be improved.
H.5 2 Describe any incident (s) in which the operating crew staffing structure affected control room operations. How can this be improved?
A.6 1 Identify any obstacle (s)-in the main control room that interfere with movement.
B.2 1 Identify any throttleable valve (s) that would potentially ' restrict your time to respond during emergency operations because of their throttleability.
B-2
Question Frequency ~ Questionnaire Item B.5 1 Identify areas on the main control boards where your use of a control is interfered with by other equipment surrounding it (eg. controls,' displays, telephones, radios, etc. ) .
B.6 1 Identify equipment (controls, displays) in the main control room which are difficult to reach or monitor. Describe any incident (s) in which this difficulty has had an impact on operator job performance.
B.7' 1 Identify any-control (s) on back panels that should be on front panels or vice-versa. Please explain why and be specific.
B.9 1 Describe any incident (s) in which controls located in the control room were accidently activated.
Why?
C.1 1 Identify and describe those areas in the main control room where background noise levels interfere with annunciator alarms. Describe any incident (s) in which the background noise delayed an operator in detecting an annunciator alarm in a timely manner.
D.2 1 Identify any area (s) in the main control room where messages presented over the PA or radio systems can not be heard clearly.
D.3 1 Describe any instance (s) in which the use of the PA or radio systems by non-operating personnel interfered with control room use of the system.
D.5 Describe any incident (s) in which use of walkie-talkies have interfered with plant instrumentation.
E.6 1 Identify any CRT's located in the control room which are difficult to use from normal operating positions because of their placement in the control room.
F.1 1 Describe any incident (s) in which maintenance activities contributed to an operational problem.
G.1 1 Identify any procedure (s) which are unclear or difficult to use. E:cplain. Describe any incident (s) in which this led to an operational problem? -
'G.5 1 Identify the testing procedure (s) that should be performed more or less frequently (daily, weekly, monthly, quarterly, etc.) than they are now. For each, state why.
B-3
Question Frequency Questionnaire Item ,
H.2 1 Describe any individual responsibilities which are not clearly understood. How could they be improved?
I.1 1 Describe any inconsistencies between training and actual control room operations. What can be done to make the two more consistent?
I.2 1 Describe any emergency situation (s) for which you feel you have not received enough training.
D.1 0 Identify any auditory signal (s) presented in the control room which are confusing.
D.4 0 Describe any situation (s) in which problems with the PA or radio systems prevented or interfered with an operators ability to communicate with individuals in other areas.
E.2 0 Describe any feature (s) of the computer system that you feel are helpful.
E.8 0 Identify any computer system procedures which are difficult to understand. Describe any incident (s) in which this had caused a problem.
E.9 0 Identify any key (s) on the keyboard for the computer which are not used by main control room personnel. Describe any incident (s) in which these keys have caused problems in using the computer.
F.2 0 Describe any incident (s) in which the station maintenance program was particularly helpful in preventing an operational problem.
F.3 0 Identify and describe any characteristic (s) of the main control room preventative maintenance program, or corrective maintenance procedures that are a) very effective b) not effective.
G.3 0 Identify the log (s) that you feel are difficult to update or maintain. Explain why.
G.4 0 Identify any mathematical calculation (s) that are time consuming and/or difficult to perform.
Explain.
H.1 0 Are there any job duties which are performed by others in which you feel main control room personnel should be more directly involved or vice versa? Explain.
B-4
Question Frequency ,
Questionnaire Item H.3 0 Describe any instance (s) in which distractions, in the form of unnecessary personnel, traffic, etc.,
interfered with-your main control room duties.
B-5
APPENDIX C~
Management and Staffing: Personnel O
1.0 INTRODUCTION
The management and administration of the LaSalle Station Detailed Control Room Design Review (DCRDR) was the responsibility of the Technical Services Nuclear Department.
Within this department, the DCRDR Program Administrator reports to .the Technical Services Nuclear Department Manager who reports directly to an Assistant Vice President and hence to a CECO Executive Vice President.
The DCRDR activities were implemented by experienced Operating,
' Engineering and ' Human Factors Engineering personnel. These individuals performed the DCRDR with input from other CECO
' studies, analyses and concerns involving human factors engi-neering considerations.
The DCRDR review team consisted of a select group of profes-sionals with the wide range of skills necessary for the performance of the design review and included:
e An I&C-engineer e An engineer / architect with control room design experience e A senior reactor operator or operations technical advisor with operating experience e A human factors specialist Subject Matter Experts (SMEs) participated in every phase of
~
the review. They worked closely with all review team members to provide the appropriate level of plant design and opera-tional knowledge.
The following sections summarize the qualifications of each of the LaSalle Station DCRDR review team participants. Two cate-gories of involvement are listed: DCRDR review team partici-pants (Section 2.0), and SME Support Personnel (Section 3.0).
C-1
2.0 DCRDR REVIEW TEAM PARTICIPANTS The qualifications of the DCRDR review team members are summarized below. The responsibilities and duties of each member is discussed in Section 3.0, of Volume 1 of the LaSalle Station DCRDR Final Summary Report.
The Program Administrator position was originally filled by Mr.
Gary Abrell. During the second half of the LaSalle DCRDR, the Program Administrator position was filled by Mr. Larry Davis.
Both, men were CECO employees. Mr. Abrell qualifications are as follows:
Education: B.S., U.C. Naval Academy, Annapolis, Maryland, 1961.
. Experience: Mr. Abrell has served as. the Supervisor of Station Support Services for the past 11 months.
Prior to .that he was the Director of Quality Assurance for Operations for 6-1/2 years. He has 23 years of engineering experience which includes 20 in the nuclear field. He has held positions in Nuclear Licensing and Nuclear Station opera-tions at Commonwealth Edison. He has had 3-1/2 years - in the Navy Nuclear Power Program. He has held an SRO license for Dresden Station since 1970 and has been a Registered Professional Engineer.in Illinois since 1978.
In the Human Factors area, Mr. Abrell adopted the
" Green Board" for Dresden Station in 1973 and was responsible for its implementation. This concept is in use at LaSalle, Byron, and Braidwood stations.
C-2
y Mr. Davis' qualifications are as follows:
Education: M.B.A., Illinois Institute of Technology, 1978.
B.S., Engineering, University of Illinois, 1970.
Experience: For the past six months, Mr. Davis has served as the Supervisor of Station Support Services including the duty as the CECO Human Factors Program Administrator. He has approximately 14 years of nuclear power plant experience, was SRO licensed at the Dresden Station (BWR) and was license certified at the Braidwood Station (PWR). Prior to his present assignment, he held various positions at a newly established Production Training Center including the Acting Training D. nager position. Prior experience included duties at both an operational and pre-operational nuclear generating station.
C-3
The position of DCRDR Program Coordinator was filled by Mr.
Robert G. Howard of CECO. Mr. Howard's qualifications are as follows:
Education: B.S., Electrical Engineering, University ~of .
Wisconsin, 1955.
Experience: For the past four years, Mr. Howard has assisted in the Human Factors Reviews of CECO's Zion, LaSalle, Byron, Braidwood, Dresden, and LaSalle nuclear stations. For the past three years he was Coordinator of the Byron /Braidwood Prelimina'ry Design Assessment (PDA) and for the past two years assisted Mr. Squires and Mr. Lau in the development and implementation cf the DCRDR Generic Program Plan for CECO nuclear plants. For the past seven years Mr. Howard was assigned as Staff Engineer in the Control and Instrument group of the Station Electrical Engineering Department and as of September 3, 1984, is a Staff Engineer in Technical Services Nuclear Department. For eight years prior to that he was Operating- Engineer at the Zion Station (SRO license from 1973 to 1979).
Twenty-three of his 40 years experience with power plants have been in the nuclear power area,
' including assignments in operation, maintenance, construction and engineering.
C-4
.The position of Senior Subject Matter Expert was filled by Mr.
William R. Huntington (Assistant Superintendent-Operations) of CECO. Mr. Huntington's qualifications are as follows:
Education: B.S., Electrical Engineering, M.I.T., 1965.
Experience: Mr. Huntington is now Assistant Superintendent-Operations.
March 1984 to April 1985 -
Technical Staff Supervisor at LaSalle Station. In this capacity, Mr. Huntington's responsibilities included Tech-nical Support of Operations, including Technical Specification changes, procedure revisions and plant modifications.
January 1976 to March 1984 -
Lead Engineer /
Assistant Technical Supervisor /Preoperational Test Coordinator in the Technical Staff. In this position, his primary function was to supervise the development, performance, and evaluation of the pre-operationa. testing of both LaSalle County Station reactors.
July 1965 to July 1975 - Officer, United States Navy. Served in various capacities in nuclear submarines during construction, operation and overhaul phases.
C-5
The position of Human Factors Management Assistant is being filled by Kathleen A. Hesse of CECO. Ms. Hesse's qualifica-tions are as follows:
Education: B.S., Psychology, Minor in Engineering Manage-ment, University of Missouri-Rolla, 1984.
Associate of Science in General Studies, Specialization in Pre-Engineering, Belleville Area College, 1980.
Diploma in Drafting, Specialization in Electrical Drafting, St. Louis Tech, 1976.
Experience: Since joining Commonwealth Edison Company in January of 1985, Ms. Hesse has supported projects under Commonwealth Edison Company's human factors engineering program. Her main task is working closely with the Detailed Control Room Design Review Coordinator, offering additional support.
Ms. Hesse also works on.the technical aspects of the project where and when help is needed. Other power plant experience includes employment with another utility company. Ms. Hesse has been totally involved in all aspects of the Detailed Control Room Design Review for the Commonwealth Edison nuclear stations.
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The individuals filling the Human Factors Engineering pcaitions were made up of individuals from outside contractors.
The position of Lead Human Factors Specialist (LHFS) was filled by Mr. Robert L. Kershner from Advanced Resource Development (ARD) Corporation. Mr. Kershner's qualifications are as follows:
Education:. M.A., Human Factors Psychology, the Catholic University of America, Washington, D.C., 1977.
B.A., Applied Psychology, cum laude, University of Baltimore, Baltimore, Maryland, 1975.
Experience: For the past five years Mr. Kershner, Vice President of Human Factors Technology Division for ARD Corporation, has worked in the nuclear utility industry providing support in a number of human factors areas including Lead Human Factors Engineer for over 8 DCRDRs, program plan develop-ment, SPDS design and evaluation, control room design reviews, and EOP validation. Prior to >
that time, he spent six years designing, conducting and evaluating human factors research in vibrotactile codes, traffic management, driver information systems, low-fidelity simulation aids, information presentation to time critical materials, visual searen patterns, and military systems design, analysis and improvement. In addition, Mr.-Kershner participated in underwater acoustical testing of nuclear submarines serving as assistant trial director.
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~ . . _- . .-. .. . - _ .-
Dr. Eugene B. Silverman, president of Advanced Resource Development (ARD) Corporation, acted in a quality assurance capacity. Dr. Silverman's qualifications are as follows:
Education: Ph.D., Applied Experimental Psychology, Computer Science and Electrical Engineering, The Catholic University of America, Washington, DC, 1976.
M.A., Human Factors, The Catholic University of America, Washington, DC, 1975.
B.S., Physiological Psychology, University of Maryland, College Park, Maryland, 1969.
Experience: Dr. Silverman~has developed an organization which is highly responsive to the current needs of business and technology. He has managed the comprehensive human factors engineering reviews of Pressurized Water Reactor and Boiling Water Reactor nuclear power plant control rooms. The reviews were conducted within the operational, cost and schedule constraints of the plant and were implemented, jointly, with utility engi-neering and operations personnel. Design issues addreised included control board layout, contr al/ display design and functional grouping, environmental conditions, process computer performance, procedure (normal, emergency, and ,
abnormal) effectiveness, maintainability and annunciator system design. Supporting consulta-tion was provided in the areas of operator training, task analysis, human fatigue and stress, and personnel error analysis.
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T The Human Factors. Specialist positions are being filled by ARD -
Corporation personnal, the names, affiliations, and educational and experimental qualifications for these individuals are as follows:
Individual: Mr. Stephen H. Cooley
' Affiliation: Advanced Resource Development (ARD) Corporation
- Education: M.A., Industrial / Organizational Psychology, Uni-versity of Illinois at Chicago, Illinois, 1980.
B.A., Psychology with minors in Business Admini-stration and Statistics, George Washington University, Washington, D.C., 1976. -
Experience: For the past four years, Mr. Cooley, a Senior Human Factors Specialist for ARD, has worked in the nuclear power industry. Ha has provided support in a number of human factors areas that include: program plan development, control room design reviews, procedure writing and evaluation, training, and human error as a result of inade-quate man-machine interfaces. Prior to his work in the nuclear industry, he worked for three years in designing, conducting and evaluating both applied and theoretical research in leader-ship emergence, personnel selection, personnel staffing patterns, stress management, group dynamics, market research, management assessment, and the psychological factors associated with addiction.
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Individual: Mr. Joseph B. Winter Affiliation: Advanced Resource Development (ARD) Corporation Education: M.S., Psychology, Virginia Commonwealth .
University, Richmond, Virginia, 1979.
B.S., Psychology, Virginia Commonwealth s
University, Richmond, Virginia, 1974.
Experience: Mr. Winter has over two years experience in the power industry conducting task analyses on nuclear jobs for training purposes. In addition to utility employment, he has three additional years of human factors experience utilizing a variety of analytic techniques in the areas of test validation, selection, classification, compensation, performance appraisal and multi-purpose job analysis. He is an accomplished SAS programmer and has used task analysis approaches to create computerized classification systems, tying them to human resource development projects which factor geographic differences in pay. He has experience developing job evaluation systems and has worked extensively as a job analyst.
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1 l
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Individual: Mr. Michael A. Boggi Affiliation: Advanced Resource Development (ARD) Corporation Education: M.S., Industrial Engineering, North Carolina State University, Raleigh, North Carolina, expected completion: December 1985.
B.A., Psychology, LaSalle College, Philadelphia, Pennsylvania, 1981.
Experience: In 1982 Mr. Boggi supervised a group of researchers conducting a noise control project for the regional headquarters of the Amoco Oil company of Raleigh, North Carolina. In addition, Mr. Boggi worked on a team that evaluated aspects ;
of safety, biomechanics, and the man-machine interface at specific work locations at the ITT plant in Raleigh, North Carolina. Besides his applied experience, Mr. Boggi has conducted observational research in freight management and traffic control. Presently he is applying his training and experience to complex man-machine interface issues in the nuclear industry.
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Individual: Mr. Christopher C. Plott Affiliation: Advanced Resource Development (ARD) Corporation Education: M.S., Industrial Engineering, Texas Tech University, Lubbock, Texas, 1983.
B.S., Kinesiological Sciences, University of Maryland,' College Park, Maryland, 1981.
Experience: Presently, and for the last year and one-half, Mr. Plott has been involved in the evaluation of the complex man-machine interface issues in the nuclcir industry as well as in the development of the computerized data base management system being used for a DCRDR.
For the previous two and one-half years, he was involved in various applied research projects conducted at Texas Tech. These included work in the areas of work physiology, biomechanics, anthropometry, task analysis and work load measurement while under contract to the Bureau of Mines, the State of Texas, and the McDonnel Douglas Corp. His responsibilities included the design, conduct and analysis of various aspects of these projects. Mr. Plott has also worked in the areas of human-computer interface and sofware development.
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Individual: Ms. Kimberly R. Siler i
Affiliation: Advanced Resource Development (ARD) Corporation Education: B.S., Human Factors Psychology, Wright State University, Ohio, 1982.
Experience: Since joining the ARD Corporation in October of 1984, Miss Siler-has been involved in the conduct of nuclear power plant CRDRs. During the previous two years Ms. Siler was a research psychologist responsible for the design, implementation and analysis of applied research in the areas of Behavioral Workload Assessment and Biomagnetism in the Visual Evoked Response Laboratory of the Air Force Aerospace Medical Research Laboratories / Human Engineering at Wright-Patterson Air Force Base, Dayton, Ohio. In addition to her research activities, Ms. Siler was continuing her education in the' Graduate Program in Human Factors at the Psychology Department at Wright State University.
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.m Individual: Mrs. Cynthia F. Weiss /Parr Affiliation: Advanced Resource Development (ARD) Corporation Education: M. S.'E. , Industrial Engineering. (Occupational Safety and Health), NIOSH Graduate Traineeship, University of Michigan, Ann Arbor, Michigan, 1982.
B.S.E.,. Industrial Engineering (Human Factors),
University ^of Michigan, Ann Arbor, Michigan, 1981.
?
Experience: Mrs. Parr has over three years experience in the nuclear power industry and, as a project engineer in the Human Factors Technology Group, she has provided human factors engineering support to a variety of ARD programs. Her expertise in the control room is in the design and retrofit of annunciator reviews for several nuclear stations a
and has published and presented a paper on this subject. In addition, she has designed work-stations for control room operators to ensure that computers, hardcopy records, and spare parts were easily accessible, and performed environ-mental evaluations on light, . ventilation, and auditory design to numerous stations.
)
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Individual: Mr. Vincent J. Fortunato III
-Affiliation: Advanced Resource Development (ARD) Corporation Education: M.A., Experimental Psychology, State University of New York, Binghampton, New York, 1982.
B.S., Psychology, State University. College, Oswego, New York, 1979.
Experience: Mr. Fortunato has provided both research and consulting support to a variety of-ARD programs.
His research activities have included NASA-funded projects involving psychophysiological measures of workload and computer graphic displays of system status. His support of ARD's nuclear clients has included control room I&C inventories; and, human factors reviews of computer graphic display systems, emergency response computer c. 'shics systems, radiation monitor graphic ( fr* ys, and quadrex safety assessment syste.:c.
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Individual: Mr. Robert Klein Affiliation: Advanced Resource Development (ARD) Corporation Education: M.S., Industrial Psychology, California State University at Long Beach, Long Beach, California, 1978.
B.S., Psychology, St. Joseph's College, Philadelphia, Pennsylvania, 1973.
Experience: Mr. Klein has been involved with human engineering in the design and evaluation of complex control and display systems for over four years. He prepared an overall assessment of cruise missile weapon control system hardware and.
software components, reporting on human factors engineering, operability, maintainability, safety, and nuclear security. He was the human factors member of a multidiscipline maintainability demonstration team to verify system compliance with Navy maintenance standards. He participated in experimental design execution, and analysis on ,
Coast Guarc and DOD related projects. Mr. Klein's experience in military applications of process control and integrated display systems is now utilized in support of nuclear power plant control room design reviews as a Staff-Engineer in ARD's Human Factors Technology Group.
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Individual: Dr. Linda A. Cosgrove Affiliation: Advanced Resource Development (ARD) Corporation
' Education: Ph.D., Experimental Psychology, University of Virginia, Charlottesville, Virginia, 1979.
M.A., Experimental Psychology, University of Virginia, Charlottesville, Virginia, 1976.
B.A., George Mason University, Fairfax, Virginia, 1974, summa cum laude.
Experience: As a Project Scientist, Dr. Cosgrove has been responsible for several curriculum development, industrial and computer training, and human factors engineering studies. Her support of ARD clients has included the development of an industrial training program and a task analysis of emergency operating procedures.
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Individual: Dr. E. Ralph Dusek Affiliation: Advanced Resource Development (ARD) Corporation Education: Ph.D., Experimental Psychology, Statistics, State University of Iowa, Iowa City, Iowa, 1951.
M.A., Experimental Psychology, Statistics, State University of. Iowa, Iowa City, Iowa, 1949.
B.A., Psychology, Mathematics, University of Missouri, Columbia, Mis sou r'i , 1947.
Experience: Dr. -Dusek has over 30 years of experience in applied experimental psychology and human- f actors engineering. During that period he held a succession of responsible positions all involving applied research in experimental psychology and human factors engineering. In addition, he has extensive management experience in directing the activities of laboratories and contractors conducting work for which he was responsible.
.Dr. Dusek has participated in human factors evaluations in nuclear plant control room design reviews at seven different stations. He has also written human factors manuals for use in future modifications of specific control rooms.
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Individual: Mr. Donald F. Taylor Affiliation: Advanced Resource Devel.opment (ARD) Corporation Education: M.S., Industrial Engineering and Operations Research (Human Factors), Virginia Polytechnic Institute and . State University, Blacksburg, Virginia, 1975.
B.S., Industrial Engineering and Operations Research, Virginia Polytechnic Institute and
-State University,.Blacksburg, Virginia, 1972.
Experience: Mr. Taylor has been active in human factors for a period of over ten years. He has applied experience in mechanical and fluids engineering as well as in nuclear maintenance and operations.
As a senior engineer in the Human -Factors Technology Group, Mr. Taylor provides human engineering support to the ARD nuclear programs.
Mr. Taylor has extensive experience in the design, evaluation, and enhancement of the man-machine interface in process control appli-cations. He developed human factors guidelines for the design of nuclear power plants, the preparation of emergency procedures, and the development of maintenance procedures and docu-mentation. He has participated in all phases of Control Room Design Reviews (CRDRs), including over 75 interviews with licensed nuclear operators and ' surveys of 15 control rooms. Mr. Taylor developed criteria, methods and procedures for the analysis, verification, and validation of control room tasks, and surveys of control room equipment.
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Other Review Team Members The position of System Design Engineer was filled by Mr. Edward L. Seckinger of CECO. Mr. Seckinger's qualifications are as follows:
Education: B.S., Engineering, Southern Illinois University at Carbondale, Illinois, June 1972.
M.S., Electrical Engineering, University of Illinois at Urbana, Illinois, December 1973.
Experience: Mr. Seckinger has over 11 years of experience in the nuclear power area. Between 1974 and 1977 he worked in the Tech Staff at Dresden Station performing modification and Tech Spec tests, investigating deviations and incidents, etc.
From 1977 to 1980 he worked in the Dresden/ Quad Cities group of the Station Nuclear Engineering Department providing support in the planning, design and installation of plant modifications.
From 1980 to 1983 he worked in the LaSalle Project Engineering Department providing support in the design, construction and licensing of LaSalle Station and reviewing pre-operational test procedures and results. From 1983 to the present he has worked in the LaSalle group of SNED. Some of his current duties are the review of modifications, NRC notices and bulletins, etc.
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The Instrument.and Control Engineer position was filled by Mr.
James J. Krass (assisted by Robert Howard) of CECO. Mr. Krass' qualifications are as follows:
Education: B.S., Electrical Engineering, Technology from Purdue University, 1968.
Experience: Presently Mr. Krass is assigned to the Control and Instrument section in the Station Electrical Engineering Department of CECO. From February 1979 to April of this year he was assigned to the Electrical Instrumentation and Control Branch of the Clinch River Breeder Reactor Project at Oak Ridge Tennessee. And, for the ten years prior to that, Mr. Krass was in CECO's Operational Analysis Department working on Instrument and Control Systems in both fossil and nuclear plants.
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z 3.0 SUBJECT MATTER EXPERTS (SMEs)
Sixteen SMEs participated during various phases of the LaSalle Station DCRDR; they. include: Don Crowl, Andy Ruger, Al ,
Magnafici, Jay Houston, Tom Carr, Dennis Cornish, Bob McConnaughay, Chuck Maney, Mark Dowd, Larry Nickles, Paul Nelson, Roger Armitage, Bill Kirchikoff, Ken Wolf, Joe
' Williams, and -Ken Rauch. Qualifications of each of these individuals are summarized in Table C-1.
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Years of Years of Senior React'or Reactor Years of Years of Operator Operator Nuclear SME Education Experience Experience Experience R. Armitage 12 3 1 12.5 T. Carr 14 4 15 D. Cornish 12 3 13 D.-Crowl 12 3 1 9.5 M. Dowd 16 2.5 8.5 J. Houston 12 4 8 W. Kirchikoff 18 2 '
9
$ Al Magnafici 12 4 12.5 C. Maney 14 4 11
+
B. McConnaughay 14 2 2 9.5 P.-Nelson 12 3 1 15 L. Nickles 14 4 16 K..Rauch 12 2.5 6 A. Ruger 12 3.5 7 J. Williams 16 1.5 15 W. Wolf 14 4 10 Total 216 28 27 177.5 Mean 13.5, 3.1 2.5 11.1 -
Mean for holding license (SRO/RO)
- 3.4 years i
Table C-1. LaSalle DCRDR SME Participant Qualifications 4
e s
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l 1
(
l APPENDIX D Codes i
~- , , - - - . . .. . . r,.-- .,,, - - - - , - - , -.- - -,,.n., -..-..--,-,-~_,..,,_.....,,_,.,n---.. , , , , , . , - -, , , , + , - - - - , .- - , -
CONTROLLER TYPE 1 POT SETPOINT POTENTIOMETER 2 MAN MANUAL CONTROLLER 3 M/ATS MANUAL / AUTO TRANSFER' STATION 4 ANSP AUTOMATIC CONTROLLER W/O SETPOINT ADJUST 5 MASP' M/A TRANSFER STATION WITH SETPOINT ADJUST 6 ANM AUTOMATIC CONTROLLER W/O MANUAL FUNCTION 7 EGCC' EGC CONTROLLER LOCATION 1 OPM08J 24 1N62-P600 47 2H13-P610 2 OPM11J 25 1N62-P601 48 2H13-P611 3 OPM12J 26 1PM01J 49 2H13-P614 4 OPM14J 27 IPM02J 50 2H13-P624 5 OPM17J 28 1PM03J 51 2H13-P632 6 1D21-P600 29 IPM04J 52 2H13-P635 7 1H13-P600 30 1PM05J 53 2H13-P636 8 1H13-P601 31 1PM06J 54 2H13-P642 9 lH13-P602 32 IPM07J 55 2H22-P007 10 1H13-P603 33 IPM08J 56 2N62-P600 11 1H13-P604 34 1PM09J 57 2N62-P601 12 1H13-P607 35 1PM10J 58 2PM0lJ 13 1H13-P608 36 1PM13J 59 2PM02J 14 lH13-P609 37 IPM16J 60 2PM03J 15 IH13-P610 38 2D21-P600 61 2PM04J 16 1H13-P611 39 2H13-P600 62 2PM05J 17 lH13-P614 40 2H13-P601 63 2PM06J
-18 1H13-P624 41-2H13-P602 64 2PM07J 19 1H13-P632 42 2H13-P603 65 2PM08J 20 1H13-P635 43 2H13-P604 66 2PM09J 21 1H13-P636 44 2H13-P607 67 2PM10J 22 1H13-P642 45 2H13-P608 68 2PM13J 23 1H22-P007 46 2H13-P609 69 2PM16J CONTROL TRANSFER SWITCH TYPE - CONTROL TYPE 1 CTW CONTINUOUS THUMBWHEEL CONTROL 2 CRC CONTINUOUS ROTARY CONTROL 3 PBI PUSH BUTTON INCRESE 4 PBD PUSH BUTTON DECREASE 5 CTS CONTROL TRANSFER SELECTOR SW.
6 CTP CONTROL TRANSFER PUSHBUTTON MATCH CONDI? ION 1 YES 1 DEN DENERGIZED 2 NO 2 EN ENERGIZED 11 YES 12 NO D-1
COMMUNICATIONS 1 CDO CENTER DESK OPERATOR 2 EM ELECTRICAL MECHANIC 3 EMF ELECTRICAL MECHANIC FORMAN 4 EA EQUIPMENT ATTENDANT 5 EO EQUIPMENT OPERATOR 6 IM INSTRUMENT MECHANIC 7 IMF INSTRUMENT MECHANIC FORMAN 8 LD LOAD DISPATCHER 9 MM MAINTENANCE MECHANIC 10 MMF MAINTENANCE MECHANIC FORMAN 11 NSO NUCLEAR STATION OPERATORS 12 OE OPERATING ENGINEER ,
13 RWE RADWASTE EQUIPMENT.
14 SCRE SHIFT CONTROL ROOM ENGINEER 15 SE SHIFT ENGINEER 16 SF SHIFT FORMAN 17 GSEP STATION GSEP DIRECTOR 18 SST STATION SUPERINTENDANT COLOR, 1A AMBER 2 BG BIEGE 3 BK BLACK 4B BLUE 5 BR BROWN 6C CLEAR 7 GY GRAY 8G GREEN 9O ORANGE 10 P PINK 11 R RED 12 RG RED / GREEN l 13 W WHITE 14 Y YELLOW WHAT MEASURED 1 Conc CONCENTRATION 16 Load LOAD 31 Temp TEMPERATURE 2 Cond CONDUCTIVITY 17 Per PERIOD 32 T TIME 3 cont CONTINUITY 18 PA PHASE ANGLE 33 Unit UNIT
'4 Cur CURRENT 19 Pos POSITION 34 Vac VACUUM 5 Dev DEVIATION 20 P PRESSURE 35 VARS VARS 6 DP DIFFERENTIAL Pressure 21 Pur PURITY 36 Vib VIBRATION l 7 Dis DISPLACEMENT 22 Rad RADIATION 37 V VOLTAGE l 8 DIR DIRECTION 23 Vars REACTIVE LOAD 38 Vol VOLUME
! 9 Ecc ECCENTRICITY 24 RxP REACTOR POWER 39 Wear WEAR l 10 ElP . ELECTRICAL POWER 25 RDGP ROD GROUP ID 40 INDV INPUT DEVIATION l 11 Exp EXPANSION 26 RDID ROD ID NUMBER 41 MADV M/A DEVIATION
! 12 Flow FLOW 27 RPos ROD POSITION 42 SRVO SERVO ERROR
(- 13 Freq 28 STPT SET POINT 43 OD OUTPUT DEMAND f 14 Hum HUMIDITY 29 Spd SPEED 98 TEST TEST 15 Lev LEVEL 30 SUR START UP RATE 99 CTRN CONTROL TRANSFER i
D-2 l
DISPLAY TYPE 1 EM EDGEWISE METER 66 RRO RADIO-RECEIVER ONLY 2 RM ROTARY METER 70 GTC GRAPH / TABLE / CHART / INSTR.
10 SP SINGLE PEN RECORDER 71 PRC PROCEDURES 11 DP DUAL PEN RECORDER 72 PID P&ID/ DRAWINGS 12 MP MULTI PEN RECORDER 73 RB REFERENCE BOOK 13 MPT MULTI POINT RECORDER 74 LOG LOG 14 XYP X-Y PLOTTER 75 BRD BOARD 15 P PRINTER 76 PTM PORTABLE TIMER 16 TR TAPE RECORDER 77 CLK CLOCK 20 DC DRUM COUNTER (INTEGRATOR) 78 TBA THUMB BUSTER AID 21 EC ELECTRONIC COUNTER 79 DS DATE STAMP 22 LED LIGHT EMITTING DIODE 80 CHR CHAIR 23 LED LIGHT EMITTING DIODE 81 TBL TABLE 30 LLI LEGEND LIGHT INDICATOR 82 DSK DESK 31 IL NONLEGEND LIGHT INDICATOR 83 CAB CABINET 40 TAR TAPGET 84 BC BOOK CASE 41 REL RELAY 85 FC FILE CABINET 42 ANN ANNUNCIATOR 86 PT PAPER TRAY 43 TIM TIMER 87 LAD LADDER / STEP STOOL 50 REM PESPONSE EDGEWISE METER 88 TC TRASH CAN 51 DEM DEMAND EDGEWISE METER 89 CAR CART 52 DEV DEVI ATION EDGEWISE METER 90 FE FIRE EXTINGUISHER 53 T/I MOVING TAPE / FIXED INDEX 91 EA EMERGENCY AIR 54 KS KNOB SKIRT 92 EAH EMERGENCY AIR HOSE 55 T/S SETPOINT TAPE INDICATOR 93 SCB AIR MASK AND TANK (SCBA) 59 ELECTRIC METER 94 EL EMERGENCY LIGHTING 60 PHN PHONE 95 KB KEYBOARD 61 RBS RADIO BASE STATION 96 CRT CATHODE RAY TUBE 62 RP PORTABLE RADIO 98 DW DEC WRITER 63 RPC PORTABLE RADIO CHARGER 99 CAL CALCULATOR 64 SPP SOUND POWER PHONE 65 SPJ SOUND POWER PHONE JACK UNITS 1 Amps AMPERES 2 cmHg CENTIMETERS OF MERCURY 3 CPM COUNTS PER MINUTE 4 CPS COUNTS PER SECOND 5 CF CUBIC FEET 6 CFM CUBIC FEET PER MINUTE 7 DPM DECADES PER MINUTE 8 Deg DEGREES 9 DegC DEGREES CENTIGRADE 10 DegF DEGREES FARENHEIT 11 Ft FEET 12 Ftw FEET OF WATER 13 G GALLONS 14 GPH GALLONS PER HOUR 15 GPM GALLONS PER MINUTE D-3
r-UNITS. (cont.)
16 Hz HERTZ 17 Hr HOURS 18 In INCHES 19 InHg INCHES OF MERCURY-20 InW INCHES OF WATER 21 Ka KILOAMPERES .
22 Kvar KILOVARS 23 KV KILOVOLTS
~24 KW KILOWATTS 25 Mvar MEGAVARS 26 MW MEGAWATTS 27 MWT MEGAWATTS THERMAL 28 umho MICRO MHOS 29 ua MICROAMPERES 30 uCI/cc MICROCURIES PER CUBIC CENTIMETER 31 uCI/S MICROCURIES PER SECOND 32 mph MILES PER HOUR 33 ma MILLIAMPERES 34 MPPH MILLION POUNDS PER.MOUR 35 mr/hr MILLIREMS PER HOUR 36 mv MILLIVOLTS 37 mils MILS 38 min MINUTES 39 Notch NOTCHES 40 PPB PARTS PER BILLION 41 PPM PARTS PER MILLION 42 % PERCENT 43 %V PERCENT BY VOLUME 44 %W PERCENT BY WEIGHT 45 %Def PERCENT DEFLECTION 46 %P (T) PERCENT THERMAL POWER 47 PTS POINTS 48'PPH POUNDS PER HOUR 49 PSI POUNDS PER SQUARE INCH 50 PSIA POUNDS PER SQUARE INCH ATMOSPHERIC 51 PSID POUNDS PER SQUARE INCH DIFFERENTI AL 52 PSIG POUNDS PER SQUARE INCH GAUGE 53 rpm REVOLUTIONS PER MINUTE 54 R/hr ROENTGENS PER HOUR 55 W/sqcm SCFH 56 sec SECONDS 57 SCFH STANDARD CUBIC FEET PER HOUR 58 SCFM STANDARD CUBIC FEET PER MINUTE 59 Steps STEPS 60 Units UNITS 61 VDC VOLTAGE-DC 62 V VOLTS 63 W WATTS 64 UCI/ML MICROCURIES PER MILLILITER 65 umo/cm MICRO MHOS/ CENTIMETER i 66 KVDC KILOVOLTS-DC D-4
_ _ - _ _ _ _ - __ _ , _ _ ~ _ _ . . - _ - _ . . ~ ._
1 s.
SWITCH TYPE l
1 CARD CARD )
2 CB CIRCUIT BREAKER 3 CRC CONTINOUS ROTARY CONTROL 4 DRC' DISCRETE ROTARY CONTROL 5 JH J-HANDLE CONTROL SWITCH 6 JACK JACK 7 JS JOY STICK 8 KLS KEY LOCK SWITCH 9 KP KEY PAD 10 KFS KINFE SWITCH 11 LLPB LEGEND LIGHT PUSH-BUTTON 12 NLPB NON-LEGEND LIGHT PUSH-BUTTON 13 NSND NON-SWITCH /NON-DISPLAY 14 PB PUSH-BUTTON 15 RMH REMOVABLE HANDLE 16 RKR ROCKER SWITCH 17 RCS ROUND CONTROL SWITCH 18 SS SLIDE SWITCH 19 TW THUMBWHEEL 20 TCS THUMB CONTROL SWITCH 21 TGS TOGGLE SWITCH 22 LTW LEGEND THUMBWHEEL 24 PBL LEGEND PUSH-BUTTON SWITCH ACTION 1 AI AS IS 2 SR SPRING RETURN VALVE CONTROL 1 SC SEAL CLOSED 2 SO SEAL OPEN 3 TC THROTTLE CLOSED .
4 TO THROTTLE OPEN DIVISIONS
~
1 .0001 15 10 29 30 2 .002 16 100 30 4 3 .005 17 1000 31 5 4 .01 18 12 32 50 5 .02 19 12.5 33 500 6 .05 20 18 34 6 7 .1 21 2 35 8 8 .2 22 2.5 36 EACH 9 .25 23 20 37 LOG 10 .4 '
24 200 38 PERIOD 11 .5 25 25 39 7.5 12 1 26 250 40 .00001 13 1.25 27 3 41 .6 14 1.5 28 3.33 42 .0833 D-5
SWITCH POSITIONS 1 +15 56 APRM 111 CH 21 2 -15 57 ARMED 112 CH 22 3 0 58 -AUTO 113 CH 23 4 0-10% 59 AUTO OPEN 114 CH 24 5 0-100 60 AVERAGE 115 CH 3 6 0-25% 61 AVG 116 CH 4
'7 0-54 62 B 117 CH 5 8 1 63 B BUS + 118 CH 6 9 10 64 B BUS - 119 CH 7 10 100 65 B LEVEL 120 CH 8 11 10E-1 C6 B OFF 121 CH 9 2 10E-2 67 B PRIM 122 CHECK 13 10E-3 68 B START 123 CHK 14 10E-4 69 B STBY 124 CLOSE 15 10E-5 70 B-C 125 CLOSED 16 10E-6 71 BALANCE 126 CONVERTER OUTPUT 17 10E-7 72 BC 127 COUNT 18 10E-8 73 BLOCK 128 CV TEST 19 10E-9 74 BOTTOM 129 D 20 10E5 75 BUS 21 B-C 130 DCR 21 11 76 BUS 22 B-C 131 DECR
- 2 2 12 77 BUS 23 B-C 132 DECREASE 23 125 78 BUS 23-1 B-C 133 DISARMED 24 13 79 BUS 24 B-C 134 DISCH 25 14 80 BUS 24-1 B-C 135 DOWN 26 15 81 BUS 25 B-C 136 DRAIN 27 16 83 BUS 26 B-C 137 DRYWELL 28 2 83 BUS 27 138 DW 29 2-3 84 BUS 28 AB 139 DW1 30 21 85 BUS 28 BC 140 DW2 31 22. 86 BUS 28 CA 141 DW3 32 23 87 BUS 29 AB 142 EMERG ROD IN 33 24 88 BUS 29 BC 143 ENGAGE 34 -3 89 BUS 29 CA 144 EXPAND X 10 35 3 E EM CONT 90 BY 145 F5 36 3-1 91 BYP 146 FAN 37 4 92 BYPASS 147. FAN A 4 38 40 93 C 148 FAN B 39 5 94 C-A 149 FAST 40 6- 95 CA 150 FAST LOWER 41 7 96 CAL 151 FAST RAISE 42' 8 97 CALIB 152 FILTER IN 43 9 98 CH 1 153 FILTER OUT 44 A 99 CH 10 154 FIRE 45 A BUS + 100 CH 11 155 FIXED 46 A BUS - 101 CH 12 156 FLOW 47 A LEVEL 102 CH 13 157 FWD 48 A OFF 103 CH 14 158 GAIN
- 49 A PRIM 104 CH 15 159 50 A START 105 CH 16 160 GR 1 AND 4 51 A STBY 106 CH 17 101 GR 2 AND 3 52 A-B 107 CH 18 162 HAND 53 AB 108 CH 19 163 HI CAL 54 ADD 180- 109 CH 2 164 HI CAL 10E5 55 ANALY2E 110 CH 20 165 HOLD D-6
SWITCH POSITIONS (cont.)
166 HOLD 221 PUMP 1 276 TOP 167 I 222 PUMP 2A 277 TORUS 168 IN 223 PUMP 2B 276 TREAT 169 INBD 224 PUMP 2C 279 TRIP 170 INCR 225 PUMP 2D 280 TRIP A ,
171 INCREASE 226 PUMP 5 281 TRIP ADJ 172 INHIBIT 227 PUMP ON 282 TRIP B 173 IRM- 228 PURGE 283 TRIP TEST 174 ISOL 229 PWR 284 TURB TEST 175 ISOLATE 230 PWR & FLOW. TEST 285 UNLABLED MIDPOSITION 176 LO CAL 231 PWR FLOW 286 UNLABLED POSITION 1 177 LO CAL 10 232 PWR TEST 287 UNLABLED POSITION 2 178 LO CAL'10E5 233 RAISE 288 UP 179 LOCAL 234 RAMP 289 VALVE A 180 LOWER 235 RBM 290 VALVE B 181 MAN 236 READ 291 VAR 182 MAN OPEN 237 RECIRC 292 X1 183 MANUAL 238 REF 293 X3.16 184 MANUAL OVERRIDE 239 REFUEL 294 ZERO 185 MANUAL OVRD 240 RELEASE 295 ZERO 1 186 MON A 241 PESET 296 ZERO 2 187 MON B 242 REV 297 ZERO CHECK 188 MON C 243 REVERSE 298 ZERO NO 1 189 MON D 244 REVERSE 299 ZERO NO 2
'190 MONITOR 245 RFP 2A 300 ARM 191 NEU' 246 RFP 2B 301 27 192 NEUTRAL 247 RFP 2C21 302 28 193 NOR 248 RFP 2C22 303 29 194 NORM 249 ROD IN 304 SUPP POOL 195 NORMAL 250 ROD OUT NOTCH 305 D. GEN 196 NORTH 251.RUN 306 REMOTE / MANUAL 197 NOTCH OVERRIDE 252 SAMPLE 307 D. GEN / BUS 8 NUET 253 SET 308 BUS 9 OFF 254 SHUTDOWN 309 VLV 200 OFF OFF 255 SLOW 310 TURB B 201 ON 256 SLOW LOWER 311 TURB A 202 ON OFF 257 SLOW RAISE 312 DRYWELL L1 203 ON ON 258 SOU 313 DRYWELL L2 204 OP 259 SOUTH 314 E 205 OPEN 260 SPAN 315 P 206 OPER 261 SPAN 1 316 G 207 OPERATE 262 SPAN 2 317 H 208 OUT 263 STANDBY 318 TRIP RESET
'209 OUTBD 264 START 319 SYS A 210 OVER TEST 265 START HOT STBY 320 L S B 211 OVERRIDE 266 STOP 321 IV0053 212 PERIOD 267 SUPP 322 IVQ052 213 POWER OFF 268 SV TEST 323 NORMAL BUS 214 POWER ON 269 SYST 1 324 LOCAL MANUAL 215 PRIM 270 SYST 2 325 INOP 216 PPOGRAM 271 T 326 NORMAL (NO TRIP) 217 PSA 272 T1 327 TEST (WILL TRIP) 218 PSB 273 T2 328 TURBINE TRIP 219 PULL TO LOCK 274 T3 329 TEST PWR 220 PULL TO STOP 275 TEST 330 TEST FLOW D-7
f SWITCH POSITIONS (cont.)
331 PRINT 333 PRINT ON ALARM 334 MM/ MIN 332 SCAN -e D-8 O - - . - . -
APPENDIX E.
Control Room Design Review Survey
4 CONTROL ROOM DESIGN REVIEW SURVEY The Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) is requiring that a detailed human factors review of every nuclear power plant control room be performed. Part of the guidance document published to support these reviews, NUREG-0700, suggests the use of your operating experience to help the review team identify operator / control board interface problems.
The Commonwealth Edison Company and the management of this station support the spirit of the NRC's directives. As a result, we are asking for your support and assistance in the program by completing the attached questionnaire. For this progtem, the Company's goal is to improve the operating crew's capability to recognize, control and manage plant abnormal and emergency conditions. A by-product, of course, is that some changes and corrections will be made which will make the operating crews' job easier to perform.
The que'stionnaire contains 52 questions that cover nine general topic areas dealing with different aspects of control room design and operating crew job duties and tasks. The questions deal with " problem
- areas as well as good or beneficial features associated with the control room. In completing the questionnaire, please read each question carefully and then answer it as fully as you can based upon your experience. In preparing your answers, consider the questions from all the various modes of plant operation, e.g., startup, hot stand-by, full power, etc. Give detailed answers so that someone not as familiar with the area as you are will be able to understand exactly what you mean.
Thcagh the questionnaire is long, please take the time you need and answer all thw questions you can. Your viewpoints and experiences are important to this review. Use additional paper if necessary and attach it to this question-naire. If you do use additional paper, please be sure to match your answer to the appropriate question. If you feel that we have left anything out or failed to cover an area in which you have a concern, please tell us by attaching comments to the questionnaire. If you are unable to answer a particular question, please indicate this in the space provided for your response.
In asking for your support in this program, we feel it is important for you to know what we will do with your answers. As the questionnaires are returned, a non-CECO contractor will summarize your answers on a question-by-question basis and compile results for each. The team conducting the control room design review will then be informed of each problem area identified so that they can pay special attention to it during the review process. Should the team verify the area as a problem, they will document it on a form made for that purpose.
Though the NRC may eventually be told of the problems you help identify, we want to assure you that your answers and comments on this questionnaire will be kept in strict confidence. Your answers will be summarized so that your exact words do not appear. Further, your answers will in no way ef fect your careers, standings or promotions in Commonwealth Edison. Therefore, in answering the questionnaire, be as open, honest and straightforward as you can.
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2 In addition to completing the questionnaire, we would like you to supply us with the additional information requested on the following page. It will hcip ,
- us to integrate your responses with other.information we must collect as part of this project. The contractor' who will be summarizing your answers may contact you privately for additional information or clarification, if neces-sary. When you have completed the qitestionnaire, place it in the envelope provided, seal the envelope, and return it within four weeks to the individual indicated on - the next page. Thank you very much for your cooperation and assistance.
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-NAME:
PRESENT POSITION:
NUCLEAR OPERATING EXPERIENCE: YEARS
-CONTROL BOARD OPERATING EXPERIENCE YEARS HELD A REACTOR. OPERATOR'(RO) LICENSE YEARS HELD A SENIOR REACTOR OPERATOR (SRO) LICENSE YEARS AGE:
SEX: ,
l HEIGHT:
Return To:
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= A .1 Identify any additional controls ' which would be helpful in the main control room. Explain why.
A.2 Identify any additional displays which would be helpful in the main control room. Explain why.-
A.3 Identify the arca(s) in the main control room where direct voice communication is difficult.
A.4 Identify any area (s) in the main control room where the air quality (temperature, humidity, air flow) makes it uncomfortable or distracting to wc;k.
A.5 Describe areas in the main control room where lighting causes glare, reflections, dark areas, or other problems.
A.6 Identify any obstacle (s) in the main control room that interfere with movement.
B.1 Identify any control device (s) that should be operated manually instead of automatically or vice versa. hty?
B.2 Identify any throttleable valve (s) that would potentially restrict your time to respond during emergency operations because of their throttle-ability.
B.3 Identify the system (s) in which controls and/or displays are not grouped together but should be.
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B.4 Describe how the layout of the control board equipment can be improved to allow operators to perform more effectively.
B.5 Identify areas on the main control boards where your use of a control is interfered with by other equipment surrounding it- (e.g., controls, displays,' telephones, radios, etc.).
B.6 Identify equipment (controls, displays) in the main control room which are difficult to reach or monitor. Describe any incident (s) in which this difficulty has had an impact on operator job performance.
B.7 Identify any control (s) on back panels that should be on front panels or vice versa. Please explain why and be specific.
B.8 Describe any system (s) in the control room which you feel are difficult o- n'. fusing to operate. Describe any incident (s) in which these have afte ted operator job performance.
B.9 Describe any incident (s) in which controls located in the control room were accidently activated. Why?
C.1 Identify and describe those areas in the main control room where back-ground noise levels interfere with annunciator alarms. Describe any incident (s) in which the background noise delayed an operator in
. detecting an annunciator alarm in a timely ranner.
C.2 Describe any incident (s) in which the annunciator warning system was ineffective in helping operators respond to a problem.
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i C.3 Identify and describe those alarm tiles that have an inappropriate set- !
point, that 'is, one that gives the operator either too much or too l
- little time in which to respond to a plant problem.
C.4 For alarms with multiple inputs, is the computer printout capability
- sufficient for you to determine the cause? If not, which alarms should be split into single inputs?
C.5 Identify any alarm tile (s) in the main control room which are confusing i or difficult to understand. Explain why.
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D.1 Identify any auditory signal (s) presented in the control room which are confusing.
- D.2 Identify any area (s) in the main control room where messages presented over the PA or radio systems cannot be heard clearly.
D.3 Describe any instance (s) in which the use of the PA or radio systems by non-operating personnel interfered with control room use of the system.
f D.4 Describe any situation (s) in which problems with the PA or radio systems prevented or interfered with an operators ability to communicate with individuals in other areas.
I D.5 Describe any incident (s) in which use of walkie-talkies have interfered ,
with plant instrumentation.
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E.1 Identify any information or calculations not presently provided by the process computer that would be useful.
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E.2 Describe any feature (s) of the computer system that you feel are helpful.
E.3 Identify any words or symbols used on the computer that are diffictilt to
. understand or interpret. 'Suggest improvements.
E.4 Describe any incident (s) in which a delay in computer response to a request has detracted from or interfered with job performance.
E.5 Is there any information presented on the CRT's that would be more useful if it was presented differently? Explain.
E.6 Identify any CRT's located in the control room which are difficult to use from normal operating positions because of their placement in the contrni room.
E.7 Identify any information presented on the computer printer that is not
-useful to control room operations and explain why. Describe any situation (s) in which presentation of this information interfered with main control room personnel receiving information from the printer.
E.8 Identify any computer system procedures which are difficult to under-stand. Desctibe any incident (s) in which this has caused a problem.
E.9 Identify any key (s) on the keyboard for the computer which are not used by main control room personnel. ' Describe any incident (s) in which these keys have' caused problems in using the computer.
,F.1 Describe any incident (s) in which maintenance activities contributed to an operational problem.
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F.2 Describe any incident (s) in 'which the station maintenance program was particularly helpful in preventing an operational problem.
-F.3- Identify and describe any characteristic (s) of the main l control room preventative maintenance program or corrective maintenance procedures that are a) very effective, b) not effective.
'- 'F.4 Describe any' occasion (s) in which replacement equipment such as fuses, bulbs, or ink was unavailable for corrective maintenance.
F.5 Describe the method used to determine lamp failure on the control panels. Describe a method that you feel would be more effective.
Explain.
G.1 Identify any procedure (s) which are unclear or difficult to use.
Explain. Describe any incident (s) in which this led to an operational problem.
G.2 Identify tables / checklists / status boards, etc. which could be redesigned to improve their usefulness. Explain.
G.3 Identify the log (s) that you feel are dif ficult to update or maintain.
Explain why.
G.4 Identify any mathematical calculation (s) that are time consuming and/or difficult to perform. Explain.
.G.5 Identify the testing procedure (s) that should be performed more or less frequently (daily, weekly, monthly, quarterly, etc.) than they are now.
For each, state why.
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H.1 Are there any job duties which are performed by others in which you feel main control room personnel should be more directly involved or vice
'" versa? Explain.
H.2- Describe any- individual responsibilities .which are not clearly understood. How could they be improved?
H.3 Describe any instance (s) in which distractions, in the form of unnecessary personnel, traffic, etc., interfered with ' your main control room duties.
H.4 Describe how the shift turnover process can be improved.
H.S Describe'any incident (s) in which the operating crew staffing structure
.affected control room operations. How can this be improved?
, I.1 Describe any inconsistencies between training and actual control room operations. What can be done to make the two more consistent?
I.2 Describe any emergency rituation(s) for which you feel you have - not received enough training.
I.3- Describe any incident (s) involving control room personnel in which additional training would have been helpful.
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APPENDIX F Control Room Labeling Standard 1
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CONTROL ROOM LABELING STANDARD The following information is'a summary guideline to be followed
-for labeling system / workstations, subsystem / functional areas, components and control positions within the LaSalle control room.
The chcracteristics of labels must be such that they provide maximum information to the operator. The various illumination levels of control areas, control locations, and restraints on operator position demand that all label characteristics (such
- as size, lettering and placement) serve as perceptual aids to information discrimination and processing. The redundancy inherent in such characteristics can serve as a visual code to reduce response time and minimize probability of error.
Placement of labels should be uniform throughout the system to insure ease of element / control identification and should
. provide maximum visibility. Labels should be oriented horizon-tally in order to be read easily, quickly and accurately and should not be subject to accidental removal.
The following guidelines adhere to those established by the Ceco checklist to aid the operator in the locating, identifying
- and handling of controls, displays and equipment.
- 1. Label Information -
Labels should describe the function of equipment items, or if needed for clarity, describe engi-neering characteristics or nomenclature.
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- 2. Placement of Labels -
Labels should be placed below indi-cators except in cases-where there are space constraints.
If the labels are located above eye level, they should be positioned to ensure visibility. All labels should be placed close to the corresponding panel element. Placement should also provide sufficient space to allow adequate discrimination from adjacent' controls and minimum inter-ference with visibility during adjustment or manipulation of controls. Placement should also be such that labels do l
. 1 not obscure or detract from other information sources (see Figures 1 and 2). .Therefore, the following guidelines should be followed:
- a. Labels should not appear on the control itself when an I adjustment or manipulation is required that causes the operator's hands to obscure the label for an extended time period.
- b. Adjacent labels should be separated by sufficient space so they are not read as one continuous label (see Figure 3).
- c. Eliminate, wherever possible, vertically oriented labels and replace with horizontal labels.
- d. Curved patterns of labeling should be avoided.
- e. Labels should be mounted to minimize the possibility of accidental detachment.
- f. Labels should be mounted on a flat surface.
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Figure 1. Proximity of label to panel element.
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i Figure 2. Separation of adjacent labels.
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Figure 3. Examples of preferred and non-preferred 4
label placement.
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- 3. Character Style and Dimensions - Recommended styles are shown in Figure 4. A condensed Helvetica type font is an acceptable style. Capital letters that art simple in design (i.e., without flourishes or serifs) should be used in all labels. Other character dimensions are given below:
- a. Letter width-to-height ratio - no less than 1:1; no greater than 3:5.
- b. Numeral width-to-height ratio - 3:5 (except for the numeral "4" which should be one stroke width wider and the numeral "1" which is one stroke in width).
- c. Stroke width-to-character height ratio - no less than 1:6; no greater than 1:8.
- d. Minimum space between:
- 1) Characters - one stroke width
- 2) Words - one character width
- 3) Lines - one-half character height
- 4. Character Readability -
In order to insure speed and accuracy in the reading of labels, uniform size and style of the characters should be adopted.
- 5. Character Height - Letter height should be identical for all labels within the same hierarchical level, based on the maximum viewing distance. The heights displayed in Table 1 are the minimum and preferred values recommended for opera-tor viewing distances of three feet. If the operator's normal viewing distance is not three feet, the alphanumeric character's height should subtend a visual angle on the retina of 15 minutes at a minimum (0.004 x viewing dis-tance). A visual angle of 20 minutes (0.006 x viewing l
distance) upon the retina is preferred by the NRC i 1
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- b. U.S. Military Standard MS--33558 ( ASG)
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Table 1. Preferred values for character height MINIMUM MAXIMUM Letter height .150 Letter width .100 .150 Stroke width .019 .025 Space between characters .019 .025 Space between words .100 .150 Space between lines .075 1
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- 6. Labeling Visibility - The -following guidelines should be adhered to:
- a. Labels should not cover,- detract from or obscure figures or scales which must be read by the operator.
- b. Labels should be visible to the operator during control activation.
- 7. Label color codes - General control room should be white with black lettering. Yellow, blue and green should be used to identify Division I, II, and III equipment, respectively. Orange should be used for reactor protection system equipment.
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APPENDIX G Control Room Annunciator Standard m
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CONTROL ROOM ANNUNCIATOR STANDARD The guidelines governing the labeling of aanunciator warning systems-parallel the labeling guidelines for the control room.
- 1. Location - The annunciator warning panel labels should be located above the panel and be consistent with a subtended visual angle of at least 15 minutes (.004 x viewing distance) when viewed from a central position within the primary operating area. For LaSalle, this should be .625= inches. Within each panel, alarm tiles shculd be grouped by function or system, and each panel should be located above the related controls or displays necessary for diagnostic or corrective response.
- 2. Legends -
Legends on individual annunciator til'es should be unambiguous and specific as to conditions that they address. Information should be ' conveyed concisely using abbreviations and acronyms consistent with those used elesewhere in the control room. The use of alarms which refer to other detailed annun-ciator panels located outside the primary operating area should be minimized.
- 3. Character Height - For optimum legibility of the panel legends, letter height should subtend a minimum visual angle of 15 minutes and be identical for all tiles based on maximum viewing distance. For LaSalle, the G-1
letter height should be .22 inches. The alphanumeric labeling of the vertical and horizontal axes of the annunciator panels should be consistent with a sub-tended visual angle of at least 15 minutes viewed from a central . position within the primary operating area.
For LaSalle, this should be .5 inches.
- 4. Character Style - Type style for legends should be simple, upper-case, and consistent for all tiles to insure maximum readability *. Legends should be engraved on tiles using black lettering on white background to provide high contrast. Character dimensions should be consistent with those recommended in the labeling standard.
- 5. General Guidelines
- a. An abbreviation standard should be developed and strictly observed,
- b. Words in the label should express exactly what action is intended and at the same time be clearly understood, direct and correctly spelled. The meanings of words should be commonly accepted by all intended users. Unusual technical terms should be avoided.
- c. Symbols can be used only if they have a commonly accepted meaning, they are unique and distin-guishable from each other, they use a commonly accepted standard configuration, and they are used ' consistently within and across panels.
Roman numerals should be avoided.
- McCormick, E.J. Human Factors in Engineering and Design ~(Sth Edition). New-York: McGraw-Hill, 1976.
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- d. Words and abbreviations which are similar in appearance should be avoided where error in interpretation could result.
- e. Labels should identify functionally grouped controls or displays and be located above the groups they identify.
- f. All discrete functional control positions should be identified along with the direction of motion in continuous motion rotary controls.
- g. Labels should describe the function or equipment compon'ents.
- h. Words should be used which have a commonly accepted meaning for all intended users; unusual terms should be consistent within and across pieces of' equipment.
- i. Words on labels should be concise yet convey the intended meaning.
- j. Abbreviations should be limited to five or less characters.
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' Final Summary Report LaSalle County Station PREFACE The following document was prepared jointly by the Commonwealth Edison Company (CECO) and Human Factors Technology Group of the Development (ARD) Corporation. The ARD Advanced Resource
. Corporation assisted CECO throughout all phases of the Control Room Design Review (CRDR).
This report contains the Commonwealth Edison Company's LaSalle }
County -Station Detailed Control Room Design Review (DCRDR) final summary report, as per CECO's April 14, 1983, recponse to NUREG-0737 Supplement ~ 1, and to the NRC's subsequent February Mr.
27, 1984, confirmatory order (Docket Number 50-373)- to Dennis L. Farrar from Mr. A. Schwenger.
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Final Summary Report LaSalle County Station TABLE OF CONTENTS PAGE SECTION VOL.'l DCRDR FINAL
SUMMARY
REPORT PROGRAM IMPLEMENTATION 1-1
1.0 INTRODUCTION
2.0 OVERVIEW 2-1 2.1 Review Phases 2-2 2.2 Foundation Processes 2-3 2.3 Investigative Processes 2-4 2.4 Assessment Phase 2-4 2.5 Reporting Phase 2-4 3-1 3.0 MANAGEMENT AND STAFFING 4.0 DOCUMENTATION AND DOCUMENT CONTROL 4-1 Output Documentation 4-2 4.1 Document Control 4-2 4.2 Data Base Management System 4-3 4.3 5.0 INTEGRATION WITH OTHER SUPPLEMENT 1 5-1 NUREG-0737 INITIATIVES 6-1 6.0 REVIEW PROCESS 6.1 Historical Event Review 6-1 Operating Experience Review 6-7 6.2 Task Analysis 6-15 6.3 Control Room Inventory 6-24 6.4 6.5 Verification of Equipment Availability and suitability 6-31 Validation of Control Room Functions 6-37 6.6 6-43 6.7 Control Room Survey 7-1 7.0 HED ASSESSMENT 8-1 8.0 HED IMPLEMENTATION General 8-1 8.1 Labeling 8-3 8.2 8-4 8.3 Annunciators 8-4 8.4 Enhancements 8-5 8.5 Verification of Corrective Actions
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LaSalle County Station Final Summary Report TABLE OF CONTENTS (continued)
PAGE SECTION APPENDICES A-1 A FORMS B NUMBER OF ASSOCIATIONS OF OPERATOR SURVEY
SUMMARY
ITEMS TO HUMAN ENGINEERING B-1 DISCREPANCIES C-1 C MANAGEMENT AND STAFFING: PERSONNEL D-1 D CODES E-1 E CONTROL ROOM DESIGN REVIEW SURVEY F-1 F CONTROL ROOM LABELING STANDARD G-1 G CONTROL ROOM ANNUNCIATOR STANDARD s
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Final Summary Report LaSalle County Station I
- 1. 0' INTRODUCTION .
The Detailed Control Room Design Review (DCRDR) is part of a broad program designed by the nuclear industry and the federal government to ensure consideration of human factors in nuclear
' power plant design and operation. The purpose of the LaSalle DCRDR was to review and evaluate the control room workspace, instrumentation,- controls and other equipment from a human factors standpoint, taking into account both system demands and operator capabilities. Secondly, the human factors review room design identified, assessed and will implement control modifications which correct inadequate or unsuitable items.
The following objectives were identified for the LaSalle County Nuclear Generating Station DCRDR:
- 1. Determine whether the control room provides the system information, control capabilities, feedback, status and analytic aids necessary for control room operators to accomplish their functions effectively.
- 2. Identify characteristics of the existing control room instrumentation, . controls, other equipment, and physical arrangements that may detract from operator performance.
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Final Summary Report LaSalle County Station
- 3. Analyze and evaluate the problems that could arise from the aforementioned human engineering discrepan-(HEDs), and analyze means of correcting those cies ~
discrepancies which could lead to substantial problems.
Define and put into effect a plan of action that 4.
applies human factors principles to improve control and enhance operator effectiveness; room design particular emphasis should be placed on improvements affecting control room design and operator performance under emergency conditions.
- 5. Integrate the control room design review with other factors inquiry identified in the areas of human Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) Task Action Plan.
- 6. Verify Preliminary Design Assessment (PDA) results and integrate corrective actions resulting from PDA into DCRDR recommendations.
Final Summary. Report. LaSalle County Station 2.0 OVERVIEW
'The Commonwealth Edison Company DCRDR evaluates the control room workspace, instrumentation, controls .and other equipment ,
from the human factors ~ engineering perspective. Both system
' demands and operator capabilities were taken into account. The HEDs identified in the review phase were assessed ~by the Human Discrepancy Assessment Team (HEDAT). For those Engineering HEDs significant enough to warrant a corrective action, this team identified and assessed control room improvements which would correct the problems described'in the HEDs. A tentative corrective action schedule based upon the safety significance As and = human' ' factors importance was also established.
indicated in.the CECO response to the NUREG-0737 Supplement .1, this schedule is dependent upon the NRC's response to this repor t .' and the.results of the integration of all Supplement 1 initiative modifications.
Prior .t o licensing, Commonwealth Edison conducted a human factors ' Preliminary Design Assessment (PDA) of the LaSalle c3ntrol. room. As a result, a large number of design improve-
.ments were . completed. In addition, a number of items..was deferred until1 the DCRDR. Each of these deferred ' items was reviewed.and documentation . supporting the disposition of each is available on-site.
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E Final' Summary Report LaSalle County Station 2.1 Review Phases The co.itrol. rooms were reviewed to determine if they provide with the system status information, control the operator capabilities, feedback, and performance aids necessary to accomplish this function and task effectively. Characteris-tics of the existing control room instrumentation, controls, other equipment and physical arrangements that may detract from operator performance were also identified during this phase.
processes were used to collect pertinent These review information and/or to identify HEDs within the control rooms.
2.1.1 Operating Experience Review of historical An operating personnel survey and a review reports was conducted to identify conditions which affect probability for those operator errors which could affect safe operation of the generating stations. Industry-wide Licensee Event Reports _ (LERs) for similarly designed control rooms that applicability, were included in this review.
have generic Operating personnel were also interviewed to obtain feedback based on previous operating experience.
System Functions and Analysis of Tasks 2.1.2 Review of Involved in Control Room Operator Functions l
The BWROG EPGs were used as the base document for establishing information requirements.and performance criteria for the tasks which operators must accomplish.
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'2.1.3 Inventory of Control Room Instrumentation and Equipment The inventory itemized and described the existing control room the information, control, components for comparison with 2-2
LaSalle County Station Final Summary Report equipment and material requirements identified in the system functions review and task analysis.
2.1.4 Survey of the Human Engineering Acceptability of Control Rc om Components and Environmental Conditions This survey identified whether the control room components and environment (e.g., lighting, noise / sound control) were designed such as physical to accommodate basic human characteristics size and perceptual-motor capabilities.
2.1.5 Verification of Task Performance Capabilities During this phase, the adequacy of workstations to support the tasks was assessed. The execution of control room operator verification was made by comparing the information and control requirements derived from the task analysis to the existing instrumentations and controls available in the control rooms.3 2.1.6 Validation of Control Room Functions The validation was conducted to determine whether the functions allocated to the control room operating crew could be accomp-lished within the structure of the defined Emergency Operating Procedures (EOPs) and the design of the control room as it exists.
2.2 Foundation Processes The first three are foundation processes in which frames of reference and benchmarks for identification of discrepancies were established. The last three are investigative processes with which the benchmarks were used to identify HEDs.
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Final Summary Report LaSalle County Station-2.3 Investigative Processes The investigative processes used the data collected during the foundation processes to determine the adequacy of control room tasks and functions from a human engineering operators'
_ perspective by comparing the data against the human factors benchmarks established during these processes. Deficiencies were identified and documented during this part of the review.
It was during this part of the review that the control room survey of the control boards was conducted. This' survey was followed by a verification of task - performance capabilities, including the verification of instrumentation and control availability and suitability.
Subsequent to the verification process, a validation of the control room . functions was conducted to determine whether the functions allocated to the control room operating crew could be accomplished within' the structure of the emergencyioperating procedures and the design of the existing control room.
2.4 Assessment Phase Upon completion' of the DCRDR investigations, a review of the HEDs was conducted by the HEDAT. The review served to identify the significance of each HED, as well as to provide the review team with the opportunity to determine the appropriate actions necessary to correct the HEDs. A schedule was then developed.
2.5 Reporting Phase The following report represents the methodology, findings and conclusions from the LaSalle County Generating Station DCRDR.
The review was conducted by Commonwealth Edison Company with 2-4
, , . . .- - - - - . .- ..- - - . . - ~ ~ -. ._ -.. . . . . . . - . - -
Final Summary Report LaSalle County Station engineering support from ARD extensive human factors Maryland. Th'is report was prepeced to i
.Corporati on, columbia,
- show compliance with NUREG-0737 Supplement 1.
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Final Summary Report LaSalle County Station 3.0 MANAGEMENT AND STAFFING
.The purpose of the DCRDR was to identify and correct those features in the control room environment which were not in concert with.the safe and efficient operation of the facility.
The .DCRDR activities were implemented by experienced operations, nuclear systems and~ human factors ' engineering personnel.
The DCRDR Team ?
The LaSalle DCRDR team consisted of a group of professionals from various disciplines with the wide range of skills necessary for the performance of the design review and included:
o I&C engineering e Nuclear systems engineering e Human factors engineering e Operations This core group was' supplemented, as required. During the review, any additional . specialists (e.g.,
course of the lighting, acoustics) required for. specific tasks were made available as needed.
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Final Summary Report LaSalle County Station Before beginning the review, team members were selected and the methods and content of relevant NRC familiarized with documents, general human factors engineering _ principles and methodology. Team members were also provided with the _ oppor-tunity to familiarize themselves with the general design and operation of the plants. Any general or specific procedural
. issues were resolved at this point.
The review team members were encouraged to document dissenting regarding ~HEDs, if. appropriate. They were also opinions, facilities, personnel, necessary provided access to plant documents and information required to perform their assigned tasks.
A statement of responsibility and qualifications was provided for each team member under agreement with the NRC at the commencement of the station's DCRDR within the Commonwealth Edison system, and this statement is included in Appendix C.
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Final Summary Report LaSalle County Station 4.0 DOCUMENTATION-AND DOCUMENT CONTROL This section describes the documentation system (input / output and documentation management / control procedures documents) which CECO used to support the LaSalle'DCRDR.
From the beginning of the review, the team had at its disposal the following reference documents:
o System Lists e System Descriptions e Piping and Instrumentation Drawings (Lighting, HVAC, Acoustics, e Control Room Floor Plan etc.)
e Panel Layout Drawings e -Panel Photographs e List of Acronyms, Abbreviations e Description of Control Room Coding Conventions e Samples of Computer Printouts e Procedures (Emergency, Abnormal and Operating) e Guidelines for Procedural Development o Other Human Factors / Control Room Studies they were As additional documents were acquired or written, added'to the library.
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LaSalle County Station Final Summary Report l
4 . 11 Output Documentation In order to facilitate systematizing and recording Control Room Design Reviews, a series of standard forms was developed. The forms used. are listed below and appear in their entirety in Appendix A.
L.
o Control Room Human Engineering Discrepancy Record e Questionnaire Item Summary Form
-o Personnel Survey Summary Form o Index of Reviewed Reports Report Review Error Analysis Problem e Historical Analysi's Report e Control Room Review Task Development o Validation Review Worksheet e Sound Survey Record e Lighting Survey - Illuminance Record _fi.
e Lighting Survey - Luminance and Reflectance Record e Lighting Survey - CRT e Air Velocity Survey Record e Photographic Log Task Analysis Instrument / Control Requirement Form e
Task Analysis Controller Requirement Form j e
e Inventory Form o Controller Inventory Forn 4.2 Document Control The Commonwealth Edison Company recognized that a data collec-tion / analysis effort, such as that inherent in a DCRDR, can if managed improperly,
, generate volumes of ~ paperwork which, 4-2
-LaSalle County Station Final Summary Report loss of time and money. CECO,
-could result in a great therefore, implemented a data base management system (DBMS) to collect, update, analyze and provide the information necessary to fulfill the requirements of DCRDRs on a dedicated computer.
An example of a method used for the DCRDR DBMS is illustrated in Figure 4.1. Implementation of the DBMS minimized the number of_ manual transformation steps required in the data collection /
analysis effort. Furthermore, it afforded the DCRDR team the capability of real-time data analysis. Through the use of the DBMS parameters, any number or combination of data points was accessed and analyzed on an as-needed basis.
4.3 Data Base Management System The DBMS was implemented on CECO's Prime 750 computer using INFO /INFOTEXT.
It consists of a master program with memory storage devices to hold the data exQ2ted from various source documents. Because manual handling of data is largely elimi-nated after data is entered into the system, the DBMS greatly of efforts, document loss and errors reduced duplication resulting from unnecessary handling of data.
After the DBMS was implemented, the series of data files and
-records were created using information derived from the various source documents. Each source document contained specific forms, charts, schedules, etc., required for the DCRDR and each constituted a single data file. Data files, in turn, comprised.
the specitic parameters individual records which represent contained in the file forms, charts, etc. The file then served as a model of the document from which it was created, as well as an area in which to store data records. The source docu-ments included- those reports and forms listed previously in chapter. To avoid file damage or unauthorized data this manipulation, access to . the DBMS was restricted by liriting user training and by issuing passwords to a limited number of users.
4-3
Final Summary Report LaSalle County Station DATA BASE USER (S) SOFTWARE DATA BASE STORAGE CONFIGURATIOR user OPERATOR suB-tasks l81 117l13 l t, l, t, 11 p ,
T
- sRATOR tasks 1Ii 1 '2 I T3II4 I , , , . T.
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E SYSTEM PROCEDURES lEl lP2lP3lP4l, P, USER I3 7
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l t
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STANDARD STANDARD CUSTOM REPORT llEPORT REPORT
- 1 ft OUTPUT REPORTS & SCREENS Figure 4.1 Sample Human Factors Evaluation i Data Base System I
i 4-4
. .~ - - . .-- .
Final Summary Report LaSalle County Station 1
i T
I 5.0 INTEGRATION WITH OTHER SUPPLEMENT 1 ,
NUREG-0737 INITIATIVES Commonwealth Edison Company has an integrated program to address each of the Supplement 1 to NUREG-0737 initiatives.
- This program extends throu_ghout its system of nuclear generating stations and- has specific provisions for each
- station. This program is headed by the CECO Station Nuclear Engineering Department which provides the necessary integration and support to ensure that a systematic approach is adopted for.
the inclusion of each of the recommended design changes resulting from these initiatives. Details of this process, including schedules were provided in Commonwealth Edison's l: April 14, 1983 submittal to the NRC.
- The design of the Safety Parameter Display System (SPDS), the R.G. 1.97 based instrument displays, the development of function-oriente'd emergency operating procedures, the training
- of.the operating staff, and the DCRDR are being integrated in a manner which takes full advantage of the scheduling of each of l - these initiatives, and is being integrated with respect to the overall improvement of the operator's ability to comprehend plant conditions and cope with emergencies.
I h
e 5-1 _ _ _ _ . , _
Final-Summary. Report LaSalle County' Station 1
. Design changes will be integrated with the ~ informational data base collected as a function of the DCRDR. In addition, the' corrective action modifications resulting from the DCRDR will be evaluated for their effects on these programs. The integration of the -DCRDR and these other programs include provisions for operator ~ retraining and upgrading of operating procedures when necessary, to reflect the physical changes made in the control room.
Functions and tasks have been analyzed to determine information and ' control needs and to identify operator tasks during emer-gency operations. This analysis will be used to verify the completeness of the emergency operating procedure, and will serve as the basis for verifying the SPDS parameters.
t l
' 5-2
LaSalle County Station
-Final Summary Report 6.0 REVIEW PROCESS The DCRDR review process resulted in the identification of a number of HEDs that were eval'uated to determine the extent to affect the potential of operating crew which they could errors. Also requiring consideration were the recommendations correction that the Human Factors for. improvement or
' Specialists (HFSs) made for the discrepancies discovered in.the DCRnR investigative processes. Once the ' HEDs were evaluated and r recommended improvement (if applicable) agreed upon, most improvements will be implemented according to a schedule based on the relative significance of the HED.
6.1 Historical Event Review 6.1.1 Introduction The objective of the Historical Event Review was to investigate archival documentation of control room problems to ensure that the man-machine interface was adequate to reduce the potential for human error.
complicated tasks is a well Human error in performing documented fact and the potential for it is always present. In
-the_ nuclear power industry, human error can combine with poor to serious operational design features and contribute 6-1
1 Final Summary Report LaSalle County Station Fortunately, the industry, instances of past problems. in human performance error and equipment / design arrangement problems are documented in plant and industry records and can be - used as a data base for recommending design improvements.
This section describes the process used to review several such to identify areas of potential human performance documents problems at Commonwealth Edison Company's LaSalle Units 1 and 2.
There were- five sources of historical reports available for this review at LaSalle station. Three of the sources were in-house documentation and consisted of LaSalle Licensee Event Reports (LERs), LaSalle Deviation Reports (DVRs), and LaSalle Professional Committee Reports (PROS). The other two sources of documentation were industry-wide sources and consisted of Reports (SERs) and Significant Operating Significant Event Event Reports (SOERs). These latter two sources were NSAC/INPO team through reviewed reports available to the review Commonwealth Edison- Company. All five sources were used at LaSalle station for the Historical Event Review.
6.1.2 Methodology The following paragraphs delineate the processes used to screen, prioritize and evaluate the documents collect, identified above. 7 6.1.2.1 Collecting the Historical Reports In its archives, LaSalle station has a copy of every LER, DVR and PRO report generated at that station. An HFS reviewed each of' the above reports for LaSalle Units 1 and.2 from 1979 to 1985. In addition, every NSAC/INPO SER and SOER report from their _ beginning ~in 1979 following the accident at Three Mile Island Unit 2, until 1985, was reviewed by an HFS. The purpose 6-2
LaSalle County Station Final Summary Report to identify those reports that involved of the review was procedural and/or control board control room operator, Copies of equipment failure and/or design arrangement errors.
Over reports so identified were made for further screening.
4 130 reports'were reviewed for LaSalle station.
6.1.2.2 Screening the Historical Reports After collecting all potentially relevant reports for LaSalle screened by an HFS with the station, the reports were Subject Matter Expert (SME) and the DCRDR assistance of a report described and Coordinator, to determine if the documented a control room problem. Because this was a DCRDR, only reports applicable to the control room were retained for further analysis. Reports were considered to document a they met any one or more of the control room problem if following criteria:
e Equipment referenced (valve / pump controls, displays, indicators, etc.) must be in the physical confines of the control room.
o Procedure steps referenced must be accomplished within the physical confines of the control room.
o Personnel error referenced must have occurred in the control room on equipment contained in the control from procedures that room, or entailed a deviation were to be accomplished in the control room.
6.1.2.3 Prioritizing the Historical Reports A-detailed analysis of every report passing the collection and screening process would have been very time-consuming and of 6-3
T LaSalle County Station
- Final Summary Report dubious value. Therefore, the reports were . evaluated and categorized in priority by an HFS and an SME to allow the review team to focus the historical review effort. Reports were following criteria meeting any one or more of the considered to be high in priority:
report had either- a A) The consequences of the significant effect on plant operation, or had the potential for having a significant effect on plant operation.
1 documented personnel injury, radiation B) The report exposure in excess of Ceco limits, or had the adverse effect on public potential for significant health or safety.
C) The report documented a trip / scram, derating, or unit outage.
. D) The report documented equipment damage in excess of
$100,000.00.
Reports not meeting any of these criteria were considered to be All high-priority reports were evaluated.
low in priority.
of low-priority reports was left to> the The evaluation discretion of the DCRDR Coordinator, pending time and manpower LaSalle, no low-priority reports were constraints. At evaluated.
A total of 83 in-house reports was selected and prioritized at LaSalle. Of these, 27 were evaluated to be high in priority and 56 were evaluated to be low in pr.iority. A total of 45 non-in-house reports was selected and prioritized. All were evaluated as high in priority. Of these 45 reports, 20 were 1
_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ . _ __-.__ _ __ __._ ____ L A.
A Final Summary Report LaSalle County Station
[
p determined to be of potential applicability to Boiling Water Reactors (BWRs) 'of LaSalle's vintage, and consequently, only i
these 20 non-in-house reports were evaluated at LaSalle. ,
6.1.2.4 Report Review and Evaluation .
I A Problem Analysis Report (PAR) (Appendix A) was completed for each report investigated. The folloaing information was
~
recorded for each report:
e Investigators.' names e Station name.
e Unit (s) on which the problem occurred e DCRDR index number of the report which was assigned by the HFS e Type and number of the report involved e Effect of the incident on the unit e Problem as documented in the report e Any corrective action taken or proposed as documented in the report.
j .A copy of each report and its PAR was put in a Historical
~ Review project notebook, along with an index of all reports selected and prioritized. Though the low-priority reports were ,
put in the notebook, no PAR was completed for them unless they were investigated. The project notebook was maintained by the l
HFS. At the conclusion of the Historical Event Review phase of DCRDR, the project notebook was delivered 'to the LaSalle's DCRDR Coordinator for inclusion.in LaSalle's DCRDR records, and is available for review.
each report investigated, the HFS obtained copies of i For appropriate documentation to allow the HFS to identify the i individuals involved in the incident and the operating 6-5
4' LaSalle County Station Final Summary Report In conditions of the unit / plant at the . time of the incident.
most cases, the Shif t Engineer's log was sufficient for this In some instances, however, additional documentation, purpose. '
such as the unit log, center desk log, and/or a SCRAM-report, was collected. Any and all such documentation was placed in the project notebook with .the report and PAR to which it
' related.
A preliminary investigation was then conducted by the HFS for report. This investigation included the each high-priority interviewing of individuals associated with or familiar with each problem, and the examination of equipment and procedures associated with the problem. These investigations continued until the HFS had amassed enough data to determine whether the factors documented problem _ had been corrected from a human the perspective or not. If the problem had been corrected, investigations "yes" line on-the PAR was checked and no further were'made. If the HFS determined that the problem had not been factors perspective, and adequately addressed from a human hence was still uncorrected, the "no" line was checked and the These investigation and analysis of that problem continued.
additional investigations consisted of a more in-depth examina-tion of equipment and procedures and the interviewing of as many individuals associated with or familiar with the problem as possible.
Though interview notes were taken by the HFS, individuals were assured of complete confidentiality; consequently, these notes had When the HFS felt he 4 are not available for review.
collected enough data to determine the fundamental causes of the problem and ascertain its corrective status from a human factors perspective, the investigation of the problem ceased.
If, at this point, the HFS determined that the problem had not 6-6
7
\
LaSalle County Station
- Final Summary Report been adequately addressed and that additional human engineering corrective action could be taken to minimize the probability of Control Room Human Enqineering the ' problem ' recurring, a was completed and the HED number Discrepancy _ form (CRHED) entered in the appropriate space on the PAR.
The above process for report review and investigation dif fered slightly for the non-in-house reports. Because there were no the incidents des-individuals on-site who were involved in cribed in the reports, alternate individuals were interviewed.
-These alternates were people knowledgeable with the LaSalle systems and/or procedures involved in the incident and included operators, shift engineers, nuclear experienced reactor engineers, shift foremen and operating engineers. This was the only investigative modification made.
6.1.3 Results were investigated at of 33 reports and problems
'A. total LaSalle. As a result of the investigative process described above, seven problems were evaluated as uncorrected. and had HEDs written. These findings (HEDs) are contained in Volume 2.
6.2 Operatina Experience Review 6.2.1 Objectives survey is to obtain special, The objective of the operator pertinent knowledge that operating personnel at Commonwealth
. Edison Company's LaSalle plant possess regarding both positive room system features which they have and negativ_e control in the course of preparing for experienced and/or observed the'mselves. As one of the operations or during operations survey is DCRDR, the operator foundation processes of the 6-7
LaSalle County Station Final Summary Report information th'at will guide the human intended to provide factors specialists during subsequent investigative phases of.
(i.e., the- checklist survey, task analysis, the DCRDR; verification and validation processes). Aside from this primary function, the survey also provides an avenue for plant general information about the plant management. to gather control room design and operators' perceptions and opinions o f.
- procedures.
6.2.2 Methods 6.2.2.1 Development of the Self-Administered Questionnaire The open-ended, self-administered questionnaire was structured to address the following nine content-topic areas as suggested in NUREG-0700:
e Workspace Layout and Environment e Panel Design e Annunciator Warning System o Communications e Process Computers c
- e. Corrective and Preventive Maintenan'e
]
e procedures e Staffing and Job Design e Training prepared from a pool of survey A- draft questionnaire was The question orienta-questions asnembled for each topic area.
tion was predominantly like the critical Incident Technique to ensure that responses were as objective as possible. A . team operating, psychometric and consisting of personnel with 1
1 training expertise reviewed and evaluated the written questions.
a 6-8 . _ -
4
l LaSalle County Station Final Summary Report Items retained in the final questionnaire met the following criteria:
Simplicity - questions were direct, employed common everyday language and were as brief as possible.
Clarity - questions were unamoiguous.
Objectivity - questions were free of emotionally charged words such as good / bad, strong / weak, etc.
surveys are susceptible to social Error Free -
leniency, central tendency and halo-type desirability, errors. Retained items were those that had the minimum tendency toward these error types.
As an aid in the evaluation process, the team members used a rating scale to judge each item on each of the above criteria.
The question ratings were then averaged across the criteria to would be included in the questionnaire.
determine which Finally, the questions were sorted into topic areas to ensure that the area was sampled adequately as to item content. ARD personnel, along with operations personnel, selected the final The resulting set of items for inclusion in the questionnaire.
accompanying explanatory materials, was questionnaire, with then distributed to the operators. A copy of the distribution packet, including the questionnaire, is provided in Appendix E.
nine topic areas was posed as an Each question in the open-ended question. Operators were encouraged to describe in detail the specifics upon which their responses were based. In the cover letter, operators were reminded to consider all modes of plant operation, including start-up, hot standby, full power 6-9
r Final Summary Report LaSalle County Station to possible abnormal or and reduced power, in addition conditions. Opinions regarding both emergency operating
" problem" and beneficial design features of the control room were solicited.
Each respondent was also asked to complete a separate sheet background, level of experience and current detailing his status at LaSalle.
6.2.2.2 Distribution of the Self-Administered Questionnaire These questionnaires were distributed to eighty-seven person-a list prepared by CFCo. The participants nel, based on included non-licensed operations personnel, licensed operations personnel and licensed non-operations personnel at .the LaSalle time of distribution, the questionnaire plant. At the recipients received a briefing emphasizing major elements of the cover letter. The briefing included an explanation of the purpose, description of and instructions for the questionnaire, assurance of confidentiality, explanation of what will be done with the results, and a request to fill out the background /
were given several biographical information. The operators weeks to fill out the self-administered questionnaire and to it by mail to the Assistant Superintendent for return Operations in a self-addressed, stamped envelope that had been provided. He gave the unopened envelopes to ARD. Confiden-tiality was assured by assigning each questionnaire a number.
The list of potential respondents and corresponding numbers were kept in confidence by ARD personnel.
Analysis of Responses to the Self-Administered 6.2.2.3 Questionnaire ARD personnel logged the thirty-four questionnaires (39%) that were re*.urned and tallied the demographic information. Written 4-A@
Final Summary Report LaSalle County Station
' responses were reviewed for each question and then summarized on a Quest _ionnaire Item Summary Form (QISF). A sample of this
-form can be found in Appendix A. Responses which addressed the summary statement of the same- issue were collapsed into a concern, with an associated count of the frequency with which concern had been mentioned. An experienced Nuclear that Station Operator ~ (NSO) worked with the HFS to clarify any ambiguities associated 'af'.h the responses and the summaries.
Follow-up Work with Experienced Nuclear Station 6.2.2.4 Operator The objectives of the follow-up interviews were as follows:
e To clarify ambiguities in any written responses to the self-administered questionnaire e To gather additional details (e.g'., system or component information) pertaining to ambiguous or incomplete responses Working together, the HFS and the experienced NSO clarified the written responses on the self-administered questionnaire. The resulting responses were recorded on the appropriate QISP.
6.2.2.5 Integration of Interview Data with Self-Administered Questionnaire Responses The information compiled previously from the self-administered based on the follow-up work.
questionnaires was enhanced were resolved and, where Ambiguities noted previously appropriate, specifics such as system or component names were investigated further by the HFS to added. The items were 6-11
4 a4 LaSalle County Station Final Summary Report determine whether responses were in accordance with sound human engineering conventions and practices. Positive and negative responses which were in compliance were . designated as "Not an j HED" in the appropriate space on the QISF. Positive responses and negative responses deemed not in compliance were designated on the QISF. Some negative responses as " potential HED" I' evaluated to be in compliance were designated as " Complaints" in the appropriate space on the QISF.
6.2.2.6 Documentation for Future Reference The data gathered during the Operator Personnel Survey are being maintained by ARD in a form that will provide the review team with reference mate::ial for later phases of the CRDR. The stated HEDs were entered into a computerized DBMS and have been i
presented to the Review Team which will make the final determi-nation of whether they are to be classified as HEDs.
6.2.2.7 Biographical information i
i The biographical data information collected with the question-naires was summed and averaged by type of operator group. This provided the HFS and the review team with an indication of the demographics. of the population upon which the survey response
- data is based. This information is provided on a Personnel i Survey Summary Form (PSSF) (Figure 6.1).
I- 6.2.3 Findings The evaluation of operator comments resulted in 126 potential
.HEDs being designated as valid in the judgement of the HFS.
HEDs were written and are presented in The 126 potential Appendix B of this report. The following analysis is based on
' these potential HEDs since those finally designated as HEDs by k 1
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LaSalle County Station Final Summary Report the assessment team include input from other phases of the control room rev iew as well.
Some of those identified as potential HEDs by the operator survey are redundant with those found in other phases, such as the checklist, and have been attributed to the checklist rather than the operator survey.
Thus, in discussing the operator survey's sensitivity to human appropriate to analyze the factors issues, it seemed more initial set of potential HEDs.
An analysis of the items revealed that the largest number of potential HEDs was associated with problems room; of: additional additional displays which would be helpful in the control controls which would be helpful in the control room; systems where controls and/or displays are not grouped together as they should be; and how the layout of the control board equipment Also, a large number of can be improved for operators.
potential HEDs was found for systems in the control room which are difficult or confusing to operate, and for alarm tiles that those that give the have an inappropriate set point (i.e.,
operator either too much or too little time in which to respond to a plant problem).
number of potential HEDs was associated A slightly smaller being ineffective in with: the annunciator warning system problem; areas in the main helping operators respond to a is difficult; control room where direct voice cc.nmunica tion alarms with multiple inputs where cc.nputer printout capability tables / checklists /
is not sufficient to determine the causer status boards, etc., which could be redesigned to improve their control room involving and incidents in the usefulness; personnel for whom additional training would have been helpful.
l found for the An intermediate number of potential HEDs was room where lighting following: areas in the main control l
l 6-14
LaSalle County Station Final Summary Report' or other problems; alarm causes glare, reflections, dark areas, or main control room. which are confusing tile (s) in the information or calculations not to understand; difficult that would be provided by the process computer presently useful; incidents in which a delay in computer response to a request has detracted from or interfered with job performance; ,
any information presented on the CRTs that would be more useful l if it were presented differently; and any situations in which (e.g., fuses, bulbs, ink) was unavailable replacement equipment for corrective maintenance.
Decreasing numbers of potential HEDs were associated with other items as is shown in Appendix B.
6.3 Task Analysis 6.3.1 Method The objective of the LaSalle County DCRDR Task Analysis was to determine, to the extent practical, whether system performance instrumentation, requirements can be met by combinations of that operator and personnel to insure equipment, software performance do not exceed operator performance requirements emergency operating conditions.
capabilities under '
Specifically, the goal of the analysis was to identify and delineate the discrete tasks required to be performed by the '
control room staf f during emergency scenarios and to identify and document the instruments and controls required by the staff The to accomplish the objectives of the tasks identified. '
foundation and basis of the analysis was the BWR Owners Group EPGs.
The BWR Owners Group EPGs Rev. 3 outlines the steps necessary with to mitigate abnormal or transient symptoms associated
' 6-15
Ef n
LaSalle County Station Final Summary Report reactor control, primary and secondary containment integrity It is a generic control, as well as radioactivity release.
document that directs the operator to follow various steps in sequence and/or concurrently in a success path toward symptom unsuccessful attempts at with contingencies for mitigation symptom alleviation. Because of their comprehensiveness in of nymptoms -associated with such a wide variety outlining events and exercising all af fected system modes, the EPGs were task development.
selected as the source document for Developing task statenents f rom the EPGs takes full advantage of the multidisciplinary efforts directed towards discerning system and subsystem functions and man-machine interactions.
enhancements made in later generation In addition, system plants were taken into account during the development of the review team to take full EPGs, v n ic), enabled the DCRDR advantage of the opportunity to review functions possibly not considered when LaSalle was designed and constructed.
6.3.2 Site-Specific EPG Development At the outset of the LaSalle County DCRDR Task Analysis, SMEs and HFSs met to review the generic EPG document in order to Each make the document specific to LaSalle County station.
evaluated to identify the section of the generic EPGs was in systems that should be used to address the functions covered a given situation. In addition, site-specific- parameter set point values were inserted where required to ensure that the EPG document being developed was specific to the LaSalle County in operating specifications and limits, and to ensure that, the task analysis, the requir ed level of later stages of instrument and control precision for task accomplishment would be obtained.
Once the site-specific EPG document was developed, the process Each section of site-specific task identification was begun.
bl6
J Final Summary Report
- LaSalle County Station of the site-specific EPGs was reviewed in context by the SMEs and HFSs to identify the discrete operator actions both implied and explicitly stated for each step in the document. Operator actions were operationally defined at a level at which the .
action possessed a definite beginning and end, was accomplished by an individual, and had a single identifiable goal or Tasks defined at this level of specificity
- objective.
permitted the analysis to identify elemental or-basic operator activities, and subsequently their associated instrument and control requirements, that could. stand alone in terms of basic goal. orientation, or be combined with other elemental tasks in of~ more complex goal orientation. The entire terms 7
! site-specific EPG document was examined and all unique operator actions or tasks were identified, coded with a task number, and grouped into system task lists predicated upon a prevailing f ~
system being exercised or acted upon by the EPG. The tasks were also cross-referenced to the EPG by placing the task number next to the paragraph or EPG stateqent from which the task was derived. This created a direct link between the DCRDR J
which could be task listings and the EPG source document utilized in the task development process.
6.3.3 Task Development i
Once identified, the tasks were documented on the Control Room Review Task Development Form (a blank copy is contained in Appendix A) along with its task number. SMEs and HFSs then met to complete the form by developing each task. The first item of information documented on the form was the job title of the I individual who should perform the task together with the names developing the task. Next, the HFS of the individuals questioned the SME concerning the conditions under which the i
task could be performed. Both normal and abnormal or emergency during this process
! situations were included and documented i
--- m m
r i
LaSal'le County Station Final Summary Report the tasks were generated from the because, although' site-specific EPGs, many were at such an elemental level that they are typically performed daily, e.g., " determine reactor important to the water level". These task conditions were determined the level of analysis because they, in part, precision required in th'e task, as well as the general time criticality under which the task may be performed, especially conditions. Information was also obtained during transient concerning the f requency with which the task is performed, the 1 cues that alert the task performer that the task is to be performed, and the performance criteria and/or goal that each task sought to accomplish. This preliminary information about each task gave the HFS analysts and the SME a contextual base from which to discern the precise sequence of steps that must be performed in order to accomplish each task.
The final information collected during the task development process was the actual step-by-step listing of the action steps necessary to accomplish each task. The questioning in this phase of the process by the HFS analysts to the SMEs was from the perspective of what should be done versus that of what is done. This perspective was vital to the success of the DCRDR Task Analysis because it kept the focus off what currently exists and placed it on what should exist, thereby ensuring the objectivity of the analysis and preventing a "self-fulfilling For example, in collecting prophecy" loop f rom being entered. that the sequential step-by-step data, care was taken to ensure action steps that needed to be performed outside the control room, were in f act written as being performed f rom the control room. That is, if a valve should be operable f rom the control the action step room but currently is a locally operated valve, f
would have been written as; 'open the xxx valve", as opposed to; " dispatch an equipme it attendant to manually open the xxx In a parallel manner, non-existent annunciators were valve".
6-18
r-r~
LaSalle County Station Final Summary Report created if the HFS and SME felt they should exist, as well as positive indication of critical plant functions required, such as ampere indication on important pumps.
task development processes Both the cask identification and room via a table-top review were performed outside the control However, to ensure a comprehensive review, copies of approach. normal, abnormal and the station's Technical Specifications, up-to-date P& ids and electrical emergency procedures, schematics were made available to the HFS analysts and SMEs and were referenced on an as-needed basis.
The information obtained during the task development process After an independent was collected on task development forms.
review for completeness and accuracy by an SME who did not provide the original information, the information contained on
' entered into the DCRDR DBMS for LaSalle County the form station.
This data base was sorted by task number and proof It was then output and a completed read for data entry errors.
task development book resulted. This book contains all task statements identified and analyzed at LaSalle County station, initiating cues, frequency of to include their task conditions, and list of sequential steps
~
performance, performance criteria, for task completion. An excerpt from the book is presented in Figure 6.2.
6.3.4 Instrument and Control Requirements Following the completion of the Task Development process,task. the was collected for each instrument and control data most of the variables Unique codes were established for to facilitate data pertinent to the DCRDR Task Analysis analysis. As required, and subsequent computer collection collected for each information for the following variables was 6-19
LaSalle County Station Final Summary Report LASALLE COUNTY STATION STA. NO.- 1 JOB TITLE: NSC TASK NO. CN-12 PREPARED BY: SNE - HFS ACTION:
CONFIRM AUTO INITIATICN OF THE POST LO A HYOR0 GEN /0XYG SYSTEM TASK CON 0!TICNS: (Givens. Denials, Environment)
GROUP 2 ISCLATICN HAD OCURRE0 FREQUENCY: Once a OTHER PER EVENT INITIATING CUES: (When does the task start)
LOW RX WATER LEVEL: -50 in.
HIGH DRYWELL PRESSURE 1.69 PSIG MANUAL INITIATION OF THE S ANC/OR D INITIATION PUSHBUTTCNS (What dces the job incutent have to accomolf sh)
PERFORMANCE CRITERIA:
TO OBTAIN AN ACEGUATE ASSESSMENT OF ORYWELL HYORCGEN A CONCENTRATI0hS.
ACTION STEPS:
(Steps of what must be done to accomplish ACTIONS)
I I.00 CONFIRM THAT THE SUCTION VALVE FROM THE CRYWELL IS OPEN.
2.00 2
CONFIRM THAT THE RETURN VALVE TO THE SUPPRESSION CHAMB 3.00 3
CONFIRM THAT THE MONITCR ANALYIER LIGHT IS ILLUMINATED.
4 4.00 CSSERVE THE H2 AND 02 CONCENTRATICN TREN05.
5.00 5
RESPCND TO ANNUNCIATORS.
FLgure 6.2 6-20
F LaSalle County Station Final Summary Report not obvious, a brief of each task. Where action step description of each variable is included.
- 1. Relational Number - this was a sequential whole number used to uniquely number each task's action steps.
2.
Sequential Number - any given action step could have number was used to sub-steps. This several sequentially track those sub-steps.
3.
Label Name - what the label content should say was written here, as opposed to what the current content said.
4.
Location - where the equipment should be located.
5.
Communication With others - if an action step entailed communication with others, a code was entered for the to, e.g., an type of individual being communicated in the plant.
equipment attendant out
- 6. Display Requirements:
- a. Condition - generally used for indicator lights to denote whether it should be energized or de-energized.
- b. Color
- c. Type of Display
- d. What Measured
- e. Units of Measurement
- f. Required Range of Measurement
- g. Divisions
- h. Zone Banding Range and Color 6-21
7 LaSalle County Station ;
Final Summary Report 7 ', -Control Requirements:
- a. Type of Switch .
Eb. Type of Valve Control
- c. Type of Switch Action
- d. Names of Switch Positions
'8. Controller Requirements:
- a. Type of Controller
- b. Control Transfer Switch Type
- c. Control Transfer Switch Position
- d. Type of controller Switch Control
- e. Parameter Controlled
- f. What Measured
- g. Units of Measurement
- h. Required' Range of Measurement i.
Zone Banding Range and Color
- j. Divisions
- 9. Equipment Identification Number (EID) e.g., hand Sub-Number
- when a piece of equipment,
- 10. e.g., position control switch, had related components, the related components were given indicator lights, the same EID number as the piece of equipment they were related to and then uniquely identified via a sub-number.
related
- 11. Sub-Name - the label content which a component to a piece of equipment should have, as opposed to what its current content was.
6-22
LaSalle County Station Final Summary Report
- 12. Match - a field used to " flag" a piece of equipment did NOT whose Instrument and Control requirements match those identified in the task analysis as being .
required.
I&C data was collected on an action step-by-action step basis for each task. The HFS analysts would question the SMEsthat for each relevant variable about the characteristics which As the SMEs identified the appropriate variable should have. entered via specific codes equipment variable values, they were on the Task Analysis Instrument and control Requirements Form.
This process was accomplished in the control room,.but off to Data on the side, out of the immediate primary operating area.
variables numbered 1 tl'ough 8 were collected and recorded first.
These are the v riables that delineate the unique I&C l
requirements that a piece of equipment should possess for the Once collected, particular task action step being analyzed.
this data was compared to the characteristics of the piece of equipment that exists in the control room to accomplish the function under investigation, in order to ascertain the degree does what should exist and what of compatibility between of the piece of this point, the EID number exist. At was equipment, and any sub-number and sub-name as appropriate, entered on the I&C form. If the current characteristics inidentified of the the piece of equipment EXACTLY matched those "yes" was placed in analysis as being required, the code for the space for the variable ' match'. If any current character-istic of the piece of equipment did not exactly match that "no" was placed identified in the task analysis, the code for These compatibility in the spaca for the variable ' match'.
in the comparisons were done within the primary operating area control room. However , ef f orts were made as to minimize the time well as to be as spent in the primary operating area L 6-23
\
LaSalle County Station Final Summary Report unit operator as possible. This non-distracting to the approach permitted a preliminary verification. of availability to be accomplished concurrently . with the task analysis, and provided the DCRDR. review team with a means to independently verify the accuracy of the computer-generated results < of the comparison of the task analysis a,nd inventory data baser. It data concerning the I&C should be emphasized that the characteristics required for each action step were collected and recorded prior to any compatibility comparison in order to and objective analysis, unbiased by ensure an independent current characteristics.
Once th'e I&C requirements were identified and recorded for each was entered onto the DBMS, task's action steps, the data printed out and compared to tQe original hard copy to ensure data entry accuracy. The original.bhrd copy was retained and A blank -copy of the Task Analysis filed for future reference. found Requirements Form can be in Ins t r umen't and Control Appendix A.
6.4 control Room Inventory The objective of the control room inventory for the LaSalle a reference set of data which station was to establish identified all instrumentation, controls and equipment within displays, controls, controllers, the control room. All annunciators and other equipment on the control boards, with which the operators interact, were included in this inventory.
Based on the guidance of NUREG-0700, HFSs from ARE Corporation and NSOs from Commonwealth Edison completed an inventory of the In
' control room for Units J1 and 2 at the LaSalle station.
-order to ensure that an up-to-date inventory was generated, the approach taken was that of direct observation in the control room.
I?urRA .
LaSalle County Station Final-Summary Report Each piece of equipment on the control boards was identified by
~
the specific needs of a unique code which was developed to meet the DCRDR project. This code served to identify the sectionwas of the specific control panel in which each piece of equipment located, as well as equipment components that were functionally related. The relevant physical characteristics of each piece of . equipment, a r, they appeared from the front of the control panels, were then coded. The characteristics noted were those the which would determine, from a human factors standpoint, in monitoring and usefulness of the equipment to the operators ,
controlling the plant.
The data was stored in the computerized DBMS developed by ARD for Commonwealth Edison's DCRDRs.
6.4.1 Methods front panels, back panels and common All equipment on the The Unit 1 panels for LaSalle Unit 1 was inventoried.
2 because there are only minor
-inventory can be applied to Unit These differences have been differences between the two units. The following documented and are included with the inventory.
f i g the inventory:
. steps summarize the approach taken in per orm n 1.
The most recent set of the simulator controlcompared panel obtained. An HFS drawings was elevation their component by component, to these prints, the control room and control panels in respective noted any discrepancies on the prints.
- 2. The prints from the simulator were used because of the actual panels and their accurate reflection - of because there was already a numbering scheme imposed 6-25
LaSalle County Station Final Summary Report upon them which was tied to a data base containing station equipment piece nu'mbers and system informa- used by tion.
This data base was integrated into that the DCRDR team so that this The information would not have numbering scheme was to be collected redundantly.
that the prints and also adopted by the DCRDR team so Any changes made due to the data base.could be used.
the actual configuration of the boards were also made Any new identifi-on the prints and in the data base.
with those already cation numbers were made consistent in place.
There was a sub-identification number (Sub-ID) scheme used to designate components that were functionallyA related and did not have a number of their own.
typical example of the use of this scheme concerns a lights.
control switch and its associated indicator The control switch was assigned an EID toindicating show its location on the boards. Its relative lights were given the same EID to show assigned functionalto relationship, but a sequential number was each as a Sub-ID. The control switch had a Sub-ID of distinguish were also used to 000. Sub-numbers between points on multiple-point recorders, different and control and display components on a controller, different components on a vendor-supplied panel inset.
3.
The inventory was originally taken by video taping each c'omponent as an HFS and an NSO described items functions and positions which were not such as switch An HFS evident from simply looking at the component.
then entered the da'ta from the video tape directly Equipment was inventoried directly into the DBMS.
from the control boards when there was any question about the accuracy of the information on the video tape.
($-26
Final Summary Report LaSalle County Station
- 4. The inventory was accomplished panel. by panel. As each piece of equipment .was inventoried, it was checked off on the appropriate print.
- 5. The Inventory form (shown in Appendix A) was used to inventory - equipment other than - controllers. The data in with numerical :
fields on this form were filled codes as summarized in Appendix D. By utilizing these codes, data entry into the computerized DBMS was and consistency in terminology was facilitated achieved among the various HFSs and NSOs collecting the inventor 1 data. The following summarizes the information recorded on the inventory forms:
e The EID and SUB-NUMBER were entered on the Inventory Form for each piece of equipment.
e The LABEL name was taken verbatim from the control panel, o The SUB-NAME was used for legends on indicating lights, names of points on multi-point recorders, names of pens for dual-pen or multi-pen recorders, or. labels for components that were sub-numbered.
Detailed information about each piece of equipment (i.e., that which had been assigned a sequence or sub-number) was then entered with reference to the lists of codes in Appendix D. Some fields were appropriate for displays and others were appropriate for controls. Note (refer to the Inventory forms) that there could be multiple entries in some fields in the detailed record of information about a given piece of equipment, e The COLOR field was used for several purposes
-- to identify the color of indicating lights, targets on breaker controls, or pens on multi-pen recorders.
a 6-27
n LaSalle County Station Final Summary Report DISPLAY ' field referred to anything gauges or presents information e The TYPE OF that meters, switch position.
. other than There coulda label be onlyname oneortype a of display per detail record. Instruments that had more than one scale or point would have had these coded in separate sub-numbered records.
the parameter (s)
WHAT MEASURED referred to e physical scale was or being displayed on one collection, this continuum. In data in the display assumed or inferred from if the units were question. For instance,
" gallons per minute," flow was postulated to If more than one scale be the WHAT MEASURED. (e.g., dual-pen existed on an instrument recorder), each scale was inventoried on a record (and appropriately separate detail subnumbered).
directly to WHAT e The UNITS field related taken directly from MEASURED field, but was the scale shown on the display.
e The RANGE of a meter or gauge wasAny directly one observable from the instrument. range.
than one instrument could have more
" DIVISIONS" on the meter Any change in the range. Some scales had indicated a new multipliers generally increasing x10; the range x100; by x1000; of 10 (e.g.,
a factor Some meters conveyed this multiplier x10E3). gpm x 100). This as part of the UNITS (e.g., the boards ~ were not was one case in which The multiplier was always copied verbatim.
assumed to be associated with the RANGE.
the meter or gauge were e The DIVISIONS of the instrument.
directly observable from derived; they were were always DIVISIONS the smallest defined as the absolute valite of Any one gradation on the scale have to be read.
several different instrument could divisions.
Whenever there was a change in the number of minor scale marksinbetween the major divisions was marks, a change scale For ease of coding, divisions were indicated. no multiplier. For scales assumed to have it was only necessary to with multipliers, code the multipliers for the range fields.
w
LaSalle County Station Final Summary Report ZONE BANDING and the COLOR used for each zone e
were directly observed from the instrument.
The range marked with each color was recorded in the zone banding field and the code thefor. the color respective color was recorded in field for zone banding. ~
e TYPE OF SWITCH referred to any control except controllers.
" Shape" was the most important being con-with "what was characteristic, trolled" ranked second. Examples would be a or J-handle valve control or a pushbutton test a keylock selector control switch. There was in the only one type of switch per detail line inventory.
VALVE CONTROL referred to a specific type of This e
switch -- those that control valves.
field was valve wasused to delineate seal-in whether (valve travels or notor full open a closed) or throttleable (valve is able to be mid-position of travel). For stopped in a there were only four possible this . parameter , close, throttle open, throttle variables --
seal-in open, seal-in closed. If a switch is throttle open but has an as-is function travel full (see SWITCH ACTION), the valve will operator action, open without any further features. On the therefore having seal-in inventory, it was documented as both throttle open and seal-in open, to what a control o SWITCH ACTION referred been reposi-do after it has switch' will either stays where it is put tioned. It to its mid-positio'n (spring (as-is) or returns It is possible that one switch is return). (e.g., a . pump both as-is and spring return but control that is able normally is spring return).
to be locked "off" verbatim position POSITION was the e SWITCH labels taken from the escutcheon plate of a control. Switch functions and position names by pushbuttons were established for inventory form was knowledgeable NSOs. The than one switch designed to handle more position on one detail record.
__ 6-29 -- . _ _
LaSalle County Statior.
Final Summary Report pieces of equipment that typically
- 6. Controllers are functions. The contain both display and control controller received the EID' number and ~ all .. components were sub-numbered. A(e.g., typical controller may take two flow and pressure) to different signals the parameters and, therefore, directly control one the other indirectly.
ofThe display may show the actual demand to the parameter, or it may meter the response To inventory control-of the controlled parameter.
1ers, a Controller Inventory form was developed (see Appendix A for the form and Appendix D for codes).
The following summarizes the information collected on the Controller Inventory Form:
e TYPE OF CONTROLLER Thereferred code for to the thecontroller type of unit as a whole.
controller was entered on every detail record that was sub-numbered for the controller.
e CONTROLLER PARAMETER also referred to the controller unit as a whole. The formats were It chosen from the WHAT ME.\SURED format list.
was possible to have more than one parameter controlled. The inventory form was designed to handle this contingency.
TYPE OF CONTROL referred to a specific control on the controller. This variable was always e
sub-numbered so there was never more than one per detail line.
e For every ~ type of control there was a WHAT CONTROLLED entry. 'These were taken from and the included MEASURED list of codes WHAT level and position, parameters such as flow, o SWITCH POSITIONS were taken from the switch positions list but generally Balance, were Auto, one or of the 0-100.
following: Manual, to the These entries referred specifically control listed in TYPE OF CONTROL.
(COLOR, TYPE OF e The display characteristicsUMITS, RANGE and DISPLAY, WHAT MEASURED, synonymous with their DIVISIONS) were
~co'nterparts u in the standard inventory form.
6 6-30
g' l LaSalle County Station Final Summary Report 6.5 Verification of Equipment Availability and Suitability 6.5.1 Objective _
The objective of the DCRDR verification process was to assure that .. operator tasks can be performed in the existing control room at the LaSalle station with minimum potential for human error.
The focus was on instruments and equipment, not on The verification was
~
and knowledge.
operator skills accomplished by comparing-the operators' perceived. requirements during emergency information and control capabilities for the DCRDR task analysis, with operations derived from the equipment present in the LaSalle control room identified by the '
control room inventory.
this verification process. First it
' There were two aspects .to equipment was l
whether or not appropriate was determined available in the control room to perform each functional task Second, for equipment that required by emergency operations.
available, it was determined whether or had bee'n identified as it not the characteristics of each piece of equipment made i.e., whether it offered the operator suitable for the task, and display capab'ilities to efficiently
, sufficient control accomplish the task. The characteristics addressed were those physical aspects of the equipment that were apparent from the
-front of the control panels and which, from a human factors l . perspective, determined the equipment's usability by the plant operators.
LaSalle control room summary of the As detailed in the relevant equipment inventory, a thorough compilation of displays, controls, completed for all characteristics was the front, back and common
. controllers and annunciators- on panels at LaSalle Units 1-and 2.
6-EL
LaSalle County Station Final Summary Report with a unique The ' inventory identified each piece of equipment number, so that Equipment Identification (EID) code, the could be referenced during the-task analysis specific equipmen,t and all pertinent characteristics of each piece of equipment could be retrieved from a computerized data base.
As detailed in the summary of the LaSalle task analysis of emergency procedures, the operators' need for specific display identified at each step information or control capabilities was The tasks to be throughout sequences 'of emergency operations.
performed during emergency operations were derived from the Procedure Guidelines.
General Electric Owner 's Group Emergency tasks were implied by these The equipment requirements categorized in terms of the characteristics described for the control room inventory.
The verification process involved the collaboration of HFSs The from ARD Corporation and NSOs from the LaSalle station. .
~
. availability and suitability of appropriate emergency equipment in the task was control room to meet the needs of each of the task analysis
-judged by.SMEs, and noted by HFSs, as part the ' equipment To ensure that data collection effort.
did not place requirements determined from different tasks of equipment, the HFS, conflicting demands on specific pieces analysis, base from the task computerized data using the that had been grouped all references to each piece of equipment in consultation with the SMEs, judged to be unsuitable and, HEDs the oesirable equipment characteristics.
determined perceived to be documented the incidents where equipment was required but was unavailable or unsuitable. The HEDAT review requirements were in finally determined whether these perceived fact required, u 6-32
LaSalle County Station Final Summary Report Method _ !
6.5.2 The'following approach was used for conducting the~ verification emergency and suitability for equipment availability of operations:
- 1. After the equipment requirements for a given task were identified during the task analysis process, the SME if any, control room made a judgement as to which, used to perform that instrumentation was presently task, and whether or not t aat piece of equipment was suitable in each of its relevant characteristics.
The HFS noted on the Task Analysis Instrument / Control Requirement Form the EID number of the equipment that was available for the operator to perform each task.
If the equipment was not available, a distinctive EID number was created for it which identified Also, it as an if the piece of unavailable piece of equipment.
redundant piece was equipment was available, but a needed in another location, it was coded as unavail-able. Whether or not this piece of equipment was suitable for the task (i.e., had characteristics that matched those specified on the task analysis form for that task), was also indicated on the form in the If this needed equipment was column labeled " Match".
unavailable or unsuitable, a "no-match" was designated on this form.
digital displays, meters, recorders and For of the basis was determined on the suitability following criteria:
- Does the display provide the e What measured operator with the needed information in the form does not require mental of a parameter that m
LaSalle County Station Final Summary Report '
if the difference in transformation? (e.g.,
is needed, a delta temperature between two points separate T display would be suitable; whereas, two absolute temperature
. displays for the readings would not be suitable.)
e Units -- Do the units in which the display is correspond to that expected by the scaled operator? (e.g., temperature in degrees F) e Range -- Does the range of the available display by operator to span the range required the perform the task?
-- Do the divisions in which the e Divisions display is graded allow the operator to read the display with the level of precision required by the task? display Is tbe type of e Type of display --
if trend appropriate for the task at hand (e.g.,
information is needed, a chart recorder should be available) lights (including those that provide For indicator the operator regarding control switch feedback to suitability was implied actuation) and annunciators, by availability.
There were no separate criteria for the suitability of these types of displays.
~
For controls, suitability was determined on the basis of the following criteria:
Type of switch - Does the type of switch used e
allow the control task to be performed in an unanbiguous manner? For example, a continuously adjustable rotary switch would be unsuitable for an on-off control function.
~'*r 'm n.
I LaSalle County Station Final Summary Report Do the switch e Name of switch positions --
positions labeled on the escutcheon plate include the control function that is to be performed?
Is the type of valve e Type of valve control --
consistent with the degree of control required by ,
the operator? For example, if graded control of valve position. is required, a throttleable valve would be suitable; whereas, a seal-in valve would not be suitable, e Type of switch action -- Does the control switch to perform the control allow the operator unambiguously and in a reasonable function duration of time? For example, if the task calls for a switch to remain in the actuated position an "as-is" switch for a long . period of time, than one that spring would be more suitable returns.
controllers, suitability was determined on the For basis of the following criteria, which were applied similarly to the corresponding criteria for displays and controls listed above:
e Type of switch for the control function (s) e Range of setpoint (demand) display e Divisions of setpoint (demand) display e What measured by status (response) display e Units of status (response) display e Range of status (response) display e Divisions of status (response) display a comment was flagged as a "no match",
If the record was included which briefly described the nature of the "no match" for ease of later reference.
6-35
LaSalle County Station Final Summary Report
- 2. The EIDs of available equipment and the " match" or "no match" designation for each' task was entered as part of the task analysis data into the computerized DBMS developed by' ARD, for Commonwealth Edison's DCRDRs.
The "no matches" were then selected out of the Task Analysis DBMS and sorted by EID number. The nature of unavailable the numbers that were created for the equipment resulted in them being grouped together upon sorting. The sorting also resulted in the grouping of all the discrepancies of a single piece of equipment.
Computer printouts of these selected data were then to further investigate apparent used by the HFS discrepancies between the equipment requirements from the task analysis and the actual equipment character-istics.
- 3. Required but unavailable equipment, as identified from those records in the task analysis data base that had been given a created EID number, were evaluated first by having SMEs confirm the validity of these dis-crepancies. The HFS then documented them as HEDs.
- 4. Unsuitable equipment, as identified from those records in the task analysis data base for which "no match" had been specified, but for which an actual EID number existed, were then evaluated. "No match" records were sorted .by EID number, in order to group all of the tasks which had referenced a given piece of equipment as being unsuitable. The equipment might have been judged unsuitable for different reasons in different tasks. Moreover, conflicting requirements for a given piece of equi'pment might have been generated across to changes being tasks, implying that in. addition required in some aspect of the available equipment, a new piece of equipment might be needed.
6-36
LaSalle County Sta' tion Final Summary Report 5.
The validity of the "no mat-ch" items was confirmed by an HFS by checking the requirements specified during the actual piece of the task analysis against room. Any conflicting equipment in the control piece of equipment were requirements for a given resolved with input from SMEs. An HFS then documented the valid discrepancies as HEDs.
6.5.3 Findings Forty-eight HEDs resulted from the LaSalle verification process. These HEDs were given to the HEDAT for resolution.
missing equipment was in fact This team assessed whether Similarly, they and, if so, what was required.
required was necessary to resolve " unsuitable" determined what equipment.
6.6 Validation of control Room Functions 6.6.1 Introduction The objective of the validation review was to determine whether room operating crew the functions allocated to the control the structure of could be accomplished ef fectively within both the the established emergency procedures and the design of control room as it exists.
6.6.2 Methodology LaSalle The following paragraphs describe the processes used at used, County Station to determine the validation approach to be validation, assist with the secure operating personnel to implement the approach selected, record the data, and evaluate the data collected.
' 6-37
LaSalle County Station Final Summary Report 6.6.2.1 Determining the Validation Approach approaches to conducting a validation The_ three possible presented in the Commonwealth Edison Generic DCRDR Program Plan were available to the review team to implement at LaSalle County Station. These approaches were:
room walk-through using the appropriate a) A control procedures; run-through of a simulation of the event on a real-b) A time simulator; c) A talk-through on a control room mockup using uniform of the control room scale, architectural drawings panels.
considered to be the optimal approach to Approach "b" was implement for the LaSalle County validation. At the outset of the LaSalle County DCRDR, the DCRDR Coordinator approached the LaSalle County simulator manager at the Commonwealth Edison determine the feasibility of Production Trainino Center to using the LaSalle County simulator for the station's valida-1985 was picked to tion. The week of April 29, 1985 to May 3, conduct real-time run-through simulations.
6.6.2.2 Securing Operating Personnel After securing the simulator, the DCRDR Coordinator approached the Assistant Superintendent ~for Operations at LaSalle . County to request two reactor operators, a shift foreman and a shift I
6-38
<-- )
LaSalle County Station Final Summary Report This engineer to assist the review team with the validation. the minimal considered to be complement of personnel is staffing crew according to the station's Technical Specifica- of The Assistant Superintendent tions for operations.
Operations was also given an overview of what would be expected he agreed to and request'ed of the crews during the validation; Ilowever, provide the review team with the personnel requested. SRO in lieu of a shift engineer, he proposed providing an licensed Shift Control Room Engineer (SCRE) because he was not certain that because of the limited number of shift engineers reserved at the station, one would be available the week we had the simulator.
6.6.2.3 Validation Events The following emergency events were selected for simulation for In the estimation of operating the LaSalle County validation.
SMEs, they provided f.or the exercise of all major unit systems and every control room workstation:
e normal reactor startup e normal reactor shutdown (LOCA) e small break loss of coolant accident e large LOCA inside the drywell e medium LOCA inside the drywell e LOCA outside the drywell e inadequate core cooling:
- due to feedwater problems
- due to loss of shutdown cooling
- due to loss of recirculation flow without reactor scram (ATWS) e anticipated transient following the loss of offsite power e reactor scram 6-39
LaSalle County Station Final Summary Report 6.6.2.4 Implementing the Real-Time Simulator Run-Through Three video tape machines and color cameras were obtained for validation. In addition, a time-code the LaSalle County two generator was used on the two main cameras that tracked the This equipment reactor. operators (Unit RO and Center Desk RO).
was brought to the LaSalle simulator in Braidwood, set up and tested prior to the conduct of the validation events.
Before the validation started, the DCRDR Coordinator selected the' order of the events to be simulated from the above list and insured that up-to-date copies of the applicable LaSalle County An HFS developed a floor diagram of procedures were available. unit and numerically identified the unit workspace
. workstations. These numbers were written on pieces of paper and placed on the vertical sections of the control panels in In addition, the upper left-hand portion of each workstation.
the DCRDR Coordinator conferred with the SROs ' assisting with the validation, and the simulator operator, to devise realistic scenarios to envelope the events to be validated, to make the simulation as realistic as possible. For example',
sutveil-lances were being run when the official valid-tion event's symptoms were first introduced.
At the start of each day's validation,them the DCRDR Coordinator on the purpose and assembled all participants and briefed simulation, identified any specific objectives of the event situation, and gave the assumptions about the operating operating crew . time to review any procedures they felt a need to review.
In order to maximize realism, the crews were not informed of the specific event to be simulated; however, they Each were informed of the overall events to bea validated.
microphone with of the crew was provided with member 6-40 .
LaSalle County Station Final Summary Report sufficient cable to allow him f reedom of movement around the entire primary operating area. Finally, the operators were the event simulation, the instructed to call out, during direction of the action's actions they were taking, the to which they referred (to ,
movement, the display / indicator verify system response to the actions taken), and what that response indication is or must be before subsequent action can take place.
from the DCRDR Coordinator, all cameras, video At a signal simulator were started. One camera was recorders and the devoted to the unit operator and followed his activities.
desk operator and Another camera was devoted to the center followed his activities. Occasionally, camera assignment was switched between the two to facilitate coverage. When this was it was coordinated by the camera operators. A third
.done, camera was positioned to encompass the entire primary operating area. The cameras were operated by HFSs, technical assistants under the direction of HFSs, or the DCRDR Coordinator's assistant under the direction of an HFS.
The role of the SME narratot was assumed by the SCRE, an SRO licenced individual provided by LaSalle County station. This individual had nine years of nuclear experience, six of which were in operations. He has held his license for one year.
During the validation event, he conveyed what was transpiring, what the operators should be attempting and why, and what the operators should be anticipating. The members of the review team did not of f er ~any assistance during the event scenarios.
When, in the opinion of the DCRDR Coordinator, the crew had the simulated event, the event and successfully mitigated recordings were terminated. At the conclusion of each event, the equipment operators recorded the tape counter readings, the event recorded, the date and time, and any unusual circum-stances surrounding the event.
6-41
- . .= .- .__ - . .. - --
h_
LaSalle County Station Final Summary Repor.t i
The above process was followed for each of the events presented earlier in this summary.
To the extent possible, the personnel assigned to assist the review team with the validation were The two given. dif ferent roles to play for different events.
reactor operators who assisted the validation had seven and which, six and nine of nine years of nuclear experience, They held their RO respectively, were in nuclear operations. Foreman who The Shift
' licenses for four and eight years. exper-assisted the validation had fifteen years of nuclear He held his SRO ience, ten of which had been in operations.
license for four years.
6.6.2.5' Data Recording and Analysis The video tapes generated in the LaSalle County validation this simulation serve as the primary means of documentation for review, and are available for phase of the LaSalle County review. . Shortly after the even' simulation was coriple ted , an and analyze the data and SME met to jointly- review HFS LaSalle Copies of the applicable collected on the tapes.
County normal, abnormal and emergency procedures were available.
The review and analysis were and referenced during the review.
basis, with the HFS attending to performed on an event-by-event the control compared to the operators' performance as board / control room design utilizing the criteria identified DCRDR -Program and specified in the Commonwealth Edison Generic Plan.
The tapes were reviewed on as close to a procedural the HFS stopping the tapes step-by-step basis as possible with
.as necessary to question the SME and obtain clarification on 1
l I GM2
LaSalle County Station Final Summary Report in the opinion of the E the operator actions observed. When, HFS, an ' instance was observed in which equipment availability, suitability or location could be enhanced, or in which operator i uncertainty due to procedural ambiguity could be minimized, a documented on a validation review l suitable ~ comment was worksheet (VRW).
The comment would contain the tape number, l counter reading, event title, procedure number and step, and a This process continued
. description of the observed problem.
until each simulated event had been reviewed and analyzed.
the validation Subsequent ~ to the validation data analysic, compared to existing observation comments on the VRW were If an HED concerning the observed problem control room HEDs.
had been previously written, its number was written in the recording each comments' HED space provided on the VRW for number. If the observation represented a new discrepancy, an HED was ' generated and its number placed in the appropriate column on the VRW.
-6.6.3 Results From the analyses
' Eleven events were simulated and evaluated. found twenty-four HEDs were generated that were performed, solely during the validation. If an HED that was discovered and documented as a result of another review phase was also observed during the validation, a comment was added to the existing HED that it was also observed during the validation.
Copies of the In these cases, a duplicate HED was not written.
in Volume 2 and HEDs written from the validation are contained are kept on file at Commonwealth Edison.
6.7 Control Room Survey This survey considered the extent to which equipment and the environment in the control room are designed to accommodate 6-43
LaSalle County Station Final Summary Report such as physical size and basic human characteristics p'erceptual-motor capabi.tities.
Human Factors Specialists, in concert with experienced Common-knowledgeable of plant systems and wealth Edison personnel and equipment, and operations control room instruments personnel, observed and measured control room featurea.
and other equipment items were Instrumentation, controls engineering acceptability as components examined for human without reference to their specific uses in task performance.
Discrepancies were based on design incompatibility with human perceptual, motor, psychological or size characteristics.
Examples included controls too closely spaced for easy manipu-lation, meters with markings too small to be distinguishable at displays too high to be read.
a practical distance, and Environmenta.1 conditions were surveyed independently.
included principles or explanatory statements The guidelines followed by specific categorical or numeric statements. The procedure was to observe or measure, as required, and check statement.
compliance with each categorical or numerical The review team members conducting the checklist survey placed in the "Yes" box to indicate their initials and the date in the "No" box to compliance, or placed their initials indicate noncompliance. "Yes" was checked only if there was of the item was total compliance (i.e., only if every instance fully consistent with the provisions of the checklist).
If instance of noncompliance, the "No" box was there was any made as to where noncompliance checked and a reference occurred. A CR HED form (Appendix A) was filled out for each non-compliant item and a photograph of at least one instance of each. type of discrepancy was taken.
6-44 __
LaSalle County Station Final Summary Report 6.7.1 Human Factors Engineering Checklist for the nine Human Factors Engineering guidelines were applied topic areas listed below:
1.
Control Room Workspace addressed the- general layout, availt' ility and accessibility of operating equipment and materials; the anthropometric suitability of work-stations; coordination and separation in multi-unit rooms; availability and accessibility of control emergency equipment; and enviro.nmental factors.
Compliance with most of the workspace guidelines was determined by inspection. Certain sets of guidelines required simple measurements,. including measurements and of distance, heigh't and span; viewing angles; In addition, assessment of climate
' reach radius.
' control, lighting adequacy and the auditory environ-ment required more specialized measurements or tests of temperature, humidity and air flow; luminance and reflectance; noise and reverberation; and audibility of speech and signals. These measures are explained in section 6.7.2.
2.
Panel - Design Section addressed allocation of controls areas; grouping of and displays to preferred panel 1
cor.crols and displays; spacing, demarcation and color recognizability of individual shading to enhance components and of groupings; ordering of components within groupings; layout consistency within and among panels; and strings, clusters, or matrices of similar
' components.
E 6-45
LaSalle County Station Final Summary Report 3.
Annunciator Warning System Section addressed overall concerns such as . alarm parameter selection and set and prioritization; and points, first-out alarms design features of the auditory alert, visual alarm It was necessary to and operator response subsystem.
assess the annunciator system on both a general or control room-wide basis and a panel-by-panel basis.
Guidelines concerning such design features as auditory alert signal intensity, automatic reset after silence, were applied labeling of visual alarm tiles, etc.,
equally throughout the control room.
Compliance with many of the guidelines was determined by inspection, review of annunciator system specifica- The tions and questions asked of operating personnel.
annunciator system was tested so that its performance Assessment of could be observed.
characteristics discriminability and auditory signal audibility, localizability were based on perfcrmance tests with there was any uncertainty sound measurements where (Section 6.7.2).
Communications Section addressed auditory communica-4.
Communica-tions equipment used in the control room.
which was treated tions is a specialized topic on- a control room-wide relatively independently, basis.
Individual workstations were considered only incidentally.
- 5. Process Computer Section addressed software security (dialogue / command language, and characteristics prompting, structuring); procedures and other aids to computer use; keyboard arrangement, function controls 1
j 6-46
l J
LaSalle County Station Final Summary Report , ,
and other controls: computer response time; and design characteristics of displays and printers / printer messages. The guidelines addressed generic qualities in a manner that did not require knowledge of specific guidelines was -
uses. Compliance with most of the inspection in the control room and determined by review of software and hardware specifications. It was necessary to question control room operators or supervisors to make determinations about some of the criteria.
' Measurements were necessary to assess response times, keyboard key dimensions and separation and certain including character size and readability factors angle,- luminance contrast, separation viewing geometric distortion and resolution of CRT displays.
selection, Controls Section addressed principles of 6.
and specifications for protection and designs controls. The guidelines were different types of applied on a control room-wide basis and called for dimensions, spacing and measurements of control of displacement of key-resistance. Measurement operated controls was also included. Dimensions and were checked on the panels themselves.
spacing with different Resistance measurements were made devices depending on the type of control.
principles of displays
- 7. . Displays Section addressed including information to be displayed, usability of displayed values, readability, printing, markings and given as to design coding. Guidelines were also of displays characteristics of particular types including meters, light indicators, graphic recorders 6-47 - - - - - - - - - - - - _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ .
l .-
LaSalle County Station
~ Final Summary Report and counters.
Each display was checked for confor-After every mance tc the applicable . guidelines.
displsy had been checked, they were considered from a system perspective to assure appropriate consistenvy in labels, markings and coding.
8 '.
Labels and Location Aids _ Section addressed labeling, lettering; use of temporary location, content and labels; and use of location aids such as demarcation, color and mimics. Each label was checked for accuracy A system / panel-and conformance to guidelines. labeling oriented check was used to examine the hierarchy and consistency of terms and abbreviations used to refer to system components.
Labeling and color coding was considered from a total control room perspective to assure consistency.
9.
control-Display Integration Section addressed relative positioning of single control and display pairs and multiple controls and displays; function and sequence-of-use relationships; movement relationship and other controls and displays of compatibility of aspects which are used together. The control-display integra-tion survey was conducted panel-by-panel.
6.7.2 Environmental Measurement Pro _cedures 6.7.2.1 Sound Survey Procedures Using a control room layout drawing, locations were selected Measure-
-and marked where sound measurements were to be taken.
ments were taken at each operator position that requiredsignal. verbal a
and/or auditory discrimination of communication 6-48
LaSalle County Station Final Summary Report the center of the Measurements were made with the microphone at The microphone was located 5 ft. above the head location. the operator stands and 4 ft. above floor at positions _ where Measurement positions included:
the floor at seated positions.
e Senior reactor operator's desk e Reactor operator's desk the center of e Operator workstation or points near each panel or console the e Back panel areas requiring communication with primary operating area at grazing having an essentially flat response Microphones microphone was -placed-were used. The incidence (90") sensitive the measurement location with the vertically at element up.
noise levels (where ambient These measurements were for ambient noise without the noise is defined as background control room communications equipment).
contribution of alarms, printers or Integrated "A" weighted db(A) measurements were taken for all of the above positions. Octave measurements were also taken center frequencies from about 31.5 Hz to about and included Measure 3nents were recorded on the Sound Survey Record 8000 Hz.
(Appendix A) that specifies both location and direction.
A second set of measurements was taken for the annunciators a alarms using equipment and personnel from the CECO Operations and - Analysis. Department (OAD).
These were taken at the seated head level for the unit desk for each unit and at the cen A real-time integrating spectrum analyzer was useu co desk.
obtain the sound levels corresponding to one-third and full ith frequencies, octave bans e ao __
c LaSalle County Station Final Summary Report each location previously A set of tests was performed at described. First, the control room ambient sound levels were measured. The measurements were taken while each annunciator, Finally a corresponding to the unit location, was activated.
measurement was taken while all annunciators were activated simultaneously.
The following Section 6 checklist items were analyzed using the sound level measurements:
e Ambient Noise (6.1.5.5) e Communications (6.2.2.3, 6.2.2.5, 6.2.2.6) e Annunciator (6.3.2.1) e Computers (6.7.3.2) 6.7.2.2 Lighting Survey Procedures Using a control room layout drawing, locations were selected to be taken and marked where the illumination measurements were Readings were taken: in for normal and emergency lighting. in the front of each front panel; at operator workstations control room; and in front of each back panel.
At each position, the following were measured:
e Full AC ambient e Full DC emergency For determining the variance in illumination levels across the boards under normal lighting, measures were taken at 1-foot so intervals horizontally, intervals vertically, and 2-foot
-that a matrix of the levels across the boards was developed.
Readings were recorded on the Lighting Survey - Illuminance Record Form (Appendix A).
Final Summary Report LaSalle County Station The determination of the luminance and reflectance ratios, followed these procedures:
e The object was covered with a " perfect reflector" pad, with care taken not to block light.
e The luminance reading on the pad was taken and recorded.-
e The reflector pad was removad.
e The' luminance reading of the object was then taken and recorded.
At each panel, measurements were taken of:
e Reflectance of pad on panel e Panel background (where reflectance pad was placed) e Meter faces (with and without glare) e other display faces (with and without glare) e Lights Readings were recorded on the Lighting Survey Luminance and Reflectance Record (Appendix A).
6.7.2.3 Humidity / Temperature Procedures Humidity and temperature were measured by setting up meters in an area where they were not disturbed. The locations of the meters were marked on a control room layout drawing. Readings were taken at floor level and at 6 ft. above floor level for at
+ least a 24-hour period. The graph of the recording for the period was kept.as a permanent record.
6-51 r - - -
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7_
w l
,e LaSalle County Station Final Summary Report 6.7.2.4 Air Velocity Survey Procedures Using: a ' control ~ room layoutf ! drawing, locations were selected Measure-and' marked where air velocity readings were taken.
Measure-ments were taken at principal ~ operator workstations. standing
.ments 'were taken at an elevation of 6 ft. .for for sitting positions. Measurements positions, and at 4 ft.
were recorded on the Air Velocity Survey Record (Appendix A).
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6-52
V LaSalle County Station Final Summary Report 5
7.0 HED ASSESSMENT The assessment- of HEDs for, impact on plant safety and oper-ability was accomplished by the HED Assessment Team (HEDAT).
At-a minimum, the HEDAT consisted of the Lead Human Factors the DCRDR Coordinator, the I&C Engineers, Specialist (LHFS), (SNED) Station Engineeri[ig . Department Station Nuclear and the Station Assistant
'the Engineer or designate, Project Each member their designate.
Superintendent for Operaticns or meets or exceeds the minimum requirements committed _to in the
( Appendix 'C provides a list of all DCRDR CECO Program Plan. and and their qualifications.) The team met The participants the DCRDR process.
the HEDs generated in reviewed in regards to the relative objective was to categorize each HED importance as it. pertbins to safe and productive operation classified into of Based on team consensus, HEDs were the plant. the ' level of one of three categories (I, II or III) based question. on Three of the equipment in safety relatedness categories were identified as follows:
engineered safe-
. Category I:
Discrepancies associated' with guard systems or engineered safety features Category II:
Discrepancies associated with plant systems not included in Category I Category III:
Discrepancies falling in neither Category I or II 7-1
LaSalle County Station Final Summary Report Second, the HEDAT reviewed each HED to determine at what level of severity.each HED should be assigned within the categories, based on the following criteria:
A). Includes HEDs with documented errors, documented control-based problems or, in the judgement of the HEDAT, may have a significant impact on plant safety and/or productivity.
B) Includes HEDs which may have a moderate -influence on plant "C" category HEDs that have been performance- and any documented in' more than one phase of the DCRDR (conse-but not significantly, the quences may' delay or impact, efficient operation of the plant).
c) Includes HEDs with a relatively minimal impact on plant performance (consequence of human error will not lead to degraded plant safety system).
Level assignment-was the determining factor in the recommenda-tion to correct HEDs. The HEDs in level A should be corrected because they have been documented to have caused errors and/or The HEDs in level B or C may performance problems in the past.
or may not be corrected, depending on their relative opera-tional significance. While it is desirable from sound human engineering practices to rectify every discrepancy discerned, it is recognized that the . potential
- benefit to be gained may not offset the expected short- and long-term considerations entailed, particularly in light of the fact that these HEDs potential for impact on operating have merely a moderate performance and/or plant safety.
The ultimate responsibility for addressing tne HEDs discovered in the DCRDR process rested with the Station Operations and The DCRDRs Review Station Nuclear ' Engineering Departments.
Team performed the review, documented the results and made recommendations to the aforementioned responsible departments.
=-
7-2
._ . ~ . . . . . - -. .
LaSalle County Station
. Final. Summary Report Station Operations and Responsible representatives from- the the LHFS, the Station Nuclear Engineering Departments met' with
- I&C Engineer and - DCRDR Coordinator to review the assessed HEDs During these meetings, the LHFS land : decide which to correct. ensure .that the HED's and .the DCRDR Coor6inator worked to given proper weight in potential- for negative impact was benefit of the recommended comparison to the overall differentiated correction. Those HEDs to be corrected were be corrected. The LHFS and the DCRDR from those :not to Station Operations the assistance of the Coordinator, with Department and/or the Station Nuclear Engineering Department, have written a justification for those HEDs which warrant no The justifications are recorded in Volume 2.
further action.
The HEDs from.all phases of the DCRDR were reviewed in sequence HEDs according to the Ceco checklist guideline , organization.
assessment (PDA) were the ' preliminary design relating to evaluated first.
Differences from Program Plan The assessment process exercised for the LaSalle DCRDR. differed Edison
-from the methodology identified in the Commonwealth Program Plan. These differences described herein were a direct of several conduct result of the experience gained in the the overall review DCRDRs and were designed to facilitate
+
integrity of the assessment process was process. The maintained and each HED was _ evaluated to determine the extent to which the HED af fects the potential for operating crew error and its potential impact on safety.
reviewed and evaluated During theLAssessment, each HEDAT member operational influencing each 'HED on several . factors performance. T ae swicch to a consensus format facilitated the the impact each HED may have on practical understanding of unique performance. Each member contributed a operator.
7-3
_ ...~
_LaSalle County Station Final Summary Report perception to the HED which helped shape- the opinion of the group. In this process, each member had equal opportunity to influence the final decision on every HED. This switch also Pre-Assessment form originally negated the need for the that the human factors discussed in the program plan in component was well represented in the HEDAT.
- A further change to the program plan involved a switch from a four-tier rating to a three-tier rating. This was accomplished in the program plan to by collapsing Level A and B as described Level A, with the remaining levels moving up a notch.
1 7-4 .
, ev LaSalle County Station Final Summa'ry: Report 4
.f 8.0 HED IMPLEMENTATION t
8.1 General _
r
-In . conjunction with the assessments, the HEDAT reviewed the selected recommendations suggested corrective actionsNo and/or accepted recommendation will be for the appropriate HEDs.
E implemented until the Commonwealthcomments. Edison Company (CECd) has concerning it, and received the NRC's reactions following the submittal of each station's DCRDR final report.
regarding HED l from the NRC l
.Upon . receiving confirmation resolve the- HED corrective actions I resolutions, CECO will accordingly.
the 1)
The HEDs to be corrected will be ordered according 'to
{ priorities set forth in the- Implementation Schedule except associated - with- enhance-where noted (Figure 8.1). HEDs corrected by the procedures may be
'ments, labeling or of regardless
- first refueling outage completion of-'the category.
2 )-
Equipment necessary to correct HEDs for Prompt and - Near-
[ an HFS has reviewed
. Term Correction will be ordered af ter to ensure that the equipment
. their design- specifications fact correct the
. meets applicable ~ criteria 'and will in discrepancy.
(This assumes that the equipment is available on an "off-the-shelf" basis.)
8-1
D LaSalle County Station Final' Summary Report LEVEL _
B C A
CATEGORY First .Second**
First*
1 Second Second First 2
Second Second Second 3
Estimated refueling outage dates:
Unit One Unit Two June 1987 December 1988
- First refueling outage September 1989 May 1988
- Second refueling outage Figure 8.1. Suggested Planned Plant Refueling Outages HED Corrective Actions Impicmentation l- . .- --
o LaSalle County Station Final Summary Report ,
"special or' der" pieces of necessary For .one-of-a-kind, equipment, CECO will select a vendor and supply them with the pertinent design. specification criteria.
and/or Station Nuclear Engineering
- 3) Station Operations Departments will review the station's upcoming outage work schedules and arrange manpower and time, as necessary, to implement the corrections according to plant schedules.
- 4) The Station Operations and/or Station Nuclear Engineering Departments will deliver copies of each HED and supporting information to the DCRDR Coordinator for inclusion in the station's permanent DCRDR records file. An HFS will review and/or assist in the resolution of HEDs, as required.
- 5) Upon completion of each HED's recommended correction, the responsible department will notify the DCRDR Coordinator who, in turn, will arrange for the corrections reviewed by an HFS.
- 6) An HFS will review the correction for compliance to sound principles and verify that additional human engineering discrepancies were not created. Should the correction ' not be satisfactory,_the HFS will complete a new HED form to be assessed via the procedure set forth above.
scale, as identified in the program plan for The rating It was not supporting the assessment process, was not used.
necessary to utilize this technique' in that a consensus was reached through discussion of each of the team members.
8.2 Labeling A detailed, coordinated labeling standard has been designed ,
(Appendix F) and will be implemented for all future labels.
8-3
LaSalle County Station Final Summary Report This labeling package has been developed, based on an _ extensive Labeling review of labeling requirements in the control room.
requirements have been developed to be consistent in size and The use of labeling, as style throughout the control room. reduce needed, will- reduce the wordiness of the labeling, relationships between reading time, and enhance functional controls and displays, thereby reducing search time.
8.3- Annunciators An annunciator standard (Appendix G) has been developed and all future legends on annunciator tiles.
will be used for human Appropriate plant personnel, operations experts and closely reviewed the requirements factors specialists have placed on the plant annunciator system.
8.4 Enhancements Several enhancement techniques may be used for implementation be techniques will of corrective action. These enhancement reviewed closely by plant personnel, operations experts, and the on this review, factors specialists. Based human enhancement package will be coordinated over the entire control room so as -to ensure that all enhancement techniques will be mutually supportive of one consistent, interactive, and important to ensure that an another. This coordination is enhancement technique used in one area of the control room does not conflict with or degrade the effectiveness of enhancement techniques used in other areas of the control room.
may .be used based on the Several methods of enhancement These methods may include:
enhancement requirements review.
lines, background color shading, color codina demarcation shape coding, re-labeling (coordinated with labeling package),
re-sealing (of displays, mimics) and/or other location aids and enhancements.
%-_f
-. . . =-
LaSalle County Station Final Summary-Report Any, or all, of these methods used will. be coordinated ~on a
~ control room-wide basis, and will be implemented to conform with good human engineering principles.
8.5 Verification of Corrective Actions Corrective. Actions being implemented will be reviewed to verify This their ef fectiveness f rom a human ' engineering perspective. methods.
utilize sound human engineering verification will Verification will be performed using panel mock-ups incorpora -
consultation with operators and ting the corrective actions, reviews, and possible systems experts, human factors specialist If the result of the use- of the control room simulator.
result in verification determines that a corrective action will room operations, then the negative effec + on control a-suggested corrective action will be altered or cancelled to as be appropriate. If a corrective action is verified effective it may then be implemented in the control room.
8-5
APPENDIX A Forms Control Room Human Engineering Discrepancy Record A-la/b/c/d A-2 Questionnaire Item Summary Form A-3 Personnel Survey Summary Form A-4 Index of Reviewed Reports Historical Report Review Error Analysis Problem A-5.
Analysis Report Control Room Review Task Development A-6 A-7 -Validation Review Worksheet A-8 Sound Survey Record A-9 Lighting Survey - Illuminance Record
-A-10 Lighting Survey - Luminance and Reflectance Record A-11 Lighting Survey - CRT A-12 Air Velocity Survey Record
-A-13 Photographic Log A-14 Task Analysis Instrument / Control Requirement Form A-15 Task Analysis Controller Requirement Form A-16 Inventory Form A-37 Controller Inventory Form
.