ML20136F038
| ML20136F038 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Crane  |
| Issue date: | 12/31/1985 |
| From: | Hukill H GENERAL PUBLIC UTILITIES CORP. |
| To: | Stolz J Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation |
| References | |
| RTR-NUREG-0737, RTR-NUREG-737, TASK-2.F.2, TASK-TM 5211-85-2206, NUDOCS 8601070190 | |
| Download: ML20136F038 (26) | |
Text
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GPU Nuclear Corporation Nuclear a::erdie:r8o o
s Middletown, Pennsylvania 17057 0191 717 944 7621 TELEX 84 2386 Writer's Direct Dial Number December 31, 1985 5211-85-2206 Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation Attn:
J. F. Stolz, Chief Operating Reactors Branch No. 4 U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, D. C.
20555
Dear Mr. Stolz:
Three Mile Island Nuclear Station Unit 1 (TMI-1)
Operating License No. DPR-50 Docket No. 50-289 RCITS Design Responses (NUREG 0737 II.F.2)
In response to your questions of June 14,1983 (Enclosure 1), and September 12,1985 (Enclosure 2), enclosed please find our conpleted response which references inforation provided in GPUN letters dated January 31, 1984, and July 6,1984. The Reactor Coolant Inventory Trending System (RCITS) is installed and has been tested.
Sincerely,
. D.
ill Director, TMI-l HDH/LWH/gpa:0431 A cc:
R. Conte J. Thom Attachments
.' I
-h0 i
8 8601070190 851231 I
DR ADOCK 05000289 PDR GPU Nuclear Corporation is a subsidiary of the General Public Utilities Corporation
r Responses to NRC Questions of June 14, 1983
r Question 1.
Provide an analysis of the expected errors in the hot leg and reactor vessel head level measurements. This analysis should include not only an overall estimate of the measurement uncertainty, but estimates of each contributing factor, i.e.,
temperature of the inpulse lines, common mode pressure effects on the differential pressure transducer, and uncertainties associated with the transducer.
Explain how the individual errors are combined to give an estimate of the overall error.
Response: entitled "TMI-l RCITS Loop Error Calculation Sumnary" provides a summry of GPUN Calculation C-1101-662-5350-023 which is available for review at the GPUN Corporate Offices.
The nornal and accident errors are based upon two separate error calculations:
(1) Instrument loop errors and (2) errors due to temperature distribution in the RCS.
The instrument loop error is random error, + 13.88%
for either hot leg or vessel, which will likely be reduced as RB condTtions become less severe. The temperature error -9.6% and -9.9% (hot leg + vessel respectively), which is reduced as time elapses from reactor trip.
An estinate of the overall error could be stated as +4.28% to -23.48% and
+3.98% to -23.78% (hot leg + vessel respectively).
Question 2.
Suppose an impulse line on one hot leg was broken that would tend to drive the d/p transducer full scale. How would this condition be detected? When would a level be detected in the other leg?
Response
All four of the RCITS transmitters are set up as follows:
If the reference leg to the top of the hot leg would fail, the corresponding transmitter would fail high. These effects can only be detected by indirect means (e.g.,
leakage, nakeup).
There would be no effect on the other 3 transmitters.
Question 3.
Provide specifications for the proposed d/p transducer.
Response
Please refer to Attachnent 2.
Note that appropriate errors are described in Attachment 1.
Question 4.
Provide an analysis to show the effects of flashing or dissolved gases in the impulse lines.
Response
A.
SATURATION CONDITIONS IN THE IMPULSE LINES:
Under conditions of nornal plant operation, a simplified heat transfer analysis performed on the impulse lines of the reactor vessel and hot leg level instrunentation will show that the RCS temperature is dissipated over relatively short lengths of impulse piping.
Tne result will suggest that the thermodynamic and transport properties of Water in the impulse legs are primrily functions of the local ambient temperature. At the pressure differential transducer, the hydrostatic pressure in the high pressure and reference ports can be shown to be related to local static pressure in the RCS, the ambient temperature, and the vertical distance between each instrunent port and its corresp,nding system tap.
Consequently, under the conditions ci a SB LOCA, there is the likelihood that the first several inches of water in the hot leg level reference leg my become saturated.
Obviously, this depends on conditions in the RCS.
If the first several inches of water in that leg reach the vapor phase as the RCS pressure continues to drop, the hot leg level instrument my reflect a slightly higher level than actual.
Further saturation of water in the reference impulse leg my occur if ambient temperature reaches that value where a local value of hydrostatic pressure in the line corresponds to the saturation pressure at that temperature.
Under these conditions, the instrument my report a reading which is biased high.
Saturation conditions in the high pressure impulse line inplies large break LOCA.
(Note: The RCITS is not designed to be operational for a LBLOCA.)
B.
UNDISSOLVED / DISSOLVED GASES IN IMPULSE LINES:
In water, it can be shown that the solubility of gases are primrily a strong function of temperature.
Should any undissolved gases appear in the impulse lines, the following will be trua:
1.
The density of the entrained gas will be much less than the density of the liquid which surrounds it.
2.
A buoyant force will be imposed on the gas bubble by the surrounding water. The force will be proportional to the bubble volume and the difference in density between the two fluids.
3.
The unbalanced buoyant force '.4f11 cause the bubble to attempt to migrate toward the highest part of the inpulse line.
With regard to undissolved gas entrainment in water filled impulse lines:
1.
Entrained gas will migrate to the highest point in the inpulse line as long as its motion is not impeded.
It will not pass through horizontal legs and tends to distribute itself in the upper region along the horizontal.
2.
Entrained gas tends to become trapped in the impulse line at small radius (tight) 90* or greater departures from the vertical. The gas will generally tend to distribute itself along the bend.
Some gas nay be collected in the transmitter during a transient. _
n
-3.
The net effect of gas bubble entrainment on instrument reading during short lived pressure perturbation in the system would tena to reduce the system damping coefficient and produce an oscillatory reading around the actual due to compressibility effects of the gas. As soon as the pressure perturbations cease, the instrument should return to the correct reading '(if RCS pressure is returned to 2155 psig).
At TMI-1, the hot._ leg level and reactor vessel instrumentation will be installed with a nanual gas venting system.
Instrumentation impulse lines will be installed per specifications which require a minimum slope. Fill and
-Vent on transmitters and sensing lines that have had mintenance performed on them.or' exhibit abnornal behavior will occur as part of' the instrument naintenance program.
(Note that the transmitter sensing lines enter the bottom of.the transmitter and nake the transmitter a high point.)
Under a ' scenario of RCS LOCA where the reference impulse leg of the hot leg level instrunent is uncovered and a gas bubble is produced in that line, the undissolved gas is not expected to be a najor problem for the following reasons:.
- 1. ~ The ' system is designed and will be installed to eliminats undissolved gas as described above.
2.
If snall amounts of gas do become lodged in the inpulse lines as mentioned previously, the instrumentation should produce a reasonably accurate reading (trending).
-3.
Redundant instrumentation-(one level instrument per 1oop and two level instrunents for the RV head) allows a means of comparison.
Question 5.
Discuss the ability of the transmitters to' withstand a LOCA environment within the containment and be available for post-accident monitoring - consider the loss of the pressurizer transmitters in the TMI-2 accident in this' discussion.
Response
The pressure transmitters are Foxboro model N-E13DH which are qualified for LOCA environments.
The transmitters ability is to survive the LOCA scenario is amply demonstrated-by the transmitter qualification to the more severe accident per Attachment 2.
The pressurizer level transmitters (RCl-LT l&2-3ailey By 3B40X-and LT777
'Rosemount 11530D5 are environmentally qualified in accordance with 10CFR 50.49 as are the Foxboro-transmitters.
Question 6.
On page 6, " Temperature element will be installed in the reference leg,... to correct for water density as a function of water tempera ture.... ".
Provide an analysis of the error that would be expected both with and without' the temperature compensation.
Response
Since the TMI-l RCITS design uses temperature compensation, that is the only error analysis provided.
(See the response to Question 1.)
Question 7.
On page 7, "A ' caution' sign will be mounted by the inventory indication stating that readings are valid only when the reactor coolant pumps are idle."
Describe the location of an indication of the state of the reactor pumps with respect to the location of the inventory readouts in the control rooo.
Does " idle" mean pumps are off?
Response
As indicated in the System Design Description (Attachment 1 to our January 31, 1984 submittal) the level display will be via the plant conputer on the computer screen in the control room.
The display will indicate null display if RCPs are operating.
Idle does mean that the RC pumps are off. Therefore a caution sign will not be put up.
Question 8.
On page 8, "A ' caution' sign will be mounted by (the void fraction)... indicators stating that readings are valid only when the reactor coolant pumps are in operation."
Describe the location of an indication of the state of the reactor pumps with respect to the location of the void fraction readouts in the control room.
Response
As indicated in the System Design Description (Attachment 1 of our January 31, 1984 submittal) the void fraction display will be via the plant computer on the computer screen in the control room. The display will indicate null display when RC pumps are not operating.
Questfor.9.
On page 9, the void fraction neasurement is stated to be more important for trending than absolute accuracy.
In this case, is the trend available on a chart recorder for reference by the operator.
Response
Trending information is displayed via the plant computer as described in Attachment 1 of our letter of July 6,1984.
During nornal operation data points are plotted every 6 minutes and during accident conditions (post trip every 30 seconds).
The resultant plot displays infornation over a period of 150 minutes and is historically retrievable on tape for long term storage.
Question 10.
The analyses presented for SBLOCAs are for 0.01 square foot breaks.
Describe the range of breaks fc which the RCITS may be useful to the operator.
Specifically, what is the largest sized break for which the transient proceeds slowly enough for operator action? What is the area of a stuck open PORV?
r
Response
This reply is based upon a 10 minute estinted response time interval for the operator:
1.
To be alerted to the fact that a problem exists.
2.
To diagnose the nature of the problem as a LOCA.
3.
To decide and implement a course of action in support of the actions of plant safety systems in order to bring the plant to a safe shutdown.
RCITS my be useful to the operator for the following:
1.
With the RCS pumps running, for assessment of the thermodynamic conditions of the RCS inventory.
2.
With the RCS pumps tripped, for RCS inventory tracking; from any snall break size up to an estimted maximum break size of 0.15 f t.2, The largest estimted break size for which the transient 2
proceeds slowly enough for operator action is 0.15 f t,
In addition, the operator nay use the mixture height vs. time history for example, to calculate an order of magnitude of system leak rate.
The bore diameter of a PORY is 1.094 inches (.006525 f t.2),
Operation 11.
On page ll, "... fuel temperature rise to th6 point of fuel da nage".
Discuss the range of possible values of clad temperatures, which you consider to be indicative of fuel danage.
Response
Fuel damage is considered to occur when the fuel assembly is subjected to temperatures at which the naterial properties of the fuel could be altered so that the fuel's perfornance characteristics are degraded beyond original design parameters and thus, rendered unusable. The onset of fuel danage nay be considered to occur when the fuel cladding reaches temperatures of about 800*F. For all temperatures above this value, the fuel would have to be re-evaluated to determined usability.
Question 12.
' Discuss the ta; in the decay heat drop line from the standpoint of a single failure of a line leading to this tap.
Response
Redundancy is not compromised by having a shared tap since it is highly unlikely that the tap will fail either from plugging or breaking. Freedom from plugging is enhanced by, (1) use of stainless steel connections which preclude corrosion products
~
and, (2) absence of mechanism, such as chemical solidification of boric acid which precludes buildup of entrained material.
It is also unlikely that the tap will break because it is in a area which is physically isolated from physical damage.
It should also be pointed out that in other cases where sharing of a tap occurs in the RCS, we know of no prior experience reporting deleterious malfunctions of the shared tap.
In the unlikely event the shared tap does fail, it should be recognized that RCITS is not a Protection System initiating automatic action, but a monitoring system with adequate and redundant backup monitoring such as by core exit thermocouples for operator correlation.
Question 13.
How many of the level d/p transducers will be conducted to a single tap?
Response
As shown in Figure 1 of our July 6,1984 submittal, d/p transmitters are connected to single taps as follows:
Head Tap 2 level d/p transmitters Loop Tap 1 level d/p transmitters per loop
. Decay Heat Drop Line Tap 4 level d/p transmitter TMI-1 RCITS LOOP ERR 0" CALCULATION
SUMMARY
' 0BJECTIVE To determine the instrument loop errors for the RCITS reactor vessel level, and hot leg level that are output to the plant computer. Find the error for normal and accident conditions.
REFERENCES 1.
Nonlinear neasurerent of water and steam in a pressurized vessel. Koska &
Rednond, the Foxboro Company, Foxboro, Mass.
2.
USNRC Meno - Peter S. Kapotow 8/23/82 page A6 NUREG-0737 analytical solutions to two problems pertinent to Items II.F.1.4,5,6, a statistical treatment of deadband and hystersis errors.
ASSUMPTIONS 1.
Unless othervise stated, vendor published accuracy data includes the combined effects of linearity, hystersis, deadband, and repeatability as stated in Staniard ISA-551.1959.
2.
Unless otherwise stated vendor published accuracy data represents 3 Signa 30 values and can be converted to 2a values by multiplying by 2/3 as stated in Reference 2.
~3.
a.
Hornal Conditions are:
RC Temp. at 560*F, Ref. Leg temperatures at 100*F b.
Accident conditions are:
RC Tenp. at 650*F Ref. Leg temperatures at 250*F Radiation at 2x107 RAD TID CONCLUSIONS Reactor Vessel Level Instr. Loop Error Non accident = + 6.76% or + 9.46" level Accident = 113788% or + 17.44" level Hot Leg Level Instr. Loop Error Non accident = + 6.16% or + 40 56" level Accident = + 13788% or + 87.28% level -
1 DISCUSSION The Reactor Coolant Inventory Trending System (RCITS) provides a neans for the control room operator to monitor the water inventory in the hot leg of each primary loop and in the reactor vessel when the RC pumps are not operating.
Hot leg water. inventory is measured by a differential pressure transmitter
'with taps at the decay heat drop line and a reference leg from the vent connection at the top of the hog leg.
Reactor vessel inventory is neasured by a separate differential pressure transmitter with taps at the same decay heat
' drop line and its reference leg from the Reactor Vessel head vent line. See t
figure 1.
l Process -instrumentation is provided in an' environmentally controlled area to
. correct 'the water and steam density from pressure. This provides a more
. accurate level reasurenent than straight line approximation.
See Reference 1 for full explanation of.the nethod.
For.each loop of level indication, the process instrumentation is designed to solve the following equation:
7
.A P = hGw + (H-h) Gs-HGo
= H(Gw-Gs) + H(Gs-Go)
Solving for h from the above h=
A P-H(Gs-Go) 4 Gw-Gs where:
A P = Dif. pressure at transmitter h = Level height above bottom tap Gs = Specific gravity of steam in the vessel Gw = Specific gravity of water in the vessel Go = Specific gravity of water in ref. leg & sensing lines H = Reference leg height above bottom tap where H = 600" for-hot legs H =.140" for Rx vessel Figure 2 provides a flow diagram of the process instrumentation for one of the two redundant instrunent loops.
Error calculations are referenced to Figure 2.
The loop error is derived as the two signa (2a) standard deviation, and is calculated using the statistical technique of finding the square root of. the sum of the. square of each of the random variable errors, each expressed at the 2 ovalue.
The error of.each module changes with the gain of the next module in the instrument loop.
Therefore, the gain of each module is included in the calculation. Error values for each nodule are related to the span of the module output, 'therefore some method is required to relate all individual errors to the final loop output which is in ' inches of level'. This is acconplished by expressing all input & output values in voltage, normalized
. between 0 & 10V a; O to 10.
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ELECTRONIC PRESSURE TRANSMITTERS These transmitters measure absolute pressure, gauge pressure, or differential 2 wire transmitters that have been type tested for applica Plants per IEEE 3231974 and 3441975 requirements. radiation OPERATING CONDITIONS influence Reference Operating Normal Operating Conditions Amt ent Temcerature Conditions Limits (OsE)
Operative Limits (Teoworks with AMDhfer) 24 :2*C (DsE) 0 ana 80*C
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Process Terr :erature (32 and 180*F)
-18 and - 216*C o 24 22*C (0 and 420'F) l 0 arc 80*C r 75 : 3*F)
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Amorent Pressure NoLet 101 *Pa (t4 7 csi)
No L m t iArmesenenc; 94 and 108 APa 42CApa Veerat,on anc Seismic (13 7 and 15 7 csi) i60 csa
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(see F:qure 2) vor gi 1 Rad!ation Rate fGamma) 0 to 90* tilt in any clar's Negng ble No Let Total integratec Dose (710) 0 2 rad!h 3 x '06 racin e>
(Gamma Air Ecurvaient)
Negng;o,e 3 5 x 108 rad 2 0 x tca raam
+LOCA peax is 216'C (420*F) for a 3-min te curar:on. and ? 76'C (350'F) for a 10-m'n t u
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- Acc cent cose rate rs 3 x too rad'n 'or 2 nours tnen ' x 'Ce racin test crofde.
'c'TIO r ciudes 15 x tca rad acc cent cosage clus 0.3 x Margin also meiuced in 710.
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FREQUENCY, Hz Figure 1.
Figure 2.
SUPPLY VELTACE AND EXTERNAL LOAD LOOP R The Supply voltage limits are Shown in Figure 3 for both LOCA and non LOCA a voltage. the hmits of the transmitter external 1000 resistance are Set TO Cetermine th a ions. However, for a given Sucoly i
Series resistance Of each Component
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traasm;tter eth uncton box has 10 onm resistarace for tre t
to to 50 mA vers:en. or 25 onm for resistance for Me 4 to 20 version rnA 4 TO 20 mA OUTPUT 1500 to TO 50 mA OUTPUT
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u ame.ent. Transm tte s oo*ereo av a secarate power sucoiy and not frorn a system moaconcations Area C
- Ooerstme Area requiremeats ter non LOCA,HEL8 accocattons of transmitters un to cute. %mm m loco resistance 800 G.
u ters powered tnru a svitem moo +e usmg a f ete Dus supply er otP (180*F) amoient. Transmit-Output Components N 2 Al 12V ro N-2Al 13V Converters. Loco resistances set ber system I/O component.
y 40o0 configuration intamally an the Area D - Operating Ares roouirements for ron LOCA/MEL8 and LOC ambient. Transmitters oc*erto teu a system module using a field Out supply or other system scurce R SPEC 200 System inout:Ourout Comoonents N 2Al 12V and N 2Al 43V Co AreeE n erters as en Area C.
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FUNCTIONAL SPECIFICATISNS N-E130L, DE and DH Series Differential Pressure Transmitters Spen. R nge, and Maalmum Static Pressure Sensor Transmitter Code Maximum Sean Umits Series (Caosule) kPa AP l inh 0 aP Ranae Limits'ai Static 3
kPa AP Presaure mH 0 AP MPs psia N-E f 3DH M
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'a Nonzero caseo ranges reawre cct oral zero e evation suceression mt Uccer and lowe nceec rarge ornts PERFORMANCE SPECIFICATIONS Sensor Span Between Performancem at Reference Operating Conditions Transmitter Code kPa
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.'c Aecrocuc:cmty 'ectoces e"ects of rysteres s receatacihty. ceac OL *n crever s 'arger DBE PERFORMANCE SPECIFICATION (Output snifts are in cercent of scan)
Max. Output Shift,
% of Calibrated Span Normal Radiation at USL _See Note A TID 3.5 x 10' rac (gamma)
Accident Radiation
=05 2 0.5 TID 2.0 x 10* rac # gamma).
(inc:uces 0.3 x 104 rac gamma ecurvalent 'or teta TIO
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Seismic (Refer to Figures t and 2. OBE anc SSE Resocnse Scectrums Dunng OBE's and SSE s After OBE's and SSE's 25 25 LOCAlHEL8 ISee Figure 5 arc Note 8)
- 1
- 1 First 3 hours3.472222e-5 days <br />8.333333e-4 hours <br />4.960317e-6 weeks <br />1.1415e-6 months <br /> of Test Profile From 3 hours3.472222e-5 days <br />8.333333e-4 hours <br />4.960317e-6 weeks <br />1.1415e-6 months <br /> to 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> of Test Profile 23
- S From 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> to 30 days 22
- 6 (30 cays at 176'F = 1 year at 120*F)
- t
- 3 Notes:
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50 inh O cr 12 kPa 2
H 200 inh O or 50 kPa A more accurate analysis. casec ucot'scecific acchcations (or for scans 2
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PHYSICAL SPECIFICATIONS
~
. Enclosure Classification Meets IEC (P65 and orovides the environmental protection of NEMA Type 4 With Cast iron l
Topworks(e.ca With AluminumR Topworks Cover and Base Material Transmitter Topworg,,,ei Code I Cast iron per ASTM A48-64. Class 30. with ga gg Ib (
kg l
lb Amercoat 66 finish.
Code A Low copper aluminum ahoy with vinyt paint
[ N-E130H
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18 f
39 finish.
55 Application The aluminum cover and base meet the same requirements as tne nuclear transmitter with cast iron cover and base for seismic, radiation. aging, and LOCA/HELB. except where chemical sprays are present Instrument Mounting Mountmg is on a vertical or hor-izontal DN 50 or 2 in cice. or en a surface A set of carts 1ctiunally available for this curDose. The N-E11GH h is
'a Wnen oct'onal cast iron. nonindicating sect:en tures section for mounting selection.ever. can not be surface-mounted Aefer to ac12.3 arg (5 :01 to total mas
. ow,
""U'"#'"*'"'*'""s aca 0 9 kg (1810) to total mass'"O'catng snet.on tax.s used.
Bottomworks Materials Refer to table below
- c.4,so aca 3 0 kg(6 7ib) ween co Approximate Mass Refer to adjacent tacle.
racket (3 0 :t) witn N-Et tGH. and aco 3 4 kg (7 5 ib)
N-E t TAM. N-E f 3OL N-E13DM. and N-E t30H with N-E t 1 AL s
71 Sottomworks i
Part Description N-E13DH Boav Bolts Bocy 316 ss ~
Process Connector 3t6 ss sensor 3 6 ss Lower Force Bar l'6 ss Force Bar Oiacnragme Cuh ailev
_ Process Conrec!cr Gasset3*6 ss Sensor Gasnet 3*.6 ss -
Force Bar Gasket SJcc*e a
Eiastcmer J
n
.a All asteriskea mater ais are acacrocess wettec All otrers hStec raate ciTre force car c,acreagm s r= ace trem a coca t.niewe! enrom r als are crocess wettec ium ailey STANDARD PROCEDURES, TESTS. AND CERTIFICATES Standard Procedures Design Control in accordance witn ANSI N45 2 and Standard Tests and Certificates Code of Federal Regulation 10CFP50. Accendix B.
Nuclear Cleaning To 1 com chtcrrde content Certif.
Quality Assurance Program in accoroance with cate (Form 7221)is crovided.
i ANSIN45.2andCodeof FeceralRegu'ation 10CFR50 Hydrostatic Test At 150% of rated cressure. Cert.fi-Apoendix 8.
cate (Form 7220)is provided.
Qualification Program Class IE Per IEEE 3231974 Calibration Certificate (Form 3759)is crovided Nuclear Classification Coce is CS-N/ SAC.344 1975.
Certificate of Compliance andIEEE Class lE (Safety rela ed: to lEEE 3231974. lEEE 344-Class il Per IEEE only). Nuclear Classification Ccce is CS-N/SRO-3441975 (Structural integnty 1975, and NUREG 0588 (Cat.1] Dec 1979) Form 4129CS-N/SRC is crovided.
Class 11 (Structuralintegnty: to IEEE 344 1975.) Form 4129CS-N-SRD is proviced.
4
Type Test Reports Type test recorts (user documents),
supporting ouahtication of thes0 transmittIrs to IEEE Trmw Standards 323 1974 and 344 1975 (aging, seismic. LOCA, aseest Nummer series user Documents and radiation), are available on an as needed basis. They N-Ef 30H-HA. Hl. IA. and il
- 1. COAACf o.
are not routinely orovided with every transmitter. Tne ad-jacent table hsts transmitter models covered Dy the ao-fr'e' m$.E to's orcoriate user documents-2 OOAAC11 Test Recort 3 GCAACt2.
S.mriarity Occament I
DESIGN QUALIFICATION These transmitters nave ceen designed to meet the re-cuirements of acchcacie Product Quahfication Stan-cards The acchcacie standarcs crovice tr e methodology for proving device cerformance uncer generic environ-ments as estachshed in the Foxcoro Transmitter Quahfi-cation Program (OOAAC10). This includes Design Basis Event (DBE) environments. User documents. supporting the cuahflCat)Cn tests. are avallacle as recuired.
MODEL CODES Model Code: N-E13DN Series Transmitters
'N-E13DH = Nuclear Efectrorhc Differen'hal Pressure Transmitter Outout Signai nge i
-H = 10 to 50 mA. 60 to 95 V de
-1 = 4 to 20 mA. 25 to 42 V de Base and Cover Materral I = Cast Iron IFor caustic scray environment)
A = Aluminum Senser Code-Scan L e its M = 5 anc 51 <Pa AP (20 anc 205 inh O AP) 2 H = 5 and 210 kPa AP (200 and 850 inh O AP) 2 Process Ccnrect: ens 0 = None 180cy taccea for 1/4 NPT) 1 = 1/4 NPT 2 = 1/2 NPT 3 = R 1/4 4 = R 1/2 5 = Machinea to accect 9/1618 Amirc3 fitting
Response to NRC Questions of September 12, 1985
Question 1:
Provide an analysis of the expected errors in the hog leg and reactor vessel head level measurements. This analysis should include not only an overall estimate of the measurement uncertainty, but estimates of each contributing factor, i.e.,
temperature of the inpulse lines, common mode pressure effects on the differential pressure transducer, and uncertainties associated with the transducer.
Explain how the individual errors are combined to give an estimate of the overall error.
(This is a repeat question described in the June 14,1983 NRC to GPUN letter).
Response: of the enclosure entitled "TMI-l RCITS Loop Error Calculation Sumery" provides a summary of GPUN Calculation C-1101 -662-5350-023 which is available for review at the GPUN Corporate Offices.
The norm 1 and accident errors are based upon two separate error calculations:
(1) Instrument loop errors and (?) errors due to temperature distribution in the RCS. The instrument loop error is random error, + 13.88%
for either hot leg or vessel, which will likely be reduced as RB conditions become less severe. The temperature error -9.6% and -9.9% (hot leg + vessel respectively), which is reduced as time elapses from reactor trip.
An estimte of the overall error could be stated as +4.28% to -23.48% and
+3.98% to -23.78% (hot leg + vessel respectively).
Question 2:
The Reactor Coolant Inventory Trending System with no pump running as described appears to satisfy the requirements of NUREG-0737 II.F.2 with regard to qualification, redundant trains, etc., including redundant displays on two computers, except for a common mitiplexer between the instrument trains and the two computers.
Earlier submittals suggest that the reliability of the mltiplexer was being investigated, but we have seen no data or justification for this common link.
Since Technical Specifications will require that at least one complete train be operable, the mitiplexer could become a critical component requiring plant shutdown if it should fail.
Therefore, provide the results of the investigation on the reliability of the multiplexer and justify this common link or provide an upgrading plan for the multiplexer to meet the single failure criterion specified in Appendix B of NUREG-0737.
Response
In order to clarify som apparent misunderstandings concerning the display system for the RCITS see Figure I for details.
As noted in Figure I the void fraction signal from the RCP's is fed into one of a number of cabinets which mkes up the transient monitor portion of the multiplexer. Void fraction can only be calculated in the Mod Comp Computer and not the Bailey. Therefore, this portion of the system is not redundant nor could it be mde such with the existing computer system.
-u Although new computers for TMI-l are under consideration, there is no justification for installing new computer simply for this instrument which is used for a beyond-design-basis-event and is only used when RCP's are operating.
Since saturation margin below 25*F is the trigger for turning off the RCP's, and once the RCP's are' turned off the void fraction is useless; redundancy is not required.
This same argument holds true for the 855 multiplexer interface switch which is also not redunda nt. - Note too that signals in the Mod Comp Computer cannot-be displayed through the Bailey Computer displays. For the RV head and the hot legs level -indication signals enter a separate section of the Bailey 855 multiplexer and are displayed through the Bailey or Mod Comp Computers.
In this case, the computer acts as merely a display device. Again the 855 multiplexer interface rennins the common couponent.
However, no significant problems in the operation of this component has been experienced at TMI-1. Although recorders could be installed for level in the control room, they could
- not be displayed on the main console and would be relegated to a position on a back panel which could not be easily. read from the control room operators work station.
GPUN has investigated the reliability of the Bailey and the Mod Corp Computers. Because TMI-l has not operated in 6-1/2 years and the data prior to that was incomplete, no neaningful reliability data was obtained.
Concerning Technical Specifications, GPUN does not intend to use the model standardized Tech Specs but rather an integrated Tech Spec for the inadequate core cooling instrumentation.
In this way failure of a single conponent would not, of necessity, result in the inability to monitor an inadequate core cooling
- situa tion.
Question 3:
Provide.a block diagram of the final ICCI system from sensors to the display system.
Response
See Figures 2, 3 and 4 attached.
Question 4:
Describe the current. status of the final ICCI system with respect to conformance with the design requirenents of NUREG-0737. Item II.F.2, identify any as-built deviations of the system from your previous design descriptions, and provide the-implementation Letter Report (described in Enclosure 2).
Response
The RCITS is fully described in GPUN submittals dated March 10, 1983 (5211-83-071), Ja nuary 31,1984 (5211-83-379), July 6, 1984 (5211-84-2173) and February 6, 1985 (5211-85-2026).
Additionally, conpliance with the requirements of this system with respect to RG 1.97 is described in GPUN letter dated r--
October 1, 1984 (5211-84-2252).
The principle deviations are the common taps for RV Head and the DH drop line; RCP motor power is not 1E and the display system which cannot be proven to have 99% availability for the liquid level display due to lack of recent operational data. These deviations have been addressed in the reference submittals.
The Implenentation Letter Report will be provided in February, 1986 The RCITS has been installed, tested, and calibrated.
Test results are available at the site for review. The system, in general, performs as designed.
Procedure changes have been made which incorporate the RCITS, and operators have been trained in the operation of this system.
ICC Tech Specs are currently under developnent.
Question 5:
Provide a detailed description of the upgraded CET system and SMM.
Response
The extent of the upgrade for the Saturation Margin Monitor (Siti) included replacenent of the existing temperature sensors with qualified sensors and assuring independence from the ICS.
Additionally, the saturation margin digital indicator was seismically qualified by test.
The extent of the upgrade for the Backup Insure Readout System was to demonstrate environnental and seisnne qualification of the system. Additionally, a seismically qualified digital indicator has replaced the original indicator.
GPUN Letters:
02/02/82 (82-007) 12/22/83 (83-369) 05/31/84 (84-2125) 04/12/65 (85-2072) 05/21/85 (85-2100) 06/28/85 (85-2121) l i
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