ML20073M631

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Forwards Draft Question Response Changes & Draft Text Changes to FSAR Resulting from 830330 Meeting W/Auxiliary Sys Branch.Encl Changes Will Be Incorporated Into FSAR
ML20073M631
Person / Time
Site: Limerick  Constellation icon.png
Issue date: 04/19/1983
From: Bradley E
PECO ENERGY CO., (FORMERLY PHILADELPHIA ELECTRIC
To: Schwencer A
Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
References
NUDOCS 8304220162
Download: ML20073M631 (27)
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PHILADELPHIA ELECTRIC COMPANY 2301 M ARKET STREET P.O. BOX 8699 PHILADELPHI A. PA.19101 l

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CDW ARD G. B AU ER, JR. ,

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DON ALD BLANKEN EUDOLPH A. CHILLEMB April 19, 1983 ff. C. KIRK M ALL T. H. M AHER CORNELL PAUL AUERBACH assesvant essen A6 counssk CDW ARD J. CULLEN, J R.

THOM AS H. MILLER. J R.

IR EME A. McKENN A asses? Aser c.umssk Mr. A. Schwencer, Chief Licensing Branch No. 2 Division of Licensing U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Camission Washington, D.C. 20555

Subject:

Limerick Generating Station, Units 1 and 2 Request for Information fran the Power Systems Branch

Reference:

Meeting between Auxiliary Systens Branch and Philadelphia Electric Carpany on March 30, 1983 File: GOVT l-1 NFC)

Dear Mr. Schwencer:

The attached documents are draft question response changes and draft text changes to the FSAR resulting fran the discussions with Mr. Jchn Ridge'ly, Auxiliary Systens Branch reviewer, at the referenced meeting.

The attached changes will be formally incorporated into the FSAR revision scheduled for May, 1983.

Sincerely, f fEugene . adley JfR/gra/Z-1 86M cc: See Attached Service List 8304220162 830419 DR ADOCK 05000352 PDR

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.cc: Judge. Lawrence Brenner (w/o enclosure)

Judge Richard F. Cole (w/o enclosure)

Judge Peter A. Morris (w/o enclosure)

Troy B. Conner, Jr., Esq. (w/o enclosure)

Ann P. Hodgdon (w/o enclosure)

Mr. Frank R.1%2teno (w/o enclosure)

Mr. Robert L.. Anthony (w/o enclosure)

Mr. Marvin I. Irwis (w/o enclosure)

Judith A. Dorsey, Esq. (w/o enclosure)

Charles W. Elliott, Esq. (w/o enclosure)

Mr. Alan J. Nogee (w/o enclosure)

Thmas Y. Au, Esq. (w/o enclosure)

Mr. Thcmas Gerusky .

(w/o enclosure)

Director, Pennsylvania Drergency Managment Agency (w/o enclosure)

Mr. Steven P. Hershey (w/o enclosure)

James M. Neill, Esq. (w/o enclosure)

Donald S. Bronstein, Esq. (w/o enclosure)

Mr. Joseph H. White, III (w/c enclosure)

Walter W. Cohen, Esq. (w/o enclosure)

Robert J. Sugarman, Esq. (w/o enclosure)

Rodney D. Johnson (w/o enclosure)

Atmic Safety and Licensing Appeal Board (w/o enclosure)

Atcmic Safety and Licensing Board Panel (w/o enclosure)

. Docket and-Service Section (w/o enclosure)

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- OUESTION 410.13 (Section 3.5.2)

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The FSAR states that all safety-related structures, systems and components as listed in Table 3.2-1 were reviewed for missile protection yet only those items listed in Table 3.5-7 were provided protection. Discuss why only the items listed in FSAR Table 3.5-7 are required to be tornado missile protected in terms of safe shutdown of the plant.

RESPONSE .

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gpESTION 410.15 (Section 3.5.2)

FSAR Table 3.5-7 indicates the emergency service water and RHR

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water piping is missile protected by virtue of beingP piping, the distance from the top of the pipe to grade, a that this amount of protection is adequate.

RESPONSE

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The emergency service water and RHR service water piping located within the yard area are installed underground with adequate cover for missile protection.

The physical routing of the piping and typical profiles showing soil cover and installation details are shown in Figure 2.5-37.

The cementitious backfill for pipe bedding is shown in FigureThis bac 2.5-37, Sheet 1, detail 3.for Category I piping to provide additional missile The properties of cementitious backfill are defined in Section 7

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A detailed assessment of soil cover for Category I yard piping shows a minimum depth of 4 feet, with most soil coveringsThe 4-f exceeding 6 feet.

tornado missiles (Table 3.5-4) in accordance with the criteria set forth in " Depth Predication for Earth-Penetrating Projectiles",

P. 6558, May 1969. Soil 3{ Mechanics and Foundation Division, A h 4w b &f~defL$f M M f % E te

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LGS FSAR QUESTION 410.29 (Section 9.1.1)-

Specify the maximum uplift force of the auxiliary hoist of the reactor enclosure crane. -If this force is greater than 4000 pounds, (the design maximum uplift force of the racks) describe the method (s)-that will be employed to limit the force to less than 4000 pounds so that possible damage to the racks will be prevented.

RESPONSE

The auxiliary hoist of the reactor enclosure crane has a maximum uplift force in excess of 4000 pounds. However, the auxiliary hoist is not used for fuel handl'ing; t'!: ' = td= '

  • performed by the hoists on the refueling platf rm. The hoists have an uplift limit of 1200 pounds or less; therefore, possible damage to the racks is precluded. t t

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.w-LGS FSAR QUESTION 410.39 (Section 9.1.3)

FSAR Figure 9.1-3 shows valve number 1007 as a 10" seismic Category I, normally open, manual isolation valve. This valve is connected to the non-seismic Category I spent fuel pool cooling system. In order to maintain cooling of the spent fuel pool following a seismic event, i t appears necessary to manually close valve 1007 and open valve 1006. Provide a discussion of the environmental conditions associated with the pipe break in the nonseismic Category I line with respect to personnel access to close valve 1007 and open valve 1006 (to the RHR), the effect of internal flooding until the pipe is isolated and the effect on pool cooling during the time necessary to accomplish the valve operations.

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714 Iriaxim~um"ter.perature (1500F) and pressure (31 psig) of tne water in the line are not high enough to significantly affect the temperature, pressure, or humidity conditions in the room (the room is open at the top to the reactor enclosure access area at

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LGS FSAR QUESTION 410.41 (Section 9.1.3)

Assuming a moderate energy leakage crack in the common spent fuel pool cooling pump discharge line with the reactor at full power, provide the time required to re-initiate cooling via the RHR cooling system and the maximum spent fuel pool water temperature attained during that time. Verify that the reactor will be in cold shutdown prior to dedication of the RHR to cool the spent ,a fuel.

RESPONSE P i

As stated in Section 9.1.3.2.3, administrative contro;.s prevent the use of the RHR system intertie to cool the spent fuel pool unless the associated reactor is shutdown. As discussed in Section 9.1.3.6, if the fuel pool heat exchangers are not available, the water in the spent fuel pool could start boiling before cooling can be re-initiated via the RHR system This conservatively assumes that it would take 20 hours2.314815e-4 days <br />0.00556 hours <br />3.306878e-5 weeks <br />7.61e-6 months <br /> tolshut-down tho reacMr, realign valves, adjust the spent fuel ' pool weir, and install the interconnecting piping between the RHR system and the fuel pool cooling system (Section 5.4.7.1.1). If boiling does occur and the RHR intertie is not available, makeup water will be supplied to the pool as described in Section 9.1.3.2.3.

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OUESTION 410.43 (Section 9.1.4) O:= RAFT The FSAR states t' ' is a " removable stop that jams the hoist cable against some part of the platform structure to prevent hoisting on the refueling platform telescoping grapple." For this two-blocking event, verify that should a fuel bundle drop (load drop) occur as a result, the effects will be less than for the design basis fuel drop accident.

RESPONSE NDN N }

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LGS FSAR QUESTION 410.49 (Section 9.2.2)

Assuming the loss of either loop A.and loop B of the emergency service water system, verify that the redundant loop can provide adequate cooling for both units.

RESPONSE

SRP 9.2.2, paragraph II.3.b, requires sufficient component redundancy so that safety functions can be performed assuming a M, single active component failure coincident with the loss of offsite power.  % fg* Q bagQM gg ThisisaddressedinSection9.2.2.1.d.,Mosingleactivefailure coincident with loss of offsite power can cause the loss of either loop A or loop B. Table 9.2-4 has been changed to clarify this.

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""- DRAFT OUESTION 410.51 (Section 9.2.2) ,

i Provide the design and the minimum ESW system heat transfer rate and flow requirements, by component, for normal plant operation and accidents. Specify the designed allowable component operational degradation (e.g., pump leakage) and describe the q

procedures that will be followed to detect and correct these i

conditions when they become excessive.

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RESPONSE

The ESW system is not required for normal plant operation except 0

during testing of the standby diesel generators. Table 9.2-3

[ provides the flow rates required for components in both ESW loops g

during a loss of offsite power condition or a design basis 4

x accident. Table 9.2-3 has been changed to provide the heat The heat transferfactor ratesforforeach transfer ratqs by component. The fouling

essential components do not vary.

component is typ c y 0.002 he fta oF/ Btu. g ppig g g

} Credible pump leakage rategjwould be of no consequence because As stated

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in Section 9.2. .2, a significant difference between the 4alet I

ggk,TsuMet flow}4R the control each ESW room.+9If loop the lead is recorded cooler'in any pumpand annunciated in compartment F'~ degrades to the point that room temperatures exceed desired In the levels, the redundant cooler will automatically start.

event that both coolers degrade to the point that the compartments cannot be effectively cooled, high compartment Operator

." temperature will be annunciated in the control room.

corrective actions could entail cooler repair, switching to the use of ECCS equipment located in another compartment, and/or opening compartment doors to facilitate cooling by natural circulation.

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1' 00ESTION 410.54 (Section 9.2.2) ~

! The FSAR is not clear with respect to the protection of the emergency service water system from natural phenomena. Verify 1 that the spray pond pumphouse, which houses the emergency service . ,

water pumps, provides protection against the effects of tornadoes ,

and tornado generated missiles. l l

RESPONSE

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LGS FSAR QUESTION 410.58 (Section 9.2.2) RAr'T

, We require in accordance with GDC 64 and SRP Section 9.2.2 that t the emergency service water system have the capability to detect and control leakage of radioactive material contamination into and out of the system. Commit to provide such a leakag'e control and detection system and provide a revised FSAR figure (s) to show the radiation monitors and the one manual and the one one manual

, and one automatic isolation valve in series per line, as per the Standard Review Plan.

RESPONSE .

io OO dOracge, 99 eA dn "RYl9 h eh edr. N .w y a w d LeakageofradioachivematerialisdetectedviarKdiation monitoring systemskin the combined ESW/RHRSW system return lines s shown on Figure 9.2-3 and described in Section 9.2.2.2.

ection 9.2.2.2 has been changed to provide information on leakage control capacity. These leakage control provisions satisfy th,e requirements of GDC 64 and SRP Section 9.2.2.

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. g5 TION 410.70 (Section 9.2.6)

Provide the basis for concluding that the design temperature for tha ESW and RHRSW will not be exceeded using only tornado and tornado r.issile protected structures, systems and components.

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., Response .

As described in Section 9.2.6,the Ultimate Heat Sink for IES is an excavated spray pond with a surface area of 9.6 acres. Four spray networks, each having 501 capacity for shutdown of two units,are provided.

Details of the spray pond excavatico and finished grading are shown in Figures 3.8-55, 56, 57. 2e general arrangernent of the spray pond, spray networks, and spray pond punp structure is shown in Figure 9.2-6.

S e layout of the spray networks is shown in Figure 9.2-7.

As discussed in Section 3.5.1.4, all essential structures, systems, and caponents related to the ESW systs, RHRSW systs, and the UPS are protected frm, the effects of tornadoes and tornado missiles. protection of the spray networks is provided by location of the network piping and sprays below the surrounding grade and by physical separation of the

' networks: a)In all but the spillway area, the surrounding grade is in excess of tha El. 260' while the top of the sprays are at El. 25t' and the spray network piping is between El. 253'g" and El. 256'8". 6)he closest branches of adjacent spray networks a'fe separated by 65 feet.

c) he supply piping to Mjacent networks is separated by 215 feet.4)The frm the edge of the pond.

-. networks are located at a minimrn distance of (K.-- 'ZE.fut

% e use of elevational differences and physical separation to provide protecticn of the spray pond networks frm tornado missiles is justified by the following considerations:

1) Only tw spray networks are required for the safe shutdown of both units.
2) We only active failure which can c.uwmise the operability of a spray network is failure of its supply valve (HV-57-032A, B, C, or D). These valves may be manually operated to isolate damaged networks, or to initiate the use of undamaged networks, if their controls or notors are inoperable.

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3) n e physical arrangment P.t -tke v precludes possibility that large missiles can damage nore than one spray network due to trgjectory considerations. Multiple missiles of sufficient energy and distribution to substantially damage multiple networks are unlikely.
4) ne loss of scre sprays in a network does not result in substantial loss of heat r e oval capability for the entire network (each network contains 240 spray nozzles).

5)(p, Jestyfhermal performance of the spray pond is based on extreely conservative design values of initial pond teperature and meteorology as describal in Section 9.2.6.4. For all expected corrlitions, the margin in thermal performance would be considerably greater than the 10% margin dmonstrated under design canditicns.

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6) Interconnections are provided which allow the use of the cooling towers as a heat sink for ESW and M RSW systems.

Such operatico may be initiated frczn the control recrn or locally by manual operation.  ;

7) 'Ihe loss of more than two spray networks and the coincident loss of the cooling towers due to tornado missiles is unlikely ,

due to physical separation of the coolin towers and the spray  !

pond. The cooling towers are locat eet frcrn the nearest I portion of a spray network.

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8) Tgrnado et %e lowmissiles are an insignificant contributor to plant risky bec=se
9) Plant procedures will address the various contingent actio available to the operators to deal with degraded UHS conditions. i
10) Substantial tine is available for corrective operator actions.

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DRAFT OUESTION 410.72 (Section 9.3.1)

Y Verify the availability of the 'l day instrument air supply after a safe shutdown earthquake which fails all non-seismic Category Consider I air piping (which. includes all 1" JDD-106 air lines).the resultan valve 1024E~ .

! RESPONSE Two seismic Category I air supplies have been provided to assure One air supply the long-term operability of the ADS valves.

' serves three ADS valves, the other serves the remaining two.

These air supplies have been designed to remain Fich is provided operable with an.

following a loss of offsite power.

external connection which may be used to provide pneumatic n Redundant automatic valves pressure for periods beyond 7 days.are provided to isolate These two airthe seism m

system from the non-seismic Category I portions.

supplies are physically separated such that no single failure can prevent the required long-term operation of the ADS valves.

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  1. LGS FSAR QUESTION 410.74 (Section 9.3.1)

Provide a discussion of the maintenance and periodic testing program for each instrument air system to assure compliance with the requirements of ANSI MC11.1-1976. Specify the maximum time between testing of the compressed air system in the discussion.

~

RESPONSE

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  • lb Limerick is_in compliance with the requirements of ANSI MC11.1-1976 as discussed in the response to Question 410.73.

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LGS FSAR d(V QUESTION 410.81 (Section 9.4.1)

Provide a drawing which shows the details of the tornado missile protection for each air intake and exhaust structure. .

RESPONSE

+Torno'do -

Figure 9.4-12 has been added to show the missile protection for the control structure e xhaust. Missile protection for the diesel generator enclosure aity'igtake and exhaust are shown on Figures 1.2-35 and 1.2-36. C E S d "S P % terel %6sh. air W'f-is de2cibed ec A 1 5.G.3 p tthe control structure air intakeiw (Figure 1.2-27) and for the spray pond pump structure air intakes and exhausts (Figures 1.2-37 and 1.2-39), missile protection is provided by virtue of the building design. ,

_ Table 3.5-8 gives minimum dimensions of missile barriers. __l_

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. 410.81-1 Rev.,14, 12/82 1

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l OUESTION 410.85 (Section 9.4.6, 9.4.7)

(a) Assuming the outside air temperature is at its maximum value of 1060F, verify that diesel generators will not fail at full load..- Specify the maximum temperature in the diesel generator cell.

_ (b) Assuming the outside air temperature is at its maximum value of 1060F verify that no emergency or residual heat removal service water pump will fail. Specify the maximum temperature in the spray pond pump room.

RESPONSE

The design basis for the outdoor air temperature used in designing the HVAC systems for the spray pond pumphouse and for the diesel generator enclosure is in accordance with the 1977 ASHRAE Fundamentals, Volume 1, Chapter 23. The use of ASHRAE is consistent with the practices used by other plants in the nuclear industry. Table 1 of Chapter 23 of the 1977 ASHRAE Fundamentals shows that the highest 1% design dry-bulb temperature for the areas around Limerick is 940F. A design outside air temperature

) of 950F was conservatively used for Limerick, which corresponds to a maximum internal room temperature of 1150F for both items a) and b) above. The diesel generators and emergency and residual heat removal service water pumps wers qualified to operate at this design room temperature throughout their normal operating lives and any accident conditions.

The 1% design dry-bulb temperatures provided in ASHRAE represent values that have been equalled or exceeded for 1% of the total hours during the summer months of June through September.

In a normal summer, there would be less than 30 hours3.472222e-4 days <br />0.00833 hours <br />4.960317e-5 weeks <br />1.1415e-5 months <br /> at or above this value. Even when the design value is exceeded, it would not normally be exceeded by a large amount. The data from Limerick Weather Station 1 (Table 2.3.2-54t) shows that the maximum temperature was 96.20F for the period between January 1972 through December 1976. The use of 1060F, the maximum temperature recorded in Philadelphia over the last century, does not represent a realistic design basis.

The few hours a year in which the room t mperature might exceed .

1150F due to an outside air temperature great-er-than 950F would not adversely affect the operation of the-subject compone ts..

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ch I allhedJ 410.85-10* f

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OUESTION 410.89 (Section :40.3) f ~~Y Verify that the structure which contains the. main.Furthermore, steam piping ~

...up . . . _

to the main stop valves,.is seismic Category J. ----

'- verify that no non-seismic Category I piping or appurtenances are located above the main steam piping and associated valves which _.

could damage the main steam piping and appurtenances during a

_-~ safe shutdown earthquake.

RESPONSE ..

The main steam piping is seismic Category I up to the main stop . . .

valves.

The main steam lines, Ep to and including the second.

isolation valves, are located in a seismic Category I structure..

The remainder of the' main steam piping, up to the stop valves, is located in the turbine enclosure, which 3.8. 4.1.11 - is seismic Category and 10.3.3, thoseII.

However, as described in Sections portions of the turbine enclosure that support the main steam lines are designed so that the main steam lines and their

~

supports maintain their integrity under the seismic loading f- _. _ . resulting ..f rom the SSE. . _ _ .

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