ML20066E756
| ML20066E756 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Midland |
| Issue date: | 10/22/1982 |
| From: | Garde B GOVERNMENT ACCOUNTABILITY PROJECT |
| To: | Harold Denton, James Keppler NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION III), Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20066E754 | List: |
| References | |
| NUDOCS 8211160123 | |
| Download: ML20066E756 (19) | |
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GOVERNMENT ACCOUNTABILITY PROJECT
. Institu:e for Policy Studies 1901 Que Street. N.W., Washington. D.C. 20009 (202)234 9382 October 22, 1982 Mr. Harold R. Denton, Director Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation Division of Licensing U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, D.C. 20555 Mr. J.G. Keppler Administrator, Region III U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission 799 Roosevelt Road Glen Ellyn, IL 60137 RE: Midland Nuclear Power Plant, Units I & II
-Consumers Power Company Quality Assurance
. Program Implementation for Soils Remedial Work
-Consumers Power Company Midland Plant Independent Review Program This letter provides additional comments to the current negotiations between the Nuclear Regulatory Commission ("NRC") and Consumers Power Ccapany ("CPCo") regarding two major areas of concern to local citizens and our own staff:
- 1) soils remedial construction; and
- 2) Independent Review Program.
On behalf of those former employees, local citizens.and the Lone Tree Council, the Government. Accountability Proj ect (" GAP") reviewed the various proposals submitted by the licensee of an independent re- -
view program as well as their description of the independent soils assessment program. Our questions and comments about both programs
! are outlined below. We appreciate the opportunity to provide this l information.
Based on our review of the licensee proposals, we are asking the NRC to not approve the independent audit proposal in its present form.
Further, we request on behalf of the local residents that* live and
! work around the plant that the details of the independent contract be finalized in a series of public meetings--one in Jackson, Michigan (the corporate home of CPCo) and one in Midland, Michigan (the plant site). Further, we ask that the public comment offered at these two meetings, as well as this letter, be included in the analysis'of CPCo's proposal.
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- Harold R. Denton October 22, 1962 J.G. Xeppler This request is consistent with Mr. Keppler's stated intention to invite public comment surrounding Midland's problems; and also-in line with Region III . policy surrounding the Zack controversy at LaSalle, which allowed several public participants to comment and suggest improvements in the independent audit of the Heating, Ven-tillating and Air Conditioning ("HVAC") equipment imposed'on Common-wealth Edison by the NRC.
As you know, it is the position of our . project that the only avenue to restore public confidence in a nuclear power plant that-has suffered from extreme loss of credibility is to offer the public the opportunity to participate in the decision-making process.
.This is particularly applicable to the situation at the Midland plant.
Clearly the utility and the regulators are aware of the substantial problems that have occurred in b'u11 ding the Midland plant. Indeed, it is the history of these problems that have led to this meeting in the first place. Yet, apparently there has been little desire to tackle the real issue of corporate negligence in the construction of this plant.
Background
The Government Accountability Project is a project of the Institute for Policy Studies. It is a national public interest organization that assists individuals, often called "whistleblowers," who expose waste, fraud or abuse in the federal workplace; or safety and health hazards within communities through GAP's Citizen's Clini:
for Accountable Government. As an organization dedicated to pro-tecting individuals who have the courage to bring information forward on behalf of their fellow citizens GAP has had a close work-ing relation with various Congressional and Senatorial committees, government agencies and other public interest organizations.
In recent years GAP has been approached by a growing number of nuclear witnesses from various nuclear power plants under construction.
In keeping with its objectives the GAP Whistleblower Review Panel and the Citizens Clinic Review Panel have directed the staff to pursue aggressively the complaints and problems that nuclear workers bring forward. Our first case involving a nuclear witness began when we were approached by a Mr. Thomas Applegate about serious problems at the William H. Zimmer Nuclear Power Station near Cincinnati Ohio. As you are aware Mr. Applegate's allegations and the subsequent investigations, reinvestigations, Congressional inquiries, and intense public scrutiny have revealed the Mr. Applegate exposed only the tip of the iceberg of problems. Zimmer was recently described in the Cleveland Plain Dealer as "the worst nuclear construction proj ect in the midwest, possibly the country. . . ." (October 3,1932. ) *
- This article also referred to the Midland Plant. Mr. John Sinclair,.an NRC inspector, responded to the question of whether there are other "Zimmers" around the country by stating that Zimmer's protlems
'kere similar to those found at [ Midland]."
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.' Harold R. Denton October 22, 1982 J.3. Keppler Following the GAP staff work at Zimmer we received a request from the Lone Tree Council of the Tri-City Michigan area to pursue worker allegations of major problems at the Midland Nuclear Power Plant in Midland, Michigan. Our preliminary investigation resulted in six affidavits being filed with the Nuclear Regulatory Commission on June 29, 1982. Since then we have filed an additional four affidavits resulting from the HVAC quality assurance breakdown revelations. We are also preparing an expanded affidavit of one of our original witnesses, Mr. E. Earl Kent, of serious welding construction problems at the Midland site. Other worker allegations-ranging from security system breakdowns to worker safety problems have come to our attention at an alarming rate.
The Citizens Clinic Review Panel a panel of seven respected individuals, met recently to review the status of Clinic cases. It was their unanimous recommendation to begin a thorough and aggressive probe of Midland's problems. We look forward to beginning that probe shortly. Unfortunately our previous experience at Zimmer and'LaSalle has given us a good idea of what to look for and what we will find.
I. SOILS REMEDIAL WORK The 1980/81 SALP Report, issued April 20, 1982 gave CPCo a Category 3 rating in soils and foundations.
A Category 3 rating, according to the SALP criteria states:
Both NBC and licensee attention shculd be increased...
Weaknesses are evident; licensee resources appear to be strained or not effectively used such that minimally satisfactory performance with respect to operational safety or construction is being achieved.
Clearly this rating, the lowest rating that can be given was deserved by the licensee. Although the soils settlement problems have resulted in the most serious construction problems that CPCo has faced, the SALP report points out in its analysis:
In spite of this attention, every inspection involving regional based inspectors and addressing soils settle-ment issues has resulted in at least one significant item of non-compliance. (p. 9)
This trend continues to the present date. As recently as May 20, 1932, Mr. R.B. Landsman the soils specialist of the Region III Midland Special Team discovered significant differences between the as-built condition of the plant in relation to the soils remedial work and the approved April 30, 1982 ASLB order.
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- Harold R. Denton October 22, 1932 J.G. Keppler Although Mr. Landsman had no quarrel with the technical aspects of the excavation in question.he had a significant disagreement with the licensee's failure to notify NRR of their plans. He aptly captured the essence of the problem in his August 24, 1982 memo to Mr. W.D. Shafer, Chief of the Midlana Section:
Since the licensee usually does not know what is in the ground or where it is, as usual the 22 foot duct bank was found at approximately 35 feet. It also was not in the right location. . . in addition,
. . . they inadvertently drilled into the duct bank. . . .
On August 20, 1982 Mr. Keppler requested the Office of Investigations to investigate two instances of apparent violation of the April 30, 1982 ASLB Order.
This latest experience with the licensee's failure to comply with NRC requirements is indicative of the reasons that the Advisory Committee on Reactor Safeguards, in a letter to NRC Chairman Nunzio Palladino, deferred its approval of full power operation of the Midland plant until an audit of the plant's quality. This QA pro-gram audit is to include electrical, control, and mechanical systems as well as undergrnund piping and foundations.
Now CPCo is again asking for "another chance" to get its corporate act together. They offer to institute a series of steps to " enhance the implementation of the quality program with regard to the soils remedial work " (Letter to Mr. Harold Denton from Mr. James Cook, September 17, 1982, p. 2.) Unfortunately, as pointed out below, the program on soils remedial work leaves much to be desired if public confidence is to be restored in the ultimate safety of the Midland plant.
A. Consumers Power Company Retention of Stone & Webster as a Third Party to Independently Assess tne Imple-mentation of the Aux 111ary Building Underpinning Work 3ased on a careful investigation of Stone & Webster's ("S&W")
performance in the nuclear power industry this decision, already made, may unfortunately for the licensee prove te be as disasterous as the pre-load operation of several years ago.
Our assessment is based on information obtained from the NRC Public Documents Room, private audits of S&W's performance en nuclear proj ects , legal briefs from intervenors , NRC " Notice of Violation" reports, public source information, and interviews with intervenors, engineers, as well as current and former employees of the NRC familiar with S&W's work.
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. *HaroAd R. Denton ~
October 22, 1982 J.G Keppler-
- 1. History S&W has been the chief contractor and architect / engineer at eight
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plants now operating, and for six plants presently under construc-tion. In reviewing numerous documents concerning two nuclear plants now under construction at which S&W was, or'stil1:is, the Project Manager and chief-architect / engineer, this investigation has documented S&W's reputation for massive' cost overruns at its nuclear construction sites, major problems with Quality Control and contruction management, and significant design errors at a number of these plants. The Shoreham plant on Long Island, N.Y.,
and the Nine Mile 2 plant near-Syracuse, N.Y., are both infamous nuclear boondoggles constructed by S&W.
a) Nine Mile 2 The Nine Mile 2 plant has been described as a " disaster area."
Cost overruns have gone from an original 360 million to 3.7 billion dollars, and the NRC has cited the plant for numerous violations.
According to an article in the Syracuse Post-Standard newspaper (May 17, 1982), "Nearly everything that can go wrong with a major construction project has beset Nine Mile 2."
In 1980 Niagara Mohawk, the utility which is building the plant, hired the firm of Black and Veatch Consulting Engineers to conduct and " independent assessment" of the management systems, costs, and work accomplished at the Nine Mile 2 plant. The final Project Evaluation Report'(_ September 1980) was extremely critical of S&W's performance, describing their work as " poor," " lacking" and
" confused." The evaluation found 127 problem areas at the plant.
Below is a list of some of the problems S&W were explicitly cited for:
- Failure to effectively implement the Quality Control program.
- Significant overruns against budget. .
- Ineffective Project Management Reports.
- Inadequate mamagement control of engineering -work.
- Engineering Management System was "never properly imple-mented on the Unit 2 project."
- " Key components of good cost control are not present.
- Inadequate " problem identification, impact analysis, and descriptions of corrective action plans."
Failure to keep abreast of regulatory changes.
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- Harold R. Denton October 22, 1982 J.G. Keppler
- Drawings used for construction based on unapproved documents. .
- Inadequate construction pro-planning /constructability review'.
- InaccuracieslLn the engineering and procurement status.
which have diminished user confidence in existing reports.
Many of the conditions cited in this audit have not been improved.
According to a May 17, 1982 inspection letter from the NRC, S&W has failed to remedy these identified problems:
There is a significant problem in the timeliness of corrective action resulting from S&W responses to Niagara Mohawk audit findings. Det'ermination of corrective action to be taken is repeatedly delayed due to either belated answers by S&W and/or inadequate responses by S&W. NMPC Quality Assurance Management has been unable to correct the problem.
On top of these problems, the NRC cited S&W, in the May 17, 1982 letter, for "significant" nonconformances with NRC regulations.
One major problem was found in S&W's philosophy on QC. Instead of analycing eroblems to find their causes, S&W would just out the identified mistake into " technical acceptability. " According to the NRC, this caused a repetition of problems:
The lack of identification and correction of the root cause of the nonconformance has led to numerous noncon-formances being written in a short period of time involving the same functional area. . ..
The QC program was also cited for its lack of training and its high personnel turnover.
S&W also failed to properly oversee subcontractors at Nine Alle
- 2. For example, over 300 bad welds were identified as made by one sub-contractor. These faulty welds were discovered after S&W inspectors had certified that they met construction standards.
(Post-Standard, May 19, 1982.)
b) Shoreham S&W was the Project Manager and chief architect / engineer at Shoreham.
In September 1977 the Long Island Lighting Company ("LILCo"), the utility which is building the Shoreham plant, removed S&W as Proj ect Manager. Although initially denied, LILCo reports obtained by intervenors in discovery, have documented LILCo's dissatisfaction with S&W--dissatisfaction which led to their termination.
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- Harold R. Denton October 22, 1982 J.G. Keppler In an April 1977 report.(Shoreham Nuclear Power Station Schedule and Construction Management Evaluation), prepared by LILCo's Proj ect Manager and other LILCo engineers, S&W was criticized and the utility was urged to terminate their services. Examples of SsW's unsatisfactory performance outline in this report were:
- Design problems.
- Inaccurate monitoring and controlling systems.
- Unnecessary and redundant procedures.
- Responsibility for cost overruns.
Other LILCo documents charged:
- Failure to produce or meet work schedules.
- Inability to adequately define urgent needs.
- Poor physical work documents.
Shoreham, described by the New York State Public Service Commission as " seriously deficient," has suffered from ccst cverruns which will make the electricity produced at the plant the most costly of any nuclear plant in the country. The overrun has been frcm 265 million to 2.49 billion dollars.
S&W was also at fault with Shoreham's largest design error. The reactor size which was originally planned for Shoreham was increased, but S&W failed to make adjustments and increases in the size of the reactor building. According to Newsday, this error had led to costly design problems and changes, and cramped work space within the reactor building.
Shoreham has also been cited by the NRC for numerous violations.
- Between 1975 and 1981 the Commission cited Shoreham for 46 violations.
For example, S&W was cited for repeatedly failing to have electrical cables installed correctly, and for allowing dirt in sensitive areas.
- 2. Problems Found in S&W Ooerating Reactors Most serious for the Midland plant was our discovery of S&W's .ork at the North Anna Plant.
a) Horth Anna According to a Washington Star article (May 5,1978), the North Anna plant has suffered from serious design problems regarding soils settlement. A pumphouse, designed to funnel cooling water into the
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.' Harold R. Denton October 22, 1982 J.G. Keppler reactor in event of a nuclear emergency, " settled" into the.groudd at a much higher rate than. planned. In only six years the pump-house sunk more than 79% of the amount planned for its forty year life expectency. This settlement caused " cracks in nearby walls and forced accordion-like pleats to be added'to nearby pipes."
According to the Star, this soils problem could lead to.the plant's premature closing.
Other mechanical malfunctions have also been reported at North Anna. For example, a malfunction in a steam pump and turbine contributed to a " negligible" overexposure of five plant workers to radiation, and the release of contaminated gas. (Washington Post, September 27, 1979.)
It is incredulous to us that the NRC could allow S&W, a construction firm that has caused untolled am'ounts in cost overruns, shut-down damaged plants and lengthy lists of URC violations to be transformed into an independent party, capable of enough internal reform to audit the work of the Bechtel construction of the Midland plant.
Further, S&W committed a serious design error in the vital cooling system's pipe design. This error potentially rendered the pipes exposed to failure in the event of even a minor earthquake, and could have created a major nuclear accident. Upon discovery of the error, the NRC ordered all five plants temporarily closed.for in-vestigation and repair. (Excerpt from the Public Meeting Briefing on Seismic Design Capability of Operating Reactors, NRC, June 28 1979.)
When the NRC entered these plants to inspect the pipes, they found additional problems. According to the NRC document Surry I, Beaver Valley and FitzPatrick all suffered from "significant differences between original design and the 'as built' conditions...." For example, Surry I had the following problems: "mislocated supports, wrong support type, and different pipe geometry."
b) Other plants All of the other operating nuclear plants investigated reported numerous problems. For example, in 1981 a faulty weld at the Beaver Valley plant caused a " minor leakage" of radioactivity into the local environment. Within one year after the Maine Yankee was turned on in 1972, 58 " malfunctions" were reportea, including leaks in the cooling water systems. A review of the URC report--Licensed Operating Reactors Status Report--of May 1982 revealed that all S&W plants were operating at an operating history of below 80% of the industry goal. Beaver Valley, for example, had a lifetime operating history of only 30%.
. ' Harold R. Denton October 22, 1982 J.G. Keppler 3 Stone & Webster Coroorate Attitude Our review of S&W's past attempts at constructing nuclear power plants prevents us from being convinced of anything but a future that is a dismal repeat of the past.
This fear was confirmed by an article written by the Chairman and Chief Executive Office of Stone and Webster, Mr. William T. Allen, Jr. in the Public Utilities Fortnightly, May 13, 1982, entitled "Much of the Anxiety about Nuclear Power Is Needless."
In this article Mr. Allen displays a critical disregard and dis-respect for the regulatory system that this nation has mandated to protect its citizens from the corporate instincts of profit and survival. His dialogue begins by labeling the public as apathetic about energy needs. He wishfully hypothesizes a 120 boost of electrical demand for a single year when the economy recovers.
Mr. Allen moves quickly to his conclusion that the energy needs of the future can be met with only coal and nuclear power, but his real point is made when he calls for the "necessary institutional adjustments to revitalize the nuclear industry." Mr. Allen's view of the revitalization is a chilling indication of his companies committment to safety. This excerpt is most revealing:
[W]e are working, along with others in the industry, in cupport of those activities which we hope will restore nuclear power to a state of robust health. In that con-nection, one specific effort we have undertaken within Stone:& Webster is the consolidation and analysis of recent data pertaining to the amount'of radiation which possibly would be released to the environment in the event of an accident in a nuclear power plant. . . . [3]ased on infor-mation our people have assembled it now is becoming clear to the scientific anl engineering communities that cri- .
teria established years ago, but still in use today, are incredibly and needlessly conservative."
This quoted paragraph captures Mr. Allen's observations although he goes on to attempt to convince his " apathetic public" that the three basic components in the source term (the quantity of radio-activity postulated to be available for leakage from the reactor containment into the environment) are needlessly conservative.
The arguments into the size of a " safe dose of radiciodine" contradict all other literature we have reviewed on the subj ect.
Mr. Allen's attempts to allay the fears of the public about nuclear power have only increased the fears that GAP has about its allegedly independent audit of the soils work.
If Mr. A.ien's corporation believe s the regulations over nuclear power are needlessly conservative, and he is not concerned with the
Harold R. Denton October 22, 1982 J.G. Keppler levels of radioiodine, I find it difficult to believe he will approach the Midland Auxillary Building with the attitude it will take to produce any replica of a safe nuclear facility.
As a result of our investigation, and our # ell-known support for independent audits of nuclear construction projects, it is impossible for GAP to accept the S&W review of the soils work under the Aux-illary Building as anything more than another licensee " rubber stamp."
- 3. Recommendations It is the recommendation of the Government Accountability Project that certain minimum requirements be used by the NRC in determining the acceptability of independent. audit charters. Further we recom-mend that the Midland public meeting (infra, at 15 ) include a presentation of the charters, and the availability of the auditors for public questioning into the understanding of this contract responsibility. These charters should include the following:
- 1) The independen.t contractor should be responsible directly to the NRC. Submitting all interim and final product simul-taneously witn CPCo,and tne f ac.
This is somewhat different from the proposal explained in the CPCo letters, which suggests that all reports would first be processed through the licensee.
- 2) The independent contractor should do a historical assess-ment of CPCo's prior work, including a frank report of the causes of the soils settlement problem.
This suggestion fecm the ACRS July 9, 1982 letter, is particularly appropriate to get on the public record.
- 3) The charter should ensure that, once hired, CPCo cannot dismiss the indeoendent contractor from the project without prior notice to the NRC and a MRC-sponsored public meeting to justify the decision.
Purthar, the NRC should make it clear that the licensing conditions will not be met for Midland if the NRC does not approve of any such dismissal. Although CPCo is hiring and paying several auditors, their credibility in the eyes of the public will be voided without a truly independent accountability structure. Otherwise the entire excercise is little better than an expensive public relations gimmick.
- 4) The charter should require that each auditor, at least 5 already identified, sub-contract any services for which its
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. ' Harold R. Denton October 22, 1982 J.G. Keppler .
direct personnel are not' qualified.
Proof of. qualifications should be provided for etery '
task in the Midland contracts.
- 5) The charter should require that the' propcsed met hodology be disclosed; specifically selection criteria and size of the samples for inspections and testing.
This is particularly critical with the proposed audits of the historical quality assurance breakdown. It is impossible to have any confidence in the results of an independent inspection and testing program if the selection criteria and size of the sample are a mystery.
- 6) The charter should require the auditors to provide calcu-lations demonstrating that it is possible to adequately complete its work during the proposed timeframe.
This is particularly important at the Midland site where
- " rush jobs" are all too common under the pressure of the 1984 deadline.
- 7) The charter should require the auditors to supoort its proposed methodology through references to established j professional codes (ASIM, ASME, ANSI, AWS, etc.).
This will insure that the methodology is a product of professional standards, rather than CPCo's timetable for operations. This is particularly important in the light of recent disclosures putting the 3echtel codes in oppos-ition to the AWS codes.
- 8) The charter's should require all auditors to report all safety-related information directly to the NRC.
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CPCo's own judgment in determining when to inform the NRC, and about what, is highly suspect. Only with stringent guidelines for an independent auditor is there any hope for public trust in the work performed on CPCo's payroll .
- 9) The employees and auditors should demonstrate that the personnel assigned to the proj ect are free from conflicts of interest.
In the October 5 letter, CPCo references the conflict
- of interest points- presented in a February 1, 1982 letter from NRC Chairman Nunzio Pallidino to Representative John Dingell. These five points should apply to all employees of the audit teams. It is insufficient for the company to be free of conflicts of interest if the key fact finders and decision-makers are not.
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, *Ha'rold R. Denton October 22, 1932 J.G. Keppler It seems only reasonable that all auditore should guarantee and demonstratethe absence of any conflicts of interest on the organizational and individual levels.
Insignificant conflicts should be fully disclosed and explained, subj ect to the NRC's app'roval.
- 10) :The auditors must recommend corrective action, and then control its implementation.
If the independent auditors are not allowed to develop corrective actions the teams become a highly paid re-search department for the licensee. The NRC must receive the independent recommendations of the auditor teams prior to the finalizations of any licensee plan on any system. Without this final and critical step there will be no resolution of the key question--can Midland ever operate safely?
II. CONSUMERS POWER COMPANY INTEGRATION OF THE SOILS QA AND CA/
QC FUNCTIONS UNDER THE DIRECTION OF MPQAD This reorganization, putting CPCo in charge of the Quality Assur-ance/ Quality Control program raises serious questions in our analysis. First, CPCo has consistently disregarded the importance of Quality Assurance / Quality Control in the past. Nothing in their historical performance or their recent past indicates that CPCo's MPQAD has the type of serious committment to QA/QC that will produce meticulous attention to detail. Further, the experience that GAP's witnesses have had with MPQAD have been far from favorable. In fact, all of our witnesses (but one who resigned after refusing to approve faulty equipment) have tried in vain to get their in-house management to do something about their allega-tions. All of them were dismissed--the result of their efforts to ensure a safe nuclear plant.
Mr. Dean Larty, Mr. Terry Howard, Mrs. Sharon Morella, Mr. Mark Cions and Mr. Charles Grant have attested to the failure of the MPQAD. If the Zack experience has demonstrated nothing else, it has certainly left a clear warning to construction employees that committing the truth is not a virtue at the Midland site.
GAP's previous experience with nuclear construction projects that take total control of a QA program has firmly been negative. At Zimmer the switch from contractor to owner brought with it deliberate coverups instead of corporate bungling. We believe that based on CPCo's previous performance and attitude that it is unacceptable for CPCo to offer their MPQAD to be the new answer to an old problem.
In a September 30, 1982 Midland Daily News article, Mr. Wayne Shafer st.ated that the new move to put CPCo at the helm will give
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- Harold R. Denton October 22, 1932
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\ .s them "first hand knowledge" of'the problems with the Midland plant.
Mr. Shafer has apparently mistake'n Midland for-Zimmer on a very, serious point. , .'j At Zimmer the owner, Cinbinnati Gas and Electric Company, was fined
$200,000.00 in November IS81. They claimed that their, main failure was to supervise their contractor, Kaiser, in the con-struction. At Midland there has never been a question of who is in control of the construction decisions. CPCo has consistently had some degree of involvement--usually substantial--with the history of probems on the site.
III. ' CONSUMERS-POWER COMPANY HAS PROPOSED A SINGLE-POINT ACCOUNTABILITY SYSTEM TO ACCOMPLISH ALL WORK COVERED BY THE ASLB ORDER Although none of the documentation defines what " single-point accountability" is, there is some hint through-other comments from CPCo. In both the September 17, 1982 letter from Mr. Cook to Messrs. Keppler and Denton' and several local newspapers, there is a specific reference to " good and dedicated" employees. Even Robert Marnick, acting director of the Office of Special Cases, stated in the September 30, 1982 Midland Daily News article,
" Consumers to Take Responsiblity for QC":
It'll only work if yo'i've got good, strong people doing the job. I guess the proof of the pudding is in the performance.
We agree whole heartedly with Mr. Warnick. GAP has always main- >
tained that the only way to make any regulatory system work effectively is to have strong, trustworthy, individuals of high integrity.
As a project GAP has watched many " good, strong people" attempt to do their jobs correctly, only to be scorned, fined and ostra-cized by corporations or bureaucracies that ignored their responsi-bility to the public. g ,
4 Ironically, perhaps the strongest, most credibb good person GAF has worked with recently was fired by Bechtel and CPCo from the Midland site-- Mr. E. Earl F.ent.
Mr. Kent's allegation's'were among those submitted on June 29, 1982 to the NRC. After GAP submitted his allegations to the NRC , Mr.
Kent prepared his evidence and documentation for the anticipated visit by NRC investiga, tors. Unfortunately the investigators never arrived. In mid-August, at Mr. Kent's own expense, he went to the Regional Office of the NRC to talk to the government officials charged with investigating his allegations. He wanted to insure that the investigators understood completely the~ detail End speci-fically of his claims about the problems at Midland.' Fur,ther'he,
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.' Harold-R. Denton October 22, 1982 J.G. Keppler wanted to clarify that the NRC was aware of his knowledge about serious hardware problems at the two other sites. Mr. Kent was seriously-disappointed in his reception.
Following the mid-August visit, GAP wrote a letter to Mr. James Keppler, Regional Director, emp.hasizing our concerns about Mr.
Kent's visit. In the three months following the submission of Mr. Kent's ' claims--serious construction flaws--there remained no efforts on the part of the NRC, other than Mr. Kent's own, to begin to untangle the mystery of Bechtels' inadequate welding procedures.
Mr. Kent's personal life has been irrevocably harmed as he has waited patiently for his allegations to be substantiated by the nuclear regulators that he placed his trust in. He has been unemployed for nearly a year. His professional reputation hangs in the balance of an ongoing federal investigation. His financial condition has dropped daily. However, it was not until a few weeks ago that Mr. Kent gave up on the NRC. Like so many other good strong workers before him, Mr. Kent sincerely believed that the regulators would pursue his allegations made in defense of the public health and safety, instead he discovered an agency promoting the industry positions.
Last week WXYZ' Television Station, in Detroit, the Los Anceles Times, the WalI Street Journel, the Detroit Free Press, numerous local. stations in California and Michigan--both radio and tele-vision, and national wire services carried the details of Mr.
Earl Kent's allegations.
In t' e wane lof the public revelation of Mr. Kent 's claims the NRC has fir. ally acted. The Region III office, in a flurry of
" catch-up work," finally sent the affidavit to the Region V office.
Region V investigators met with Mr. Kent for a seven and a half hour session on October 15, 1982. . Unfortunately, the intent of their questioning raises extensive concerns among GAP staff who have worked with nuclear witnesses and the NRC before. In fact, one of the first comments made by one of the investigators was to inform.EDF.. Kent that his allegaticns were well-known now all over the United States, as "well as Russia."
The direction of the NRC's questioning was obvious to Mr. Kent.
He remains unconvinced that there will be an aggressive investiga-tion into the allegations he has been making for the past eighteen mont hs' . His concerns over serious structural flaws at three nuclear plants remain as real,as when he risked--and lost--his career to bring them to the attention of his industry supervisors.
Mr. Kent is by far one of the most credible and honest individuals with whom GAP has had the opportunity to work. Our investigation o
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.' Ha old R. Denton October 22, 1982 J.G. Keppler of his qualifications, professional experience, and contributions to the field of uelding impressed us even more than his humility and integrity. I urge either or both of you to personally talk to Mr. Kent if there is any doubt about the allegations that he is making, or about the seriousness of the consequences if these problems that he has identified remain unresolved. ,
Mr. Warnick's statement about.the " proof being in the pudding" seems hopelessly blinded as to the experience of nuclear witnesses at the Midland facility.
A single-point accountability system certainly depends on strong individuals, but with CPCo's reputation for swift and cruel dis-position of those workers who point out problems, only a fool would allow himself to be placed in a position of single-point accountability (" SPA").
In order for this proposition to have any credibility GAP recommends that this critical QA/QC link be explained fully at the GAP-proposed meeting in Jackson, Michigan. Along with specific details of this SPA system, we would request that the individual or indiv-iduals'who are to perform this function explain their personal approach to their position.
Along with the above, GAP recommends the following structural elements be included in this ombudsman program:
- 1) Final approval of the individual (s) should rest with the HRC in a courtesy agreement between CPCo and Region III.
- 2) The SPA officials should have at least one meeting with those public nuclear witnesses who do not believe their allegations have been resolved. This visit should include a site tour structured by the witness to satisfy himself/
herself whether repairs have been made on the systems he/she raised questions about. No group . individuals .
is better prepared to or qualified to as,ist with iden-tifying problems to be corrected than the witnesses themse-lves.
- 3) These SPA officials should havc frecuent (weekly) recularly scheduled meetings with the public to discuss the status of the repair work. These meetings should include an honest discussion of all problems encountered in construction.
This " good faith" measure on the part of the utility would do much to recapture some of its lost credibility.
i IV. UPGRADED TRAINING ACTIVITES AND THE QUALITY IMPROVEMENT PROGRAM The concepts incorporated into the proposals on upgraded retraining
- were largely positive steps forward. GAP's analysis specifically
. Ha'rold R. Danton October 22, 1952 J.G. Keppler approves of the extensive training efforts--including the test pit--to provide as much direct training for workers and quality control personnel involved in the massive work involved. Most specifically GAP appreciates the efforts to increase communication between " individual feedback."
We would like to have more specific-information on the mechanisms within the Quality Improvement Program for feedback. Further, if these steps are deemed appropriate to the soils project it would seem only reasonable to incorporate them throughout the construction proj ect . Our analysis of the QIP was limited by the lack of information and*look forward to receiving more detail before the final assessment.
GAP recommends that the training session that covers Federal Nuclear Regulations, the NRC Qua'lity Programs in general and the Remedial Soils Quality Plan be expanded significantly and that the NRC review and comment on the training materials.
Further, that the NRC provide a summary of its intentions and expectations of workers-in soils remedial work as well as QA in general.
GAP also requests that Mr. Keppler conduct a personal visit to the site, similar to his visit to Zimmer, and talk to all the QA/QC employees as soon as possible.
V. INCREASED MANAGEMENT INVOLVEMENT Finally we express reservations about the increased senior manage-ment involvement. While we recognize the intent of this commit-ment, we are concerned with the lack of corporate character demon-strated to date. It appears quite clear to us that there has been extensive senior management level direct participation to date. That involvem9nt has been less than complimentary to CPCo.
In recent months the " argumentative attitude" of CPCo officials have emerged in many forums:
- An August article in the Detroit News, in which President John Selby said he was tired of " subsidizing the public."
- The June and July public " red-baiting" of GAP for its work on behalf of citizens and former workers.
- The recent distribution of a flyer accusing a Detroit television station of " sensationalist and yellow journal-1sm."
- The continuous attempts to influence and intimidate local rep.orters, editors and newspapers to print only biased accounts of the Midland story.
~
< Harold R. Denton October 22, 1982 J.G. Keppler Although approving in principal of the weekly in depth reviews of all aspects of the construction project, we remain skeptical of this step doing anything to improve the Midland situation.
Certainly it should not be confused with the independent audit recommendation of the ACRS, ASLB, and NRC staff.
VI. INPO EVALUATION The answer to the mystery of Midland's problems is to be provided by an INPO evaluation conducted by qualified, independent contractors.
This results from the June 8, 1982 ACRS report, and the July 9, 1982 NRC staff letter requesting such an assessment.
The proposal offered by CPCo, a replica of INFO' criteria for inde-pendent evaluations, is divided into three parts:
- 1) Horizontal type review;
- 2) Biennial QA Audit; and
- 3) Independent Design verification (Vertical slice).
It is particularly distressing to us to note that CPCo received proposals and then selected the Management Analysis Company
("MAC") to perform two of the three audits.
MAC is far from an independent contractor on CPCo construction proj ec t s . In fact, MAC has been involved with both the Midland and Palisades projects at various times throughout the past decade. For example:
- In 1981 MAC performed an assessment of the hardware problems on site. They failed to identify Zack's contin-uing HVAC problems, the bad welds in the control panals, and improper welds and cable tray / hanger discrepancies.
- Further, MAC failed to identify the problems of uncertified and/or unqualified welders on site.
GAP strongly disagrees with the choice of MAC. It is an insult to the NRC and the public to accept MAC's review of its own previcrs analysis as a new and independent audit. Although Mr. L.J. Keebe appears to be both an experienced and credible individual, it does not remove the connection of MAC to two other CPCo-Bechtel productions. This relationship is simply too close fcr the comfort of the public.
The MAC INPO review may be extremely valuable to CPCo officials as a self-criticism review, however, it should not be presented to the NRC as " independent" by any stretch of the imagination.
8
Na'r*old R'. Denton October 22, 1982
}J.G.Keppler Further, there was a marked lack of specific methodology and information about the audit to be performed. GAP staff was particularly _ disappointed with the lacx of specificity into the work to be performed by the " experts." [This report read more 12.ce a college term paper review than a technical review of a crucial independent audit.3 It confirms GAP's overall reservations about INPO audits as building an effective wall between the public and the true nature of the problems on the site. Our reservations seems confirmed with reference to establishing layers of informal reporting--
including an initial verbal report to the project--before the actual acknowledgement of identified problems. (October 5, 1982 letter, p. 12.)
The selection of the Tera Corporation to perform the Independent Design Veri.fication is more positive. (GAP was unable to deter-mine whether or not the Tera Corporation has been involved previously with the Midland plant.) Tera's work experience, as presented in the October 5, 1982 letter, at the Vermon) Yankee Nuclear Power Plant has been determined to be both extremely-thorough and of high quality. The Yankee Plant is rated amony the best operating nuclear power plants (those with the least problems) according to the Nuclear Power Safety Recort: 1981 (Public Citizen).
With the acknowledgement of previous reservations and recommenda-tions about independent audit work at.Mid1rnd, we concur with the selection of the Tera Corporation for the Independent Design Verification.
The October 5 letter referred extensively to the confirmation of installed systems reflecting system design requirements. GAP hopes that, unlike other audits we have seen, the Tera-Corporation does not simply confirm the findings.
Additionally GAP requests that the entire record of comments, investigations and additional information will be provided to the NRC, and also placed in the Public Documents Room, as opposed to CPCo's offer to " maintain" the "auditable record."
There was no reference to the percentage of the work that would be audited by a field verification. This is critical to any type
- of credible independent review of construction, particularly at I
plants like Midland and Zimmer where every weld and cable is suspect. We believe the percentage of field review should be established.
The discrenancias documented thoughout the review (" findings")
should be reported to the NRC simultaniously with the referral to senior level review teams. There is little point to delaying the referral of the findings -- only delays the inevitable, taking time that CPCo doesn't have.
G m
a o i
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- Harold R. Denton October 22, 1982
, J.G. Keppler VII. CONCLUSION The evidence of noncompliances, improprieties, quality assurance breakdowns, misrepresentations, false statements, was.t.e, corporate imprudence and massive construction failures rapeatedly meets the general NRC and Region III criteria for suspension of a construction permit or the denial of an operating license. The NRC's own assessment concludes that Midland's Quality Assurance Pr ogram--the backbone of any safe nuclear construction--had generic problems. Mr. Keppler concluded that, next to Zimmer, Midland was the worst plant in his region. Last year William Dircks classified it as one of the worst five plants in the country.
In recent months Midland has been the subject of repeated revelations and accusations of construction flaws, coverups, and negligence.
The evidence already on the record is indicative of a significant failure on the part of CPCo to demonstrate respect for the nuclear power it hopes to generate, or the agency which regulates its activities.
CPCo has taken repeated risks with its stockholders' investments, its corporate credibility and its regulatory image. In each of these risks it has lost. It is too much to expect citizens to accept CPCo's arrogant disregard for the public's health and safety.
GAP recognizes the' steps forward by.the Regional office--establishing a Special Section to monitor Midland's problems and the request for an independent audit. However, this must only be the beginning.
CPCo has numerous problems to w,rry about, and it is clearly not in their own best interest to put the strictest possible construction on the regulations under which they have agreed to build this nuclear facility. It is for just this reason that the nuclear industry is regulated -- but even regulat. ion, fines, extensive public mistrust,
- and corporate embarrasment have not humbled Consumers Power Company.
If Midland is ever going to be a safe nuclear facility, someone else is going to have to put their professional credibility on the line.
This independent auditor, paid by CPCo, must be given strict guidelines for accountability and responsibility in order to justify its hard line recommendations.
GAP hopes that both the Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation and the Region III office of the NRC will give serious consideration to GAP's ccncerns and recommendations set forth above and implement a system whereby there is a truly independent system of auditing the extensive problems with the Midland plant.
Sincerely, (])
h ^1+
Billie Pirner Garde Director, Citizens Clinic for Accountable Government
MEETING
SUMMARY
DISTRIBUTION j 3~~-
Nov a m
' Docket' No(s): 8Drdd); d3 o o /n, c L NRC/PDR Local PDR NSIC PRC System LB #4 r/f Attorney, OELD E. Adensam Project Manager D. Hood Licensing Assistant M. Duncan RHernan l MMiller l
NRC
Participants:
! D. Hood R. Hernan E. Adensam l R. Warnick l
W. Shafer I E. Sullivan J. P. Knight
- S. Black M. A. Miller D. Allison M. Wilcove R. Vollmer* .
- i. Novak D. Eisenhut -
N. Wright H. Denton*
l bec: Applicant & Service List l
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