ML20065A203

Final Deficiency Rept Re Welding of ASME Iii,Class 1 Joints Using ASME Iii,Class 2 & 3 Welding Procedures.Initially Reported on 820429.Welds Will Be Removed & Replaced by 830131.List of Planners Revised

ML20065A203
Person / Time
Site:	Nine Mile Point
Issue date:	08/31/1982
From:	Manno S NIAGARA MOHAWK POWER CORP.
To:	Starostecki R NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION I)
References
10CFR-050.55E, 10CFR-50.55E, 82-483, NUDOCS 8209130169
Download: ML20065A203 (3)

Text

--

b=

Y NIAGARA NuMOHAWK NIAGARA MOHAWK POWER CORPORATION /300 ER:E BoVLEVAAD WEST, SYRACUSE. N.Y.13202/ TELEPHONE (315) 474-1511 SAMUE L F. MANNO VICE PRESIDENT NUCLEAR CONSTRUCTION August 31, 1982 82-483 Office of Inspection and Enforcement Region I Attention: Mr. R. W. Starostecki, Director Division of Project and Resident Programs U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Comission 631 Park Avenue King of Prussia, PA 19406 Re: Nine Mile Point Unit 2 Docket No. 50-410

Dear Mr. Starostecki:

Enclosed is a final report in accordance with 10CFR50.55(e) for the deficiency regarding the welding of certain ASME III, Class 1 joints using ASME III, Class 2 and 3 welding procedures. This condition was reported by telephone to Mr. H. Kister of your staff on April 29, 1982.

p Very truly yours,

[ NIAGARA M0 HAWK POWER CORPORATION kf444M/

S. . Manno Vice President Nuclear Construction xc: Director of Inspection and Enforcement U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Comission

[

Washington, DC 20555 l

Mr. R. D. Shulz, Resident Inspector i

8209130169 820031 PDR ADOCK 05000410 S PDR pt1 J

w W NIAGARA M0 HAWK POWER CORPORATION Nine Mile Point Unit 2 Docket No. 50-410 Final Report for a Deficiency Under 10CFR50.55(e) Regarding the Welding of ASME III, Class 1 Joints Using ASME III, Class 2 and 3 Welding Procedures Description of the Deficiency Ten (10) ASME III C1 ass 1 joints were either partially or completely welded by the field piping erection contractor, ITT Grinnell, using ASME III, Class 2 and 3 welding procedures. Of the ten joints, four were completed, three were stopped in progress, one was tack welded only, and two had weld end preparation repairs perfonned, but had not yet been fitup. An additional ninety-two (92) ASME III, Class 1 joints were identified on the contractor's planners (travelers) for welding using the same improper welding procedures.

Welding of the additional ninety-two joints had not begun at the time this condition was discovered.

Analysis of Safety Implications The difference between the ASME III, Class 1 procedures that should have been used and the ASME III, Class 2 and 3 procedums that actually were used is that the Class 1 procedures require impact test qualification whereas the Class 2 and 3 procedums do not. Impact-qualified welding procedures provide additional assurance of adequate toughness of the joint by controlling the welding parameters that affect heat input.

Although not all of the heat input parameters were monitored for the welding perfonned, an evaluation of the processes used,, the parameters monitomd, and other restrictions imposed by the governing specification and procedures indicates that the expected heat input was such that adequate toughness of the l joint would be developed.

l Based on the above evaluation, we are of the opinion that had this problem remained uncorrected it would not have adversely affected the safe operation of the plant and is not a reportable deficiency under 10CFR50.55(e). However, the ten welds will be replaced and the planners identifying the additional ninety-two joints have been revised as outlined under Corrective Action.

Corrective Action

1. The welds of the ten joints, which were comletely/ partially made utiizing the improper ASME III, Class 2 and 3 welding procedures, will be removed and replaced using the ASME III, Class 1 welding procedures. This work will be completed by January 31, 1983.

l l

.. l' ,

~

2. The planners identifying the improper welding procedure for the . .

ninety-two joints have been revised to indicate ASME- III, Class 1 welding procedu re s.

3. ITT Grinnell has modified and strengthened its Site Engineering Organization:

(a) ITT Grinnell Cat I Planner preparation positions have been .

upgraded.

(b) ITT Grinnell Cat I Planner checking has been strengthened.

~ '

(c ) ITT Grinnell has established additiona1 level of re'iew, v

" Verification of Code Acceptability."

4. ITT Grinnell has developed a revised training program for Engineering and QC personnel involved in planner preparation and checking.

5. As an interim measure, Stone & Webster Engineering Corporation (SWEC) now.

reviews and concurs with the adequacy of Engineering and QA/QC instructions of all Cat I Welding Planners prior to issuance to construction. As of July 1,1982, only those Cat I Welding Planners that have been reviewed by and concurred with by SWEC are released by ITT Grinnell for construction. The results of SWEC reviews will be closely monitored. At such time that SWEC and Niagara Mohawk determine that tre planners are being consistently and properly prepared,.SWEC review and' concurrence will be reduced or discontinued, as appropriate.

6. ITT Grinnell Site QA/QC Organization has been modified and expanded. A new Site QA Manager position has been added with substantial oversight responsibilities, including continued program evaluation.

d

)

s -

w v ., .w. _ - ,