ML20236T591

LER 98-S01-00:on 980618,security Force Member Left Nine Mile Point,Unit 2 Vehicle Gate Unattended Without Ensuring,Gate Alarm Had Been Reactivated.Caused by Inadequate Work Practice.Vehicle Gate Alarm Was Activated

ML20236T591
Person / Time
Site:	Nine Mile Point
Issue date:	07/20/1998
From:	Christensen H NIAGARA MOHAWK POWER CORP.
To:
Shared Package
ML20236T568	List: ML20236T566 ML20236T591
References
98-S01, 98-S1, LER-98-S01, LER-98-S1, NUDOCS 9807280279
Download: ML20236T591 (5)

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NAMit TELEPHONE NUMBLk Howant G. Christensen. Manager Nuclear Security (315) 349-1036 i

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On June 17,1998, at 1549 hours0.0179 days <br />0.43 hours <br />0.00256 weeks <br />5.893945e-4 months <br />, a Security Force Member (SFM) left the Nine Mile Point Unit 2 vehicle gate unattended without ensuring that the gate alarm had been reactivated. At 1651 hours0.0191 days <br />0.459 hours <br />0.00273 weeks <br />6.282055e-4 months <br />, the Central Alarm Station Operator discovered the situation and reactivated the alarm. Initial evaluation indicated that

' acceptable compensatory measures had been established, but additional review the next morning determined that this was not the case. A telephone report to the NRC was made on June 18,1998 at 0924 hours0.0107 days <br />0.257 hours <br />0.00153 weeks <br />3.51582e-4 months <br />.

[  : The root cause of this event was inadequate work practice demonstrated by the SFM, who, contrary to

{ security procedures, left his post without verifying the gate alarm was functional.

Immediate corrective actions were reactivation an' d proper testing of the alarm. The SFM was retrained in  !

gate operation and adherence to procedure. Requirements for compensatory post closure, functional alarm f testing, and notification upon discovery of unusual conditions were reviewed with Security Site Supervisors and SFMs. The need to enforce procedural compliance has been reviewed with Security Site Supervisors.

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00 02 OF 05 TEXT Wmore opere is nyednd, we eurkrud NNC For.n J%4 's) (17) f I. DESCRIPTION OF EVENT i

On June 17,1998, at 1549 hours0.0179 days <br />0.43 hours <br />0.00256 weeks <br />5.893945e-4 months <br />, a Security Force Member (SFM) left a compensatory post, the Nine Mile Point Unit 2 (NMP2) vehicle gate post, unattended without first ensuring that the zone had been secured.

This action constituted a violation of security procedures, S-SEC-3.3, " Vehicle Access Control", and S- l SAP-8.1 " Opening, Monitoring, md Closing Compensatory Posts", which require the posted SFM to verify that the gate alarm has been reactivated and functionally tested prior to leaving the post. At the time of this event, Nine Mile Point Unit 1 (NMPI) was operating at approximately 99 percent power, and NMP2 was in shutdown for refueling.

In accordance with S-SEC-3.3, two individuals were actively involved in controlling vehicle access to the protected area. One was the SFM posted at the gate, who was in charge of vehicle search and registration.

The other was an SFM positioned in the Unit 2 Access Control Room (ACR). This individual was in charge of opening the gate and is referred to as the " gate monitor".

The SFM at the gate had assumed gate duties at approximately 1440 hours0.0167 days <br />0.4 hours <br />0.00238 weeks <br />5.4792e-4 months <br />. At that time, as permitted by procedure, the alarm on the vehicle gate had been inactivated to facilitate entry and exit of vehicles during peak traffic periods. As required by S-SEC-3.3 and S-SAP-8.1, the alarm is to be reactivated and functionally tested before the gate post is closed and the posted SFM leaves the location. Reactivation of the alarm is performed by the Central Alarm Station (CAS) Operator. The functional test is performed by the gate SFM, and the CAS Operator informs the SFM of the test results.

At approximately 1540 hours0.0178 days <br />0.428 hours <br />0.00255 weeks <br />5.8597e-4 months <br />, the gate SFM contacted the gate monitor to report that there was one remaining vehicle awaiting entry to the protected area and that the gate was to be resecured when processing of the vehicle was complete. Shortly thereafter, the gate SFM processed the vehicle through the gate and, at 1549 hours0.0179 days <br />0.43 hours <br />0.00256 weeks <br />5.893945e-4 months <br />, left the vehicle bay to attend to other duties in the ACR. He did so under the assumption that ,

the gate monitor had requested the CAS Operator to reactivate the alarm and had verified it as functional l subsequent to the final vehicle transaction (i.e., when the gate was raised and the vehicle passed through the zone). Although this method of testing the gate alarm was contrary to that specified in procedure, the gate l SFM had used it in the past while serving as gate monitor and assumed that the gate monitor had performed the same process on this occasion.

At 1641 hours0.019 days <br />0.456 hours <br />0.00271 weeks <br />6.244005e-4 months <br />, the gate was remanned to facilitate exit of a transport vehicle. Involved SFMs expected the alarm at the gate to be active. However, the CAS Operator, while observing the exit on Closed Circuit Television (CCTV), noticed that the alarm did not annunciate when the vehicle passed through the zone. At  !

1651 hours0.0191 days <br />0.459 hours <br />0.00273 weeks <br />6.282055e-4 months <br />, the CAS Operator checked the status of the gate alarm and found that it was inactivated.  !

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FAC111TY NAME (t) IXXKLT NUMBLR C) 11R NUMBER (6) PAGE (3)

YEAR SEQUlNTIAL RINISION NUMt1Ek NUMBLR Nine Mile Point Urdt 1 05000220 98 - S01 - 00 03 OF 05

, ext q , .., u +,a. .aw ne r m y an I. DESCRIPTION OF EVENT (Cont'd)

The CAS Operator immediately reactivated the alarm and directed the gate SFM to conduct a functional test in accordance with procedure. Performance of the test satisfactorily resulted in generation of an alarm, and the gate SFM was permitted to leave the zone. However, contrary to procedure, the CAS Operator did not immediately inform the Security Site Supervisor of the event. The CAS Operator did not make the notification until 1725 hours0.02 days <br />0.479 hours <br />0.00285 weeks <br />6.563625e-4 months <br />, which was after his own supervisor had been relieved by the on-coming Security Site Supervisor and shortly before Security Force shift turnover.

The on-coming Security Site Supervisor commenced an initial evaluation of the situation. However, due to shift turnover occurring at approximately the same time, several individuals from the previous shift had already left site by the time he recognized the need to speak with them about the event.

As part of the evaluation of the event, the Security Site Supervisor consulted with other Security management personnel and reviewed security computer records associated with the vehicle bay and the NMP2 ACR. It appeared that one of several SFMs in the ACR could have been assigned as a dedicated observer (via CCTV) of the vehicle gate, which would have been an adequate compensatory measure for the inactivated alarm during the period in which the gate was unmanned (from 1549 hours0.0179 days <br />0.43 hours <br />0.00256 weeks <br />5.893945e-4 months <br /> to 1641 hours0.019 days <br />0.456 hours <br />0.00271 weeks <br />6.244005e-4 months <br />).

It was also known that the preceding Security Site Supervisor had been informed in advance that the transport vehicle would require exit from the protected area shortly after the time that the gate post normally closed.

Therefore, it was concluded that a determination had been made to leave the gate alarm inactive until the vehicle exited, and, in the interim, a SFM in the ACR had been designated to monitor the gate via CCTV in

. place of the gate SFM. However, upon completion of additional fact-gathering the next morning, it was determined that a SFM had not been assigned as a dedicated observer and that the event should be reported as a one-hour phone call under 10CFR73.71. The call to the NRC was made at 0924 hours0.0107 days <br />0.257 hours <br />0.00153 weeks <br />3.51582e-4 months <br /> on June 18,1998.

II. CAUSE OF EVENT The root cause of this event was inadequate work practice demonstrated by the gate SFM, who, contrary to security procedures, left his post without verifying the gate alarm was functional. His leaving the post was due to an assumption that the SFM serving as gate monitor had verified the alarm for him.

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YEAN SEQUENTIAL R EVISION NUMhER NUMHER Nine Mile Point Unit 1 05000220 98 .

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00 04 OF 05 Text w-a arm u rm u ra. - an.a suc r~ m w) l III. ANALYSIS OF EVENT Plant safety systems were not and will not be affected by this event. During the period in which the NMP2 vehicle gate alarm was inactive without proper implementation of compensatory measures, the status of other perimeter zones and vital area portals continued to be monitored by the security system and Security Force personnel, No unusual or unauthorized activity was detected or observed.

Integrity of the protected area barrier and the vehicle barrier system were not compromised during this event.

Both gates at the NMP2 vehicle bay were closed during this period, and the vehicle barrier system's sliding beam had been ekmed and secured. Existence of the inactive gate alarm was not observable to passersby, and, due to protective measures inherent in the security system software, knowledge of it was not available to unauthorized personnel. Lastly, upon recognition of the inactive alarm, it was immediately restored and properly verified as functional.

IV. _ CORRECTIVE ACTIONS

1. The vehicle gate alarm was activated and functionally tested in accordance with procedure at 1652 hours0.0191 days <br />0.459 hours <br />0.00273 weeks <br />6.28586e-4 months <br /> .on June 17, 1998.

2. The SFM who had been posted at the gate was prohibited from performing any further gate duties until he was ret ~ained in proper gate operation and adherence to procedures. This was completed on June 22,1998.

3. On June 18,1998, the Security Site Supervisor met with the CAS Operator to reinforce the procedural requirement to promptly notify the Supervisor upon discovery of any security system degradation or other unusual condition. This requirement was also reviewed with all other CAS Operators during l pre-shift briefings.

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IV. CORRECTIVE ACTIONS (Cont'd)

4. To ensure proper compliance with procedure, requirements associated with the following activities have been reviewed between Security Site Supervisors and SFMs during pre-shift briefings:

a. Compensatory post closings

b. Performance of functional alarm tests

5. The General Supervisor Security Operations has met with all Security Site Supervisors to relate the details of this event, to reinforce the expectation that Security Force activities are to be conducted in accordance with applicable procedures, and, that upon observation of non-compliances, individuals are to be promptly corrected.

i V. ADDITIONAL INFOllM ATION The Security Force at Nine Mile Point Nuclear Station is proprietary.

No events similar to the one described herein have previously occurred at the Station.

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