ML19209B180
| ML19209B180 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Trojan, Davis Besse File:Portland General Electric icon.png |
| Issue date: | 08/27/1979 |
| From: | Edwards E BECHTEL GROUP, INC. |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML19209B064 | List: |
| References | |
| TAC-07551, TAC-11299, TAC-7551, NUDOCS 7910090285 | |
| Download: ML19209B180 (11) | |
Text
ATTACHMENT 9-1 SYSTEMS BRANCH QUESTION 9 AUGUST 17, 1979 PAGE 1 of 23 UNITED STATES OF AMERICA NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION BEFORE THE ATOMIC SAFETY AND LICENSING BOARD In the Matter of
)
)
PCRTLAND GENERAL ELECTRIC COMPANY,)
Docket No. 50-344 et al.
)
(Control Building
)
Proceeding)
(Trojan Nuclear Plant)
)
)
AFFIDAVIT OF C. W.
EDWARDS CONSOLIDATED INTERVENORS' CONTENTIONS NOS. 2 A AND C.
1.
My name is E. W. Edwards.
I am employed by Bechtel Power Corporation (Bechtel) as Field Construction Manager in the San Francisco Power Division.
I have been employed in this position since 1977.
My professional qualifications are contained in an attachment to this affidavit.
This affidavit was prepared by me or under my supervision.
2.
I have been involved in the Trojan Plant modification work since May 1978.
My duties have included responsibility for construction planning, which has consisted of constructi-bility reviews of engineering design, conceptual development of construction methods, scheduling of work sequences and planning of construction activities with Portland General Electric Company (PGE) personnel.
3.
The purpose of this affidavit is to address Consolidated In te rv e no rs ' Contentions Nos. 2 a and c, which read :
Licensee has not shown that there will be adequate fire protection at the Trojan plant during modifica-tions in the following areas:
BO-1 90A 00 o
ATTACHMENT 9-1 SYSTEMS BRANCH QUESTION 9 AUGUST 17, 1979 PAGE 2 of 23 CI #2A & C Page 2 of 6 E.
W.
Edwa rds a) fire protection of cable penetrations c) with respect to welding, particularly in the Cable Spreading Room 4.
This affidavit will describe the fire protection mea-sures to be taken in the vicinity of cable penetrations and in the vicinity of all welding to be done during the modifica-tion program.
5.
The proposed modification work will require some welding and cutting in the vicinity of the cables that pass through the Control Building west (R line) wall between the Control Building and the Turbine Building.
Arc welding equipment will be used to join the steel plates to be bolted to this wall.
This welding will take place on the west side of the R line wall (in the Turbine Building) in the area bounded by el. 64' and el. 86' and column lines 41 and 47.
Use of this arc weld-ing equipment will produce welding " splatter", which consists of hot metal droplets.
In addition, prior to installation of the steel plates approximately two inches must be cut from a steel girder in the Turbine Building facing the R line wall.
The cutting will be done either by electric arc or oxyacetylene torch, and will take place at the beam supporting the floor at elevation 93 ft.
in the Turbine Building, between column lines 41 and 47.
Use of the cutting torch will produce " slag",
which is similar to welding splatter.
BO-1 1122 160
ATTACHMENT 9-1 SYSTEMS BRANCH QUESTION 9 AUGUST 17, 1979 PAGE 3 of 23 CI #2A & C Page 3 of 6 E.
W.
Edwa rds 6.
A " cable penetration" is an opening in a wall, or other s tructural forma tion, to allow a cable tray or conduit, both of which contain cables, to pass through.
Certain of the structural formations in the Trojan Control Building, Auxil-iary Building, and Fuel Building Complex (Complex) are fire barriers; that is, one of their purposes is to act as a fire protection barrier to stop fire propagation from one area to another.
A cable penetration through a fire wall requires some additional fire protection to maintain the integrity of the fire barrier.
At the Plant the existing fire protection barriers for the cable penetrations consist of silicone foam that seals the opening.
These fire protection seals meet the requirements of the NRC Operating License.
These seals will not be affected by welding splatter or cutting slag.
7.
Since the cables are covered with layers of self-extin-guishing insulation and jacket material, they will not ignite even if struck by welding splatter or cutting slag.
How./er, since such splatter or slag might melt into the insulation and damage the cables, the cable trays will be covered com-pletely by non-combustible fire protective blankets at all times when either welding or cutting is done in this area.
These blankets will be either Claremont Weld Shield style No.
800-24 or Fabri Cote 1584-white.
These blankets will completely protect the cables in the cable trays from any slag or splatter caused by cutting or welding.
Documentation of fire tests on such blanke ts, which has been previously provided to all parties on March 28, 1979 and August 13, 1979, establishes the acceptability of such blankets.
Such documentation is attached as Attachments 1 and 2 to this affidavit.
BO-1 1122 161
ATTACHMENT 9-1 SYSTEMS BRANCH QUESTION 9 AUGUST 17, 1979 PAGE 4 of 23 CI #2A & C Page 4 of 6 E.
W.
Edwards 8.
In addition to the non-combustible blankets, other fire protection measures will be taken during the cutting and welding in the vicinity or cable penetrations.
Standard Plant procedures require that, prior to any welding or cutting in the Plant, a " Welding and Cutting Pe rmit" must be requested by the craf tsman performing the work, processed through the appropriate plant procedures, and issued by the cognizant s upe rv i so r.
Such permit will require that before the welding or cutting is begun the welding or cutting equipment must be in good repair, any combustible materials in the area must either be moved or adequately protected, and a fire watch must be posted.
The fire watch will be provided with extinguishers or fire hoses, trained in fire fighting, and knowledgeable in Plant fire protection procedares.
The fire watch must remain on station for at least 30 minutes af ter completion of tha welding or cutting operation.
9.
Other tasks in the modification work will require lit-tie, if any, additional combustible material in the vicinity of cable penetrations.
Should such materials as rags, etc.
be brought into the Complex in the area of the cable penetra-tions, they will be kept in self-closing safety cans and re-moved from the Complex at the end of the day.
Building the new concrete walls on the Control Building east (N line) wall and on the west (R line) wall will require that some wood form material be used.
At any time that the form material is in the Complex, fire extinguishers will be available in its vic-inity.
The forms will be removed before any welding or cut-ting operations in the vicinity are begun.
BO-1 1122 162
ATTACHMENT 9-1 SYSTEMS BRANCH QUESTION 9 AUGUST 17, 1979 PAGE 5 of 23 CI #2A & C Page 5 of 6 E.
W.
Edwards 10.
The major part of the welding necessitated by the modification work will be to connect the steel plates described above.
All other welding, including Cadwelding, required by the modification program will also be done in strict accordance with the precautions discussed in paragraphs 7, 8 and 9 above.
11.
There is no welding planned in the Cable Spreading Room.
12.
Thus, as described above, adequa te fire protection measures will be taken in the vicinity of cable penetrations during the modification work.
In addition, adequate fire protection measures will be taken with respect to all welding during the modification work.
1122 163 BO-1
ATTACILVINT 9-1 SYSTEMS BRANCH QUESTION 9 AUGUST 17, 1979 PAGE 6 of 23 CI #2A & C Page 6 of 6 E.
W.
Edwards I,
E. W.
Edwards, of lawf ul age, be ing first duly sworn, state that I have reviewed the foregoing affidavit, and that the statements contained therein are true and correct to the best of my knowledge and belief.
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E.
W.
EDWAncs STATE OF CALIFORNIA
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County of $/IN FRA ucevo) g 71 SUBSCRIBED AND SWORIl TO before me this day of 8 V60 %I 1979 h
NOTARY PUBLIC FOR CA
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FRED BCRGM AN NOTARY PUSUC CAL!FCRNIA SAN FRANo5CO CCUNTY My comm. espires CCT 2.1979 1122 164 BO-1
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N ATTACHMENT 9-1 SYSTEMS BRANCH QUESTION 9 Weld Shield hb rics AUGUST 17, 1979 PAGE 7 of 23 Cla remone W eld Shield fab ~rics have been designed for difficut: and ecmsac n; service condi* ions. Under no rmal weiding and ace:viene cutting conditions Cla rement W:1d Shield fab rics will ;ive many times the use and wea r life eXpec*ed of COnVCntional Welding Cloth.
Con s tructien Weld snield fab rics are made of specisi ;1 ass fab rics designed for high strength anc flex r e<istanc e.
The incombustible cha racteristics of glas s are then enhanced with a specia!!y enmpounded Neoprene coating.
.ne resulting fab ric provides high ab rasion resistanc=. ::a and punc ure resistance. easy sewing and will shed molten metal splash in a ;eed many applications.
Advanta:e s Mes con re ntiuns! f ab ric s used fo r weiding e r ace:f ene cu::ing protection can i
becerne cui:e fismmable if con:2minated with oils or g ease. W eld Shield p rodue:s do net eadily ab so re.any !!cuid and surfaces can gena. rally be wiped clean increasin; me life and safe:r of :he fab ric.
.ne comoina:icn of glas s and Neopr ene in a fab rie r-ak.e it : lean ao use-nc lin: o r dus: to ::ntaminate immediate o r adjac ent a reas. Wnld shield fabrics a re ligh: weight and s ::ng pe r-nitting easy sewing of curtains, pads and c10 thing.
A =elic a tions P rotec: ion.f equipmen:, protec: ion of personnel, fIsmep roof cur:ains fo r eye p.-o cection (of chippe r s, sanders and welders). Weld Shield can be used t:
direc: ac etylene cutti: : drop to desired areas, all purpose protection during heav f :en st.netion whe re weldin g, cutting, ab ra sion and I'.ame a re p res en:.
W eld Shield fab rics ran b e us ed for Safety Clothing applica:icns such as ap.-:ns, etc. based on the hazard and condin:ns.
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ATTACHMENT 9-1 SYSTEMS BRANCH QUESTION 9 m2 AUGUST 17, 1979 AFFIDAVIT-OE_E. W.
S PAGE 12 of 23 C1 2A & C /
Pp-1 of 10 BURN TESTS ON SILASTICS RUBBER-COATED GLASS DROP CLOTHS by D. N. Ingebrigtson Analytical Services Department and D. R. Anderson Industrial Hygiene Department Dow Corning Corporation Midland, Michigan 48640 February 25, 1974 a
1122 170 Nuk$!bb w
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ATTACHMENT 9-1 SYSTEMS BRANCII QUESTION 9 AUGUST 17, 1979 0F E. WJ'd PAGE 13 of 23 CI 2A & C P
of 10 m.
1 Burn Tests on SILASTICS Rubber-Coated Glass Drop Cloths Abstract Two samples of silicone elastomer-coated glass cloth were burned under controlled conditions using an oxygen-acetylene cutting flame in a closed chamber 100 ft3 in volume.
Evolved gases and solid particles were collected and analyzed.
ATTACHMENT 9-1 SYSTEMS BRANCH QUESTION 9 AUGUST 17, 1979 T OF E.
aARDS PAGE 14 of 23 CI 2A &
PACE 3 of 10 2
Table of Contents Page I.
Introduction 3
II.
Experimental Equipment and Procedure 3
s III.
Results and Discussion 4
IV.
Degree of Hazard from Evolved Vapors and 5
Gases V.
Degree of Hazard from Evolved Dust 5
VI.
Documentation 5
Tables I through III Figs. 1 through 6
'2 172
ATTACHMENT 9-1 SYSTEMS BRANCH QUESTION 9 AFF OF E.
'ARDS AUGUST 17, 1979 CI 2A &
PAGE 15 of 23
- of 10
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3 I.
Introduction The objective of this investigation was to determine the degree of hazards which might exist when SILASTICe brand silicone elastomer-coated glass cloth is used as a drop cloth for welding operations in an enclosed area.
During welding operations, the oxygen-acetylene torch may be dropped, or the flame may be accidentally directed on the drop cloth.
Cutting operations with the oxygen-acetylene flame generates slag and hot droplets of molten metal which fall onto the drop cloths.
The situations described above can cause thermal decomposition of the Silastics
' rubber coating on glass fabric.
These situations were simulated in a 100 ft3 test chamber using an oxygen-acetylene welding torch.
Provisions were made to sample the volatile gases evolved as well as any dust particles generated.
II.
Experimental Apparatus and Procedure A test chamber approximately 6' x 3' x 5-1/2', with a volume of 100 ft3 was constructed of 18-gauge sheet metal (Fig. 1).
Sample ports were provided for collection of dust and gas samples.
The tip of the oxygen-acetylene torch was inserted into the chamber through an air-tight seal in such a way that the flame could be controlled from the outside.
A window in the chamber, located just above the torch, permitted observa-tion of the sample during burning tests.
A small fan inside the test chamber was used to ensure complete mixing of the gases.
The drop cloth, 18" x 18", was placed vertically in the test cabinet, perpendicular to the flame and 5-3/4" from a No. 2 tip on the oxygen-acetylene torch.
The sample was exposed to the cutting flame for 30 seconds.
The gases were then mixed for 5 minutes and samples were collected in evacuated 125-m1 glass sampling bulbs (seen at the top of the chamber in Fig. 1).
Approximately 10 liters of gac was drawn through the bulbs before samples were taken.
The sampling bulbs were removed and a gas cell of 20.25-meter path length was filled for infrared spectroscopic analysis.
Dust particles were collected using a 25-mm diameter Metracil membrane filter with 0.45-micron pore size, mounted near the center of the chamber on a suction line (see Fig. 2).
The drop cloths were also subjected to molten metal and welding sparks using the oxygen-acetylene torch to melt 3/16" drill rod suspended about 5-1/2" above the drop cloth (Fig. 2).
Each cloth was subjected to at least 2.5 gm of molten metal.
Samples of the ambient gases and dust particles were collected as previously described.
1I22 173
AIIACHMENT 9-1 SYSTEMS BRANCH QUESTION 9 NT 2 AUGUST 17, 1979 0FE.J'A d S PAGE 16 of 23 CI 2A & C.
P 10 4
The filters were weighed before and after exposure to determine the amount of particulate material in the air.
Microscopic examination of the collected material was made to determine type of material.
Analysis of gas samples was done using infrared spectroscopy and gas chromatography.
The drop cloths were also analyzed by emission and atomic absorption spectroscopy for heavy metals.
Total chloride was determined by sodium peroxide fusion of drop cloth followed by a potentiometric titration with silver nitrate as described in CTM 0186.
III.
Results and Discussion Results of the analyses of drop cloths for metals and chloride are listed in Table I.
Burn test results are given in Table II.
Gas samples were examined by both infrared spectroscopy and gas chromatography.
Infrared analyses were performed using Perkin Elmer Model 467 spectrometer with a 20.25-meter gas cell.
GLC analyses were performed using a combination of FID and TC detectors with Porapak R 6' x 1/8", Tenax 3' x 1/8",
and Porapak S 10' x 3/16" columns.
The later column was used with N2 carrier gas for the determination of hydrogen.
Mass spectrometry was used to identify trace materials observed by GC.
Results of the analysis of suspended particulate solids are summarized in Table III.
Some general observations may be of interest.
CF-2137 appeared to withstand the burning test better than 2351.
When the cutting flame was applied to glass cloth, the area exposed to the flame (about 2"-3" diameter) was at red heat within a few seconds.
The silicone rubber did appear to burn in this area; however, flaming ceased when torch was removed (Fig. 3).
The 2351-coated material burned more vigorously in the area exposed to the flame.
The flames and heat generated from the torch were sufficient to cause the area directly above the burn spot to ignite.
This area continued to burn for several seconds after the torch was removed.
Fig. 4 shows the larger burned area of the 2351.
Drop cloth CF-2137, when exposed to welding sparks, did develop one small hole where a piece of molten metal had fallen (Fig. 5).
The metal did not burn through but was fused to the glass cloth and left a small hole when the metal ball (1.2 gm) was removed.
The 2351 sample was scorched and burned where exposed to the molten metal but left no holes when metal was removed.
Fig. 6 shows the effect of welding sparks on the 2351-coated cloth.
\\\\22 iI4
ATTACHMENT 9-1 SYSTEMS BRANCH QUESTION 9 M CHMENT 2
/
AUGUST 17, 1979 AFFIDAVIT _OF E. W.~-EDWARDS PAGE 17 of 23 CI 2A & C EAe M f 10 s
IV.
Degree of Hazard from Evolved Vapors and Gases As shown in Table II, the concentration of H 0, CO2, H2, and 2
hydrocarbons given off during the tests was found to be approximately the same as the blank except for 2351 burn where the concentration of CO was found to be 50-100 ppm.
The OSHA limit is 50 ppm for CO, and it refers to the time-weighted average (TWA) concentration for an 8-hour work day and a 40-hour work week.
The concentration of 50-100 ppm for CO found during the 2351. burn should not represent a health hazard due to short exposure time that would be encountered for an accidental burn of the drop cloth.
Based on toxicology data and our experience, the exposure to concentrations of 3-5 ppm of (Me2Sio)x cyclics found for the burning tests should not present any health hazards.
The only other gas detected was a trace of 502 for 2351 exposed to welding sparks,and again it should not present a health hazard due to the short exposure time.
V.
Degree of Hazard from Evolved Dust
..ne major component (93%-99%) of the dust evolved when the drop cloths are burned is amorphous SiO2 The OSHA limit for amorphous SiO2 is given by:
80 mg/m3 80 mg/m3
= 0. 8 3 mg/m3
% S102 96 As shown in Table III, the CF 2137 burn produced an amorphous SiO2 concentration of 3 mg/mg in the test chamber and the 2351burngave173mg/m].
These high concentrations would preseat a health ha:ard if a worker were exposed for a long period of time but for an intermittent short term exposure, the health hazard should be minimal.
For example, a 10-minute exposure to 173'mg/m3 would give a 40-hour TWA exposure of 3
0.72 mg/m ; therefore, a worker exposed to 173 mg/m3 for 10 minutes during a 40-hour work week would not exceed the OSHA limit.
As shown in Table III, the concentration of amorphous SiO2 generated from the welding sparks is low and should not present any health hazards.
VI.
Documentation The original experimental work described in this report can be found in Dow Corning workbook A 1934, pp. 7-13.
1I22 I/5
ATTACHMENT 9-1 SYSTEMS BRANCH QUESTION 9 ACHMENT 2 AUGUST 17, 1979 AFFI a
- OF E. W.
FAGE 18 of 23 CI 2A & C
.e of 10 TABLE I Analysis of Drop Cloths CF-2137 (Red Stock)
M,etals Mg 0.003%
N.D.
<0.003%
Ti,Al,Fe
>0.06%
- ,Sn,V,Co,Ni N.D.
<0.001%
Ca 0.007%
Ge,Mo,3i,Be N.D.
<0.0005%
Zr 0.017%
Cu, Ag, Mn N.D.
<0.0005%
Cr Tr <0.001%
Hg N.D.
40.0002%
P N.D.
<0.05%
Ba,As,Na,Zn N.D.
<0.01%
Chloride, Total:
104 + 10 ppm.
2351 (White)
Metals Ba 0.07%
Zr 0.007%
Mg 0.2%
Al,Ca
>>2%
Pb 0.0025%
Mn,Cu Tr <0.001%
Cr 0.003%
P N.D.
<0.1%
Fe 0.15%
As,Zn N.D.
<0.025%
Ti 0.06%
Sb N.D.
<0.005%
V 0.005%
Sn,Co,Ni N.D.
<0.0025%
Na 0.04%
Ge,Mo,Bi,Be,Ag N.D.
<0.001%
Hg N.D.
<0.0002%
Chloride, Total:
230 + 15 ppm Tr = Trace N.D.
= Not detected 1122 i76
TABLE II Gas Analysis from Burn Tests on SILASTICm Brand Silicone Rubber-Coated Drop Cloths flyd ro-(Me2Sio)
II 0 CO II2 carbons x = 3,4,N 2
Sample CO2 ppm ppm ppm ppm Other Remarks CF-2137
- Trace,
- Unidenti{ied Burn Major
<501
<l502
<20
<31 material 2
2351 Trace 2,3
- Unidentifled ggyg Burn Major 50 to 1001
<l502
<25 51 l
material Qo$>
Blank Major 501
<1502
<202
<3
- Unidentified material ept no sample.
0" d
CF-2137 U$g[
Welding
- Unidentified 2.5 gm metal 1
1 o
Sparks Major
<50
<l502
<202 3
materiall drop cloth 2351 Trace SO2 3.9 gm metal 5
Welding by mass spec.
on drop cloth Z
Sparks Major
<501 2
1
<l50
<202 3
- Unident. mtr1.1 og N
"m N
1.
By infrared analysis 2
2.
By GLC analysis
]n g
y sa On o;
3.
Not enough to ide ify, but may be propane from retention time.
m
- This material was sf
- .in to be a product of the oxygen-acetylene flame itself and is not due to the drop cloth, g
/
iC
/
h
e TABLE III Particulate Matter Analysis from Burn Tests on SIIASTICe Brand Silicone Rubber Drop Cloths Volume Sampling of Air Particulate I
- Time, Flow Sampled Weight Conc Sample Minutes 1/ min (1)
(gm)
Mg/M3 Remarks CF-2137 Cutting flame.
Sample 2
Burn 15 7.4 111
.00458 33 perpendicular to oxy-acetylene m2-vi>
flame, #2 Tip, 30 see burn.
gy(}
3 0hh 2351 3
O Burn 15 3.7 55.5
.01006 173 Same conditions o.C m si m
Blank 30 7.4 222
.00183 8 4 All conditions the same jgey t
except no sample.
9r 3
CP 2137 Regular welding flame.
j Welding 2.54 gm of molten metal 4
q Sparks 15 6.6 99.5
.0068 Nil on cloth.
s O
~
2351 Regular welding flame.
e
~
Welding 3.9 gm of molten metal 4
Sparks 15 8.1 122.1
.00118 1.5 on cloth.
Oh
@E e, g.
I 3
]
A blank of 8 mg/M subtracted from sample burns.
E c1-Microscopical examination shows the dust to be an amorphous powder.
There is no evidence of appreciable amounts of crystr.llinity.
IIP ashing gave about a 91% loss which would indicat amorphous silica.
The residue has a brown to red color indicating iron oxide pigment.
C 3The dust collected from this burn is again primarily amorphous powder by microscopic examination.
There are only occasional particles present which show cryctallinity.
IIF ashing vo.atilized approximately 99% of the dust.
The dark color in the sample y,
appears to be due to a trace of residual carbon.
4Particulate material is amorphous carbon.
.~
S tV2'9~1 """nu,
2 P4 >a e.
4t
glP9
% ; 2 D ~
h Qg) 4 3yn.6s.~.mgyUd>w.,;.J
[.
A.
e
- .'s f'..
.d.,%.;:. gw *. 5 :: _..,
'2.,.
. U,
'%g 4,'
7 r
g[f.s
~ s.y 4,%w;g
- y
- -L. ;.;' Yk.
,~t
- -..ay
['
s t
/
s
&d '
- p'.,. :t ' s
~
Th.
s t
~
.~
m
,,f M
N N(
'~
'A
.s
~r
- + g N
.aW %".,=-
N
% %',g' j A
4%4 h;
7
/g
(
- Q
'~@ f s,
'3
~ %
N r
4 g
i'
/
'6"'"Q*+.~P.
.g*4 i
yy +:., -
--x.,&4v..,
s' -
T,
~
"..., ' t ~
4-j ll' %;q,:'
4/
v Q,%,,
ngy.., ~ ~
Q
,e "
c
~%>
- n.,
.i.[*.A.fj$ ';
n,s._ %
~
/.
~ 8'.;
- w.,c : g h.
% s.,.
,.4
.. %. n.3. ;
,5 s
6 g
2 a,
i
_7 ep
('
2
- -d*/.,;.
4 g.
i i
fic e
w.. #
g,
a
.8
-f.;.;
f i
[
m.&
Y p
i E%1g, l122 77,
ATTACHMENT 9-1 SYSTEMS BRANCH QUESTION 9 AUGUST 17, 1979 PAGE 22 of 23 PROFESSIONAL QUALIFICATIONS OF EDWIN W.
EDWARDS PRESENT Field Construction Manager, Bechtel Power Corporation EDUCATION B.S.,
Electrical Engineering, University of Oklahoma, No rman M.B.A. General Management - Golden Gate University of San Francisco PROFESSIONAL Registered Professional Electrical Engineer, DATA California, Florida, New York
SUMMARY
2 years:
Field Construction Manager 1 year:
Cost / Schedule Supervisor 2 years:
Assistant Field Construction Manager 3 years:
Project Superintendent 2 years:
Field Superintendent 2 years:
Project Superintendent 1 year:
Senior Field Engineer 6 years:
Field Engineer, Electrical EXPE RIENC E Mr. Edwa rds is a Field Construction Manager assigned to the Trojan and Skagit projects.
Before being assigned to his present position, Mr. Edwards was Cost / Schedule Supervisor for the Pebble Springs Nuclear Plant.
Pr ev i ou sl y,
he was Assistant Field Construction Manager at the Trojan Nuclear Power Plant.
This assignment was during preparation for initial operation of the plant.
As Project Superintendent he was fully in charge of the construction effort at the Gerald Andrus Steam Electric Station in Greenville, Miss.
Prior to this assignment Mr. Edwards was Field Superintendent at Unit 2 of the Baxter Wilson Steam Electric Station, Vicksburg, Miss. and Montville Unit 6, Montville, Conn.
1122 i80 S"-2
ATTACHMENT 9-1 SYSTEMS BRANCH QUESTION 9 AUGUST 17, 1979 PAGE 23 of 23 Edwin W.
Edwards EXPERIENCE (Concluded)
Mr. Edwards was Project Superintendent managing various contractors in construction of gas tur-bine facilities at the Missouri Avenue Station, Atlantic City, N.J.
As field engineer, electrical and senior field e ng ineer, Mr. Edwards worked on Cocoa Unit 1 and Turkey Point Units 1 and 2 at Cocoa and Florida City, Florida respectively.
With a previous employer, Reynolds Electric and Engineering,
Mr. Edwards worked-as a Field Engineer, electrical on the Titan I Missile bases, Rapid City, S.D.
and at the Nevada Test Site, Mercury, Nevada.
'2 181 BN-20
Page 2 of 5 Question 10, Systems Branch Answer:
There are three safety-related cable trays, ABA401, ABA010, and ABA380, which leave a stack of cable trays to penetrate the R line wall such that they may be exposed to a drop of a plate washer in excess of 3 ft.,
depending on final location of the bolts.
If the final bolt location is such that these trays may be subjected to a drop of a plate washer in excess of three feet, suitable guides or equivalent alternate protection will be provided to prevent the washer from damaging the cables.
d)
What types and weight of tools will be utilized in the Cable Spreading Room (i.e. does the analysis of the plate washers provide the upper bound of potential impact on cable tray covers)?
Answer:
The only tools scheduled for use in the cable spreading room are snall hand tools, a bolt tensioner device and the lifting polc depicted on drawing RSK-1, each of which will be consi-darably lighter than the plate washer.
In any event the y.cantial impact energy of tools or parts of the lifting pole will not exceed that analyzed for drop of a plate washer.
Therefore a drop of a plate washer is the worst case.
1122 182
Page 3 of 5 Question 10, Systems Branch e)
Regarding the fire protective blankets discussed in your response to question 11 of 7/20/79, uhat blanket material will be used, and is it the same material which was in use at the site during our site visit?
Answer:
As described in the Affidavit of E.
W.
Edwards attached to Question 9 above, the blanket material to be used will be Claremont Weld Shield No. 800-24 or Fabri-Cote 1584-white.
These protective blankets are similar to the 3M blanket mate-rial seen at the jobsite.
All three manufacturers have de-monstrated the fire resistant qualities of their product by test.
We know of no FM or UL listing for these products.
f)
Identify what material and additional measures will be utilized to restore or compensate for the fire walls to be drilled.
Answer:
Following drilling of each hole penetrating a fire wall, the hole will be temporarily sealed in conformance with Appendix A of the Trojan Technical Specifications, which requires that fire and control room differential pressure requirements be maintained.
This will be accomplished by plugging any hole in fire walls with a fireproof material, and providing a positive seal to comply with the differential pressure requirement.
I122 183
Page 4 of 5 Question 10, Systems Branch Plant approved methods include use of Fiberfa): or silicon foam and gasketed plate seals separately or in combination with fire watch personnel as appropriate to the location and rating of the material and the particular wall being penetrated.
g)
In your response to question 6 of 7/20/79 you identified the battery exhaust as the only safety-related equipment that may be disabled.
Describe what measures will be provided to replace that system.
Answer:
The battery room exhaust duct will not be disable during in-stallation of the concrete on the N line wall.
The duct will be extended through the concrete form in a manner that will maintain its function during tha entire construction sequence, h)
On page 2 of Table 7-1 in your reponse dated August 13, 1979 to question 7, the power cable for the B Emergency Diesel exhaust fans is listed under " Train A".
Is there a train B cable in a train A conduit?
Answer:
The train B cable was listed under Train A as a result of a typographical error.
Instead of being the last cable listed 1'22 184
Page 5 of 5 Question 10, Systems Branch under " Train A" it should be the first cable listed under
" Train B."
A corrected page 2 of Table 7-1 is attached.
i)
What additional fire protection, if any, will be provided in the areas where nontreated wood will be used for concrete forms.
Answer:
Nontreated wood will be used for all forms external to areas cc: staining Category I equipment.
Additional protection will be provided by use of a fire watch patrol inspecting the area at least once per hour as described in Section 3.7.9 of the Trojan Technical Specifications.
-C
.r c.
bl
Page 2 of 25 pages Mechanical Equipment:
None close to the area of modification Electrical Conduits:
(underground or embedded)
Sketch No. 7-2 Cable fenction of Cables in Conduits Equipment No.
Train A Power for Service Water Pump P108C Power for Service Water Pump P108A Power for Centrifugal Charging Pump P205A Power for CCW pump P210C Powcr for CCW pump P210A Power for RHR pump P202A Power for Containment Spray Pumn P204A Power for Safety Injection Pump P203A Train B Power for East DG Roor Fans VCl32 Power for DG Air Compressor C103B Control for DG Fuel Oil Valve MO4903B Control for Diesel Generator B G201 Metering for Diesel Generator B G201 Power for DG Fuel Oil Valve M04903B Control for DG Fuel Oil Valve M04903B Control for East DG Room Fan VC162 Control for DG oil Transfer Pump P144B Control for Diesel Generator B G201 Control for ESF Initiation Control for CCW & Service Water Valves SV3304, SV3288, SV3714, SV3712B, SV3720B, SV3803 Diesel Generator B to the 4KV BUS A2 G201 1122 186 CORRECTED COPY
1 Page 1 of 2 Questio_n 11, Systems Branch Demonstrate that the cteel solid cable tray covers shown in Attachment 9-1 to response to question 9 of 6/20/79 can withstand the force of a plate washer dropping on its rounded corner from a height of 6 ft. without penetration.
Answer:
The following ballistic Research Laboratory formula was used to calculate the steel plate thickness, T, which will just be perforated by a missile:
T = (1/2 Mv )2/3 (Ref. Formul a 2-7, Bechte.". Topical 2
672D Report BC-TOP-9A, Rev. 2)
- where, T = FLeel plate thickness to just perforate (inches).
2 M = Mass of the Missile (Ib soc /ft)
Vs = Striking Velocity of the Missile Normal to Target Surface ('ft/sec)
D = Diameter of the Missile (in.)
The following values were used in the above equation:
i Weight of washer = 224 pounds Mass of washer = 7 lb cec 2 ft
\\\\22
\\87
Page 2 of 2 Drop height = 6ft Striking velocity = (2 gh) 1/2 = 20 ft/sec.
Diameter of missile ~= 2.67 in., based on rounded corners with 1-1/2 in, radius.
The thickness, T, which would Just be perforated is 0.071 in.
In order to prevent perforation, the thickness was conserva-tively increased by 25 percent, resulting in 1.25 x 0.071 =
0.0875 in.
Since the cable tray covers are 0.1046 in. thick, the plate washer will not perforate them.
!l22 i88 5
4 I